Ce conseil d’administration est-il pour vous ?


Aujourd’hui, je vous recommande la lecture d’un excellent article publié dans HBR qui vous fera réfléchir sérieusement si vous recherchez un poste sur un conseil d’administration.

L’article de Stacy Smith montre que les choses ont beaucoup changé et qu’il est important de prendre la pleine mesure des opportunités qui s’offrent à nous, en considérant quatre questions :

(1) Suis-je passionné par ce type de business ?

(2) L’entreprise possède-t-elle un avantage compétitif clair ?

(3) Où se situe cette entreprise par rapport à ma résidence ?

(4) Puis-je travailler harmonieusement avec les administrateurs et avec la direction ?

Bonne lecture !

Decide Whether That Board Seat Is Right for You

For many executives, a corporate board seat is a coveted opportunity. But any invitation to take one should not be considered lightly. While the business world is overflowing with advice for companies in selecting board members, prospective directors themselves have little guidance in determining whether accepting a board seat is the right move for them.

femmes-conseils-administration

In decades past, the decision was easier, because a board seat was often a ceremonial position. Today, a directorship is a serious, even awesome responsibility. Directors play a key role in setting corporate strategy and appointing senior executives. They are called upon to advise companies that must manage risk in an increasingly complex global operating environment and navigate disruptive technologies that threaten their business models.

At the same time, board members face far greater scrutiny than ever before. The legislative and regulatory responses to the Enron/MCI scandals (Sarbanes-Oxley) and the financial crisis (Dodd-Frank) created a slew of new accounting rules, regulatory requirements, and governance responsibilities. Challenges by activist shareholders are adding even more pressure to corporate boards.

Each of these factors has significantly upped the ante for board members. With this new landscape in mind, here are four questions prospective board members should ask themselves before accepting a director’s position.

First: Am I passionate about this business?

Potential board members must not only have knowledge but also have deep conviction and be energized about the company’s mission and business. If money is the motivating factor, a board seat is the wrong way to achieve it. The commitment is too great and the responsibility is too important to fake it – and shareholders won’t stand for it.

In the past two years, engaged investors have led successful fights with Darden Restaurants, Abercrombie & Fitch, Office Depot, DuPont, and others to add greater industry expertise to their boards. The lesson: Today’s directors must be authentically engaged, deeply experienced, and highly motivated to solve problems, advise management, and champion shareholders.

Second: Is this a company with a clear competitive advantage?

Prospective directors should ask themselves if the company has a unique advantage that can be translated into industry leadership. The advantage can be a dominant technology, a distinctive culture or a breakthrough product – as long as a board member can identify it and believe in it.

This sounds like a pretty low barrier, but research shows that many board members lack a firm grasp on the company’s strategy or value creation model. A 2013 McKinsey report found that only 34 percent of directors felt the boards they served on had a complete understanding of current strategy and just 22 percent had full knowledge of how the company created value.

Third: Where in the world are they in relation to me?

Board meetings are often face-to-face affairs and may happen as often as once a month. Serving on a board is extremely time and travel intensive – a commitment that should be factored in before accepting a directorship.

Former Intel CEO Paul Otellini once told me that there are interesting companies everywhere in the world, but the ones in your backyard are going to be a lot more practical to help out. Good advice for any prospective board member.

Fourth: Can I work with these people?

I once asked former Intel CEO Andy Grove for advice on whether or not I should accept a board appointment. I’ll never forget his answer. He said if I took the position, I’d be spending a lot of time with the other board members. “Make sure you can work with them,” he told me.

Potential board members should do their homework on current board members and board dynamics, always asking themselves: Is this a collegial, inquisitive, professional group to work alongside? The last thing anyone wants is to join a dysfunctional board of bickering power grabbers or rubber-stamping snoozers.

A corporate board membership can be an incredibly rewarding experience. Directors have the opportunity to represent shareholders, shape strategy at the highest level, tackle interesting business problems and work with some of the most talented people in the world. Prospective board members need to make sure they’re up for the challenge – and excited to take it on.

La croissance des interventions activistes | Comment les organisations doivent-elles réagir ?


Voici un article de Mary Ann Cloyd, directrice du Center for Board Governance de PricewaterhouseCoopers, qui résume parfaitement la nature et la portée des interventions des actionnaires activistes aux États-Unis (et, par enchaînement au Canada).

Les administrateurs des sociétés sont de plus en plus préoccupés par les agissements des actionnaires activistes dont l’objectif ultime est l’amélioration de la situation financière des entreprises par la remise en question de sa gouvernance.

Lors d’un précédent billet, nous avons exploré les tenants et aboutissants du phénomène de l’activisme (Voir Explications du phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires | PwC) en montrant qu’il y avait différents types d’activismes, en fonction de leur niveau d’engagement.

« Shareholder activism comes in different forms, ranging from say-on-pay votes, to shareholder proposals, to “vote no” campaigns (where some investors will urge other shareholders to withhold votes from one or more directors), to hedge fund activism. »

L’auteure présente ici une synthèse d’une enquête menée par PwC; elle met principalement l’accent sur trois aspects de la réponse à la « menace » :

(1) Pourquoi l’entreprise est-elle ciblée ?

(2) L’importance de la préparation continue

(3) Comment réagir lorsque les activistes interviennent ?

Bonne lecture !

Activism can build or progress. If a company is the target of a less aggressive form of activism one year, such as say-on-pay or shareholder proposals, and the activists’ issues are not resolved, it could lead to more aggressive activism in the following years. (For more background information, see a previous PwC publication, discussed on the Forum here.)

Hedge fund activists are increasing their holdings

pwc

Hedge fund activists may push a company to spin off underperforming or non-core parts of their businesses seek new executive management, operational efficiencies, or financial restructuring, engage in a proxy contest for full control of the board, or work to influence corporate strategy through one or two board seats. Some hedge fund activists target a company’s “capital allocation strategy” and push the company to change its acquisition strategy or return reserved cash to investors through stock buybacks or dividends. In order to drive these changes, activists are generally engaging with at least some of a company’s other major investors to get support for their proposals.

Directors have been taking notice of hedge funds and other activist shareholders, and they are talking about activism in the boardroom: Last year, 29% of directors said their board has interacted with an activist shareholder and held extensive board discussions about activism. [1] An additional 14% said they extensively discussed shareholder activism, though they hadn’t had any interactions with an activist. Given the state of activism, we anticipate the level of boardroom discussion on this topic will continue, or even grow, this year.

What might make your company a target?

About one in five S&P 500 companies was the target of a public activist campaign in 2014—and the number more than doubles when you consider the activity that never become public. [2] What are some common themes?

Companies where management appears to be either unable or unwilling to address issues that seem apparent to the market, investors, or analysts are ripe for activism. In addition, poor financial and stock performance, a weak pipeline of new products, a lack of innovation, the absence of a clear strategy, and turnover in leadership are also frequent red flags.

Hedge fund activists often focus on whether a company’s business line or sector is significantly underperforming in its market. They may target profitable companies with low market-to-book value, a well-regarded brand, and sound operating cash flows and return on assets. If a company’s cash reserves exceed historic norms and those of its peers, the company may be a target, particularly when it’s unclear why it has a large cash reserve. And board composition practices can also draw an activist’s attention—for example, if the company has a classified board or a long average director tenure and few new board members

An activist campaign can come at a very high cost. In addition to the out-of-pocket legal and advisory fees for a proxy battle, the management distraction, emotional impact, and potential business disruption can take a toll. Relationships with suppliers, customers, and even employees can also be damaged.

Preparation is key

Viewing a company through the eyes of an activist can help management and boards anticipate, prepare for, and respond to an activist campaign. A first step is to critically assess the company’s businesses as an activist would—looking for underperforming components. Some companies proactively examine their portfolios and capabilities to determine what fits both strategically and financially.

Companies that can articulate their strategy and demonstrate that it is grounded in a well-considered assessment of both their asset portfolios and their capabilities may be more likely to minimize the risk of becoming an activist’s target. Companies will want to tell a compelling story about their vision for success to shareholders.

Companies should also understand their shareholder base and have a tailored engagement plan in place.

Responding when an activist comes knocking

Companies and their boards will need to consider how to respond based on the facts and circumstances. Generally, an effective response plan will objectively consider the activist’s ideas to identify if there are areas around which to build consensus. Finding a way to work with an activist may avoid the potentially high costs of a proxy contest.

“One of the first areas of focus for boards and the management team is to engage. Sit down, have a discussion, hear out the activist, understand what’s on their mind, and then see if you can find common ground. We find engaging and listening is important,” Tim Ryan, PwC’s Vice Chairman and Markets, Strategy and Stakeholders Leader said in a recent interview with Wall Street Journal Live’s MoneyBeat.

It is important to recognize that the pressure from shareholder activists is not likely to go away any time soon, and companies of all sizes and in all industries need to be on alert. A well-articulated strategy, supported by a proactive assessment of the company’s existing portfolio, is critical. By telling a clear story and openly communicating with shareholders and investors, companies may minimize the risk of becoming a target of activists.

____________________________________

Endnotes:

[1] PwC, 2014 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, October 2014 (discussed on the Forum here).

[2] Brendan Sheehan, “Trends in Shareholder Activism,” Global Governance Advisors, October 2014.

Proposition de la SEC eu égard à la divulgation de la rémunération de la direction en rapport avec la performance organisationnelle


Les actionnaires doivent obtenir toute l’information pertinente pour leur permettre d’évaluer l’efficacité de leurs hauts dirigeants et leur permettre de voter en ayant accès aux meilleures informations possibles. C’est la raison pour laquelle la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) propose un amendement règlementaire relatif à la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, en rapport avec la performance.

Il est ainsi proposé que la SEC adopte un renforcement des règles de divulgation dans les circulaires de procuration en publiant une table qui révèle la rémunération de la haute direction en relation avec la performance financière de l’entreprise au cours des cinq dernières années.

La divulgation de ces données, sous une forme standardisée, facilitera les comparaisons avec d’autres entreprises cotées du même secteur d’activité.

Le résultat de cette consultation sera déterminante dans les décisions des autorités règlementaires canadiennes.

Le court article ci-dessous est basé sur les vues exprimées par *, commissaire de la  U.S. Securities and Exchange. J’ai enlevé les notes de bas de page afin d’alléger le billet mais vous pouvez retrouver l’intégralité de ses propos dans l’article Proposed Rule on Pay Versus Performance, publié dans le Harvard Law School of Corporate Governance.

Executive compensation and its relationship to the performance of a company has been an important issue since the first proxy rules were promulgated by the Commission nearly 80 years ago. The first tabular disclosure of executive compensation appeared in 1943, and over the years, the Commission has continued to update and overhaul the presentation and content of compensation disclosures.

CEO Pay – Humongous

Today [April 29, 2015], the Commission, as directed by Congress, takes another important step in modernizing our executive compensation rules by proposing amendments on pay versus performance. Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act directed the Commission to adopt rules requiring public companies to disclose in their proxy materials the relationship between executive compensation actually paid, and the financial performance of the company.

I believe that today’s proposal thoughtfully fulfills that mandate. The net result of the proposed rule should be enhanced pay versus performance disclosure in the proxy statement. It should make it easier for shareholders to locate, understand, and analyze executive compensation information before they have to vote.

The Commission’s current rules require that shareholders receive a proxy statement prior to a shareholder meeting. The proxy statement must disclose all the important facts about the issues on which shareholders may be asked to vote. Today’s proposed rule should provide shareholders, via the proxy statement, meaningful new information and metrics to aid in making informed decisions.

The Senate Report that accompanies Section 953(a) of the statute noted: “It has become apparent that a significant concern of shareholders is the relationship between executive pay and the company’s financial performance…The Committee believes that these disclosures will add to corporate responsibility as firms will have to more clearly disclose and explain executive pay.”

In order “to more clearly disclose and explain executive pay” in this context, the Commission is proposing to use a standardized, machine readable table. This table includes, in one location, easy to understand data regarding the last five years of a company’s financial performance. Financial performance data would be presented directly next to the data detailing the compensation of the company’s executive officers during the last five years.

This simple presentation should make it easier for shareholders to understand the relationship between executive pay and company performance. In addition to providing data on compensation “actually paid” to certain executive officers, the proposed table requires registered companies to include the Summary Compensation Table figures for certain executive officers. Including these numbers in the pay versus performance table is vitally important. It would allow shareholders to view a measure of pay that excludes changes in the value of equity grant awards. Providing two measures of compensation in the table may facilitate meaningful comparison, especially in situations where the “actually paid” figure may be misleading or not reflective of the true compensation package awarded to an executive in a given year.

Comparability is also an important part of the proposal. Requiring each registrant to complete this standardized table should promote comparability across all companies. Each registrant would be required to provide data responsive to the same questions, year after year, with clear direction on exactly what the table requires. This comparability also should promote robust data analysis going forward.

Along with providing data in the table, registrants would provide supplemental disclosure about the relationship between executive compensation and performance. The proposed rule appropriately recognizes that some flexibility may be needed to demonstrate this relationship. For example, registrants may describe the relationship in narrative form or by means of a graph or chart. Registrants would be allowed to describe this relationship in a way that is best suited to their particular circumstances. The combination of a standardized table and a more flexible disclosure following the table is a sensible way to ensure comparability and uniformity, while still providing companies with some appropriate flexibility in disclosure.

Finally, I have been a consistent advocate for data tagging of Commission forms, so I am very pleased to see that pay versus performance disclosure, as proposed, will be tagged in eXtensible Business Reporting Language, or XBRL. The proposed rule sets forth an approach toward incorporating machine readable data for communicating compensation and performance information. XBRL streamlines the collection and reporting of financial information. XBRL data tagging involves a process in which a company essentially marks certain parts of its financial disclosure with specific defined terms from a shared dictionary, referred to as a “taxonomy”. All registrants use the same shared taxonomy, which allows for comparability across companies.

In order to achieve comparability, we need structured data in formats like XBRL. Today’s proposal would represent the first piece of data in the proxy statement to be tagged and is hopefully a harbinger of things to come. We should be moving toward having the entire proxy statement tagged, and this is a great first step.

As the SEC Investor Advisory Committee noted in its recommendation advocating for more data tagging, “modern technology provides the SEC with the opportunity to unlock far greater value from the information that it collects and stores.” I personally believe that tagging the entire proxy statement would unlock great value for both the Commission and shareholders.

The current proposal is to have pay versus performance disclosure tagged in XBRL. It is my hope and expectation that this disclosure would be tagged in Inline XBRL once available, which would allow companies to file the required information and data tags in one document rather than repeated in separate exhibits. I understand that Inline XBRL is not yet available on the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, but soon will be. When that day comes, Inline XBRL should be used for pay versus performance and all other parts of the proxy statement.


*Kara M. Stein is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Stein’s recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Stein and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance about CEO pay includes Paying for Long-Term Performance (discussed on the Forum here) and the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Éloge à la confiance du PCD envers son CA


Voici le point de vue de Liam McGee paru récemment dans la section Leadership de la revue du Harvard Business School (HBR). L’auteur relate son expérience alors qu’il était le président et chef de la direction (PCD) de la Hartford Financial Services Group.

Selon lui, tous les PCD tentent de « gérer leur CA » en utilisant diverses approches basées sur le contrôle et le pouvoir de l’information. Cependant, depuis une dizaine d’années, les conseils d’administration ont progressivement repris leurs droits ! Ils cherchent à maintenir une plus grande distance entre leurs rôles de fiduciaires et ceux qui incombent à la direction de l’organisation.

Pour l’auteur, il n’y a qu’une façon de réconcilier les deux parties : le partenariat. Celui-ci est fondé sur la confiance, et la confiance ne s’acquiert pas du jour au lendemain ! Il faut élaborer une stratégie et mettre en œuvre des mécanismes qui renforceront graduellement la confiance entre le CA et la haute direction. Selon lui, il vital que le PCD ait confiance en son CA.

Toute la carrière de l’auteur a été consacrée à l’établissement de liens de confiance essentiels aux bonnes pratiques de gouvernance. C’est de son expérience dont il est question dans ce bref extrait. Bonne lecture !

CEOs, Stop Trying to Manage the Board

 

It’s understandable that most CEOs try to manage their boards. With directors often attempting to take a more active role in decisions these days, CEOs naturally feel a bit threatened. They’re trying to lead a group of people who typically lack the time or expertise to fully understand what’s going on — but who have real power.

At most companies, despite all the best intentions, managing the board usually means keeping directors at arm’s length. Most CEOs I’ve known are inclined to give out just enough information to satisfy their fiduciary obligations, often in highly structured meetings that leave little to chance. They hold off on revealing the deeper challenges or complexities that might provoke tough questions.

But as I learned over the course of my career, there’s a better approach with boards. A CEO can work in partnership with directors without sacrificing his or her authority — and thereby accomplish far more than is possible with an arm’s-length relationship. It’s all a matter of developing trust. In my five years as CEO of The Hartford, a Fortune 100 insurer, winning trust was crucial to turning around the company in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Building trust can be a delicate thing, but it isn’t magic. You don’t need special charisma. All you really need is courage and self-confidence.

The first step is to show that you trust your directors. In practical terms, that means not trying to stage-manage board interactions. When I took over at The Hartford, the management team took up most of our board meetings going through long slide decks. I got rid of that barrier. We distilled the most important information into pre-reads for the directors to study in advance. The meetings themselves, aside from the CFO’s report on financials, focused on discussions of the main issues. Real transparency, I learned, isn’t so much in the numbers, but in open conversation.

That wasn’t easy at first for my executives, who were used to wielding their slide decks to control their presentations. I had to coach them not to worry and to remember that directors were genuinely interested in their businesses and in getting to know them as managers. So they should just be open to the discussions that came up.

These unscripted meetings not only freed directors to ask more questions, but also gave them more of a window into the company. They got to see the other executives in action, including my potential successors.

It’s important to remember that boards see only a small part of you, and even less of the company. They visit for a day or two and get a snapshot. How you work with them is often as important as the substance of what you say. If you give the board unfettered access to executives, you’ll build trust with the directors as well as with your management team. Openness and transparency in board meetings over time can go a long way toward making everyone comfortable with everyone else.

Still, those steps weren’t enough for me to build a strong basis of trust. It’s one thing to allow open discussion on the usual company topics. But what about the issues that involved me personally? How could I get the directors to trust me on my own performance? Obviously a CEO will want to maintain some discretion here. But openness on even these issues can pay off enormously.

A year into my tenure, a senior executive quit abruptly and, on the way out, criticized my management style to the board. I was concerned enough to get a coach, who conducted a full 360-degree feedback process for me. But instead of just telling the directors about the coaching, I decided to give them an overview of my coach’s findings. Her report was generally positive, but it had some tough parts in it, and I decided to discuss these openly. It may have been risky, but it helped to break the ice. The board members felt relaxed enough to give me some feedback of their own. My lead director even became something of a second coach. All of this was invaluable, and it wouldn’t have happened if I hadn’t made myself vulnerable in the first place.

That trust made a big difference in 2012, when an activist investor challenged us to restructure the company. We were still in the process of developing our new strategy, and the stock price was disappointingly low. The controversy could have led to my departure and, more important, a costly delay in the company’s revival. Instead the board stayed unified and we stuck to our plan, which turned out to be a better approach than the strategy the activist was pushing.

All along the way, as we developed trust, I grew to welcome the board members’ tough questions. I could see they were focused on helping me protect and improve the company. A CEO’s job is hard enough. One of your biggest responsibilities is to avoid making dumb decisions. Wouldn’t you want all the directors to feel comfortable challenging you and each other?


*Liam McGee was chairman and CEO of the Hartford Financial Services Group (“The Hartford”) from 2009 to June of 2014. He died in February 2015.

Vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance ?


Aujourd’hui, je cède la parole à Me Donald Riendeau*, Directeur général et co-fondateur de l’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations, qui agit à titre de blogueur invité.

Celui-ci nous entretiendra de l’importance de solidifier la confiance à l’échelle de toutes les entreprises et d’insuffler une gouvernance créatrice de confiance eu égard aux relations entre le conseil d’administration et la direction.

L’auteur nous présentera également un avant-goût du premier sommet international de la confiance.

Vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance ?

par

Me Daniel Riendeau

Vous avez tous entendu l’expression ‘’ vers une gouvernance créatrice de valeurs ‘’, pour différencier celle-ci de la gouvernance plus traditionnelle mais néanmoins importante qu’est  ‘’ la gouvernance fiduciaire ‘’ ?  Le Dr Yvan Allaire, avec lequel j’ai eu le privilège de collaborer est un visionnaire qui dès 2003 fût le premier à parler de ces deux types de gouvernance.

Au cours des douze dernières années, plusieurs consultants et experts en gouvernance ont poussé ces notions pour en permettre un maximum de valeur ajoutée. Malgré tous ses efforts et les nombreux progrès en matière de gouvernance, il semble encore manquer une pièce au puzzle. Cette pièce pourrait bien être celle de la confiance.

LE PRISME DE LA CONFIANCE

Le mot confiance est le mot de neuf lettres à la fois le plus fort et le plus essentiel. Que ce soit dans nos vies personnelle, sociale et professionnelle. Pourtant cette notion si importante est encore difficile à saisir. La confiance n’est ni une valeur, ni un comportement, ni une attitude. La confiance est ‘’ la ‘’ méta-valeur, en fait tous nos comportements, décisions et actions contribueront à la solidifier ou à l’effriter.  Comme l’énonce si bien l’un de mes mentors, monsieur Jean-Claude Deschênes, la confiance est comme l’huile d’un moteur. Imaginez ce qui arrive à un moteur lorsqu’il n’y a pas d’huile… celui-ci fige, ou pire brûle. La confiance est comme cette huile. On ne l’a voit pas, mais elle est essentielle.

Institut de la confiance dans les organisations

La mission de l’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations est de solidifier la confiance dans nos organisations. Bien entendu, l’intégrité et de bonnes instances de gouvernance sont des ingrédients clés. Mais la confiance est bien davantage. Par exemple, une organisation peut être parfaitement intègre et avoir les meilleures règles de gouvernance mais si les résultats ne sont pas au rendez-vous, la confiance sera déficiente. Un autre exemple est celui d’une organisation dans le domaine de la construction que nous avons accompagné. Rarement il nous a été donné de voir une confiance interne aussi forte (climat de travail exceptionnel, valeurs partagées, travail d’équipe synergique, activation des accomplissements personnels, respect des délais, niveau des compétences élevé, etc.). Cependant, malgré tous ses efforts, la confiance des autorités réglementaires, des créanciers et de la caution était vacillante en raison du passé de certains de ses actionnaires.

Je pourrais vous donner un grand nombre d’exemples qui vous démontreront que la confiance est une notion large qui repose sur de nombreuses composantes. Or, qui est mieux positionné qu’un conseil d’administration pour veiller à la mise en place et l’évolution d’ingrédients qui contribueront à solidifier la confiance interne et celle des parties prenantes externes ?

UNE ÉVOLUTION NATURELLE

Doucement, nos conseils d’administration évolueront d’une gouvernance créatrice de valeurs, vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance. Les conseils d’administration se poseront d’importantes questions telles que : Quel est le niveau de la confiance entre les employés et notre direction ? Quel est le niveau de confiance des autorités réglementaires envers notre organisation ? Quel est le niveau de confiance entre nos clients privés et notre organisation ? Mais plus important, qu’avons-nous fait et que pouvons-nous faire comme organisation pour solidifier la confiance des différentes parties prenantes.

L’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations accompagne des organisations afin de procéder à leur diagnostic de confiance interne et externe mais surtout pour mettre en place des parcours qui solidifieront cette confiance si importante. Certes, l’intégrité et la gouvernance sont des disciplines très importantes, mais n’oublions jamais qu’elles servent une cause encore plus importante, soit celle de bâtir la confiance.

MONTRÉAL ACCUEILLE LE PREMIER SOMMET INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONFIANCE

Je profite de l’occasion pour vous inviter à un Sommet dont l’objectif est de permettre aux administrateurs, dirigeants, gens d’affaires et professionnels d’être mieux outillés pour mettre de l’avant des stratégies, pratiques et outils contribuant à la confiance dans leur environnement de travail. Aider les participants à devenir des leaders d’organisations créatrices de confiance.

Qui sont les conférenciers? Nous aurons la chance de compter sur des conférenciers internationaux tels que l’Australienne Vanessa Hall (« The Trust Lady »), l’expert international en conformité, l’Allemand Andreas Polhmann, le gourou du management français Hervé Sérieyx, et les spécialistes américains Rob Peters, Dennis Reina et Michelle Reina. Nous compterons également sur plusieurs conférenciers de chez nous tels que : Robert Poëti (ministre du Transport), Caroline Néron (femme d’affaires et PDG de Bijoux Caroline Néron), Suzanne Blanchet (VP Cascades), Pascale Pageau (PDG Delegatus), René Rouleau (PDG La Capitale), Me Denis Gallant (Inspecteur en Chef de la Ville de Montréal), Alex Brisson (PDG Roche), Michel Nadeau (DG IGOPP), Christian Latreille (Journaliste Radio-Canada), Benoit Robert (PDG Communauto), Luc Durand (DG IPSOS Québec), François Casgrain (Commissaire au Lobbyisme), Ève Laurier (DG Edelman Québec), Diane Gareau (syndic de la Chambre des notaires du Québec) et Jean-Claude Deschênes (Administrateur de sociétés). Sans compter que ce Sommet sera animé par monsieur Jean-François Lépine.

 

Quand ce Sommet se tiendra-t-il ? Les 21 et 22 mai 20015 à Montréal. La première journée en sera une de conférences sous forme de tables rondes. Nous aborderons quatre grands thèmes :

(1) l’importance et le portrait de la confiance de par le monde;

(2) Stratégies, pratiques et expériences de dirigeants de confiance;

(3) Reconstruire la confiance en temps de crise;

(4) Devenez des leaders de confiance en participant au « mouvement » de la confiance.

Nous tiendrons également un cocktail lors duquel nous saluerons des leaders de confiance s’étant illustrés dans leurs secteurs d’activité.  La deuxième journée regroupera des formations plus en profondeur et nous compterons sur deux invités spéciaux soient Diane Lemieux, PDG de la CCQ (petit déjeuner) et le ministre Robert Poëti (dîner). Il est à noter que ces deux journées sont reconnues par plusieurs ordres professionnels dont l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés (Adm.A.), le Barreau et l’Ordre des conseillers en ressources humaines (CRHA).

Les administrateurs qui participeront à ce sommet comprendront encore mieux l’important rôle qu’ils ont à jouer pour donner le ‘’ ton ‘’ à la confiance comme prisme d’intervention au sein de leurs organisations.

Pour en savoir plus : 

www.institutdelaconfiance-sommet.org


Me Donald Riendeau*, Directeur général et co-fondateur, Institut de la confiance dans les organisations, donaldriendeau@institutdelaconfiance.org 

Le rôle malaisé du PDG dans l’évaluation de la performance de son équipe de direction


L’une des activités les plus cruciales et … décisives d’un PDG (PCD) est de constituer une équipe de hauts dirigeants d’une grande qualité. Son succès personnel et celui de l’organisation dépend ultimement de la cohésion et de l’efficacité de son équipe de direction.

Alors, lorsqu’un problème de performance chez l’un ou plusieurs de ses lieutenants est identifié, il doit nécessairement procéder au rétablissement de l’équilibre, de l’équité et de la performance de son équipe. Mais comment ?

Quels sont les facteurs déterminants dans les mesures correctives que peut apporter le PDG ? Comment doit-il agir pour faire face à la musique ?

C’est un sujet d’une grande complexité, qui exige une solide dose d’analyse de la situation, de coaching et de courage. D’autant plus que l’expérience montre que les équipes de direction sont destinées à échouer un jour ou l’autre !

Voici l’hypothèse qui sous-tend toute la discussion de l’article de Mark Nadler, récemment publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Our approach is grounded in some basic notions concerning the complexity of senior-level jobs and the profound consequences that can result from deficient performance at the top. Experience and observation lead us to this troubling but inescapable conclusion: The composition of the executive team virtually guarantees that some of its members will fail.

Each member of the executive team is required to play multiple, complex, and essential roles—and what’s more, to play them in concert with the CEO and with each other. That’s why it’s so difficult, and so crucial, to create and maintain an effective cast of senior characters. Basically, each member is expected to play these roles:

– Individual contributor, providing specialized analysis, perspectives, and technical expertise to the rest of the team
– Organizational leader, managing the performance of a major segment of the enterprise and representing that segment’s interests in the corporate setting
– Supporter of the CEO, promulgating the CEO’s agenda both publicly and privately
– Colleague and peer, demonstrating public and private support for fellow members of the executive team
– Executive team member, taking an active and appropriate role in the team’s collective work
– External representative of the team and the organization to the workforce at large and to outside constituencies
– Potential successor to the CEO or a potential member of the next generation of top-tier leadership

 

With each team member playing so many vital roles, just one ineffective, unqualified, or disruptive member can undermine the team and damage the organization in countless ways. The consequences can range from an impotent executive team to the breakdown of a key operating unit to the alienation of essential customers. Within the organization, the perceived tolerance of a senior executive who fails to meet objectives or openly flouts the organization’s values creates a huge credibility problem for management in general, and for the CEO in particular.

L’auteur explore les avenues qui se présentent aux PDG dans les cas de gestion de la performance de son équipe, en considérant plusieurs enjeux liés à la dynamique interpersonnelle des équipes de direction.

La lecture de cet article sera très utile aux PDG aux prises avec des problèmes de procrastination à cet égard.

Bonne lecture !

When Executives Fail: Managing Performance on the CEO’s Team

Picture, if you will, the chief executive officer of a Fortune 500 company slumped over a conference table, holding his head in his hands, anguishing over whether the time had come to pull the plug on one of his most senior executives. “Tell me,” he asks in despair, “is it this hard for everybody?”

Yes, it is.

Of all the complex, sensitive, and stressful issues that confront CEOs, none consumes as much time, generates as much angst, or extracts such a high personal toll as dealing with executive team members who are just not working out. Billion-dollar acquisitions, huge strategic shifts, even decisions to eliminate thousands of jobs—all pale in comparison with the anxiety most CEOs experience when it comes to deciding the fate of their direct reports.

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To be sure, there are exceptions. Every once in a while, an executive fouls up so dramatically or is so woefully incompetent that the CEO’s course of action is clear. However, that’s rarely the case. More typically, these situations slowly escalate. Early warning signs are either dismissed or overlooked, and by the time the problem starts reaching crisis proportions, the CEO has become deeply invested in making things work. He or she procrastinates, grasping at one flawed excuse after another. Meanwhile, the cost of inaction mounts daily, exacted in poor leadership and lost opportunities.

This issue is so critical because it is so common. Embedded in the unique composition and roles of the executive team are the seeds of failure; it’s virtually guaranteed that over time, a substantial number of the CEO’s direct reports will fall by the wayside. The stark truth, as David Kearns of Xerox once remarked, is that the majority of executive careers end in disappointment. Nowhere is Kearns’s observation more poignant than at the executive team level. Of all the ambitious young managers who yearn to become CEOs, only a fraction will achieve their ultimate dream. Even among the relative handful who achieve the second tier, only a few possess the rare combination of intelligence, competence, savvy, flexibility, and luck to go out on top. The pyramid is steep and slippery; the closer you get to the top, the harder it is to hold on.

There are lots of ways for senior executives to stumble, and when they do, the shock waves can rock the enterprise. At the most senior level, each executive’s performance is magnified; one dysfunctional individual can stop the entire executive team in its tracks and wreak havoc throughout the organization. Consequently, decisions about replacing executive team members are highly leveraged, with far-reaching consequences often involving thousands of people and literally billions of dollars.

Despite those organizational consequences, the decision by any CEO to remove a direct report is, in the end, an intensely personal one. This isn’t a matter of reasoning your way through a strategic problem or even of deciding to lay off multitudes of workers halfway around the globe. Instead, it involves the face-to-face acknowledgment of failure by a powerful, successful member of the inner circle, quite possibly a long-time colleague. There is no way to take the pain out of these decisions; instead, our intent here is to suggest ways to make them somewhat more rational. There are processes and techniques that can help CEOs deal with executives who are in deep trouble, and methods to sort through the conflicting considerations that inevitably muddle the final decision. When the time comes to actually dismiss someone, however, there are no slick approaches or decision trees that can substitute for character and courage.

…..

Quelques caractéristiques d’un CA efficace


Cet article a été publié sur le site de IT Business.ca en avril 2015. Son auteur, *, est un expert en gouvernance; il nous fait part de son expérience avec le fonctionnement des conseils d’administration et il nous présente les six éléments-clés qui contribuent à l’efficacité des CA. et qui constituent sa recette secrète.

Ce bref article est intéressant et il va directement au cœur de la question du succès des bons conseils.

Bonne lecture !

The secret ingredients that make a successful board of directors

« There are few experiences that can have such an extremely different outcome on the spectrum from total nightmare to self-fulfilling achievement, but sitting on a board of directors is one of those experiences. When one has the privilege to serve on a good board it is both a pleasant, educational, and a rewarding experience. When the opposite is true, it can be exacerbating, draining of energy, and very frustrating. I have personally enjoyed the former and attempted to turn around the latter with varying degrees of success. In this blog post, I would like to provide some of the characteristics I find to be common in a good board. »

Great leadership

In most organizations I have been a part of – whether it is a public corporation or the youth organizations I serve on the board of – I always find if there is strong leadership, it leads to a well-run company and a well-functioning board. With a confident and mature CEO there most often will be a strong lead director or chair of the board. Both of these positions must be filled with well-meaning and strong individuals of integral character. If not, the leadership on the board must be instrumental in weeding out unqualified board members and those board members who are disruptive unprepared. Some may need coaching and others may need to be plainly relieved of their board duties.

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Diversity

A well-functioning board requires diversity of thought, experience, gender, and culture. If all of the board members think and act alike, their decisions will reflect their lack of diversity. I don’t only mean culture and gender. Well run boards also reflect diversity of age, experience, and industry that include complementary skills such as risk management, channel distribution, sales, marketing, human resources, compensation, information technology, finance, fundraising, and industry vertical knowledge. A board needs to be clear about duties, roles and responsibilities of it’s directors in the recruiting process to ensure that applicants expectations and the company are aligned.

Directors who leave their egos at the door

When a board consists of directors who have the company or organization foremost in their minds and feel they don’t have to prove themselves most often make the best contribution to the company. These characteristics are most often present in confident, seasoned executives who have accumulated several years of board experience. All directors need to have their interests aligned with the company. When there is the existence of venture capital investor appointed directors, these directors need to be focused on the strategic direction of the company. That is often not the case and detracts from having a high functioning board.

Strategically minded

A organization with a strong strategic direction where the CEO, chair, directors, and management is most often the organization that will have a strong board and be successful. Whether it is a start-up, a charity or a Fortune 500 company. When the board is holding the CEO accountable for this strategic direction and the directors are not getting their fingers, or worse, noses into the weeds or micro-operations of the company, the best chance of success exists. I have often experienced boards where the director has a lack of governance experience and education. Often, they compensate for this by getting into the minutiae and minor details of the operations of the organization. When directors are mature, experienced, educated and confident in their board roles the resulting board is most often well functioning.

Strong committee structure

A high functioning board will have strong committees with good leadership that will do the heavy lifting on specific board work that will include committees such as audit, compensation, governance and risk. Then based on the need and complexity of the company there will be committees for IT, cyber security, investment, finance and merger and acquisitions when required. The directors will be confident in discharging their duties when they are presented with well-framed reports from the committees of the board.

Time commitment

The days are over when a board member can hold down 10 or 15 board roles. As an individual board member, you have to be committed to the agenda and work of the board you sit on. A board member should have the time and schedule flexibility to be able to attend between five and nine board meetings and another five committee meetings a year and be substantially prepared for those meetings by reading the pre-meeting materials. A director can not deliberate and participate in a discussion without being prepared. In the case of a large bank board the suggested time commitment is half of a full-time career position. Even if you are on the board of a growth stage private company that is raising financing or being acquired, the time commitment can be substantial for extended periods of time. Therefore to ensure your board is high functioning you require board members who have the proper amount of time a schedule flexibility to discharge their responsibilities properly.

When these characteristics exist whether it is in a tech Start-up or multi-billion dollar company the participation in this high functioning board of directors will be both a rewarding and educational experience.

_______________________________

*Gerard Buckley has been working in the financial industry for over 32 years, helping companies strategically plan for accelerated levels of growth at Scotia Capital, Maple Leaf Angels and Jaguar Capital where he is now Managing Director. He leads a management consulting practice with mandates focused on growth in entrepreneurial companies and is an expert in structuring companies to access financing by employing governance, financial management and funding strategies. Gerard has worked on Merger & Acquisition teams transacting over $10 billion of deal flow in his career.As an experienced investor and a member of Angel Investment Networks, he understands the process of investment in growth private companies and advises CEO’s on how to prepare. Gerard is Chairperson of The Board of Directors of Maple Leaf Angels Corporation and was the Entrepreneur in Resident at INcubes, an internet accelerator based in Toronto. He served as a member on the Small and Medium Enterprise Committee of The Ontario Securities Commission and has served on the board of an Exempt Market Dealer and a TSX.V Public Company. He has a passion for helping young entrepreneurs prepare their companies for scale. Read more about Gerard’s advisory firm at http://www.jaguarcapital.ca.

Étude sur la situation des offres d’achats (OPA) hostiles au Canada


Ce billet présente les résultats d’une étude menée par Aaron J. Atkinson and Bradley A. Freelan, associés des pratiques de fusions et acquisitions chez Fasken Martineau Dumoulin, qui porte sur la situation des OPA hostiles au Canada et sur les propositions de changements visées par le processus de consultation des ACVM du règlement 62-105. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le sommaire exécutif de la version française de cette étude que vous pourrez télécharger sur le site de Fasken Martineau. Cette étude fait le point sur la situation canadienne et expose 5 conclusions très intéressantes. Bonne lecture !

Étude de 2015 sur les OPA hostiles canadiennes

INTRODUCTION

Au Canada, les façons d’acquérir une société ouverte sont nombreuses. Toutefois, une offre publique d’achat (« OPA ») présentée directement aux actionnaires constitue le seul et unique moyen d’acquérir le contrôle légal de la société sans l’appui ni le consentement de son conseil d’administration. Une telle OPA non sollicitée (ou « hostile ») sert souvent à contourner le conseil de l’émetteur visé pour présenter une offre directement aux actionnaires après l’échec de discussions avec le conseil, une manœuvre qui place par le fait même la société visée « en jeu ».

C’est d’ailleurs cette caractéristique unique des OPA qui alimente un débat aussi nourri au sujet du rôle que doit jouer le conseil d’un émetteur visé et de la portée adéquate de ses pouvoirs pour réagir à une opération qui, fondamentalement, en est une entre l’initiateur et les actionnaires de cet émetteur visé. D’un côté, les lois sur les valeurs mobilières prévoient un rôle essentiellement « consultatif » pour le conseil, qui a alors pour tâche de formuler une recommandation aux actionnaires. D’un autre côté, les lois canadiennes sur les sociétés par actions confèrent au conseil une plus grande latitude dans la gestion des affaires de la société, ce qui, en théorie, et dans les limites de la règle du jugement commercial, permettrait au conseil de tout simplement « refuser » l’offre d’achat pour y mettre fin. Or, on sait qu’en pratique, cette théorie est difficilement applicable.

En réalité, le principal outil à la disposition du conseil pour se prémunir contre une OPA hostile, soit le régime de droits des actionnaires (couramment appelé la « pilule empoisonnée »), comporte un caractère inéluctablement temporaire. En effet, lorsqu’elles ont été appelées à le faire, les autorités de réglementation des valeurs mobilières ont presque toujours rendu inopérants les régimes de droits des actionnaires après un certain temps, ce qui a alors permis à l’initiateur de contourner le conseil et de donner aux actionnaires la possibilité de prendre leur propre décision.

Devant cette situation, certains intervenants du marché sont d’avis que « cette position est plus favorable aux initiateurs qu’aux émetteurs visés et à leurs actionnaires, qu’elle limite le pouvoir discrétionnaire du conseil et des actionnaires et qu’elle ne maximise pas nécessairement la valeur pour ces derniers.

En 2015, les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières diffuseront une proposition afin d’aborder ces préoccupations et de traiter d’autres enjeux, en apportant d’importants changements au régime canadien de réglementation des OPA. Plutôt que d’imposer une limite à la durée des régimes de droits ou aux mesures que peut prendre le conseil d’un émetteur visé, les modifications proposées allongeront considérablement la période pendant laquelle une OPA hostile doit demeurer ouverte, qui passera de 35 à 120 jours, et prévoiront une condition de dépôt minimal correspondant à la majorité des actions de l’émetteur visé. Ainsi, les actionnaires, plutôt que le conseil de l’émetteur visé, continueront d’avoir le dernier mot dans toute OPA.

En vue de contribuer au débat, nous avons mené une analyse empirique de l’ensemble des 143 OPA non sollicitées visant l’acquisition du contrôle légal de sociétés ouvertes canadiennes cotées en bourse au cours de la période de dix ans terminée le 31 décembre 2014. Les parties qui ont lancé ces OPA étaient principalement des initiateurs dits « stratégiques » (90 %), plutôt que des initiateurs « financiers » (10 %), ce qui confirme la croyance populaire voulant que les acquéreurs financiers tendent à éviter la quête très publique du contrôle d’une société en l’absence du soutien de son conseil. Par ailleurs, deux tiers des initiateurs étaient situés au Canada, les autres étant américains (22 %) et étrangers (11 %).

Des 143 OPA analysées, 139 constituaient des courses aux procurations en vue d’acquérir le contrôle légal de la société ciblée. Parmi elles, des offres concurrentes visant une même société ont émergé dans quatre cas. La répartition des émetteurs ciblés reflétait essentiellement, pour la période visée par l’étude, la répartition des émetteurs canadiens cotés en bourse selon le secteur d’activité (à l’exception du secteur des services financiers, lequel était considérablement sous-représenté, possiblement en raison des contraintes réglementaires rigoureuses touchant la propriété de bon nombre des émetteurs de ce secteur) de même que selon la capitalisation boursière (à l’exception des émetteurs à microcapitalisation, qui étaient eux aussi considérablement sous-représentés, possiblement en raison des coûts élevés afférents au lancement d’une OPA en bonne et due forme par rapport à la taille de l’émetteur).

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Nombre d’OPA non sollicitées visant le contrôle légal par année de déclenchement de l’OPA (143 OPA)

Parmi les sociétés ciblées, 127 d’entre elles (91 %) ont été ciblées par l’OPA d’un « premier joueur », c’est-à-dire que l’OPA a été lancée en l’absence de toute autre proposition publique d’acquisition. Pour déterminer si le régime canadien de réglementation des OPA favorise les initiateurs, un point de départ logique consiste à évaluer les résultats de telles OPA, puisqu’on peut présumer que, dans la plupart des cas, le conseil de l’émetteur visé ne cherchait pas activement un changement de contrôle lorsque l’initiateur a mis la société « en jeu ». Bien que ce fut le point de départ de notre étude, ce fut loin d’en être la fin.

Une minorité des sociétés ciblées (9 %) proposait publiquement une opération de changement de contrôle lorsque l’OPA hostile a été annoncée, c’est-à-dire que l’initiateur recherchait volontairement une enchère compétitive. Nous avons donc évalué séparément l’impact, s’il en est, de la dynamique de l’enchère sur les résultats. Enfin, bien que l’issue de toute OPA hostile soit le produit de nombreux facteurs, nous avons examiné, autant que possible, l’incidence potentielle de certains facteurs clés dont les parties avaient le contrôle. On pense par exemple à la prime et à la forme de la contrepartie offerte par l’initiateur, à l’adoption d’un régime de droits des actionnaires par la société ciblée, et à la recommandation formulée par le conseil d’administration.

Répartition des émetteurs visés par secteur d’activité

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Notre analyse vise à alimenter le débat actuel et ne prétend pas fournir des réponses définitives. Nous espérons que notre étude sera lue dans cet état d’esprit et, bien entendu, vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

FAITS SAILLANTS

1. En lançant une opération de prise de contrôle publique, l’initiateur d’une OPA hostile réussissait dans plus de la moitié des cas. Toutefois, un changement de contrôle n’était en aucun cas inévitable.

L’OPA hostile d’un premier joueur a réussi dans 55 % des cas. En tenant compte des OPA contrecarrées par l’arrivée d’un chevalier blanc, c’est plus de 70 % des émetteurs canadiens cotés en bourse qui ont été acquis après avoir été mis « en jeu » par une OPA hostile. En même temps, près de 30 % des émetteurs visés par un initiateur premier joueur ont maintenu leur indépendance. C’est donc dire que la vente de la société n’est d’aucune façon inéluctable. Cependant, le bien-fondé d’une telle issue pour les actionnaires reste à prouver : au premier anniversaire de l’annonce de l’OPA, le titre de plus de 60 % de ces émetteurs visés se négociait à un escompte par rapport au prix définitif offert aux termes de l’OPA.

2. Bien que peu fréquents, les scénarios avec concurrence, lorsqu’ils se sont produits, ont été clairement à l’avantage des actionnaires alors que l’initiateur d’une OPA hostile se retrouvait souvent les mains vides.

Dans une bataille sans concurrent avec l’émetteur visé, l’initiateur a été victorieux dans les deux tiers des cas. En présence de concurrents, l’émetteur visé a été acquis dans 86 % des cas, mais l’acquéreur ultime fut l’initiateur dans seulement 33 % des cas. Mais peu importe la partie victorieuse, les actionnaires ont toujours bénéficié de l’émergence de concurrents, puisque dans de tels cas, la prime définitive offerte par l’initiateur était en moyenne de 76 % (une amélioration de 69 % par rapport à la prime définitive moyenne offerte aux termes des OPA sans concurrence). Bien que les initiateurs aient de bonnes raisons de craindre la concurrence, l’émergence de compétiteurs est demeurée somme toute rare : seules 37 % des OPA ont fait l’objet d’une concurrence.

3. Offrir une somme au comptant ou une prime solide augmentait les chances de réussite d’un initiateur d’OPA hostile. Toutefois, démarrer d’une position de force s’est révélé une formule avantageuse.

Plus des trois quarts de toutes les OPA comportaient une contrepartie au moins partiellement au comptant, et avec raison : en l’absence de compétition, l’initiateur offrant une contrepartie au moins partiellement au comptant avait gain de cause dans 72 % des cas et, en présence de concurrents, l’initiateur qui offrait une contrepartie entièrement au comptant améliorait substantiellement ses chances de succès (42 % contre 17 %). Bien qu’une prime initiale élevée n’ait pas dissuadé la concurrence, une prime de 30 % ou plus a permis à l’initiateur de remporter la mise dans près de 75 % des cas en l’absence de concurrence, et, en présence de concurrence, une prime relative positive était trois fois plus susceptible de faire gagner l’initiateur.

Parmi toutes les stratégies que peut envisager un initiateur pour remporter son OPA, l’acquisition d’une participation importante dans l’émetteur visé et la conclusion de conventions de dépôt avec ses actionnaires se sont révélées gagnantes. Ces stratégies se sont traduites par un taux de succès de 87 % lorsque l’initiateur détenait dès le début une participation de 20 % ou plus dans l’émetteur visé.

4. Les régimes de droits des actionnaires ont démontré leur valeur en permettant de  du temps et en favorisant la concurrence.

Les régimes de droits des actionnaires ont permis aux conseils d’administration des émetteurs visés de gagner du temps, en doublant pratiquement, en moyenne, la période minimale de cinq semaines prévue par la loi avant que l’initiateur ne puisse prendre livraison d’actions aux termes de son offre. Ce délai additionnel s’est révélé critique : lorsqu’un initiateur premier joueur se trouvait confronté à une concurrence, cette concurrence a émergé après la fin de la période minimale prévue par la loi dans près de 70 % des cas. Il n’est donc pas surprenant que des concurrents se soient manifestés pour contrer l’initiateur premier joueur deux fois plus souvent lorsque l’émetteur visé avait adopté un régime de droits des actionnaires.

5. L’appui du conseil était un atout précieux : les initiateurs ont réalisé une OPA dans presque tous les cas où ceux-ci avaient obtenu l’appui du conseil d’administration, contrairement à ceux qui n’avaient pas un tel appui, notamment si la recommandation du conseil était plus susceptible d’influer sur le résultat.

Dans les cas où l’initiateur a ultimement obtenu le soutien du conseil d’administration de la société visée, son OPA a réussi dans tous les cas sauf un, soit 98 % du temps. Au contraire, sans l’appui du conseil, les OPA hostiles n’ont réussi que dans 22 % des cas. De plus, la décision du conseil de ne pas appuyer une OPA s’alignait plus fréquemment avec l’issue de l’OPA dans les cas où la recommandation du conseil aurait dû avoir plus d’influence : un alignement de 80 % dans les cas sans concurrence où le régime de droits des actionnaires était toujours en vigueur au moment de la recommandation finale du conseil; un alignement de 83 % lorsque l’actionnariat était moins concentré parmi les initiés, de sorte que le conseil était plus enclin à jouer un rôle de conseiller et de mandataire dans les négociations; et un alignement de 95 % dans le cas d’une OPA entièrement en actions, qui est davantage susceptible de faire les frais d’une critique négative du conseil de l’émetteur visé.

Ce que nous réserve l’avenir

Une OPA hostile demeure une manœuvre relativement peu fréquente au Canada : parmi les quelques 3 700 sociétés ouvertes cotées en bourse au Canada, en moyenne, seulement 14 ont fait l’objet d’une OPA hostile au cours d’une année donnée pendant la période de dix ans visée par l’étude. Cela ne veut pas dire pour autant que le spectre d’une OPA hostile est une menace en l’air. Dans une situation où des parties s’affrontent de façon évidente, si un régime favorisait réellement une partie plutôt qu’un autre et donnait un résultat nettement plus fréquent qu’un autre, le comportement (et le pouvoir de négociation de toutes les parties) sera naturellement influencé.

Les intervenants préoccupés par le fait que le régime actuel favorise les initiateurs plutôt que les émetteurs visés seront sans doute rassurés de savoir que le nouveau régime, s’il est adopté dans sa forme actuelle, devrait conférer un pouvoir accru aux conseils d’administration, en modifiant fondamentalement la dynamique des négociations futures en matière d’OPA, et pourrait faire augmenter l’incidence de la concurrence. D’un autre côté, à la lumière des risques accrus et des coûts potentiels du nouveau régime de réglementation pour les initiateurs, les prochaines années pourraient amener une baisse des OPA non sollicitées et, par le fait même, une baisse du risque même de faire l’objet d’une OPA. Dans la perspective où les réformes réglementaires visent à améliorer la dynamique des offres en conférant aux porteurs de titres un pouvoir de choix accru et en maximisant la valeur pour les actionnaires, cet objectif ne peut être atteint que si les initiateurs d’OPA estiment toujours avoir une chance de succès raisonnable malgré les risques inhérents au lancement d’une OPA.

Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de sociétés


Les personnes  intéressées par les nouvelles recherches en gouvernance des entreprises sont invitées à assister au Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de société mardi 14 avril 2015

En partenariat avec la FSA et la Chaire en gouvernance des sociétés, le CÉDÉ organise un colloque étudiant. Les étudiants du cours de Gouvernance de l’entreprise DRT-6056 du professeur Ivan Tchotourian et du cours de Gouvernance des sociétés CTB-7000 du professeur Jean Bédard présenteront lors de cet événement le bilan de travaux de recherche réalisés durant la session d’hiver 2015.

Heure : 8 h 30 à 11 h 30
Lieu : Salon Hermès de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration

L’entrée est libre.

 

Un document complet sur les principes d’éthique et de saine gouvernance dans les organismes à buts charitables


Plusieurs OBNL sont à la recherche d’un document présentant les principes les plus importants s’appliquant aux organismes à buts charitables.

Le site ci-dessous vous mènera à une description sommaire des principes de gouvernance qui vous servirons de guide dans la gestion et la surveillance des OBNL de ce type. J’espère que ces informations vous seront utiles.

Vous pouvez également vous procurer le livre The Complete Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice.

What are the principles ?

The Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice outlines 33 principles of sound practice for charitable organizations and foundations related to legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The Principles should be considered by every charitable organization as a guide for strengthening its effectiveness and accountability. The Principles were developed by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2007 and updated in 2015 to reflect new circumstances in which the charitable sector functions, and new relationships within and between the sectors.

The Principles Organizational Assessment Tool allows organizations to determine their strengths and weaknesses in the application of the Principles, based on its four key content areas (Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight, and Responsible Fundraising). This probing tool asks not just whether an organization has the requisite policies and practices in place, but also enables an organization to determine the efficacy of those practices. After completing the survey (by content area or in full), organizations will receive a score report for each content area and a link to suggested resources for areas of improvement.

Voici une liste des 33 principes énoncés. Bonne lecture !

 

Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice 

 

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

  1. Laws and Regulations
  2. Code of Ethics
  3. Conflicts of Interest
  4. « Whistleblower » Policy
  5. Document Retention and Destruction
  6. Protection of Assets
  7. Availability of Information to the Public

Effective Governance

  1. Board Responsibilities
  2. Board Meetings
  3. Board Size and Structure
  4. Board Diversity
  5. Board Independence
  6. CEO Evaluation and Compensation
  7. Separation of CEO, Board Chair and Board Treasurer Roles
  8. Board Education and Communication
  9. Evaluation of Board Performance
  10. Board Member Term Limits
  11. Review of Governing Documents
  12. Review of Mission and Goals
  13. Board Compensation

Strong Financial Oversight

  1. Financial Records
  2. Annual Budget, Financial
    Performance and Investments
  3. Loans to Directors, Officers,
    or Trustees
  4. Resource Allocation for Programs
    and Administration
  5. Travel and Other Expense Policies
  6. Expense Reimbursement for
    Nonbusiness Travel Companions
  7. Accuracy and Truthfulness of Fundraising Materials

Responsible Fundraising

  1. Compliance with Donor’s Intent
  2. Acknowledgment of Tax-Deductible Contributions
  3. Gift Acceptance Policies
  4. Oversight of Fundraisers
  5. Fundraiser Compensation
  6. Donor Privacy

Première Grande soirée de la gouvernance Les Affaires


Voici un communiqué du CAS sur le choix des entreprises qui se sont démarquées dans le domaine de gouvernance.

Première Grande soirée de la gouvernance Les Affaires

 

Grande soirée de la gouvernanceAfin de souligner les meilleures pratiques des conseils d’administration, Les Affaires, en collaboration avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés et l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP), tenait le 1er avril dernier la Grande soirée de la gouvernance.

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux d’avoir collaboré à cette soirée célébrant la saine gouvernance. Pour la première édition de cet événement, trois conseils ont été honorés pour leurs pratiques exemplaires.

Dans la catégorie Professionnalisation, c’est le conseil d’administration de Marquis Imprimeur qui a été retenu à titre de modèle en se dotant d’un conseil plus solide pour accompagner la croissance. Le Collège tient à souligner la participation du président du CA, M. Jacques Mallette, et du PDG de l’entreprise, M. Serge Loubier, parmi ses formateurs au cours Gouvernance des PME. De plus, M. Jacques Lefebvre, ASC, siège également sur ce conseil et en préside le comité de gouvernance depuis 2009.

Le conseil d’administration de Promutuel Assurance a été, quant à lui, désigné dans la catégorie Transformation en raison de son plan d’action pour changer sa culture grâce à la formation continue. Le Collège a collaboré étroitement à la réalisation de ce plan remarquable avec M. Martin Bergeron, ASC, dans l’un de ses volets visant la formation des 200 administrateurs de l’ensemble des mutuelles.

Le conseil d’administration de Pages Jaunes Limitée s’est aussi distingué dans la catégorie Situation de crise par les actions qu’il a posé au cours des dernières années pour sortir plus fort d’une crise financière.

Explications du phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires | PwC


Mary Ann Cloyd, responsable du Center for Board Governance de PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), vient de publier dans le forum du HLS un important document de référence sur le phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires.

Son texte présente une excellente vulgarisation des activités conduites par les parties intéressées : Qui, Quoi, Quand et Comment ?

Je vous suggère de lire l’article au complet car il est très bien illustré par l’infographie. Vous trouverez ici un extrait de celui-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Shareholder Activism: Who, What, When, and How?

Who are today’s activists and what do they want?

Shareholder activism Spectrum

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“Activism” represents a range of activities by one or more of a publicly traded corporation’s shareholders that are intended to result in some change in the corporation. The activities fall along a spectrum based on the significance of the desired change and the assertiveness of the investors’ activities. On the more aggressive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism that seeks a significant change to the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board. On the other end of the spectrum are one-on-one engagements between shareholders and companies triggered by Dodd-Frank’s “say on pay” advisory vote.

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The purpose of this post is to provide an overview of activism along this spectrum: who the activists are, what they want, when they are likely to approach a company, the tactics most likely to be used, how different types of activism along the spectrum cumulate, and ways that companies can both prepare for and respond to each type of activism.

Hedge fund activism

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At the most assertive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism, when an investor, usually a hedge fund or other investor aligned with a hedge fund, seeks to effect a significant change in the company’s strategy.

Background

Some of these activists have been engaged in this type of activity for decades (e.g., Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz). In the 1980s, these activists frequently sought the breakup of the company—hence their frequent characterization as “corporate raiders.” These activists generally used their own money to obtain a large block of the company’s shares and engage in a proxy contest for control of the board.

In the 1990s, new funds entered this market niche (e.g., Ralph Whitworth’s Relational Investors, Robert Monks’ LENS Fund, John Paulson’s Paulson & Co., and Andrew Shapiro’s Lawndale Capital). These new funds raised money from other investors and used minority board representation (i.e., one or two board seats, rather than a board majority) to influence corporate strategy. While a company breakup was still one of the potential changes sought by these activists, many also sought new executive management, operational efficiencies, or financial restructuring.

Today

During the past decade, the number of activist hedge funds across the globe has dramatically increased, with total assets under management now exceeding $100 billion. Since 2003 (and through May 2014), 275 new activist hedge funds were launched.

Forty-one percent of today’s activist hedge funds focus their activities on North America, and 32% have a focus that spans across global regions. The others focus on specific regions: Asia (15%), Europe (8%), and other regions of the world (4%).

Why?

The goals of today’s activist hedge funds are broad, including all of those historically sought, as well as changes that fall within the category of “capital allocation strategy” (e.g., return of large amounts of reserved cash to investors through stock buybacks or dividends, revisions to the company’s acquisition strategy).

How?

The tactics of these newest activists are also evolving. Many are spending time talking to the company in an effort to negotiate consensus around specific changes intended to unlock value, before pursuing a proxy contest or other more “public” (e.g., media campaign) activities. They may also spend pre-announcement time talking to some of the company’s other shareholders to gauge receptivity to their contemplated changes. Lastly, these activists (along with the companies responding to them) are grappling with the potential impact of high-frequency traders on the identity of the shareholder base that is eligible to vote on proxy matters.

Some contend that hedge fund activism improves a company’s stock price (at least in the short term), operational performance, and other measures of share value (including more disciplined capital investments). Others contend that, over the long term, hedge fund activism increases the company’s share price volatility as well as its leverage, without measurable improvements around cash management or R&D spending.

When is a company likely to be the target of activism?

Although each hedge fund activist’s process for identifying targets is proprietary, most share certain broad similarities:

  1. The company has a low market value relative to book value, but is profitable, generally has a well-regarded brand, and has sound operating cash flows and return on assets. Alternatively, the company’s cash reserves exceed both its own historic norms and those of its peers. This is a risk particularly when the market is unclear about the company’s rationale for the large reserve. For multi- business companies, activists are also alert for one or more of the company’s business lines or sectors that are significantly underperforming in its market.
  2. Institutional investors own the vast majority of the company’s outstanding voting stock.
  3. The company’s board composition does not meet all of today’s “best practice” expectations. For example, activists know that other investors may be more likely to support their efforts when the board is perceived as being “stale”—that is, the board has had few new directors over the past three to five years, and most of the existing directors have served for very long periods. Companies that have been repeatedly targeted by non-hedge fund activists are also attractive to some hedge funds who are alert to the cumulative impact of shareholder dissatisfaction.

A company is most likely to be a target of non-hedge fund activism based on a combination of the following factors:

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How can a company effectively prepare for—and respond to—an activist campaign?

Prepare

We believe that companies that put themselves in the shoes of an activist will be most able to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to an activist campaign. In our view, there are four key steps that a company and its board should consider before an activist knocks on the door:

Critically evaluate all business lines and market regions. Some activists have reported that when they succeed in getting on a target’s board, one of the first things they notice is that the information the board has been receiving from management is often extremely voluminous and granular, and does not aggregate data in a way that highlights underperforming assets.

Companies (and boards) may want to reassess how the data they review is aggregated and presented. Are revenues and costs of each line of business (including R&D costs) and each market region clearly depicted, so that the P&L of each component of the business strategy can be critically assessed? This assessment should be undertaken in consideration of the possible impact on the company’s segment reporting, and in consultation with the company’s management and likely its independent auditor.

Monitor the company’s ownership and understand the activists. Companies routinely monitor their ownership base for significant shifts, but they may also want to ensure that they know whether activists (of any type) are current shareholders.

Understanding what these shareholders may seek (i.e., understanding their “playbook”) will help the company assess its risk of becoming a target.

Evaluate the “risk factors.” Knowing in advance how an activist might criticize a company allows a company and its board to consider whether to proactively address one or more of the risk factors, which in turn can strengthen its credibility with the company’s overall shareholder base. If multiple risk factors exist, the company can also reduce its risk by addressing just one or two of the higher risk factors.

Even if the company decides not to make any changes based on such an evaluation, going through the deliberative process will help enable company executives and directors to articulate why they believe staying the course is in the best long-term interests of the company and its investors.

Develop an engagement plan that is tailored to the company’s shareholders and the issues that the company faces. If a company identifies areas that may attract the attention of an activist, developing a plan to engage with its other shareholders around these topics can help prepare for—and in some cases may help to avoid—an activist campaign. This is true even if the company decides not to make any changes.

Activists typically expect to engage with both members of management and the board. Accordingly, the engagement plan should prepare for either circumstance.

Whether the company decides to make changes or not, explaining to the company’s most significant shareholders why decisions have been made will help these shareholders better understand how directors are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, strengthening their confidence that directors are acting in investors’ best long-term interests.

These communications are often most effective when the company has a history of ongoing engagement with its shareholders. Sometimes, depending on the company’s shareholder profile, the company may opt to defer actual execution of this plan until some future event occurs (e.g., an activist in fact approaches the company, or files a Schedule 13d with the SEC, which effectively announces its intent to seek one or more board seats). Preparing the plan, however, enables the company to act quickly when circumstances warrant.

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Respond

In responding to an activist’s approach, consider the advice that large institutional investors have shared with us: good ideas can come from anyone. While there may be circumstances that call for more defensive responses to an activist’s campaign (e.g., litigation), in general, we believe the most effective response plans have three components:

Objectively consider the activist’s ideas. By the time an activist first approaches a company, the activist has usually already (a) developed specific proposals for unlocking value at the company, at least in the short term, and (b) discussed (and sometimes consequently revised) these ideas with a select few of the company’s shareholders. Even if these conversations have not occurred by the time the activist first approaches the company, they are likely to occur soon thereafter. The company’s institutional investors generally spend considerable time objectively evaluating the activist’s suggestion—and most investors expect that the company’s executive management and board will be similarly open- minded and deliberate.

Look for areas around which to build consensus. In 2013, 72 of the 90 US board seats won by activists were based on voluntary agreements with the company, rather than via a shareholder vote. This demonstrates that most targeted companies are finding ways to work with activists, avoiding the potentially high costs of proxy contests. Activists are also motivated to reach agreement if possible. If given the option, most activists would prefer to spend as little time as possible to achieve the changes they believe will enhance the value of their investment in the company. While they may continue to own company shares for extensive periods of time, being able to move their attention and energy to their next target helps to boost the returns to their own investors.

Actively engage with the company’s key shareholders to tell the company’s story. An activist will likely be engaging with fellow investors, so it’s important that key shareholders also hear from the company’s management and often the board. In the best case, the company already has established a level of credibility with those shareholders upon which new communications can build. If the company does not believe the activist’s proposed changes are in the best long-term interests of the company and its owners, investors will want to know why—and just as importantly, the process the company used to reach this conclusion. If the activist and company are able to reach an agreement, investors will want to hear that the executives and directors embrace the changes as good for the company. Company leaders that are able to demonstrate to investors that they were part of positive changes, rather than simply had changes thrust upon them, enhance investor confidence in their stewardship.

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Epilogue—life after activism

When the activism has concluded—the annual meeting is over, changes have been implemented, or the hedge fund has moved its attention to another target—the risk of additional activism doesn’t go away. Depending on how the company has responded to the activism, the significance of any changes, and the perception of the board’s independence and open-mindedness, the company may again be targeted. Incorporating the “Prepare” analysis into the company’s ongoing processes, conducting periodic self-assessments for risk factors, and engaging in a tailored and focused shareholder engagement program can enhance the company’s resiliency, strengthening its long-term relationship with investors.

Modèle d’affaires nord-américains | La priorité aux actionnaires ou aux parties prenantes ?


Voici un excellent article publié par Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart et David Wessels dans le magazine Insights & Publications de McKinsey & Company, qui avance qu’il est préférable d’opter pour l’appréciation de la valeur aux actionnaires plutôt que pour la satisfaction de toutes les parties prenantes, en autant que l’entreprise met l’accent sur la gestion à long terme.

Cet article explique les principes fondamentaux du modèle d’affaires nord-américain en précisant ce qu’implique (1) la création de valeur pour les actionnaires et (2) la réconciliation des intérêts des parties prenantes (stakeholders).

Les auteurs montrent que la recherche, même inconsciente, de résultats à court terme est vraiment ce qui pose problème. Ce n’est pas la recherche d’accroissement de la valeur des actions qui est questionnable dans le modèle, c’est le court-termisme qui domine les actions.

 Shareholder-oriented capitalism is still the best path to broad economic prosperity, as long as companies focus on the long term.

L’article réfute les argumentations des approches qui évoquent la primauté de la réconciliation des intérêts des parties prenantes sur la recherche des intérêts des actionnaires.

Bonne lecture !

The real business of business

The guiding principle of business value creation is a refreshingly simple construct: companies that grow and earn a return on capital that exceeds their cost of capital create value. The financial crisis of 2007–08 and the Great Recession that followed are only the most recent reminders that when managers, boards of directors, and investors forget this guiding principle, the consequences are disastrous—so much so, in fact, that some economists now call into question the very foundations of shareholder-oriented capitalism. Confidence in business has tumbled.1 1.An annual Gallup poll in the United States showed that the percent of respondents with little or no confidence in big business increased from 27 percent in the 1983–86 period to 38 percent in the 2011–14 period. For more, see “Confidence in institutions,” gallup.com. Politicians and commentators are pushing for more regulation and fundamental changes in corporate governance. Academics and even some business leaders have called for companies to change their focus from increasing shareholder value to a broader focus on all stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers, and local communities.

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No question, the complexity of managing the interests of myriad owners and stakeholders in a modern corporation demands that any reform discussion begin with a large dose of humility and tolerance for ambiguity in defining the purpose of business. But we believe the current debate has muddied a fundamental truth: creating shareholder value is not the same as maximizing short-term profits—and companies that confuse the two often put both shareholder value and stakeholder interests at risk. Indeed, a system focused on creating shareholder value from business isn’t the problem; short-termism is. Great managers don’t skimp on safety, don’t make value-destroying investments just because their peers are doing it, and don’t use accounting or financial gimmicks to boost short-term profits, because ultimately such moves undermine intrinsic value.

What’s needed at this time of reflection on the virtues and vices of capitalism is a clearer definition of shareholder value creation that can guide managers and board directors, rather than blurring their focus with a vague stakeholder agenda. We do believe that companies are better able to deliver long-term value to shareholders when they consider stakeholder concerns; the key is for managers to examine those concerns systematically for opportunities to do both.

What does it mean to create shareholder value?

If investors knew as much about a company as its managers, maximizing its current share price might be equivalent to maximizing value over time. In the real world, investors have only a company’s published financial results and their own assessment of the quality and integrity of its management team. For large companies, it’s difficult even for insiders to know how the financial results are generated. Investors in most companies don’t know what’s really going on inside a company or what decisions managers are making. They can’t know, for example, whether the company is improving its margins by finding more efficient ways to work or by simply skimping on product development, maintenance, or marketing.

Since investors don’t have complete information, it’s not difficult for companies to pump up their share price in the short term. For example, from 1997 to 2003, a global consumer-products company consistently generated annual growth in earnings per share (EPS) between 11 and 16 percent. Managers attributed the company’s success to improved efficiency. Impressed, investors pushed the company’s share price above that of its peers—unaware that the company was shortchanging its investment in product development and brand building to inflate short-term profits, even as revenue growth declined. In 2003, managers were compelled to admit what they’d done. Not surprisingly, the company went through a painful period of rebuilding, and its stock price took years to recover.

In contrast, the evidence makes it clear that companies with a long strategic horizon create more value. The banks that had the insight and courage to forgo short-term profits during the real-estate bubble earned much better returns for shareholders over the longer term.2 2.Bin Jiang and Tim Koller, “How to choose between growth and ROIC,” McKinsey on Finance, September 2007. Oil and gas companies known for investing in safety outperform those that haven’t. We’ve found, empirically, that long-term revenue growth—particularly organic revenue growth—is the most important driver of shareholder returns for companies with high returns on capital (though not for companies with low returns on capital).3 3.Bin Jiang and Tim Koller, “How to choose between growth and ROIC,” McKinsey on Finance, September 2007. We’ve also found a strong positive correlation between long-term shareholder returns and investments in R&D—evidence of a commitment to creating value in the longer term.4 4.Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, fifth edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

The weight of such evidence and our experience supports a clear definition of what it means to create shareholder value, which is to create value for the collective of all shareholders, present and future. This means managers should not take actions to increase today’s share price if they will reduce it down the road. It’s the task of management and the board to have the courage to make long-term value-creating decisions despite the short-term consequences.

Can stakeholder interests be reconciled?

Much recent criticism of shareholder-oriented capitalism has called on companies to focus on a broader set of stakeholders, not just shareholders. It’s a view that has long been influential in continental Europe, where it is frequently embedded in the governance structures of the corporate form of organization. And we agree that for most companies anywhere in the world, pursuing the creation of long-term shareholder value requires satisfying other stakeholders as well.

Short-termism runs deep

What’s most relevant about Stout’s argument, and that of others, is its implicit criticism of short-termism—and that is a fair critique of today’s capitalism. Despite overwhelming evidence linking intrinsic investor preferences to long-term value creation,10 10.Robert N. Palter, Werner Rehm, and Jonathan Shih, “Communicating with the right investors,” McKinsey Quarterly, April 2008. too many managers continue to plan and execute strategy, and then report their performance against shorter-term measures, EPS in particular.

As a result of their focus on short-term EPS, major companies often pass up value-creating opportunities. In a survey of 400 CFOs, two Duke University professors found that fully 80 percent of the CFOs said they would reduce discretionary spending on potentially value-creating activities such as marketing and R&D in order to meet their short-term earnings targets.11 11.John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal, “Value destruction and financial reporting decisions,” Financial Analysts Journal, 2006, Volume 62, Number 6, pp. 27–39. In addition, 39 percent said they would give discounts to customers to make purchases this quarter, rather than next, in order to hit quarterly EPS targets. Such biases shortchange all stakeholders.

Shareholder capitalism won’t solve all social issues

There are some trade-offs that company managers can’t make—and neither a shareholder nor a stakeholder approach to governance can help. This is especially true when it comes to issues that affect people who aren’t immediately involved with the company as investors, customers, or suppliers. These so-called externalities—parties affected by a company who did not choose to be so—are often beyond the ken of corporate decision making because there is no objective basis for making trade-offs among parties.

If, for example, climate change is one of the largest social issues facing the world, then one natural place to look for a solution is coal-fired power plants, among the largest man-made sources of carbon emissions. But how are the managers of a coal-mining company to make all the trade-offs needed to begin solving our environmental problems? If a long-term shareholder focus led them to anticipate potential regulatory changes, they should modify their investment strategies accordingly; they may not want to open new mines, for example. But if the company abruptly stopped operating existing ones, not only would its shareholders be wiped out but so would its bondholders (since bonds are often held by pension funds). All of its employees would be out of work, with magnifying effects on the entire local community. Second-order effects would be unpredictable. Without concerted action among all coal producers, another supplier could step up to meet demand. Even with concerted action, power plants might be unable to produce electricity, idling their workers and causing electricity shortages that undermine the economy. What objective criteria would any individual company use to weigh the economic and environmental trade-offs of such decisions—whether they’re privileging shareholders or stakeholders?

In some cases, individual companies won’t be able to satisfy all stakeholders. For any individual company, the complexity of addressing universal social issues such as climate change leaves us with an unresolved question: If not them, then who? Some might argue that it would be better for the government to develop incentives, regulations, and taxes, for example, to encourage a migration away from polluting sources of energy. Others may espouse a free-market approach, allowing creative destruction to replace aging technologies and systems with cleaner, more efficient sources of power.

Shareholder capitalism has taken its lumps in recent years, no question. And given the complexity of the issues, it’s unlikely that either the shareholder or stakeholder model of governance can be analytically proved superior. Yet we see in our work that the shareholder model, thoughtfully embraced as a collective approach to present and future value creation, is the best at bridging the broad and varied interests of shareholders and stakeholders alike.

_______________________________

*Marc Goedhard is a senior expert in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, and Tim Koller* is a principal in the New York office; David Wessels* is an adjunct professor of finance and director of executive education at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.

« Vous êtes devenus l’un d’entre eux » | 15 règles qu’un administrateur doit appliquer !


Voici un article qui rappelle les règles à suivre pour un administrateur siégeant sur le conseil d’une entreprise familiale, d’une entreprise privée de capital de risque, d’une entreprise gérée par les fondateurs ou toute autre combinaison de celles-ci. L’article a initialement été publié par  en mars 2015 dans Private Company Director Magazine.

Pour plusieurs administrateurs, le fait de prendre position en faveur de la direction, des propriétaires dirigeants ou du management en général peut constituer un manquement aux obligations de fiduciaire, surtout si la position adoptée est contraire à celle de certains autres administrateurs qui ont des intérêts à protéger ! 

L’incident relaté dans l’extrait suivant est assez révélateur …

You’ve become one of them.” That’s what a fellow Director (“MoneyGuy”) said to me after one of XYZ Company’s regular board meetings. MoneyGuy was from XYZ’s lead investor group and the majority shareholder. The ’them’ MoneyGuy was speaking about was XYZ’s management team. From his tone, I knew MoneyGuy wasn’t giving me a compliment; I was being admonished because I ‘sided with management’ about a particular matter that was pivotal to the future of the company.

What had I done wrong? To find the answer, you’ll need to read the following fifteen “rules” on how to work with owners.

Ce commentaire d’un collègue administrateur a incité * à proposer quinze (15) règles de conduite dans des cas similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces règles et à ajouter votre grain de sel.

Bonne lecture !

« You’ve Become One of Them »  | Fifteen Rules for Directors

Here are my fifteen rules :

1. Remember your role as a fiduciary. MoneyGuy knew I had a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, not just to him and his private equity firm. They put me on the Board to be ‘an outside, independent voice.’ Somehow that slipped his mind! This brings me to Rule #2…P1010169

2. Don’t be a rubber stamp. You can get rubber stamps at Staples. MoneyGuy or any other majority shareholder should realize that you are not on the Board just to be another automatic vote for them. Another Director friend told me: “There is a fine line to walk as an independent director when those sitting around the table own the company and you are effectively their invited guest.” If management knows you are truly independent and not there to throw them under the bus, this will help build trust with all.

3. Understand the owner’s expectations and their personal and financial goals. One owner told me: “I believe the most important consideration for an outside Director is to ensure the shareholders’ goals and desires are fully understood. Private company owners are likely to have a complex mix of primary and secondary goals that often change based on circumstances impacting their lives. Multiple shareholders might present further complications which need to be blended into the stew.”

4. Understand the owners’ personalities. This is different than #3. The particular personality style of the individual majority shareholder exerts a significant influence on the board and management.

5. Get to know the management team. Is the CEO and senior team strong-willed, weak or balanced? How well does the CEO work with the company’s owners? Being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the C-Suite will help you be a better coach to the owners.

6. Understand the culture of the company. Why? Because you and your other directors do have a role in shaping it and maintaining it by your actions.

7. Be consequential. Joe White used this term in his book Boards That Excel. One CEO/owner told me: “I want Directors that challenge me and bring perspective and skills I lack. I also want them to be well-grounded. The one thing my board has lacked is someone who is very knowledgeable about the specifics of my industry, but I think that has been outweighed by Directors with broad experience who see the big picture.”

8. Understand the business model and the industry. I had recently joined the Board of a company and we were discussing changes to the distribution channels. One Director said: “That’s not how we go to market now, is it?” He had been on the Board for over ten years and did not know one of the basic aspects of the business model!

9. Be a colleague, not an adversary. You are on the Board to give your opinion and offer advice, suggestions and ideas, not to advance your own career or agenda. I disagreed with MoneyGuy, but I wasn’t being disagreeable. No grandstanding, no pontificating allowed.

10. Don’t be timid about personally coaching or mentoring the owners. Even though they own the company, they may need advice on areas they are unfamiliar with. See #7.

11. Trust your gut. It’s ok to be a nudge (…and be Columbo-like). For those of you who are too young to know who Columbo was, Google him. Don’t allow the CEO and the team to stiff arm you or ignore your questions. Hopefully you have proved to the owners that your probing is done with good intentions.

12. Prepare for and attend the meetings. How obvious is this? Don’t be a no show or empty seat.

13. Participate. Be available to the owners not only at the Board meetings but also between the meetings. Encourage honest two-way communication and feedback.

14. Embrace and use technology. Just a pet peeve of mine…I’m tired of hearing about people being ‘too old’ to learn today’s communication technologies. The cloud is something more than moisture in the air.

15. Stay fresh. Owners don’t want ‘stale’, they deserve ‘fresh’.

None of this is complicated and these rules may seem pretty basic and just common sense to you. But if that’s the case, then why have I witnessed so many Directors who don’t follow these, who behave irrationally and/or who are ineffective with ownership?

___________________________________

* is an Entrepreneur, Director, CEO Coach, Optimist, Instigator of Positive Change…and Fixer of Stuck Companies. CEOs, family owners, investors and Boards enlist Jim to be their ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and confidant.

Aux É.U., il est temps de favoriser le rapprochement entre les administrateurs et les actionnaires


Voici un excellent article paru dans la section Business du The New York Times du 28 mars 2015 qui porte sur les appréhensions, relativement injustifiées, des communications (engagement) entre les administrateurs et leurs actionnaires (en dehors des assemblées annuelles).

L’article évoque le manque de communication des Boards américains avec leurs actionnaires et avec les parties prenantes, contrairement à la situation qui prévaut du côté européen. Selon l’auteure, cette grande distance entre les administrateurs et les actionnaires mène aux insatisfactions croissantes de ceux-ci, et cela se reflète dans l’augmentation du nombre d’administrateurs n’obtenant pas le soutien requis lors des assemblées annuelles.

On le sait, les actionnaires des entreprises américaines souhaitent pouvoir faire inscrire leurs propositions dans les circulaires de procuration, notamment pour présenter des candidatures aux postes d’administrateurs.

En 2015, plusieurs grandes corporations américaines permettront l’accès des grands actionnaires à leurs circulaires de procuration (voir Les conséquences inattendues de l’accès des actionnaires à la circulaire de procuration lors de l’assemblée annuelle et Proxy Access Proposals: The Next Big Thing in Corporate Governance).

Il est donc temps de revoir le mode de communication entre les deux acteurs principaux et d’exposer les avantages à collaborer à la gouvernance de l’entreprise. Plusieurs pays européens donnent l’exemple à cet égard.

Ainsi, en Suède et en Norvège, les cinq (5) plus grands actionnaires d’une entreprise reçoivent des invitations à se joindre au comité de gouvernance et de nomination afin de choisir des administrateurs potentiels.

En Europe, les actionnaires ont plus de poids; ceux qui possèdent au moins 1 % de la propriété peuvent soumettre des candidatures pour les postes d’administrateurs. De plus, dans certains pays européens, contrairement à la situation américaine, les administrateurs doivent soumettre leurs démissions s’ils ne reçoivent pas un soutien majoritaire aux élections.

P1060488

Voici une politique sur la communication du CA avec les investisseurs qui pourrait être envisagée; elle présente un certain nombre de sujets jugés appropriés :

(1) la rémunération de la direction,

(2) la structure des comités du conseil,

(3) le processus de planification de la relève,

(4) le rôle du CA dans la supervision de la stratégie.

Je suis assuré que vous trouverez cet article du NYT stimulant et engageant ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Bonne lecture !

At U.S. Companies, Time to Coax the Directors Into Talking

It’s shareholder meeting season again, corporate America’s version of Groundhog Day.

This is the time of year when company directors venture out of the boardroom to encounter the investors they have a duty to serve. After the meetings are over, like so many Punxsutawney Phils, these directors scurry back to their sheltered confines for another year.

This is a bit hyperbolic, of course. But institutional investors argue that there’s a troubling lack of interaction these days between many corporate boards in the United States and their most important investors. They point to contrasting practices in Europe as evidence that it’s time for this to change.

“It’s a very different culture in the U.S.,” said Deborah Gilshan, corporate governance counsel at RPMI Railpen Investments, the sixth-largest pension fund in Britain, which has 20 billion pounds, or about $30 billion, in assets. “In the U.K., we get lots of access to the companies we invest in. In fact, I’ve often wondered why a director wouldn’t want to know directly what a thoughtful shareholder thinks.”

As Ms. Gilshan indicated, directors at European companies routinely make themselves available for investor discussions; in some countries, such meetings are required. Many directors of foreign companies even — gasp — give shareholders their private email addresses and phone numbers.

Their counterparts in the United States seem fearful of such contact. Large shareholders say that some directors of American companies refuse to meet at all, preferring to let company officials speak for them.

Le rôle du président du conseil lors des réunions


Dans ce blogue, j’ai souvent rappelé le rôle fondamental du président du conseil dans le bon fonctionnement des réunions du CA mais aussi dans la mise en œuvre de règles de saine gouvernance.

L’article qui suit, publié par David Ferguson et Chuanchan Ma sur le site de l’Association of Corporate Counsel, insiste sur trois points importants eu égard au rôle légal du président du conseil d’administration (PCA) :

(1) Le comportement du président lors des rencontres du conseil;

(2) Le rôle du PCA eu égard aux règles de gouvernance;

« The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues ».

(3) L’autorité du président du conseil dans le processus de gouvernance.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article afin de mieux comprendre le rôle essentiel d’un président du conseil (PCA).

Bonne lecture !

Company meetings – tips and insights: the role of the chair

In cooperation with Association of Corporate Counsel

Introduction

The constitutions of most companies divide the corporate powers between the board of directors, which is usually given the power to manage the company’s business, and the members, who usually have the power to appoint and remove directors and change the constitution. The powers of the board and members are usually exercised through resolutions passed at a meeting.

This article considers the role of the chair in the context of meetings as well as the broad corporate governance role allocated to an individual director appointed to the role of chair of a public company. This reveals the increased expectations of the role while noting the limited formal powers of the chair.

The chair’s role in meetings

Courts have taken the view that, generally, a meeting can only take place with more than one participant.2 This reflects the fact that “according to the ordinary usage of the English language” that it is not possible for a person to have a meeting with themselves. This is the case even though the one person present holds proxies for others.3 While exceptions to this general position have been identified to enable a meeting of a single holder of a class of shares4 , the general concept of a meeting contemplates discussion between the participants and, for this reason, courts have also held that a meeting of directors or shareholders cannot proceed without a chair.

This indispensable element of any meeting was recognized in Colorado Constructions Pty Ltd v Platus5 where Street J identified that the chair’s role included the setting of the order of business, nomination of the person entitled to speak, putting questions to the meeting, declaring resolutions carried or not carried and declaring the meeting closed. As noted in a subsequent case, “the essence of chairmanship is actually exercising procedural control over the meeting”.6

In carrying out this role, the chair is required to act impartially to ensure that the meeting operates in a fair manner. As observed by Young J in NAB v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq)7 , citing National Dwelling Society v Sykes8:

It is the duty of the chairman, and his functions, to preserve order, and to take care that the proceedings are conducted in a proper manner, that the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question which is properly before the meeting.

The chair’s role in corporate governance

Most public company constitutions provide that the board of directors will elect one of their number to act as chair and that the person elected also acts as chair of general meetings. While the position of chair could be filled on an ad hoc basis, there is a broader corporate governance significance to the role that the chair of a public company plays. This is reflected in the following excerpt from commentary to Recommendation 2.5 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations:

The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues.

Accordingly, the role of chair in a public company is usually attributed special status and additional remuneration. Although the position can be carried out in different individual styles, the chair often acts as spokesperson for the company on high level matters and usually plays an important link between the board and management of the company. It is worth noting that the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations also express the view that the chair should be a non-executive role so as to separate the chair’s role from that of the chief executive officer and the executive management team. This article has been formulated on the assumption that the chair is a nonexecutive director, but a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond its scope.

The allocation of a broader corporate governance role has been recognised as potentially giving rise to a more extensive duty of care and diligence on the part of the chair. As noted by Austin J in reflecting on the duties of the chair of the board of One.Tel Limited:9

The court’s role, in determining liability of a defendant for his conduct as company chairman, is to articulate and apply a standard of care that reflects contemporary community expectations.

Austin J further noted that it is now commonplace to observe that the standard of care expected of company directors, both by the common law (including equity) and under statutory provisions, has been raised over the last century or so, and that “[o]ne might correspondingly expect that the standard for company chairmen has also been raised”.10

The individual requirements of the standard of care owed by the chair of a public company will depend on the allocation of corporate governance roles and responsibilities within the company and the skills and experience of the individual person carrying out the role of chair.11 In this respect, the responsibilities of the chair are not limited to delegated tasks but include the responsibilities with which the chair is entrusted by reason of his or her expertise and experience.12

The authority of the chair

Despite the essential nature of the chair’s role in the context of meetings and the elevated duty of care and diligence that may be attributed to the chair’s role within public companies, a person appointed to that role does not have authority, merely by virtue of that office, to make decisions binding on the company or to give binding directions.13 The board makes its decisions by resolutions which are carried or lost depending on a majority vote. Accordingly, unless the board has delegated powers, the chair has no more power to carry out matters on behalf of a company than any other individual non-executive director.

The chair’s authority in the context of meetings is more robust. Constitutions typically provide that the chair is elected by the board of directors and, in some cases, provide that the chair has a casting vote at meetings of directors and members. Consistent with his or her role in regulating meetings, constitutions also usually provide that the chair of a general meeting can require a vote to be taken by way of a poll and empower the chair to make certain rulings at the meeting.14 Where a company’s constitution provides that rulings by the chair on certain matters are final and the chair makes a ruling on those matters in good faith, there is no right in the meeting to challenge the ruling, although it could be overturned by a court in appropriate circumstances. Even if a decision is made by the chair in connection with the proper conduct of a meeting that does not have the protection of an express constitutional provision, courts have indicated that the decision should be regarded as correct unless the contrary is proved by a person objecting to it.15

If the chair has a casting vote at a meeting, that right must be exercised “honestly and in accordance with what (the chair) believes to be the best interests of those who may be affected by the vote”. Subject to this, the chair is entitled to exercise the casting vote as he or she thinks fit.16 While there has been a view that, because the chair has a duty to maintain impartiality, a casting vote should be used to maintain the status quo so as to allow further discussion of the relevant matter, it is doubtful that this general proposition exists.17

A number of provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) also recognize the special status of the chair’s role in meetings. For example, the Corporations Act acknowledges that the chair often receives multiple proxy appointments and therefore imposes an obligation on the chair to vote as proxy on a poll.18 It also gives greater scope for the chair, as compared to other directors, to vote proxies in connection with directors’ remuneration.

Un guide des pratiques de gouvernance dans l’Union Européenne (EU)


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un guide complet des pratiques de gouvernance relatives aux entreprises de l’Union Européenne.

Il n’y a pas de version française de ce document à ce stade-ci. J’ai cependant demandé à ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) si un guide en français était en préparation. Toute personne intéressée par la gouvernance européenne trouvera ici un excellent outil d’information.

Bonne lecture !

This publication has been produced in collaboration with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa) primarily aimed at ecoDa’s membership and for supporting IFC’s work in surrounding regions with countries aspiring to understand and follow rules, standards and practices applied in the EU countries but which may be of wider relevance and interest to practitioners, policy makers, development finance institutions, investors, board directors, business reporters, and others.

A Guide to Corporate Governance Practices in the European Union

The purpose of this publication is twofold: to describe the corporate governance framework within the European Union and to highlight good European governance practices. It focuses on the particular aspects of European governance practices that distinguish this region from other parts of the world.DSCN3217

In addition to providing a useful source of reference, this guide is designed to be relevant to anyone interested in the evolving debate about European corporate governance. It should be of particular interest to the following parties:

Policymakers and corporate governance specialists, to assist in the identification of good practices among the member states. Improvements in corporate governance practices in a country may attract foreign direct investment.

Directors of listed and unlisted companies, to inspire them to look again at their ways of working.

Directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to assist in improving corporate governance practices prior to selling off state assets.

Bankers, to assist in the identification of good corporate governance practices to inform their lending and investing practices.

Staff within development financial institutions, to assist in the identification of good corporate

Proxy advisors and legal advisors, to assist in the identification of corporate governance compliance issues.

Investors, shareholders, stock brokers, and investment advisors, to assist in the identification of good practices in investor engagement and activism.

Senior company management, to assist in the identification of good relationship-management practices with boards of directors.

Journalists and academics within business schools, who are interested in good corporate governance practices.

Private sector and public sector stakeholders from the EU candidate and potential candidate countries in their preparation for eventual accession. Geographical areas of potential readership may include the following in particular:

The 18 Eurozone countries (listed in Appendix A);

The 28 EU member states (Appendix B);

The five EU candidate countries (Appendix C);

The three potential candidate countries

The 47 European Council Countries (Appendix E); and

Emerging markets and others seeking to increase trade or attract investment with European countries.

Les conséquences inattendues de l’accès des actionnaires à la circulaire de procuration lors de l’assemblée annuelle


Cet article est publié par David A. Katz associé de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les questions de fusions et acquisitions ainsi que dans les transactions boursières complexes. Cet article a été publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

L’auteur explique les conséquences inattendues du processus utilisé par les entreprises cotées eu égard à la modification de leurs règlements internes afin de permettre l’inscription des propositions de certains actionnaires dans les circulaires de procuration.

L’on sait que, dans le passé, il y avait beaucoup de réticence à permettre aux actionnaires de soumettre des propositions lors des assemblées annuelles et à proposer des candidatures aux postes d’administrateurs, une initiative réservée au comité de gouvernance.

Cependant, à la suite d’intenses pressions des activistes, plusieurs entreprises ont accepté de soumettre au vote de leurs actionnaires une proposition autorisant les actionnaires majeurs à proposer des administrateurs désignés. Il semble qu’il ne reste que le pourcentage de propriété qui soit en suspend à ce moment-ci : 3% ou 5%.

L’auteur discute des difficultés que ces changements pourraient engendrer, notamment le gaspillage de ressources organisationnelles, les manquements au devoir de fiduciaire, l’isolation des administrateurs désignés, les dysfonctions du CA, les tensions au sein du conseil, etc.

L’auteur fait un bon résumé des conséquences négatives éventuelles pour la gouvernance des sociétés. Je vous invite également à lire l’article paru sur le blogue du Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy  : Proxy Access Proposals: The Next Big Thing in Corporate Governance. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ?

Je vous encourage à lire l’extrait ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The Unintended Consequences of Proxy Access Elections

It’s official: Proxy access is the darling of the 2015 season. Shareholder-sponsored proxy access proposals are on the ballots of more than 100 U.S. public companies this spring. These precatory proposals seek a shareholder vote on a binding bylaw that would enable shareholders who meet certain ownership requirements to nominate board candidates and have them included in the company’s own proxy materials. P1000674

Powerful institutional investors have given the proxy access movement enormous momentum this spring, and blue chip firms such as GE, Bank of America, and Prudential have voluntarily adopted versions of proxy access in advance of their annual meetings. Companies such as Citigroup have agreed to support proxy access shareholder proposals in their definitive proxy materials. In the absence of regulatory guidance, proxy advisors such as ISS have stepped into the breach to define the terms and conditions of proxy access. As proxy access proposals proliferate—after years of controversy—the primary debate now seems to be whether a 3 percent or 5 percent ownership threshold is more appropriate.

….

Unintended Consequences

The detrimental consequences of proxy access fall into three general categories. First, there are those that occur before and during the proxy solicitation period. These include waste of corporate resources, negative publicity, the impairment of a company’s ability to attract qualified candidates to stand for election as a director, and the undermining of the company’s nominating committee and board leadership. Proxy access could cause tension among shareholders, particularly large shareholders, who disagree in public or private over whether to nominate candidates for inclusion in the proxy, and if so, which ones. It also could cause internal controversy for large shareholders; institutional investors or pension funds, for example, may find themselves pressured by certain constituencies (such as unions) to participate in proxy access for political reasons, while other constituencies support the current board’s direction on substantive grounds. The instability caused by proxy access—like that created by proxy fights—could create significant disruption in a business, as executives, managers, and employees struggle with fear and uncertainty about the future. Damaging effects on hiring, long-range planning, and employee retention can cause lasting harm to a corporation regardless of the election results.

Second, there are those consequences that relate to the composition of the board. Were proxy access to become widespread and effective, a board could become unable to ensure that it would have the necessary expertise (such as the audit committee financial expert mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or industry specialists) or make progress toward a desired diversity of skills, genders, and backgrounds. Moreover, it could create the potential for distrust and a lack of collegiality that would reduce the board’s effectiveness and distract the company’s management, and it would increase the likelihood of politicization and balkanization of directors into factions with different goals.

Third, there are those consequences that relate to the board’s ability to fulfill its legal duties and obligations. Proxy access directors would owe a duty of loyalty to all shareholders under Delaware law—as all directors do—yet they might feel themselves to be—or be expected or viewed by others to be—beholden to the particular shareholder group that nominated them and pushed for their election. In conjunction with the paramount issue of loyalty, questions of confidentiality, transparency, board committee structure, and board dynamics could arise. Complications familiar from the constituency/blockholder director context likely would be exacerbated if sponsored directors were to reach the board through proxy access. Boards would be addressing these issues in a context of significant uncertainty, both as to the legal questions of fiduciary duty and as to the factual questions of a proxy access director’s allegiance.

If proxy access directors are elected in any meaningful number, boards will be contending with an array of complications that have the potential to impair board functioning in ways that the current debate has not addressed. As the popularity of proxy access reaches a high-water mark this season, shareholders should consider carefully whether they really want what proxy access proponents are asking for. If not, now is the time for them to say so.

Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains présidents et chefs de direction (PCD) | En reprise


Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.

C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.

L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.

P1040752La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes.

La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.

Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études.

Bonne lecture !

In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.

In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…

                             

If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:

The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.

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Recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis pour la votation aux assemblées annuelles de 2015 | En rappel


Quelles sont les avis émis par les firmes conseil en votation qui servent à évaluer la qualité de la gouvernance des entreprises cotées ? Quels sont les facteurs pris en compte par les actionnaires, les investisseurs institutionnels et les Hedge Funds pour juger de la gouvernance et de la performance globale des sociétés, et pour voter lors des assemblées annuelles des actionnaires ?

Cet article, publié dans Lexology, en collaboration avec l’association des juristes corporatifs, a été rédigé par Dykema Gossett, Robert Murphy, Mark A. Metz et D. Richard McDonald. Les auteurs présentent les recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis eu égard à des sujets chauds en gouvernance.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des mises à jour fournies par ces deux firmes-conseil et accessibles à tous les actionnaires, notamment les recommandations relatives à l’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration.

Bonne lecture !

ISS and Gass Lewis proxy voting policy updates for the 2015 proxy season

The proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, recently announced updates to their respective voting policies for domestic companies for the upcoming 2015 proxy season. These two firms have risen to prominence in recent years, wielding significant power in corporate governance matters, proxy fights and takeover votes. Hedge funds, mutual fund complexes, institutional investors and similar organizations that own shares of multiple companies pay ISS and Glass Lewis to advise them regarding shareholder votes.

In cooperation with Association of Corporate Counsel

The ISS and Glass Lewis policy updates are effective for annual meetings on or after February 1, 2015, and January 1, 2015, respectively. For your convenience, we have summarized below the most important updates relating to corporate governance matters.

Independent Board Chairs

The most notable ISS policy change relates to shareholder proposals that seek to separate the chairman and chief executive officer positions. For the 2015 proxy season, ISS is adding new governance, board leadership and performance factors to its current analytical framework. In this regard, ISS’s policy will continue to generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” independent chair shareholder proposals after consideration in a “holistic manner” of the following factors:

Scope of the Proposal: Whether the shareholder proposal is binding or merely a recommendation and whether it seeks an immediate change in the chairman role or can be implemented at the next CEO transition.

Company’s Current Board Leadership Structure: The presence of an executive or non-independent chairman in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chairman, and/or a departure from a structure with an independent chairman.

Company’s Governance Structure: The overall independence of the board, the independence of key committees, the establishment of governance guidelines, as well as board tenure and its relationship to CEO tenure.

Company’s Governance Practices: Problematic governance or management issues such as poor compensation practices, material failures of governance and risk oversight, related party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk will be reviewed as well as corporate or management scandals and actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.

Company Performance: One-, three- and five-year total shareholder return compared to the company’s peers and the market as a whole.

In view of its new holistic approach in evaluating these types of shareholder proposals, ISS indicates that a “For” or “Against” recommendation will not be determined by any single factor, but that it will consider all positive and negative aspects of the company based on the new expanded list of factors when assessing these proposals.

Glass Lewis generally does not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board of directors, but it encourages clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever the issue arises in a proxy statement.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments

ISS and Glass Lewis have adopted new policies pursuant to which they will generally issue negative vote recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder ability to exercise their rights (“Unilateral Amendments”).

Under the updated policy, if the board adopts a Unilateral Amendment, ISS will generally make a recommendation for an “against” or “withhold” vote on a director individually, the members of a board committee or the entire board (other than new nominees on a case-by-case basis), after considering the following nine factors, as applicable:

– the board’s rationale for adopting the Unilateral Amendment;

– disclosure by the issuer of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the Unilateral Amendment;

– the level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the Unilateral Amendment;

– the board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw and charter amendments and other entrenchment provisions;

– the issuer’s ownership structure;

– the issuer’s existing governance provisions;

– whether the Unilateral Amendment was made prior to or in connection with the issuer’s IPO;

– the timing of the Unilateral Amendment in connection with a significant business development; and

– other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to the determination of the impact of the Unilateral Amendment on shareholders.

Glass Lewis has revised its policy to provide that, depending on the circumstances, it will recommend that shareholders vote “against” the chairman of the board’s governance committee, or the entire committee, in instances where a board has amended the company’s governing documents, without shareholder approval, to “reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right” such as:

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent;

– an increase to the ownership threshold required by shareholders to call a special meeting;

– an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments;

– the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse (e.g., bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or “fee-shifting” bylaws);

– the adoption of a classified board structure; and

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Equity Plan Proposals

Of particular importance to management are the revised ISS and Glass Lewis policies pertaining to their voting recommendations on company proposals seeking shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. Equity compensation of management remains a central focus of many institutional investors and shareholder activists.

For 2015, ISS adopted a new “scorecard” model, referred to as Equity Plan Scorecard (“EPSC”), that considers a range of positive and negative factors in evaluating equity incentive plan proposals, rather than the current six pass/fail tests focused on cost and certain egregious practices to evaluate such proposals. The total EPSC score will generally determine whether ISS recommends “for” or “against” the proposal.

Under its new policy, ISS will evaluate equity-based compensation plans on a case-by-case basis depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, as evaluated by the EPSC factors. The EPSC factors will fall under the following three categories (“EPSC Pillars”):

Plan Cost (45 percent weighting): The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers. ISS will measure plan cost by using ISS’s Value Transfer Model (SVT) for the company in relation to its peers. The SVT calculation assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors.

Plan Features (20 percent weighting): The presence or absence of provisions in the plan providing for (i) automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control; (ii) discretionary vesting authority; (iii) liberal share recycling on various award types; and (iv) minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan.

Grant Practices (35 percent weighting): The issuer’s recent grant practices under the proposed plan and all other plans including (i) the company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; (ii) vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (three-year lookback); (iii) the estimated duration of the plan based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years; (iv) the proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions; (v) whether the company maintains a clawback policy; and (vi) whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

In its updated voting policy, ISS will generally recommend voting “against” the plan proposal if the combination of the factors listed above in the EPSC Pillars indicates that the plan is not, overall, in the shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:

– awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

– the plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of prepricing – for non-listed companies);

– the plan is a vehicle for “problematic pay practices” or a “pay-for-performance disconnect;” or

– any other plan features are determined to have a “significant negative impact on shareholder interests.”

Political Contributions

In recent years, many issuers have received shareholder proposals seeking reports or other disclosure regarding political contributions, including lobbying and political activities. Under the updated policy on political contribution shareholder proposals, ISS will generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, after considering:

– the company’s policies as well as management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

– the company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups where it makes political contributions; and

– recent significant controversies, fines or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Practical Considerations

Despite the policy changes discussed above, public companies should continue to tailor their individual governance policies with a view towards what is in the long-term best interests of their own shareholders as opposed to meeting the ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines. ISS notes that its 2015 policy is intended to address the recent substantial increase in bylaw/charter amendments that adversely impact shareholder rights without being subject to a shareholder vote. Companies that intend to adopt any corporate governance policies that adversely impact shareholder rights should consider seeking shareholder support before implementing such policies, if a negative ISS or Glass Lewis recommendation on re-election of directors is likely to have a material effect on the election.

Companies should review last year’s proxy compensation and governance disclosures in order to make improvements in this year’s disclosures where appropriate – particularly if the company has received comments on this disclosure from the SEC staff. The failure to address a previous year’s staff comment may provoke a more detailed review by the staff, with its attendant time delays, should it be noticed during the staff’s initial screening of the filing.

Companies should also review their corporate governance and compensation practices for potential vulnerabilities under ISS’ policy updates, such as equity compensation plans that may be up for a vote at the next annual meeting or an independent chair shareholder proposal, and decide what action, if any, to take in light of this assessment.

Companies should continue a regular dialogue with key investors, bearing in mind limitations imposed by the SEC on proxy solicitations. Shareholder engagement efforts should continue to focus on what shareholders’ greatest concerns are and the rationale for board action.