Un grand débat fait présentement rage dans le monde des actionnaires activistes : la dénonciation des amendements apportés aux règlements internes de l’entreprise (Bylaws) qui ont pour buts de disqualifier les candidats aux postes d’administrateurs qui sont rémunérés par les actionnaires activistes en vue de leur élection lors des assemblées annuelles.
L’article ci-joint, publié par Carl Icahndans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, tente de justifier la façon de faire des activistes en montrant que cette approche est le nouveau moyen de défense utilisé par certaines organisations pour bloquer la venue de nouveaux administrateurs « dissidents ». L’adoption de cet amendement se fait sans le consentement des actionnaires.
Je vous propose donc la lecture de la position de M. Icahn lui-même sur cette question. Il présente un ensemble d’arguments soutenant le droit des actionnaires à une représentation qui relève d’eux, et non de la direction ou des administrateurs en place !
Quel est votre point de vue sur les moyens de défense utilisés par les organisations qui sont les cibles des actionnaires activistes organisés ? Voici un court extrait de l’article pour vous mettre en contexte.
There are many good, independent boards of directors at public companies in the United States. Unfortunately, there are also many ineffectual boards composed of cronies of CEOs and management teams, and such boards routinely use corporate capital to hire high-priced “advisors” to design defense mechanisms, such as the staggered board and poison pill, that serve to insulate them from criticism. Recently, these advisors have created a particularly pernicious new mechanism to protect their deep-pocketed clients—a bylaw amendment (which we call the “Director Disqualification Bylaw”) that disqualifies certain people from seeking to replace incumbent members of a board of directors.
Under a Director Disqualification Bylaw, a person is not eligible for election to the board of directors if he is nominated by a shareholder and the shareholder has agreed to pay the nominee a fee, such as a cash payment to compensate the nominee for taking the time and effort to seek election in a proxy fight, or compensation that is tied to performance of the company. [1]
We believe that the Director Disqualification Bylaw is totally misguided. It is absolutely offensive for an incumbent board to unilaterally adopt a Director Disqualification Bylaw without shareholder approval, and shareholders should also reject a Director Disqualification Bylaw if their incumbent board puts one up for a vote in the future. For the reasons explained below, we believe it is more appropriate for shareholders to continue, as they have in the past, to evaluate candidates individually based on their merits, including their experience, relationships and interests, all of which is required to be fully disclosed in a proxy statement.
As of November 30, 2013, thirty-three (33) public companies had unilaterally (i.e. without shareholder approval) amended their bylaws to include a Director Disqualification Bylaw. [2] In response, on January 13, 2014, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) stated that it may recommend a vote against or withhold from directors that adopt a Director Disqualification Bylaw without shareholder approval. In adopting this new policy position, ISS noted, as we do below, that “the ability to elect directors is a fundamental shareholder right” and that Director Disqualification Bylaws “unnecessarily infringe on this core franchise right.”
Peter Tunjic* avance que les actes de gouvernance, de la part d’un conseil d’administration, et les actes de direction, au sens de management, correspondent à deux systèmes de pensée fondamentalement différents.
Dans son article, l’auteur présente une matrice que vous trouverez peut-être utile de considérer. Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails.
A recent survey of CEO attitudes to their boards by respected commentator Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues, shouldn’t surprise anyone: ‘CEOs complain that boards often lack the intestinal fortitude for the level of risk taking that healthy growth requires.
“Board members are supposed to bring long-term prudence to a company”, as one CEO says, but this often translates to protecting the status quo and suppressing the bold thinking about reinvention that enterprises need when strategic contexts shift.’ Consensus is emerging that public company boards are too focused on compliance and are ignoring their role as creators of enduring value for the firms they direct. But it’s not for lack of will on their part.
The board’s role in strategy is considered the biggest issue for 67 per cent of respondents to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index want to spend more time on strategy. Despite this, according to Heidrick & Struggles, 84 per cent of directors of the top 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the US thought ‘they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy. Consequently, only one-third of respondents to a 2013 McKinsey & Company report say they have a complete understanding of current strategy. If directors have their eyes on value creation why is it that their feet are still pointing in a different direction? It’s because the system is not designed to create value. Best practice in corporate governance produces too many ‘governors’ focused on protecting value and not enough directors focused on creating it.
Public companies have become over governed and under directed because corporate governance regulation and education is designed to ensure the ‘correct’ board structure, process and composition rather than ensure ‘imagination, creativity, or ethical behavior in guiding the destinies of corporate enterprises’
This paper argues that in order to create enduring value, public company directors must go beyond governing and governance and must also embrace ‘directing’ and ‘directorship’. I propose that governance and directorship are two distinct systems of thought and action in the boardroom.
The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to value. Governance concerns right structure and process. The focus is on protecting and preserving value through maintaining control and managing risk. In contrast, directorship involves bold choices that necessarily create risk.
Directing involves designing the ways in which value is created, making decision of consequence and inspiring CEO’s to lead their organisations into strength, resilience and endurance. The boundaries between the two might blur in the heat of a board meeting, but the differences in attitude, competencies and outcome are clear. Here are four tests to help you decide whether you stand on the question of value.
Governing for shareholder value versus directing for firm value
Measuring value versus creating value
Governing for transparency versus directing with discretion
Managing risk versus creating risk
…. The DLMA Matrix graphically represents the similarities and differences of each perspective as well as the inherent dilemma required to balance them all.
THE DLMA MATRIX ™
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*Peter Tunjic is an independent corporate advocate and commercial lawyer based in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of ondirectorship.com and has co-authored several learning programmes for the Australian Institute of Company Directors. He consults on creating value in the boardroom and improving board/manager relations.
Dans cette entrevue,Robert Borghese, avocat en pratique privée, discute avec Michael Useem, directeur du Wharton’s Center for Leadership and Change Management, et co-auteur (avec Ram Charan et Dennis C. Carey), du nouveau livre : Boards That Lead.
Le livre explique que les « Boards » ne sont pas uniquement des organismes de contrôle, de surveillance et de conformité, mais ils sont également des agents de changement et de création de valeur en exerçant un rôle essentiel de leadership, en collaboration avec la haute direction.
Les fonctions d’administrateurs de sociétés sont de plus en plus exigeantes, ceux-ci étant de plus en plus sollicités pour représenter les intérêts des actionnaires, tout en préservant les droits des parties prenantes.
Les administrateurs ne sont plus des pions à la solde des CEO comme autrefois nous dit Useem; ils sont choisis parmi les meilleurs leaders du monde des affaires, ils sont indépendants, rigoureux, visionnaires; les actionnaires investisseurs, qui occupent une place toujours plus grande, s’attendent à des conseils d’administrations de la plus haute qualité, capables de questionner les actions des dirigeants et de les aider à accroître la valeur de l’organisation.
L’auteur discute également de la fine ligne à préserver entre le leadership actif du « Board » et le management de l’entreprise et la gestion des opérations. Il est important que les responsabilités entre ces deux groupes soient bien délimitées. Useem constate que dans les grandes entreprises cotées contemporaines, les rôles sont assez clairement identifiés.
Voici un extrait de cette entrevue. J’espère que vous apprécierez le langage clair et simple de la conversation. Bonne lecture !
In this interview, Useem explains why monitoring is no longer the only responsibility of the board, where board directors should draw the line in their leadership of organizations and where some companies and boards are getting it right, including Lenovo.
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RobertBorghese: Mike, thanks for being with us today. What led you to write a book on board leadership?
Michael Useem: Corporate governance has been a topic of great interest for many people, including myself, for a number of years. My colleagues Ram Charan, who is a very high-end consultant, and Dennis Carey, who is the vice-chair of Korn/Ferry, which is a very large executive search firm, and I got into a dialogue on what exactly is happening in boardrooms these days….
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Boards have to monitor, and they do that much better after Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, these two legislative acts that strengthen the hands of boards of directors. But increasingly, directors are also exercising a leadership function in the boardroom and with top management.
As we drew upon our experience – and all three of us have been in boardrooms – we did inductively conclude that it is good for all of us to rethink what boards do [beyond] just monitoring, which is what they are required to do, but to also see boards as helping the company to be going where it has to go, [which we will] call leadership.
Borghese: Mike, give us a little historical perspective on the role that boards have played over time and how that role has evolved beyond the monitoring function to more of a leadership function.
Useem: If we go way back, boards were aptly described by the title of a very well known book, which was Pawns or Potentates, by a professional colleague, Jay Lorsch, who is on the faculty of the HarvardBusinessSchool. He had a bit of a question mark there, but his conclusion was that historically – 30, 40 years ago – boards tended to be pawns. They had become passive. They were really under the thumb of the chief executive. They met, had a great lunch together and all went home.
“If you are a director, it is good to think of what you are doing both as a defender of shareholder value and as a leader of the company.”
With the rise of big institutional investors – the California pension fund, Fidelity, BlackRock, hedge funds – the pressure came from investors for directors to not be pawns, but to get in there and to keep management’s feet to the fire to avoid malfeasance. Think Enron. On the affirmative side, [in order] to get great growth at a reasonable degree of risk, boards [needed to] move from that pawn role to a much more active monitoring role. We can see that [in the research] on the background of directors and how boards are organized. Virtually all the major Standard & Poor’s 500 boards, for example, now have an independent audit committee, an independent governance committee and an independent compensation committee. “Independent” meaning that they are not under the thumb of the chief executive. They actually have that relationship turned around.
With a more vigilant monitoring function pushed by the big stockholders out there and reinforced by legislation coming out of the early part of the last decade after the Enron failure, boards began to exercise more leadership – in an unanticipated way and in an almost unplanned way. What we mean by that is that directors now often come from top management positions themselves. Many former CEOs, for example, occupy board rooms now. When they come into a board meeting, they are helping the top executive think through a spin-off, an acquisition. They are helping top executives think about how they develop top talent here so they have a great replacement once their day is up.
We ended up titling this book,Boards That Lead. Implicit in that is that boards also monitor on behalf of stockholders. That is the deal set forward by the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange. We all want that to happen, but in addition, because of this historical and quite profound transformation, boards now increasingly are at the plate, helping the company to go where it ought to get to, substantively.
Afin de vous mettre à jour sur les développements de la gouvernance en France, je vous réfère à l’article publié par Samuel Schmidt dans LesÉchos.fr le 4 février 2014.
English: Bill Gates at Medef Français : Bill Gates au Medef (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
L’auteur présente les interprétations apportées par le haut comité de gouvernance eu égard au code Afep-Medef (Association française des entreprises privées – Mouvement des entreprises de France) des sociétés françaises cotées en bourse dont les sept éléments identifiés.
Je vous invite à lire l’article afin d’avoir le portrait global.
L’innovation la plus marquante, tant il s’agit d’un sujet hautement sensible, réside dans l’introduction du principe dit du « say on pay », à l’article 24.3 du code Afep-Medef révisé, qui à trait à l’information et à la consultation des actionnaires sur la rémunération individuelle des « dirigeants mandataires sociaux ».
2) Les indemnités de prise de fonction (« golden hello ») sont reconnues, mais encadrées
Le code Afep-Medef révisé s’est enrichi de recommandations relatives aux golden hellos ou « indemnités de prise de fonction » pour préciser, à l’article 23.2.5, qu’elles ne peuvent être accordées « qu’à un nouveau dirigeant mandataire social venant d’une société extérieure du groupe » et que « son montant doit être rendu public au moment de sa fixation ».
3) Les indemnités de non-concurrence sont plus strictement encadrées
Il en va de même concernant les indemnités dites de « non-concurrence », pour lesquelles il est désormais prévu « une réflexion approfondie au sein du comité des rémunérations » et une autorisation préalable, ainsi qu’au moment du départ du dirigeant, du conseil d’administration sur l’accord de non-concurrence.
4) Toilettage pour les indemnités de départ
Concernant les « indemnités de départ » ou golden parachute, la nouvelle version du code indique que les conditions de performance doivent s’apprécier sur au moins deux exercices. Il est confirmé que l’indemnité de départ ne doit pas excéder, le cas échéant, deux ans de rémunération (fixe et variable). De plus, lorsqu’une clause de non-concurrence est en outre mise en œuvre, le cumul de ces deux indemnités ne peut excéder ce plafond.
5) Cumuls des mandats : un code plus restrictif
Le code Afep-Medef révisé met davantage l’accent que son prédécesseur sur la limitation du cumul des mandats. Ainsi, le nouvel article 19 du code indique que l’ »administrateur ne doit pas exercer plus de quatre autres mandats dans des sociétés cotées extérieures au groupe, y compris étrangères » et que le « dirigeant mandataire social ne doit pas exercer plus de deux autres mandats d’administrateur dans des sociétés cotées extérieures à son groupe, y compris étrangères »
6) Comités : des précisions sur l’organisation et la gouvernance
Ainsi il est recommandé, pour ces comités, de se doter d’un « règlement précisant ses attributions et ses modalités de fonctionnement », de ne pas avoir d’administrateurs dits « croisés », et de veiller à l’objectivité des conseils externes auxquels ils recourent. Il est désormais précisé de manière claire que le président, s’il est directeur général, ne peut présider le comité des nominations et que le comité des rémunérations doit être présidé par un administrateur indépendant.
7) Une force accrue conférée à la règle dite du « Comply or Explain »
Une force accrue est conférée à la règle dite du comply or explain en ce sens que la nouvelle version du code impose aux sociétés de fournir une explication claire, détaillée et pertinente, si elles souhaitent s’écarter des règles prescrites, et d’indiquer les mesures alternatives adoptées.
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez un billet, partagé par Denis Lefort, expert-conseil en gouvernance et en audit interne, qui vous incite à prendre connaissance du Bulletin de janvier 2014 du Conference Board intitulé « Risk Oversight: Evolving expectation for Board« .
Ce document, très intéressant, fait un retour en arrière sur les différentes analyses et recommandations effectuées par différents groupes dont, le NACD, la SEC, le SSG, Dodd-Frank, ICGN, FSB, FRC (les acronymes sont explicitées dans le document de 10 pages), dans la foulée des scandales financiers de 2008.
English: Contribution and prioritizing threats and risks to Risk Management Effectiveness (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Le document est très critique quant au rôle très actif que devraient jouer les conseils d’administration au niveau de la surveillance des risques. Il est aussi très critique des approches mises en œuvre par les fonctions Gestion des risques et audit interne. Enfin, des recommandations sont formulées pour ces trois instances.
Bien qu’au départ, le document ait ciblé les institutions financières, ses propos peuvent s’appliquer à un grand éventail d’organisations. C’est pourquoi je vous encourage tous à en prendre connaissance et à le partager avec vos dirigeants, membres de conseils, collègues et contacts professionnels. Voici un extrait. Bonne lecture !
The Risk Oversight Committee is responsible for :
a. determining where and when formal documented risk assessments should be completed, recognizing that additional risk management rigor and formality should be cost/benefit justified
b. ensuring that business units are identifying and reliably reporting the material risks to the key objectives identified in their annual strategic plans and core foundation objectives necessary for sustained success, including compliance with applicable laws and regulations
c. reviewing and assessing whether material risks being accepted across XYZ are consistent with the corporation’s risk appetite and tolerance
d. developing, implementing, and monitoring overall compliance with this policy
e. overseeing development, administration and periodic review of this policy for approval by the board of directors
f. reviewing and approving the annual external disclosures related to risk oversight processes required by securiti esregulators
g. reporting periodically to the CEO and the board on the corporation’s consolidated residual risk position
h. ensuring that an appropriate culture of risk-awareness exists throughout the organization
Business unit leaders are responsible for:
a. managing risks to their unit’s business objectives within the corporation’s risk appetite/tolerance
b. identifying in their business when they believe the benefits of formal risk assessment exceed the costs, or when requested to by the CEO or risk oversight committee
Risk management and assurance support services unit is responsible for :
a. providing risk assessment training, facilitation, and assessment services to senior management and business units upon request
b. annually preparing a consolidated report on XYZ’s most significant residual risks and related residual risk status, and a report on the current effectiveness and maturity of the Corporation’s risk management processes for review by the risk oversight committee, senior management, and the corporation’s board of directors
c. completing risk assessments of specific objectives that have not been formally assessed and reported on by business units when asked to by the risk oversight committee, senior management, or the board of directors; or if the risk management support services team leader believes that a formal risk assessment is warranted to provide a materially reliable risk status report to senior management and the board of directors
d. conducting independent quality assurance reviews on risk assessments completed by business units and providing feedback to enhance the quality and reliability of those assessments
e. participating in the drafting and review of the corporation’s annual disclosures in the Annual Reports and Proxy Statement related to risk management and oversight
Vous êtes intéressés par la problématique de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, et préoccupés par les effets pervers de celle-ci, l’article de Richard Leblanc dans le HuffPost explique clairement et succinctement pourquoi la gouvernance de la rémunération dans les organisations ne fonctionne pas …
Vous trouverez-ci dessous le lien vers son récent article ainsi qu’une énumération des 10 raisons évoquées pour expliquer les défaillances de la gouvernance. Bonne lecture !
Nous publions ici un troisième article de Danielle Malboeuf* laquelle nous a soumis ses réflexions sur les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux les 23 et 27 novembre 2013, à titre d’auteure invitée.
Dans un premier article, publié le 23 novembre 2013 sur ce blogue, on insistait sur l’importance, pour les C.A. des Cégep, de se donner des moyens pour assurer la présence d’administrateurs compétents dont le profil correspond à celui recherché.
D’où les propositions adressées à la Fédération des cégeps et aux C.A. pour élaborer un profil de compétences et pour faire appel à la Banque d’administrateurs certifiés du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), le cas échéant. Un autre enjeu identifié dans ce billet concernait la remise en question de l’indépendance des administrateurs internes.
Le deuxième article publié le 27 novembre 2013 abordait l’enjeu entourant l’exercice de la démocratie par différentes instances au moment du dépôt d’avis au conseil d’administration.
Ce troisième article, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure, porte sur l’efficacité du rôle du président du conseil d’administration (PCA).
Voici donc l’article en question. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.
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LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES INSTITUTIONS D’ENSEIGNEMENT COLLÉGIAL
par Danielle Malboeuf*
Le réseau des Collèges d’enseignement général et professionnel (Cégep) doit se préoccuper du rôle assumé par le président ou la présidente du conseil d’administration (C.A.) car cette personne est appelée à jouer un rôle central d’animation et de coordination des activités du conseil. Mais qu’en est-il dans les faits ?
Cégep de Drummondville, au Québec. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
La Loi sur les Cégep encadre le rôle du PCA ainsi : « le président du conseil préside les réunions du conseil et assume les autres fonctions que le conseil lui assigne par règlement. » [i]
Présentement, les présidents de C.A. pourraient être tentés de se limiter à jouer un rôle d’animateur de réunions. Heureusement, certains s’engagent déjà dans de nouvelles pratiques pour améliorer la gouvernance de ces institutions. Ils s’inspirent des approches préconisées par le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), par l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organismes privés et publics (IGOPP), et celles inscrites dans la Loi sur la gouvernance des sociétés d’état.
À ce sujet, monsieur Yvan Allaire, président de l’IGOPP, dans un article publié dans le Devoir le 6 décembre dernier, « Des conseils d’administration défaillants? Crise de gouvernance dans le secteur public » encourage nos institutions publiques à adopter des principes de saine gouvernance comme ceux imposés aux sociétés d’État et à exiger leur mise en place dans toutes les instances de l’État québécois.
Rappelons que la finalité recherchée dans la mise en place d’une meilleure gouvernance est de permettre aux C.A. de participer activement à la mission première d’une institution d’enseignement qui est celle de donner une formation pertinente et de qualité où l’étudiant et sa réussite éducative sont au cœur des préoccupations. À cet égard, le C.A. s’assure entre autres que les objectifs sont clairs et que les stratégies sont pertinentes. Il se donne également les moyens pour faire le suivi des activités et des résultats.
Parmi les principes à mettre en place, on retient le profil de compétences recherché chez un président de C.A.. On exige de cette personne d’être expérimentée, aux états de service éprouvés, dotée d’un bon leadership [ii]. En présence de ce type de personnes, on assiste à une évolution de leur rôle. En plus d’assurer le bon fonctionnement du C.A., cette personne relève un défi majeur, celui de faire connaître auprès de toutes les instances du milieu, le mandat confié au C.A. et ainsi, contribuer à la légitimité de cette entité de gouvernance. Puis, afin de faire jouer au C.A. son rôle de surveillance et d’être un contributeur important à la création de valeur de l’institution, le PCA anime et coordonne le travail des administrateurs et ce, en mettant à contribution leurs compétences. En sus du comité d’audit, il doit encourager la création d’un comité de gouvernance et d’un comité de ressources humaines car cela lui permet de mettre à contribution ces compétences et de s’appuyer sur les travaux de ces comités pour améliorer la gouvernance. Finalement, cette personne inscrit ses actions sous la forme de soutien et de conseil auprès de la directrice ou du directeur général sans faire ombrage à son autorité.
Pour assurer une gouvernance efficiente et stratégique, il est donc impératif que les présidentes et présidents de C.A. s’inscrivent dans la mise en place des grands principes de gouvernance et ce, avec l’appui des directions. La Fédération des Cégeps joue un rôle majeur dans cette démarche en fournissant aux présidents de C.A., le soutien, la formation et les outils appropriés.
Par ailleurs, considérant le niveau de compétences attendues, l’accroissement de leurs responsabilités qui exigera plus de disponibilités et de temps et l’évaluation qui sera faite de leur travail, il serait normal de considérer la rémunération de ces personnes. Les présidents de certaines sociétés d’état ont déjà accès à une telle rémunération.
[i] Loi sur les collèges d’enseignement général et professionnel, article 14.
*Danielle Malboeuf est consultante et formatrice en gouvernance; elle possède une grande expérience dans la gestion des CEGEP et dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégial et universitaire. Elle est CGA-CPA, MBA, ASC, Gestionnaire et administratrice retraité du réseau collégial et consultante.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est fier de présenter sa 8e Grande conférence en gouvernance de sociétés, qui aura lieu le mardi 4 février 2014, au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital, à Montréal, dès 17 h. Un cocktail dînatoire suivra la conférence.
Lors de l’événement, M. Louis Morisset, président-directeur général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers, agira à titre de conférencier.
Le thème de cette conférence portera sur « La force du régulateur intégré et les grands enjeux de gouvernance ».
La grande majorité des actionnaires de compagnies publiques ne sont pas impliqués dans la gouvernance et dans le management des entreprises dans lesquelles ils ont investi. On peut dire qu’ils font confiance aux mesures prises par les actionnaires plus activistes et par les fonds d’investissement pour garantir un comportement de bon citoyen corporatif et pour prendre des décisions qui auront pour effet d’augmenter la valeur de leur investissement.
Alors quelles seront les priorités des activistes en 2014 pour assurer que les entreprises travaillent dans le meilleur intérêt des actionnaires, petits, moyens et gros …
L’article rédigé par Eleanor Bloxham, PCD de The Value Alliance, dans Fortune présente un sommaire des entrevues que l’auteure a faites avec les principaux actionnaires activistes aux É.U.
Que retrouve-t-on sur l’agenda de ces investisseurs ? Plusieurs priorités en fonction des intérêts que ces groupes d’investisseurs défendent. Cependant, il ressort un certain consensus sur les thèmes suivants :
« Board diversity, executive pay, transparency on political contributions, and human rights improvements »
Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous, dont je produis un court extrait :
Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards. But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.
Many of us free ride on actions taken by active, long-term shareholders. These unsung heroes goad managers and boards to reach better decisions, make available desirable employment opportunities and, overall, push them to act like good corporate citizens. These active investors accomplish these things by talking to companies, preparing proxy proposals for all shareholders to consider, and offering recommendations on director elections and company-sponsored proxy measures.
What shape can we expect their efforts to take this year? Overall, we can expect more sophisticated requests of companies than we’ve ever seen before, and more direct board member interaction with shareholders.
To get the behind-the-scenes skinny, I asked shareholders and others who know what’s in store this upcoming proxy season. Here are their informed, excerpted, and edited comments:
Photo: Jetta Productions/Getty Images
Également, je vous invite à visionner cette vidéo de 7 minutes produite par Lucy Marcus qui porte sur ce que le Board peut faire pour se préparer à la nouvelle offensive qui s’annonce en 2014 ?
Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards. But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.
Ce matin, Richard Leblanc nous présente un « draft » de son nouveau syllabus de cours offert à l’Université York sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises/sociétés d’état.
Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de cours dans ce domaine – loin de là – mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y en pas de si complets … et de si exigeants.
Voyez par vous-même en suivant le lien ci-dessous pour vous rendre sur le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn et ouvrir le document présentant le syllabus.
Si vous êtes dans le domaine de la consultation, du coaching et de la formation en gouvernance, notamment des OBNL, les éléments de contenu de ce syllabus ainsi que les nombreuses références qu’il contient vous intéressera sûrement. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Operation of the Board, Board and Committee Meetings, and Staff Relations
Development and Retirement of Directors
Fundraising and Donor Stewardship
Financial Oversight, Anti-Fraud, External Audit, and Internal Audit
Values, Mandate, Strategy and Prerogative
Risk, Internal Controls, and Assurance
Organizational Performance, CEO Succession, and Executive Compensation
Stakeholder Accountability of Crown Corporations and Other Public Entities: Government as Sole Shareholder, Taxpayors; Members, Donors, Funding Agencies, Beneficiaries, Volunteers, Staff, Partners, Sponsors, Community
Fraud, Corruption, Lack of Oversight, and Misbehavior Case Analysis: The Senate of Canada, The Quebec Corruption Inquiry, Ontario Power Generation, the Mayor of Toronto
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu, rédigé par Elizabeth Mullen dans le magazine du NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors), et résultant d’une table ronde portant sur le phénomène des investisseurs activistes.
On notera que plusieurs experts, dans certaines circonstances, considèrent les activistes comme des agents de changement. Voici quelques extraits très intéressants :
Directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy.
While it is widely accepted that directors’ primary duty is to protect shareholder interests, directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy, participants said in a recent National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) roundtable, presented in partnership with AIG and WilmerHale.
Ellen B. Richstone (left), Jeffrey Rudman, and Steve Maggiacomo
“Shareholder activist” and “shareholder activism” are umbrella terms that encompass a range of groups, interests, and modes of action, so boards’ responses naturally will vary depending on their particular situations. Some companies may face the Icahns and Ackmans of the world, who purchase ownership stakes in companies with the hope of gaining board seats and strategic control; or institutional investors like CalPERS, which are vocal in their opinions of the companies in which they invest; and retail investors with less influence but important opinions of their own.
“Fidelity is more likely to be at your feet while Icahn is more likely to be at your throat,” said WilmerHale’s Jeffrey Rudman. Even the types of shareholder activism can vary, said Martin M. Coyne II, ranging from Harvard Business School’s Shareholder Rights Project, to derivative suits following an M&A event, to family-owned companies facing strategic differences, to private companies with initial investors who are highly involved in strategic planning, to highly influential proxy firms.
While all these voices deserve to be heard, Coyne advised boards to remain focused on an end goal, rather than trying to satisfy all parties involved. “When that topic becomes omnipresent and goes from a discussion topic that should be discussed by the board and decided upon—and you start making bad business decisions to satisfy—what it does is take away from succession planning discussions, strategy discussions, operational discussions. It distracts the board and becomes an operational weakness,” he said.
The opinions of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co., and other proxy advisors should be considered guidelines, not scripture; ensuring a solid reasoning process behind decisions is more important, participants said. Their influence can be a “good wake-up call,” said Shaun B. Higgins, to reevaluate governance practices, such as joint CEO-chair roles or certain types of compensation plans that proxy firms often campaign against. Bringing up these opinions is a jumping-off point for boards to ensure their policies are sound and defensible, and communicate those justifications to shareholders.
“What they bring is awareness to boards that there are certain issues of concern to the public that they have to address thoroughly,” said James J. Morris. “If the board can have a good rationale of why they want it that way, they’re going to be okay.”…
… Boards today must also consider investors’ and stakeholders’ interests beyond the bottom line, particularly when it comes to environmental concerns. Higgins noted that today’s reports and disclosures are more extensive than ever: “If you told me back in 2000 we were going to put corporate social responsibility in the annual report I would have said, ‘Are you kidding me?’ It wasn’t even on our radar screen.”
Participants à la table ronde :
Martin M. Coyne II, Director, Akamai Technologies, RockTech
Peter T. Francis, Director, Dover Corp., Stanford Graduate School of Business
Shaun B. Higgins, Director, Aryzta AG, Carmine Labriola
Scott Hunter, FCA, Director, Allied World Assurance Company Holdings
James G. Jones, CFA, Founder/Portfolio Manager Sterling Investment Advisors; Director, CFA Institute
Jerry L. Levens, Director, Hancock Holding Co.
Steve Maggiacomo, SVP Financial Lines, AIG
James J. Morris, Principal, 2 Ventures; Director, Esterline Technologies, JURA Corp., LORD Corp.
Craig W. Nunez, Chairman and CEO, Bocage Group; Director, Goodwill Industries of Houston, Medical Bridges
Steve Pannucci, Professional Liability Underwriting Manager, AIG
Donald K. Peterson, Director, Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, TIAA-CREF
Ellen B. Richstone, Director, ERI, OpEx Engine, NACD New England
Andrea Robinson, Partner, WilmerHale
Jeffrey Rudman, Partner, WilmerHale
Carole J. Shapazian, Director, Baxter International
Richard Szafranski, Director, Corporate Office Properties Trust, Cleared Solutions
Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.
Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.
Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :
Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.
À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).
Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !
One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of
2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.
The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism
Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.
In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.
Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism
Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.
… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.
Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”
Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.
Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.
In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.
Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.
In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.
The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.
These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.
Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.
And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.
Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.
One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.
What to Expect Ahead
The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.
Articles reliés au sujet des actionnaires activistes :
Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.
Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.
J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en cette fin d’année 2013 et Joyeuses Fêtes à tous et à toutes.
Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.
At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.
To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.
Key topics :
Duties and responsibilities of a director
Oversight of strategy and governance
Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
Enabling key executive appointments
Managing productive meetings
Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
Dans cet article paru sur mon blogue l’an dernier, je soulignais que de plus en plus d’administrateurs d’organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) sont intéressés à en savoir davantage sur les règles de gouvernance et sur les modes de fonctionnement de ces types d’organisations.
Chez les professionnels de la gestion ainsi que chez les membres d’ordres professionnels, rares sont ceux qui ne sont pas membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL. Il existe plusieurs entreprises québécoises qui s’intéressent aux OBNL, mais il y en a une qui se consacre en priorité à la formation des membres de ces organisations avec beaucoup de succès et qui a publié des volumes qui sont devenus, au fil des ans, des références auprès des administrateurs et des directeurs généraux d’organismes à but non lucratif.
Je vous invite à consulter le lien ci-dessous pour en connaître davantage portant sur la formation et sur les publications la gouvernance de ce type d’organisation très répandu.
“Quand vous acceptez un poste d’administrateur, savez-vous à quoi vous vous engagez ? Est-ce que les associations et les organismes sans but lucratif ont des règles de bonne gouvernance ? Est-ce que la reddition de compte se fait de façon responsable ? Face au déficit d’imputabilité dans notre société, les associations et autres organismes sans but lucratif, tant privés que publics, ont peu de pratiques de performance leur permettant d’assurer leur crédibilité et d’inspirer confiance”.
Série Gouvernance – Guides pratiques
Les Guides pratiques pour une Gouvernance Stratégique ® se veulent des publications qui abordent des aspects sensibles de la gestion d’OSBL et pour lesquelles on retrouve moins facilement des réponses. La série comprendra, au fil des années, une dizaine de titres.
Depuis le début de la parution du blogue, le 19 juillet, j’ai publié 820 billets en gouvernance et suscité l’intérêt d’environ 75 000 personnes. Le blogue a eu trois fois plus de visiteurs dans la dernière année. Beaucoup d’abonnés au blogue se servent de l’outil de recherche (situé au bas de la page) afin d’obtenir des informations pertinentes et d’actualité sur leurs questionnements en gouvernance. À ce stade-ci, mon objectif est d’avoir plus de 50 000 visiteurs pour l’année 2014.
Le référencement se fait principalement par LinkedIn (43 %) et par des engins de recherche tels que Google (43 %); le reste (14 %) se réparti entre plusieurs autres réseaux sociaux.
Le partage des billets se fait par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn (40 %), Twitter (29 %), Facebook (22 %) et Tumblr (9 %).
Le site est fréquenté par des visiteurs provenant :
du Canada (59 %)
de la France (20 %) (incluant Suisse et Belgique)
du Magreb (4 %) (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie)
d’autres pays de diverses provenance (17 %).
J’en profite pour remercier à nouveau tous les lecteurs qui, par leurs votes, ont exprimé leur appréciation du blogue lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne. Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65)blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul candidat finaliste dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance.
Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernancedans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes
Notre groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn, Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance, sous l’égide du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), a connu une croissance remarquable au cours des dernières années, passant de 372 membres, au 1er septembre 2012, à 858 membres au 26 décembre 2013.
Notre objectif est de demeurer le groupe francophone de référence en gouvernance le plus actif et le plus influent en 2014 sur LinkedIn.
Au cours de cette période, nous avons réussi à maintenir un haut niveau de respect dans nos échanges, et à provoquer de saines discussions sur des thèmes relatifs à la gouvernance de tous les types d’entreprises évoluant dans des environnements règlementaires différents (USA, CANADA, UK, UE).
En tant qu’administrateur et contributeur principal de ce groupe, je vous remercie vivement de vos contributions à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de la gouvernance.
Au nom du CAS, et en mon nom personnel, je vous souhaite un excellent temps des Fêtes et une année 2014 à la hauteur de vos aspirations.
Merci encore de votre présence soutenue au blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’au groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance du CAS.
Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :
“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”
Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !
Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.
They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.
An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.
Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”
It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.
“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”
There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”
If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.
At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch
There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.
Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD
The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.
The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’
“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”
The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.
At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts
For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.
The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.
A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.
One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”
The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”
Débats entre présidents de conseils
Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”
It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.
The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.
They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.
Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.
The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”
The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.
The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.
All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.
Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.
Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.
It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.
Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.
Voici un article choc publié par Dena Aubin et diffusé par l’agence Reuters le 10 décembre 2013. Il est ici question d’une recherche universitaire menée par deux professeurs de l’Université de Tilburg aux Pays-Bas qui montre que 40 % des administrateurs responsables de la supervision des affaires financières entretiennent des liens sociaux très étroits avec la haute direction de l’entreprise, laissant une impression de non-indépendance et de possibilité de conflit d’intérêt entre des personnes qui ont des liens d’amitié et d’affinité.
De là à penser que ces administrateurs seront plus susceptibles d’adopter des positions plus favorables à la direction, il n’y a qu’un pas à franchir. Et les chercheurs n’ont pas hésité à pousser leur investigation dans ce sens.
L’étude montre que ces situations de « proximité » peuvent donner lieu à de plus faibles contrôles financiers, notamment à des manipulations comptables, suivies de tentatives d’étouffer la vérité.
Ce sont des études comme celle-ci qui amène les autorités règlementaires à resserrer les critères d’indépendance des membres des comités d’audit.
Bonne lecture; vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
NEW YORK (Reuters) – Almost 40 percent of U.S. corporate directors with responsibility for monitoring the profit-and-loss ledger have social ties to the chief executive, a study says, making them look more like lapdogs than watchdogs.
Conducted by two accounting professors at Tilburg University in The Netherlands, the study reinforces long-held perceptions of a clubby culture on U.S. corporate boards, where members seldom challenge the executives they are meant to police.
The study looked at about 2,000 U.S. companies and their board audit committees, which are responsible for overseeing outside auditors and making sure financial reports are accurate. It found that personal friends of senior managers were often appointed to these committees, making the directors more likely to go along with the company’s reporting practices.
Where that was the case, earnings manipulation was more frequent and problems such as weak financial controls were covered up, the study found.
Tilburg University (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Regulations put in place over a decade ago after accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom required audit committees to be made up only of independent directors. That meant they were never employed by the company or a firm doing business with it.
Even so, audit committee members often have long-standing social ties to executives, belonging to the same elite clubs or charity boards, the study found.
« Although such firms appear to have independent audit committees, in reality these committees offer little to no monitoring at all, » the study found.
The study, by accounting professors Liesbeth Bruynseels and Eddy Cardinaels, researched social ties with BoardEx, a business intelligence service. It appears in the January 2014 issue of the American Accounting Association’s Accounting Review.
The professors suggested that legislators consider requiring more disclosure about social connections between audit committees and CEOs, given the committees’ importance.
Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance in Newark, Delaware, said it would be difficult for regulators to define social ties.
« Is it one lunch a week, is it two lunches? Inevitably, social ties will develop when you’re on a board – you have to see that person on a regular basis, » he said.
The United States made a major push to improve audit committees’ effectiveness with the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which tightened membership requirements.
More recently, regulators in Europe and the United Kingdom have been trying to get audit committees to be more rigorous in choosing outside auditors and monitoring them.
À chaque année, la firme Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) revoit son processus d’établissement des recommandations qui guide les actionnaires dans leurs votes aux assemblées annuelles.
On entend souvent parler des politiques de ISS concernant la gouvernance des sociétés mais on ne saisit pas toujours la méthodologie derrière les recommandations aux actionnaires.
Le document ci-dessous présente les mises à jour des recommandations qui s’adressent aux entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse. Je crois que c’est un document de référence majeur pour les actionnaires qui doivent se doter d’un conseil d’administration exemplaire et de règles de gouvernance en relation avec les intérêts des actionnaires. Bonne lecture !
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez le sommaire du processus de formulation des politiques de ISS, suivi des éléments constituant la table des matières.
Each year, ISS’ Global Policy Board conducts a robust, inclusive, and transparent global policy formulation process that produces the benchmark proxy voting guidelines that will be used during the upcoming year.
The policy review and update process begins with an internal review of emerging issues and notable trends across global markets. Based on data gathered throughout the year (particularly from client and issuer feedback), ISS forms policy committees by governance topics and markets. As part of this process, the policy team examines academic literature, other empirical research, and relevant commentary. ISS also conducts surveys, convenes roundtable discussions, and posts draft policies for review and comment. Based on this broad input, ISS’ Global Policy Board reviews and approves final drafts and policy updates for the following proxy year. Annual updated policies are announced in November and apply to meetings held on and after February 1 of the following year.
Also, as part of the process, ISS collaborates with clients with customized approaches to proxy voting. ISS helps these clients develop and implement policies based on their organizations’ specific mandates and requirements. In addition to the ISS regional benchmark (standard research) policies, ISS’ research analysts apply more than 400 specific policies, including specialty policies for Socially Responsible Investors, Taft-Hartley funds and managers, and Public Employee Pension Funds, as well as hundreds of fully customized policies that reflect clients’ unique corporate governance philosophies. The vote recommendations issued under these policies often differ from those issued under the ISS benchmark policies. ISS estimates that the majority of shares that are voted by ISS’ clients fall under ISS’ custom or specialty recommendations.
This document presents the changes being made to ISS’ Benchmark Canadian Corporate Governance Policies. The full text of the updates, detailed results from the Policy Survey, and comments received during the open comment period, are all available on ISS’ Web site under the Policy Gateway.
Table des matières du document de mise à jour
BOARD
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Definition of Independence – TSX and TSXV
2014 ISS Canadian Definition of Independence
Persistent Problematic Audit Related Practices – TSX
Voting on Directors for Egregious Actions – TSX and TSXV
Board Responsiveness – TSX and TSXV
Director Attendance & Overboarding – TSX
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS & DEFENSES
Advance Notice Requirement for Director Nominations – TSX and TSXV
Enhanced Shareholder Meeting Quorum for Contested Director Election – TSX and TSXV
Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada. De plus, c’est un document publié en français.
Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document sur le site de l’entreprise.
Depuis la diversité au sein des conseils jusqu’aux risques liés aux marchés émergents, en passant par l’activisme actionnarial, cette troisième édition du Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance, notre compte rendu annuel, analyse l’actualité sur de nombreuses questions d’intérêt pour les conseils d’administration et les observateurs du paysage de la gouvernance au Canada.
Dans le premier chapitre, Administrateurs et conseils d’administration, nous faisons le point sur l’évolution de la composition des conseils d’administration au Canada, les appels à la diversité au sein de ces conseils et des équipes de direction ainsi que les idées proposées par les autorités de réglementation et les investisseurs à cet égard. Dans le chapitre intitulé Rémunération des membres de la haute direction et des administrateurs, nous faisons état de la popularité grandissante du vote consultatif sur la rémunération de la haute direction et proposons des mesures que peuvent prendre les conseils d’administration pour éviter d’être pris de court par le résultat d’un tel vote. Dans le chapitre intitulé Questions relatives au vote des actionnaires, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés concernant la question de l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires au Canada, les initiatives de réglementation des agences de conseil en vote et la pratique du vote à la majorité parmi les émetteurs. Dans le chapitre intitulé Initiatives des actionnaires, nous mettons en lumière les tendances et les questions d’actualité comme l’« achat de votes », la rémunération offerte aux administrateurs par les dissidents et le « vote vide » ainsi que les règlements de préavis. Dans le chapitre intitulé Surveillance des risques : les activités sur les marchés émergents, nous examinons comment les émetteurs gèrent les risques associés à leurs activités sur les marchés émergents ainsi que les nouveautés importantes touchant la législation et la mise en application de la loi en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, dans le chapitre intitulé Régimes de droits : gouvernance et changement de contrôle, nous analysons les deux cadres de réglementation des régimes de droits en situation de prise de contrôle proposés cette année par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous un condensé de l’entente intervenue par les institutions européennes concernant la réforme de l’audit. Ce résumé nous est transmis par ecoDa- The European Confederation of Directors’ Associations, dont le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est l’un des membres affiliés.
Voici donc un bref résumé suivi d’une présentation sommaire des principaux changements convenus. À la suite de cet article d’ecoDa, vous trouverez le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia. Bonne lecture !
Yesterday, the European institutions managed to get a provisional agreement in trilogue on the reform of the audit sector. With the agreement, audit firms will be required to rotate every 10 years. Public interest entities will only be able to extend the audit tenure once, upon tender. Under this measure, joint audit will also be encouraged. To avoid the risk of self-review, several non-audit services are prohibited under a strict ‘black list’, including stringent limits on tax advice and on services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. In addition, a cap on the provision of non-audit services is introduced.
Audit reform
1. A clarified societal role for auditors
Increased audit quality : In order to reduce the ‘expectation gap’ between what is expected from auditors and what they are bound to deliver, the new rules will require auditors to produce more detailed and informative audit reports, with a required focus on relevant information to investors.
The legislative triangle of the European Union (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Enhanced transparency : Strict transparency requirements will be introduced for auditors with stronger reporting obligations vis-à-vis supervisors. Increased communication between auditors and the audit committee of an audited entity is requested.
Better accountability : The work of auditors will be closely supervised by audit committees, whose competences are strengthened. In addition, the package introduces the possibility for 5% of the shareholders of the company to initiate actions to dismiss the auditors. A set of administrative sanctions that can be applied by the competent authorities is also foreseen for breaches of the new rules.
2. A strong independence regime
Mandatory rotation of audit firms : Audit firms will be required to rotate after an engagement period of 10 years. After maximum 10 years, the period can be extended by up to 10 additional years if tenders are carried out, and by up to 14 additional years in case of joint audit, i.e. if the company being audited appoints more than one audit firm to carry out its audit. A calibrated transitional period taking into account the duration of the audit engagement is foreseen to avoid a cliff effect following the entry into force of the new rules.
Prohibition of certain non-audit services : Audit firms will be strictly prohibited from providing non-audit services to their audit clients, including stringent limits on tax advice and services linked to the financial and investment strategy of the audit client. This aims to limit risk of conflicts of interest, when auditors are involved in decisions impacting the management of a company. This will also substantially limit the ‘self-review’ risks for auditors.
Cap on the provision of non-audit services: To reduce the risks of conflicts of interest, the new rules will introduce a cap of 70% on the fees generated for non-audit services others than those prohibited based on a three-year average at the group level.
3. A more dynamic and competitive EU audit market
A Single Market for statutory audit : The new rules will provide a level playing field for auditors at EU level through enhanced cross-border mobility and the harmonisation of International Standards on Auditing (ISAs).
More choice : In order to promote competition, the new rules prohibit restrictive ‘Big Four only’ third party clauses imposed on companies. Incentives for joint audit and tendering will be introduced, and a proportionate application of the rules will be applied to avoid extra burden for small and mid-tier audit firms. Tools to monitor the concentration of the audit market will be reinforced.
Enhanced supervision of the audit sector : Cooperation between national supervisors will be enhanced at EU level, with a specific role devoted to the European Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA) with regard to international cooperation on audit oversight.
Voici également le point de vue de Julia Irvine présenté dans Economia.
Listed companies will have to tender their audit every 10 years and rotate auditors every 20 years after trilogue agreement was reached this morning on a package of audit reform measures
Certain non-audit services – such as some tax and corporate finance advice – which impact on an audit client’s financial and investment strategy, will be banned, and shareholders will find it easier to initiate action to get the auditors dismissed.
The measures, which were agreed between the European Parliament and the Lithuanian EU presidency, still have to be approved later this week by COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives of the member states. The European Parliament will then have to formally adopt the text next year.
Negotiations over audit reform reached stalemate earlier this month and led to the decision by British MEP and lead rapporteur Sajjad Karim to cancel scheduled trilogue discussions “because of a lack of will by some parties to compromise”. The major sticking points were mandatory rotation of auditors and non-audit services.
However, the breakthrough came today, thanks to “constructive efforts from all sides to find a way forward”, Karim said, adding that the compromise on a 20-year timespan for rotation was workable and a “considerable improvement on the commission’s original proposal”.
The agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit market.
Other measures under the agreement include extending companies that have joint auditors can extend the 20 years to 24 and a four-year transitional period to avoid every company going out to tender at the same time.
Auditors will be prohibited from providing certain non-audit services to audit clients, including “stringent limits” on tax advice and services. The measures also include a 70% cap on fees from all other non-audit services, based on a three-year average at group level.
Big Four only clauses are banned and incentives for joint audit and tendering (as yet unspecified) are to be introduced. It is also intended that the rules will be applied proportionately to avoid extra burdens on small and mid-tier audit firms.
Auditors will have to provide more detailed and informative audit reports, focusing on relevant information for investors, they will be bound by strict transparency requirements in their communications with supervisors and will generally be required to talk more often to a client’s audit committee.
Shareholders will be able to start action to dismiss the auditors, provided 5% of them collaborate.
Finally, the package of measures will ensure a level playing field for auditors throughout the European Union through enhanced cross-border mobility and harmonisation of international auditing standards.
EU commissioner Michel Barnier hailed the outline agreement as “the first step towards increasing audit quality and re-establishing investor confidence in financial information, an essential ingredient for investment and economic growth in Europe”.
Auditors, he said, played an important societal role by providing stakeholders with an accurate reflection of the veracity of companies’ financial statements. “However, a number of banks were given clean bills of health despite huge losses from 2007 onwards. In relation to the real economy, inspection reports from the member states revealed lack of professional scepticism by auditors, misstatements and a lack of fresh thinking in the audits of major companies because of the average long-lasting relationship between the auditor and their clients.
“Taken all together, the agreed measures ensure that auditors will be key contributors to economic and financial stability through increased audit quality, stronger independence requirements and more open and dynamic EU audit markets.”
Karim added, “The European Parliament is optimistic that the proposal can be approved by a majority of member states and MEPs, considering it is a balanced compromise that will go a long way towards restoring confidence in the audit market.”
Initial reaction from the profession to the news was cautious. ICAEW chief executive Michael Izza said that after three years of debate and hard work, there was now hope that the follow-up work might be achieved before the EU elections on 22 May next year.
“Focus now needs to move to the transition and practical implications,” he said. “It is important not to underestimate the considerable practical impact the reform package will have, not only on the auditing profession but also on companies across the EU.
“It will take time for everybody involved – the profession, business, regulators – to work through the details and get to grips with all the changes.”
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 