Le rôle du président du conseil lors des réunions

Dans ce blogue, j’ai souvent rappelé le rôle fondamental du président du conseil dans le bon fonctionnement des réunions du CA mais aussi dans la mise en œuvre de règles de saine gouvernance.

L’article qui suit, publié par David Ferguson et Chuanchan Ma sur le site de l’Association of Corporate Counsel, insiste sur trois points importants eu égard au rôle légal du président du conseil d’administration (PCA) :

(1) Le comportement du président lors des rencontres du conseil;

(2) Le rôle du PCA eu égard aux règles de gouvernance;

« The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues ».

(3) L’autorité du président du conseil dans le processus de gouvernance.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article afin de mieux comprendre le rôle essentiel d’un président du conseil (PCA).

Bonne lecture !

Company meetings – tips and insights: the role of the chair

Introduction

The constitutions of most companies divide the corporate powers between the board of directors, which is usually given the power to manage the company’s business, and the members, who usually have the power to appoint and remove directors and change the constitution. The powers of the board and members are usually exercised through resolutions passed at a meeting.

This article considers the role of the chair in the context of meetings as well as the broad corporate governance role allocated to an individual director appointed to the role of chair of a public company. This reveals the increased expectations of the role while noting the limited formal powers of the chair.

The chair’s role in meetings

Courts have taken the view that, generally, a meeting can only take place with more than one participant.² This reflects the fact that “according to the ordinary usage of the English language” that it is not possible for a person to have a meeting with themselves. This is the case even though the one person present holds proxies for others.³ While exceptions to this general position have been identified to enable a meeting of a single holder of a class of shares4 , the general concept of a meeting contemplates discussion between the participants and, for this reason, courts have also held that a meeting of directors or shareholders cannot proceed without a chair.

This indispensable element of any meeting was recognized in Colorado Constructions Pty Ltd v Platus⁵ where Street J identified that the chair’s role included the setting of the order of business, nomination of the person entitled to speak, putting questions to the meeting, declaring resolutions carried or not carried and declaring the meeting closed. As noted in a subsequent case, “the essence of chairmanship is actually exercising procedural control over the meeting”.6

In carrying out this role, the chair is required to act impartially to ensure that the meeting operates in a fair manner. As observed by Young J in NAB v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq)7 , citing National Dwelling Society v Sykes8:

It is the duty of the chairman, and his functions, to preserve order, and to take care that the proceedings are conducted in a proper manner, that the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question which is properly before the meeting.

The chair’s role in corporate governance

Most public company constitutions provide that the board of directors will elect one of their number to act as chair and that the person elected also acts as chair of general meetings. While the position of chair could be filled on an ad hoc basis, there is a broader corporate governance significance to the role that the chair of a public company plays. This is reflected in the following excerpt from commentary to Recommendation 2.5 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations:

The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues.

Accordingly, the role of chair in a public company is usually attributed special status and additional remuneration. Although the position can be carried out in different individual styles, the chair often acts as spokesperson for the company on high level matters and usually plays an important link between the board and management of the company. It is worth noting that the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations also express the view that the chair should be a non-executive role so as to separate the chair’s role from that of the chief executive officer and the executive management team. This article has been formulated on the assumption that the chair is a nonexecutive director, but a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond its scope.

The allocation of a broader corporate governance role has been recognised as potentially giving rise to a more extensive duty of care and diligence on the part of the chair. As noted by Austin J in reflecting on the duties of the chair of the board of One.Tel Limited:9

The court’s role, in determining liability of a defendant for his conduct as company chairman, is to articulate and apply a standard of care that reflects contemporary community expectations.

Austin J further noted that it is now commonplace to observe that the standard of care expected of company directors, both by the common law (including equity) and under statutory provisions, has been raised over the last century or so, and that “[o]ne might correspondingly expect that the standard for company chairmen has also been raised”.10

The individual requirements of the standard of care owed by the chair of a public company will depend on the allocation of corporate governance roles and responsibilities within the company and the skills and experience of the individual person carrying out the role of chair.11 In this respect, the responsibilities of the chair are not limited to delegated tasks but include the responsibilities with which the chair is entrusted by reason of his or her expertise and experience.12

The authority of the chair

Despite the essential nature of the chair’s role in the context of meetings and the elevated duty of care and diligence that may be attributed to the chair’s role within public companies, a person appointed to that role does not have authority, merely by virtue of that office, to make decisions binding on the company or to give binding directions.13 The board makes its decisions by resolutions which are carried or lost depending on a majority vote. Accordingly, unless the board has delegated powers, the chair has no more power to carry out matters on behalf of a company than any other individual non-executive director.

The chair’s authority in the context of meetings is more robust. Constitutions typically provide that the chair is elected by the board of directors and, in some cases, provide that the chair has a casting vote at meetings of directors and members. Consistent with his or her role in regulating meetings, constitutions also usually provide that the chair of a general meeting can require a vote to be taken by way of a poll and empower the chair to make certain rulings at the meeting.14 Where a company’s constitution provides that rulings by the chair on certain matters are final and the chair makes a ruling on those matters in good faith, there is no right in the meeting to challenge the ruling, although it could be overturned by a court in appropriate circumstances. Even if a decision is made by the chair in connection with the proper conduct of a meeting that does not have the protection of an express constitutional provision, courts have indicated that the decision should be regarded as correct unless the contrary is proved by a person objecting to it.15

If the chair has a casting vote at a meeting, that right must be exercised “honestly and in accordance with what (the chair) believes to be the best interests of those who may be affected by the vote”. Subject to this, the chair is entitled to exercise the casting vote as he or she thinks fit.16 While there has been a view that, because the chair has a duty to maintain impartiality, a casting vote should be used to maintain the status quo so as to allow further discussion of the relevant matter, it is doubtful that this general proposition exists.17

A number of provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) also recognize the special status of the chair’s role in meetings. For example, the Corporations Act acknowledges that the chair often receives multiple proxy appointments and therefore imposes an obligation on the chair to vote as proxy on a poll.18 It also gives greater scope for the chair, as compared to other directors, to vote proxies in connection with directors’ remuneration.

Un guide des pratiques de gouvernance dans l’Union Européenne (EU)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un guide complet des pratiques de gouvernance relatives aux entreprises de l’Union Européenne.

Il n’y a pas de version française de ce document à ce stade-ci. J’ai cependant demandé à ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) si un guide en français était en préparation. Toute personne intéressée par la gouvernance européenne trouvera ici un excellent outil d’information.

Bonne lecture !

This publication has been produced in collaboration with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa) primarily aimed at ecoDa’s membership and for supporting IFC’s work in surrounding regions with countries aspiring to understand and follow rules, standards and practices applied in the EU countries but which may be of wider relevance and interest to practitioners, policy makers, development finance institutions, investors, board directors, business reporters, and others.

A Guide to Corporate Governance Practices in the European Union

The purpose of this publication is twofold: to describe the corporate governance framework within the European Union and to highlight good European governance practices. It focuses on the particular aspects of European governance practices that distinguish this region from other parts of the world.

In addition to providing a useful source of reference, this guide is designed to be relevant to anyone interested in the evolving debate about European corporate governance. It should be of particular interest to the following parties:

Policymakers and corporate governance specialists, to assist in the identification of good practices among the member states. Improvements in corporate governance practices in a country may attract foreign direct investment.

Directors of listed and unlisted companies, to inspire them to look again at their ways of working.

Directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to assist in improving corporate governance practices prior to selling off state assets.

Bankers, to assist in the identification of good corporate governance practices to inform their lending and investing practices.

Staff within development financial institutions, to assist in the identification of good corporate

Proxy advisors and legal advisors, to assist in the identification of corporate governance compliance issues.

Investors, shareholders, stock brokers, and investment advisors, to assist in the identification of good practices in investor engagement and activism.

Senior company management, to assist in the identification of good relationship-management practices with boards of directors.

Journalists and academics within business schools, who are interested in good corporate governance practices.

Private sector and public sector stakeholders from the EU candidate and potential candidate countries in their preparation for eventual accession. Geographical areas of potential readership may include the following in particular:

The 18 Eurozone countries (listed in Appendix A);

The 28 EU member states (Appendix B);

The five EU candidate countries (Appendix C);

The three potential candidate countries

The 47 European Council Countries (Appendix E); and

Emerging markets and others seeking to increase trade or attract investment with European countries.

Les conséquences inattendues de l’accès des actionnaires à la circulaire de procuration lors de l’assemblée annuelle

Cet article est publié par David A. Katz associé de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les questions de fusions et acquisitions ainsi que dans les transactions boursières complexes. Cet article a été publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

L’auteur explique les conséquences inattendues du processus utilisé par les entreprises cotées eu égard à la modification de leurs règlements internes afin de permettre l’inscription des propositions de certains actionnaires dans les circulaires de procuration.

L’on sait que, dans le passé, il y avait beaucoup de réticence à permettre aux actionnaires de soumettre des propositions lors des assemblées annuelles et à proposer des candidatures aux postes d’administrateurs, une initiative réservée au comité de gouvernance.

Cependant, à la suite d’intenses pressions des activistes, plusieurs entreprises ont accepté de soumettre au vote de leurs actionnaires une proposition autorisant les actionnaires majeurs à proposer des administrateurs désignés. Il semble qu’il ne reste que le pourcentage de propriété qui soit en suspend à ce moment-ci : 3% ou 5%.

L’auteur discute des difficultés que ces changements pourraient engendrer, notamment le gaspillage de ressources organisationnelles, les manquements au devoir de fiduciaire, l’isolation des administrateurs désignés, les dysfonctions du CA, les tensions au sein du conseil, etc.

L’auteur fait un bon résumé des conséquences négatives éventuelles pour la gouvernance des sociétés. Je vous invite également à lire l’article paru sur le blogue du Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy : Proxy Access Proposals: The Next Big Thing in Corporate Governance. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ?

Je vous encourage à lire l’extrait ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The Unintended Consequences of Proxy Access Elections

It’s official: Proxy access is the darling of the 2015 season. Shareholder-sponsored proxy access proposals are on the ballots of more than 100 U.S. public companies this spring. These precatory proposals seek a shareholder vote on a binding bylaw that would enable shareholders who meet certain ownership requirements to nominate board candidates and have them included in the company’s own proxy materials.

Powerful institutional investors have given the proxy access movement enormous momentum this spring, and blue chip firms such as GE, Bank of America, and Prudential have voluntarily adopted versions of proxy access in advance of their annual meetings. Companies such as Citigroup have agreed to support proxy access shareholder proposals in their definitive proxy materials. In the absence of regulatory guidance, proxy advisors such as ISS have stepped into the breach to define the terms and conditions of proxy access. As proxy access proposals proliferate—after years of controversy—the primary debate now seems to be whether a 3 percent or 5 percent ownership threshold is more appropriate.

….

Unintended Consequences

The detrimental consequences of proxy access fall into three general categories. First, there are those that occur before and during the proxy solicitation period. These include waste of corporate resources, negative publicity, the impairment of a company’s ability to attract qualified candidates to stand for election as a director, and the undermining of the company’s nominating committee and board leadership. Proxy access could cause tension among shareholders, particularly large shareholders, who disagree in public or private over whether to nominate candidates for inclusion in the proxy, and if so, which ones. It also could cause internal controversy for large shareholders; institutional investors or pension funds, for example, may find themselves pressured by certain constituencies (such as unions) to participate in proxy access for political reasons, while other constituencies support the current board’s direction on substantive grounds. The instability caused by proxy access—like that created by proxy fights—could create significant disruption in a business, as executives, managers, and employees struggle with fear and uncertainty about the future. Damaging effects on hiring, long-range planning, and employee retention can cause lasting harm to a corporation regardless of the election results.

Second, there are those consequences that relate to the composition of the board. Were proxy access to become widespread and effective, a board could become unable to ensure that it would have the necessary expertise (such as the audit committee financial expert mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or industry specialists) or make progress toward a desired diversity of skills, genders, and backgrounds. Moreover, it could create the potential for distrust and a lack of collegiality that would reduce the board’s effectiveness and distract the company’s management, and it would increase the likelihood of politicization and balkanization of directors into factions with different goals.

Third, there are those consequences that relate to the board’s ability to fulfill its legal duties and obligations. Proxy access directors would owe a duty of loyalty to all shareholders under Delaware law—as all directors do—yet they might feel themselves to be—or be expected or viewed by others to be—beholden to the particular shareholder group that nominated them and pushed for their election. In conjunction with the paramount issue of loyalty, questions of confidentiality, transparency, board committee structure, and board dynamics could arise. Complications familiar from the constituency/blockholder director context likely would be exacerbated if sponsored directors were to reach the board through proxy access. Boards would be addressing these issues in a context of significant uncertainty, both as to the legal questions of fiduciary duty and as to the factual questions of a proxy access director’s allegiance.

If proxy access directors are elected in any meaningful number, boards will be contending with an array of complications that have the potential to impair board functioning in ways that the current debate has not addressed. As the popularity of proxy access reaches a high-water mark this season, shareholders should consider carefully whether they really want what proxy access proponents are asking for. If not, now is the time for them to say so.

Recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis pour la votation aux assemblées annuelles de 2015 | En rappel

Quelles sont les avis émis par les firmes conseil en votation qui servent à évaluer la qualité de la gouvernance des entreprises cotées ? Quels sont les facteurs pris en compte par les actionnaires, les investisseurs institutionnels et les Hedge Funds pour juger de la gouvernance et de la performance globale des sociétés, et pour voter lors des assemblées annuelles des actionnaires ?

Cet article, publié dans Lexology, en collaboration avec l’association des juristes corporatifs, a été rédigé par Dykema Gossett, Robert Murphy, Mark A. Metz et D. Richard McDonald. Les auteurs présentent les recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis eu égard à des sujets chauds en gouvernance.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des mises à jour fournies par ces deux firmes-conseil et accessibles à tous les actionnaires, notamment les recommandations relatives à l’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration.

Bonne lecture !

ISS and Gass Lewis proxy voting policy updates for the 2015 proxy season

The proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, recently announced updates to their respective voting policies for domestic companies for the upcoming 2015 proxy season. These two firms have risen to prominence in recent years, wielding significant power in corporate governance matters, proxy fights and takeover votes. Hedge funds, mutual fund complexes, institutional investors and similar organizations that own shares of multiple companies pay ISS and Glass Lewis to advise them regarding shareholder votes.

The ISS and Glass Lewis policy updates are effective for annual meetings on or after February 1, 2015, and January 1, 2015, respectively. For your convenience, we have summarized below the most important updates relating to corporate governance matters.

Independent Board Chairs

The most notable ISS policy change relates to shareholder proposals that seek to separate the chairman and chief executive officer positions. For the 2015 proxy season, ISS is adding new governance, board leadership and performance factors to its current analytical framework. In this regard, ISS’s policy will continue to generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” independent chair shareholder proposals after consideration in a “holistic manner” of the following factors:

– Scope of the Proposal: Whether the shareholder proposal is binding or merely a recommendation and whether it seeks an immediate change in the chairman role or can be implemented at the next CEO transition.

– Company’s Current Board Leadership Structure: The presence of an executive or non-independent chairman in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chairman, and/or a departure from a structure with an independent chairman.

– Company’s Governance Structure: The overall independence of the board, the independence of key committees, the establishment of governance guidelines, as well as board tenure and its relationship to CEO tenure.

– Company’s Governance Practices: Problematic governance or management issues such as poor compensation practices, material failures of governance and risk oversight, related party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk will be reviewed as well as corporate or management scandals and actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.

– Company Performance: One-, three- and five-year total shareholder return compared to the company’s peers and the market as a whole.

In view of its new holistic approach in evaluating these types of shareholder proposals, ISS indicates that a “For” or “Against” recommendation will not be determined by any single factor, but that it will consider all positive and negative aspects of the company based on the new expanded list of factors when assessing these proposals.

Glass Lewis generally does not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board of directors, but it encourages clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever the issue arises in a proxy statement.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments

ISS and Glass Lewis have adopted new policies pursuant to which they will generally issue negative vote recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder ability to exercise their rights (“Unilateral Amendments”).

Under the updated policy, if the board adopts a Unilateral Amendment, ISS will generally make a recommendation for an “against” or “withhold” vote on a director individually, the members of a board committee or the entire board (other than new nominees on a case-by-case basis), after considering the following nine factors, as applicable:

– the board’s rationale for adopting the Unilateral Amendment;

– disclosure by the issuer of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the Unilateral Amendment;

– the level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the Unilateral Amendment;

– the board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw and charter amendments and other entrenchment provisions;

– the issuer’s ownership structure;

– the issuer’s existing governance provisions;

– whether the Unilateral Amendment was made prior to or in connection with the issuer’s IPO;

– the timing of the Unilateral Amendment in connection with a significant business development; and

– other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to the determination of the impact of the Unilateral Amendment on shareholders.

Glass Lewis has revised its policy to provide that, depending on the circumstances, it will recommend that shareholders vote “against” the chairman of the board’s governance committee, or the entire committee, in instances where a board has amended the company’s governing documents, without shareholder approval, to “reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right” such as:

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent;

– an increase to the ownership threshold required by shareholders to call a special meeting;

– an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments;

– the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse (e.g., bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or “fee-shifting” bylaws);

– the adoption of a classified board structure; and

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Equity Plan Proposals

Of particular importance to management are the revised ISS and Glass Lewis policies pertaining to their voting recommendations on company proposals seeking shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. Equity compensation of management remains a central focus of many institutional investors and shareholder activists.

For 2015, ISS adopted a new “scorecard” model, referred to as Equity Plan Scorecard (“EPSC”), that considers a range of positive and negative factors in evaluating equity incentive plan proposals, rather than the current six pass/fail tests focused on cost and certain egregious practices to evaluate such proposals. The total EPSC score will generally determine whether ISS recommends “for” or “against” the proposal.

Under its new policy, ISS will evaluate equity-based compensation plans on a case-by-case basis depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, as evaluated by the EPSC factors. The EPSC factors will fall under the following three categories (“EPSC Pillars”):

– Plan Cost (45 percent weighting): The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers. ISS will measure plan cost by using ISS’s Value Transfer Model (SVT) for the company in relation to its peers. The SVT calculation assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors.

– Plan Features (20 percent weighting): The presence or absence of provisions in the plan providing for (i) automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control; (ii) discretionary vesting authority; (iii) liberal share recycling on various award types; and (iv) minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan.

– Grant Practices (35 percent weighting): The issuer’s recent grant practices under the proposed plan and all other plans including (i) the company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; (ii) vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (three-year lookback); (iii) the estimated duration of the plan based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years; (iv) the proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions; (v) whether the company maintains a clawback policy; and (vi) whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

In its updated voting policy, ISS will generally recommend voting “against” the plan proposal if the combination of the factors listed above in the EPSC Pillars indicates that the plan is not, overall, in the shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:

– awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

– the plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of prepricing – for non-listed companies);

– the plan is a vehicle for “problematic pay practices” or a “pay-for-performance disconnect;” or

– any other plan features are determined to have a “significant negative impact on shareholder interests.”

Political Contributions

In recent years, many issuers have received shareholder proposals seeking reports or other disclosure regarding political contributions, including lobbying and political activities. Under the updated policy on political contribution shareholder proposals, ISS will generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, after considering:

– the company’s policies as well as management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

– the company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups where it makes political contributions; and

– recent significant controversies, fines or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Practical Considerations

Despite the policy changes discussed above, public companies should continue to tailor their individual governance policies with a view towards what is in the long-term best interests of their own shareholders as opposed to meeting the ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines. ISS notes that its 2015 policy is intended to address the recent substantial increase in bylaw/charter amendments that adversely impact shareholder rights without being subject to a shareholder vote. Companies that intend to adopt any corporate governance policies that adversely impact shareholder rights should consider seeking shareholder support before implementing such policies, if a negative ISS or Glass Lewis recommendation on re-election of directors is likely to have a material effect on the election.

Companies should review last year’s proxy compensation and governance disclosures in order to make improvements in this year’s disclosures where appropriate – particularly if the company has received comments on this disclosure from the SEC staff. The failure to address a previous year’s staff comment may provoke a more detailed review by the staff, with its attendant time delays, should it be noticed during the staff’s initial screening of the filing.

Companies should also review their corporate governance and compensation practices for potential vulnerabilities under ISS’ policy updates, such as equity compensation plans that may be up for a vote at the next annual meeting or an independent chair shareholder proposal, and decide what action, if any, to take in light of this assessment.

Companies should continue a regular dialogue with key investors, bearing in mind limitations imposed by the SEC on proxy solicitations. Shareholder engagement efforts should continue to focus on what shareholders’ greatest concerns are and the rationale for board action.

Quelles sont les dix plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. pour l’année 2015 ?

Voici un article de Kerry E. Berchem*, paru récemment dans le Harvard Law School Forum, qui présente une liste détaillée des 10 plus importantes préoccupations des conseils d’administration en 2015.

Cet excellent article devrait intéresser tous les membres de C.A., notamment le président du conseil et les présidents des comités du conseil. Même si l’article peut vous paraître assez dense, je crois qu’il fait vraiment le tour de la question.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les sujets chauds à considérer par les C.A. en 2015.

Bonne lecture !

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015

1. Oversee strategic planning in the face of uneven economic growth and rising geopolitical tensions

2. Oversee cybersecurity as hackers seek to infiltrate even the most sophisticated information security systems

3. Assess the impact of advances in technology and big data on the company’s business plans

4. Cultivate shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities as activist investors target more companies

5. Consider the impact of M&A opportunities

6. Oversee risk management as newer and more complex risks emerge

7. Ensure appropriate board composition in light of increasing focus on diversity, director tenure and board size

8. Explore new trends in reducing corporate health care costs

9. Set appropriate executive compensation

10. Ensure the company has a robust compliance program as the SEC steps up its enforcement efforts and whistleblowers earn huge bounties.

…….

In light of these developments, it is critical for companies to have comprehensive and effective compliance programs in place, including a transparent process for internal investigations. Companies should also review and update as necessary their anti-retaliation policies and procedures and make sure employees and executives at every level are sufficiently trained in this area.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

_______________________________________________

* Kerry E. Berchem, associé et co-responsable des pratiques de gouvernance de la firme Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD ? Réflexions d’Yvan Allaire

Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) et le président et chef de la direction (PCD).

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance. Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées…

Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval ont mis sur pied une chaire de recherche en gouvernance des sociétés dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

Gouvernance, stratégie…et al. Yvan Allaire

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’indépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. … Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables.

Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

Le gouvernement résistera-t-il à la tentation partisane de la nomination du prochain PCD à Hydro-Québec ?

Voici un article de Michel Nadeau, ex vice-président de la Caisse de dépôt et placement et directeur général de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP), paru dans le Devoir récemment.

L’auteur se questionne, tout comme moi d’ailleurs, sur le processus d’embauche du PDG d’Hydro-Québec et sur la tentation, très réelle, de procéder à une nomination partisane !

Le point de vue de M. Nadeau est tout à fait pertinent eu égard à gouvernance des sociétés d’État.

Ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article.

Bonne lecture. À suivre !

Règles de gouvernance à Hydro-Québec | Nomination du nouveau PDG

Photo: Hydro-Québec

Il était rafraîchissant d’entendre le ministre de l’Énergie et des Ressources naturelles, M. Pierre Arcand, terminer mercredi matin une entrevue chez Marie-France Bazzo en déclarant : « Je vais laisser le conseil d’administration faire le travail et c’est à lui de faire des recommandations quant au successeur de M. Vandal. » Photo: Hydro-Québec

La tentation est toujours très forte dans les cabinets politiques à Québec de passer outre les normes de bonne gouvernance et de sortir un p.-d.g. d’un chapeau partisan. Tout individu a droit à ses convictions politiques, mais l’essentiel est qu’il remplisse les critères de compétence et de crédibilité selon le mandat. À ce chapitre, le premier ministre, M. Philippe Couillard, n’a pas fait vivre un grand moment de gouvernance au Québec en confiant récemment la présidence du conseil d’administration et du comité de gouvernance d’Hydro-Québec à une personne qui n’a aucune expérience dans la gestion du CA d’une grande organisation. Cela étant dit, il faut maintenant faire confiance à M. Michael Penner.

Comme l’indique l’article 11.6 de sa Loi, le conseil d’administration a déjà établi le profil de compétence et d’expérience du candidat recherché….

…

Le ministre l’a dit : ce n’est pas un choix politique. Le comité des ressources humaines devra trouver le meilleur candidat en interne ou à l’externe sans se gêner pour regarder à l’international. Le CA, qui compte une bonne moitié de gens expérimentés, peut relever ce défi. Les administrateurs pourraient se précipiter sur le bottin de l’Ordre des ingénieurs en cherchant un dirigeant intègre et honnête. Malgré le flou accusateur des audiences de la commission Charbonneau, ce profil peut encore se trouver. Mais rappelons-nous que le marché de l’énergie a beaucoup changé et que l’époque de la construction de grands barrages dans les milliards de dollars et les régions lointaines est, pour le moment, chose du passé. Au cours des prochaines années, la priorité sera davantage la gestion serrée des actifs actuels de 73 milliards et un contrôle rigoureux de l’utilisation des revenus de 13 milliards. Les usagers veulent des gestionnaires intelligents… Pas juste des compteurs !

Cette nomination sera un indicateur du sérieux de ce gouvernement dans la gouvernance et la gestion du plus important outil de développement économique et industriel du Québec.

Un rappel des guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses

Voici le billet qui a attiré l’attention du plus grand nombre de lecteurs sur mon blogue depuis le début. Celui-ci a été publié le 30 octobre 2011. Je l’ai mis à jour afin que les nombreuses personnes intéressés par la gouvernance des OBNL puissent être mieux informées. L’Institut canadien des comptables agréés (ICCA) a produit des documents pratiques, pertinents, synthétiques et accessibles sur presque toutes les questions de gouvernance. Il est également important de noter que l’ICCA accorde une attention toute particulière aux pratiques de gouvernance des organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL = OBNL).

Ainsi, l’ICCA met à la disposition de ces organisations la collection 20 Questions pour les OSBL qui comprend des questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL=OBNL) devraient se poser concernant des enjeux importants pour la gouvernance de ce type d’organismes. Ces documents sont révisés régulièrement afin qu’ils demeurent actuels et pertinents. Si vous avez des questions dans le domaine de la gouvernance des OBNL, vous y trouverez certainement des réponses satisfaisantes.Si vous souhaitez avoir une idée du type de document à votre disposition, vous pouvez télécharger le PDF suivant:

20 questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la gouvernance

Vous pouvez choisir le document pertinent (voir la liste ci-dessous) et le commander à la boutique CA.

Boutique CA de ICCA – SÉRIE ORGANISMES SANS BUT LUCRATIF OSBL/OBNL

SÉRIE ORGANISMES SANS BUT LUCRATIF

20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les ressources humaines

(also available in English)

Le présent cahier d’information aidera les administrateurs d’OSBL à assumer leurs principales responsabilités à cet égard, soit : le recrutement, l’évaluation et la planification de la relève du directeur général ou du principal responsable au sein du personnel, l’établissement de la rémunération du directeur général et l’approbation de la philosophie de rémunération de l’organisme, ainsi que la surveillance des politiques et pratiques en matière de ressources humaines de l’organisme pris dans son ensemble.

20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les risques

(also available in English)

20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les risques a été rédigé pour aider les membres des conseils d’administration des OSBL à comprendre leur responsabilité à l’égard de la surveillance des risques.

20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur l’obligation fiduciaire

(also available in English)

20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur l’obligation fiduciaire vise à aider les membres des conseils d’administration d’OSBL à comprendre leurs obligations fiduciaires et à s’en acquitter en leur fournissant un résumé des principes juridiques et des pratiques de pointe en matière de gouvernance pour ces organismes.

20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la gouvernance

(also available in English)

Ce cahier d’information décrit brièvement les principaux éléments de gouvernance des organismes sans but lucratif et des responsabilités des administrateurs. Il sera utile non seulement aux administrateurs éventuels, nouveaux et expérimentés, mais aussi aux comités des candidatures et aux organisateurs des séances d’orientation et de formation des administrateurs. Il est le premier d’une série de cahiers d’information destinés aux administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif et portant sur des aspects particuliers de la gouvernance de ces organisations.

20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la stratégie et la planification

(also available in English)

La viabilité d’un organisme sans but lucratif, soit sa capacité de poursuivre et de financer ses activités année après année, est l’une des principales responsabilités du conseil. Les administrateurs doivent comprendre la raison d’être de l’organisme, les intérêts de ses parties prenantes et la façon dont il gère les risques auxquels il est exposé. Ils doivent également participer activement à l’élaboration de la stratégie de l’organisme et à son approbation.

20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur le recrutement, la formation et l’évaluation des membres du conseil

(also available in English)

Le document 20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur le recrutement, la formation et l’évaluation des membres du conseil explore les défis que doivent relever les OSBL pour recruter les personnes aptes à siéger à leur conseil d’administration. Il souligne aussi l’importance qu’il convient d’accorder à la formation et au perfectionnement des administrateurs ainsi qu’à l’évaluation régulière du conseil et de ses membres.

20 Questions que les administrateurs devraient poser sur l’indemnisation et l’assurance responsabilité des administrateurs et des dirigeants
(Comprend un supplément à l’intention des organismes sans but lucratif)

(also available in English)

Les administrateurs sont exposés à divers risques juridiques du fait de leur association avec une société et de leur obligation fiduciaire à son égard. De plus en plus, ils s’intéressent aux conditions de leur indemnisation et de leur assurance et se tournent vers leurs conseillers professionnels pour vérifier qu’ils disposent d’un niveau de protection adéquat. Il est recommandé aux conseils de s’intéresser activement aux dispositions prises par la société en ce qui concerne l’indemnisation et l’assurance relatives à la responsabilité civile des administrateurs et des dirigeants.

Cinq questions qu’un administrateur devrait considérer lors d’une décision d’octroi de contrat | Pascale Lapointe

Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un billet soumis par Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A,, gestionnaire de projet et membre de CA d’OBNL.

Son article rappelle les questions qu’un administrateur de sociétés doit se poser lorsqu’il est confronté à une décision d’octroi de contrat.

Bonne lecture !

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Quelles sont les cinq (5) questions usitées qu’un dirigeant ou un administrateur (selon les cas) devrait se poser avant de prendre une décision d’affaires. J’avais d’abord préparé ces questions pour moi, puis j’ai décidé d’en faire un billet pour publication sur le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Je sais, la littérature d’affaires regorge de détails et d’analyses encore plus complets sur la prise de décision en situation de conflits d’intérêts potentiels. Cependant, ici, je n’ai voulu aborder le sujet qu’en en faisant un sommaire et un court aide-mémoire.

Pascale Lapointe, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A.

Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces cinq questions classiques sont encore le meilleur moyen pour s’assurer d’agir avec la plus grande intégrité et la plus grande transparence possible.

Chaque membre d’un conseil d’administration doit se poser les questions suivantes avant de prendre une décision relative à l’octroi d’un contrat majeur :

Les règles d’attribution des contrats sont-elles claires et bien comprises au sein de l’organisation ? C’est le rôle du conseil de s’en assurer auprès de la direction ;
Les règles ont-elles été respectées ? Y-a-t-il apparence de conflits d’intérêts ? En d’autres termes, peut-on déceler une quelconque apparence de favoritisme, d’amis impliqués, de relations d’affaires douteuses ou autres ;
Y-a-t-il eu assez de transparence dans les règles d’attribution des contrats ? En d’autres termes, les soumissionnaires ont-ils reçus les mêmes informations et les règles ont-elles été suivies de façon juste et équitable ? Dans ce contexte, il est souhaitable d’exiger un minimum de soumissionnaires ;
Les entreprises soumissionnaires et les partenaires possèdent-ils et appliquent-ils un code d’éthique à l’interne et dans leurs relations d’affaires ? Leur réputation en matière d’intégrité est-elle irréprochable ?
Toutes les déclarations pertinentes à la prise de décision ont-elles été faites par la direction ? Ainsi, on s’assure que le gestionnaire qui fait la présentation au CA fait preuve d’abnégation et demeure le plus impartial possible en ce qui regarde l’intérêt et la mission de l’organisation.

En résumé, si, comme administratrice, je devais défendre publiquement une décision d’octroi de contrat, aurais-je accès à l’ensemble des éléments vérifiables pour justifier ma décision ?

Malgré toutes ces précautions, la prise de décision se fait toujours avec une information incomplète et, en ce sens, elle comporte un risque. L’important pour l’administrateur est de démontrer qu’il a été vigilant et qu’il s’est assuré d’obtenir toute l’information pertinente.

_______________________________________

Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A, contribue au Conseil du Développement du Loisir Scientifique (Réseau CDLS-CLS – organisme responsable des Expo-Sciences Québec), ainsi qu’à la Maison des familles de Ville Saint-Laurent.

On peut consulter son profil sur LinkedIn ca.linkedin.com/pub/pascale-lapointe-mba-pmp/18/b66/b35

Pourquoi un C.A. a-t-il besoin d’administrateurs externes … et indépendants ? | En rappel

Aujourd’hui, je vous recommande cette brève lecture dominicale sur les bénéfices à retirer d’un conseil composé, en tout ou en partie, d’administrateurs externes, mais … indépendants.

L’article est récemment paru sur le blogue de Larry Putterman* un spécialiste des questions de gouvernance. Nous avons déjà publié un article de cet auteur sur notre blogue il y a un an.

Selon nous, l’admission d’administrateurs externes au sein du conseil est l’une des actions les plus profitables pour tous les types d’entreprises, qu’elles soient, cotées, privées, PME, familiales, coopératives, gouvernementales, ou à but non lucratif.

Selon votre expérience, quels sont les autres avantages qui vous paraissent importants ? Pouvez-vous faire un témoignage en faveur d’un conseil composé uniquement d’administrateurs externes ? Je serais heureux de publier un recueil de bonnes pratiques à ce sujet.

Voici trois autres billets publiés sur mon blogue au cours des dernières années.

Contribution des administrateurs externes à la vision des entreprises

Les bénéfices reliés à la nomination d’administrateurs externes au sein d’une PME

Un argumentaire en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.

Bonne lecture. J’attends vos commentaires !

Why Your Board Needs Outside Directors

Boards without outside directors do not make objective decisions. Boards need outside directors to see all sides of a problem and find the best solution. Outside directors bring incredible value with their “fresh eyes.”

I believe boards that have not brought somebody new to the organization in the last one to two years run the risk of stalling the growth of the company.

Public companies are obligated to have outside directors, but private and family businesses are not. The Wall Street Journal states: “In US public companies, outside directors make up 66% of all boards and 72% of S&P 500 company boards.”

7 Benefits of Outside Directors:

Unbiased advice: Their advice is not tainted by the existing boards views and politics.

Different perspective than insiders: A CEO needs different views and perspectives to problems that only outsiders can bring. This is especially true for a family business.

Objective: Outsiders have been there and done that and can add the objective advice that boards need to distinguish crises and normal situations.

New skills: New board members skills and experiences bring a different view to problems and discussions.

Credibility: It sends the message that you are a serious organization. This can help with negotiating new financing, selling the company or an IPO.

New resources and contacts: Outside directors bring a whole new set of contacts and connections that can be leveraged. Contact introductions include customers, suppliers, and bankers.

On your side: Outside directors are on management’s side and will give opinions and advice that the company’s lawyers, accountants and bankers cannot give.

I was chairman, CEO and board director of SafeData, a data backup and recovery company. Our premium service offering was cloud-based high availability. High availability is data replication from one server to another.

We had an exceptional outside director who benefited us in all 7 areas. We spoke with him daily. He made the difference in our growth and successful sale of the company.

______________________________

*Larry Putterman* Outside Director | Interim CEO | CEO | Growth Strategist | Technology | Industrial | CEO Coach & Advisor

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur | En rappel

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

C’est certainement le document le plus exhaustif que je connaisse eu égard au futur de la gouvernance corporative. Cet article rédigé par Holly J. Gregory* associée et responsable de la gouvernance corporative et de la rémunération des dirigeants de la firme Sidley Austin LLP, a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School (HLS).

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Les avantages liés à la constitution d’un comité consultatif pour les PME et les OBNL

Voici une vidéo de la Banque de Développement du Canada (BDC) vantant les mérites d’un comité consultatif dans le cas d’une petite entreprise. Les propriétaires affirment que la mise en place d’un comité consultatif est « l’un des secrets les mieux gardés pour améliorer une entreprise ».

Il ne fait aucun doute que les petites entreprises privées ou les OBNL ont de multiples avantages à former un conseil consultatif, avant de se lancer dans la mise en place d’un conseil d’administration. Le cas de l’entreprise Steelworks Design illustre bien les bénéfices à retirer d’un tel arrangement de gouvernance.

Cependant, il faut se concentrer sur une solide composition de ce conseil, et c’est là que réside tout le défi !

6 avantages d’un comité consultatif

Découvrez pourquoi former un comité consultatif est l’un des secrets les mieux gardés pour améliorer une entreprise. Rhonda Barnet, vice-présidente de Steelworks Design, explique ici comment les conseils externes ainsi que les encouragements de son comité consultatif ont permis à l’entreprise de surmonter les difficultés et de connaître de nouveaux succès.

Si vous voulez consulter un autre article qui résume parfaitement les principaux avantages reliés à l’utilisation d’un comité consultatif (aviseur), je vous invite à lire ce court article d’Olivier Dellacherie paru dans Talent4Boards Inc.

The pros and cons of an Advisory Board

Strategy, Innovation

Boost and foster CEO’s strategic capacity,

Analyze market conditions,

Are sources of ideas or trends,

Recommend technological innovation,

Suggest product or service changes.

Source of advice

Bring a wide range of experiences and perspectives to the company,

Empower CEO/founder to make smarter and more effective business decisions.

Independence

Provide a set of “fresh eyes” for the organization.

Give independent and honest advice.

Will be on the side of CEOs.

Assistance, business development

Help CEOs grow their company,

Help with business deals,

Bring new business and revenue opportunities,

Can pro-actively assist CEOs for certain tasks, in order they can devote most of his/her time to the business development.

Support entrepreneur so they don’t navigate unfamiliar waters alone.

Cost effective

Provide a talent pool that they could not normally afford.

Be an inexpensive alternative to a formal BOD.

Efficient

No fiduciary responsibility.

Structure problem solving

Create an organized process to discuss business opportunities and concerns.

Value creation

Branding the Company thanks to having recognizable names on board,

Be an important asset in the valuation of the company.

Networking

Broaden networks and encompass business vision

Mentoring

Bring opportunity for mentoring relationships

Mentoring thanks to the combined experience,

Share difficult issues.

Recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis pour la votation aux assemblées annuelles de 2015

Bonne lecture !

ISS and Gass Lewis proxy voting policy updates for the 2015 proxy season

The proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, recently announced updates to their respective voting policies for domestic companies for the upcoming 2015 proxy season. These two firms have risen to prominence in recent years, wielding significant power in corporate governance matters, proxy fights and takeover votes. Hedge funds, mutual fund complexes, institutional investors and similar organizations that own shares of multiple companies pay ISS and Glass Lewis to advise them regarding shareholder votes.

The ISS and Glass Lewis policy updates are effective for annual meetings on or after February 1, 2015, and January 1, 2015, respectively. For your convenience, we have summarized below the most important updates relating to corporate governance matters.

Independent Board Chairs

The most notable ISS policy change relates to shareholder proposals that seek to separate the chairman and chief executive officer positions. For the 2015 proxy season, ISS is adding new governance, board leadership and performance factors to its current analytical framework. In this regard, ISS’s policy will continue to generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” independent chair shareholder proposals after consideration in a “holistic manner” of the following factors:

– Scope of the Proposal: Whether the shareholder proposal is binding or merely a recommendation and whether it seeks an immediate change in the chairman role or can be implemented at the next CEO transition.

– Company’s Current Board Leadership Structure: The presence of an executive or non-independent chairman in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chairman, and/or a departure from a structure with an independent chairman.

– Company’s Governance Structure: The overall independence of the board, the independence of key committees, the establishment of governance guidelines, as well as board tenure and its relationship to CEO tenure.

– Company’s Governance Practices: Problematic governance or management issues such as poor compensation practices, material failures of governance and risk oversight, related party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk will be reviewed as well as corporate or management scandals and actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.

– Company Performance: One-, three- and five-year total shareholder return compared to the company’s peers and the market as a whole.

In view of its new holistic approach in evaluating these types of shareholder proposals, ISS indicates that a “For” or “Against” recommendation will not be determined by any single factor, but that it will consider all positive and negative aspects of the company based on the new expanded list of factors when assessing these proposals.

Glass Lewis generally does not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board of directors, but it encourages clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever the issue arises in a proxy statement.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments

ISS and Glass Lewis have adopted new policies pursuant to which they will generally issue negative vote recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder ability to exercise their rights (“Unilateral Amendments”).

Under the updated policy, if the board adopts a Unilateral Amendment, ISS will generally make a recommendation for an “against” or “withhold” vote on a director individually, the members of a board committee or the entire board (other than new nominees on a case-by-case basis), after considering the following nine factors, as applicable:

– the board’s rationale for adopting the Unilateral Amendment;

– disclosure by the issuer of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the Unilateral Amendment;

– the level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the Unilateral Amendment;

– the board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw and charter amendments and other entrenchment provisions;

– the issuer’s ownership structure;

– the issuer’s existing governance provisions;

– whether the Unilateral Amendment was made prior to or in connection with the issuer’s IPO;

– the timing of the Unilateral Amendment in connection with a significant business development; and

– other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to the determination of the impact of the Unilateral Amendment on shareholders.

Glass Lewis has revised its policy to provide that, depending on the circumstances, it will recommend that shareholders vote “against” the chairman of the board’s governance committee, or the entire committee, in instances where a board has amended the company’s governing documents, without shareholder approval, to “reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right” such as:

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent;

– an increase to the ownership threshold required by shareholders to call a special meeting;

– an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments;

– the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse (e.g., bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or “fee-shifting” bylaws);

– the adoption of a classified board structure; and

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Equity Plan Proposals

Of particular importance to management are the revised ISS and Glass Lewis policies pertaining to their voting recommendations on company proposals seeking shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. Equity compensation of management remains a central focus of many institutional investors and shareholder activists.

For 2015, ISS adopted a new “scorecard” model, referred to as Equity Plan Scorecard (“EPSC”), that considers a range of positive and negative factors in evaluating equity incentive plan proposals, rather than the current six pass/fail tests focused on cost and certain egregious practices to evaluate such proposals. The total EPSC score will generally determine whether ISS recommends “for” or “against” the proposal.

Under its new policy, ISS will evaluate equity-based compensation plans on a case-by-case basis depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, as evaluated by the EPSC factors. The EPSC factors will fall under the following three categories (“EPSC Pillars”):

– Plan Cost (45 percent weighting): The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers. ISS will measure plan cost by using ISS’s Value Transfer Model (SVT) for the company in relation to its peers. The SVT calculation assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors.

– Plan Features (20 percent weighting): The presence or absence of provisions in the plan providing for (i) automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control; (ii) discretionary vesting authority; (iii) liberal share recycling on various award types; and (iv) minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan.

– Grant Practices (35 percent weighting): The issuer’s recent grant practices under the proposed plan and all other plans including (i) the company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; (ii) vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (three-year lookback); (iii) the estimated duration of the plan based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years; (iv) the proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions; (v) whether the company maintains a clawback policy; and (vi) whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

In its updated voting policy, ISS will generally recommend voting “against” the plan proposal if the combination of the factors listed above in the EPSC Pillars indicates that the plan is not, overall, in the shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:

– awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

– the plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of prepricing – for non-listed companies);

– the plan is a vehicle for “problematic pay practices” or a “pay-for-performance disconnect;” or

– any other plan features are determined to have a “significant negative impact on shareholder interests.”

Political Contributions

In recent years, many issuers have received shareholder proposals seeking reports or other disclosure regarding political contributions, including lobbying and political activities. Under the updated policy on political contribution shareholder proposals, ISS will generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, after considering:

– the company’s policies as well as management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

– the company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups where it makes political contributions; and

– recent significant controversies, fines or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Practical Considerations

Despite the policy changes discussed above, public companies should continue to tailor their individual governance policies with a view towards what is in the long-term best interests of their own shareholders as opposed to meeting the ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines. ISS notes that its 2015 policy is intended to address the recent substantial increase in bylaw/charter amendments that adversely impact shareholder rights without being subject to a shareholder vote. Companies that intend to adopt any corporate governance policies that adversely impact shareholder rights should consider seeking shareholder support before implementing such policies, if a negative ISS or Glass Lewis recommendation on re-election of directors is likely to have a material effect on the election.

Companies should review last year’s proxy compensation and governance disclosures in order to make improvements in this year’s disclosures where appropriate – particularly if the company has received comments on this disclosure from the SEC staff. The failure to address a previous year’s staff comment may provoke a more detailed review by the staff, with its attendant time delays, should it be noticed during the staff’s initial screening of the filing.

Companies should also review their corporate governance and compensation practices for potential vulnerabilities under ISS’ policy updates, such as equity compensation plans that may be up for a vote at the next annual meeting or an independent chair shareholder proposal, and decide what action, if any, to take in light of this assessment.

Companies should continue a regular dialogue with key investors, bearing in mind limitations imposed by the SEC on proxy solicitations. Shareholder engagement efforts should continue to focus on what shareholders’ greatest concerns are and the rationale for board action.

Le gouvernement résistera-t-il à la tentation partisane de la nomination d’un nouveau PDG à Hydro-Québec ?

Voici un article de Michel Nadeau, ex vice-président de la Caisse de dépôt et placement et directeur général de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP), paru dans le Devoir récemment.

L’auteur se questionne, tout comme moi d’ailleurs, sur le processus d’embauche du PDG d’Hydro-Québec et sur la tentation, très réelle, de procéder à une nomination partisane !

Le point de vue de M. Nadeau est tout à fait pertinent eu égard à gouvernance des sociétés d’État.

Ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article.

Bonne lecture. À suivre !

Règles de gouvernance à Hydro-Québec | Nomination du nouveau PDG

Photo: Hydro-Québec

Il était rafraîchissant d’entendre le ministre de l’Énergie et des Ressources naturelles, M. Pierre Arcand, terminer mercredi matin une entrevue chez Marie-France Bazzo en déclarant : « Je vais laisser le conseil d’administration faire le travail et c’est à lui de faire des recommandations quant au successeur de M. Vandal. » Photo: Hydro-Québec

La tentation est toujours très forte dans les cabinets politiques à Québec de passer outre les normes de bonne gouvernance et de sortir un p.-d.g. d’un chapeau partisan. Tout individu a droit à ses convictions politiques, mais l’essentiel est qu’il remplisse les critères de compétence et de crédibilité selon le mandat. À ce chapitre, le premier ministre, M. Philippe Couillard, n’a pas fait vivre un grand moment de gouvernance au Québec en confiant récemment la présidence du conseil d’administration et du comité de gouvernance d’Hydro-Québec à une personne qui n’a aucune expérience dans la gestion du CA d’une grande organisation. Cela étant dit, il faut maintenant faire confiance à M. Michael Penner.

Comme l’indique l’article 11.6 de sa Loi, le conseil d’administration a déjà établi le profil de compétence et d’expérience du candidat recherché….

…

Le ministre l’a dit : ce n’est pas un choix politique. Le comité des ressources humaines devra trouver le meilleur candidat en interne ou à l’externe sans se gêner pour regarder à l’international. Le CA, qui compte une bonne moitié de gens expérimentés, peut relever ce défi. Les administrateurs pourraient se précipiter sur le bottin de l’Ordre des ingénieurs en cherchant un dirigeant intègre et honnête. Malgré le flou accusateur des audiences de la commission Charbonneau, ce profil peut encore se trouver. Mais rappelons-nous que le marché de l’énergie a beaucoup changé et que l’époque de la construction de grands barrages dans les milliards de dollars et les régions lointaines est, pour le moment, chose du passé. Au cours des prochaines années, la priorité sera davantage la gestion serrée des actifs actuels de 73 milliards et un contrôle rigoureux de l’utilisation des revenus de 13 milliards. Les usagers veulent des gestionnaires intelligents… Pas juste des compteurs !

Cette nomination sera un indicateur du sérieux de ce gouvernement dans la gouvernance et la gestion du plus important outil de développement économique et industriel du Québec.

Paula doit prendre une décision très délicate et déterminante au conseil | Cas en gouvernance

Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie McLelland qui aborde un problème relatif à la conduite d’un conseil d’administration de petite entreprise, dans un contexte de conflit d’intérêt et de malversations potentielles. Paula, la nouvelle administratrice doit prendre une décision très délicate !

Le cas présente la situation de manière très claire, puis trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit la nouvelle membre du C.A.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Une décision difficile au conseil : Le cas de Paula

Pourquoi un C.A. a-t-il besoin d’administrateurs externes … et indépendants ?

Aujourd’hui, je vous recommande cette brève lecture dominicale sur les bénéfices à retirer d’un conseil composé, en tout ou en partie, d’administrateurs externes, mais … indépendants.

L’article est récemment paru sur le blogue de Larry Putterman* un spécialiste des questions de gouvernance. Nous avons déjà publié un article de cet auteur sur notre blogue il y a un an.

Voici trois autres billets publiés sur mon blogue au cours des dernières années.

Contribution des administrateurs externes à la vision des entreprises

Les bénéfices reliés à la nomination d’administrateurs externes au sein d’une PME

Un argumentaire en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A.

Bonne lecture. J’attends vos commentaires !

Why Your Board Needs Outside Directors

Boards without outside directors do not make objective decisions. Boards need outside directors to see all sides of a problem and find the best solution. Outside directors bring incredible value with their “fresh eyes.”

I believe boards that have not brought somebody new to the organization in the last one to two years run the risk of stalling the growth of the company.

Public companies are obligated to have outside directors, but private and family businesses are not. The Wall Street Journal states: “In US public companies, outside directors make up 66% of all boards and 72% of S&P 500 company boards.”

7 Benefits of Outside Directors:

Unbiased advice: Their advice is not tainted by the existing boards views and politics.

Different perspective than insiders: A CEO needs different views and perspectives to problems that only outsiders can bring. This is especially true for a family business.

Objective: Outsiders have been there and done that and can add the objective advice that boards need to distinguish crises and normal situations.

New skills: New board members skills and experiences bring a different view to problems and discussions.

Credibility: It sends the message that you are a serious organization. This can help with negotiating new financing, selling the company or an IPO.

New resources and contacts: Outside directors bring a whole new set of contacts and connections that can be leveraged. Contact introductions include customers, suppliers, and bankers.

On your side: Outside directors are on management’s side and will give opinions and advice that the company’s lawyers, accountants and bankers cannot give.

I was chairman, CEO and board director of SafeData, a data backup and recovery company. Our premium service offering was cloud-based high availability. High availability is data replication from one server to another.

We had an exceptional outside director who benefited us in all 7 areas. We spoke with him daily. He made the difference in our growth and successful sale of the company.

______________________________

*Larry Putterman* Outside Director | Interim CEO | CEO | Growth Strategist | Technology | Industrial | CEO Coach & Advisor

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Cinq questions qu’un administrateur devrait considérer lors d’une décision d’octroi de contrat

Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un billet soumis par Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A,, gestionnaire de projet et membre de CA d’OBNL.

Son article rappelle les questions qu’un administrateur de sociétés doit se poser lorsqu’il est confronté à une décision d’octroi de contrat.

Bonne lecture !

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces cinq questions classiques sont encore le meilleur moyen pour s’assurer d’agir avec la plus grande intégrité et la plus grande transparence possible.

Chaque membre d’un conseil d’administration doit se poser les questions suivantes avant de prendre une décision relative à l’octroi d’un contrat majeur :

Les règles d’attribution des contrats sont-elles claires et bien comprises au sein de l’organisation ? C’est le rôle du conseil de s’en assurer auprès de la direction ;
Les règles ont-elles été respectées ? Y-a-t-il apparence de conflits d’intérêts ? En d’autres termes, peut-on déceler une quelconque apparence de favoritisme, d’amis impliqués, de relations d’affaires douteuses ou autres ;
Y-a-t-il eu assez de transparence dans les règles d’attribution des contrats ? En d’autres termes, les soumissionnaires ont-ils reçus les mêmes informations et les règles ont-elles été suivies de façon juste et équitable ? Dans ce contexte, il est souhaitable d’exiger un minimum de soumissionnaires ;
Les entreprises soumissionnaires et les partenaires possèdent-ils et appliquent-ils un code d’éthique à l’interne et dans leurs relations d’affaires ? Leur réputation en matière d’intégrité est-elle irréprochable ?
Toutes les déclarations pertinentes à la prise de décision ont-elles été faites par la direction ? Ainsi, on s’assure que le gestionnaire qui fait la présentation au CA fait preuve d’abnégation et demeure le plus impartial possible en ce qui regarde l’intérêt et la mission de l’organisation.

_______________________________________

On peut consulter son profil sur LinkedIn ca.linkedin.com/pub/pascale-lapointe-mba-pmp/18/b66/b35

Supervision accrue des firmes de conseil en vote

Quelles sont les dispositions règlementaires susceptibles de s’appliquer aux firmes de conseil spécialisées en matière de votation en 2015 ?

Comme on le sait, le marché est actuellement dominé par deux grands joueurs : (1) Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) et (2) Glass Lewis & Co. Les recommandations de ces organisations influencent grandement le comportement des actionnaires activistes et le processus de votation lors des assemblées annuelles, notamment le comportement des investisseurs institutionnels qui se fient souvent aveuglément sur les avis de ces firmes conseil, négligeant ainsi leur rôle de fiduciaire.

249 Plusieurs représentants de la communauté des affaires dont le commissaire de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Daniel M. Gallagher, s’inquiètent du manque de transparence de ces entreprises, de l’absence de mécanismes de reddition de compte et de la présence potentielle de conflits d’intérêts.

En 2015, ces firmes feront l’objet d’une supervision accrue de la SEC et, possiblement, de la mise en place d’un code de conduite prévoyant la divulgation des méthodologies utilisées. Les préoccupations relatives aux pratiques de ces firmes sont sensiblement les mêmes aux É.U., au Canada et en Europe.

Pour en savoir plus sur les actions de l’AMF, je vous invite à consulter l’Avis 25-201 relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote. Vous pouvez également consulter la présentation de l’IGOPP en réponse à l’appel de commentaires sur le projet d’avis relatif aux indications à l’intention des agences de conseil en vote.

Je vous invite aussi à lire l’article ci-dessous publié par David A. Katz, associé de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans le domaine des fusions et acquisitions, et paru sur le forum de la Harvard Law School.

Voici un bref extrait de la conclusion de l’article. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Important Proxy Advisor Developments

At best, proxy advisors play an important role in making investment managers more informed, efficient stewards of their clients’ proxy voting. However, their influence has become so significant that it is crucial that their recommendations be as worthwhile, transparent, and objective as possible. As the focus shifts to the 2015 proxy season, companies should be mindful of the SEC’s increased scrutiny of investment advisers’ voting and use of proxy advisory firms. Corporate issuers can and should be proactive in obtaining and reviewing proxy voting reports relating to the company and promptly requesting any needed corrections of incorrect information. In cases of material misstatements or confusion created by the proxy voting reports, companies may wish to add their own corrections to their proxy materials or other shareholder communications. Companies should, as always, continue to engage directly with their large shareholders and make the case for supporting the recommendations of the board. Healthy communication with issuers will help enable institutional investors to make their own independent, informed decisions about voting matters.

A separate issue that has not been widely discussed is whether the proxy advisory firms should be required to make their reports public, since they influence such a large segment of the voting population. Although the proxy advisory firms currently are not required to publicly file their reports, if the goal is increased transparency, perhaps this should change. As the SEC monitors the proxy advisory firms in the coming months, appropriate consideration should be given to modernizing the antiquated proxy voting system and determining what additional steps, if any, should be taken to regulate these firms and their influence on public companies.

Companies concerned about the undue influence of proxy advisors have an engaged advocate in Commissioner Gallagher, and momentum may be building, both in the United States and abroad, toward further reform in this area. The upcoming proxy season will be a key time for the SEC to observe any ramifications of SLB 20 and to consider next steps. Fundamentally, the SEC has, with SLB 20, reminded investment managers that their fiduciary duties are incompatible with inattentive overreliance on proxy advisors. It remains to be seen what effect the new guidance will have, but if it proves to be effective, it may herald a new era of decreasing relevance for proxy advisory firms.

_______________________________________

* David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh that first appeared in the New York Law Journal; the full article, including footnotes, is available here.

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015

En cette veille de Noël, voici un article de Kerry E. Berchem*, paru aujourd’hui dans le Harvard Law School Forum, qui présente une liste détaillée des 10 plus importantes préoccupations des conseils d’administration en 2015.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les sujets chauds à considérer par les C.A. en 2015.

Bonne lecture !

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015

1. Oversee strategic planning in the face of uneven economic growth and rising geopolitical tensions

2. Oversee cybersecurity as hackers seek to infiltrate even the most sophisticated information security systems

3. Assess the impact of advances in technology and big data on the company’s business plans

4. Cultivate shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities as activist investors target more companies

5. Consider the impact of M&A opportunities

6. Oversee risk management as newer and more complex risks emerge

7. Ensure appropriate board composition in light of increasing focus on diversity, director tenure and board size

8. Explore new trends in reducing corporate health care costs

9. Set appropriate executive compensation

10. Ensure the company has a robust compliance program as the SEC steps up its enforcement efforts and whistleblowers earn huge bounties.

…….

In light of these developments, it is critical for companies to have comprehensive and effective compliance programs in place, including a transparent process for internal investigations. Companies should also review and update as necessary their anti-retaliation policies and procedures and make sure employees and executives at every level are sufficiently trained in this area.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

_______________________________________________

* Kerry E. Berchem, associé et co-responsable des pratiques de gouvernance de la firme Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

SÉRIE ORGANISMES SANS BUT LUCRATIF

Partagez (share) ce post

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post