Un consultant de McKinsey responsable des rémunérations excessives des PCD (CEO) !


C’est le constat que fait Max Nisen dans Business Insider le 14 août 2013.

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous.

How One Employee And One Consulting Firm May Be Singlehandedly Responsible For The Staggering Gap Between CEO And Worker Pay

McKinsey is the world’s largest and most profitable management consulting firm,  as well one of the most difficult places to get hired. Over its 87-year existence it’s had a  massive impact on the U.S. economy according to « The Firm, » a forthcoming book by Duff McDonald.

mckinsey & company

In a New York Observer column, pointed out by Mike Dang at The Billfold, McDonald argues that the massive modern-day  gap between executive and worker pay has its origin with the consulting  firm.

It’s a fascinating story that all started  with General Motors commissioning a study on executive pay from McKinsey  consultant Arch Patton. He found that from 1939 to 1950, hourly employee pay  more than doubled, but top management pay went up only 35%.

The study, published in the Harvard Business Review, became a  series and turned national attention toward executive compensation,  promoting the idea that higher pay and bonuses were the lever to attract and  retain top executives.

Patton became a superstar,  hired by managers who were not surprisingly interested in hearing they were  underpaid. McKinsey’s CEO apparently thought this type of consulting was beneath  the firm, but wasn’t about to turn down the money.

« For several years, Mr. Patton personally  accounted for almost 10 percent of the firm’s billings, » McDonald writes. « At the end of the war, only 18 percent of  companies in the country had bonus plans. By 1960, about 60 percent of them  did. »

In 1961 came the books « Men, Money  and Motivation: Executive Compensation as an Instrument of  Leadership » and « What Is an  Executive Worth?« 

One McKinsey consultant told McDonald that Patton wrote « the same article  [26] times for the Harvard Business Review. »

Because of its popularity  and McKinsey’s influence, the idea became an entrenched philosophy, as did the  concept that as a company grows, so should CEO pay.

While Patton’s  compensation philosophy started with rigorous analysis of performance, soon it  took on a life of its own, with executive pay spiraling higher and higher, while  worker pay was left to languish.

Here’s where we are today, according to a  report by The State Of Working America,  a project of the Economic Policy Institute:

The AFL-CIO puts the number even higher, saying that the average Fortune 500  CEO makes 354 times the average wage of their employees. Some executives make 1,000 times more.

Of course, McKinsey and  Patton weren’t the only factor. Bull markets and economic expansion help push  pay upwards and encourage investors to look the other way — and once it moves  up, pay is slow to move back down. Meanwhile, slack labor markets and  weak growth prospects help to explain stagnant wages.

Regardless, McKinsey and Patton may have been a major driver in the  gap between CEO and employee wages exploding by a factor of 10 since the middle of the  century.

Read more:  http://www.businessinsider.com/mckinsey-and-the-ceo-pay-gap-2013-8#ixzz2c3CFCgwB

Is McKinsey to Blame for Skyrocketing CEO Pay? (ritholtz.com)

Jobs multiplier – The making of a boardroom hero | The Times (morethanaframework.wordpress.com)

« Abolissez les bonis versés aux hauts dirigeants » | Henry Mintzberg


Il y a 9 jours, j’ai lancé une discussion dans le groupe Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn sur la problématique liée au versement de bonis aux hauts dirigeants des sociétés cotées. J’avais alors proposé la lecture d’un article d’Henry Mintzberg* paru le 30 novembre 2009 et publié dans le Wall Street Journal le 12 novembre 2012 : No More Executive Bonuses !

Ce partage a donné lieu à une discussion extrordinairement musclée dans le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn que je vous invite à consulter afin de saisir toute la gamme des arguments invoqués, soit pour justifier l’utilisation des bonis, soit pour proposer de nouvelles variables à tenir en ligne de compte, soit, carrément, pour vilipender les tenants de cette approche trop souvent abusive. On peut dire que l’article de Mintzberg a, encore une fois, suscité de vives réactions.

Dans son article, Mintzberg critique sévèrement l’utilisation de cette façon de rémunérer la direction des entreprises et recommande l’abolition, pure et simple, des primes au rendement et des autres bonis versés aux hauts dirigeants. Cet article me semble toujours d’actualité.

L’auteur donne cinq raisons qui guident le comportement des hauts dirigeants lorsque le système de rémunération comporte des bonis. Il suggère que le système est basé sur de fausses hypothèses, notamment :

(1) A company’s health is represented by its financial measures alone—even better, by just the price of its stock;

(2) Performance measures, whether short or long term, represent the true strength of the company;

(3) The CEO, with a few other senior executives, is primarily responsible for the company’s performance.

Je vous invite à lire l’article de Mintzberg, ci-dessous, puis à consulter le lien vous menant au fil de discussion mentionné plus haut.

Ce billet a une grande valeur pédagogique; n’hésitez pas à faire connaître votre point de vue. Bonne lecture.

Let’s end corporate bonuses, says Henry Mintzberg, a professor at the Desautels Faculty of Management at McGill University. Executive bonuses, especially stock and option grants, are a form of legal corruption that has been bringing down the global … The problem isn’t that they are poorly designed. The problem is that they exist.

No More Executive Bonuses !

… These days, it seems, there is no shortage of recommendations for fixing the way bonuses are paid to executives at big public companies. Well, I have my own recommendation: Scrap the whole thing. Don’t pay any bonuses. Nothing.

This may sound extreme. But when you look at the way the compensation game is played—and the assumptions that are made by those who want to reform it—you can come to no other conclusion. The system simply can’t be fixed. Executive bonuses—especially in the form of stock and option grants—represent the most prominent form of legal corruption that has been undermining our large corporations and bringing down the global economy. Get rid of them and we will all be better off for it.

Mintzberg Speaking
Mintzberg Speaking (Photo credit: Daphne Depasse)

The failings of the current system—and the executives who live by it—are painfully obvious. Although these executives like to think of themselves as leaders, when it comes to their pay practices, many of them haven’t been demonstrating leadership at all. Instead they’ve been acting like gamblers—except that the games they play are hopelessly rigged in their favor.

First, they play with other people’s money—the stockholders’, not to mention the livelihoods of their employees and the sustainability of their institutions.

Second, they collect not when they win so much as when it appears that they are winning—because their company’s stock price has gone up and their bonuses have kicked in. In such a game, you make sure to have your best cards on the table, while you keep the rest hidden in your hand.

Third, they also collect when they lose—it’s called a « golden parachute. » Some gamblers.

Fourth, some even collect just for drawing cards—for example, receiving a special bonus when they have signed a merger, before anyone can know if it will work out. Most mergers don’t.

And fifth, on top of all this, there are chief executives who collect merely for not leaving the table. This little trick is called a « retention bonus »—being paid for staying in the game!  …

___________________________________________________________________

*Henry Mintzberg est le Cleghorn Professor of Management Studies à la Desautels Faculty of Management de McGill University, Montréal.

Autres articles d’intérêt :

Mintzberg in the WSJ: Get Rid of Executive Bonuses (bobsutton.typepad.com)

L’ancienneté du PCD (CEO) nuit-elle à la performance ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Proposition de changement aux règles de gouvernance | Une enquête de Richard Leblanc


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. L’auteur a interrogé un nombre important d’acteurs de la scène de la gouvernance (investisseurs activistes, gestionnaires de fonds privés, administrateurs, CEO) et a tenu compte des points de vue émis par plusieurs groupes d’experts dans le domaine :

« Advisory work with regulators; assessments of leading boards; expertwitness work; academic and practitioner literature; current and emerging regulations; director conferences and webinars; lectures the author has delivered to the Institute of Corporate Directors and Directors College in Canada; discussions in the author’s LinkedIn group, Board and Advisors; and research being conducted with the author and Henry D. Wolfe on building high performance public company boards ».

Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :

(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;

(2) Imputabilité de la direction envers le C.A.;

(3) Imputabilité du C.A. envers les actionnaires.

L’auteur nous indique que l’article sera bientôt publié dans International Journal of Disclosure and Governance sous le titre Forty Proposals to Strengthen: the Public Company Board of Director’s Role in Value Creation; Management Accountability to the Board; and Board Accountability to Shareholders

Je vous invite à consulter cette liste afin d’avoir un aperçu des types de changements proposés. Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus. Bonne lecture.

Proposals to Strengthen a Board’s Role in Value Creation, Management Accountability to the Board, and Board Accountability to Shareholders

I.    Increase Board Engagement, Expertise and Incentives to Focus on Value Creation

Reduce the size of the Board.

Increase the frequency of Board meetings.

Limit Director overboardedness.

Limit Chair of the Board overboardedness.

Increase Director work time.

Increase the Board Chair’s role in the value creation process.

Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard Uni...
Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the college yard. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Focus the majority of Board time on value creation and company performance.

Increase Director roles and responsibilities relative to value creation.

Increase Director compensation, and match incentive compensation to long-term value creation and individual performance.

Enable Director access to information and reporting Management.

Enable Director and Board access to expertise to inform value creation as needed.

Require active investing in the Company by Directors.

Select Directors who can contribute directly to value creation.

Revise the Board’s committee structure to address value creation.

Hold Management to account.

Disclose individual Director areas of expertise directly related to value creation.

Increase Board engagement focused on value creation.

Establish and fund an independent Office of the Chairman.

Limit Board homogeneity and groupthink.

II.   Increase Director Independence from Management and Management Accountability to the Board

Increase objective Director and advisory independence.

Limit Director interlocks.

Limit over-tenured Directors.

Limit potential Management capture and social relatedness of Directors.

Decrease undue Management influence on Director selection.

Decrease undue Management influence on Board Chair selection.

Increase objective independence of governance assurance providers.

Limit management control of board protocols.

Address fully perceived conflicts of interest.

Establish independent oversight functions reporting directly to Committees of the Board to support compliance oversight.

Match Management compensation with longer-term value creation, corporate performance and risk management.

III.   Increase Director Accountability to Shareholders

The Board Chair and Committee Chairs shall communicate face-to-face and visit regularly with major Shareholders.

Communicate the value creation plan to Shareholders.

Implement integrated, longer-term reporting focused on sustained value creation that includes non-financial performance and investment.

Implement independent and transparent Director performance reviews with Shareholder input linked to re-nomination.

Each Director, each year, shall receive a majority of Shareholder votes cast to continue serving as a Director.

Make it easier for Shareholders to propose and replace Directors.

Limit any undue Management influence on Board – Shareholder communication.

Limit Shareholder barriers to the governance process that can be reasonably seen to promote Board or Management entrenchment.

__________________________________

* Richard W. Leblanc, Associate Professor, Law, Governance & Ethics, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, of the Bar of Ontario; Summer Faculty 2013 (MGMT S-5018 Corporate Governance) at Harvard University; Faculty at the Directors College; and Research Fellow and Advisory Board Member, Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management.

L’ancienneté du PCD (CEO) nuit-elle à la performance ?


La longueur de l’exercice du mandat d’un président et chef de direction (PCD) nuit-elle à la performance ? Il semble bien que oui selon l’étude de Xueming Luo, Vamsi K. Kanuri et Michelle Andrews, publiée dans HBR The Magazine.

Les implications pour les C.A. sont discutées dans l’article. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous?

Long CEO Tenure Can Hurt Performance

It’s a familiar cycle: A CEO takes office, begins gaining knowledge and experience, and is soon launching initiatives that boost the bottom line. Fast-forward a decade, and the same executive is risk-averse and slow to adapt to change—and the company’s performance is on the decline. The pattern is so common that many refer to the “seasons” of a CEO’s tenure, analogous to the seasons of the year.

New research examines the causes of this cycle and shows that it’s more nuanced than that. We found that CEO tenure affects performance through its impact on two groups of stakeholders—employees and customers—and has different effects on each. The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.

We studied 356 U.S. companies from 2000 to 2010. We measured CEO tenure and calculated the strength of the firm-employee relationship each year (by assessing such things as retirement benefits and layoffs) and the strength of the firm-customer relationship (by assessing such things as product quality and safety). We then measured the magnitude and volatility of stock returns. All this allowed us to arrive at an optimal tenure length: 4.8 years.

The underlying reasons for the pattern, we believe, have to do with how CEOs learn. Previous research has shown that different learning styles prevail at different stages of the CEO life cycle. Early on, when new executives are getting up to speed, they seek information in diverse ways, turning to both external and internal company sources. This deepens their relationships with customers and employees alike.

But as CEOs accumulate knowledge and become entrenched, they rely more on their internal networks for information, growing less attuned to market conditions. And, because they have more invested in the firm, they favor avoiding losses over pursuing gains. Their attachment to the status quo makes them less responsive to vacillating consumer preferences.

These findings have several implications for organizations. Boards should be watchful for changes in the firm-customer relationship. They should be aware that long-tenured CEOs may be skilled at employee relations but less adept at responding to the marketplace; these leaders may be great motivators but weak strategists, unifying workers around a failing course of action, for example. Finally, boards should structure incentive plans to draw heavily on consumer and market metrics in the late stages of their top executives’ terms. This will motivate CEOs to maintain strong customer relationships and to continue gathering vital market information firsthand.

_______________________________________________________

*Xueming Luo is a professor at the University of Texas at Arlington and a distinguished honorary professor at Fudan University, in China. Vamsi K. Kanuri and Michelle Andrews are PhD candidates.

CEO Succession–Promote from Within (sophisticatedfinance.typepad.com)

Quels sont les grands enjeux de gouvernance ? | Six thèmes chauds !


En rappel, vous trouverez, ci-joint, une excellente publication de la NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors) qui présente les grands défis et les enjeux qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années.

Ce document est un recueil de textes publiés par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.

Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. J’ai déjà publié un billet sur ce sujet le 23 juin 2013, en référence à cette publication.

Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !

Voici comment les firmes expertes se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance. Bonne lecture.

Boardroom, Tremont Grand
Boardroom, Tremont Grand (Photo credit: Joel Abroad)

(1) What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle

(2) KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute

(3) Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies

(4) Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX

(5) Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners

(6) What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP

NACD Insights and Analysis – Governance Challenges: 2013 and Beyond

Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.

Article relié :

NACD BoardVision: Private Equity’s Influence on Executive Compensation (bulletproofblog.com)

Interventionnisme des investisseurs activistes VS défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A.


Interventionnisme des investisseurs activistes VS défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. | Un débat de fond

Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».

(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).

Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.

(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.

Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».

L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.

Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?

Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.

The Golden Age Of Activist Investing

Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.

Icahn Lab Conference Room
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)

Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”

Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…

Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets.  The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”

Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”

The Golden Age Of Activist Investing (forbes.com)

Hedge Fund News: Daniel Loeb, Dell Inc. (DELL), Herbalife Ltd. (NYSE:HLF) (insidermonkey.com)

Interventionnisme des investisseurs activistes VS défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. | Un débat de fond


Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».

(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).

Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.

(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.

Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».

L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.

Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?

Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.

The Golden Age Of Activist Investing

Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.

Icahn Lab Conference Room
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)

Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”

Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…

Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets.  The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”

Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”

The Golden Age Of Activist Investing (forbes.com)

Hedge Fund News: Daniel Loeb, Dell Inc. (DELL), Herbalife Ltd. (NYSE:HLF) (insidermonkey.com)

Comment contrer la nature insidieuse du capitalisme financier ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism.

Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document, à ma connaissance, n’a pas été traduit en français mais il mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document (traduites en français) sont les suivantes :

(1) La gestion avec une perspective court-termiste représente-t-elle un problème sérieux ?

(2) Les investisseurs activistes sont-ils des joueurs court-termistes dont les actions ont des conséquences négatives pour les entreprises à long terme ?

(3) Les conseils d’administration des sociétés canadiennes doivent-ils être mieux protégés des actions des investisseurs activistes et des offres d’achat hostiles ?

Voici quelques extraits du document ci-dessous. Je vous invite à en prendre connaissance :

Good versus Bad Capitalism: a Call for a Governance Revolution

Bad capitalism is finance-driven capitalism; it is capitalism without true owners, a capitalism in which corporate leaders, motivated by the carrot of lavish incentives and the stick of humiliating replacement, are singularly focused on generating short-term value for shareholders. It is a system where financial operators reap immense riches from activities of no social value.

 The board members of the privatized company, often made up of general partners of the fund, are compensated at a level and in a manner hardly conceivable for board members of a publicly listed company.

Capitalism Plus retail box cover.
Capitalism Plus retail box cover. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
  1. Board members of the newly privatized company must not be « independent » and rarely are; a majority of board members of publicly listed companies must be « independent ».
  2. The boards of listed corporations must discharge fully all their fiduciary and legal responsibilities; that component of governance grabs a good portion of the time available to board members; privatized companies have none of these hassles and can concentrate on strategy, cash flow management, etc.
  3. The board of a privatized companies will call directly on outside consulting firms to assess the company, its competitors and so forth, and the external consultants will report directly to the board. Now imagine that the board of a publicly listed company were to inform management that it intends to hire some firm to audit the company’s strategy and benchmark its performance. That would not fly well and would certainly create severe tensions between the board and management. Management would claim that the board is straying away from its governance role; it would contend that the company regularly gets this sort of studies and reports regularly to the board on their results, etc.

Be that as it may, a governance revolution is in the making. Novel ways of dealing with the insuperable limits of current forms of governance must be found.

Indeed, the theme of this conference could well have been « Good Capitalism versus Bad Capitalism » because short-termism and unchecked activities of speculative funds are emblematic of « bad capitalism », of the kind we must get rid.

Is Governance different in Publicly listed companies? (surenrajdotcom.wordpress.com)

Protect Equity Crowdfund Investors by Strong Corporate Governance (healthycrowdfunder.wordpress.com)

Performance Vs Governance at Disney. (surenrajdotcom.wordpress.com)

Don’t Confuse Free Market Capitalism with Crony Capitalism (yevala.com)

___________________________________________________________

* Yvan Allaire, Ph.D., FRSC, président exécutif, IGOPP

Renforcer la dynamique collaborative au sein du conseil : Première partie


Poursuivant notre politique de collaboration avec des experts en gouvernance, nous avons demandé à Hélène Solignac*, associée responsable des activités “gouvernance” de la firme française Rivoli Consulting, d’agir à titre d’auteure invitée. Le billet proposé est récemment paru sur son blogue; l’auteure explique, dans un premier temps, pourquoi il est important de renforcer la collaboration au sein de l’équipe du conseil. La question du comment sera abordée dans un article subséquent.

Un conseil n’est pas un groupe comme les autres : de taille très variable selon le type d’organisation (sociétés par actions cotées ou non cotées, mutuelles et institutions de prévoyance, associations et fondations..), ou leur actionnariat (familial, investisseurs institutionnels, private equity, public,…), il est composé de membres dont l’expérience, l’expertise, la culture sont de plus en plus diversifiées : c’est d’ailleurs une pratique de bonne gouvernance que de nommer au sein des conseils, aux côtés des représentants des actionnaires/sociétaires, des salariés et des dirigeants de l’entreprise, des administrateurs indépendants qui apportent un regard externe et veillent à la préservation des intérêts des actionnaires minoritaires non représentés au conseil. La diversification des conseils est largement encouragée par les codes de gouvernance, et compte parmi les propositions du plan d’action de la Commission Européenne de décembre 2012.

Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

par Hélène Solignac*

Renforcer la dynamique collaborative au sein du conseil : pourquoi, comment ?

Souvent de cultures différentes, les administrateurs ne partagent donc pas tous la culture de l’entreprise. C’est aussi fréquemment le cas du dirigeant exécutif, lorsqu’il est recruté à l’extérieur.

Par ailleurs, contrairement aux comités de direction, les membres des conseils passent très peu de temps à travailler ensemble : le nombre de séances se situe en moyenne entre 6 et 9 par an dans les sociétés cotées. Or le conseil, organe collégial, doit non seulement débattre, mais aussi être capable de prendre rapidement des décisions qui seront ensuite assumées par l’ensemble de ses membres.

Comment alors faire de ce groupe hétérogène une équipe efficace, à même de soutenir et de challenger le management, de jouer pleinement son rôle de contrôle, mais aussi de proposer des orientations, de sélectionner le dirigeant et d’évaluer sa performance, d’être le garant de l’intérêt social et de la pérennité de l’entreprise ?

Comment dépasser les enjeux de pouvoirs, les coalitions, prendre en compte tous les points de vue et parvenir au consensus ?

Comment intégrer les nouveaux membres, le conseil étant amené à se renouveler régulièrement ?

Comment gérer la relation avec l’exécutif de l’entreprise ?

Comment organiser le processus de décision pour le rendre le plus efficace possible ?

English: Helicopter view of the Crédit Lyonnai...
English: Helicopter view of the Crédit Lyonnais tower in Lyon (France) Français : Vue d’hélicoptère de la tour du crédit lyonnais à Lyon (France) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Au-delà des compétences techniques, le processus de sélection des administrateurs prend désormais de plus en plus en compte les qualités personnelles du candidat : capacité à intégrer la culture et les valeurs de l’entreprise, vision d’ensemble, écoute, capacité à présenter clairement son point de vue, à poser des questions (et à obtenir des réponses), à débattre de façon constructive, capacité à travailler en équipe et à accepter la décision collective…toutes qualités utiles pour adopter la posture d’un membre du conseil, bien différente de celle d’un dirigeant exécutif habitué à décider seul en tant que responsable hiérarchique.

Le président a bien évidemment un rôle clé : organiser la prise de parole, encourager systématiquement  les contributions au débat, et favoriser des prises de décision consensuelles, mais aussi fixer l’ordre du jour,  veiller à la qualité de l’information et à l’intégration des nouveaux membres, recevoir régulièrement et individuellement les administrateurs, faciliter les contacts avec le management, s’assurer que les comités rendent compte de leurs travaux au conseil, gérer efficacement la relation avec l’exécutif, …

L’éventail de plus en plus large des sujets qui sont aujourd’hui du ressort du conseil, auquel répond la diversité des profils et des compétences de ses membres, nécessitent une implication de plus en plus forte du président en tant qu’animateur du conseil, afin d’obtenir les meilleures contributions individuelles possibles, et d’organiser un processus de décision efficace. Selon que les fonctions de président et de directeur général sont dissociées ou non, selon le mode de gouvernance du président, plus ou moins participatif, le travail collectif du conseil sera sensiblement différent.

Le conseil est un groupe humain dont le fonctionnement est particulièrement complexe, et les responsabilités considérables. La qualité des échanges, les attitudes des différents acteurs et les relations au sein du conseil sont déterminantes dans l’efficacité du processus de décision.

Nous reviendrons dans un prochain billet sur les moyens d’optimiser la dynamique collective du conseil et les relations entre ses membres.

________________________________

* Hélène Solignac est associée responsable des activités “gouvernance” de la firme Rivoli Consulting depuis 2009. Diplômée de Sciences Po, Hélène Solignac a exercé des responsabilités au sein du Crédit Lyonnais pendant près de 20 ans, d’abord en tant que responsable commercial auprès de grands groupes internationaux; elle a participé, comme secrétaire du conseil d’administration et des comités de direction générale, à la privatisation et à l’introduction en bourse de la banque, avant de prendre en charge le suivi des filiales et participations à la direction financière du groupe, où elle a exercé des mandats d’administrateur dans différentes filiales.

En 2006, elle a rejoint InvestorSight, conseil en communication financière, membre associé de l’Institut Français des Administrateurs, comme responsable du pôle Gouvernance ; elle a développé une activité de conseil en préparation d’assemblées générales et est notamment intervenue sur des dossiers d’activisme actionnarial ; elle a participé à différentes études sur ce thème des assemblées générales qu’elle a présentées dans le cadre de Matinales de l’IFA et a également été rédactrice de la « Lettre des AG » (analyse des assemblées générales du SBF 120).

Elle est présentement Corporate Advisory auprès de Sodali, conseillère en relations actionnariales pour les sociétés cotées, responsable de la formation « Actif humain » du Certificat Administrateur de Société Sciences Po-IFA, Co-fondatrice du Cercle des Administrateurs Sciences Po, membre de l’IFA et de l’AFGE (Association Française de Gouvernement d’Entreprise) et administratrice de l’association humanitaire Matins du Soleil.

Top 10 des billets en gouvernance sur mon blogue | Juillet 2013


Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en juillet 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.

On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur les principaux sujets d’actualité suivants : la recherche de mandats au sein des conseils, la gestion de crises, les responsabilités des membres du conseil, la gouvernance des OBNL, les fondements de la gouvernance, les dysfonctions d’un C.A., la formation des administrateurs et la succession du PCD.

Séance inaugurale - Colloque Gouvernance mondiale
Séance inaugurale – Colloque Gouvernance mondiale (Photo credit: Collège des Bernardins)

En terme géographique, près du tiers des visiteurs sont de France, ou de dizaines de pays francophones, et 63 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (47 %) ou via les engins de recherche (40 %).

Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !

Il faut changer notre mentalité à propos de l’évaluation des OBNL !

Les C.A. sont à blâmer dans la plupart des cas d’échecs majeurs des entreprises

La recherche de mandats sur des C.A. | Au delà des contacts !

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses

Dix Leçons tirées d’une multitude d’entrevues avec des PCD de PME

Faut-il limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs ?

Le secrétaire du conseil et la gouvernance de l’entreprise

Quels sont les membres de la haute direction susceptibles d’être congédiés par un nouveau PCD (CEO) ?

Éléments à considérer dans le choix d’un programme de formation des administrateurs

Quelles sont les questions à poser avant de joindre un CA ?

La gestion de la succession du PCD (CEO) par le C.A. | Les nombreux éléments à considérer


Voici un article sur les nombreux éléments à considérer dans le cas du remplacement d’un président et chef de direction (PCD). Les conseils d’administration ne sont pas souvent confrontés à ce genre de décision; mais c’est sûrement l’une des plus importantes décisions qu’ils auront à prendre.

L’auteur présente une sorte de check list de tout ce dont il faut se préoccuper dans les cas de changements de PCD. Cet article, publié par Brian V. Breheny, et paru dans HLS on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, est l’un des plus opérationnels qu’il m’ait été donné de lire. Il sera sûrement d’une grande utilité pour les membres de conseils appelés à vivre cette période critique de la vie des organisations. Je vous recommande d’en tenir compte lors du remplacement d’un PCD.

Notez que l’auteur prend pour acquis que le C.A. a déjà préparé un plan de relève du PCD. Cependant, si ce n’est pas le cas, l’article vous incitera sûrement à concevoir un tel plan ! Bonne lecture.

The Landscape of CEO Succession Issues

A board’s decision as to whether, when and how to terminate the employment of a CEO and hire a successor is among the most critical decisions facing the board of any company—large or small, public or private, established or start-up. In most cases, however, a CEO termination is a rare event and one with respect to which—as would be expected—the board, the company’s general counsel and its human resources professionals may have little or no experience. In addition, the situation is further complicated by contractual, regulatory and personal factors.

Contracts
Contracts (Photo credit: NobMouse)

This post describes the substantive and procedural considerations that boards will want to take into account when there is a change of CEO. In it, we assume that the board has made the business decision relating to CEO succession and is focused on strategy, implementation and minimizing potentially costly and/or embarrassing oversights and errors. Many but not all of the same considerations apply in respect of executive officers other than the CEO, and some additional considerations may apply to such other officers; in any event, their relative significance likely will differ from the case of the CEO.

Communication Practices in CEO Succession (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

The Landscape of CEO Succession Issues (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Les aspects éthiques de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Un rapport qui prend en compte la réalité européenne (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

The best solutions for governance problems can only come from well-informed corporate shareholders and stakeholders (venitism.blogspot.com)

Le secrétaire du conseil et la gouvernance de l’entreprise


Ce matin, je tente de répondre à de nombreuses interrogations concernant le rôle et les fonctions d’un secrétaire du conseil. En premier lieu, voici une présentation faite par Richard Leblanc auprès des membres de la Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries (CSCS) – Société canadienne des secrétaires corporatifs (SCSC) lors d’un panel à Toronto.

Le professeur Leblanc a énoncé dix recommandations très pertinentes sur les actions à entreprendre par les responsables afin de s’assurer du bon traitement réservé à la diversité. Mon billet du 24 octobre 2012, intitulé Le rôle des secrétaires corporatifs eu égard à la diversité des C.A. des sociétés canadiennes, aborde ce sujet.

Je constate que le président du conseil est un acteur clé dans la conduite des activités des secrétaires. Comme le président assume la responsabilité des communications entre le conseil et la direction, son rôle se confond souvent avec celui de secrétaire. C’est le président qui établit l’ordre du jour avec le PCD et qui, souvent, rédige ou supervise étroitement les procès-verbaux, une tâche normalement accomplie par le secrétaire. Ainsi, dans beaucoup de cas, le secrétaire joue le rôle d’adjoint au président du conseil pour la gestion administrative des affaires du conseil.

Français : Cabinet du Secrétaire Perpétuel de ...
Français : Cabinet du Secrétaire Perpétuel de l’Académie nationale de Médecine, Paris, France (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

En cherchant à connaître davantage la description de tâche d’un secrétaire du conseil, j’ai trouvé, parmi les publications de notre partenaire IFA (Institut Français des Administrateurs), un document qui répond très bien à cette préoccupation et qui peut convenir à tous les types d’organisations. Le document de l’IFA est le fruit d’une enquête menées auprès de 149 secrétaires du conseil; il traite (1) du statut, (2) de la fonction, (3) des moyens et (4) du profil du secrétaire du conseil. Vous pouvez télécharger le document au bas du communiqué de l’IFA.

Le Secrétaire du Conseil & la Gouvernance de l’Entreprise | IFA

Les fonctions de Secrétaire du Conseil et des comités du conseil, couvrent par ordre d’importance, les travaux suivants :

rédige les procès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil et s’assure avant leur approbation qu’ils reflètent fidèlement le déroulement des séances ;

est en relation avec les administrateurs en dehors du Conseil, répond à leurs questions, s’assure de leur présence pour le quorum, suit leurs questions matérielles et réglementaires (jetons de présence, suivi des déclarations pour les opérations sur titres etc.) ;

met au point le calendrier des réunions du Conseil, prépare les ordres du jour et convoque les administrateurs ;

prépare l’ordre du jour et organise le déroulement de la séance du Conseil avec le Président ;

prépare ou contribue à l’élaboration des différents documents mis à la disposition des actionnaires en vue de l’Assemblée Générale ;

organise matériellement les réunions, y compris hors du siège social ;

surveille les règles de déontologie et de conformité ;

organise le processus d’évaluation du fonctionnement du Conseil ;

assure le suivi des relations avec les actionnaires individuels, les institutionnels;

est le « Gardien de la gouvernance dans le Groupe »  et

assure le secrétariat du Conseil de chaque filiale.

Voici les recommandations qui émanent de cette enquête :

1. La fonction de Secrétaire du Conseil doit être formalisée par le Conseil (plutôt que par des textes réglementaires). Son rôle doit être défini dans le Règlement Intérieur du Conseil et sa nomination entérinée lors d’une séance du Conseil.

2. Lorsque des comités spécialisés existent, il est recommandé que le Secrétaire du Conseil soit aussi le secrétaire de tous les comités. Dans le cas contraire, des comptes rendus des travaux de chaque comité doivent être établis et le Secrétaire du Conseil doit en être destinataire.

3. Dans les entreprises cotées, son poste doit évoluer vers un poste à plein temps et les moyens nécessaires à l’exercice de sa fonction doivent lui être donnés. Budgétairement et en comptabilité analytique, un centre de coût spécifique doit lui être attribué (frais de missions, de formation, jetons de présence …)

4. Le Secrétaire du Conseil doit être disponible et, si possible, rattaché directement au Président du Conseil (exécutif ou non) afin de favoriser une plus grande indépendance et un meilleur fonctionnement du Conseil.

5. Si son poste n’est pas à plein temps, il peut être rattaché à d’autres directions dans le cadre de ses autres fonctions.

6. Il est apparu utile qu’un lieu permanent de rencontre et d’échange (mais aussi d’information et de formation) soit mis à la disposition des Secrétaires du Conseil dans le cadre de l’IFA.

Départ du président et chef de direction (PCD) | Vigilance accrue du conseil !


Vous serez sûrement intéressés par les résultats de cette recherche publié par R. Christopher Small et paru dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Les résultats montrent que les PCD qui se retirent ont tendance à divulguer des prévisions de profits futurs plus positives et plus optimistes que lors des divulgations des années antérieures, surtout si leur rémunération incitative est élevée et si les mécanismes de suivis par le C.A. sont faibles.

C’est un article qui montre clairement la nécessité d’avoir un conseil d’administration vigilant à l’occasion du départ d’un PCD. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Evidence on the Properties of Retiring CEOs’ Forecasts of Future Earnings

Theory suggests that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with short horizons with their firm have weaker incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders (Smith and Watts 1982). To date, research examining the “horizon problem” focuses on whether CEOs adopt myopic investment and accounting policies in their final years in office (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Davidson et al. 2007; Kalyta 2009; Antia et al. 2010). In our paper, Forecasting Without Consequence? Evidence on the Properties of Retiring CEOs’ Forecasts of Future Earnings, forthcoming in The Accounting Review, we extend this line of research by investigating whether retiring CEOs are more likely to engage in opportunistic forecasting behavior in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Specifically, we contrast the properties (issuance, frequency, news, and bias) of earnings forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during pre-terminal years (where the CEO will be in office when the associated earnings are realized) with forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during their terminal year (where the CEO will no longer be in office when the associated earnings are realized). We also examine circumstances in which opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is likely to be more or less pronounced.

retirement
retirement (Photo credit: 401(K) 2013)

Our predictions are based on several incentives that arise (or increase) during retiring CEOs’ terminal year with their firm. Specifically, relative to CEOs who will continue with their firm, retiring CEOs face strong incentives to engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior in an attempt to inflate stock prices during the period leading up to their retirement. Deliberately misleading forecasts can be used to influence stock prices. Consistent with this argument, prior work shows that managers use voluntary disclosures opportunistically to influence stock prices (Noe 1999; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) and that managers use opportunistic earnings forecasts to manipulate analysts’ (Cotter et al. 2006) and investors’ perceptions (Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) in an effort to maximize the value of their stock-based compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Moreover, because SEC trading rules related to CEOs’ post-retirement security transactions are less stringent than those in effect during their tenure with the firm, post-retirement transactions can be made before the earnings associated with the opportunistic forecast are realized and with reduced regulatory scrutiny.

To test our predictions, we first identify all CEO turnover events in Execucomp from 1997 through 2009 (a total of 3,548 events). For each CEO turnover event identified, we perform detailed searches of SEC filings, executive biographies (appearing on various social media outlets such as LinkedIn, Forbes People Finder, etc.), press releases, and related disclosures to determine whether the CEO turnover was due to retirement. Our results indicate that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts of future earnings and that they issue such forecasts more frequently in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Moreover, we find that retiring CEOs’ terminal-year forecasts of future earnings are more likely to convey good news and are more optimistically biased relative to pre-terminal years. Our findings, that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior, represent a previously undocumented implication of the “horizon problem.” Furthermore, we find that opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is more pronounced in the presence of higher CEO equity incentives and discretionary expenditure cuts in the terminal year, and less pronounced in the presence of stronger monitoring mechanisms (e.g., higher institutional ownership).

Our results should be of interest to market participants (e.g., investors, analysts, etc.) who use information from management earnings forecasts. However, market participants’ ability to use our evidence is contingent on their knowledge of (or ability to anticipate) a given CEO’s impending retirement. Our study should also be of interest to stakeholders (e.g., boards of directors, regulators, etc.) who seek to implement incentive mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts. Interestingly, our results suggest that equity incentives (a tool commonly used to align incentives and minimize agency costs) can have the unintended consequence of creating or exacerbating opportunistic forecasting. Thus, CEO and firm characteristics (such as equity incentives) may have competing effects on various horizon-problem induced behaviors.

The full paper is available for download here.

Les T.I. et le conseil d’administration


Richard Leblanc, professeur associé de Law, Governance & Ethics à l’Université York de Toronto nous propose une liste impressionnante (quasi exhaustive) de lectures susceptibles d’intéresser les membres de conseils qui se posent des questions sur les TI et sur le rôle des médias sociaux.

English: Logo for the Addicted to Social Media...
English: Logo for the Addicted to Social Media Blog (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Cette liste a été préparée en vue de sa participation à la conférence annuelle de National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) du 11 au 13 octobre 2013 qui portera sur le leadership du « Board », notamment lorsqu’il s’agit de mieux appréhender les nouvelles technologies de l’information.

Bien sûr, la liste est longue mais en la parcourant rapidement vous trouverez certainement un lien vers un document qui vous intéressera. Bonne lecture.

NACD Board Leadership Conference

Board’s role in Social Media “listening”

Lead or be left behind: A chairman’s perspective on social media

http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_chairman_LeadorLeftBehind_042213.pdf

What Do Corporate Directors and Senior Managers Know about Social Media?

http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/TCB_DN-V4N20-12.Social_Media.pdf

50 Top Tools for Social Media Monitoring, Analytics, and Management

http://socialmediatoday.com/node/1458746

Social Media and the Board: Why #Hashtags Matter to Directors

http://business-ethics.com/2012/04/12/1642-social-media-and-the-board-why-hashtags-should-matter-to-directors/

Seven Steps for Board Success in the Facebook Age

http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2940

Cameras May Open Up the Board Room to Hackers

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/technology/flaws-in-videoconferencing-systems-put-boardrooms-at-risk.html?_r=0

Nonprofit Boards and the iPad: a Good Fit?

http://nonprofit.about.com/od/boardquestions/a/Nonprofit-Boards-And-The-Ipad-A-Good-Fit.htm

Social Media and Reputational Risk

Reputation Risk: A Corporate Governance Perspective

http://processunity.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Reputation-Risk-Conference-Board.pdf

Director: Reputations at Risk

http://www.director.co.uk/magazine/2010/6_June/social_media_63_10.html

Ten Keys to Manage Reputation Risk

http://www.knowledgeleader.com/KnowledgeLeader/Content.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/OpenAttachment/KnowledgeLeader/Content.nsf/C3C1BFD887594D4B88257B58006610E6/body/The%20Bulletin,%20Issue%202,%20Volume%20V%20–%20Ten%20Keys%20to%20Managing%20Reputation%20Risk.pdf

Virtual world, real risks: When social media becomes a liability

http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/PageFiles/3572/Virtual%20World_Real%20Risk.pdf

Reputational Risks & The Role Of Social Media

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoTtmRgDThs

Social Media Said to Present Significant Reputational Risks

http://www.marketingcharts.com/wp/direct/social-media-said-to-present-significant-reputational-risks-22952/

Three Steps Towards Managing Reputational Risk

http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/04/25/three-steps-toward-managing-reputational-risk/

The Board, Social Media and Liabilities

http://www.mediabadger.com/2012/12/the-board-social-media-and-liabilities/

Reputation risk management on the rise

http://www.camagazine.com/reputationrisk/

Social media reputation damage high on risk managers’ list of concerns

http://www.ferma.eu/2011/10/social-media-reputation-damage-high-on-risk-managers-list-of-concerns/

The Risks of Social Media: Self-Inflicted Reputation Damage

http://www.riskmanagementmonitor.com/the-risks-of-social-media-self-inflicted-reputation-damage/

Integrating Social Media into overall strategy/questions the board should be asking management

Why boards need to adopt social media

http://blogs.reuters.com/lucy-marcus/2012/03/22/why-boards-need-to-adopt-social-media/

What Directors Think About Social Media

https://www.boardmember.com/MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=9128

Boards remain uneasy about social media, says women’s directors group

http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/technology-social-media/12487/boards-remain-uneasy-about-social-media-says-womens-directors-group/

Directors and IT: What works best?™

http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/corporate-governance/publications/directors-and-it/assets/pwc-it-for-corporate-directors-full-report.pdf

Social Media – questions for directors to ask

http://www.cica.ca/focus-on-practice-areas/governance-strategy-and-risk/directors-series/director-alerts/item63118.pdf

20 Questions Directors Should Ask about Information Technology Security

http://www.cica.ca/focus-on-practice-areas/information-technology/publications/item46763.pdf

SOCIAL MEDIA: What Boards Need to Know

http://www.weil.com/files/upload/May2012_Opinion.pdf

10 Questions You Should Ask Your Social Media Expert, Guru or Wizard

http://www.socmedsean.com/10-questions-you-should-ask-your-social-media-expert-guru-or-wizard/

52 Questions To Ask When Hiring A Social Media Company

http://outspokenmedia.com/social-media/quesitons-hiring-a-social-media-company/

The Key to Social Media Success Within Organizations

http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-key-to-social-media-success-within-organizations/

The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1947283

MONITORING RISKS BEFORE THEY GO VIRAL:
IS IT TIME FOR THE BOARD TO EMBRACE SOCIAL MEDIA?

http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research/documents/CGRP25%20-%20Social%20Media.pdf

Privacy and Boards of Directors:; What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You

http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/director.pdf

Execs Not Using Social Media At Board Level Strategy

http://www.business2community.com/social-media/execs-not-using-social-media-at-board-level-strategy-0318067

Social Media — The New Business Reality for Board Directors

http://www.pwc.com/en_CA/ca/directorconnect/publications/pwc-social-media-new-reality-for-directors-2012-09-28-en.pdf

Too Many Top Executives Aren’t Taking Social Media Seriously

http://www.businessinsider.com/top-executives-dont-take-social-media-seriously-2013-5

Why 1700 CEOs Are Wrong about Social Media

http://socialmediatoday.com/thoughtreach/991031/why-1700-ceos-are-wrong-about-social-media?inf_contact_key=3791995094c307c4b1d275d00b36b16025118ec3bcf13175ef3d187c59ac45b8&goback=.gmp_4220981

How Kodak Squandered Every Single Digital Opportunity It Had

http://mashable.com/2012/01/20/kodak-digital-missteps/

Big Data/ Analytics

Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and productivity

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation

Big data

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data

http://searchbusinessanalytics.techtarget.com/definition/big-data-analytics

Guide to big data analytics tools, trends and best practices

Experts share perspectives and identify best practices for big data analytics projects in this Essential Guide.

http://searchbusinessanalytics.techtarget.com/essentialguide/Guide-to-big-data-analytics-tools-trends-and-best-practices

Severe Consequences Face Big Data Analytics Without Governance, Experts Say

http://www.crn.com/news/security/240158457/severe-consequences-face-big-data-analytics-without-governance-experts-say.htm

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND FIRM PROFITABILITY: MECHANISMS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1000732

New research suggests using big data, particularly social media data, can lead to a biased representation of the data based on societal factors.

http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-pitfalls-of-using-online-and-social-data-in-big-data-analysis/

Social Media & CRM

Three Out of Four Social Networkers are Logging in on Company Time, Ethics Resource Center Reports

http://www.ethics.org/news/three-out-four-social-networkers-are-logging-company-time-ethics-resource-center-reports

How the Voice of the People Is Driving Corporate Social Responsibility

http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/07/how_the_voice_of_the_people_is.html

Social Media in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

http://blogs.cisco.com/csr/social-media-in-corporate-social-responsibility-csr/

Tying Together Social Media and Corporate Social Responsibility

http://www.convinceandconvert.com/pr-20/tying-together-social-media-and-corporate-social-responsibility/

Mashable: Corporate Social Responsibility

http://mashable.com/category/corporate-social-responsibility/

Why Social Media Is Vital to Corporate Social Responsibility

http://mashable.com/2009/11/06/social-responsibility/

A Guide To Social Media For CSR Professionals

http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/721-a-guide-to-social-media-for-csr-professionals

Telus Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2012

http://csr.telus.com/en/

Tying Together Social Media and Corporate Social Responsibility

http://www.convinceandconvert.com/pr-20/tying-together-social-media-and-corporate-social-responsibility/

Trends/Emerging Topics

What Do Corporate Directors and Senior Managers Know about Social Media?

http://tcbblogs.org/governance/2012/10/31/what-do-corporate-directors-and-senior-managers-know-about-social-media/

Use of board portals and social media

http://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-CoW_V2N11.pdf&type=subsite

2012 CEO, social media & leadership survey

http://www.brandfog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2012_CEO_Survey.pdf

Taming Information Technology Risk:

A New Framework for Boards of Directors

http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OW_EN_GRC_2011_PUBL_Taming_IT_Risk.pdf

IBM CEO Predicts Three Ways Technology Will Transform The Future Of Business

http://www.forbes.com/sites/jennagoudreau/2013/03/08/ibm-ceo-predicts-three-ways-technology-will-transform-the-future-of-business/?goback=.gmp_4220981.gde_4220981_member_221432830

The Next Digital Paradigm

http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2013/02/02/the-next-digital-paradigm/?goback=.gmp_4220981

Make Social Media an Organizational Asset – Right Now!

http://www.thecmosite.com/author.asp?section_id=1237&doc_id=246605

THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL [SLIDE DECK]

http://www.businessinsider.com/future-of-digital-slides-2012-11?goback=.gmp_4220981

Ten Technology Trends that Will Change the World in the Next Ten Years

http://www.zawya.com/story/ZAWYA20120212081954/

Technology, Strategy and Shareholder Engagement Driving Corporate Governance

http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_us/us/press/ac998d5e23835310VgnVCM2000001b56f00aRCRD.htm

Cyber

Cyber Risk Management – A Board Level Responsibility:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-sectors/docs/c/12-1119-cyber-risk-management-board-responsibility

10 Steps to Cyber Security – Executive Companion:

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-sectors/docs/0-9/12-1120-10-steps-to-cyber-security-executive

http://www.gchq.gov.uk/Press/Pages/10-Steps-to-Cyber-Security.aspx

Cyber risk, Guidance note

https://www.icsaglobal.com/assets/files/Guidance%20notes/gn06-2013cyberrisk.pdf

Cyber security: Considerations for the audit committee

http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Cybersecurity_Considerations_for_the_audit_committee/$FILE/Cybersecurity_considerations_for_the_audit_committee_GA0001.pdf

Cyber Security and the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure

http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/178171

Cost of cyber attacks triples in a year

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb3fcc90-ab4a-11e2-ac71-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Zcz9iIg1

Cyber threats and security breaches forcing companies to re-evaluate risk management

http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/news/cyber-threats-and-security-breaches-forcing-companies-to-re-evaluate-risk-management/1002271537/

The Art of Cyber War

http://www.nacdonline.org/Resources/Article.cfm?ItemNumber=6807

U.S. Outgunned in Hacker War

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577307773326180032.html

Cybersecurity and Internet Governance

http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-internet-governance/p30621?goback=.gmp_4220981

Time to get real over cyber security

http://www.cbronline.com/blogs/cbr-rolling-blog/time-to-get-real-over-cyber-security-230212

Cyber crime is now a booming industry

http://www.business-standard.com/article/technology/cyber-crime-is-now-a-booming-industry-112012300057_1.html

BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) – Security

Good Governance Guide: Issues to consider in the use of tablets for accessing board papers

http://www.csaust.com/media/365618/2012_ggg_tablets_boardroom_v2.pdf

10 steps for writing a secure BYOD policy

http://www.zdnet.com/10-steps-for-writing-a-secure-byod-policy-7000006170/

For BYOD Best Practices, Secure Data, Not Devices

http://www.cio.com/article/711258/For_BYOD_Best_Practices_Secure_Data_Not_Devices

Security Think Tank: BYOD – key tenets and best practices

http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Security-Think-Tank-BYOD-key-tenets-and-best-practices

Bring Your Own Devices Best Practices Guide – Dell

http://i.dell.com/sites/doccontent/business/smb/sb360/en/Documents/good-byod-best-practices-guide.pdf

Learn BYOD policy best practices from templates

http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-consultant/learn-byod-policy-best-practices-from-templates/

Best practices to make BYOD simple and secure

A guide to selecting technologies and developing policies for BYOD

http://www.citrix.com/content/dam/citrix/en_us/documents/oth/byod-best-practices.pdf

Dell Outlines The Death Of The PC

http://www.forbes.com/sites/adriankingsleyhughes/2013/03/30/dell-outlines-the-death-of-the-pc/?goback=.gmp_4220981

Executive Security

Corporate Theft? Build a barrier with access governance

http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/corporate-theft-build-barrier-access-governance.pdf

Global Status Report
on the
Governance of Enterprise It (GEIt)—2011

http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Research/Documents/Global-Status-Report-GEIT-10Jan2011-Research.pdf

Cobit: An information security survival kit

http://www.pkfavantedge.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/COBIT_Security.pdf

Social Media & Investor Relations

A Virtual Annual Meeting Approach

http://www.directorship.com/adopting-a-virtual-approach-to-the-annual-meeting/

Call to move huge annual reports online

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/71dc17ba-19d5-11e0-b921-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Zcz9iIg1

Twitter Speaks, Markets Listen and Fears Rise

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/business/media/social-medias-effects-on-markets-concern-regulators.html?pagewanted=all

Dress rehearsal for disaster shows why Twitter has no place on Wall Street

http://opinion.financialpost.com/2013/04/26/dress-rehearsal-for-disaster-shows-why-twitter-has-no-place-on-wall-street/

SEC Says Social Media OK for Company Announcements if Investors Are Alerted http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171513574#.Uer4KFMpcvQ

New SEC Guidance on Social Media Levels Playing Field for Investors

http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2013/04/08/new-sec-guidance-on-social-media-levels-playing-field-for-investors/

How to Use Social Media for Regulation FD Compliance

https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/16/how-to-use-social-media-for-regulation-fd-compliance/

SEC Blesses Social Media Disclosures

http://www3.cfo.com/article/2013/4/disclosure_regulation-fair-disclosure-twitter-facebook-social-media-sec-guidelines-governance

The Push and Pull of Social Media for Investor Relations

http://blog.businesswire.com/2013/06/20/the-push-and-pull-of-social-media-for-investor-relations/

The Greatest Social Media for Investor Relations Panel Ever*

http://blog.investorrelations.com/2013/06/24/the-greatest-social-media-for-investor-relations-panel-ever/

Social Media’s Place in Investor Relations

http://thesocialmediamonthly.com/social-medias-place-in-investor-relations/

Social Media for Investor Relations

http://www.slideshare.net/IRSmartt/social-media-for-investor-relations-12976664

Survey finds social media gap between investors, companies

http://irwebreport.com/20130611/iros-vs-investors-social-media/

Crisis investor relations in the age of social media

http://irwebreport.com/20111208/crisis-investor-relations-social-media/

SEC’s social media guidance has devil in details

http://irwebreport.com/20130403/secs-social-media-guidance-has-devil-in-details/

Social Media Strategy for Investor Relations

http://www.brandchannel.com/images/papers/530_ccg_wp_social_media_strategy_ir_0911.pdf

Other:

Director skills

Recruiting the Digital Director

http://www.spencerstuart.com/research/bg/1535/

Wanted: More Directors With Digital Savvy

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324031404578483043683328314.html?goback=.gmp_4220981.gde_4220981_member_241245618

CIOs Say Corporate Directors Are Clueless About IT

http://www.cio.com/article/721456/CIOs_Say_Corporate_Directors_Are_Clueless_About_IT?goback=.gmp_4220981

Risk and IT intersection

Observations on Developments in Risk Appetite Frameworks and IT Infrastructure

http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2010/an101223.pdf

Management suite:

Digital diaspora in the enterprise: Arrival of the CDO and CCO

http://www.zdnet.com/digital-diaspora-in-the-enterprise-arrival-of-the-cdo-and-cco-7000016193/

CIOs Can Strengthen Your Board of Directors

http://blogs.cio.com/careers/17010/cios-can-strengthen-your-board-directors?goback=.gde_4220981_member_111162885

KPMG brochure:

Risk management in an evolving world

Making the case for social media governance

http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/social-media-brochure.pdf

La formation d’administrateurs de sociétés (ASC) du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) est né de la volonté de quatre partenaires fondateurs d’offrir aux administrateurs de sociétés une formation unique et de haut niveau, axée sur les meilleures pratiques de gouvernance. Depuis sa création en mars 2005, le Collège a admis plus de 1000 administrateurs dans ses différentes formations.

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés | CAS

Excellence | Éthique | Ouverture | Engagement

Le Collège contribue au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance en offrant aux administrateurs de sociétés une formation de la plus haute qualité dans un environnement dynamique de partage du savoir et une source d’information privilégiée à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques.

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, c’est :

Un centre de formation à l’avant-garde des plus hauts standards de gouvernance répondant aux multiples besoins des administrateurs, tant à Québec, qu’à Montréal ;

Une équipe d’intervenants-formateurs, reconnus pour leur expertise, leur ouverture et leur passion ;

Des administrateurs provenant de tous milieux: des sociétés publiques, privées, d’État, municipales ou parapubliques, des coopératives, des associations, des OBNL, etc. ;

Un programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance unique au Québec menant à la désignation Administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC) et jouissant d’une reconnaissance pancanadienne grâce à une entente avec le Directors College de l’Université McMaster ;

Une base de données en ligne présentant 600 profils d’administrateurs de sociétés certifiés ;

Une expérience enrichissante permettant aux administrateurs de développer un réseau de contacts privilégié.

Perfectionnez vos compétences en gouvernance

Ce qui fait la renommée du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est sans aucun doute l’ouverture et l’innovation dont il s’est inspiré pour établir une offre de formations unique, recherchée et adaptée aux besoins des administrateurs de sociétés.

Des formations diversifiées

La certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés comprend cinq (5) modules d’une durée de trois (3) jours chacun et son cheminement peut varier entre douze et dix-huit mois

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite (Durée : 2 jours)

Gouvernance des services financiers (Durée : 2 jours)

Gouvernance des PME (Durée : 2 jours)

Les formations d’une durée de trois jours de même que les modules du programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés ont lieu les jeudi, vendredi et samedi.

Une approche stimulante pour un perfectionnement optimisé

Quelle que soit votre provenance, votre cheminement professionnel ou votre secteur d’activité, les formations du Collège vous permettent de bénéficier :

D’une expérience Québec-Montréal vous permettant de côtoyer, d’échanger et de développer un réseau de contact avec des gestionnaires et des administrateurs de différents secteurs et milieux d’affaires ;

D’un environnement valorisant les échanges entre les participants et les intervenants ;

D’un programme de certification universitaire sous la responsabilité d’un directeur de programme et d’une équipe de professeurs de l’Université Laval et d’intervenants de renom de la pratique privée.

Reconnaissance professionnelle

Des ententes de partenariat avec plusieurs ordres et organismes professionnels reconnaissent la valeur des formations du Collège.

Propositions des actionnaires américains lors des assemblées annuelles | Tendances observées


Laura J. Finn responsable du blogue Trending in Governance, l’un des blogues en gouvernance du NYSE, nous présente les résultats d’une recherche effectuée sur le site proxymonitor.org qui inventorie l’ensemble des propositions des actionnaires pour les prochaines assemblées annuelles. L’auteure identifie cinq catégories de proposition susceptibles de recevoir un appui significatif des actionnaires :

1. Limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs

2. S’incorporer au Delaware

3. Adopter une politique sur la diversité du conseil

4. Limiter la durée des mandats des administrateurs

5. Planifier la succession du PCD

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les détails concernant ces propositions. Cette tendance générale est-elle également observée au Canada ? Bonne lecture.

Cinq tendances dans les propositions des actionnaires aux É.U. 

(Five Coming Trends in Shareholder Proposals)

Every year shareholders file proposals that garner barely any votes cast in favor by their fellow shareholders. Nevertheless, I like to keep an eye on the “off-beat” corporate governance proposals that are filed each year to see if there may be a coming trend. Here are five such proposals that may gain traction in coming proxy seasons:
1- Curb Excessive Directorships – filed by Kenneth Steiner at three companies this year: AIG, Bank of America, and Exxon Mobil. None of the proposals received more than 6% of votes cast in favor,  but Steiner raised the point that overextended directors may be bad for corporate governance. In the case of AIG, he noted that GMI Ratings, formerly Corporate Library, has rated the company a “high governance risk” since 2007. In all three proposals he asked his fellow shareholders to vote in favor of his proposal “to protect shareholder value.” Apparently, the other shareholders don’t see directors serving on 3 or more boards as problematic.

Network diagram showing corporate interlocks w...

2- Re-incorporate in Delaware – filed by Gerald Armstrong at Chesapeake Energy Corp. This proposal is particularly interesting. After years of shareholders voting in the majority on a number of proposals, like declassifying the board and enacting majority voting, and the company not heeding shareholders’ votes, Armstrong filed this proposal to re-incorporate in the state of Delaware because the state “is known for fairness and integrity.”  Currently, Chesapeake is incorporated in Oklahoma and Armstrong believes the company worked with state legislature to create a law that “all corporations incorporated in Oklahoma with more than 1,000 shareholders be required to have a classified board of directors with three-year terms for each director.” Chesapeake opposed the proposal and the majority of shareholders sided with the company. This energy company is not Delaware-bound, at least for now.

3- Adopt Policy on Board Diversity – filed by NYC Pension Funds at Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold. Currently, the company has no women or minorities on its board, so the purpose of the proposal is four-fold: to include women and minority candidates in the pool of board candidates, expand director searches to include “nominees from both non-executive corporate positions and non-traditional environments such government, academia, and non-profit organizations,” review board composition periodically to find and fill knowledge gaps, and report on the process to shareholders. The company stated in its opposition that it “believes that this proposal would not improve its ability to select the most suitable and qualified candidates for membership on the board and would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and costs.” The shareholders will vote on this proposal next week, July 16. Stay tuned.

4- Director Term Limits – filed by Dennis Rocheleau at General Electric. He argued that term limits “apply to the President of the United States and are in effect for directors at a number of Fortune 500 firms” and believes that GE “need[s] a better board and the sooner the better.” GE argued that term limits would “prevent qualified, experienced and effect directors from serving on the board” and further explained the company believes the proposal was motivated by Rocheleau’s desire to remove specific directors. Shareholders sided with GE, giving a vote of confidence to the company’s nomination and evaluation process.

5- CEO Succession Planning – filed by Laborers’ District Council & Contractors of Ohio at Google. A dozen similar proposals have been filed at Fortune 250 companies in the past three years, though none have received majority support. Google opposed the proposal, stating: “The Leadership Development and Compensation Committee reviews at least annually and recommends to the full board of directors plans for the development, retention, and replacement of executive officers, including the Chief Executive Officer.” At this time, the majority of shareholders feel confident in the board’s ability to handle succession planning without a formal policy.

Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

La recherche de mandats sur des C.A. | Au-delà des contacts !


Plusieurs personnes très qualifiées en gouvernance de sociétés souhaitent trouver une place sur un ou plusieurs conseils d’administration de sociétés cotées. Mais comment s’y prendre ? L’article ci-dessous rédigé par *Boris Groysberg et Deborah Bell et paru dans HBR Blog Network saura sûrement piquer votre curiosité !

Les auteurs proposent une méthode plus acceptable de choisir les membres de conseils que celle de s’en remettre aux administrateurs potentiels reconnus par les membres de C.A. Bien sûr, l’appartenance à des réseaux d’administrateurs et l’approche progressive de l’acceptation des mandats, en commençant par les OBNL, sont des méthodes très pratiquées … mais souvent elles tardent à produire les résultats escomptés.

Les auteurs présentent une autre option laquelle dépend de la mise en place d’un processus de sélection systématique consistant à repérer les personnes possédant les expertises répondant aux besoins de l’entreprise. De plus en plus, la stratégie de recherche de mandats sera de faire connaître son expertise et son expérience auprès des membres des comités de gouvernance et de nomination.

L’article montre que les capacités les plus prisées par les comités de nomination sont (1) la connaissance de l’industrie, (2) les compétences stratégiques et (3) les expertises en finance-audit.

Je vous invite à lire l’article au complet afin de mieux vous préparer à trouver votre place sur des conseils. Vos commentaires sont toujours très appréciés. Bonne lecture !

Joining Boards: It’s Not Just Who You Know That Matters 

For many, a corporate directorship is a career capstone. But attaining one is far from easy. No one can say for sure how to get on a corporate board, but many people point to two routes: the first is to break into the « right » network and the second is to seek a progression of board seats that begins with, for example, a seat on a not-for-profit or community board and eventually results in appointment to a corporate board.

Both paths are problematic — neither is particularly transparent or relies on objective measures and given that many boards are stubborn bastions of white masculinity, pursuing the « right » network can be fraught, especially for women and other diverse candidates. Indeed, our research reinforces that concern: many boards still rely on their own (mostly white, mostly male) networks to fill seats.

There’s a different way — one that is more measurable, controllable and offers greater transparency. It starts with a focus on skills. Although many boards continue to select new members from their own networks, our research suggests that more are beginning to implement objective processes to select members based on the skills and attributes that boards need to be effective. Our 2012 survey, in partnership with WomenCorporateDirectors and Heidrick & Struggles, of more than 1,000 corporate directors across the globe, found that only 48% of the boards had a formal process of determining the combination of skills and attributes required for their board and, therefore, for new directors

We know this approach can work because we’ve seen it: We studied a large corporation that was being split into two public companies for which two new boards had to be created. The chairman wanted to create two balanced boards, with the mix of skills, knowledge, and experience each company needed. He appointed a special team to create an objective, transparent method for selecting the directors. After reviewing the roles and responsibilities of each board and the natures of the new businesses, the team derived lists of the skills each board needed. Then it created a model containing the dimensions critical to a high-performing board, from functional and industry expertise to behavioral attributes. This approach led both companies to recruit board members that were diverse in needed strategic skills. Both boards are on to a good start — demonstrating that when a firm builds a board using a rigorous assessment of the qualities it needs to carry out its governance task, rather than personal networks, the board is better equipped to execute its functions.

In our survey, we also asked about specific skills. We wanted to know which were the strongest skills represented on boards and which were missing. Directors named industry knowledge, strategy, and financial-audit expertise as their strongest skill sets.

Skill Sets Overall

And 43% cited technology expertise, HR-talent management, international-global expertise, and succession planning as the skills missing most on their boards.

______________________________________________

* Boris Groysberg is a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School. His  work examines how a firm can be systematic in achieving a sustainable competitive advantage by leveraging its talent at all levels of the organization.

* Deborah Bell is a researcher of organizational behavior whose work focuses on leadership, drivers of success, and organizational effectiveness and dynamics, especially at the board level.

Getting a Seat at the Table (venitism.blogspot.com)

Corporate Director Selection and Recruitment: A Matrix (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Strategy For Securing a Seat on a Corporate Board (thestreet.com)

Why your business needs an advisory board (hiponaconsulting.wordpress.com)

Nouvelles responsabilités pour l’audit interne


Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un article de Ken Tysiac paru dans le Journal of accountancy qui résume les résultats du sondage mondial 2013 d’Ernst & Young portant sur l’audit interne.

Cet article identifie les attentes principales des participants au sondage, chefs de l’audit interne et membres de comités d’audit, quant à l’évolution que devrait prendre les responsabilités de l’audit interne.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter l’enquête de Thomson Reuters Accelus Survey on Internal Audit dont nous avons parlé dans notre billet du 7 juin. Bonne lecture.

New duties on horizon for internal auditors

“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”

New risks

As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.

Thomson Reuters Messenger
Thomson Reuters Messenger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.

The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:

  1. Economic stability (54%).
  2. Cybersecurity (52%).
  3. Major shifts in technology (48%).
  4. Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
  5. Data privacy regulations (39%).

Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:

  1. Data analytics;
  2. Business strategy;
  3. Deep industry experience;
  4. Risk management; and
  5. Fraud prevention and detection.

“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”

Keeping Internal Auditors Up to the Challenge (forbes.com)

Internal Audit Has To STOP Focusing On Internal Controls (business2community.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Useful Internal Auditing in 4 Easy Steps (isocertificationaustralia.com)

Thomson Reuters Develops Accelus Governance, Risk and Compliance Platform (risk-technology.typepad.com)

Faut-il limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs ?


Voici un article publié par JOANN S. LUBLIN paru dans The Wall Street Journal qui montre l’évolution remarquable de la gouvernance des sociétés au cours des quarante dernières années. Vous verrez qu’il y a une tendance lourde à limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs de sociétés, mais que ce changement ne se fait pas sans heurt.

Plusieurs pensent que, malgré certains avantages évidents à avoir des administrateurs séniors sur les C.A., cette situation est un frein à la diversité et au renouvellement des générations au sein des conseils d’administration. C’est un article qui discute de ces problématiques avec nuance et avec des statistiques à l’appui.

Je souligne certains extraits pertinents de cet article. Bonne lecture. Faites-moi part de nos commentaires sur ce sujet assez controversé.

The 40-Year Club: America’s Longest-Serving Directors

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Board colleagues say long-serving members often provide useful context about a company, its industry and its past. But activist investors contend the growing ranks of long-serving board members occupy spots that otherwise might go to younger and fresher talent. « Over-tenured directors also frustrate the goal of race and gender diversity, » adds Brandon Rees, acting head of the AFL-CIO’s Office of Investment.

Staying Power

Twenty-eight outside directors have at least 40 years’ tenure on a U.S. public company board.

Voir l’article pour identifier les noms

While 40-year directors are rare, companies appear increasingly reluctant to shake up their boardrooms. Among Russell 3000 companies, 6,457 independent directors—nearly 34% of the total—have served a decade or longer, GMI found. That’s up from 3,216 or about 18% in 2008.

Companies in Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index elected the smallest number of new directors last year in 10 years, according to a study by recruiters Spencer Stuart.

Some activist investors believe long-tenured board members can become too cozy with management.

The Council of Institutional Investors, a governance advocate, may soon urge shareholders and boards to look more skeptically at the independence of long-serving directors, says Ann Yerger, its executive director.

« Board members may not be able to fully exercise independent judgment after several years of service, » she adds. The council represents 125 pension funds with more than $3 trillion of assets.

Certain less-tenured directors favor term limits to hasten turnover. But just 17 major corporations impose such limits, Spencer Stuart’s study showed. A 12-year term makes sense because « board members become very stale after a while, » says Fred Hassan, a Time Warner Inc. TWX +0.55%director since 2009 and former Schering-Plough Corp. MRK -0.21%chief executive. He hopes to propose that limit for new board members of the media giant.

Not surprisingly, long-serving board members frequently oppose such rules. Instead, they support replacing poor performers through periodic evaluations of individual members. Richard T. Fisher, a Leggett director since 1972, says he and David S. Haffner, the firm’s CEO, sold the idea to its board last year.

Men seen as impediments to shaking up boardrooms (business.financialpost.com)

HP Board Expands Amid Turnaround Push (cio-today.com)

After 41 years, Soriano steps down from Harrison board (kitsapsun.com)

Quels sont les membres de la haute direction susceptibles d’être congédiés par un nouveau PCD (CEO) ?


Cet article de Sarah Green, paru dans HBR Blog Network, présente une entrevue avec David Astorino, le directeur d’une recherche qui porte sur la probabilité de changement des membres de la haute direction selon que le nouveau président et chef de direction (PCD-CEO) provient de l’externe ou de l’interne. On verra que dans les deux cas, des changements significatifs sont à prévoir, mais pas nécessairement dans les mêmes postes.

Cet article est vraiment très intéressant car il explore un sujet-clé de la succession au sommet stratégique de l’organisation. Le PCD a besoin d’une équipe de grande compétence mais surtout de personnes en qui il a une totale confiance.

Ainsi, on notera que le PCD externe aura beaucoup plus tendance à congédier son CFO et son directeur des ressources humaines (CHRO). Également, près de la moitié des PCD externes changent de directeur des affaires juridiques et/ou secrétaire corporatif. Le chercheur ne semble pas être en mesure d’expliquer pourquoi !

President Barack Obama talks with Michael G. M...
President Barack Obama talks with Michael G. Morris, right, of American Electric Power Company, and David Cote in the Cross Hall of the White House, before a dinner with CEOs, Feb. 24, 2010. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vu sous l’angle d’un membre de conseils d’administration, avez-vous une idée des raisons qui incitent les PCD à congédier leurs directeurs des affaires juridiques ?

Voici un extrait de cet article du HBR ainsi que quelques questions sous-jacentes (voir l’article pour les réponses offertes). Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Who New CEOs Fire First ?

New research by RHR international shows which executives incoming CEOs are likely to replace, and highlights some differences between first-time CEOs and more seasoned chief executives. I interviewed Dr. David Astorino, Global Practice Leader for Senior Team Effectiveness, about the findings. Below is an edited version of our conversation.

Your survey showed that as much as CEOs had shaken up their senior team, looking back on it they wished they’d moved even faster.  Why ?

When they look back, and you ask them what you would have done differently, they almost always say, « I knew in my gut that was not going to work with that individual, and I wish I had trusted that gut feeling and made that decision faster. » By delaying the transformation of a particular function or business unit, they’re now six months behind. That’s often where that comment comes from. There are some other factors, but that’s the main one.

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What are some of those other factors ?

A lot of it relates to organizational knowledge. They hesitate because they don’t feel like they know enough about what’s going on. You’ll also see a real difference between first-time CEOs and people who’ve been a CEO before, especially if that first-time CEO is coming from outside the company. They don’t trust themselves as much, and they tend to not be as suspicious, frankly, as CEOs who have been there, done that before. They tend to wait too long. CEOs who’ve been around the block a bit more say, « I’d rather risk losing institutional knowledge and get someone in there I trust. »

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  1. HBR has published research suggesting that insider CEOs are more effective than outsiders. Could part of the reason be that outsiders replace so much of their staff with other outsiders, lacking that institutional knowledge ?

  2. So to that point about skills, how much of this is really about bringing in new skills, and how much of it is about what you mentioned earlier — just looking for people they can trust, people they’re comfortable with ?

  3. Speaking of functions, it wasn’t terribly surprising to me that the CHRO and the CMO are two that are likely to leave. But why the General Counsel ?

  4. What about the difference between insider and outsider CEOs — they really seem to replace different functional heads. Insiders are much more likely to replace the COO, for instance, while outsiders are more likely to replace the CFO. Why the discrepancy ?

  5. What are some of the other differences between first-time CEOs and more experienced CEOs ?

These Are The People Most Likely To Get Canned If A New CEO Arrives (businessinsider.com)

Instagram CEO thinks Instagram could actually outgrow Facebook (bgr.com)

Warby Parker CEO Wants More Millennials On His Team (businessinsider.com)