Catégorie : Comportement

Propositions des actionnaires américains lors des assemblées annuelles | Tendances observées


Laura J. Finn responsable du blogue Trending in Governance, l’un des blogues en gouvernance du NYSE, nous présente les résultats d’une recherche effectuée sur le site proxymonitor.org qui inventorie l’ensemble des propositions des actionnaires pour les prochaines assemblées annuelles. L’auteure identifie cinq catégories de proposition susceptibles de recevoir un appui significatif des actionnaires :

1. Limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs

2. S’incorporer au Delaware

3. Adopter une politique sur la diversité du conseil

4. Limiter la durée des mandats des administrateurs

5. Planifier la succession du PCD

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les détails concernant ces propositions. Cette tendance générale est-elle également observée au Canada ? Bonne lecture.

Cinq tendances dans les propositions des actionnaires aux É.U. 

(Five Coming Trends in Shareholder Proposals)

Every year shareholders file proposals that garner barely any votes cast in favor by their fellow shareholders. Nevertheless, I like to keep an eye on the “off-beat” corporate governance proposals that are filed each year to see if there may be a coming trend. Here are five such proposals that may gain traction in coming proxy seasons:
1- Curb Excessive Directorships – filed by Kenneth Steiner at three companies this year: AIG, Bank of America, and Exxon Mobil. None of the proposals received more than 6% of votes cast in favor,  but Steiner raised the point that overextended directors may be bad for corporate governance. In the case of AIG, he noted that GMI Ratings, formerly Corporate Library, has rated the company a “high governance risk” since 2007. In all three proposals he asked his fellow shareholders to vote in favor of his proposal “to protect shareholder value.” Apparently, the other shareholders don’t see directors serving on 3 or more boards as problematic.

Network diagram showing corporate interlocks w...

2- Re-incorporate in Delaware – filed by Gerald Armstrong at Chesapeake Energy Corp. This proposal is particularly interesting. After years of shareholders voting in the majority on a number of proposals, like declassifying the board and enacting majority voting, and the company not heeding shareholders’ votes, Armstrong filed this proposal to re-incorporate in the state of Delaware because the state “is known for fairness and integrity.”  Currently, Chesapeake is incorporated in Oklahoma and Armstrong believes the company worked with state legislature to create a law that “all corporations incorporated in Oklahoma with more than 1,000 shareholders be required to have a classified board of directors with three-year terms for each director.” Chesapeake opposed the proposal and the majority of shareholders sided with the company. This energy company is not Delaware-bound, at least for now.

3- Adopt Policy on Board Diversity – filed by NYC Pension Funds at Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold. Currently, the company has no women or minorities on its board, so the purpose of the proposal is four-fold: to include women and minority candidates in the pool of board candidates, expand director searches to include “nominees from both non-executive corporate positions and non-traditional environments such government, academia, and non-profit organizations,” review board composition periodically to find and fill knowledge gaps, and report on the process to shareholders. The company stated in its opposition that it “believes that this proposal would not improve its ability to select the most suitable and qualified candidates for membership on the board and would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and costs.” The shareholders will vote on this proposal next week, July 16. Stay tuned.

4- Director Term Limits – filed by Dennis Rocheleau at General Electric. He argued that term limits “apply to the President of the United States and are in effect for directors at a number of Fortune 500 firms” and believes that GE “need[s] a better board and the sooner the better.” GE argued that term limits would “prevent qualified, experienced and effect directors from serving on the board” and further explained the company believes the proposal was motivated by Rocheleau’s desire to remove specific directors. Shareholders sided with GE, giving a vote of confidence to the company’s nomination and evaluation process.

5- CEO Succession Planning – filed by Laborers’ District Council & Contractors of Ohio at Google. A dozen similar proposals have been filed at Fortune 250 companies in the past three years, though none have received majority support. Google opposed the proposal, stating: “The Leadership Development and Compensation Committee reviews at least annually and recommends to the full board of directors plans for the development, retention, and replacement of executive officers, including the Chief Executive Officer.” At this time, the majority of shareholders feel confident in the board’s ability to handle succession planning without a formal policy.

Article relié

Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2013 Proxy Season (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

La recherche de mandats sur des C.A. | Au-delà des contacts !


Plusieurs personnes très qualifiées en gouvernance de sociétés souhaitent trouver une place sur un ou plusieurs conseils d’administration de sociétés cotées. Mais comment s’y prendre ? L’article ci-dessous rédigé par *Boris Groysberg et Deborah Bell et paru dans HBR Blog Network saura sûrement piquer votre curiosité !

Les auteurs proposent une méthode plus acceptable de choisir les membres de conseils que celle de s’en remettre aux administrateurs potentiels reconnus par les membres de C.A. Bien sûr, l’appartenance à des réseaux d’administrateurs et l’approche progressive de l’acceptation des mandats, en commençant par les OBNL, sont des méthodes très pratiquées … mais souvent elles tardent à produire les résultats escomptés.

Les auteurs présentent une autre option laquelle dépend de la mise en place d’un processus de sélection systématique consistant à repérer les personnes possédant les expertises répondant aux besoins de l’entreprise. De plus en plus, la stratégie de recherche de mandats sera de faire connaître son expertise et son expérience auprès des membres des comités de gouvernance et de nomination.

L’article montre que les capacités les plus prisées par les comités de nomination sont (1) la connaissance de l’industrie, (2) les compétences stratégiques et (3) les expertises en finance-audit.

Je vous invite à lire l’article au complet afin de mieux vous préparer à trouver votre place sur des conseils. Vos commentaires sont toujours très appréciés. Bonne lecture !

Joining Boards: It’s Not Just Who You Know That Matters 

For many, a corporate directorship is a career capstone. But attaining one is far from easy. No one can say for sure how to get on a corporate board, but many people point to two routes: the first is to break into the « right » network and the second is to seek a progression of board seats that begins with, for example, a seat on a not-for-profit or community board and eventually results in appointment to a corporate board.

Both paths are problematic — neither is particularly transparent or relies on objective measures and given that many boards are stubborn bastions of white masculinity, pursuing the « right » network can be fraught, especially for women and other diverse candidates. Indeed, our research reinforces that concern: many boards still rely on their own (mostly white, mostly male) networks to fill seats.

There’s a different way — one that is more measurable, controllable and offers greater transparency. It starts with a focus on skills. Although many boards continue to select new members from their own networks, our research suggests that more are beginning to implement objective processes to select members based on the skills and attributes that boards need to be effective. Our 2012 survey, in partnership with WomenCorporateDirectors and Heidrick & Struggles, of more than 1,000 corporate directors across the globe, found that only 48% of the boards had a formal process of determining the combination of skills and attributes required for their board and, therefore, for new directors

We know this approach can work because we’ve seen it: We studied a large corporation that was being split into two public companies for which two new boards had to be created. The chairman wanted to create two balanced boards, with the mix of skills, knowledge, and experience each company needed. He appointed a special team to create an objective, transparent method for selecting the directors. After reviewing the roles and responsibilities of each board and the natures of the new businesses, the team derived lists of the skills each board needed. Then it created a model containing the dimensions critical to a high-performing board, from functional and industry expertise to behavioral attributes. This approach led both companies to recruit board members that were diverse in needed strategic skills. Both boards are on to a good start — demonstrating that when a firm builds a board using a rigorous assessment of the qualities it needs to carry out its governance task, rather than personal networks, the board is better equipped to execute its functions.

In our survey, we also asked about specific skills. We wanted to know which were the strongest skills represented on boards and which were missing. Directors named industry knowledge, strategy, and financial-audit expertise as their strongest skill sets.

Skill Sets Overall

And 43% cited technology expertise, HR-talent management, international-global expertise, and succession planning as the skills missing most on their boards.

______________________________________________

* Boris Groysberg is a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School. His  work examines how a firm can be systematic in achieving a sustainable competitive advantage by leveraging its talent at all levels of the organization.

* Deborah Bell is a researcher of organizational behavior whose work focuses on leadership, drivers of success, and organizational effectiveness and dynamics, especially at the board level.

Articles reliés à l’obtention d’un poste sur un conseil d’administration :

Getting a Seat at the Table (venitism.blogspot.com)

Corporate Director Selection and Recruitment: A Matrix (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Strategy For Securing a Seat on a Corporate Board (thestreet.com)

Why your business needs an advisory board (hiponaconsulting.wordpress.com)

Faut-il limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs ?


Voici un article publié par JOANN S. LUBLIN paru dans The Wall Street Journal qui montre l’évolution remarquable de la gouvernance des sociétés au cours des quarante dernières années. Vous verrez qu’il y a une tendance lourde à limiter le nombre de mandats des administrateurs de sociétés, mais que ce changement ne se fait pas sans heurt.

Plusieurs pensent que, malgré certains avantages évidents à avoir des administrateurs séniors sur les C.A., cette situation est un frein à la diversité et au renouvellement des générations au sein des conseils d’administration. C’est un article qui discute de ces problématiques avec nuance et avec des statistiques à l’appui.

Je souligne certains extraits pertinents de cet article. Bonne lecture. Faites-moi part de nos commentaires sur ce sujet assez controversé.

The 40-Year Club: America’s Longest-Serving Directors

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Board colleagues say long-serving members often provide useful context about a company, its industry and its past. But activist investors contend the growing ranks of long-serving board members occupy spots that otherwise might go to younger and fresher talent. « Over-tenured directors also frustrate the goal of race and gender diversity, » adds Brandon Rees, acting head of the AFL-CIO’s Office of Investment.

Staying Power

Twenty-eight outside directors have at least 40 years’ tenure on a U.S. public company board.

Voir l’article pour identifier les noms

While 40-year directors are rare, companies appear increasingly reluctant to shake up their boardrooms. Among Russell 3000 companies, 6,457 independent directors—nearly 34% of the total—have served a decade or longer, GMI found. That’s up from 3,216 or about 18% in 2008.

Companies in Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index elected the smallest number of new directors last year in 10 years, according to a study by recruiters Spencer Stuart.

Some activist investors believe long-tenured board members can become too cozy with management.

The Council of Institutional Investors, a governance advocate, may soon urge shareholders and boards to look more skeptically at the independence of long-serving directors, says Ann Yerger, its executive director.

« Board members may not be able to fully exercise independent judgment after several years of service, » she adds. The council represents 125 pension funds with more than $3 trillion of assets.

Certain less-tenured directors favor term limits to hasten turnover. But just 17 major corporations impose such limits, Spencer Stuart’s study showed. A 12-year term makes sense because « board members become very stale after a while, » says Fred Hassan, a Time Warner Inc. TWX +0.55%director since 2009 and former Schering-Plough Corp. MRK -0.21%chief executive. He hopes to propose that limit for new board members of the media giant.

Not surprisingly, long-serving board members frequently oppose such rules. Instead, they support replacing poor performers through periodic evaluations of individual members. Richard T. Fisher, a Leggett director since 1972, says he and David S. Haffner, the firm’s CEO, sold the idea to its board last year.

Articles reliés :

Men seen as impediments to shaking up boardrooms (business.financialpost.com)

HP Board Expands Amid Turnaround Push (cio-today.com)

After 41 years, Soriano steps down from Harrison board (kitsapsun.com)

Suggestions de réforme pour la rémunération des membres de C.A.


Voici un article de Richard Leblanc paru dans BoardExpert.com que vous apprécierez sûrement. Comme à son habitude, Richard utilise un style direct et simple pour aborder l’une des facettes les plus complexes de la gouvernance des organisations : la rémunération incitative reliée à la performance à long terme.

L’auteur discute plus particulièrement d’un objet novateur : la rémunération des administrateurs alignée sur les intérêts des actionnaires.

Voici un extrait de l’article ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’approche qu’il suggère. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Reforms to director compensationneed to occur

« Most independent directors on public company boards are compensated in a blend of cash and company shares. The equity component is typically restricted or deferred until the director retires from the board, thus postponing taxes and enabling the director to amass a portion of equity in the company to align his or her interests with shareholders (it is believed). The equity can be a predetermined number of restricted shares, or a set monetary amount in the form of share “units.”

The problem with paying independent directors this way is that there is little incentive for personal performance or company performance. Directors get paid the cash and equity regardless. There is little if any downside, especially when directors can ride a stock market or Fed driven increase in overall share prices. Not surprisingly, the activists noted this lack of incentive pay.

Sometimes money is a powerful incentive.
Sometimes money is a powerful incentive. (Photo credit: wayneandwax)

It is hardly surprising that boards do not focus on value creation, strategic planning, or maximizing company performance, survey after survey, as much as they do on compliance. Their compensation structure does not incent them to. Compensation incentives drive behavior, both for management and for directors ».

Here is what is needed to align director pay with shareholder interests:

  1. Directors should be required to issue cheques from their personal savings accounts to purchase shares in the company. Bill Ackman of Pershing Square stated that if Canadian Pacific directors were required to cut cheques for $100,000 each, the CEO would have been fired prior to Pershing Square being involved. Mr. Ackman is right. “Skin in the game” for a director does not mean shares are given to a director in lieu of service. The motivational factor to be attuned to shareholders is greater if directors are actual investors in the company. In private equity companies, non-management directors are encouraged to “buy into” the company and invest on the same terms as other investors.
  2. For Directors’ equity to vest (the portion they did not purchase), hurdles would need to be achieved that reflect personal performance and long-term value creation of the company. Assuming you have the right directors, this sets up a situation in which Directors are forced to engage in value creation and be rewarded for doing so, similar to private equity directors. The hurdle rate provides the incentive. The vesting hurdle should be based on the underlying performance of the company, commensurate with its risk and product cycle, possibly peer based, and not simply on riding a bull market.
  3. The long-term performance metrics for value creation should also apply to senior management, and the board should lead by example. The vast majority of performance incentives are short-term, financial and quantitative. We know that the majority of company value however is now based on intangibles. Long-term leading indicators such as innovation, reputation, talent, resilience and sustainability are being completely overlooked in compensation design. You get what you pay for.

Management has proposed “passive” pay for directors and short-term pay for themselves. Boards have acquiesced.

Quels sont les membres de la haute direction susceptibles d’être congédiés par un nouveau PCD (CEO) ?


Cet article de Sarah Green, paru dans HBR Blog Network, présente une entrevue avec David Astorino, le directeur d’une recherche qui porte sur la probabilité de changement des membres de la haute direction selon que le nouveau président et chef de direction (PCD-CEO) provient de l’externe ou de l’interne. On verra que dans les deux cas, des changements significatifs sont à prévoir, mais pas nécessairement dans les mêmes postes.

Cet article est vraiment très intéressant car il explore un sujet-clé de la succession au sommet stratégique de l’organisation. Le PCD a besoin d’une équipe de grande compétence mais surtout de personnes en qui il a une totale confiance.

Ainsi, on notera que le PCD externe aura beaucoup plus tendance à congédier son CFO et son directeur des ressources humaines (CHRO). Également, près de la moitié des PCD externes changent de directeur des affaires juridiques et/ou secrétaire corporatif. Le chercheur ne semble pas être en mesure d’expliquer pourquoi !

President Barack Obama talks with Michael G. M...
President Barack Obama talks with Michael G. Morris, right, of American Electric Power Company, and David Cote in the Cross Hall of the White House, before a dinner with CEOs, Feb. 24, 2010. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Vu sous l’angle d’un membre de conseils d’administration, avez-vous une idée des raisons qui incitent les PCD à congédier leurs directeurs des affaires juridiques ?

Voici un extrait de cet article du HBR ainsi que quelques questions sous-jacentes (voir l’article pour les réponses offertes). Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Who New CEOs Fire First ?

New research by RHR international shows which executives incoming CEOs are likely to replace, and highlights some differences between first-time CEOs and more seasoned chief executives. I interviewed Dr. David Astorino, Global Practice Leader for Senior Team Effectiveness, about the findings. Below is an edited version of our conversation.

Your survey showed that as much as CEOs had shaken up their senior team, looking back on it they wished they’d moved even faster.  Why ?

When they look back, and you ask them what you would have done differently, they almost always say, « I knew in my gut that was not going to work with that individual, and I wish I had trusted that gut feeling and made that decision faster. » By delaying the transformation of a particular function or business unit, they’re now six months behind. That’s often where that comment comes from. There are some other factors, but that’s the main one.

ceochanges2.gif

What are some of those other factors ?

A lot of it relates to organizational knowledge. They hesitate because they don’t feel like they know enough about what’s going on. You’ll also see a real difference between first-time CEOs and people who’ve been a CEO before, especially if that first-time CEO is coming from outside the company. They don’t trust themselves as much, and they tend to not be as suspicious, frankly, as CEOs who have been there, done that before. They tend to wait too long. CEOs who’ve been around the block a bit more say, « I’d rather risk losing institutional knowledge and get someone in there I trust. »

ceosreplace2.gif

  1. HBR has published research suggesting that insider CEOs are more effective than outsiders. Could part of the reason be that outsiders replace so much of their staff with other outsiders, lacking that institutional knowledge ?

  2. So to that point about skills, how much of this is really about bringing in new skills, and how much of it is about what you mentioned earlier — just looking for people they can trust, people they’re comfortable with ?

  3. Speaking of functions, it wasn’t terribly surprising to me that the CHRO and the CMO are two that are likely to leave. But why the General Counsel ?

  4. What about the difference between insider and outsider CEOs — they really seem to replace different functional heads. Insiders are much more likely to replace the COO, for instance, while outsiders are more likely to replace the CFO. Why the discrepancy ?

  5. What are some of the other differences between first-time CEOs and more experienced CEOs ?

Articles reliés au sujet

These Are The People Most Likely To Get Canned If A New CEO Arrives (businessinsider.com)

Instagram CEO thinks Instagram could actually outgrow Facebook (bgr.com)

Warby Parker CEO Wants More Millennials On His Team (businessinsider.com)

Les C.A. sont à blâmer dans la plupart des cas d’échecs majeurs des entreprises


Voici un article de Peter Whitehead paru dans le Financial Times du 5 juin 2013. L’auteur présente une synthèse des principales sources de risques confrontant chaque conseil d’administration. En bref, l’étude montre que les conseils d’administration sont responsables de la plupart des échecs des entreprises, notamment de ceux qui résultent en désastres majeurs.

Le rapport de la firme Reputability conclue que l’un des principaux problèmes est le manque d’information des membres des C.A. Les autres facteurs identifiés sont reliés :

– au manque de qualification (et de caractère) des membres pour comprendre les grands enjeux et les principaux risques de l’entreprise;

– au manque de sensibilité aux aspects des relations humaines, et

– à la priorité accordée aux jugements de nature quantitative.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article en vous inscrivant gratuitement au contenu du F.T. Que pensez-vous de ces résultats ?

Company disasters – boards are to blame 

The root causes of most company failures lie in the boardroom, with a serious skills gap and risk blindness being the most common factors. A study of 41 corporate crises highlights repeated patterns of failure that are little understood by boards and that are rarely spotted using standard risk  management techniques.

English: Enron Complex in Houston Texas
English: Enron Complex in Houston Texas (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Executive Appointments, which is running a series of features on  the topic of “Better  Boards” during 2013, was given an advance briefing on the analysis by Reputability, a firm specialising in organisational and behavioural risk. Its study found a lack of skills on the board and its inability to influence executives were root causes in 88 per cent of company failures. A board’s blindness to risk was a root cause in 85 per cent of the crises. Defective information flows to and from the board, and inadequate leadership on company ethos and culture, were each root causes in 59 per cent of cases.

The Reputability research builds on a 2011 “Roads to Ruin” report by Cass Business School that carried out a detailed examination of 18 corporate crises, including the collapses of Enron and Northern Rock, and events such as the BP Texas City oil refinery explosion in 2005, and the Hatfield rail crash in 2000. It looked at the underlying causes that led to disaster and the resilience of the organisation in handling the aftermath….

… Anthony Fitzsimmons, chairman of Reputability, says: “A fundamental  manifestation of the problem with boards is information. A board has  information, but doesn’t know if it’s accurate or has important gaps. If you don’t have the right information how can you be in control ?

Articles d’intérêt dans le domaine de l’impact des Boards :

Les aspects éthiques de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Un rapport qui prend en compte la réalité européenne (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Enquête de Aon sur la gestion globale des risques en 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Soft Skills in the Crisis Management Environment (business2community.com)

Many Roads to Ruin: The Impact of Culture on Performance (johnrchildress.com)

Is your board dysfunctional? (david-doughty.com)

How Does Risk Management Create Value? (davisdyermax.wordpress.com)

Renforcement des règles de gouvernance | Une proposition de Richard Leblanc


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :

(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;

(2) Imputabilité de la direction envers le C.A.;

(3) Imputabilité du C.A. envers les actionnaires.

L’auteur nous demande de faire des suggestions dans le but de peaufiner un cas qu’il est en voie de réaliser. Des suggestions concernant cette liste ?

Proposals to Strengthen a Board’s Role in Value Creation, Management Accountability to the Board, and Board Accountability to Shareholders

I.    Increase Board Engagement, Expertise and Incentives to Focus on Value Creation

Reduce the size of the Board.

Increase the frequency of Board meetings.

Limit Director overboardedness.

Limit Chair of the Board overboardedness.

Increase Director work time.

Increase the Board Chair’s role in the value creation process.

Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard Uni...
Statue of John Harvard, founder of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the college yard. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Focus the majority of Board time on value creation and company performance.

Increase Director roles and responsibilities relative to value creation.

Increase Director compensation, and match incentive compensation to long-term value creation and individual performance.

Enable Director access to information and reporting Management.

Enable Director and Board access to expertise to inform value creation as needed.

Require active investing in the Company by Directors.

Select Directors who can contribute directly to value creation.

Revise the Board’s committee structure to address value creation.

Hold Management to account.

Disclose individual Director areas of expertise directly related to value creation.

Increase Board engagement focused on value creation.

Establish and fund an independent Office of the Chairman.

Limit Board homogeneity and groupthink.

II.   Increase Director Independence from Management and Management Accountability to the Board

Increase objective Director and advisory independence.

Limit Director interlocks.

Limit over-tenured Directors.

Limit potential Management capture and social relatedness of Directors.

Decrease undue Management influence on Director selection.

Decrease undue Management influence on Board Chair selection.

Increase objective independence of governance assurance providers.

Limit management control of board protocols.

Address fully perceived conflicts of interest.

Establish independent oversight functions reporting directly to Committees of the Board to support compliance oversight.

Match Management compensation with longer-term value creation, corporate performance and risk management.

III.   Increase Director Accountability to Shareholders

The Board Chair and Committee Chairs shall communicate face-to-face and visit regularly with major Shareholders.

Communicate the value creation plan to Shareholders.

Implement integrated, longer-term reporting focused on sustained value creation that includes non-financial performance and investment.

Implement independent and transparent Director performance reviews with Shareholder input linked to re-nomination.

Each Director, each year, shall receive a majority of Shareholder votes cast to continue serving as a Director.

Make it easier for Shareholders to propose and replace Directors.

Limit any undue Management influence on Board – Shareholder communication.

Limit Shareholder barriers to the governance process that can be reasonably seen to promote Board or Management entrenchment.

__________________________________

* Richard W. Leblanc, Associate Professor, Law, Governance & Ethics, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, of the Bar of Ontario; Summer Faculty 2013 (MGMT S-5018 Corporate Governance) at Harvard University; Faculty at the Directors College; and Research Fellow and Advisory Board Member, Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, University of Texas at Dallas, Naveen Jindal School of Management.

Éléments à considérer dans le choix d’un programme de formation des administrateurs


Le document ci-dessous, publié par Deloitte, brosse un portrait des initiatives que les conseils d’administration doivent prendre dans le but d’instaurer une culture de formation continue en gouvernance de sociétés.

Quels sont les préalables à un programme de perfectionnement et de développement des connaissances en gouvernance; quel sont les types de livraisons proposés et quelle peut être la fréquence des activités de formation; quels sont les thèmes les plus courants et les sujets les plus chauds ?

Référez-vous à l’article pour en savoir plus. Bonne lecture.

Éléments à considérer dans le choix d’un programme de formation des administrateurs | Le point de vue de Deloitte

Not long ago, many boards lacked a formal board education program. As risks have multiplied, and as the roles and responsibilities of board members have come under increased pressure, the importance of having such a program has been highlighted, and formalized educational efforts have become more prevalent.

Education vs Experience
Education vs Experience (Photo credit: gtalan)

An effective board education program features activities such as recurring director training and developmental programming on a wide range of topics, from onboarding to continuing education to updates on emerging issues. Such activities allow organizations to continuously invest in and significantly enhance the knowledge and readiness of the board and the overall organization. Educational programs can be offered through a variety of approaches and at varying frequencies, and can be tailored to address important industry-and company-specific issues.

Les billets en gouvernance les plus consultés en juin 2013


Voici un relevé des billets les plus lus ce mois-ci sur mon site. Quel est votre choix ?

P1020141

Quelles sont les questions à poser avant de joindre un CA ?
Les comportements “court-termistes” sont les ennemis de la création de valeur !
Les critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés
Les administrateurs et les technologies de l’information | Questions capitales
Conjuguer les intérêts des parties prenantes avec la performance globale de l’entreprise | la vision française
Enquête de Aon sur la gestion globale des risques en 2013
Un modèle d’affaires pertinent pour actualiser les principes du développement durable
Dix Leçons tirées d’une multitude d’entrevues avec des PCD de PME
Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
L’état de la situation de l’Audit interne en 2013
Une formation en gouvernance pour les nouveaux administrateurs | Un prérequis ?
On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A.  |  Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter !

Élaboration d’un processus d’engagement des investisseurs institutionnels


Voici un article très pertinent sur l’étude du processus d’implication (engagement) entre les actionnaires institutionnels et les conseils d’administration des sociétés cotées. L’auteur de l’article, John Mellor, est le fondateur de la Foundation for Governance Research and Education (FGRE), une OBNL dont la mission est de développer les meilleures pratiques et les plus hauts standards d’éthique dans le domaine du leadership en gouvernance.

L’article décrit très bien les caractéristiques de « l’engagement » entre les parties, montre en quoi cet engagement est important, propose une nouvelle approche pour susciter l’implication des investisseurs à long terme, et met l’accent sur les incitatifs nécessaires à adopter pour accroître l’efficacité des pratiques d’engagement.

Nous reproduisons ici la teneur de cette publication. Bonne lecture. Quelles sont vos impressions de cette approche ?

STEWARDSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT

Shareholder engagement and fund management 

  1. Engagement incorporating constructive and challenging dialogue, based on trust and mutual respect between institutional shareholders and company boards, should be an integral part of stewardship. However, such engagement does not apply or is not relevant to all investment funds.
  2. Investment funds cover a range from long-only funds to shorter term, e.g. hedge funds, high frequency trading funds. Investment strategies reflect the nature of the fund and for many, engagement is not a relevant activity. This applies particularly to those with a short term investment focus. As a guide, this may be set at no more than one or, at most, two years.
  3. Contemporary practice of engagement indicates that it falls broadly into two categories – reactive engagement and pro-active engagement:
    1. Reactive engagement, meaning reacting to events, is the practice most commonly observed amongst institutional shareholders.
    2. Pro-active engagement may have one or other of two objectives.
      1. Engagement over a limited period of time with the sole objective of driving up the company share price in the short term with a view to selling out and capturing the capital gain. This is the practice most commonly employed by so-called ‘activist’ shareholders.
      2. Engagement with the objective of company long-term value creation. This engagement is described in 1. above and, as a result of supporting the increase in company value over the long-term, aims to benefit the economy and provide sustainable returns for investors and, ultimately, savers. This engagement is, therefore, necessarily linked into a long-term investment strategy.

Effective engagement takes place in private (rather than in public) and through shareholders acting collaboratively, usually over an extended period of time.

Samsung Electronics’ 44th Annual General Share...
Samsung Electronics’ 44th Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting (Photo credit: samsungtomorrow)

Why this engagement matters

It has already been stated above that engagement linked into a long-term investment strategy has implications for the economy and savers, but the crucial point must surely be that sustained economic growth and efficient allocation of capital will not happen without it. Investment in research and development and in new industries with global growth potential, which our nation requires, is dependent upon a sustained and pragmatic relationship between capital and business. This requires a long-term investment approach and constructive engagement between the parties.

Engagement and holding company boards accountable

Engagement with boards is part of the process of holding company directors accountable and, therefore, an integral part of the corporate governance framework. It is regarded as an ingredient to the maintenance of the ‘comply or explain’ regime which underpins the UK Corporate Governance Code. Important though this is, it is ancillary to the main reason explained above of why constructive engagement over the long-term matters.

The economic case for engagement

By the very nature of the engagement which is the focus of this Paper, increase in company and investment value can only be realised over the long-term. It is, therefore, not surprising that sufficient robust evidence has yet to be accumulated to make the economic case. What evidence exists relates mainly to activist investors, such as hedge funds and focus funds, with a pro-active short-term focus on driving up the share price and selling out to realise the capital gain.

A new approach to engagement for long-only investors

This Paper is focussed upon engagement which rests on constructive and challenging dialogue between institutional shareholders and company boards, with a view to building trust and mutual respect between the parties, and with the all-important purpose of enhancing and sustaining company value to benefit the economy and savers. Necessarily, this conforms to the interest of long-only investment funds, those with a long-term perspective on investment. Specifically:

  1. A more holistic approach to engagement needs to be adopted by aligning the dialogue more closely with the duties of directors as expressed in Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which binds directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and, in particular, to have regard to likely consequences in the long-term of any decision.
  2. In line with adoption of the more holistic approach, long-only investors should also take into account the capital structure and needs (equity and debt) of the company as a basis for engagement.
  3. With a view to a more effective holistic approach to engagement, organisations should synchronise the engagement activities and practices of equity and debt (bond) fund managers.

Review of incentives

  1. Without meaningful incentives the quality and effectiveness of engagement practice is unlikely to make significant progress. To counter asset owner inertia, and with a view to winning investment business, asset managers should devise attractive long-only investment products which incorporate engagement. These products would be structured based upon intrinsic rather than relative value models, and would, therefore, differentiate these providers from the present mass of asset managers whose offerings are structured based upon relative performance criteria.
  2. The limitation of quarterly reporting (already a Government action) should aid a shift in thinking from the short to a longer term view of fund performance, which in turn should encourage a longer term perspective on the part of asset owners.
  3. To encourage long-term holding of shares, a variety of incentives have over time been proposed, and remain under consideration with typically firm views for and against. Perhaps some form of tax incentive holds the greater promise, for example, that which distinguishes between short and long-term investment with the former attracting a higher rate of income tax and the latter a lower rate of capital gains tax.

Recommendations for next steps

Asset managers should:

      1. Review what lessons for fund managers might be drawn from comparing the engagement practice of holders of private and public debt (bonds)
      2. Explore the practical implications of more synchronisation between equity and debt (bonds) analysis and engagement
      3. Review and take into account any differences in approach to engagement for different sectors, e.g. capital goods, consumer goods, utilities, resource companies, financial services
      4. Give serious consideration, in the light of the above, to resourcing for engagement and, in particular, the level of skills required and the implications for training and development.

Business School education, particularly at post-graduate and executive levels, has a crucial role to play in changing culture and mind sets to value the importance of constructive engagement between capital and business and a long-term investment approach. Programmes and courses should be redesigned to meet the need for change.

A data bank on the performance of selected long-only funds, adopting the approach to engagement advocated above, should be constructed with a view to collecting records over a sufficiently long period of time (up to 10 years) to provide evidence to demonstrate the economic value of constructive engagement.

____________________________________

* Dr John Mellor, is FGRE’s Founder and Director of Research. A former international banker with Citigroup, he has written and lectured extensively on governance. He is a former NatWest Visiting Senior Fellow in Corporate Leadership at the University of Exeter and Visiting Professor in Governance at the University of the West of England from 2003 to 2012.

Articles reliés au thème de l’engagement des investisseurs :

Shareholder power and responsibilities (councilcommunity.wordpress.com)

Shareholder Activism Metamorphosed In The U.S. (valuewalk.com)

It’s OK to Give Shareholders Access to Outside Directors (blogs.hbr.org)

Investors – In it for the long-term? (sustainability.com)

Aguilar on Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility (clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu)

Comprendre la culture de l’organisation et agir résolument | Le secret des PCD !


L’une des plus importantes compétences et responsabilités d’un PCD est de connaître les fondements de la culture de son organisation et de s’assurer d’en faire un des éléments-clés de sa gestion.

L’article ci-dessous, publié par Jon Katzenbach and  DeAnne Aguirre dans la revue strategy+business de la firme de consultation Booz & Company est vraiment très utile pour explorer les multiples facettes de la culture des organisations. Pourquoi ? Parce que, bien qu’assez difficile à appréhender, elle demeure le ressort le plus puissant de la performance des entreprises.

L’article présente plusieurs témoignages à cet effet, avec en prime, une petite vidéo de Douglas Conant, CEO de Campbell Soup  qui nous explique comment entrer en relation avec les employés en mettant une paire de souliers de course.

Comme moi, vous serez sûrement fascinés par la lecture de cet article. Bonne lecture. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Culture and the Chief Executive

It is striking to see how many chief executives see their most important responsibility as being the leader of the company’s culture. According to Ginni Rometty, CEO of IBM, “Culture is your company’s number one asset.” Her counterpart at Microsoft, Steve Ballmer, has said, “Everything I do is a reinforcement or not of what we want to have happen culturally.” In another typical remark from the C-suite, Starbucks Corporation CEO Howard Schultz has written that “so much of what Starbucks achieved was because of [its employees] and the culture they fostered.” Researchers such as former Harvard Business School professors John Kotter and James Heskett have also found consistent correlation between robust, engaged cultures and high-performance business results (as described in their book, Corporate Culture and Performance [Free Press, 1992]). But most business leaders don’t need that evidence; they’ve seen plenty of correlation in their own workplace every day.

Organizational Learning Culture Mind Map
Organizational Learning Culture Mind Map (Photo credit: kvalunas)

Recognizing the importance of culture in business is not the same thing as being an effective cultural chief executive. The CEO is the most visible leader in a company. His or her direct engagement in all facets of the company’s culture can make an enormous difference, not just in how people feel about the company, but in how they perform. Schultz described the CEO’s role this way in his book Onward: How Starbucks Fought for Its Life without Losing Its Soul (Rodale Books, 2012): “Like crafting the perfect cup of coffee, creating an engaging, respectful, trusting workplace culture is not the result of any one thing. It’s a combination of intent, process, and heart, a trio that must constantly be fine-tuned.”

A company’s culture is the collection of self-sustaining patterns of behaving, feeling, thinking, and believing, the patterns that determine “the way we do things around here.” At its best, an organization’s culture is an immense source of value. It enables, energizes, and enhances its employees and thus fosters ongoing high performance. At its worst, the culture can be a drag on productivity and emotional commitment, undermining long-term success. Most companies are so large and complex that the culture acts in both ways at once. Indeed, the culture of a large company is typically made up of several interwoven subcultures, all affecting and responding to one another.

Articles en lien avec le sujet de la culture organisationnelle :

How to Make Culture Work for You (csrtransblog.wordpress.com)

How Corporate Culture is Formed . . . (johnrchildress.com)

Five Critical Questions About Organization Culture That People Avoid Asking. (mootee.typepad.com)

Dix leçons tirées d’une multitude d’entrevues avec des PCD de PME


Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des entrevues avec les PCD (CEO) d’entreprises de petites capitalisations. C’est ce que nous présente Adam J. Epstein*, un spécialiste de « hedge fund » qui investit des centaines de millions de dollars dans les petites entreprises. L’article a été publié dans mc2MicroCap par Ian Cassel.

J’ai trouvé les conseils très pertinents pour les personnes intéressées à connaître la réalité des évaluations d’entreprises par des investisseurs privés. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

10 Lessons Learned from Interviewing Hundreds of MicroCap CEOs

1)    Preparation – there is no reason to waste your time and someone else’s by sitting down with a CEO to discuss their company without preparing – really preparing.  To me, “really preparing” doesn’t mean looking at Yahoo Finance for a few minutes in the taxi on the way to the meeting, or flipping through the company’s PowerPoint on your phone.  That kind of preparation is akin to walking up a few flights of stairs with some grocery bags to get ready for climbing Mt. Rainier.  To be really prepared for a first meeting means reading/skimming the most recent 10K, the most recent 10Q, the most recent proxy filing, the management presentation, any previous management presentations (more on this later), a recent sell-side company or industry report, and an Internet search of the management team’s backgrounds (with particular emphasis on any prior SEC, NASD, or other state/federal legal problems).  It’s hard to overemphasize how many would-be micro-cap investing disasters can be headed off at the pass by reading what’s said, and not said, and then having the opportunity to ask the CEO directly about what you’ve found.

Stream Near Mt Rainier

2)    Non-Starters – for better or worse, the micro-cap world is home to some “colorful” management teams.  After all of the time served in this regard, absolutely nothing surprises me anymore.  I have found CEOs who were simultaneously running 3 companies, CEOs who were banned from running a public company by the SEC, management presentations that were largely plagiarized, CEOs who shouted profanities in response to basic questions about their “skin in the game,” and CEOs who not only didn’t understand Reg. FD, but clearly didn’t even know it existed.  When in doubt, it’s much better not to invest at all than to make a bad investment; fortunately there are always thousands of other companies to consider.

3)    Company .PPT – these presentations speak volumes about what kind of company you are dealing with if you’re paying attention: a) my colleagues and I came up with a golden rule during my institutional investing tenure, namely that the length of a .ppt presentation is, more often than not, inversely proportional to the quality of the micro-cap company being presented (i.e., any micro-cap company that can’t be adequately presented in less than 20 slides is a problem, and 15 is even better); b) if the slides are too complex to understand on a standalone basis then either the company has a problem or you’re about to invest in something you don’t sufficiently understand – neither is good; c) NEO bios, market information, service/product/IP, strategy, financials, and use of proceeds should all receive equal billing (when buying a house, would you go and visit a house with an online profile that only features pictures of the front yard and the garage?); d) .ppt formatting and spelling/syntax problems are akin to showing up at an important job interview with giant pieces of spinach in your teeth; e) when reviewing use of proceeds (for a prospective financing) or milestones, look up prior investor presentations to see how well they did with prior promises – history often repeats itself; f) treat forward looking projections for what they typically are – fanciful at best, and violations of Reg. FD at worst; and g) micro-cap companies that flaunt celebrities as directors, partners, or investors should be approached cautiously.

4)    NEO Bios – as Ian Cassel often points out quite rightly in my opinion, micro-cap investing is an exercise in wagering on jockeys more than horses.  One of the principal ways prospective investors have to assess jockeys is the manner in which professional backgrounds are set forth; i.e., management bios.  Like a company .ppt, bios of named executive officers speak volumes about the people being described. Here are some things to look out for: a) bios that don’t contain specific company names (at least for a 10 year historic period) typically don’t for a reason, and it’s unlikely to be positive (e.g., “Mr. Smith has held senior management roles with several large technology companies”); b) it’s a good idea to compare SEC bios with bios you might find for the same people on other websites (remember the “three company CEO” referred to earlier?); c) bios that don’t contain any educational references or only highlight executive programs at Harvard, Wharton, Stanford, etc.; d) company websites that don’t have any management/director bios (surprising how many there are); and e) CEOs and CFOs who have never held those jobs before in a public company (to be clear, lots of micro-cap NEOs are “first-timers,” but it’s something you should at least factor into the risk profile of the investment).

5)    Management Conduct – just as management bios speak volumes, so does their conduct at in person one-on-one meetings.  More specifically: a) organized, professional corporate leaders rarely look disheveled or have bad hygiene; b) service providers chosen by companies also represent the company, so the previous observation applies to bankers/lawyers as well; c) CEOs who are overly chatty about non-business issues might not be keen to talk about their companies; d) if a CEO seems glued to their .ppt presentation (i.e., essentially just reading you the slides), tell them to close their laptops and just talk about the company with no visual aids – you will learn an awful lot about them in the ensuing 5 minutes; e) be on the lookout for NEOs or service providers cutting each other off, disagreeing with each other, or talking over one another;  f) when asking questions of the CEO or CFO watch their body language – moving around in their seats, running hands through their hair, perspiration, and less eye contact are nonverbal signs of duress (it’s one of the reasons why in-person meetings with management are always preferable to phone calls); g) if there are more than one NEOs in attendance, are they listening to each other (it’s rarely a great sign when other execs are looking at their phones during meetings); h) is the CEO providing careful, thoughtful answers or are they shooting from the hip – loose lips virtually always sink ships; i) did the CEO answer any questions with “I don’t know” – even great CEOs can’t possibly know the answer to every question about their companies; and j) something partially tongue-in-cheek just to think about – we know from everyday life that when someone starts a sentence with “with all due respect” what inevitably  follows is, well, something disrespectful, and when a CEO repeatedly says “to be honest” what inevitably follows is….

6)    Service Providers – micro-cap service providers (bankers, lawyers, auditors, IR firms, etc.) can run the gamut from highly professional to so bad that they can actually jeopardize companies with their advice.  While it certainly can take a while to learn “the good, the bad, and the ugly” in the micro-cap ecosystem, you can learn a lot about the CEO by asking him/her to take a few minutes to explain why the company’s service providers are the best choices for the shareholders.  It perhaps goes without saying that if a CEO can’t speak artfully, and convincingly in this regard, then buyer beware.

7)    Corporate Governance – spans the full continuum in micro-cap companies from top-notch to nothing more than a mirage.  One way to quickly ferret out which flavor of governance you’re dealing with is to ask a CEO to succinctly set forth the company’s strategy (i.e., goals, risks, opportunities, customers, etc.), and subsequently ask the CEO to describe how each seated director assists with the fundamental elements of achieving that strategy.  Though oversimplified, material disconnects in this regard are very likely to illustrate some governance challenges.  Also, ask the CEO how each of the directors came to the company; if all of the directors were brought to the company by the CEO, it’s fair to ask the CEO how confident an investor should be that the board is suitably independent to monitor the CEOs performance (one of the principal roles of all boards).

8)    Public Company IQ – easily one of the biggest problems with investing in the micro-cap arena is the conspicuous lack of (relevant, successful) capital markets and corporate finance experience in boardrooms and C-suites.  As alluded to earlier, it’s a fact of life that a large percentage of micro-cap officers and directors lack appreciable tenures in shepherding small public companies (to be clear, this doesn’t mean they aren’t smart, successful, and sophisticated, it just means they haven’t had lots of experience in small public companies).  Unlike larger public companies, small public companies can execute relatively well, and still toil in obscurity creating little or no value for shareholders.   It’s a good idea to evaluate the same when meeting with management, because companies with low “public company IQs” are more likely to underperform all else being equal.  Be on the lookout for CEOs who: a) can’t articulate a sensible strategy for maintaining or increasing trading volume; b) seem to regularly undertake financings that are more dilutive than similarly situated peer companies; c) frequently authorize the issuance of press releases that don’t appear to contain material information; d) blame some or all of their capital markets challenges on short-seller/market-making conspiracy theories; and e) can’t name the company’s largest 5 shareholders, their approximate holdings, and the last time he/she spoke to each.

9)    Follow-Up – CEOs who promise to follow-up after meetings with clarified answers, customer references, or more information but don’t are tacitly underscoring for you that they are either disorganized, disingenuous, don’t care about investors or all three.  The opposite is also not good; for example, if the company’s internal or external IR professionals subsequently convey information that seems inappropriate (from a Reg. FD standpoint) – it probably is.

10) Cautionary Note – Bernard Madoff undoubtedly would have passed these tests and a lot more with flying colors.  Sometimes the “bad guys” are really smart and charming and you’re going to either lose most of your money or get defrauded, or both. It’s happened to me, and it’s maddening and humbling at the same time.  Hence, the apt phrase: high risk, high return.

It’s easy, in my experience anyway, to get so skeptical about micro-cap companies that it can be paralyzing.  But, just when you’re about to throw in the towel, along comes a compelling growth prospect run by management with as much integrity and skill as the day is long, and it serves as a poignant reminder of everything that’s great about investing in small public companies.

Like most “best-of” lists, this isn’t intended to be exhaustive by any stretch of the imagination.  In addition to making money and promoting US jobs/innovation, one of the best parts of investing in small public companies in my opinion is continuing to hone the craft, and learn from other investors and their experiences.  Accordingly, add/subtract per your own experiences, and happy hunting.

_________________________________________

*Adam J. Epstein advises small-cap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors, LLC, is a National Association of Corporate Directors Board Leadership Fellow, and the author of The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies, (McGraw Hill, 2012).  He was co-founder and principal of Enable Capital Management, LLC.

Article relié :

Even micro-cap companies not immune to proxy battles (business.financialpost.com)

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Les aspects éthiques de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Un rapport qui prend en compte la réalité européenne


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, en primeur, un rapport exceptionnel rédigé par Julia Casson pour le compte de IBE (Institute of Business Ethics) et de EcoDa (European Confederation of Director’s Associations) qui porte sur l’éthique et la gouvernance européenne et qui sera présenté à Londres le 2 juillet. À cette occasion l’auteure présentera les grandes lignes du rapport ci-joint et discutera des questions suivantes :

  1. Why ethics has been left out of the debate around CG in the last ten years ?
  2. Is Corporate Governance guidance working/adequate ?
  3. What should be done about it ?
  4. What are boards doing in practice ?
  5. What is the role of Directors in promoting an ethical dynamics in the companies ?

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document afin de mieux appréhender les préoccupations des conseils d’administration en matière de gouvernance.

Un document vraiment précieux pour étudier toutes les facettes de l’éthique !

A review of Ethical Aspects of Corporate Governance Regulation and Guidance in the EU

IBE is holding a launch of it’s latest publication A Review of the Ethical Aspects of Corporate Governance Regulation and Guidance in the EU by Julia Casson, Director of Board Insight Limited.  This IBE Occasional Paper is published in association with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa).

Institute of Business Ethics
Institute of Business Ethics (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The purpose of governance includes encouraging robust decision making and proper risk management, and to account to those that provide capital as well as other stakeholders.  To support business sustainability, explicit attention to the ethical dimensions of these goals might be considered as requisite in any corporate governance guidance and regulation.

This new report suggests, however, a general lack of ethical language in corporate governance provisions at the pan-EU level in spite of an approach which is soft law and principles based and the fact that boards are expected (though not required) to set the values which will guide their company’s operations.

The event will begin with the author reflecting on the report’s findings. This will be followed by a panel discussion around:

Would it be correct to say that ethical drivers have been largely missing from the debate around corporate governance in the last ten years? • Is corporate governance guidance working? • What are boards doing in practice to promote an ethical dynamic in companies?

Panel members include: Julia Casson; Pedro Montoya, Group Chief Compliance Officer, EADS, sponsors of the report; and Paul Moxey, Head of Corporate Governance, ACCA.
Articles d’intérêt :

Business Ethics- What is it? (corporatetips.wordpress.com)

Board Evaluation – A Window into the Boardroom (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Corporate governance in multicultural organization (leadershipbyvirtue.blogspot.com)

Prise de position du Cercle des ASC sur le projet de consultation de l’AMF relatif au régime des OPA


Voici un suivi à notre billet du 25 mars qui annonçait que l’Autorité des marchés financiers du Québec (AMF) avait publié un document de consultation proposant des modifications significatives au régime des OPA présentement en vigueur. En guise de rappel, vous trouverez, plus bas, un extrait du projet de consultation décrivant (1) les raisons qui motivent l’AMF à intervenir, (2) les deux changements proposés et (3) les résultats anticipés.

Aujourd’hui, nous présentons la prise de position publique du Cercle des ASC eu égard à ce projet de consultation. Le texte qui suit a été transmis à l’AMF et à la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario par Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés. Bonne lecture.

Au cours des derniers mois, l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) a entrepris une consultation publique pour déterminer l’approche adéquate à adopter en matière de réglementation des mesures de défense en matière d’offre publique d’achat (« OPA ») non sollicitée. Selon elle, l’approche actuelle ne cadre plus avec le contexte juridique et économique ni avec les pratiques du marché entourant les OPA non sollicitées. Notamment, les indications contenues dans la réglementation actuelle limitent, à son avis, la capacité du conseil d’administration et de la direction des sociétés visées par une OPA non sollicitée d’envisager d’autres mesures que la vente de la société, même si ces mesures pourraient maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs de titres à long terme.

Le Cercle des ASC prend position pour appuyer l’orientation suggérée par l’AMF dans son document de consultation intitulé pour  « Un regard différent sur l’intervention des autorités en valeurs mobilières dans les mesures de défense » visant à renforcer la capacité des sociétés à se défendre des offres publiques d’achat non sollicitées. L’AMF propose « de remplacer l’Avis 62-202 par une nouvelle instruction générale sur les mesures de défense qui reconnaîtrait explicitement l’obligation fiduciaire dont les administrateurs doivent s’acquitter envers leur société lorsqu’ils réagissent à une OPA non sollicitée et redéfinirait l’intervention des autorités au motif de l’intérêt public. Nous estimons qu’il faut manifester envers les administrateurs des sociétés visées la déférence appropriée dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire. Nous partons du principe que les risques éventuels de conflits d’intérêts et d’enracinement des administrateurs sont circonscrits et gérés de façon adéquate, et que ces derniers font preuve de la compétence et des aptitudes nécessaires lorsqu’ils s’acquittent de leur obligation de diligence, notamment en tenant des délibérations rigoureuses et informées« . (Pour en savoir +)

Cercle des ASC

Le Cercle des ASC appuie cette position et est d’avis que les conseils d’administration ont toutes les qualités requises pour apprécier une offre publique d’achat et leur permettre de « simplement dire non ». La proposition de l’AMF accorde aux conseils d’administration une plus grande capacité d’exercer leur jugement en fonction des meilleurs intérêts de la société et de l’ensemble de ses parties prenantes, y compris ses actionnaires. C’est également la position de l’IAS-Québec avec qui nous avons récemment conclu une alliance stratégique. (Pour en savoir +).

Pour compléter, mentionnons que l’AMF préconise une approche différente des Autorités canadiennes de valeurs mobilières canadiennes (ACVM)  qui favorisent plutôt un nouveau cadre de réglementation qui remettrait entre les mains des actionnaires la responsabilité de prendre les décisions concernant les régimes de droit, responsabilité qui incombait auparavant aux autorités en valeurs mobilières. À l’instar de l’AMF, nous sommes d’avis « les porteurs élisent les administrateurs avec la conviction que ceux-ci s’acquitteront de leur obligation avec diligence et loyauté. Pour s’acquitter de leur obligation de diligence, les administrateurs doivent posséder le niveau de compétence et d’aptitude nécessaire à l’exercice de leurs fonctions. Pour s’acquitter de leur obligation de loyauté, ils doivent agir avec intégrité, de bonne foi et au mieux des intérêts de la société. Que la décision à prendre concerne les affaires quotidiennes de la société, une modification fondamentale dans ses activités, un projet de fusion ou d’acquisition ou une OPA amicale ou non sollicitée, l’obligation des administrateurs demeure la même. »

Je vous invite à lire le document de consultation si vous souhaitez avoir plus d’informations; on y traite plus en détail des points suivants : Le régime canadien des OPA, l’Avis 62-202 et son interprétation, les détails de l’affaire Fibrek, le rôle des administrateurs, la déférence à l’égard des décisions du conseil d’administration des sociétés visées, les normes de gouvernance et intervention des porteurs de titres, l’évolution de la gouvernance et des recours, l’activisme actionnarial, le pouvoir d’influence notable des fonds spéculatifs et des autres arbitragistes sur la vente des sociétés visées.

En voici un extrait:

Un regard différent sur l’intervention des autorités en valeurs mobilières

« La proposition de l’Autorité vise principalement à rétablir l’équilibre réglementaire entre les initiateurs d’offres publiques d’achat (OPA) et le conseil d’administration des sociétés visées et à actualiser l’encadrement réglementaire des OPA pour tenir compte du contexte juridique et économique ainsi que des pratiques du marché qui les entourent actuellement. Nous proposons donc de réexaminer l’approche actuellement adoptée à l’égard des mesures de défense dans l’Avis 62-202 et d’apporter deux changements importants à notre régime des OPA.

Le présent document de consultation vise à permettre un échange de points de vue sur la problématique soulevée par la réglementation des mesures de défense au Canada, y compris le rôle des conseils d’administration réagissant aux OPA non sollicitées, et à recueillir des commentaires sur la proposition de l’Autorité.

Nous proposons de remplacer l’Avis 62-202 par une nouvelle instruction générale sur les mesures de défense qui reconnaîtrait explicitement l’obligation fiduciaire dont les administrateurs doivent s’acquitter envers leur société lorsqu’ils réagissent à une OPA non sollicitée et redéfinirait l’intervention des autorités au motif de l’intérêt public.

Nous estimons qu’il faut manifester envers les administrateurs des sociétés visées la déférence appropriée dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire. Nous partons du principe que les risques éventuels de conflits d’intérêts et d’enracinement des administrateurs sont circonscrits et gérés de façon adéquate, et que ces derniers font preuve de la compétence et des aptitudes nécessaires lorsqu’ils s’acquittent de leur obligation de diligence, notamment en tenant des délibérations rigoureuses et informées.

Nous proposons également de modifier notre régime des OPA pour exiger, comme condition irrévocable de toute offre visant l’ensemble des titres d’une catégorie et de toute offre partielle, que plus de 50 % des titres en circulation de la catégorie visée détenus par d’autres personnes que l’initiateur et ses alliés soient déposés et que le dépôt de ces titres ne soit pas révoqué à la date d’expiration de l’offre. Nous proposons aussi d’exiger que l’offre soit prolongée de 10 jours à la suite de l’annonce du dépôt de ce pourcentage de titres.

Selon nous, la mise en oeuvre de la proposition de l’Autorité aurait les effets suivants :

– elle permettrait aux administrateurs de disposer d’une plus grande latitude dans l’exécution de leur obligation fiduciaire et examiner toutes les options en vue de maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs sans que les autorités interviennent;

– elle créerait un cadre révisé de réglementation de l’ensemble des mesures de défense, et non seulement les régimes de droits;

– elle atténuerait l’effet coercitif de notre régime des OPA pour toutes les offres et non seulement pour celles qui sont visées par des régimes de droits;

– elle apporterait une solution réglementaire directe à certaines des lacunes de notre régime des OPA;

– elle pourrait limiter le pouvoir d’influence des arbitragistes sur la vente des sociétés visées;

– elle pourrait encourager les initiateurs à négocier avec les conseils d’administration, ce qui pourrait maximiser la valeur pour les porteurs ».

Article d’intérêt pour le sujet :

Pratiques exemplaires en matière de divulgation d’information concernant les administrateurs | CCGG (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

L’importance de bien connaître son actionnariat | Une étude de PWC


Connaissez-vous bien la situation de l’actionnariat dans les organisations publiques (cotées en bourses) ? Ce compte rendu de Mary Ann Cloyd, leader du Center for Board Governance à PricewaterhouseCoopers, est  paru dans la dernière édition de *ProxyPulse™, une collaboration entre Broadridge Financial Solutions et PwC’s Center for Board Governance.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce bref rapport afin d’avoir une meilleure idée des réponses aux questions suivantes :

– What is the extent of our retail share ownership ?

– How does our company’s size impact the voting participation of our shareholders ?

– Does the company have an engagement program that allows for adequate communications with all shareholders ?

– Do we fully understand the impact of retail voting at our company ?

– Have we done sufficient cost/benefit analysis of our distribution method(s) for proxy materials and its effect on voting participation ?

– Does the company anticipate a close shareholder vote on a sensitive issue ?

– Are there situations where additional outreach to retail shareholders might make the difference on a close or sensitive voting issue? Are we leaving any opportunities to enhance a favorable voting outcome on the table ?

– Do we understand the concerns of any shareholders who may decide to organize a “vote no” campaign against one or more of our directors and what have we done to address them ?

– How do the results of our director elections compare to our peers ?

Voici un extrait de la réponse à la première question. Les deux tiers (67 %) des actions sont détenues par des institutions et le tiers (33 %) par divers autres actionnaires. Les institutions votent à 90 % tandis que les autres actionnaires ne votent qu’à 30 %.

Il est donc important de bien connaître la base actionnariale de l’entreprise afin de mettre en place la stratégie de communication susceptible de favoriser la participation du plus grand nombre d’actionnaires au vote annuel.

How well do you know your shareholders ?

OWNERSHIP AND VOTING BY SHAREHOLDER SEGMENT

The company may have a higher level of retail ownership than you think; but few retail shareholders are voting. On average, institutions owned approximately 67% of public company shares and retail owned 33%.  On average, 70% of the street name shares were voted: 60 percentage points by institutions and 10 percentage points by retail. With low rates of retail participation that leave 70% of retail shares un-voted, companies should reconsider strategies to encourage voting by all shareholders.

In particular, retail shareholders support management’s voting recommendations at high rates. Simply stated, an objective of engaging with this important group is to get them to vote.  Newer communication channels make it more efficient for companies to engage with retail shareholders – and, more convenient than ever for them to access proxy materials and vote.  In contrast, because institutional shareholders vote at very high rates, the objective is to ensure ongoing dialogue throughout the year and to eliminate the potential for “surprises” at the annual meeting.

DIRECTOR QUESTION:

– What is the extent of our retail share ownership ?

Rates of voting vary substantially between institutional and retail voting segments.
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*Mary Ann Cloyd is leader of the Center for Board Governance at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on an edition of ProxyPulse™, a collaboration between Broadridge Financial Solutions and PwC’s Center for Board Governance; the full report, including additional figures, is available here.

*ProxyPulse™ provides data and analysis on voting trends as the proxy season progresses. This first edition for the 2013 season covers the 549 annual meetings held between January 1, and April 23, 2013 and subsequent editions will incorporate May and June meetings. These reports are part of an ongoing commitment to provide valuable benchmarking data to the industry.

Les dix billets les plus populaires la semaine du 16 juin 2013 – Quel est votre choix ?


Voici un relevé des dix billets les plus populaires sur mon site cette semaine . Quel est votre choix ?

English: Port aux Choix lighthouse, Newfoundla...
English: Port aux Choix lighthouse, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada Français : Phare de Port au Choix, Terre-Neuve at Labrador, Canada (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Quelles sont les questions à poser avant de joindre un CA ?
Les comportements “court-termistes” sont les ennemis de la création de valeur !
Les administrateurs et les technologies de l’information | Questions capitales
Conjuguer les intérêts des parties prenantes avec la performance globale de l’entreprise | la vision française
L’urgence est un choix | Le propos de René Villemure
Une méthodologie de l’évaluation de la gouvernance des sociétés | ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard
Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A.  |  Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter !
L’état de la situation de l’Audit interne en 2013
Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

Grands défis de gouvernance pour les entreprises cotées en 2013 | Un recueil de la NACD


Vous trouverez, ci-joint, une publication de la NACD qui présente les grands défis qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années. Ce document est un recueil de lectures publié par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.

Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !

Voici comment les auteurs se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance.

English: 1166 Avenue of the Americas (Marsh & ...
English: 1166 Avenue of the Americas (Marsh & McLennan Headquarters) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
    1. What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle
    2. KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute
    3. Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies
    4. Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX
    5. Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners
    6. What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP

NACD Insights and Analysis – Governance Challenges: 2013 and Beyond

Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.

Article relié :

– NACD BoardVision: Private Equity’s Influence on Executive Compensation (bulletproofblog.com)

Changement important dans la relation auditeur externe/interne | Financial Reporting Council (FRC)


Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un article concernant une importante décision du Financial Reporting Council au Royaume-Uni. Cette décision concerne la relation entre les auditeurs externes et les auditeurs internes.

The Financial Reporting Council has banned internal auditors from providing « direct assistance » to external audit teams. The new rules will come into effect in June 2014.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Voici le sommaire de l’étude.

Internal audit staff can no longer work on external audit teams.The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has prohibited external auditors from using internal audit staff as “direct assistance” members of the audit team. It is doing this to create a clearer division of responsibility between internal and external audit teams to safeguard against conflicts of interest. It is aiming both to ensure the independence of the external auditor and promote greater confidence in the integrity of the audit for investors.

The prohibition comes into effect for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after 15 June 2014.

Article Image

“Prohibiting direct assistance supports stakeholders’ expectation that external auditors should be free from threats to their independence, » said Nick Land, FRC board member and chairman of the Audit and Assurance Council. « In determining the effective date of the prohibition, the FRC has taken into consideration that planning the use of the work of internal auditors may take place early in the financial period being reported on.”

The ban follows the announcement in February that the FRC would adopt the revised international auditing standards on the external auditor’s use of work carried out by internal audit. It also announced that it would consider going beyond the international standard by prohibiting the direct use of internal audit staff on the external audit team. Feedback to the consultation suggested that there could be logistical issues for audits that were under way when the prohibition began. The FRC therefore decided to delay implementation until 2014.

Other revisions to the FRC’s auditing and ethical standards to reflect the revised international auditing standards on the external auditor’s use of work carried out by internal audit will also have the same effective date.

Les comportements « court-termistes » sont les ennemis de la création de valeur !


Êtes-vous intéressés à comprendre les comportements à court terme adoptés par les organisations en réponse aux nombreuses occasions qu’ont les gens de profiter de situations non-éthiques, à l’encontre de la création de valeur à long terme ?

Si vous vous demandez quels sont les facteurs-clés qui conduisent aux abus reliés à des comportements de court terme et, surtout, si vous voulez connaître les moyens susceptibles d’améliorer la situation, l’article de Malcolm Salter, professeur à la Harvard Business School, vous fascinera.

Vous pouvez lire le résumé qui suit. Si votre curiosité l’emporte, vous pouvez télécharger le document au complet.

Short-Termism at Its Worst

Researchers and business leaders have long decried short-termism: the excessive focus of executives of publicly traded companies—along with fund managers and other investors—on short-term results. The central concern is that short-termism discourages long-term investments, threatening the performance of both individual firms and the U.S. economy.

English: Detail from Corrupt Legislation. Mura...
English: Detail from Corrupt Legislation. Mural by Elihu Vedder. Lobby to Main Reading Room, Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C. Main figure is seated atop a pedestal saying « CORRUPT LEGISLATION ». Artist’s signature is dated 1896. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In the paper, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption…and What To Do About It, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I argue that short-termism also invites institutional corruption—that is, institutionally supported behavior that, while not necessarily unlawful, erodes public trust and undermines a company’s legitimate processes, core values, and capacity to achieve espoused goals. Institutional corruption in business typically entails gaming society’s laws and regulations, tolerating conflicts of interest, and persistently violating accepted norms of fairness, among other things.

My argument starts by describing the twin problems of short-termism and institutional corruption and showing how the latter has led to a diminution of public trust in many of our leading firms and industries. Focusing most specifically on the pervasive gaming of society’s rules (with examples drawn from the finance industry, among others), I then explain how short-termism invites gaming and identify the principal sources of short-termism in today’s economy. The most significant sources of short-termism that collectively invite institutional corruption include: shifting beliefs about the purposes and responsibilities of the modern corporation; the concomitant rise of a new financial culture; misapplied performance metrics; perverse incentives; our vulnerability to hard-wired behavioral biases; the decreasing tenure of institutional leaders; and the bounded knowledge of corporate directors, which prevents effective board oversight.

I next turn to the question of what is to be done about short-termism and the institutional corruption it invites. In this final section of the paper, I discuss reforms and recommendations related to the improvement of board oversight; the adoption of compensation principles and practices that can help mitigate the destructive effects of inappropriate metrics, perverse incentives, and hard-wired preferences for immediate satisfactions; the termination of quarterly earnings guidance; and the elimination of the built-in, short-term bias embedded in our current capital gains tax regime.

The full paper is available for download here.

Articles récents reliés au sujet :

Short-Termism (projecteve.com)

In defence of short-termism (stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com)

The Reality of Short Termism Per Mark Roe (concurringopinions.com)

Leçons à tirer sur la séparation des rôles de PCD et de PCA | L’exemple de JPMorgan


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’excellent article d’Ira Millstein* de la firme Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, sur la saga JPMorgan Chase qui a alimenté les discussions en gouvernance au cours des derniers mois. Maintenant que la poussière sur l’échec de la séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA et sur l’opportunité d’utiliser un « administrateur principal » (Lead Directeur) est tombée, il y a certainement lieu d’en tirer des leçons très pertinentes pour le futur. C’est ce que fait admirablement bien l’auteure en précisant les différences fondamentales entre les rôles.

Governance Lessons from the Dimon Dust-Up

Dans le cas de JPMorgan Chase, la bataille de M. Dimon pour conserver ses fonctions de CEO et de Chairman a été féroce. Celui-ci a gagné son pari parce que les circonstances lui étaient favorables (le timing était bon). Selon l’auteure, il aurait été préférable de faire voter les actionnaires sur la séparation des rôles, pour le prochain CEO. L’article montre (1) qu’il est préférable d’avoir une séparation des rôles, (2) que la nomination d’un administrateur principal n’est pas la solution miracle parce que celui-ci n’aura jamais tout le pouvoir et toute la légitimité d’un président du conseil indépendant et (3) que dans les cas où un administrateur principal est requis, il faut définir son rôle en lui donnant le pouvoir et l’autorité nécessaire.

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase
Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase (Photo credit: jurvetson)

Voici un extrait de cet article ainsi qu’un tableau montrant les comparaisons entre deux modèles de gouvernance : le modèle du président de conseil indépendant et le modèle dual « Chair/CEO ».

Substantial work was done on this issue by the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), in its Blue Ribbon Commission Report “The Effective Lead Director.” The role of the lead director as viewed in that report is not as strong a position as the independent chair, as indicated in a comparison chart included as Appendix A (below). In comparing the key duties of a typical independent chair to a lead director, the powers and duties of a lead director fall short in the following areas:

  1. Power to call a board meeting: Unlike the chair, the lead director typically does not have convening power but only suggests to the chair/CEO that a meeting be called.
  2. Control of the board agenda and board information: Unlike the chair who bears responsibility and authority for determining both the board agenda and the information that will be provided, the lead director collaborates with the chair/CEO and other directors on these issues.
  3. Authority to represent the board in shareholder and stakeholder communications: Typically the chair/CEO represents the board with shareholders and external stakeholders; the lead director plays a role only if specifically asked by the chair/CEO or the board directly.

Appendix A Comparison of the Non-Executive Chair and the Chair/CEO Models

Click image to enlarge Click image to enlarge

__________________________________________________________

*Ira Millstein is a senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP and co-chair of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership at Columbia Law School.

Articles reliés :

Making a Case for One Leader at JPMorgan (dealbook.nytimes.com)

JPMorgan Shareholders Reject CEO-Chairman Split in Win for Dimon (bloomberg.com)

JPMorgan shareholders support Dimon’s dual roles in vote – Reuters (reuters.com)

Jamie Dimon needs a boss (blogs.reuters.com)

Jamie Dimon Vote: A New Referendum on Governance (cnbc.com)

Jamie Dimon and Entire JPM Board of Directors Overcome Shareholder Proposals (dailyfinance.com)