La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit (8) articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com


Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques.

  1. Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME
  2. Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique
  3. La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions
  4. Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller
  5. Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter
  6. Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi
  7. Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences ?
  8. Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

 

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Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME

Une entrevue avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général du Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

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Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique

Une entrevue avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

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La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions

Une entrevue avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval

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Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

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Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault

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Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi

Une entrevue avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés

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Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?

Une entrevue avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du …

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Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Joly, président de Leaders et Cie

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Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance | Jacques Grisé


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014.

Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

sans-titre

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.


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Énoncés de principes de bonne gouvernance 2012 | Business Roundtable *


Voici un document publié par l’organisation américaire Business Roundtable qui est la plus importante association de PCD (CEO) aux É.U. et qui regroupe les plus grandes sociétés avec un total de $6 trillion en revenus annuels et plus de 12 million d’employés. Ce document présente le point de vue des hauts dirigeants de ces sociétés sur les pratiques de bonne gouvernance. Le rapport est représentatif de ce que les membres pensent que devraient être les pratiques exemplaires en matière de gouvernance. C’est une lecture vraiment très pertinente.

English: Corporate Governance

Principles of Corporate Governance – 2012

« Business Roundtable supports the following guiding principles:

First, the paramount duty of the board of directors of a public corporation is to select a chief executive officer and to oversee the CEO and senior management in the competent and ethical operation of the corporation on a day-to-day basis.

Second, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to operate the corporation in an effective and ethical manner to produce long-term value for shareholders. The board of directors, the CEO and senior management should set a “tone at the top” that establishes a culture of legal compliance and integrity. Directors and management should never put personal interests ahead of or in conflict with the interests of the corporation.

Third, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the board, to develop and implement the corporation’s strategic plans, and to identify, evaluate and manage the risks inherent in the corporation’s strategy. The board of directors should understand the corporation’s strategic plans, the associated risks, and the steps that management is taking to monitor and manage those risks. The board and senior management should agree on the appropriate risk profile for the corporation, and they should be comfortable that the strategic plans are consistent with that risk profile.

Fourth, it is the responsibility of management, under the oversight of the audit committee and the board, to produce financial statements that fairly present the financial condition and results of operations of the corporation and to make the timely disclosures investors need to assess the financial and business soundness and risks of the corporation.

Fifth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its audit committee, to engage an independent accounting firm to audit the financial statements prepared by management and issue an opinion that those statements are fairly stated in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, as well as to oversee the corporation’s relationship with the outside auditor.

Sixth, it is the responsibility of the board, through its corporate governance committee, to play a leadership role in shaping the corporate governance of the corporation and the composition and leadership of the board. The corporate governance committee should regularly assess the backgrounds, skills and experience of the board and its members and engage in succession planning for the board.

Seventh, it is the responsibility of the board, through its compensation committee, to adopt and oversee the implementation of compensation policies, establish goals for performance-based compensation, and determine the compensation of the CEO and senior management. Compensation policies and goals should be aligned with the corporation’s long-term strategy, and they should create incentives to innovate and produce long-term value for shareholders without excessive risk. These policies and the resulting compensation should be communicated clearly to shareholders.

Eighth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to engage with longterm shareholders in a meaningful way on issues and concerns that are of widespread interest to long-term shareholders, with appropriate involvement from the board of directors and management.

Ninth, it is the responsibility of the corporation to deal with its employees, customers, suppliers and other constituencies in a fair and equitable manner and to exemplify the highest standards of corporate citizenship.

These responsibilities and others are critical to the functioning of the modern public corporation and the integrity of the public markets. No law or regulation can be a substitute for the voluntary adherence to these principles by corporate directors and management in a manner that fits the needs of their individual corporations ».

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* En reprise

Articles reliés au sujet :

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Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ? *


Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i...
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

  1. Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
  2. Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
  3. Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
  4. Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
  5. Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
  6. Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

 

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013.  Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006.  Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

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* En reprise

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Comment échapper aux mythes trompeurs de la rémunération des PCD ?


Voici un texte de , professeur à Southwestern Law School, qui se questionne sérieusement sur le processus de rémunération des CEO (PCD), plus particulièrement sur les indicateurs utilisés pour en établir la valeur.

Dans son livre à paraître bientôt, « Indispensable and other myths : The empirical truth about CEO pay », il avance qu’il faut échapper à l’envie d’utiliser l’approche de la comparaison (Benchmark) avec les pairs pour fixer les rémunérations des PCD, et à l’idée de relier trop étroitement leurs rémunérations avec la capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise.

Selon lui, il n’y a pas de marché pour les talents des PCD et ceux-ci ont peu de possibilités de trouver un poste similaire dans une autre entreprise. Pourquoi alors entretenir le mythe de leur situation monopolistique, toute puissante ?

L’auteur présente une vision assez révolutionnaire de la manière de concevoir la rétribution des présidents et chefs de direction (PCD).

Je reproduis ci-dessous le billet paru sur son site Indispensable and other myths. Quel est votre point de vue sur le sujet ?

Quels sont les critères les plus raisonnables pour établir la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !

Escaping the Conformity Trap

Pearl Meyer & Partners has just released their contribution to the NACD’s new Governance Challenges 2014 and Beyond report, “Escaping the Conformity Trap: Aligning Executive Pay Programs with Business and Leadership Objectives.” I love the overall theme, which is that companies should not default to cookie-cutter measures of executive performance just because their peer companies do. The report also indicates that companies shouldn’t defer to peers on the amount of pay, though this point is less prominent. I make a similar — though more sweeping — argument in my forthcoming book, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed, and How to Fix It. (The book should be out around the end of May.)

Office Politics: A Rise to the Top
Office Politics: A Rise to the Top (Photo credit: Alex E. Proimos)

Unfortunately, while there’s a lot in the Pearl Meyer report that is laudable, there’s also a fair amount of rehashing of typical errors. On page 18 (the report starts on p. 17 for some reason), the report describes the growth in CEO pay of 12% from 2009-2012 in Fortune 100 firms as “comparatively conservative.” This is technically true, if by “comparatively conservative” Pearl Meyer means that there have been much steeper rises in executive pay. But the rationale seems to be different. The report points out that the market capitalization of Fortune 100 firms increased by 50% over this same period, and credits external scrutiny of CEO pay and a desire to remain within peers’ norms for restraining CEO pay.

The clear implication here is that CEO pay should rise in proportion to the company’s stock price. (The report says this more explicitly on page 19 when it says total shareholder return is often a good performance metric.) As I point out in Indispensable, this is a dangerous fallacy. CEOs do not control their companies’ stock price. They can influence price (especially in the short term), but careful empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that executives’ actions account for only a small percentage of share price movement. The external environment broadly — and in the industry more particularly — drive the bulk of share price movement. So why should companies peg CEO pay to the growth in share price that for the most part is independent of their actions? This sort of rhetorical move is particularly disappointing in a report whose laudable aims seems to be to move companies in precisely the opposite direction, away from easy, off-the-shelf measures like share price that fail to capture what companies should really care about.
The report also backtracks when it comes to using comparable companies to set the amount of CEO pay. Despite having at least hinted that this is a poor strategy elsewhere in the report, it states (on p. 18):

Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with providing executives with pay opportunities that reflect market norms for comparable positions in similarly sized and oriented companies.  With well-designed long-term performance metrics and goals, establishing pay opportunities  at market median will help ensure that actual, realizable pay is appropriately positioned based on relative performance outcomes.

But there absolutely is something wrong with this. As Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere have recently demonstrated, there is no market for CEO talent. Since CEOs have little ability to move to another company, why should a company care what its competitors are paying their own CEOs? Why not try to get a bargain by paying less, if the CEO can’t get a comparable job elsewhere? Scholars have advanced plenty of rationales (which I explore in the book but don’t have room to delve into here), but none of them work very well.

Although I’m disappointed that the report does not go nearly far enough, I was heartened that a major compensation consultant is at least beginning to question the conventional wisdom. It’s a small step, but at least it’s in the right direction.

 

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Vent de changement dans les pratiques de vote des actionnaires !


Toute l’attention portée à la propriété et à la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières années a menée à une réaffirmation du pouvoir du vote des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles des sociétés. Les actionnaires font entendre leurs voix de multiples manières auprès de la direction des entreprises et des conseils d’administration. La montée de l’actionnariat activiste est sûrement l’une des raisons de cette recrudescence.

La théorie de l’agence – qui veut que les actionnaires choisissent leurs agents/représentants (i.e. les administrateurs) et que ces derniers soient tenus responsables de la direction de l’organisation – semble mise à mal par les nouvelles intrusions des actionnaires dans la gestion de l’entreprise.

Les auteurs Paul H. Edelman et Randall S. Thomas, professeurs à Vanderbilt University, et Robert Thompson, professeur à Georgetown University Law Center, ont publié un document de recherche captivant portant sur le renouvellement des pratiques de votation dans une ère de « capitalisme intermédiaire ».

Quels sont les implications de ces changements pour la gouvernance des entreprises ? Assiste-t-on à un séisme dans le monde de la gouvernance ? Quelle sera la place des administrateurs dans la conduite des organisations si les actionnaires veulent faire la loi et exercer leur volonté en tout temps ?

Voici un résumé du document tel qu’il est présenté sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum. Vos commentaires sont bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

 

Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism

Shareholder voting, once given up for dead as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance, has come roaring back as a key part of American corporate governance. Where once voting was limited to uncontested annual election of directors, it is now common to see short slate proxy contests, board declassification proposals, and “Say on Pay” votes occurring at public companies. The surge in the importance of shareholder voting has caused increased conflict between shareholders and directors, a tension well-illustrated in recent high profile voting fights in takeovers (e.g. Dell) and in the growing role for Say on Pay votes. Yet, despite the obvious importance of shareholder voting, none of the existing corporate law theories coherently justify it.

Vote
Vote (Photo credit: Alan Cleaver)

Traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not easily fit with the long-standing legal structure of corporate law that generally cabins the shareholder role in corporate governance. Nor do those theories reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). Most shares today are owned by intermediaries, usually holding other people’s money within retirement plans and following business plans that gives the intermediaries little reason to vote those shares or with conflicts that may distort that vote. Yet three key developments have countered that reality and opened the way for voting’s new prominence. First, government regulations now require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their beneficiaries. Second, subsequent market innovations led to the birth of third party voting advisors, including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which help address the costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action. And third, building on these developments, hedge funds have aggressively intervened in corporate governance at firms seen as undervalued, making frequent use of the ballot box to pressure targeted firms to create shareholder value, thereby giving institutional shareholders a good reason to care about voting. In a parallel way outside of the hedge fund space, institutional investors have made dramatically greater use of voting in Say on Pay proposals, Rule 14a-8 corporate governance proposals and majority vote requirements for the election of directors.

The newly invigorated shareholder voting is not without its critics though. Corporate management has voiced fears about the increase in shareholders’ voting power, as well as about third party voting advisors’ perceived conflicts of interest. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has asked for public comments on the possible undue influence of proxy advisors over shareholder voting. Even institutional investors have varying views on the topic. Can we trust the vote to today’s intermediaries and their advisors?

In our article, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, we first develop our theory of shareholder voting. We argue that shareholders (and only shareholders) have been given the right to vote because they are the only corporate stakeholder whose return on their investment is tied directly to the company’s stock price; if stock price is positively correlated with the residual value of the firm, shareholders will want to maximize the firm’s residual value and vote accordingly. Thus, shareholder voting should lead to value maximizing decisions for the firm as a whole.

But that does not mean that shareholders should vote for everything. Economic theory and accepted principles of corporate law tell us that corporate officers exercise day to day managerial power at the public firm with boards of directors having broad monitoring authority over them. In this framework, shareholder voting is explained by its comparative value as a monitor. We would expect a shareholder vote to play a supplemental monitoring role if the issue being decided affects the company’s stock price, or long term value, and if the shareholder vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board or the market. This is particularly likely where the officers or directors of the company suffer from a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at the expense of the firm. Thus shareholder voting can play a negative role as a monitoring device by helping stop value-decreasing transactions.

Monitoring is not the only theoretical justification for shareholders voting. We posit two additional theories that provide positive reasons for corporate voting because they enhance decision-making beyond monitoring. Shareholder voting can provide: (1) a superior information aggregation device for private information held by shareholders when there is uncertainty about the correct decision; and (2) an efficient mechanism for aggregating heterogeneous preferences when the decision differentially affects shareholders.

We also explore whether contemporary shareholders have the characteristics that permit them to play the roles our theory contemplates. In particular, we examine the business plan that gives today’s intermediaries reasons not to vote or conflicts that can distort their vote. Similar attention is given to the regulatory and market changes that have grown up in response to this reality: government-required voting by intermediaries; third party proxy advisory firms to let this voting occur more efficiently; and hedge fund strategies to make voting pay, for themselves and for other intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds.

Finally, we use our theory to illuminate when shareholder voting is justified. We focus on the role of corporate voting where the issue is a high dollar, “big ticket” decision. We use hedge fund activism as an example of this scenario and show how it fits with each of the prongs of our voting theory. Here we see voting performing the monitoring role anticipated by our theory, but there is also an important role for aggregating heterogeneous preferences among shareholders as mutual funds decide whether to follow hedge fund initiatives. In addition, we make the less obvious case for shareholder voting where hedge funds drop out of the equation–on decisions that have a smaller effect on stock prices, or the company’s long term value, such as Say on Pay, majority voting proposals, and board declassification proposals.

In sum, this article presents a positive theory of corporate voting as it exists today. In doing so, it directly addresses the vast shifts in stock ownership that have created intermediary capitalism and the important role of government regulations and market participants in making corporate voting effective. At the same time, it preserves for corporate management the lion’s share of corporate decision making, subject to active shareholder monitoring using corporate voting in conflict situations that affect stock price.

The full paper is available for download here.

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La petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants


Voici un article de DEBORAH HARGREAVES sur la petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants paru dans la section Opiniator du New York Times. L’expérience européenne est particulièrement instructive à cet égard.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cet historique afin de mieux comprendre les restrictions qui seront éventuellement mises en place pour remédier aux excès en matière de rémunération des dirigeants (en relation avec les salaires moyens payés).

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Can We Close the Pay Gap ?

The issue of pay ratios has become the latest front in a worldwide debate about inequality and the widening gap between the top 1 percent and everyone else. In the United States, the financial reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act contained a provision that would force American companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their chief executive officer to the median compensation of their employees. Yet fierce criticism from the business sector has succeeded in delaying this measure for four years — and counting.

Now the European Commission in Brussels has weighed in, with a proposal currently under discussion that the European Union’s 10,000 listed companies reveal their pay ratios and allow shareholders to vote on whether they are appropriate. This has unleashed howls of protest against the European Union’s unpopular, unelected commissioners. Fund managers have called the plan weird, and business leaders have objected that shareholders don’t want such power.

Pay ratio proposals, in fact, have a venerable history. In his 1941 essay “The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius,” George Orwell advocated a limitation of incomes so that the best-paid would earn no more than 10 times the lowest-paid. But this was controversial territory, even for Orwell. A few paragraphs on, he retreated and wrote: “In practice it is impossible that earnings should be limited quite as rigidly as I have suggested.”

Several decades earlier, that Gilded Age titan John Pierpoint Morgan had endorsed a 20 to 1 ratio between the head of a company and its average worker. That same ratio was recommended in the 1970s by the American management guru Peter F. Drucker.

Yet look where we are now: In 2012, the compensation received by chief executives of companies in the S.&P. 500 index was 354 times that of rank-and-file staff.

Companies are sensitive about revealing the pay differential between the bosses and the work force partly because the gap has become so extreme. Business leaders argue that they have to offer high rewards in order to compete in a global talent pool for well-qualified executives.

After big corporations threatened to quit the country, voters in Switzerland last year rejected a referendum that would have restricted the pay gap to a ratio of 12 to 1. But the proposition still garnered 35 percent support amid a heated campaign.

The idea of a global talent pool for chief executives is, however, largely a myth. Not one of the chief executives heading up the 142 American companies in the Fortune Global 500 at the end of 2012, for example, was an external hire from overseas. There was a little movement within Europe, but over all, poaching of chief executives from abroad accounted for only 0.8 percent of C.E.O. appointments in the Fortune Global 500.

Business leaders also argue that senior managers need incentives to drive the business forward, so their compensation must be linked to the performance of the corporation, usually through the offer of big share awards for meeting certain targets. The argument that chief executive pay must be linked to the performance of the company has driven share awards ever higher — in Britain, as high as 700 percent of salary. But there is scant evidence to show a definite link between executive remuneration and a company’s success.

On the contrary, some economists say that the practice of rewarding chief executives for boosting the share price (and consequently their own compensation) makes them too short-term in their focus. The way they are paid is thus at odds with the long-term success of the company.

Moreover, the manner in which chief executives are rewarded means that it is in their interests to keep work-force wages low, in order to contain costs. This may help to explain why we have seen executive remuneration continue to rise sharply during and after the financial crisis, while work-force wages have stagnated, struggling to keep up with inflation.

Last year, the top 10 most highly paid chief executives in the United States took home more than $100 million each; most of these rewards came from shares or stock options. The survey of 2,259 American chief executives found that, on average, their remuneration had risen by 8.47 percent. At the same time, the average family income was $51,017 — little changed from the year before, and 9 percent less than its inflation-adjusted peak in 1999 of $56,080.

According to a report by the French academic Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley, incomes for the top 1 percent in the United States grew by 31.4 percent from 2009 to 2012, but the bottom 99 percent saw their wages go up by only 0.4 percent during the same period. The economists conclude that the top 1 percent captured 95 percent of the income gains in the first two years of the recovery.

Widening pay gaps have added to concerns about inequality and economic instability. This is one reason regulators are struggling to find ways of making remuneration fairer or, failing that, enforcing disclosure that shows how unfair it is.

Brussels has tried to do this by introducing a law that comes into effect next year that will cap bankers’ bonuses. Europe’s highest-paid bankers will have their bonuses restricted to 100 percent of salary, or 200 percent with prior approval of shareholders. This is largely a British issue, since most of Europe’s best-paid bankers reside in Britain.

But the bank bonus rule has seen banks making big efforts to get around it by allocating monthly allowances to their top bankers and executives to make up for lost bonuses. Banks argue that without global action on bonuses, they risk losing their top performers to Wall Street or Hong Kong.

There is probably some truth in this since bankers specifically tend to be more mobile than corporate chief executives. There is, however, a counterargument that bankers will now be more attracted to working in the European Union since their pay will generally be just as high and far more predictable than an annual bonus.

The European Union bonus saga is helpful in illustrating the often perverse consequences of trying to impose laws and regulations to limit top remuneration. In a similar fashion, President Bill Clinton’s campaign pledge in 1991 to restrict top salaries to $1 million is often cited as the point at which chief executive pay started to skyrocket in America — precisely because companies introduced payments of stock options to circumvent the rule.

A regulatory crackdown on high pay ratios can also hurt the very people it is trying to help. The imposition of a maximum pay ratio, for example, might see companies outsourcing the work of their lowest-paid employees, purely to make their figures look better.

But business is not immune to the public debate about inequality and pay distribution. There is evidence that big pay gaps can undermine employee morale, leading to strikes, more sick days and higher staff turnover. And pressure on corporate leaders to address large pay disparities because it would help their business perform more effectively can be persuasive.

There is an outside chance that business will reform itself, as some business leaders bemoan the pay scandals for inflicting damage on their sector’s reputation. But expecting multimillionaires to take a voluntary pay cut is a long shot. It might be more effective to introduce structures that will tackle egregious pay awards before they are made.

In Germany, for example, the unusual system of a two-tier board structure for company governance has helped prevent top pay rising as fast as it has in other developed nations. A supervisory board, consisting half of shareholders and half of employees elected by the work force, has the ultimate power over executives and sets top pay.

In 2012, employee board members at Volkswagen forced through a 20 percent pay cut for the chief executive even though the company was making record profits. They felt the C.E.O.’s pay was too high, his bonus targets too easy and that work-force wages had been held down. This was widely seen in Germany as a response to the controversy over inequality after the financial crisis.

There is a growing chorus of voices in Britain arguing for the election of employees onto company boards or remuneration committees. This could become an important theme in the run-up to the next general election in 2015, given the way public debate has already focused on falling living standards.

Top chief executives worldwide often take home far more in one year than most people will earn in their entire lifetime. Yet the International Monetary Fund has recognized that reducing inequality leads to “faster and more durable growth.” It is important that we put pressure on businesses and policy makers to develop measures to stop pay gaps opening up even further, and to share the rewards of success more fairly — for everyone’s benefit.

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*Deborah Hargreaves is the director of the London-based campaign group the High Pay Centre.

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Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014. Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

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La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com


Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

 

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Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME

Une entrevue avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général du Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

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Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique

Une entrevue avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

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La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions

Une entrevue avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval

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Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

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Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault

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Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi

Une entrevue avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés

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Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?

Une entrevue avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du …

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Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Joly, président de Leaders et Cie

Six sujets cruciaux à l’agenda des C.A. britanniques en 2014


Le document ci-dessous expose, de manière infographique, les défis et les occasions de changement qui se présentent aux conseils d’administration des sociétés britanniques. Le leadership du Royaume-Uni en matière d’établissement de règles de gouvernance est assez reconnu dans l’univers des pays anglo-saxons (dont les É.U, le Canada, le R.U, l’Australie …).

Le sondage commandité par l’ICSA (Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators), le Financial Times et le CSS (Company Secretarial Services) présente des résultats très encourageants sur les tendances à surveiller au cours des prochaines années.

Ainsi, on constate les résultats suivants :

80 % des répondants croient que les conditions économiques iront en s’améliorant en 2014 (vs 48 % en 2013)
51 % considère leurs C.A. comme plus diversifiés en termes de genre (vs 32 % 3n 2013)P1020267
Les perceptions, en ce qui a trait à la suffisance du pipeline de talents féminins, sont en progression (25 % par rapport à 4 % en 2013)
La confiance dans l’atteinte des cibles prévues par les autorités est de 57 %
76 % des entreprises sont conscientes des cyber-risques liés aux nouvelles technologies de l’information
Les entreprises ont l’intention de modifier significativement plusieurs aspects de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants
37 % des entreprises voient les actionnaires activistes comme ayant un impact positif sur la croissance à long terme (vs 47 % qui croient que l’activisme ne favorise pas la croissance à long terme)
87 % des entreprises ont un plan d’engagement avec les investisseurs (comparativement à 60 % en 2013)
53 % des entreprises sont en faveur de ne pas imposer de limite à la durée des mandats des administrateurs (comparativement à 32 % qui croient que l’on devrait imposer une limite de 6 ou 9 ans).

Si vous souhaitez avoir plus de détail sur ce court compte rendu, je vous invite à suivre le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Six hot topics for Boards in 2014

2014 brings many fresh challenges and opportunities to the boardroom. Recent surveys of the views of company secretaries by ICSA, the Financial Times and Company Secretarial Services (CSS) highlighted six hot topics that are set to feature highly on boardroom agendas over the coming year.

L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A.


Voici un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités. L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil.

Compte tenu de la « réticence » de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites légales, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

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La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact !

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Are you using in-camera meetings ?

More companies are encouraging candid exchange among independent directors without management present

As corporate boards face more complex and difficult decisions, they may want to consider increasing the use of in-camera meetings to get more ‘realistic’ opinions from directors before moving forward with corporate strategy.

In-camera meetings, as they are called in Canada – or executive sessions, as they are referred to in the US – are special meetings where independent directors or committees of the board convene separately from management to have candid, off-the-record discussions about matters that are important to the company.

The term ‘In camera’ derives from Latin and refers to ‘in a chamber’ which is a legal term meaning ‘in private.’ During these meetings, independent board members are free to challenge each other and speak their mind freely because minutes are generally not taken. Such meetings could be held to discuss and clarify the board’s position on issues that may produce opposing views between management and the board or to deal with issues that could involve conflicts of interest with management, such as CEO compensation.

‘In-camera meetings allow directors to talk about their view of matters without management present,’ says Jo-Anne Archibald, president of DSA Corporate Services. ‘They can talk about anything related to the company and they don’t have to worry about it being written down anywhere.’

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Précisions sur le code de gouvernance français


Afin de vous mettre à jour sur les développements de la gouvernance en France, je vous réfère à l’article publié par Samuel Schmidt dans LesÉchos.fr le 4 février 2014.

English: Bill Gates at Medef Français : Bill G...
English: Bill Gates at Medef Français : Bill Gates au Medef (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

L’auteur présente les interprétations apportées par le haut comité de gouvernance eu égard au code Afep-Medef (Association française des entreprises privéesMouvement des entreprises de France) des sociétés françaises cotées en bourse dont les sept éléments identifiés.

Je vous invite à lire l’article afin d’avoir le portrait global.

Code Afep-Medef sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées : sept lignes de force à retenir  

1) Rémunération : le « Say on pay »

L’innovation la plus marquante, tant il s’agit d’un sujet hautement sensible, réside dans l’introduction du principe dit du « say on pay », à l’article 24.3 du code Afep-Medef révisé, qui à trait à l’information et à la consultation des actionnaires sur la rémunération individuelle des « dirigeants mandataires sociaux ».

2) Les indemnités de prise de fonction (« golden hello ») sont reconnues, mais encadrées

Le code Afep-Medef révisé s’est enrichi de recommandations relatives aux golden hellos ou « indemnités de prise de fonction » pour préciser, à l’article 23.2.5, qu’elles ne peuvent être accordées « qu’à un nouveau dirigeant mandataire social venant d’une société extérieure du groupe » et que « son montant doit être rendu public au moment de sa fixation ».

3) Les indemnités de non-concurrence sont plus strictement encadrées

Il en va de même concernant les indemnités dites de « non-concurrence », pour lesquelles il est désormais prévu « une réflexion approfondie au sein du comité des rémunérations » et une autorisation préalable, ainsi qu’au moment du départ du dirigeant, du conseil d’administration sur l’accord de non-concurrence.

4) Toilettage pour les indemnités de départ

Concernant les « indemnités de départ » ou golden parachute, la nouvelle version du code indique que les conditions de performance doivent s’apprécier sur au moins deux exercices. Il est confirmé que l’indemnité de départ ne doit pas excéder, le cas échéant, deux ans de rémunération (fixe et variable). De plus, lorsqu’une clause de non-concurrence est en outre mise en œuvre, le cumul de ces deux indemnités ne peut excéder ce plafond.

 5) Cumuls des mandats : un code plus restrictif

Le code Afep-Medef  révisé met davantage l’accent que son prédécesseur sur la limitation du cumul des mandats. Ainsi, le nouvel article 19 du code indique que l’ »administrateur ne doit pas exercer plus de quatre autres mandats dans des sociétés cotées extérieures au groupe, y compris étrangères » et que le « dirigeant mandataire social ne doit pas exercer plus de deux autres mandats d’administrateur dans des sociétés cotées extérieures à son groupe, y compris étrangères »

6) Comités : des précisions sur l’organisation et la gouvernance

Ainsi il est recommandé, pour ces comités, de se doter d’un « règlement précisant ses attributions et ses modalités de fonctionnement », de ne pas avoir d’administrateurs dits « croisés », et de veiller à l’objectivité des conseils externes auxquels ils recourent. Il est désormais précisé de manière claire que le président, s’il est directeur général, ne peut présider le comité des nominations et que le comité des rémunérations doit être présidé par un administrateur indépendant.

7) Une force accrue conférée à la règle dite du « Comply or Explain »

Une force accrue est conférée à la règle dite du comply or explain en ce sens que la nouvelle version du code impose aux sociétés de fournir une explication claire, détaillée et pertinente, si elles souhaitent s’écarter des règles prescrites, et d’indiquer les mesures alternatives adoptées.

 Articles reliés :

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Dix (10) raisons de l’inefficacité de la gouvernance de la rémunération | Richard Leblanc


Vous êtes intéressés par la problématique de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, et préoccupés par les effets pervers de celle-ci, l’article de Richard Leblanc dans le HuffPost explique clairement et succinctement pourquoi la gouvernance de la rémunération dans les organisations ne fonctionne pas …

Vous trouverez-ci dessous le lien vers son récent article ainsi qu’une énumération des 10 raisons évoquées pour expliquer les défaillances de la gouvernance. Bonne lecture !

Ten Reasons Why Pay Governance is Not Working

Executive pay is always in the news. Just last week an executive of Yahoo walked away with what was said to be a 100M parachute. I was interviewed by CBC radio on upcoming sunshine laws that are going to be enacted in Alberta. Last month, Ontario Power Generation fired three executives after an auditor general’s report on excessive compensation. The Premier of Ontario has vowed to crack down on excessive public sector executive compensation.

Finance

Do politicians have a track record of properly addressing compensation? I don’t believe so.

Voici dix (10) raisons qui montrent que le système de gouvernance de la rémunération est déficient :

1. Politicians

2. Pay consultants

3. Lack of professional standards

4. Unnecessary complexity

5. Captured pay-settors

6. Short termism

7. Heads I win, tails you lose, or no downside for risky behaviour

8. Undue influence of Management

9. Directors not listening to Shareholders

10. Lack of oversight and accountability

__________________________________

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Grande conférence en gouvernance de sociétés | CAS


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est fier de présenter sa 8e Grande conférence en gouvernance de sociétés, qui aura lieu le mardi 4 février 2014, au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital, à Montréal, dès 17 h. Un cocktail dînatoire suivra la conférence.

La Joute by Jean-Paul Riopelle, in the Place J...

Lors de l’événement, M. Louis Morisset, président-directeur général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers, agira à titre de conférencier.

Le thème de cette conférence portera sur « La force du régulateur intégré et les grands enjeux de gouvernance ».

Grande conférence annuelle du CAS en gouvernance de sociétés | Montréal – 4  février

Inscription et déroulement [+]
Réservation avant le 25 janvier.

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Les grandes priorités des actionnaires activistes pour 2014


La grande majorité des actionnaires de compagnies publiques ne sont pas impliqués dans la gouvernance et dans le management des entreprises dans lesquelles ils ont investi. On peut dire qu’ils font confiance aux mesures prises par les actionnaires plus activistes et par les fonds d’investissement pour garantir un comportement de bon citoyen corporatif et pour prendre des décisions qui auront pour effet d’augmenter la valeur de leur investissement.

Alors quelles seront les priorités des activistes en 2014 pour assurer que les entreprises travaillent dans le meilleur intérêt des actionnaires, petits, moyens et gros …

L’article rédigé par Eleanor Bloxham, PCD de The Value Alliance, dans Fortune présente un sommaire des entrevues que l’auteure a faites avec les principaux actionnaires activistes aux É.U.

Que retrouve-t-on sur l’agenda de ces investisseurs ? Plusieurs priorités en fonction des intérêts que ces groupes d’investisseurs défendent. Cependant, il ressort un certain consensus sur les thèmes suivants :

« Board diversity, executive pay, transparency on political contributions, and human rights improvements »

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous, dont je produis un court extrait :

Activist shareholders’ top priorities for 2014

Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards.  But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.

Photo: Jetta Productions/Getty Images

Many of us free ride on actions taken by active, long-term shareholders. These unsung heroes goad managers and boards to reach better decisions, make available desirable employment opportunities and, overall, push them to act like good corporate citizens. These active investors accomplish these things by talking to companies, preparing proxy proposals for all shareholders to consider, and offering recommendations on director elections and company-sponsored proxy measures.

What shape can we expect their efforts to take this year? Overall, we can expect more sophisticated requests of companies than we’ve ever seen before, and more direct board member interaction with shareholders.

To get the behind-the-scenes skinny, I asked shareholders and others who know what’s in store this upcoming proxy season. Here are their informed, excerpted, and edited comments:

Photo: Jetta Productions/Getty Images

Également, je vous invite à visionner cette vidéo de 7 minutes produite par Lucy Marcus qui porte sur ce que le Board peut faire pour se préparer à la nouvelle offensive qui s’annonce en 2014 ?

In the Boardroom: Directors prepare for shareholder attack

Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards.  But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.

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Syllabus d’un cours sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises d’état


Ce matin, Richard Leblanc nous présente un « draft » de son nouveau syllabus de cours offert à l’Université York sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises/sociétés d’état.

Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de cours dans ce domaine – loin de là – mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y en pas de si complets … et de si exigeants.

Voyez par vous-même en suivant le lien ci-dessous pour vous rendre sur le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn et ouvrir le document présentant le syllabus.

Si vous êtes dans le domaine de la consultation, du coaching et de la formation en gouvernance, notamment des OBNL, les éléments de contenu de ce syllabus ainsi que les nombreuses références qu’il contient vous intéressera sûrement. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Syllabus du cours « Governance of Government Enterprises and Not-for-Profit Organizations »

Voici les thèmes des sessions :

  1. Introduction to Accountability Issues in Governmental and Not-for-Profit Organizations
  2. Legal Framework, Structure, Rationale, Policies, Controls
  3. Governance of State Owned Enterprises
  4. Operation of the Board, Board and Committee Meetings, and Staff Relations
  5. Development and Retirement of Directors
  6. Fundraising and Donor Stewardship
  7. Financial Oversight, Anti-Fraud, External Audit, and Internal Audit
  8. Values, Mandate, Strategy and Prerogative
  9. Risk, Internal Controls, and Assurance
  10. Organizational Performance, CEO Succession, and Executive Compensation
  11. Stakeholder Accountability of Crown Corporations and Other Public Entities: Government as Sole Shareholder, Taxpayors; Members, Donors, Funding Agencies, Beneficiaries, Volunteers, Staff, Partners, Sponsors, Community
  12. Fraud, Corruption, Lack of Oversight, and Misbehavior Case Analysis: The Senate of Canada, The Quebec Corruption Inquiry, Ontario Power Generation, the Mayor of Toronto

L’activisme des investisseurs peut être vu comme un catalyseur


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu, rédigé par  dans le magazine du NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors), et résultant d’une table ronde portant sur le phénomène des investisseurs activistes.

On notera que plusieurs experts, dans certaines circonstances, considèrent les activistes comme des agents de changement. Voici quelques extraits très intéressants :

Activism Should Be Seen as a Catalyst, Not Operational Weakness

Directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy.

While it is widely accepted that directors’ primary duty is to protect shareholder interests, directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy, participants said in a recent National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) roundtable, presented in partnership with AIG and WilmerHale.

Ellen B. Richstone (left), Jeffrey Rudman, and Steve Maggiacomo

“Shareholder activist” and “shareholder activism” are umbrella terms that encompass a range of groups, interests, and modes of action, so boards’ responses naturally will vary depending on their particular situations. Some companies may face the Icahns and Ackmans of the world, who purchase ownership stakes in companies with the hope of gaining board seats and strategic control; or institutional investors like CalPERS, which are vocal in their opinions of the companies in which they invest; and retail investors with less influence but important opinions of their own.

“Fidelity is more likely to be at your feet while Icahn is more likely to be at your throat,” said WilmerHale’s Jeffrey Rudman. Even the types of shareholder activism can vary, said Martin M. Coyne II, ranging from Harvard Business School’s Shareholder Rights Project, to derivative suits following an M&A event, to family-owned companies facing strategic differences, to private companies with initial investors who are highly involved in strategic planning, to highly influential proxy firms.

While all these voices deserve to be heard, Coyne advised boards to remain focused on an end goal, rather than trying to satisfy all parties involved. “When that topic becomes omnipresent and goes from a discussion topic that should be discussed by the board and decided upon—and you start making bad business decisions to satisfy—what it does is take away from succession planning discussions, strategy discussions, operational discussions. It distracts the board and becomes an operational weakness,” he said.

The opinions of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co., and other proxy advisors should be considered guidelines, not scripture; ensuring a solid reasoning process behind decisions is more important, participants said. Their influence can be a “good wake-up call,” said Shaun B. Higgins, to reevaluate governance practices, such as joint CEO-chair roles or certain types of compensation plans that proxy firms often campaign against. Bringing up these opinions is a jumping-off point for boards to ensure their policies are sound and defensible, and communicate those justifications to shareholders.

“What they bring is awareness to boards that there are certain issues of concern to the public that they have to address thoroughly,” said James J. Morris. “If the board can have a good rationale of why they want it that way, they’re going to be okay.”…

… Boards today must also consider investors’ and stakeholders’ interests beyond the bottom line, particularly when it comes to environmental concerns. Higgins noted that today’s reports and disclosures are more extensive than ever: “If you told me back in 2000 we were going to put corporate social responsibility in the annual report I would have said, ‘Are you kidding me?’ It wasn’t even on our radar screen.”

Participants à la table ronde :

Martin M. Coyne II, Director, Akamai Technologies, RockTech

Peter T. Francis, Director, Dover Corp., Stanford Graduate School of Business

Shaun B. Higgins, Director, Aryzta AG, Carmine Labriola

Scott Hunter, FCA, Director, Allied World Assurance Company Holdings

James G. Jones, CFA, Founder/Portfolio Manager Sterling Investment Advisors; Director, CFA Institute

Jerry L. Levens, Director, Hancock Holding Co.

Steve Maggiacomo, SVP Financial Lines, AIG

James J. Morris, Principal, 2 Ventures; Director, Esterline Technologies, JURA Corp., LORD Corp.

Craig W. Nunez, Chairman and CEO, Bocage Group; Director, Goodwill Industries of Houston, Medical Bridges

Steve Pannucci, Professional Liability Underwriting Manager, AIG

Donald K. Peterson, Director, Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, TIAA-CREF

Ellen B. Richstone, Director, ERI, OpEx Engine, NACD New England

Andrea Robinson, Partner, WilmerHale

Jeffrey Rudman, Partner, WilmerHale

Carole J. Shapazian, Director, Baxter International

Richard Szafranski, Director, Corporate Office Properties Trust, Cleared Solutions

Convergence de vue accrue entre administrateurs et investisseurs


Voici un rapport de recherche de PwC qui tend à démontrer que les administrateurs et les investisseurs partagent les mêmes points de vue sur les plusieurs priorités, dont les suivantes :

(1) la planification stratégique,

(2) la gestion du risque et

(3) la planification de la succession.

Une belle lecture du temps des Fêtes!

What’s important to directors and investors? Depends on whose shoes you’re in !

BoardroomDirect® Update on the current board issues: November 2013There is considerable alignment between directors’ and investors’ views on the important issues directors should be focusing on in the coming year, according to the report. Both groups include strategic planning, risk management, and succession planning as top priorities. Ninety-five percent of investors say strategic planning is the “most or a very important” area for director focus while nearly eight of 10 directors say they want to spend more time in that area going forward.

In the area of IT, more than three-quarters of investors believe directors should be at least “moderately” focused on new business models enabled by IT, but only 45% of directors say they are very or moderately engaged in doing so.

For director Mike Monahan, deciding on how to provide oversight of new IT-enabled business models versus major IT project implementations is not black and white.

“They are both important, and the relative importance depends a great deal on the core mission and market characteristics of the company,” said Monahan, audit committee chair for CMS Energy.

He points to a development at a large public gas and electric utility where he sits on the board. “We are in the process of installing a so-called smart energy system whereby the company will provide meters with the capability of providing significant value to customers by enabling them to better manage their energy consumption,” he said. “The communication regime with the customer is important, but the IT-based development and installation project is more important. Without an effective application there would be no smart energy system.”

Other key findings from the PwC comparison of the director and investor surveys include:

Compensation

Directors and investors both believe that compensation consultants are “very influential” over board decisions on executive compensation (41% and 37%, respectively). And, each group had similar views on the influence of institutional shareholders, rating them “very influential” at 22% and 18%, respectively. However, by a margin of 38 percentage points investors are more likely than directors to believe that CEO pressure has a “very influential” effect on board decisions about compensation.

Investor-Relations-auf-Facebook

At least 70% of directors and investors indicate that some type of action was taken by their company in response to say on pay voting results. But investors believe that directors should reconsider their companies’ executive compensation plan at relatively lower levels of negative voting.

Regulatory and enforcement

Forty-seven percent of investors and 64% of directors say recent legislative, regulatory and enforcement initiatives have increased investor protections “not very much” or “not at all,” with very few (2% and 4%, respectively) indicating that they have helped “very much.” At the same time, one-third of directors and almost one in five investors think the costs to companies of such increased activities have “very much” exceeded the potential benefits. Eighty percent of investors and three-fourths of directors also conclude these initiatives have increased public trust in the corporate sector “not very much” or “not at all.”

Board composition, structure and performance

Twenty-eight percent of directors say the ability of boards to provide effective oversight has increased in the last 12 months, compared to 19% of investors. Similarly, 33% of directors say that board effectiveness in overseeing risk has increased compared to 27% of investors.

Nineteen percent of investors indicate the board should reconsider re-nomination of a director if he/she receives between 11% and 15% negative shareholder voting, compared to only 8% of directors who would use the same benchmark.

The report also compares CEO viewpoints alongside directors and investors regarding company strategy and risk management. It showed that all three parties believe customers and clients have the most significant influence on company strategy. As for the greatest impediment to growth, directors and investors said it is “uncertain or volatile economic growth” (91%) while CEOs said it is government response to “fiscal deficit and debt burden” (93%).

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Appointment of independent directors necessary for improved corporate governance – The Economic Times (csuitementor.wordpress.com)

NACD Issues Perspective on Executive Compensation Definitions to Help Corporate Boards Communicate Link Between Pay and Performance (virtual-strategy.com)

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ?


Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i...
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

  1. Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
  2. Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
  3. Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
  4. Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
  5. Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
  6. Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

 

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013.  Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006.  Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board | The Directors Toolkit


Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en cette fin d’année 2013 et Joyeuses Fêtes à tous et à toutes.

The Directors Toolkit

Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.

At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.

To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.

Key topics :

The Directors' Toolkit cover

Duties and responsibilities of a director

Oversight of strategy and governance

Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations

Structuring an effective board and sub-committees

Enabling key executive appointments

Managing productive meetings

Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas

Establishing new boar

Article relié :

Le comité de gouvernance du C.A. | Élément clé d’une solide stratégie (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)