Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».
L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.
Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?
Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.
Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as “constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)
Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”
Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…
Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets. The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”…
Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”
Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en juillet 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.
On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur les principaux sujets d’actualité suivants : la recherche de mandats au sein des conseils, la gestion de crises, les responsabilités des membres du conseil, la gouvernance des OBNL, les fondements de la gouvernance, les dysfonctions d’un C.A., la formation des administrateurs et la succession du PCD.
Séance inaugurale – Colloque Gouvernance mondiale (Photo credit: Collège des Bernardins)
En terme géographique, près du tiers des visiteurs sont de France, ou de dizaines de pays francophones, et 63 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (47 %) ou via les engins de recherche (40 %).
Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !
Vous serez sûrement intéressés par les résultats de cette recherche publié par R. Christopher Small et paru dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Les résultats montrent que les PCD qui se retirent ont tendance à divulguer des prévisions de profits futurs plus positives et plus optimistes que lors des divulgations des années antérieures, surtout si leur rémunération incitative est élevée et si les mécanismes de suivis par le C.A. sont faibles.
C’est un article qui montre clairement la nécessité d’avoir un conseil d’administration vigilant à l’occasion du départ d’un PCD. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Theory suggests that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with short horizons with their firm have weaker incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders (Smith and Watts 1982). To date, research examining the “horizon problem” focuses on whether CEOs adopt myopic investment and accounting policies in their final years in office (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Davidson et al. 2007; Kalyta 2009; Antia et al. 2010). In our paper, Forecasting Without Consequence? Evidence on the Properties of Retiring CEOs’ Forecasts of Future Earnings, forthcoming in The Accounting Review, we extend this line of research by investigating whether retiring CEOs are more likely to engage in opportunistic forecasting behavior in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Specifically, we contrast the properties (issuance, frequency, news, and bias) of earnings forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during pre-terminal years (where the CEO will be in office when the associated earnings are realized) with forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during their terminal year (where the CEO will no longer be in office when the associated earnings are realized). We also examine circumstances in which opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is likely to be more or less pronounced.
retirement (Photo credit: 401(K) 2013)
Our predictions are based on several incentives that arise (or increase) during retiring CEOs’ terminal year with their firm. Specifically, relative to CEOs who will continue with their firm, retiring CEOs face strong incentives to engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior in an attempt to inflate stock prices during the period leading up to their retirement. Deliberately misleading forecasts can be used to influence stock prices. Consistent with this argument, prior work shows that managers use voluntary disclosures opportunistically to influence stock prices (Noe 1999; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) and that managers use opportunistic earnings forecasts to manipulate analysts’ (Cotter et al. 2006) and investors’ perceptions (Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) in an effort to maximize the value of their stock-based compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Moreover, because SEC trading rules related to CEOs’ post-retirement security transactions are less stringent than those in effect during their tenure with the firm, post-retirement transactions can be made before the earnings associated with the opportunistic forecast are realized and with reduced regulatory scrutiny.
To test our predictions, we first identify all CEO turnover events in Execucomp from 1997 through 2009 (a total of 3,548 events). For each CEO turnover event identified, we perform detailed searches of SEC filings, executive biographies (appearing on various social media outlets such as LinkedIn, Forbes People Finder, etc.), press releases, and related disclosures to determine whether the CEO turnover was due to retirement. Our results indicate that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts of future earnings and that they issue such forecasts more frequently in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Moreover, we find that retiring CEOs’ terminal-year forecasts of future earnings are more likely to convey good news and are more optimistically biased relative to pre-terminal years. Our findings, that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior, represent a previously undocumented implication of the “horizon problem.” Furthermore, we find that opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is more pronounced in the presence of higher CEO equity incentives and discretionary expenditure cuts in the terminal year, and less pronounced in the presence of stronger monitoring mechanisms (e.g., higher institutional ownership).
Our results should be of interest to market participants (e.g., investors, analysts, etc.) who use information from management earnings forecasts. However, market participants’ ability to use our evidence is contingent on their knowledge of (or ability to anticipate) a given CEO’s impending retirement. Our study should also be of interest to stakeholders (e.g., boards of directors, regulators, etc.) who seek to implement incentive mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts. Interestingly, our results suggest that equity incentives (a tool commonly used to align incentives and minimize agency costs) can have the unintended consequence of creating or exacerbating opportunistic forecasting. Thus, CEO and firm characteristics (such as equity incentives) may have competing effects on various horizon-problem induced behaviors.
Richard Leblanc, professeur associé de Law, Governance & Ethics à l’Université York de Toronto nous propose une liste impressionnante (quasi exhaustive) de lectures susceptibles d’intéresser les membres de conseils qui se posent des questions sur les TI et sur le rôle des médias sociaux.
English: Logo for the Addicted to Social Media Blog (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Cette liste a été préparée en vue de sa participation à la conférence annuelle de National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) du 11 au 13 octobre 2013 qui portera sur le leadership du « Board », notamment lorsqu’il s’agit de mieux appréhender les nouvelles technologies de l’information.
Bien sûr, la liste est longue mais en la parcourant rapidement vous trouverez certainement un lien vers un document qui vous intéressera. Bonne lecture.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un article de Ken Tysiac paru dans le Journal of accountancy qui résume les résultats du sondage mondial 2013 d’Ernst & Young portant sur l’audit interne.
Cet article identifie les attentes principales des participants au sondage, chefs de l’audit interne et membres de comités d’audit, quant à l’évolution que devrait prendre les responsabilités de l’audit interne.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Voici un article de Richard Leblanc paru dans BoardExpert.com que vous apprécierez sûrement. Comme à son habitude, Richard utilise un style direct et simple pour aborder l’une des facettes les plus complexes de la gouvernance des organisations : la rémunération incitative reliée à la performance à long terme.
L’auteur discute plus particulièrement d’un objet novateur : la rémunération des administrateurs alignée sur les intérêts des actionnaires.
Voici un extrait de l’article ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’approche qu’il suggère. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« Most independent directors on public company boards are compensated in a blend of cash and company shares. The equity component is typically restricted or deferred until the director retires from the board, thus postponing taxes and enabling the director to amass a portion of equity in the company to align his or her interests with shareholders (it is believed). The equity can be a predetermined number of restricted shares, or a set monetary amount in the form of share “units.”
The problem with paying independent directors this way is that there is little incentive for personal performance or company performance. Directors get paid the cash and equity regardless. There is little if any downside, especially when directors can ride a stock market or Fed driven increase in overall share prices. Not surprisingly, the activists noted this lack of incentive pay.
Sometimes money is a powerful incentive. (Photo credit: wayneandwax)
It is hardly surprising that boards do not focus on value creation, strategic planning, or maximizing company performance, survey after survey, as much as they do on compliance. Their compensation structure does not incent them to. Compensation incentives drive behavior, both for management and for directors ».
Here is what is needed to align director pay with shareholder interests:
Directors should be required to issue cheques from their personal savings accounts to purchase shares in the company. Bill Ackman of Pershing Square stated that if Canadian Pacific directors were required to cut cheques for $100,000 each, the CEO would have been fired prior to Pershing Square being involved. Mr. Ackman is right. “Skin in the game” for a director does not mean shares are given to a director in lieu of service. The motivational factor to be attuned to shareholders is greater if directors are actual investors in the company. In private equity companies, non-management directors are encouraged to “buy into” the company and invest on the same terms as other investors.
For Directors’ equity to vest (the portion they did not purchase), hurdles would need to be achieved that reflect personal performance and long-term value creation of the company. Assuming you have the right directors, this sets up a situation in which Directors are forced to engage in value creation and be rewarded for doing so, similar to private equity directors. The hurdle rate provides the incentive. The vesting hurdle should be based on the underlying performance of the company, commensurate with its risk and product cycle, possibly peer based, and not simply on riding a bull market.
The long-term performance metrics for value creation should also apply to senior management, and the board should lead by example. The vast majority of performance incentives are short-term, financial and quantitative. We know that the majority of company value however is now based on intangibles. Long-term leading indicators such as innovation, reputation, talent, resilience and sustainability are being completely overlooked in compensation design. You get what you pay for.
Management has proposed “passive” pay for directors and short-term pay for themselves. Boards have acquiesced.
Voici un article de Peter Whitehead paru dans le Financial Times du 5 juin 2013. L’auteur présente une synthèse des principales sources de risques confrontant chaque conseil d’administration. En bref, l’étude montre que les conseils d’administration sont responsables de la plupart des échecs des entreprises, notamment de ceux qui résultent en désastres majeurs.
Le rapport de la firme Reputability conclue que l’un des principaux problèmes est le manque d’information des membres des C.A. Les autres facteurs identifiés sont reliés :
– au manque de qualification (et de caractère) des membres pour comprendre les grands enjeux et les principaux risques de l’entreprise;
– au manque de sensibilité aux aspects des relations humaines, et
– à la priorité accordée aux jugements de nature quantitative.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article en vous inscrivant gratuitement au contenu du F.T. Que pensez-vous de ces résultats ?
The root causes of most company failures lie in the boardroom, with a serious skills gap and risk blindness being the most common factors. A study of 41 corporate crises highlights repeated patterns of failure that are little understood by boards and that are rarely spotted using standard risk management techniques.
English: Enron Complex in Houston Texas (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Executive Appointments, which is running a series of features on the topic of “Better Boards” during 2013, was given an advance briefing on the analysis by Reputability, a firm specialising in organisational and behavioural risk. Its study found a lack of skills on the board and its inability to influence executives were root causes in 88 per cent of company failures. A board’s blindness to risk was a root cause in 85 per cent of the crises. Defective information flows to and from the board, and inadequate leadership on company ethos and culture, were each root causes in 59 per cent of cases.
The Reputability research builds on a 2011 “Roads to Ruin” report by Cass Business School that carried out a detailed examination of 18 corporate crises, including the collapses of Enron and Northern Rock, and events such as the BP Texas City oil refinery explosion in 2005, and the Hatfield rail crash in 2000. It looked at the underlying causes that led to disaster and the resilience of the organisation in handling the aftermath….
… Anthony Fitzsimmons, chairman of Reputability, says: “A fundamental manifestation of the problem with boards is information. A board has information, but doesn’t know if it’s accurate or has important gaps. If you don’t have the right information how can you be in control ?
Articles d’intérêt dans le domaine de l’impact des Boards :
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, en primeur, un rapport exceptionnel rédigé par Julia Casson pour le compte de IBE (Institute of Business Ethics) et de EcoDa (European Confederation of Director’s Associations) qui porte sur l’éthique et la gouvernance européenne et qui sera présenté à Londres le 2 juillet. À cette occasion l’auteure présentera les grandes lignes du rapport ci-joint et discutera des questions suivantes :
Why ethics has been left out of the debate around CG in the last ten years ?
Is Corporate Governance guidance working/adequate ?
What should be done about it ?
What are boards doing in practice ?
What is the role of Directors in promoting an ethical dynamics in the companies ?
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document afin de mieux appréhender les préoccupations des conseils d’administration en matière de gouvernance.
Un document vraiment précieux pour étudier toutes les facettes de l’éthique !
IBE is holding a launch of it’s latest publication A Review of the Ethical Aspects of Corporate Governance Regulation and Guidance in the EU by Julia Casson, Director of Board Insight Limited. This IBE Occasional Paper is published in association with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa).
Institute of Business Ethics (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The purpose of governance includes encouraging robust decision making and proper risk management, and to account to those that provide capital as well as other stakeholders. To support business sustainability, explicit attention to the ethical dimensions of these goals might be considered as requisite in any corporate governance guidance and regulation.
This new report suggests, however, a general lack of ethical language in corporate governance provisions at the pan-EU level in spite of an approach which is soft law and principles based and the fact that boards are expected (though not required) to set the values which will guide their company’s operations.
The event will begin with the author reflecting on the report’s findings. This will be followed by a panel discussion around:
Would it be correct to say that ethical drivers have been largely missing from the debate around corporate governance in the last ten years? • Is corporate governance guidance working? • What are boards doing in practice to promote an ethical dynamic in companies?
Panel members include: Julia Casson; Pedro Montoya, Group Chief Compliance Officer, EADS, sponsors of the report; and Paul Moxey, Head of Corporate Governance, ACCA.
Voici un suivià notre billet du 25 mars qui annonçait quel’Autorité des marchés financiers du Québec (AMF) avait publié un document de consultation proposant des modifications significatives au régime des OPA présentement en vigueur. En guise de rappel, vous trouverez, plus bas, un extrait du projet de consultation décrivant (1) les raisons qui motivent l’AMF à intervenir, (2) les deux changements proposés et (3) les résultats anticipés.
Aujourd’hui, nous présentons la prise de position publique du Cercle des ASC eu égard à ce projet de consultation. Le texte qui suit a été transmis à l’AMF et à la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario par Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés. Bonne lecture.
Au cours des derniers mois, l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) a entrepris une consultation publique pour déterminer l’approche adéquate à adopter en matière de réglementation des mesures de défense en matière d’offre publique d’achat (« OPA ») non sollicitée. Selon elle, l’approche actuelle ne cadre plus avec le contexte juridique et économique ni avec les pratiques du marché entourant les OPA non sollicitées. Notamment, les indications contenues dans la réglementation actuelle limitent, à son avis, la capacité du conseil d’administration et de la direction des sociétés visées par une OPA non sollicitée d’envisager d’autres mesures que la vente de la société, même si ces mesures pourraient maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs de titres à long terme.
Le Cercle des ASC prend position pour appuyer l’orientation suggérée par l’AMF dans son document de consultation intitulé pour « Un regard différent sur l’intervention des autorités en valeurs mobilières dans les mesures de défense » visant à renforcer la capacité des sociétés à se défendre des offres publiques d’achat non sollicitées. L’AMF propose « de remplacer l’Avis 62-202 par une nouvelle instruction générale sur les mesures de défense qui reconnaîtrait explicitement l’obligation fiduciaire dont les administrateurs doivent s’acquitter envers leur société lorsqu’ils réagissent à une OPA non sollicitée et redéfinirait l’intervention des autorités au motif de l’intérêt public. Nous estimons qu’il faut manifester envers les administrateurs des sociétés visées la déférence appropriée dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire. Nous partons du principe que les risques éventuels de conflits d’intérêts et d’enracinement des administrateurs sont circonscrits et gérés de façon adéquate, et que ces derniers font preuve de la compétence et des aptitudes nécessaires lorsqu’ils s’acquittent de leur obligation de diligence, notamment en tenant des délibérations rigoureuses et informées« . (Pour en savoir +)
Le Cercle des ASC appuie cette position et est d’avis que les conseils d’administration ont toutes les qualités requises pour apprécier une offre publique d’achat et leur permettre de « simplement dire non ». La proposition de l’AMF accorde aux conseils d’administration une plus grande capacité d’exercer leur jugement en fonction des meilleurs intérêts de la société et de l’ensemble de ses parties prenantes, y compris ses actionnaires. C’est également la position de l’IAS-Québec avec qui nous avons récemment conclu une alliance stratégique. (Pour en savoir +).
Pour compléter, mentionnons que l’AMF préconise une approche différente des Autorités canadiennes de valeurs mobilières canadiennes (ACVM) qui favorisent plutôt un nouveau cadre de réglementation qui remettrait entre les mains des actionnaires la responsabilité de prendre les décisions concernant les régimes de droit, responsabilité qui incombait auparavant aux autorités en valeurs mobilières. À l’instar de l’AMF, nous sommes d’avis « les porteurs élisent les administrateurs avec la conviction que ceux-ci s’acquitteront de leur obligation avec diligence et loyauté. Pour s’acquitter de leur obligation de diligence, les administrateurs doivent posséder le niveau de compétence et d’aptitude nécessaire à l’exercice de leurs fonctions. Pour s’acquitter de leur obligation de loyauté, ils doivent agir avec intégrité, de bonne foi et au mieux des intérêts de la société. Que la décision à prendre concerne les affaires quotidiennes de la société, une modification fondamentale dans ses activités, un projet de fusion ou d’acquisition ou une OPA amicale ou non sollicitée, l’obligation des administrateurs demeure la même. »
Je vous invite à lire le document de consultation si vous souhaitez avoir plus d’informations; on y traite plus en détail des points suivants : Le régime canadien des OPA, l’Avis 62-202 et son interprétation, les détails de l’affaire Fibrek, le rôle des administrateurs, la déférence à l’égard des décisions du conseil d’administration des sociétés visées, les normes de gouvernance et intervention des porteurs de titres, l’évolution de la gouvernance et des recours, l’activisme actionnarial, le pouvoir d’influence notable des fonds spéculatifs et des autres arbitragistes sur la vente des sociétés visées.
« La proposition de l’Autorité vise principalement à rétablir l’équilibre réglementaire entre les initiateurs d’offres publiques d’achat (OPA) et le conseil d’administration des sociétés visées et à actualiser l’encadrement réglementaire des OPA pour tenir compte du contexte juridique et économique ainsi que des pratiques du marché qui les entourent actuellement. Nous proposons donc de réexaminer l’approche actuellement adoptée à l’égard des mesures de défense dans l’Avis 62-202 et d’apporter deux changements importants à notre régime des OPA.
Le présent document de consultation vise à permettre un échange de points de vue sur la problématique soulevée par la réglementation des mesures de défense au Canada, y compris le rôle des conseils d’administration réagissant aux OPA non sollicitées, et à recueillir des commentaires sur la proposition de l’Autorité.
Nous proposons de remplacer l’Avis 62-202 par une nouvelle instruction générale sur les mesures de défense qui reconnaîtrait explicitement l’obligation fiduciaire dont les administrateurs doivent s’acquitter envers leur société lorsqu’ils réagissent à une OPA non sollicitée et redéfinirait l’intervention des autorités au motif de l’intérêt public.
Nous estimons qu’il faut manifester envers les administrateurs des sociétés visées la déférence appropriée dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire. Nous partons du principe que les risques éventuels de conflits d’intérêts et d’enracinement des administrateurs sont circonscrits et gérés de façon adéquate, et que ces derniers font preuve de la compétence et des aptitudes nécessaires lorsqu’ils s’acquittent de leur obligation de diligence, notamment en tenant des délibérations rigoureuses et informées.
Nous proposons également de modifier notre régime des OPA pour exiger, comme condition irrévocable de toute offre visant l’ensemble des titres d’une catégorie et de toute offre partielle, que plus de 50 % des titres en circulation de la catégorie visée détenus par d’autres personnes que l’initiateur et ses alliés soient déposés et que le dépôt de ces titres ne soit pas révoqué à la date d’expiration de l’offre. Nous proposons aussi d’exiger que l’offre soit prolongée de 10 jours à la suite de l’annonce du dépôt de ce pourcentage de titres.
Selon nous, la mise en oeuvre de la proposition de l’Autorité aurait les effets suivants :
– elle permettrait aux administrateurs de disposer d’une plus grande latitude dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire et examiner toutes les options en vue de maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs sans que les autorités interviennent;
– elle créerait un cadre révisé de réglementation de l’ensemble des mesures de défense, et non seulement les régimes de droits;
– elle atténuerait l’effet coercitif de notre régime des OPA pour toutes les offres et non seulement pour celles qui sont visées par des régimes de droits;
– elle apporterait une solution réglementaire directe à certaines des lacunes de notre régime des OPA;
– elle pourrait limiter le pouvoir d’influence des arbitragistes sur la vente des sociétés visées;
– elle pourrait encourager les initiateurs à négocier avec les conseils d’administration, ce qui pourrait maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs ».
Vous trouverez, ci-joint, une publication de la NACD qui présente les grands défis qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années. Ce document est un recueil de lectures publié par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !
Voici comment les auteurs se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance.
English: 1166 Avenue of the Americas (Marsh & McLennan Headquarters) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle
KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute
Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies
Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX
Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners
What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP
Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.
Êtes-vous intéressés à comprendre les comportements à court terme adoptés par les organisations en réponse aux nombreuses occasions qu’ont les gens de profiter de situations non-éthiques, à l’encontre de la création de valeur à long terme ?
Si vous vous demandez quels sont les facteurs-clés qui conduisent aux abus reliés à des comportements de court terme et, surtout, si vous voulez connaître les moyens susceptibles d’améliorer la situation, l’article de Malcolm Salter, professeur à la Harvard Business School, vous fascinera.
Vous pouvez lire le résumé qui suit. Si votre curiosité l’emporte, vous pouvez télécharger le document au complet.
Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies—along with fund managers and other investors—on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term investments, threatening the performance of both individual firms and the U.S. economy.
English: Detail from Corrupt Legislation. Mural by Elihu Vedder. Lobby to Main Reading Room, Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C. Main figure is seated atop a pedestal saying « CORRUPT LEGISLATION ». Artist’s signature is dated 1896. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In the paper, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption…and What To Do About It, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that short-termism also invites institutional corruption—that is, institutionally supported behavior that, while not necessarily unlawful, erodes public trust and undermines a company’s legitimate processes, core values, and capacity to achieve espoused goals. Institutional corruption in business typically entails gaming society’s laws and regulations, tolerating conflicts of interest, and persistently violating accepted norms of fairness, among other things.
My argument starts by describing the twin problems of short-termism and institutional corruption and showing how the latter has led to a diminution of public trust in many of our leading firms and industries. Focusing most specifically on the pervasive gaming of society’s rules (with examples drawn from the finance industry, among others), I then explain how short-termism invites gaming and identify the principal sources of short-termism in today’s economy. The most significant sources of short-termism that collectively invite institutional corruption include: shifting beliefs about the purposes and responsibilities of the modern corporation; the concomitant rise of a new financial culture; misapplied performance metrics; perverse incentives; our vulnerability to hard-wired behavioral biases; the decreasing tenure of institutional leaders; and the bounded knowledge of corporate directors, which prevents effective board oversight.
I next turn to the question of what is to be done about short-termism and the institutional corruption it invites. In this final section of the paper, I discuss reforms and recommendations related to the improvement of board oversight; the adoption of compensation principles and practices that can help mitigate the destructive effects of inappropriate metrics, perverse incentives, and hard-wired preferences for immediate satisfactions; the termination of quarterly earnings guidance; and the elimination of the built-in, short-term bias embedded in our current capital gains tax regime.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’excellent article d’Ira Millstein* de la firme Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, sur la saga JPMorgan Chase qui a alimenté les discussions en gouvernance au cours des derniers mois. Maintenant que la poussière sur l’échec de la séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA et sur l’opportunité d’utiliser un « administrateur principal » (Lead Directeur) est tombée, il y a certainement lieu d’en tirer des leçons très pertinentes pour le futur. C’est ce que fait admirablement bien l’auteure en précisant les différences fondamentales entre les rôles.
Dans le cas de JPMorgan Chase, la bataille de M. Dimon pour conserver ses fonctions de CEO et de Chairman a été féroce. Celui-ci a gagné son pari parce que les circonstances lui étaient favorables (le timing était bon). Selon l’auteure, il aurait été préférable de faire voter les actionnaires sur la séparation des rôles, pour le prochain CEO. L’article montre (1) qu’il est préférable d’avoir une séparation des rôles, (2) que la nomination d’un administrateur principal n’est pas la solution miracle parce que celui-ci n’aura jamais tout le pouvoir et toute la légitimité d’un président du conseil indépendant et (3) que dans les cas où un administrateur principal est requis, il faut définir son rôle en lui donnant le pouvoir et l’autorité nécessaire.
Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase (Photo credit: jurvetson)
Voici un extrait de cet article ainsi qu’un tableau montrant les comparaisons entre deux modèles de gouvernance : le modèle du président de conseil indépendant et le modèle dual « Chair/CEO ».
Substantial work was done on this issue by the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), in its Blue Ribbon Commission Report “The Effective Lead Director.” The role of the lead director as viewed in that report is not as strong a position as the independent chair, as indicated in a comparison chart included as Appendix A (below). In comparing the key duties of a typical independent chair to a lead director, the powers and duties of a lead director fall short in the following areas:
Power to call a board meeting: Unlike the chair, the lead director typically does not have convening power but only suggests to the chair/CEO that a meeting be called.
Control of the board agenda and board information: Unlike the chair who bears responsibility and authority for determining both the board agenda and the information that will be provided, the lead director collaborates with the chair/CEO and other directors on these issues.
Authority to represent the board in shareholder and stakeholder communications: Typically the chair/CEO represents the board with shareholders and external stakeholders; the lead director plays a role only if specifically asked by the chair/CEO or the board directly.
Appendix A Comparison of the Non-Executive Chair and the Chair/CEO Models
*Ira Millsteinis a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and co-chair of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article de Paul Willmott, directeur de McKinsey paru dans Insights & Publications. Les administrateurs doivent questionner et comprendre les décisions de l’organisation dans le domaine des technologies de l’information.
L’auteur mentionne neuf questions cruciales qui doivent faire l’objet de préoccupations de tout administrateur. Pour vraiment bien comprendre l’argumentaire derrière chaque question, je vous invite à lire l’article au complet. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
1. How will IT change the basis of competition in our industry?
2. What will it take to exceed our customers’ expectations in a digital world?
3. Do our business plans reflect the full potential of technology to improve our performance?
4. Is our portfolio of technology investments aligned with opportunities and threats?
5. How will IT improve our operational and strategic agility?
6. Do we have the capabilities required to deliver value from IT?
7. Who is accountable for IT and how do we hold them to account?
8. Are we comfortable with our level of IT risk?
9. Are we making the most of our technology story?
Some organizations are creating new technology forums, building the expertise of corporate directors, and strengthening IT governance—all with the aim of allowing boards to guide management by asking the right questions about technology…
« Technology has exceeded our humanity » (Photo credit: Toban B.)
The particulars of each enterprise’s situation will, of course, determine the focus of the discussion and the detailed questions to ask. However, across industries, every corporate director—IT savvy or not—will benefit from reviewing the following questions as a starting point for shaping a fruitful conversation with management about what the company needs to do to become a technology winner.
Je vous invite à visionner la vidéo de ReutersVideo dans laquelle Lucy Marcus discute ouvertement et candidement avec Robert Monks, actionnaire activiste avéré et conseiller en gouvernance de sociétés, à propos des réformes entreprises au Royaume-Uni, en comparaison avec les É.U.
boardroom (Photo credit: The_Warfield)
M. Monks donne son avis sur les comportements des administrateurs de demain et montre comment ceux-ci peuvent se préparer et surmonter une situation de crise.
Vous serez probablement aussi intéressés à plusieurs autres vidéos de la série In the Boardroom présentée sur YouTube. Bon visionnement !
English: Tactical Risk Management model, comparing and valuing 10 different risk or opportunity propositions (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Vous pouvez consulter les résultats de l’enquête menée par Aon sur la gestion globale des risques en 2013 : Global Risk Management Survey 2013.
The ability to anticipate opportunities and effectively respond to threats is critical for organizations to grapple with new challenges. Fact-based insights are the best way to ensure optimal decision making. Aon’s 2013 Global Risk Management Survey report is part of this process, capturing the latest risk trends and priorities facing companies around the world. The report unveiled the top 10 risks now and three years in the future. Conducted in Q4 2012, the web-based survey gathered input from 1,415 respondents — a 47 percent increase in respondents from the 2011 survey — from 70 countries in all regions of the world and was conducted in 10 languages.
In addition to identifying the top risk concerns facing companies today, the survey findings also cover the following topics:
How companies identify and assess risk
Approach to risk management and board involvement
Risk management functionsInsurance markets
Risk financing
Global programs
Captives
The survey is still open for participation and risk decision makers are invited to participate in the survey and will receive a complimentary customized report based on their industry, geography and revenue size. To take the survey, visit aon.com/grms2013.
Note: When the survey page loads, please select « First Time Users Click Here » to start the survey.
Ce billet a été publié par Jennifer Mailander sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum le 29 mai 2013. Je l’ai retenu car il montre éloquemment comment la fonction d’administrateur de sociétés est devenue exigeante au fil des ans.
L’article aborde comment éviter la surcharge d’information souvent vécue par les administrateurs ainsi que la vigilance à exercer en cas d’offres d’achat, hostiles ou amicales. Bonne lecture.
Directors receive a continuous stream of information and try to be vigilant in order to discern from the mix of background and foreground company data those dissonant notes, those underappreciated inputs, those gaps in analysis. They listen to identify the things that don’t add up.
But it’s getting harder to detect those subtle yet critical notes buried in the morass of reading material now available to directors. Only a few years ago, the volume of pre-meeting materials was limited to the width of a three-ring binder and the size of a standard FedEx box, which typically arrived at the director’s office or home a few days before the meeting. As I’ve pointed out in this Handbook, the director most up-to-speed on these “pre-reading” materials was often the director who made the longest plane trip to attend the meeting. Those directors, poring through their binders stuffed with pre-reading materials, were a common sight in the first-class sections of commercial airliners. The binder was a bulky carry-on, but at least its size limited the volume of pre-reading. Not so anymore.
English: A typical FedEx Ground truck. Photographed in Mountain View, on August 26, 2005. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Today, services like BoardLink permit companies to transmit vast amounts of information to dedicated devices supplied by boards to their directors. There is a consequent proliferation of PowerPoints, appendices, memos, advisories, agendas, draft minutes, and so on. There is also a potential collapse in timing, because content can be added or revised and resent without FedEx deadlines. The result: significantly more pre-reading, less time.
Directors need the board to put reasonable limits and priorities on this phenomenon. It is true that so long as directors make well-informed decisions without conflict of interest, they should not be held liable for business judgments that do not lead to successful outcomes, and under Delaware law can be exonerated from personal liability by company charter so long as they meet that standard of conduct. However, having more data does not necessarily mean that directors are better informed.
________________________________
* Jennifer Mailander is director of CSCPublishing at Corporation Service Company. This post is an excerpt from the 2013 Edition of The Directors’ Handbook, by Thomas J. Dougherty, partner and head of the Litigation Group of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous les grandes lignes d’un excellent article commandité par Deloitte et publié aujourd’hui dans le Wall Street Journal. L’article traite de plusieurs thèmes relatifs à l’intégrité au niveau du conseil, notamment l’intégrité comme valeur fondamentale, les effets de la dénonciation, un modèle de surveillance de l’intégrité, les principes d’une gouvernance efficace de C.A.
C’est une lecture recommandée pour tout administrateur de sociétés.
Integrity is critical to an organization’s culture and a requirement for effective dynamics in the boardroom. In view of recent headlines, a valid question is: What is integrity? Merriam-Webster defines integrity as “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values.” This, in turn, raises the question: Whose values? An individual’s? The organization’s? Society’s? All of these?
An effective board is concerned about integrity inside and outside the boardroom. It leads by example. The board plays a role in working with the CEO to help set the ethical tenor for the organization. It also promotes and monitors compliance with laws, regulations and organizational policies. Integrity in the boardroom is based on factors such as organizational values, the need to uphold the board’s fiduciary responsibilities and a willingness to be accountable.
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
A commitment to performance with integrity is widely recognized as a “must have” in organizations, yet many people and organizations struggle to put this ideal into practice. Board governance structures and practices should promote a corporate culture of integrity and ethics, coupled with corporate, environmental and social responsibility. The board should help to build trust and long-term relationships with shareholders, customers, regulators and employees.
The board’s role in maintaining integrity includes working with the CEO to establish the right tone at the top, understanding compliance requirements and establishing expectations for senior management, which then cascade to the entire organization. In addition, the board holds senior management accountable for meeting such expectations.
J’ai retenu les cinq principes de base suivants pour une gouvernance efficace du Conseil :
Integrity is critical to an organization’s sustained reputation and results. Effective boards help set the ethical tone for the entire organization and actively participate in programs designed to promote appropriate behavior with regard to compliance, integrity and ethics. A proactive role in continually setting standards and monitoring integrity is an effective way to guide an organization to improved principles, values and growth. Following are five principles for improving integrity in the boardroom:
1. Be active. The board should be informed about the organization and vigorous in management oversight.
2. Provide organizational leadership. The board, working with management, should set the organization’s strategic direction, review financial objectives and establish a strong ethical tone.
3. Comply with laws, regulations and ethics policies. The board should confirm that procedures and practices are in place to prevent and detect illegal or unethical conduct and to permit appropriate and timely action should such conduct occur.
4. Be informed, be transparent and listen. The board should take steps to confirm that management discloses fair, complete, accurate and timely information and that the organization maintains a two-way communication channel with the board.
5. Engage in continuous monitoring. The board should establish and review metrics related to ethical reporting and violations and remain aware of new developments in corporate governance that can help improve practices and procedures.
Voici le compte rendu d’une conférence donnée par Luis A. Aguilar, commissaire de la SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) qui décrit le rôle des investisseurs institutionnels et leur influence sur le contrôle des grandes sociétés publiques.
L’article est intéressant parce qu’il énonce deux problématiques cruciales eu regard à la règlementation visant les investisseurs institutionnels. (1) l’importance de la divulgation d’informations fiables aux investisseurs, (2) le besoin des investisseurs d’être entendus sur les considérations de gouvernance, notamment sur la rémunération de la haute direction.
L’article reflète la réalité américaine mais je crois que les avis de M. Aguilar sont aussi valables pour les grandes corporations canadiennes. Voici un extrait du compte rendu qui brosse un tableau éloquent des changements majeurs du rôle et de l’influence des investisseurs institutionnels survenus au cours des 60 dernières années : de 7 % de la capitalisation boursière en 1950 à 67 % en 2010 !
The topic of your conference recognizes the important role played by institutional investors and the great influence they exert in our capital markets. The role and influence of institutional investors has grown over time. For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67 % in 2010. The shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).
Institutional investor ownership is an even more significant factor in the largest corporations: In 2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate 73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.
The New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The growth in the proportion of assets managed by institutional investors has been accompanied by a dramatic growth in the market capitalization of U.S. listed companies. For example, in 1950, the combined market value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was about $94 billion. By 2012, however, the domestic market capitalization of the NYSE was more than $14 trillion, an increase of nearly1,500%. This growth is even more impressive if you add the $4.5 trillion in market capitalization on the NASDAQ market, which did not exist until 1971. The bottom line is, that as a whole, institutional investors own a larger share of a larger market.Of course, institutional investors are not all the same. They come in many different forms and with many different characteristics. Among other things, institutional investors have different organizational and governance structures, and are subject to different regulatory requirements. The universe of institutional investors includes mutual funds and ETFs regulated by the SEC, as well as pension funds, insurance companies, and a wide variety of hedge funds and managed accounts, many of which are unregulated.
And, of course, institutional investors don’t all buy or sell the same asset classes at the same time. To the contrary, they have a wide variety of distinct goals, strategies, and timeframes for their investments. As a result, their interaction with, and impact on, the market occurs in many different ways.
The growth in assets managed by institutions has also affected, and been affected by, the significant changes in market structure and trading technologies over the past few decades, including the development of the national market system, the proliferation of trading venues – including both dark pools and electronic trading platforms – and the advent of algorithmic and high-speed trading. These changes – largely driven by the trading of institutional investors – have resulted in huge increases in trading volumes. For example, in 1990, the average daily volume on the NYSE was 162 million shares. Today, just 23 years later, that average daily volume is approximately 2.6 billion shares – an increase of about 1,600%.
Simply stated, institutional investors are dominant market players, but it is difficult to fit them into any particular category. This poses a challenge for regulators, who must take into account all the many different ways institutional investors operate, and interact, with the capital markets.
It is clear, however, that professionally-managed institutions can help ensure that our capital markets function as engines for economic growth. Institutional investors are known to improve price discovery, increase allocative efficiency, and promote management accountability. They aggregate the capital that businesses need to grow, and provide trading markets with liquidity – the lifeblood of our capital markets.
In doing all this, institutional investors – like all investors – depend on the assurance of a level playing field, access to complete and reliable information, and the ability to exercise their rights as shareowners. That is why fair and intelligent regulation is necessary for the proper functioning of our capital markets.
Autres articles qui pourraient aussi vous intéresser :
Il y a une multitude de C.A. qui, à l’origine, ont été structurés sur la base de la plus grande représentation possible de membres de leurs organisations. Évidemment, dans ces cas, aucun administrateur n’est réellement indépendant et plusieurs sont mal placés pour participer à des décisions qui peuvent avoir une incidence sur les intérêts de leur groupe de référence. Dans ces cas, les administrateurs sont souvent en conflit d’intérêt car ils croient représenter un groupe particulier.
En réalité, plusieurs ne comprennent pas, ou ne veulent pas comprendre, qu’ils doivent agir en fonction des « meilleurs intérêts de l’entité » sur laquelle il siège. On leur dit qu’ils doivent être indépendants d’esprit… Plusieurs administrateurs ne respectent pas la confidentialité des informations présentées à l’assemblée. Certains s’empressent de tout rapporter aux organisations qu’ils représentent (sic).
Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (Photo credit: americaspower)
Voici un cas qui intéressera sûrement tous les membres de conseils d’administration d’associations bénévoles, surtout celles qui sont constituées de représentants de différents secteurs industriels. Même si le cas origine du blogue australien de Julie Garland McLellan, celui-ci s’applique très bien à la situation de plusieurs entreprises à vocation associative. Le cas et son analyse sont en anglais.
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Qu’auriez-vous fait à la place d’Ursula ? Quelle analyse d’expert vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ?
« This month our real life case study focuses on the complex conflicts of interest affecting association boards where the directors are representatives of industry participants ».
La gestion des risques est une activité-clé qui doit être orchestrée par la direction de l’entreprise. Mais quel doit être le rôle du conseil d’administration en matière de surveillance de l’exécution de cette tâche essentielle ? Quel est effectivement l’étendu du rôle du conseil dans les grandes sociétés publiques américaines. C’est ce que le document du Conference Board, présenté ici, décrit avec moult détails et d’une manière exceptionnellement bien illustrée. Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce texte qui traite des aspects suivants :
Responsabilité pour l’établissement des stratégies
Fréquence des révisions des stratégies
Réunion spéciale de planification stratégique
Adoption d’une approche standardisée telle qu’ERM (Enterprise Risk Management)
Responsabilité pour la surveillance des risques
Fréquence des comptes rendus de la direction au C.A. en matière de risque
Le responsable en chef de la gestion des risques (CRO)
Le comité des risques de l’entreprise
Any business is exposed to risks that can threaten its ability to execute its strategy. For this reason, strategy and risk oversight are inherently connected. Today, more than ever, the board of directors is expected to thoroughly assess key business risks and ensure that the enterprise is equipped to mitigate them. This Directors Notes discusses the current corporate practices on risk oversight by directors of U.S. public companies. Findings detail where the board assigns these responsibilities, whether it avails itself of dedicated reporting lines from senior management on risk issues, and the degree to which it adopts a standardized framework on enterprise risk management (ERM).
Given the correlation between risk and strategy, data on the frequency and forms of strategic reviews is also presented. The findings are from the most recent edition of the Board Practices Survey, which The Conference Board conducts annually in collaboration with NASDAQ OMX and NYSE Euronext (see “The Board Practices Survey” on p. 5). The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that financial institutions strengthen their risk oversight by establishing a dedicated risk committee of the board of directors.
In addition, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require all public companies to disclose the extent of their board’s role in overseeing the organization’s risk exposure, including how the board administers its risk oversight function and how the leadership structure accommodates such a role.
Finally, in October 2009, the SEC reversed a policy under which shareholder proposals relating to the evaluation of risk could be excluded from a company’s proxy materials as related to the company’s ordinary day-to-day business activities. Collectively, these developments are a nod in the direction of addressing the risk oversight failures that played so prominently in the 2008 financial crisis. Most important, they are expected to increase scrutiny of risk management programs and their endorsement and close supervision by senior leaders of corporations.
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Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 