Quelques idées à explorer en 2014 pour accroître la performance du C.A. d’une OBNL *

Voici un court billet de Tom Okarma, président fondateur de Vantage Point | For NonProfit, exposant certaines idées pour accroître l’efficacité de C.A. d’OBNL.

Ci-dessous, un extrait de son billet ainsi que quelques liens utiles pour améliorer la performance des « Boards ». Bonne lecture !

No More Nonprofit Board Problems in 2014 !

Here are a few ideas to help ministry and nonprofit leaders work more closely (and pleasurably) with their boards. Who knows, maybe everyone will actually start enjoying board meetings!

Nonprofit_Expo_01 (Photo credit: shawncalhoun)

Reconnect regularly with each director, one-to-one if possible, to tap into their wisdom, learn their perspective, and gain valuable confidential input

Invest to improve on your strengths through seminars, workshops, or conferences…like CLA 2014

Identify existing nonprofit board best practices and install the top two that you feel add the most value to your organization

When meeting with key external stakeholders, ask how they think the organization is performing

Be more available to your staff, volunteers, and key community partners

Become a director on another nonprofit or ministry board and gain valuable perspective of just what that is like

Review your calendar monthly and the organization’s budget to determine if you are allocating time and treasure in line with the year’s goals

Conduct periodic board update (they hate “training”) sessions

For a few other easy and effective ideas on how to improve board relations and effectiveness in 2014, read :

(du site de Vantage Point | For NonProfit)

Electrify Your Sleepy Directors

Board Presidents that Don’t Bore

Board Meetings The Don’t Bore

Maximize Your Board’s Performance in 2014

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* En reprise

Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | Version française *

Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde.

Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists.

Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige l’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise – document en français

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées.

Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à la version anglaise de l’ouvrage que j’avais publiée antérieurement.

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox: How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

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Le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents *

Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.

EYE ON THE HORIZON : INTERNAL AUDIT’S ROLE IN IDENTIFYING EMERGING RISKS

Key elements of emerging risks

Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.

Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.

Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.

The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.

Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).

Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter l’enquête de Thomson Reuters Accelus Survey on Internal Audit dont nous avons parlé dans notre billet du 7 juin.

New duties on horizon for internal auditors

“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”

New risks

As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.

Thomson Reuters Messenger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.

The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:

Economic stability (54%).

Cybersecurity (52%).

Major shifts in technology (48%).

Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).

Data privacy regulations (39%).

Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:

Data analytics;

Business strategy;

Deep industry experience;

Risk management; and

Fraud prevention and detection.

“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”

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* En reprise

Keeping Internal Auditors Up to the Challenge (forbes.com)

Internal Audit Has To STOP Focusing On Internal Controls (business2community.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Useful Internal Auditing in 4 Easy Steps (isocertificationaustralia.com)

Thomson Reuters Develops Accelus Governance, Risk and Compliance Platform (risk-technology.typepad.com)

Le rôle du C.A. dans la gestion des risques *

La gestion des risques est une activité-clé qui doit être orchestrée par la direction de l’entreprise. Mais quel doit être le rôle du conseil d’administration en matière de surveillance de l’exécution de cette tâche essentielle ?

Quel est effectivement l’étendu du rôle du conseil dans les grandes sociétés publiques américaines. C’est ce que le document du Conference Board, présenté ici, décrit avec moult détails et d’une manière exceptionnellement bien illustrée.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce texte qui traite des aspects suivants :

Responsabilité pour l’établissement des stratégies

Fréquence des révisions des stratégies

Réunion spéciale de planification stratégique

Adoption d’une approche standardisée telle qu’ERM (Enterprise Risk Management)

Responsabilité pour la surveillance des risques

Fréquence des comptes rendus de la direction au C.A. en matière de risque

Le responsable en chef de la gestion des risques (CRO)

Le comité des risques de l’entreprise

Risk in the Boardroom

Any business is exposed to risks that can threaten its ability to execute its strategy. For this reason, strategy and risk oversight are inherently connected. Today, more than ever, the board of directors is expected to thoroughly assess key business risks and ensure that the enterprise is equipped to mitigate them. This Directors Notes discusses the current corporate practices on risk oversight by directors of U.S. public companies. Findings detail where the board assigns these responsibilities, whether it avails itself of dedicated reporting lines from senior management on risk issues, and the degree to which it adopts a standardized framework on enterprise risk management (ERM).

ERM – Enterprise Risk Management (Photo credit: Orange Steeler)

Given the correlation between risk and strategy, data on the frequency and forms of strategic reviews is also presented. The findings are from the most recent edition of the Board Practices Survey, which The Conference Board conducts annually in collaboration with NASDAQ OMX and NYSE Euronext (see “The Board Practices Survey” on p. 5). The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that financial institutions strengthen their risk oversight by establishing a dedicated risk committee of the board of directors.

In addition, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require all public companies to disclose the extent of their board’s role in overseeing the organization’s risk exposure, including how the board administers its risk oversight function and how the leadership structure accommodates such a role.

Finally, in October 2009, the SEC reversed a policy under which shareholder proposals relating to the evaluation of risk could be excluded from a company’s proxy materials as related to the company’s ordinary day-to-day business activities. Collectively, these developments are a nod in the direction of addressing the risk oversight failures that played so prominently in the 2008 financial crisis. Most important, they are expected to increase scrutiny of risk management programs and their endorsement and close supervision by senior leaders of corporations.

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* En reprise

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit (8) articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques.

Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME
Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique
La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions
Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller
Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter
Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi
Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences ?
Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

Présenté par

Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME

Une entrevue avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général du Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique

Une entrevue avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions

Une entrevue avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault

Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi

Une entrevue avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés

Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?

Une entrevue avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du …

Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Joly, président de Leaders et Cie

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La bonne gouvernance selon Munger, vice-président du C.A. de Berkshire *

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.

Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :

1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?

2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?

3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?

À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.

Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !

Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance.

Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.

Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger

How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.

Trust-Based Governance

The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.

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* En reprise

Grands courants de pensées en gouvernance | Propositions de réforme au cours des 60 dernières années *

Je vous propose la lecture d’un essai sur les principaux courants de pensées en gouvernance des sociétés au cours des soixante dernières années. Ce document, écrit par Douglas M. Branson de l’École de Droit de l’Université de Pittsburgh et paru dans le Social Science Research Network (SSRN), représente certainement l’un des points de vue les plus articulés sur la recherche d’une explication valable à la thèse de Berle et Means concernant la séparation de la propriété de celle du contrôle des firmes.

Bien que l’essai soit rédigé dans un style assez provocateur, il est fascinant à lire, pour peu que l’on soit familier avec la langue de Shakespeare et que l’on s’accommode des accents grinçants de l’auteur.

Je recommande fortement la lecture de ce texte à tout étudiant de la gouvernance; c’est un must pour comprendre le champ d’étude ! J’ai obtenu l’autorisation de Douglas Branson pour la traduction de ce document.

Voici les points saillants de l’essai de Branson (en anglais, à ce stade-ci) :

Logo of the American Law Institute. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented the widespread dispersion of corporate shareholders, and the atomization of corporate shareholdings. They noted that in the then modern corporation “ownership has become depersonalized”. The result was that a new form of property had come into being. The person who owned the property no longer controlled it, as the farmer who owned the horse had to feed it, teach it pull the plow, and bury it when it died. “In the corporate system, the ‘owner’ of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control.” This was the fabled “separation of ownership from control.”
In one of the best known of his books (1956), American Capitalism : The Concept of Countervailing Power, Galbraith rhetorically posed a number of solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate power, including the separation of ownership from control, although he generally did not use the Berle & Means terminology. He did not propose nationalization, as the British had done. Instead, he theorized that, indeed, corporations had grown too large, their shareholders no longer controlled them, competitive market forces no longer constrained them, and the potential for abuse was great. That potential would be checked however by the growth of countervailing power inherent in the growth of labor unions, consumer groups and government agencies. Galbraith pointed to the growth and influence of consumer cooperatives which enjoyed great growth in Scandinavia, at least in the post-War years. Essentially, those newly empowered groups would supply the controls historically owners had provided.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement of the Early 70s called for government intervention, as the nationalization movement had, but on discrete fronts rather than on a plenary basis. One scholar urged replacement of the one share one vote standard prevalent in U.S. corporate law with a graduated scale so that with acquisition of addition shares owners, particularly institutional owners who were perceived to be excessively mercenary would receive less and less voting power. A “power to the people” mandate would augment the power of individual owners, who generally held fewer shares but were thought to be more socially conscious. Calls for required installation of public interest directors on publicly held corporations’ boards sometimes included sub-recommendations that legislation also require that the publicly minded be equipped with offices and staffs, at corporate expense. Others proposed requirements for social auditing and for mandatory disclosure of social audit results.
Toward the second half of the 1970s, The Corporate Accountability Research Group, created and promoted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, gathered evidence, marshaled arguments, and advocated the other, more drastic reform of the 1970s, federal chartering of large corporations. In certain of its incarnations, chartering advocates expanded the proposal’s reach, from the 500 largest enterprises to the 2000 largest U.S. corporations by revenue, to any corporation which did a significant amount of business with the federal government, and to certain categories of companies whose businesses were thought to be infected with the public interest. Whatever the universe of such corporations, these companies would have to re-register with a new federal entity, the Federal Chartering Agency. In addition, these corporations would no longer have perpetual existence as they had under state law. Instead the new federal statute corporations would have only limited life charters, good for, say, 20 or 25 years limited.
A Seismic Shift: the Swift Rise of Law and Economics Jurisprudence of the 1980s. Perhaps only once in a lifetime will one see as pronounced a jurisprudential shift as that from the corporate social responsibility and federal chartering movements to the minimalist, non-invasive take of economics on corporate law and corporate governance. Law and economics pointed to a minimalist corporate jurisprudence the core theory of which was that market forces regulated corporate and managerial behavior much better than regulation, laws, or lawsuits ever could.
An Antidote: The Good Governance Movement. The American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate Governance Project of 1994 constituted an implicit rejection of, and an antidote to, the law and economics movement. Succinctly, the ALI evinced a strong belief that, yes, corporate law does have a role to play. That belief, sometimes characterized as the constitutionalist approach, in contrast to the contractarian approach, underline and buttresses the entire ALI Project. The ALI crafted recommended rules for corporate objectives; structure, including board composition and committee structure; duty of “fair dealing” (duty of loyalty); duty of care and the business judgment rule; roles of directors and shareholders in control transactions and tender offers; and shareholders’remedies, including the derivative action and appraisal remedies.
The Early 1990s: The Emphasis on Institutional Investor Activism. Traditionally, though, institutional investors followed the “Wall Street Rule,” meaning that if they developed an aversion to a portfolio company’s performance or governance, they simply sold the stock rather than becoming embroiled in a corporate governance issue. Institutions voted with their feet. That is, they did so until portfolio positions had become so large that if an institutional investor liquidated even a sizeable portion of the portfolio’s stake in a company, the institution’s sales alone would push down the stock’s price. Thus, in the modern era, institutional investors are faced with more of a buy and hold strategy than they otherwise might prefer. So was born an opening to push for yet another proposed reform which would fill the vacuum created by the separation of ownership from control, namely, institutional activism, or “agents watching agents.” The case for institutional oversight was that because “product, capital, labor, and corporate control constraints on managerial discretion are imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the institutions are the only institutions available.”
The Shift to an Emphasis on “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance. In the second half of the 90s decade, the governance prognosticators did an abrupt about face, abandoning talk about the prospect of institutional shareholder activism in favor of pontification on the prospect of global convergence. The thesis went something like this. Through the process of globalization the world had become a much smaller place. Through use of media such as email and the Internet, governance advocates in Singapore now knew, or knew how to find out, what was happening on the corporate governance front in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to U.S. academics, the global model of good governance would replicate the U.S. model of corporate governance, of course…
Shift of the Emphasis to the Gatekeepers in 2001. Whatever the U.S. system was, it had a great many defects and it did not do the job for which it had been devised. In addition, of course, no sign existed that the convergence predicted had taken place. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heads off in varying directions but a careful reader can discern that one of the legislation’s dominant themes is strengthening gatekeepers as a means of enhancing watchfulness over corporations. Thus, for example, SOX requires public corporations to have audit committees composed of independent directors, one or more of whom must be financial experts. Section 307 imposes whistleblowing duties upon attorneys who uncover wrongdoing. To enhance their independence, SOX requires that accountings firms which audit public companies no longer may provide a long list of lucrative consulting services for audit clients.
Emphasis on Independent Directors and Independent Board Committees. The movement for independent directors gathered steam with the 2002 SOX legislation, which required that SEC reporting companies, that is, most publicly held corporations, have an audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange followed by amendments to its Listing Manual that listed public companies have a majority of directors who are independent, making the 1994 ALI recommendation of good practice into a hard and fast requirement. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act jumped on the independent director bandwagon with its requirement that exchanges refuse to list the shares of corporations who disclose they do not have a compensation committee comprised of independent directors. Observers who have written about the issue assume that the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement is a de facto requirement that corporations have compensation committees, albeit a backhanded sort of requirement.

L’extrait que je vous présente vous donnera une bonne idée de la teneur des propos de Branson. Vous pouvez télécharger le document de 25 pages.

Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés. Bonne lecture.

Proposals for Corporate Governance Reform: Six Decades of Ineptitude and Counting

This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the « reform » agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that are perceived to exist. The third inquiry is to ask why this is so? Possible answers include the top down nature of scholarship and reform proposals in corporate governance; the closed nature of the group controlling the agenda, confined as it is to 8-10 academics at elite institutions; the lack of any attempt rethink or redefine the challenges which governance may or may not face; and the continued adhesion to the problem as the separation of ownership from control as Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means perceived it more than 80 years ago.

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* En reprise

Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014.

Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Quel est le cadre juridique du fonctionnement d’un conseil consultatif de PME ? *

Quel est le cadre juridique du fonctionnement d’un conseil consultatif de PME ? Voici quelques éléments d’information en réponse à une question souvent posée dans le cadre de la formation en gouvernance de sociétés.

Cette question a été soumise à la considération de Me Raymonde Crête, professeure de droit à l’Université Laval et de Me Thierry Dorval, associé de Norton Rose.

Je reproduis ici la réponse de ces deux experts juridiques en gouvernance :

« Dans une PME, il est possible de créer un comité consultatif. Il n’existe pas de règles spécifiques concernant la création de ce type de comité. Les membres du comité consultatif ne sont pas, en principe, assujettis aux responsabilités qui incombent normalement aux administrateurs de sociétés, à moins qu’ils agissent, dans les faits, comme des administrateurs. Si les membres du comité consultatif agissent, dans les faits ou de facto, comme des administrateurs de sociétés, ils pourraient engager leur responsabilité, notamment en matière fiscale ou d’environnement. L’article 227.1 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu impose aux administrateurs une responsabilité solidaire en cas de non-paiement de certains impôts. Pour éviter d’engager leur responsabilité, les membres du comité consultatif ne doivent donc pas exercer des fonctions analogues ou des pouvoirs similaires à ceux exercés par les membres d’un conseil d’administration, tels les pouvoirs décisionnels en matière d’émission d’actions, de déclaration de dividendes, etc ».

Concernant les responsabilités du conseil d’administration, vous pouvez consulter le document ci-dessous publié par Norton Rose.

Identification et gestion des risques que comporte le rôle d’administrateur de société

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* En reprise

Histoire récente de l’essor des investisseurs activistes | Conditions favorables et avenir prévisible ? *

Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.

Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.

English: Study on alternative investments by i... — English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.

Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :

Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.

À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).

Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism

One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of

2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.

The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism

Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.

In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.

Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism

Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.

… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.

Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”

Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.

Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.

In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.

Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.

In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.

The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.

These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.

Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.

And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.

Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.

One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.

What to Expect Ahead

The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.

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* En reprise

Finding Value in Shareholder Activism (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Effective Stakeholder Engagement (venitism.blogspot.com)

The Evolving Direction and Increasing Influence of Shareholder Activism (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder activism on the rise in Canada (business.financialpost.com)

Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

American Activist Investors Get Ready To Invade Europe (forbes.com)

Activist Investors Help Companies, Not Workers – Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)

The Separation of Ownership from Ownership (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Réflexions capitales pour les Boards en 2014 – The Harvard Law School (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance by Paul Rose, Bernard S. Sharfman (togovern.wordpress.com)

Comment échapper aux mythes trompeurs de la rémunération des PCD ?

Voici un texte de Michael Dorff, professeur à Southwestern Law School, qui se questionne sérieusement sur le processus de rémunération des CEO (PCD), plus particulièrement sur les indicateurs utilisés pour en établir la valeur.

Dans son livre à paraître bientôt, « Indispensable and other myths : The empirical truth about CEO pay », il avance qu’il faut échapper à l’envie d’utiliser l’approche de la comparaison (Benchmark) avec les pairs pour fixer les rémunérations des PCD, et à l’idée de relier trop étroitement leurs rémunérations avec la capitalisation boursière de l’entreprise.

Selon lui, il n’y a pas de marché pour les talents des PCD et ceux-ci ont peu de possibilités de trouver un poste similaire dans une autre entreprise. Pourquoi alors entretenir le mythe de leur situation monopolistique, toute puissante ?

L’auteur présente une vision assez révolutionnaire de la manière de concevoir la rétribution des présidents et chefs de direction (PCD).

Je reproduis ci-dessous le billet paru sur son site Indispensable and other myths. Quel est votre point de vue sur le sujet ?

Quels sont les critères les plus raisonnables pour établir la rémunération des hauts dirigeants ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !

Escaping the Conformity Trap

Pearl Meyer & Partners has just released their contribution to the NACD’s new Governance Challenges 2014 and Beyond report, “Escaping the Conformity Trap: Aligning Executive Pay Programs with Business and Leadership Objectives.” I love the overall theme, which is that companies should not default to cookie-cutter measures of executive performance just because their peer companies do. The report also indicates that companies shouldn’t defer to peers on the amount of pay, though this point is less prominent. I make a similar — though more sweeping — argument in my forthcoming book, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed, and How to Fix It. (The book should be out around the end of May.)

Office Politics: A Rise to the Top (Photo credit: Alex E. Proimos)

Unfortunately, while there’s a lot in the Pearl Meyer report that is laudable, there’s also a fair amount of rehashing of typical errors. On page 18 (the report starts on p. 17 for some reason), the report describes the growth in CEO pay of 12% from 2009-2012 in Fortune 100 firms as “comparatively conservative.” This is technically true, if by “comparatively conservative” Pearl Meyer means that there have been much steeper rises in executive pay. But the rationale seems to be different. The report points out that the market capitalization of Fortune 100 firms increased by 50% over this same period, and credits external scrutiny of CEO pay and a desire to remain within peers’ norms for restraining CEO pay.

The clear implication here is that CEO pay should rise in proportion to the company’s stock price. (The report says this more explicitly on page 19 when it says total shareholder return is often a good performance metric.) As I point out in Indispensable, this is a dangerous fallacy. CEOs do not control their companies’ stock price. They can influence price (especially in the short term), but careful empirical studies have repeatedly demonstrated that executives’ actions account for only a small percentage of share price movement. The external environment broadly — and in the industry more particularly — drive the bulk of share price movement. So why should companies peg CEO pay to the growth in share price that for the most part is independent of their actions? This sort of rhetorical move is particularly disappointing in a report whose laudable aims seems to be to move companies in precisely the opposite direction, away from easy, off-the-shelf measures like share price that fail to capture what companies should really care about.
The report also backtracks when it comes to using comparable companies to set the amount of CEO pay. Despite having at least hinted that this is a poor strategy elsewhere in the report, it states (on p. 18):

Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with providing executives with pay opportunities that reflect market norms for comparable positions in similarly sized and oriented companies. With well-designed long-term performance metrics and goals, establishing pay opportunities at market median will help ensure that actual, realizable pay is appropriately positioned based on relative performance outcomes.

But there absolutely is something wrong with this. As Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere have recently demonstrated, there is no market for CEO talent. Since CEOs have little ability to move to another company, why should a company care what its competitors are paying their own CEOs? Why not try to get a bargain by paying less, if the CEO can’t get a comparable job elsewhere? Scholars have advanced plenty of rationales (which I explore in the book but don’t have room to delve into here), but none of them work very well.

Although I’m disappointed that the report does not go nearly far enough, I was heartened that a major compensation consultant is at least beginning to question the conventional wisdom. It’s a small step, but at least it’s in the right direction.

Vent de changement dans les pratiques de vote des actionnaires !

Toute l’attention portée à la propriété et à la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières années a menée à une réaffirmation du pouvoir du vote des actionnaires lors des assemblées annuelles des sociétés. Les actionnaires font entendre leurs voix de multiples manières auprès de la direction des entreprises et des conseils d’administration. La montée de l’actionnariat activiste est sûrement l’une des raisons de cette recrudescence.

La théorie de l’agence – qui veut que les actionnaires choisissent leurs agents/représentants (i.e. les administrateurs) et que ces derniers soient tenus responsables de la direction de l’organisation – semble mise à mal par les nouvelles intrusions des actionnaires dans la gestion de l’entreprise.

Les auteurs Paul H. Edelman et Randall S. Thomas, professeurs à Vanderbilt University, et Robert Thompson, professeur à Georgetown University Law Center, ont publié un document de recherche captivant portant sur le renouvellement des pratiques de votation dans une ère de « capitalisme intermédiaire ».

Quels sont les implications de ces changements pour la gouvernance des entreprises ? Assiste-t-on à un séisme dans le monde de la gouvernance ? Quelle sera la place des administrateurs dans la conduite des organisations si les actionnaires veulent faire la loi et exercer leur volonté en tout temps ?

Voici un résumé du document tel qu’il est présenté sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum. Vos commentaires sont bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism

Shareholder voting, once given up for dead as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance, has come roaring back as a key part of American corporate governance. Where once voting was limited to uncontested annual election of directors, it is now common to see short slate proxy contests, board declassification proposals, and “Say on Pay” votes occurring at public companies. The surge in the importance of shareholder voting has caused increased conflict between shareholders and directors, a tension well-illustrated in recent high profile voting fights in takeovers (e.g. Dell) and in the growing role for Say on Pay votes. Yet, despite the obvious importance of shareholder voting, none of the existing corporate law theories coherently justify it.

Vote (Photo credit: Alan Cleaver)

Traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not easily fit with the long-standing legal structure of corporate law that generally cabins the shareholder role in corporate governance. Nor do those theories reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). Most shares today are owned by intermediaries, usually holding other people’s money within retirement plans and following business plans that gives the intermediaries little reason to vote those shares or with conflicts that may distort that vote. Yet three key developments have countered that reality and opened the way for voting’s new prominence. First, government regulations now require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their beneficiaries. Second, subsequent market innovations led to the birth of third party voting advisors, including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which help address the costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action. And third, building on these developments, hedge funds have aggressively intervened in corporate governance at firms seen as undervalued, making frequent use of the ballot box to pressure targeted firms to create shareholder value, thereby giving institutional shareholders a good reason to care about voting. In a parallel way outside of the hedge fund space, institutional investors have made dramatically greater use of voting in Say on Pay proposals, Rule 14a-8 corporate governance proposals and majority vote requirements for the election of directors.

The newly invigorated shareholder voting is not without its critics though. Corporate management has voiced fears about the increase in shareholders’ voting power, as well as about third party voting advisors’ perceived conflicts of interest. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has asked for public comments on the possible undue influence of proxy advisors over shareholder voting. Even institutional investors have varying views on the topic. Can we trust the vote to today’s intermediaries and their advisors?

In our article, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, we first develop our theory of shareholder voting. We argue that shareholders (and only shareholders) have been given the right to vote because they are the only corporate stakeholder whose return on their investment is tied directly to the company’s stock price; if stock price is positively correlated with the residual value of the firm, shareholders will want to maximize the firm’s residual value and vote accordingly. Thus, shareholder voting should lead to value maximizing decisions for the firm as a whole.

But that does not mean that shareholders should vote for everything. Economic theory and accepted principles of corporate law tell us that corporate officers exercise day to day managerial power at the public firm with boards of directors having broad monitoring authority over them. In this framework, shareholder voting is explained by its comparative value as a monitor. We would expect a shareholder vote to play a supplemental monitoring role if the issue being decided affects the company’s stock price, or long term value, and if the shareholder vote is likely to be superior, or complementary, to monitoring by the board or the market. This is particularly likely where the officers or directors of the company suffer from a conflict of interest, or may otherwise be seeking private benefits at the expense of the firm. Thus shareholder voting can play a negative role as a monitoring device by helping stop value-decreasing transactions.

Monitoring is not the only theoretical justification for shareholders voting. We posit two additional theories that provide positive reasons for corporate voting because they enhance decision-making beyond monitoring. Shareholder voting can provide: (1) a superior information aggregation device for private information held by shareholders when there is uncertainty about the correct decision; and (2) an efficient mechanism for aggregating heterogeneous preferences when the decision differentially affects shareholders.

We also explore whether contemporary shareholders have the characteristics that permit them to play the roles our theory contemplates. In particular, we examine the business plan that gives today’s intermediaries reasons not to vote or conflicts that can distort their vote. Similar attention is given to the regulatory and market changes that have grown up in response to this reality: government-required voting by intermediaries; third party proxy advisory firms to let this voting occur more efficiently; and hedge fund strategies to make voting pay, for themselves and for other intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds.

Finally, we use our theory to illuminate when shareholder voting is justified. We focus on the role of corporate voting where the issue is a high dollar, “big ticket” decision. We use hedge fund activism as an example of this scenario and show how it fits with each of the prongs of our voting theory. Here we see voting performing the monitoring role anticipated by our theory, but there is also an important role for aggregating heterogeneous preferences among shareholders as mutual funds decide whether to follow hedge fund initiatives. In addition, we make the less obvious case for shareholder voting where hedge funds drop out of the equation–on decisions that have a smaller effect on stock prices, or the company’s long term value, such as Say on Pay, majority voting proposals, and board declassification proposals.

In sum, this article presents a positive theory of corporate voting as it exists today. In doing so, it directly addresses the vast shifts in stock ownership that have created intermediary capitalism and the important role of government regulations and market participants in making corporate voting effective. At the same time, it preserves for corporate management the lion’s share of corporate decision making, subject to active shareholder monitoring using corporate voting in conflict situations that affect stock price.

The full paper is available for download here.

Commentaire de l’IAS-ICD à l’attention de la CVMO | Amendements proposés aux pratiques de divulgation en matière de gouvernance

Voici un communiqué de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS-ICD) qui fait état de sa position auprès de la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario (CVMO), en réponse à la sollicitation de commentaires sur des amendements proposés aux pratiques de divulgation en matière de gouvernance (Formulaire 58-101F1 et Règlement 58-101).

Dans cette lettre, l’IAS salue la CVMO et la Province de l’Ontario pour leurs initiatives visant à favoriser la diversité des genres et enjoint la CVMO à travailler en collaboration avec les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières afin d’élaborer une initiative nationale sur la diversité des genres.

L’IAS souligne également qu’il s’est fait depuis longtemps, lors de consultations auprès du gouvernement et des autorités réglementaires, un promoteur du régime « se conformer ou s’expliquer ». La lettre comprend également les suggestions suivantes pour améliorer la diversité des genres au sein des conseils d’administration :

Les émetteurs devraient divulguer des cibles concernant la représentation des femmes au conseil et la manière dont ils entendent mesurer leur progrès au fil du temps. S’il n’y a pas de cibles, on devrait pouvoir exiger de l’émetteur qu’il divulgue comment il entend s’y prendre pour favoriser la diversité.

De nouvelles exigences devraient être instaurées au même moment pour tous les émetteurs non émergents, sans égard à leur capitalisation boursière ou à leur indice de société.

La question des limites de mandat a une portée beaucoup plus large et complexe que son seul rapport à la diversité et devrait donc être envisagée dans le cadre d’une consultation distincte. L’IAS favorise l’amélioration continue des conseils d’administration, mais ne croit pas que le renouvellement des conseils se résume simplement à une question de compte.

Les exigences proposées de divulgation du nombre et de la proportion de femmes parmi les cadres dirigeants des filiales de l’émetteur ne sont pas nécessaires, seraient trop lourdes et ne devraient donc pas figurer parmi les amendements.

Veuillez cliquer ici pour lire l’intégralité de la lettre de commentaires. Les membres peuvent transmettre leur rétroaction sur cette prise de position de politique et d’autres initiatives à l’adresse de courriel comments@icd.ca.

Huit pièges à éviter en matière de diversité des C.A. !

Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !

Voici le condensé d’un article publié par Deloitte en 2011 et que j’ai relayé à mes premiers abonnés au début de la création de mon blogue.

En revisitant mes billets, j’ai été en mesure de constater que plusieurs parutions étaient encore d’une grande pertinence. Ainsi, afin de revenir sur mes débuts comme blogueur, je vous présente un document de la firme Deloitte qui énumère dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration doivent éviter de faire.

Les suggestions sont toujours aussi d’actualité. Bonne relecture !

Avoid presentation overload

Presentations should not dominate board meetings. If your board meetings consist of a scripted agenda packed with one presentation after another, there may not be sufficient time for substantive discussions. The majority of board meetings should be focused on candid dialogue about the critical strategic issues facing the company. The advance meeting materials should comprise information that provides the basis for the discussions held during the meeting. Management should feel confident that the board will read these pre-meeting materials, and the board must commit an adequate amount of time in advance of the meeting to do so.

Avoid understating the importance of compliance

There is no room for a culture of complacency when it comes to compliance with laws and regulations. As noted in the Deloitte publication

Avoid postponing the CEO succession discussion

CEO succession planning is one of the primary roles of the board. With the changing governance landscape and new and proposed regulations, the board has a full agenda these days. However, it is important to occasionally take a step back to ensure the board is addressing this important responsibility. During this time of rebuilding and prior to the implementation of new regulations, boards should assess where time is being spent and perhaps redirect focus on succession.

It is important to note that the succession planning process is continual and doesn’t end when a new CEO is selected. As the company evolves, its needs change, as do the skills required of the leadership team. The board needs to ensure that a leadership pipeline is developed and that its members have ample opportunity to connect with the next generation of leaders.

Avoid the trap of homogeneity

The topic of board composition and having the « right » people on the board continues to receive much attention. The SEC has proposed rules that would require more disclosure about director qualifications, including what makes each director qualified to participate on certain board committees. The shift to independent board members facilitated a move away from a « friends on the board » approach to a new mix. However, the board needs to assess whether this new mix translates into a positive and productive board dynamic. Boards should take a closer look at the expertise, experience and other qualities of each member to ensure the board that can provide the right expertise. Diversity of thought provides the perspectives needed to effectively address critical topics, which can contribute to greater productivity and ultimately a stronger board.

Avoid excessive short-term focus

Perpetual existence is one of the principal reasons for the initial development of a corporation. However, recent history offers many examples of modern corporate entities managing to reach short-term results at the expense of long-term prosperity. The board can demonstrate its leadership by being the voice of reason and openly discussing the sustainability of strategic initiatives. This can result in a well-governed company with a greater chance of achieving long-term, sustainable success.

Avoid approvals if you don’t understand the issue

Complex issues can have significant implications for the survival of an organization. It is up to directors to make sure that they understand issues that can alter the future of an enterprise before a vote is taken. This doesn’t require dissecting every detail, but it should consist of a thorough investigation and assessment of the risks and rewards of proposed transactions. If you don’t adequately understand the issue, ask for more education from management or external experts. It comes down to being able to ask the tough questions of management and probing further if things do not make sense. Consensus doesn’t mean going along with the crowd. True consensus results from a thorough debate and airing of the issues before the board, resulting in a more informed vote by directors.

Avoid discounting the value of experience

As a director, it is important to recognize the value that your experience can bring to the issues at hand. Good governance doesn’t mean checking all the right boxes. Rather, it is bringing together the diverse skills and experiences of each director to lead the company through challenges. Directors can provide greater insight by being ‘situationally aware’ when evaluating events and courses of action to take. Just as the captain of a ship needs to understand the various environmental factors that influence navigation, boards need to understand the external risks that may have an impact on the navigation of the company. Consider the context of the current issue, how it is similar to, or different from, previous experiences, what alternatives could be considered, and how outside forces may impede a successful outcome. Don’t discount the value of experience just because it was gained outside the boardroom.

Avoid stepping over the line into management’s role

A board that makes management decisions will find it difficult to hold the CEO accountable for the outcome. A director’s role is to oversee the efforts of management rather than stepping into management’s shoes. Directors must make a concentrated effort to ensure that they have clarity on management’s role, which is to operate the company. The distinction between the board and management is often blurred by directors who forget that they are not charged with running the day-to-day operations of an enterprise. This doesn’t prevent a director from getting into the details of an issue facing the company, but it does mean that directors should avoid stepping over the line.

Avoid ignoring shareholders

A company’s shareholders are among the most important and potentially vocal constituents of the enterprise. Concerns can sometimes be addressed by providing shareholders an audience with the board to air their concerns. Historically, compliance with the SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) rules has been perceived as a hindrance to directors engaging in shareholder dialogue and meetings. As outlined in the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance policy briefing.

Avoid a bias to risk aversion

With the recent focus on excessive risk-taking and its impact on the credit crisis, there is concern that companies and boards may become risk-averse.

New Deloitte survey on risk management effectiveness

Comment se préparer aux agissements plus audacieux des actionnaires activistes ?

Joseph Cyriac, Ruth De Backer, et Justin Sanders de la firme McKinsey Insights ont produit un formidable document de recherche sur la contribution et sur l’impact des activités des actionnaires activistes. Ceux-ci ciblent de plus en plus d’entreprises … et des entreprises de plus en plus grandes.

Une recherche empirique conduite par les auteurs indique :

(1) les types de facteurs susceptibles de les attirer

(2) comment les directions et les conseils d’administration doivent réagir à l’annonce de l’intérêt.

Voici trois constats qui découlent de l’étude :

1. Les campagnes menées par les activistes génèrent, en moyenne, un accroissement de la valeur des actions

2. L’issue d’un arrangement négocié tend à produire un rendement aux actionnaires plus élevé sur une période de trois ans

3. La plupart des campagnes débutent de manière collaborative mais tournent à « l’hostilité ».

Voici un court extrait d’un article que je vous invite à lire au complet pour une meilleure compréhension de ce qu’il faut faire lorsqu’une entreprise est approchée par un investisseur activiste.

Bonne lecture !

Preparing for bigger, bolder shareholder activists !

Activist investors¹ are getting ever more adventurous. Last year, according to our analysis, the US-listed companies that activists targeted had an average market capitalization of $10 billion—up from $8 billion just a year earlier and less than $2 billion at the end of the last decade. They’ve also been busier, launching an average of 240 campaigns in each of the past three years—more than double the number a decade ago. And even though activists are a relatively small group, with only $75 billion in combined assets under management compared with the $2.5 trillion hedge-fund industry overall, they’ve enjoyed a higher rate of asset growth than hedge funds and attracted new partnerships with traditional investors. As a result, they have both the capital and the leverage to continue engaging largecap companies.

Shareholders generally benefit. Our analysis of 400 activist campaigns (out of 1,400 launched against US companies over the past decade) finds that, among large companies for which data are available, the median activist campaign reverses a downward trajectory in target-company performance and generates excess shareholder returns that persist for at least 36 months (Exhibit 1).²

Exhibit 1 : Activist campaigns, on average, generate a sustained increase in shareholder returns

En quoi les titres des hauts dirigeants d’OBNL importent-ils ?

L’appellation (le titre) donnée au premier dirigeant d’une OBNL a une grande importance pour les personnes qui transigent avec l’organisation. Ainsi, on retrouve très souvent de titre de directeur général (DG) ou le titre de directeur exécutif (DE) pour désigner les chefs de direction des entreprises à buts non lucratifs

L’article ci-dessous, publié par Eugene Fram, sur son blogue Non Profit Management propose une réflexion sur les titres octroyés dans le domaine des OBNL. Est-ce le temps de changer le titre de DG pour PDG ou pour Président et chef de direction (PCD). Quels sont les avantages ?

Dans la même veine, les PDG doivent-ils être membres de plein droit de leur conseil d’administration ? Les tendances dans les OBNL suggèrent que les PDG ne soient pas membres du C.A. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

What’s in a Name ? Benefits of the president/CEO title for NPO

Over the last 100 years, senior managers of nonprofits typically have held the title of “executive director.” During the past 30 years, many nonprofits have changed the title to “president/CEO,” following a common business practice. Many more nonprofits need to consider the same change to obtain some subtle but useful organizational benefits.

A wide range of nonprofits use the executive director title: churches, human service agencies, trade associations, and medical facilities. An executive director can be organizations; hospitals became regional healthcare systems;the only manager in a church with an annual budget of $200,000, or be the head of a medical facility with a $10 million annual budget and 200 employees. These significant differences in responsibility levels can:

•demean the contributions of many executive directors in the eyes of some important audiences
•minimize people’s perceptions of the organizations’ contributions.

La petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants

Voici un article de DEBORAH HARGREAVES sur la petite histoire de l’évolution des rémunérations des hauts dirigeants paru dans la section Opiniator du New York Times. L’expérience européenne est particulièrement instructive à cet égard.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cet historique afin de mieux comprendre les restrictions qui seront éventuellement mises en place pour remédier aux excès en matière de rémunération des dirigeants (en relation avec les salaires moyens payés).

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Can We Close the Pay Gap ?

The issue of pay ratios has become the latest front in a worldwide debate about inequality and the widening gap between the top 1 percent and everyone else. In the United States, the financial reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act contained a provision that would force American companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their chief executive officer to the median compensation of their employees. Yet fierce criticism from the business sector has succeeded in delaying this measure for four years — and counting.

Now the European Commission in Brussels has weighed in, with a proposal currently under discussion that the European Union’s 10,000 listed companies reveal their pay ratios and allow shareholders to vote on whether they are appropriate. This has unleashed howls of protest against the European Union’s unpopular, unelected commissioners. Fund managers have called the plan weird, and business leaders have objected that shareholders don’t want such power.

Pay ratio proposals, in fact, have a venerable history. In his 1941 essay “The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius,” George Orwell advocated a limitation of incomes so that the best-paid would earn no more than 10 times the lowest-paid. But this was controversial territory, even for Orwell. A few paragraphs on, he retreated and wrote: “In practice it is impossible that earnings should be limited quite as rigidly as I have suggested.”

Several decades earlier, that Gilded Age titan John Pierpoint Morgan had endorsed a 20 to 1 ratio between the head of a company and its average worker. That same ratio was recommended in the 1970s by the American management guru Peter F. Drucker.

Yet look where we are now: In 2012, the compensation received by chief executives of companies in the S.&P. 500 index was 354 times that of rank-and-file staff.

Companies are sensitive about revealing the pay differential between the bosses and the work force partly because the gap has become so extreme. Business leaders argue that they have to offer high rewards in order to compete in a global talent pool for well-qualified executives.

After big corporations threatened to quit the country, voters in Switzerland last year rejected a referendum that would have restricted the pay gap to a ratio of 12 to 1. But the proposition still garnered 35 percent support amid a heated campaign.

The idea of a global talent pool for chief executives is, however, largely a myth. Not one of the chief executives heading up the 142 American companies in the Fortune Global 500 at the end of 2012, for example, was an external hire from overseas. There was a little movement within Europe, but over all, poaching of chief executives from abroad accounted for only 0.8 percent of C.E.O. appointments in the Fortune Global 500.

Business leaders also argue that senior managers need incentives to drive the business forward, so their compensation must be linked to the performance of the corporation, usually through the offer of big share awards for meeting certain targets. The argument that chief executive pay must be linked to the performance of the company has driven share awards ever higher — in Britain, as high as 700 percent of salary. But there is scant evidence to show a definite link between executive remuneration and a company’s success.

On the contrary, some economists say that the practice of rewarding chief executives for boosting the share price (and consequently their own compensation) makes them too short-term in their focus. The way they are paid is thus at odds with the long-term success of the company.

Moreover, the manner in which chief executives are rewarded means that it is in their interests to keep work-force wages low, in order to contain costs. This may help to explain why we have seen executive remuneration continue to rise sharply during and after the financial crisis, while work-force wages have stagnated, struggling to keep up with inflation.

Last year, the top 10 most highly paid chief executives in the United States took home more than $100 million each; most of these rewards came from shares or stock options. The survey of 2,259 American chief executives found that, on average, their remuneration had risen by 8.47 percent. At the same time, the average family income was $51,017 — little changed from the year before, and 9 percent less than its inflation-adjusted peak in 1999 of $56,080.

According to a report by the French academic Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley, incomes for the top 1 percent in the United States grew by 31.4 percent from 2009 to 2012, but the bottom 99 percent saw their wages go up by only 0.4 percent during the same period. The economists conclude that the top 1 percent captured 95 percent of the income gains in the first two years of the recovery.

Widening pay gaps have added to concerns about inequality and economic instability. This is one reason regulators are struggling to find ways of making remuneration fairer or, failing that, enforcing disclosure that shows how unfair it is.

Brussels has tried to do this by introducing a law that comes into effect next year that will cap bankers’ bonuses. Europe’s highest-paid bankers will have their bonuses restricted to 100 percent of salary, or 200 percent with prior approval of shareholders. This is largely a British issue, since most of Europe’s best-paid bankers reside in Britain.

But the bank bonus rule has seen banks making big efforts to get around it by allocating monthly allowances to their top bankers and executives to make up for lost bonuses. Banks argue that without global action on bonuses, they risk losing their top performers to Wall Street or Hong Kong.

There is probably some truth in this since bankers specifically tend to be more mobile than corporate chief executives. There is, however, a counterargument that bankers will now be more attracted to working in the European Union since their pay will generally be just as high and far more predictable than an annual bonus.

The European Union bonus saga is helpful in illustrating the often perverse consequences of trying to impose laws and regulations to limit top remuneration. In a similar fashion, President Bill Clinton’s campaign pledge in 1991 to restrict top salaries to $1 million is often cited as the point at which chief executive pay started to skyrocket in America — precisely because companies introduced payments of stock options to circumvent the rule.

A regulatory crackdown on high pay ratios can also hurt the very people it is trying to help. The imposition of a maximum pay ratio, for example, might see companies outsourcing the work of their lowest-paid employees, purely to make their figures look better.

But business is not immune to the public debate about inequality and pay distribution. There is evidence that big pay gaps can undermine employee morale, leading to strikes, more sick days and higher staff turnover. And pressure on corporate leaders to address large pay disparities because it would help their business perform more effectively can be persuasive.

There is an outside chance that business will reform itself, as some business leaders bemoan the pay scandals for inflicting damage on their sector’s reputation. But expecting multimillionaires to take a voluntary pay cut is a long shot. It might be more effective to introduce structures that will tackle egregious pay awards before they are made.

In Germany, for example, the unusual system of a two-tier board structure for company governance has helped prevent top pay rising as fast as it has in other developed nations. A supervisory board, consisting half of shareholders and half of employees elected by the work force, has the ultimate power over executives and sets top pay.

In 2012, employee board members at Volkswagen forced through a 20 percent pay cut for the chief executive even though the company was making record profits. They felt the C.E.O.’s pay was too high, his bonus targets too easy and that work-force wages had been held down. This was widely seen in Germany as a response to the controversy over inequality after the financial crisis.

There is a growing chorus of voices in Britain arguing for the election of employees onto company boards or remuneration committees. This could become an important theme in the run-up to the next general election in 2015, given the way public debate has already focused on falling living standards.

Top chief executives worldwide often take home far more in one year than most people will earn in their entire lifetime. Yet the International Monetary Fund has recognized that reducing inequality leads to “faster and more durable growth.” It is important that we put pressure on businesses and policy makers to develop measures to stop pay gaps opening up even further, and to share the rewards of success more fairly — for everyone’s benefit.

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*Deborah Hargreaves is the director of the London-based campaign group the High Pay Centre.

Sept incompréhensions à propos du processus de succession du PDG (PCD)

Voici un excellent article, publié par Heidi Schwartz* dans FacilityBlog, sur un sujet très délicat mais vital pour tous les types d’organisations : Le processus de succession du PCD.

L’auteur présente les sept mythes les plus connus sur la problématique de la relève des présidents et chefs de la direction (PCD).

J’ai reproduit ci-dessous les points saillants de l’article. Bonne lecture !

The Seven Myths Of CEO Succession

« With CEOs turning over at a rate of 10%-15% per year – from jumping to another firm to resigning due to poor health or poor performance, or just retiring – companies would be expected to be well-prepared for CEO succession. But governance experts from Stanford and The Miles Group have found a number of broad misunderstandings about CEO transitions and how ready the board is for this major change.

In their recent piece for the Stanford Closer Look Series, David Larcker and Brian Tayan of the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stephen Miles of The Miles Group name seven myths around CEO succession – myths shared by corporate boards as well as the larger business community.

“The selection of the CEO is the single most important decision a board of directors can make,” say the authors, but turmoil around these decisions at the top “have called into question the reliability of the process that companies use to identify and develop future leaders.”

« What are the seven myths around CEO succession?

Myth #1:

Companies know who the next CEO will be. “The longer the succession period from one CEO to the next, the worse the company will perform relative to its peers,” says Professor Larcker. “But, shockingly, nearly 40% of companies claim they have no viable internal candidate available to immediately fill the shoes of the CEO if he or she left tomorrow.”

Myth #2:

There is one best model for succession. “There are several different paths companies can take to naming a successor – including internal and external approaches,” says Mr. Miles. “One reason companies fall short at succession planning is that they often select the wrong model for their current situation. A company may need an external recruit to lead a turnaround, for instance, or may have the capability to groom multiple internal executives over a period of time to allow the most promising one to shine through. One size does not fit all.”

Myth #3:

The CEO should pick a successor. “Sitting CEOs have a vested interest in the current strategy of a company and its continuance, and they may have ‘favorites’ they want to see follow them,” says Professor Larcker. “Boards, however, must determine the future needs of the company, and what kind of successor will best match the direction the company is headed.”

Myth #4:

Succession is primarily a “risk management” issue. “While a failure to plan adequately certainly exposes an organization to downside risk, boards should understand that succession planning is primarily about *building* shareholder value,” says Mr. Miles. “Succession planning is as much success-oriented as it is risk-oriented.”

Myth #5:

Boards know how to evaluate CEO talent. “Our 2013 survey found that CEO performance evaluations place considerable weight on financial performance (such as accounting, operating, and stock price results) and not enough weight on the nonfinancial metrics (such as employee satisfaction, customer service, innovation, and talent development) that have proven correlation with the long-term success of organizations,” says Professor Larcker.

Myth #6:

Boards prefer internal candidates. “While, ultimately, three quarters of newly appointed CEOs are internal executives, external candidates still hold a strong appeal for boards – especially at the start of a search,” says Mr. Miles. “Often boards aren’t given enough exposure to internal candidates, and directors are often nervous about giving an ‘untested’ executive the full reins of a company. There is a still-prevalent bias against promoting the insider ‘junior executive’ to the top spot one day. So, while the ‘myth’ may end up mostly true in the end, there is often a long journey of getting the board to that decision.”

Myth #7:

Boards want a female or minority CEO. “The numbers speak for themselves,” says Professor Larcker. “‘Diversity’ ranks high on the list of attributes that board members formally look for in CEO candidates, and yet female and ethnic minorities continue to have low representation among actual CEOs. We continue to see that boards select CEOs with leadership styles they perceive to be similar to their own, and the fact is that boards today are still highly non-diverse when it comes to gender and ethnic backgrounds.”

_______________________________________

Heidi Schwartz* joined Group C Media in April 1989 as managing editor of Today’s Facility Manager (TFM) magazine (formerly Business Interiors) where she was subsequently promoted to editor/co-publisher of the monthly trade magazine for facility management professionals. In September 2012, she took over the newly created position of internet director for TFM’s parent company, Group C Media, where she is charged with developing content and creating online strategies for TFM and its sister publication, Business Facilities.

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014. Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Un argumentaire en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.*

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Mars 2014

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) du mois de mars 2014.

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Mars 2014

On y retrouve beaucoup d’informations sur les activités du Collège au cours des dernières semaines et des mois à venir :

SÉMINAIRE GOUVERNANCE EXPRESS 2014

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) présentait, le 19 mars dernier à Montréal, son cinquième Séminaire Gouvernance Express offert à l’intention des diplômés des programmes de formation en gouvernance de sociétés ayant obtenu la désignation ASC (Université Laval), ASC-France (Institut Français des Administrateurs) et IAS.A.(Institute of Corporate directors). Plus de 120 administrateurs ont participé à cette journée de formation sous le thème de « La gouvernance à l’ère numérique », présentant les impacts des nouvelles technologies de l’information sur les organisations et sur le travail des administrateurs de sociétés.

ENQUÊTE SUR « LA GOUVERNANCE À L’ÈRE NUMÉRIQUE »

Devant les enjeux associés à la transformation numérique des organisations, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) a lancé, en février dernier, une enquête afin de recueillir des données sur l’impact du numérique dans la gouvernance des sociétés et les effets sur le rôle et les responsabilités des administrateurs. Les résultats de cette enquête ont été dévoilés en primeur aux participants présents au Séminaire Gouvernance Express 2014. Ce sondage a été administré par la firme BIP de Montréal auprès des diplômés de trois collèges de formation en gouvernance de sociétés soit le Directors College (Ontario), l’Institut Français des administrateurs (France) et le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (Québec). Au total, 319 personnes ont participé à cette enquête, ce qui correspond à un taux de réponse de 20 %. En savoir plus sur les résultats de l’enquête [+]

DÉLÉGATION DE 10 ASC-FRANCE AU QUÉBEC

Dans le cadre du Séminaire Gouvernance Express 2014, une délégation de 10 ASC diplômés de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) était de passage au Québec. Le CAS et le Cercle des ASC ont travaillé en étroite collaboration afin de proposer un séjour des plus intéressants à nos collègues français, en visite à Québec et à Montréal du 14 au 19 mars dernier. Outre le Séminaire du 19 mars, la délégation a assisté à une conférence de Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du CAS sur « les pratiques de gouvernance des sociétés ouvertes au Canada », suivie de celle de l’historien David Mendel portant sur la ville de Québec. Ensuite, les ASC-France ont visité l’entreprise de la Petite Bretonne, ont rencontré l’éthicien René Villemure, l’administratrice de sociétés chevronnée Guylaine Saucier, la co-présidente de l’IAS Québec Nathalie Francisci, en plus de participer à la conférence d’Hillary Clinton organisée par la Chambre de commerce de Montréal. Cette initiative du Club des ASC France aura permis de dresser des ponts entre les ASC français et québécois. L’expérience sera certainement renouvelée dans le futur avec le Cercle des ASC. En savoir plus sur la reconnaissance des ASC en France [+]

DOSSIER SPÉCIAL EN GOUVERNANCE PRÉSENTÉ PAR LE CAS

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés présente sur le site Web lesaffaires.com un dossier spécial sur « la gouvernance dans tous ses états », depuis de 17 mars dernier et ce jusqu’au 17 juin prochain. Toujours dans l’esprit de la mission du Collège de contribuer au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance, ce dossier regroupe huit articles sur divers sujets d’actualité en gouvernance rédigés à partir d’entrevues avec des experts de notre réseau.

« Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter », avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault.

« Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi », avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés.

« Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences ? », avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés.

« Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ? », avec M. Richard Joly, président, Leaders et Cie.

« Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME », avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général, Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

« Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique », avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes, Collège des administrateurs de sociétés.

« La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions », avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval.

« Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller », avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com.

Les programmes de formation du CAS :

Gouvernance des services financiers | 6 et 7 mai 2014, à Montréal

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite | 13 et 14 mai 2014, à Montréal

Gouvernance des PME | 27 et 28 mai 2014, à Montréal

Certification – Module 1 : Les rôles et responsabilités des administrateurs | 25, 26 et 27 septembre 2014, à Québec et 6, 7 et 8 novembre 2014, à Montréal

Les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé :

Petit-déjeuner de l’IAS section du Québec sur la tolérance au risque | 9 avril 2014, à Montréal

Le Rassemblement pour la santé et le mieux-être en entreprise | 14 et 15 avril 2014, à Montréal

«Sommet des dirigeants financiers» présenté par les Événements Les Affaires | 15 avril 2014, à Montréal

Petit-déjeuner du Cercle des ASC sur les comités d’audit et de gestion de risques | 22 avril 2014, à Montréal

Petit-déjeuner du Cercle des ASC sur le dialogue en ligne | 29 avril 2014, à Montréal

7e Gala des Sociétés en Bourse | 29 avril 2014, à Québec

Formation « Global Governance Board Simulation » par le Directors College | 12, 13 et 14 mai 2014, à Niagara-on-the-Lake

La capsule d’expert du mois : La rémunération, par Bridgit Courey.

Les nombreuses distinctions et les nominations d’ASC à des postes de conseil d’administration

Une section boîte à outils à consulter afin d’être à jour sur la gouvernance de sociétés

Nouvelle référence mensuelle en gouvernance : Comité de vérification en bref, par Deloitte.

Top 5 des billets les plus consultés au mois de mars du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé.

Notons aussi que le 27 mars dernier, la Conférence régionale des élus (CRÉ) de Montréal tenait un séminaire d’une journée sur le thème « Préparer la relève pour enrichir son CA » auquel le Collège a collaboré activement.

Une enquête récente de la CRÉ auprès de plus de 300 OBNL de la région de Montréal démontrait en effet clairement que les OBNL éprouvent beaucoup de difficultés à renouveler leurs conseils d’administration, voire à simplement combler les postes vacants. En savoir plus : Le Collège collabore activement à préparer la relève des CA d’OBNL

Bonne lecture !

____________________________________________

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

Faculté des sciences de l’administration Pavillon Palasis-Prince

2325, rue de la Terrasse, Université Laval Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

418 656-2630; 418 656-2624

info@cas.ulaval.ca

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