Voici un extrait du récent rapport de PwC sur l’état de la gouvernance aux États-Unis. Le sommaire exécutif reproduit ci-dessous montre clairement l’évolution de la pensée des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux thèmes suivants :
(1) Évaluation plus sévère de la performance des collègues administrateurs;
(2) Résistances quant au remplacement des collègues administrateurs;
(3) La « stimulation intellectuelle » est la principale motivation à siéger sur un conseil;
(4) Divergences d’opinions quant à la communication d’informations concernant la gouvernance, la rémunération de la direction et les nominations des administrateurs;
(5) Lacunes quant aux politiques de communications avec les parties prenantes;
(6) Peu d’administrateurs sont prêts à reconsidérer la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, même si les actionnaires questionnent la politique;
(7) Augmentation significative de la surveillance des risques par le C.A.;
(8) Différences de perception entre la direction et les administrateurs au sujet de l’influence de diverses parties prenantes sur les stratégies;
(9 Proactivité plus marquées des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux risques de fraudes;
(10) Importance accrue accordée aux projets en TI, bien que toujours considérée comme insuffisante;
(11) Augmentation importante de l’utilisation de conseillers externes, notamment en TI;
(12) Une majorité d’administrateur (aux É-U) croit que les récentes initiatives règlementaires n’ont pas accrue la protection des investisseurs, mais elles ont contribué à accroitre significativement les coûts;
(13) L’influence des firmes de conseil spécialisées en gouvernance décline.
We are witnessing unprecedented change in the corporate governance world: new perspectives on boardroom composition, higher levels of stakeholder engagement, more emphasis on emerging risks and strategies, and the increasing velocity of change in the digital world. These factors, coupled with calls for enhanced transparency around governance practices and reporting, the very active regulatory and lawmaking environment, and the enhanced power of proxy advisors, are all accelerating evolution, and in some cases creating a revolution, in the boardroom.
In the summer of 2013, 934 public company directors responded to our 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey. Of those directors, 70% serve on the boards of companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. As a result, the survey’s findings reflect the practices and boardroom perspectives of many of today’s world-class companies. The focus of this year’s research not only reflects in-depth analysis of contemporary governance trends, but also emphasizes how boards are reacting to a rapidly evolving landscape.
These are the highlights:
Directors are even more critical of their fellow directors than last year: 35% now say someone on their board should be replaced (compared to only 31% in 2012). The top three reasons cited are diminished performance because of aging, a lack of required expertise, and poor preparation for meetings.
Replacing a fellow board member can be difficult; 48% cite impediments to doing so. The top inhibitor, cited nearly twice as often as any other factor, is that board leadership is uncomfortable addressing the issue.
Board service is not driven by money or ego. More than half of directors (54%) say that their primary motivation for sitting on a corporate board is intellectual stimulation, 22% see board service as a way to keep engaged, and 17% indicate they simply want to give something back. Remuneration is low on the list.
There is a dichotomy between directors who believe it’s appropriate to communicate about governance issues directly with shareholders and those who do not. Just over 30% say it’s « very appropriate » to communicate about corporate governance issues, and about a quarter say the same about executive compensation and director nominations. But the same or slightly more say director communication about these three areas is « not appropriate. »
Regarding communication with other stakeholders, nearly half of directors say their boards either have no policy or one that’s not useful. Considering the increasing frequency of stakeholder interactions, it’s not surprising that about one-quarter of those without such a policy believe there should be one.
Boards continue to take action in response to say on pay voting results (70%) but few actually reduced compensation (3%). Over one-half of directors say that it would take a negative shareholder vote of 30% or more to cause them to reconsider executive compensation.
The number of directors who believe there is a clear allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among the board and its committees (80%) improved over the prior year by 17 percentage points. Yet half of those who say that there is clarity reflected that it still could be improved.
CEOs and directors have different perspectives on who influences company strategy or what threatens their company’s growth prospects. As reported in PwC’s 16th Annual Global CEO Survey, CEOs see more influence by the media and supply chain partners, while directors believe investors have more clout. Directors are significantly more concerned about the government impairing growth prospects.
Ninety-four percent of directors say they receive information on competitor initiatives and strategy, but nearly a quarter of them wish it were better.
Three-quarters of directors said their boards took additional action to oversee fraud risks. Six of 10 held discussions regarding « tone at the top, » a 14 percentage-point increase from last year. Other actions included increased interactions with members of management below the executive level and having discussions about insider trading controls.
Directors reflected on the increasing importance of the IT revolution at their companies—15% call IT critical, up from 13% in 2012, and the amount of time directors spent overseeing IT increased correspondingly. Despite the fact that about one-third of boards spent more hours overseeing IT, 61% want to spend even more time considering related risks in the coming year, and 55% say the same about IT strategy.
There was a jump in the use of outside consultants to advise boards on IT strategy and risk: from 27% last year to 35% this year. Even more are thinking about it. While most of these were hired on a project-specific basis, the percentage of consultants engaged on a continuous basis doubled from last year.
Almost a third of directors believe their company’s strategy and IT risk mitigation is not adequately supported by a sufficient understanding of IT at the board level. And only about a quarter « very much » agree that the company provides them with adequate information for effective oversight.
The majority of directors have evolved their practices to be more engaged in overseeing traditional IT issues: the status of major IT implementations and the annual IT budget. These account for the highest levels of director engagement (80% and 63%, respectively). But directors say they are not sufficiently engaged in understanding the company’s level of cyber-security spend (24%) and competitors’ leverage of emerging technologies (22%).
Nearly two-thirds of directors (64%) believe recent regulatory and enforcement initiatives have not increased investor protections, and 77% don’t believe such actions have increased public trust in the corporate sector. In addition, 51% think these efforts have not enhanced transparency to stakeholders « very much » or at all.
Nearly three-fourths of directors feel that increased regulation and enforcement initiatives have added costs to companies that exceed the benefits, and 56% believe they have put excessive burdens on directors. Over a third (36%) responded that such initiatives have contributed to unreasonable expectations of director performance.
Despite their perceived increased influence, proxy advisory firms appear to be losing ground when it comes to their credibility with directors. Directors’ ratings of the firms’ independence, thoroughness of work, and quality of voting recommendations all declined in 2013.
A summary of selected insights reflecting the best of the boardroom is included in the first part of this report. The appendix includes other graphs and survey results.
Plusieurs articles reliés à la gouvernance des sociétés :
Voici un excellent article publié par Geoff Beattie* et Beverly Behan** et paru dans Ivey Business Journal sur le sujet de la conduite des conseils d’administration. Les auteurs mettent l’accent sur l’importance des trois éléments suivants : (1) la conception d’un plan d’action concernant le management du CA, (2) le courage de poser des questions qui vont au-delà de l’indépendance requise des administrateurs et, (3) l’établissement d’une culture de performance et de reddition de comptes.
The role of the Board of Directors has never been more important. Boards make important decisions that affect companies, the people who work in those companies, the people who own those companies, and sometimes the economy itself. If ever there was a place where excellence is required and should be demanded, this is it. The effectiveness of a board should not be considered a nice addition to a well-managed company, but a prerequisite.
The Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
But what makes a board effective? Surprisingly simple elements that are too frequently ignored. Among them, creating a plan for the board, demanding far more than mere independence from board leadership and establishing a board culture of performance and accountability.
Geoff Beattie sits on the boards of General Electric, the Royal Bank of Canada and McCain Foods and has served on and worked with other boards throughout his career. He is the former CEO of Woodbridge and Vice-Chair of Thomson Reuters
**Beverly Behan
Bev Behan has worked with over 125 boards, primarily S&P1500s, over the past 16 years. Her latest book, Great Companies Deserve Great Boards, was named Governance Book of the Year by Directors & Boards magazine.
Le document ci-dessous présente la problématique, bien réelle, de l’asymétrie de l’information entre les membres du conseil (le Board) et la direction de l’entreprise (le management). Il y a un gap naturel entre ce qui est communiqué par le management et ce qui est requis par le Board pour bien faire son travail. Ce dernier a besoin d’une information de qualité, c’est-à-dire une information complète (quoique synthétique), représentative de la réalité, la plus objective possible et, à jour.
Le rapport, préparé par la NACD (représentant le point de vue des administrateurs) et la firme comptable McGladrey (représentant le point de vue du management), présente un excellent compte rendu des problématiques soulevées par le manque de communication entre les administrateurs et la direction et propose plusieurs pratiques susceptibles de combler le gap d’information.
On y présente les résultats des « conversations » issus de quatre panels composés d’administrateurs et de membres de la haute direction. Le compte rendu fait ressortir les principaux problèmes de communication dans les domaines suivants : (1) La stratégie et le risque, (2) la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, (3) la planification de la succession du PCD, et (4) l’évaluation du Conseil.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par cette question, c’est-à-dire les administrateurs de sociétés et les membres des directions d’entreprises, devraient prendre connaissance de ce document afin d’être mieux renseignés sur les moyens à prendre pour pallier l’asymétrie de l’information.
Voici un court extrait du document. Bonne lecture.
« Effective board oversight demands information that is as current and relevant as possible. There are, however, natural gaps between what management communicates and what the board needs to know. The information flow between management and the board may not always be perfect, and board committees may have similar troubles bringing the full board « up to speed » on certain issues. The purpose of this report is to address these issues, which we call the « effectiveness gap. »…
Plus (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The goal of this report is to offer some tips and strategies to improve communications between the full board, C-suite, and committees. In particular, we focus on four areas of concern: strategy and risk, executive compensation, CEO succession planning, and board evaluations. These four areas are traditionally of high importance to board members yet have also presented challenges.
To help bridge the gaps in effectiveness, it was necessary to speak directly with individuals from both management and the board. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) is able to assess the director perspective, we needed the C-suite perspective as well. We partnered with McGladrey to host four small gatherings of executives and directors in an effort to find ways of improving communications and relationships. The conversations that occurred during these gatherings provided the material for this document ».
Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.
Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage.
« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.
Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:
– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists
– Story Toolbox: How and where to find the story ideas
– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons
Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:
What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)
Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une présentation Power Point que Richard Leblanc a livrée à la conférence annuelle de la Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries, le 21 août 2013 à Halifax, NS.
Cette présentation aborde tous les points chauds dans le domaine de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants. Richard a eu la générosité de mettre cette présentation en ligne via le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors. Il s’agit d’une mine d’information pour toute personne intéressée par l’influence de la gouvernance sur les rémunérations des dirigeants.
President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announce new limits on executive compensation. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Si vous êtes intéressés par certains aspects plus spécifiques de ces questions, je suis assuré qu’il se fera un plaisir de vous donner de plus amples informations. Voici un résumé des 10 thèmes abordés dans cette présentation. Bonne lecture.
1. Red flags and best practices;
2. Shareholder engagement and activism;
3. Changes to executive compensation;
4. Compensation of oversight functions (Canada, FSB);
5. Internal pay equity (coming in August);
6. Independent director compensation: Case;
7. Incorporating LT NF metrics into compensation: Case;
McKinsey is the world’s largest and most profitable management consulting firm, as well one of the most difficult places to get hired. Over its 87-year existence it’s had a massive impact on the U.S. economy according to « The Firm, » a forthcoming book by Duff McDonald.
In a New York Observer column, pointed out by Mike Dang at The Billfold, McDonald argues that the massive modern-day gap between executive and worker pay has its origin with the consulting firm.
It’s a fascinating story that all started with General Motors commissioning a study on executive pay from McKinsey consultant Arch Patton. He found that from 1939 to 1950, hourly employee pay more than doubled, but top management pay went up only 35%.
The study, published in the Harvard Business Review, became a series and turned national attention toward executive compensation, promoting the idea that higher pay and bonuses were the lever to attract and retain top executives.
Patton became a superstar, hired by managers who were not surprisingly interested in hearing they were underpaid. McKinsey’s CEO apparently thought this type of consulting was beneath the firm, but wasn’t about to turn down the money.
« For several years, Mr. Patton personally accounted for almost 10 percent of the firm’s billings, » McDonald writes. « At the end of the war, only 18 percent of companies in the country had bonus plans. By 1960, about 60 percent of them did. »
In 1961 came the books « Men, Money and Motivation: Executive Compensation as an Instrument of Leadership » and « What Is an Executive Worth?«
One McKinsey consultant told McDonald that Patton wrote « the same article [26] times for the Harvard Business Review. »
Because of its popularity and McKinsey’s influence, the idea became an entrenched philosophy, as did the concept that as a company grows, so should CEO pay.
While Patton’s compensation philosophy started with rigorous analysis of performance, soon it took on a life of its own, with executive pay spiraling higher and higher, while worker pay was left to languish.
Here’s where we are today, according to a report by The State Of Working America, a project of the Economic Policy Institute:
The AFL-CIO puts the number even higher, saying that the average Fortune 500 CEO makes 354 times the average wage of their employees. Some executives make 1,000 times more.
Of course, McKinsey and Patton weren’t the only factor. Bull markets and economic expansion help push pay upwards and encourage investors to look the other way — and once it moves up, pay is slow to move back down. Meanwhile, slack labor markets and weak growth prospects help to explain stagnant wages.
Regardless, McKinsey and Patton may have been a major driver in the gap between CEO and employee wages exploding by a factor of 10 since the middle of the century.
Il y a 9 jours, j’ai lancé une discussion dans le groupe Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn sur la problématique liée au versement de bonis aux hauts dirigeants des sociétés cotées. J’avais alors proposé la lecture d’un article d’Henry Mintzberg* paru le 30 novembre 2009 et publié dans le Wall Street Journal le 12 novembre 2012 : No More Executive Bonuses !
Ce partage a donné lieu à une discussion extrordinairement musclée dans le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn que je vous invite à consulter afin de saisir toute la gamme des arguments invoqués, soit pour justifier l’utilisation des bonis, soit pour proposer de nouvelles variables à tenir en ligne de compte, soit, carrément, pour vilipender les tenants de cette approche trop souvent abusive. On peut dire que l’article de Mintzberg a, encore une fois, suscité de vives réactions.
Dans son article, Mintzberg critique sévèrement l’utilisation de cette façon de rémunérer la direction des entreprises et recommande l’abolition, pure et simple, des primes au rendement et des autres bonis versés aux hauts dirigeants. Cet article me semble toujours d’actualité.
L’auteur donne cinq raisons qui guident le comportement des hauts dirigeants lorsque le système de rémunération comporte des bonis. Il suggère que le système est basé sur de fausses hypothèses, notamment :
(1) A company’s health is represented by its financial measures alone—even better, by just the price of its stock;
(2) Performance measures, whether short or long term, represent the true strength of the company;
(3) The CEO, with a few other senior executives, is primarily responsible for the company’s performance.
Je vous invite à lire l’article de Mintzberg, ci-dessous, puis à consulter le lien vous menant au fil de discussion mentionné plus haut.
Ce billet a une grande valeur pédagogique; n’hésitez pas à faire connaître votre point de vue. Bonne lecture.
Let’s end corporate bonuses, says Henry Mintzberg, a professor at the Desautels Faculty of Management at McGill University. Executive bonuses, especially stock and option grants, are a form of legal corruption that has been bringing down the global … The problem isn’t that they are poorly designed. The problem is that they exist.
… These days, it seems, there is no shortage of recommendations for fixing the way bonuses are paid to executives at big public companies. Well, I have my own recommendation: Scrap the whole thing. Don’t pay any bonuses. Nothing.
This may sound extreme. But when you look at the way the compensation game is played—and the assumptions that are made by those who want to reform it—you can come to no other conclusion. The system simply can’t be fixed. Executive bonuses—especially in the form of stock and option grants—represent the most prominent form of legal corruption that has been undermining our large corporations and bringing down the global economy. Get rid of them and we will all be better off for it.
Mintzberg Speaking (Photo credit: Daphne Depasse)
The failings of the current system—and the executives who live by it—are painfully obvious. Although these executives like to think of themselves as leaders, when it comes to their pay practices, many of them haven’t been demonstrating leadership at all. Instead they’ve been acting like gamblers—except that the games they play are hopelessly rigged in their favor.
First, they play with other people’s money—the stockholders’, not to mention the livelihoods of their employees and the sustainability of their institutions.
Second, they collect not when they win so much as when it appears that they are winning—because their company’s stock price has gone up and their bonuses have kicked in. In such a game, you make sure to have your best cards on the table, while you keep the rest hidden in your hand.
Third, they also collect when they lose—it’s called a « golden parachute. » Some gamblers.
Fourth, some even collect just for drawing cards—for example, receiving a special bonus when they have signed a merger, before anyone can know if it will work out. Most mergers don’t.
And fifth, on top of all this, there are chief executives who collect merely for not leaving the table. This little trick is called a « retention bonus »—being paid for staying in the game! …
Interventionnisme des investisseurs activistes VS défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. | Un débat de fond
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».
L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.
Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?
Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.
Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as “constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)
Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”
Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…
Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets. The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”…
Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».
L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.
Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?
Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.
Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as “constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)
Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”
Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…
Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets. The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”…
Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism.
Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document, à ma connaissance, n’a pas été traduit en français mais il mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document (traduites en français) sont les suivantes :
(1) La gestion avec une perspective court-termiste représente-t-elle un problème sérieux ?
(2) Les investisseurs activistes sont-ils des joueurs court-termistes dont les actions ont des conséquences négatives pour les entreprises à long terme ?
(3) Les conseils d’administration des sociétés canadiennes doivent-ils être mieux protégés des actions des investisseurs activistes et des offres d’achat hostiles ?
Voici quelques extraits du document ci-dessous. Je vous invite à en prendre connaissance :
Bad capitalism is finance-driven capitalism; it is capitalism without true owners, a capitalism in which corporate leaders, motivated by the carrot of lavish incentives and the stick of humiliating replacement, are singularly focused on generating short-term value for shareholders. It is a system where financial operators reap immense riches from activities of no social value.
The board members of the privatized company, often made up of general partners of the fund, are compensated at a level and in a manner hardly conceivable for board members of a publicly listed company.
Capitalism Plus retail box cover. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Board members of the newly privatized company must not be « independent » and rarely are; a majority of board members of publicly listed companies must be « independent ».
The boards of listed corporations must discharge fully all their fiduciary and legal responsibilities; that component of governance grabs a good portion of the time available to board members; privatized companies have none of these hassles and can concentrate on strategy, cash flow management, etc.
The board of a privatized companies will call directly on outside consulting firms to assess the company, its competitors and so forth, and the external consultants will report directly to the board. Now imagine that the board of a publicly listed company were to inform management that it intends to hire some firm to audit the company’s strategy and benchmark its performance. That would not fly well and would certainly create severe tensions between the board and management. Management would claim that the board is straying away from its governance role; it would contend that the company regularly gets this sort of studies and reports regularly to the board on their results, etc.
Be that as it may, a governance revolution is in the making. Novel ways of dealing with the insuperable limits of current forms of governance must be found.
Indeed, the theme of this conference could well have been « Good Capitalism versus Bad Capitalism » because short-termism and unchecked activities of speculative funds are emblematic of « bad capitalism », of the kind we must get rid.
Voici un article de Richard Leblanc paru dans BoardExpert.com que vous apprécierez sûrement. Comme à son habitude, Richard utilise un style direct et simple pour aborder l’une des facettes les plus complexes de la gouvernance des organisations : la rémunération incitative reliée à la performance à long terme.
L’auteur discute plus particulièrement d’un objet novateur : la rémunération des administrateurs alignée sur les intérêts des actionnaires.
Voici un extrait de l’article ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’approche qu’il suggère. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« Most independent directors on public company boards are compensated in a blend of cash and company shares. The equity component is typically restricted or deferred until the director retires from the board, thus postponing taxes and enabling the director to amass a portion of equity in the company to align his or her interests with shareholders (it is believed). The equity can be a predetermined number of restricted shares, or a set monetary amount in the form of share “units.”
The problem with paying independent directors this way is that there is little incentive for personal performance or company performance. Directors get paid the cash and equity regardless. There is little if any downside, especially when directors can ride a stock market or Fed driven increase in overall share prices. Not surprisingly, the activists noted this lack of incentive pay.
Sometimes money is a powerful incentive. (Photo credit: wayneandwax)
It is hardly surprising that boards do not focus on value creation, strategic planning, or maximizing company performance, survey after survey, as much as they do on compliance. Their compensation structure does not incent them to. Compensation incentives drive behavior, both for management and for directors ».
Here is what is needed to align director pay with shareholder interests:
Directors should be required to issue cheques from their personal savings accounts to purchase shares in the company. Bill Ackman of Pershing Square stated that if Canadian Pacific directors were required to cut cheques for $100,000 each, the CEO would have been fired prior to Pershing Square being involved. Mr. Ackman is right. “Skin in the game” for a director does not mean shares are given to a director in lieu of service. The motivational factor to be attuned to shareholders is greater if directors are actual investors in the company. In private equity companies, non-management directors are encouraged to “buy into” the company and invest on the same terms as other investors.
For Directors’ equity to vest (the portion they did not purchase), hurdles would need to be achieved that reflect personal performance and long-term value creation of the company. Assuming you have the right directors, this sets up a situation in which Directors are forced to engage in value creation and be rewarded for doing so, similar to private equity directors. The hurdle rate provides the incentive. The vesting hurdle should be based on the underlying performance of the company, commensurate with its risk and product cycle, possibly peer based, and not simply on riding a bull market.
The long-term performance metrics for value creation should also apply to senior management, and the board should lead by example. The vast majority of performance incentives are short-term, financial and quantitative. We know that the majority of company value however is now based on intangibles. Long-term leading indicators such as innovation, reputation, talent, resilience and sustainability are being completely overlooked in compensation design. You get what you pay for.
Management has proposed “passive” pay for directors and short-term pay for themselves. Boards have acquiesced.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement d’une vidéo extraordinaire à propos de la conception que l’on se fait de l’efficacité des OBNL, en particulier des organisations caritatives. La plupart des administrateurs de sociétés sont membres d’OBNL ou sont engagés dans la gestion de ce type d’organisation. C’est pourquoi cette vidéo réalisée par Dan Pallotta* sur TED devrait vous intéresser.
L’auteur avance qu’il existe deux ensembles de règles de gestion, l’une pour les entreprises privées et l’une pour les OBNL. Compte tenu des besoins de gestion et des règles de fonctionnement de tout système organisationnel, il ne devrait pas y avoir deux poids, deux mesures dans l’évaluation des OBNL.
Les deux types d’organisations sont soumis aux mêmes impératifs de gestion et les conseils d’administration ont les mêmes responsabilités de supervision du management et d’orientation de l’organisation. Selon Pallotta, trop d’OBNL sont valorisées lorsqu’elles dépensent peu (même si cette frugalité se fait au détriment de la croissance de l’organisation), c’est-à-dire lorsque les frais administratifs sont limités au minimum, parce que ceux-ci ne contribuent pas à la cause !
La vidéo met l’accent sur les problématiques liées (1) à la rémunération des gestionnaires lesquels doivent souvent agir bénévolement, (2) aux dépenses de publicité et de marketing qui sont considérées comme des frais administratifs relativement « superflus », (3) aux prises de risques insuffisantes pour créer de nouvelles idées et générer de nouveaux revenus, (4) à la sous-estimation du temps requis pour obtenir des résultats à long terme et (5) au manque de considération accordé à la réalisation de surplus pour assurer la pérennité de l’organisation et attirer le capital de risque.
Je vous invite à visionner cette vidéo et à partager vos expériences et vos commentaires sur la gestion des OBNL.
Activist and fundraiser Dan Pallotta calls out the double standard that drives our broken relationship to charities. Too many nonprofits, he says, are rewarded for how little they spend — not for what they get done. Instead of equating frugality with morality, he asks us to start rewarding charities for their big goals and big accomplishments (even if that comes with big expenses). In this bold talk, he says: Let’s change the way we think about changing the world.
Everything the donating public has been taught about giving is dysfunctional, says AIDS Ride founder Dan Pallotta. He aims to transform the way society thinks about charity and giving and change.
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* Dan Pallottais best known for creating the multi-day charitable event industry, and a new generation of citizen philanthropists with the AIDS Rides and Breast Cancer 3-Day events, which raised $582 million in nine years. He is president of Advertising for Humanity, which helps foundations and philanthropists transform the growth potential of their favorite grantees.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, en primeur, un rapport exceptionnel rédigé par Julia Casson pour le compte de IBE (Institute of Business Ethics) et de EcoDa (European Confederation of Director’s Associations) qui porte sur l’éthique et la gouvernance européenne et qui sera présenté à Londres le 2 juillet. À cette occasion l’auteure présentera les grandes lignes du rapport ci-joint et discutera des questions suivantes :
Why ethics has been left out of the debate around CG in the last ten years ?
Is Corporate Governance guidance working/adequate ?
What should be done about it ?
What are boards doing in practice ?
What is the role of Directors in promoting an ethical dynamics in the companies ?
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document afin de mieux appréhender les préoccupations des conseils d’administration en matière de gouvernance.
Un document vraiment précieux pour étudier toutes les facettes de l’éthique !
IBE is holding a launch of it’s latest publication A Review of the Ethical Aspects of Corporate Governance Regulation and Guidance in the EU by Julia Casson, Director of Board Insight Limited. This IBE Occasional Paper is published in association with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa).
Institute of Business Ethics (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The purpose of governance includes encouraging robust decision making and proper risk management, and to account to those that provide capital as well as other stakeholders. To support business sustainability, explicit attention to the ethical dimensions of these goals might be considered as requisite in any corporate governance guidance and regulation.
This new report suggests, however, a general lack of ethical language in corporate governance provisions at the pan-EU level in spite of an approach which is soft law and principles based and the fact that boards are expected (though not required) to set the values which will guide their company’s operations.
The event will begin with the author reflecting on the report’s findings. This will be followed by a panel discussion around:
Would it be correct to say that ethical drivers have been largely missing from the debate around corporate governance in the last ten years? • Is corporate governance guidance working? • What are boards doing in practice to promote an ethical dynamic in companies?
Panel members include: Julia Casson; Pedro Montoya, Group Chief Compliance Officer, EADS, sponsors of the report; and Paul Moxey, Head of Corporate Governance, ACCA.
Connaissez-vous bien la situation de l’actionnariat dans les organisations publiques (cotées en bourses) ? Ce compte rendu de Mary Ann Cloyd, leader du Center for Board Governance à PricewaterhouseCoopers, est paru dans la dernière édition de *ProxyPulse™, une collaboration entre Broadridge Financial Solutions et PwC’s Center for Board Governance.
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce bref rapport afin d’avoir une meilleure idée des réponses aux questions suivantes :
– What is the extent of our retail share ownership ?
– How does our company’s size impact the voting participation of our shareholders ?
– Does the company have an engagement program that allows for adequate communications with all shareholders ?
– Do we fully understand the impact of retail voting at our company ?
– Have we done sufficient cost/benefit analysis of our distribution method(s) for proxy materials and its effect on voting participation ?
– Does the company anticipate a close shareholder vote on a sensitive issue ?
– Are there situations where additional outreach to retail shareholders might make the difference on a close or sensitive voting issue? Are we leaving any opportunities to enhance a favorable voting outcome on the table ?
– Do we understand the concerns of any shareholders who may decide to organize a “vote no” campaign against one or more of our directors and what have we done to address them ?
– How do the results of our director elections compare to our peers ?
Voici un extrait de la réponse à la première question. Les deux tiers (67 %) des actions sont détenues par des institutions et le tiers (33 %) par divers autres actionnaires. Les institutions votent à 90 % tandis que les autres actionnaires ne votent qu’à 30 %.
Il est donc important de bien connaître la base actionnariale de l’entreprise afin de mettre en place la stratégie de communication susceptible de favoriser la participation du plus grand nombre d’actionnaires au vote annuel.
The company may have a higher level of retail ownership than you think; but few retail shareholders are voting. On average, institutions owned approximately 67% of public company shares and retail owned 33%. On average, 70% of the street name shares were voted: 60 percentage points by institutions and 10 percentage points by retail. With low rates of retail participation that leave 70% of retail shares un-voted, companies should reconsider strategies to encourage voting by all shareholders.
In particular, retail shareholders support management’s voting recommendations at high rates. Simply stated, an objective of engaging with this important group is to get them to vote. Newer communication channels make it more efficient for companies to engage with retail shareholders – and, more convenient than ever for them to access proxy materials and vote. In contrast, because institutional shareholders vote at very high rates, the objective is to ensure ongoing dialogue throughout the year and to eliminate the potential for “surprises” at the annual meeting.
DIRECTOR QUESTION:
– What is the extent of our retail share ownership ?
Rates of voting vary substantially between institutional and retail voting segments.
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*Mary Ann Cloyd is leader of the Center for Board Governance at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on an edition of ProxyPulse™, a collaboration between Broadridge Financial Solutions and PwC’s Center for Board Governance; the full report, including additional figures, is available here.
*ProxyPulse™ provides data and analysis on voting trends as the proxy season progresses. This first edition for the 2013 season covers the 549 annual meetings held between January 1, and April 23, 2013 and subsequent editions will incorporate May and June meetings. These reports are part of an ongoing commitment to provide valuable benchmarking data to the industry.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture de l’article d’Adam Davidson, publié dans le New York Times du 29 mai 2013. L’auteur présente une excellente analyse des facteurs qui influencent la rémunération du PCD et montre comment le conseil d’administration doit jouer un rôle capital dans l’établissement d’une rémunération juste et efficace.
Voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
« Most C.E.O.’s used to be able to handle their pay negotiations in private, but the Dodd-Frank reforms, which were passed in 2010, now give shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation. This has helped usher in a so-called “say on pay” revolution, which tries to stop executives from making more money when their companies don’t do that well. In Switzerland, a recent nationwide referendum, passed 2 to 1, gave shareholders the right to restrict the pay for the heads of Swiss companies. The European Union is likely to vote on a similar measure by the end of the year.
Economically speaking, this is more than a little odd. Shareholders should be motivated to pay their C.E.O.’s according to their success. But doing so involves a tricky dance known to game theorists as the principal-agent problem: how does an employer (the principal) motivate a worker (the agent) to pursue the principal’s interest? This principal-agent problem is everywhere. (Do you pay a contractor per day of work or per project? Do you pay salespeople by the hour or on commission?) It becomes particularly thorny when the agent knows a lot more about his job than the principal.
Boards and chief executives don’t often suffer from Costanza-like ineptitude, but they are harder to rein in. They are often rewarded when they don’t succeed but are not usually penalized enough when they do a lackluster job. Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School and perhaps the leading academic voice for corporate reform, told me that the problem isn’t (just) greed. It’s the boards of directors. The directors are supposed to represent the stockholders’ interests, he says, but most public firms, where C.E.O.’s can have considerable influence over board appointments, neuter those interests. They are structured so that a board tends to side with its chief.
Excessive C.E.O. pay, Bebchuk says, is a manifestation of a deeper problem. A bad C.E.O. pay package can cost shareholders millions; a corporation that is being poorly overseen by its board can cost billions. “Shareholder rights in the U.S. are still quite weak relative to what they are in other advanced economies,” he explained. His solution is to pass laws that make it easier for shareholders to vote out boardmembers who fail to discipline underperforming chief executives. This, he argues, will motivate them to push back against executives that do an underwhelming job. At the very least, all the attention would keep boardmembers and C.E.O.’s on their toes. And a multitude of better-run companies would result in billions, perhaps trillions, of wealth returned to the economy ».
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le communiqué de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) qui fait le point sur le colloque du Conseil scientifique de l’Autorité des marchés financiers qui s’est tenu à Paris le 23 mai 2013, en partenariat avec le Club recherche de l’Institut français des administrateurs. L’intérêt pour les questions de gouvernance en France, et dans l’ensemble des pays européens, connaît un essor prodigieux.
En tant que nord-américain, je crois qu’il est important d’être bien informé de la situation de la gouvernance européenne qui, bien que différente de la nôtre, peut s’avérer être une source de réflexion sur nos propres mécanismes de gouvernance.
Lors de ce colloque, M. Gérard Rameix, président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers, a présenté une allocution de clôture (voir au bas du communiqué) remarquée qui fait le point sur les développements récents dans le domaine de la gouvernance en France, notamment toutes les questions touchant au fonctionnement efficace des conseils d’administration (indépendance, limitation du cumul des mandats…), à la divulgation de la rémunération globale des dirigeants et à la diffusion d’information de qualité. Pour plus d’information, veuillez consulter le site de l’IFA.
Élément déterminant des modalités de gestion et de contrôle de l’entreprise, au cœur des relations entre sa direction, son conseil d’administration, ses actionnaires et les autres parties prenantes, la gouvernance des entreprises constitue, bien au-delà des marchés financiers, un thème de société. Avec des questions à la clé sur la transparence, les rémunérations et l’équilibre des pouvoirs. Depuis la loi de sécurité financière d’août 2003 qui a instauré en France une obligation d’information du marché en matière de gouvernement d’entreprise et les codes de gouvernement d’entreprise établis par les associations professionnelles, les pratiques ont réellement évolué.
Français : Institut de France, quai de Conti, Paris, France (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Dans le cadre de cette conférence, Gérard Rameix, président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers a déclaré : « Le principe « appliquer ou expliquer » est au cœur d’une régulation « souple » du gouvernement d’entreprise et en conditionne, pour large part, l’efficacité. C’est pourquoi l’AMF veille à la qualité et à la pertinence des explications données par les entreprises qui sont donc essentielles ». S’agissant des politiques de rémunération, « un dispositif plus global d’implication des actionnaires est légitime, d’autant que de nombreux Etats européens l’ont déjà mis en œuvre au cours des dernières années », a poursuivi Gérard Rameix. « L’AMF est favorable à la mise en place d’un régime de say on pay annuel, en particulier pour les plus grandes sociétés cotées, dont les enjeux de rémunération sont plus sensibles ».
« Pour avoir un conseil d’administration qui fonctionne bien et donc une gouvernance efficace, il faut consacrer du temps et de l’intelligence collective à bien composer le Conseil et à recruter les administrateurs dont la société a besoin », a de son côté tenu à déclarer Daniel Lebègue, président de l’Institut français des administrateurs. « Il y a un consensus dans tous les pays européens sur la nécessité d’une transparence renforcée et d’un véritable droit de regard des actionnaires en matière de rémunération des dirigeants. Mais, dans la mise en œuvre de ces principes, les pratiques sont très différentes d’un pays à l’autre, en particulier en ce qui a trait au rôle respectif de l’Assemblée générale des actionnaires et du conseil d’administration », a-t-il ajouté. « Tous les pays européens s’accordent pour privilégier le recours à la soft law et aux codes professionnels pour faire progresser les pratiques de gouvernance. Il reste à déterminer qui s’assure du respect du code : un comité de place ou l’autorité de marché ? »
Le colloque, qui a bénéficié de l’expertise de personnalités issues des mondes académique, parlementaire et de représentants d’institutions européenne et internationale, s’est articulé autour de deux sessions : – la première focalisée sur la composition et le fonctionnement des conseils d’administration ; – la seconde consacrée aux rémunérations des dirigeants et à la transparence. Enfin, la table ronde conclusive a été l’occasion d’un débat sur la place de la réglementation s’agissant de la gouvernance des entreprises.
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Le Conseil scientifique de l’AMF est composé de 21 personnalités issues du monde académique et financier. Ouvert sur l’international avec la présence de chercheurs étrangers, il a une triple vocation : – améliorer l’information du régulateur sur les réflexions académiques en cours dans le domaine financier ; – identifier les évolutions susceptibles d’avoir un impact sur les champs d’activité de l’AMF ; – initier des travaux de recherche en lien avec les préoccupations du régulateur.
Créé en 2006, le Club recherche de l’Institut Français des Administrateurs (IFA) vise à favoriser les échanges entre universitaires et administrateurs, à initier et à encourager les travaux de recherche dans les domaines de la gouvernance et à faire connaître l’IFA, ses positions et ses propositions dans le monde universitaire. Le Club recherche publie également la Revue Française de Gouvernance d’Entreprise (RFGE), seule revue académique, en langue française, dédiée à la gouvernance d’entreprise.
Voici le compte rendu d’une conférence donnée par Luis A. Aguilar, commissaire de la SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) qui décrit le rôle des investisseurs institutionnels et leur influence sur le contrôle des grandes sociétés publiques.
L’article est intéressant parce qu’il énonce deux problématiques cruciales eu regard à la règlementation visant les investisseurs institutionnels. (1) l’importance de la divulgation d’informations fiables aux investisseurs, (2) le besoin des investisseurs d’être entendus sur les considérations de gouvernance, notamment sur la rémunération de la haute direction.
L’article reflète la réalité américaine mais je crois que les avis de M. Aguilar sont aussi valables pour les grandes corporations canadiennes. Voici un extrait du compte rendu qui brosse un tableau éloquent des changements majeurs du rôle et de l’influence des investisseurs institutionnels survenus au cours des 60 dernières années : de 7 % de la capitalisation boursière en 1950 à 67 % en 2010 !
The topic of your conference recognizes the important role played by institutional investors and the great influence they exert in our capital markets. The role and influence of institutional investors has grown over time. For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67 % in 2010. The shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).
Institutional investor ownership is an even more significant factor in the largest corporations: In 2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate 73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.
The New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The growth in the proportion of assets managed by institutional investors has been accompanied by a dramatic growth in the market capitalization of U.S. listed companies. For example, in 1950, the combined market value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was about $94 billion. By 2012, however, the domestic market capitalization of the NYSE was more than $14 trillion, an increase of nearly1,500%. This growth is even more impressive if you add the $4.5 trillion in market capitalization on the NASDAQ market, which did not exist until 1971. The bottom line is, that as a whole, institutional investors own a larger share of a larger market.Of course, institutional investors are not all the same. They come in many different forms and with many different characteristics. Among other things, institutional investors have different organizational and governance structures, and are subject to different regulatory requirements. The universe of institutional investors includes mutual funds and ETFs regulated by the SEC, as well as pension funds, insurance companies, and a wide variety of hedge funds and managed accounts, many of which are unregulated.
And, of course, institutional investors don’t all buy or sell the same asset classes at the same time. To the contrary, they have a wide variety of distinct goals, strategies, and timeframes for their investments. As a result, their interaction with, and impact on, the market occurs in many different ways.
The growth in assets managed by institutions has also affected, and been affected by, the significant changes in market structure and trading technologies over the past few decades, including the development of the national market system, the proliferation of trading venues – including both dark pools and electronic trading platforms – and the advent of algorithmic and high-speed trading. These changes – largely driven by the trading of institutional investors – have resulted in huge increases in trading volumes. For example, in 1990, the average daily volume on the NYSE was 162 million shares. Today, just 23 years later, that average daily volume is approximately 2.6 billion shares – an increase of about 1,600%.
Simply stated, institutional investors are dominant market players, but it is difficult to fit them into any particular category. This poses a challenge for regulators, who must take into account all the many different ways institutional investors operate, and interact, with the capital markets.
It is clear, however, that professionally-managed institutions can help ensure that our capital markets function as engines for economic growth. Institutional investors are known to improve price discovery, increase allocative efficiency, and promote management accountability. They aggregate the capital that businesses need to grow, and provide trading markets with liquidity – the lifeblood of our capital markets.
In doing all this, institutional investors – like all investors – depend on the assurance of a level playing field, access to complete and reliable information, and the ability to exercise their rights as shareowners. That is why fair and intelligent regulation is necessary for the proper functioning of our capital markets.
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Récemment Pierre CABANE* me faisait part de la publication de son dernier ouvrage sur la gouvernance des sociétés. Je sais que plusieurs personnes souhaitent consulter un livre en français qui fait le tour de la question sur la gouvernance. Alors, dès l’annonce de cette publication, j’ai demandé à l’auteur de me décrire succinctement les différents thèmes abordés. Ce billet consiste donc à vous faire connaître (1) les objectifs poursuivis par la publication de cet ouvrage, (2) la clientèle visée et (3) les thèmes abordés. Vous pouvez vous procurer ce livre sur le site d’Amazone.ca
Le texte qui suit présente les points saillants de l’ouvrage de Pierre Cabane, à la suite d’une demande de ma part.
À l’heure où les crises financières secouent à intervalles de plus en plus souvent répétés le système économique, le modèle même de l’entreprise est mis en cause. La mondialisation et l’intermédiation croissante de l’économie, la nécessaire prise en compte de l’ensemble des parties prenantes (actionnaires mais aussi salariés, clients, fournisseurs, État…) les exigences des actionnaires vis-à-vis du management des sociétés, l’arrivée de nouveaux enjeux comme la responsabilité sociétale des entreprises (RSE), rendent aujourd’hui le pilotage de celles-ci à la fois plus complexe et plus responsable. Les relations entre les dirigeants, les actionnaires et les autres parties prenantes doivent être organisées pour permettre à l’entreprise de fonctionner avec efficacité dans une conviction partagée par tous que la gouvernance d’entreprise renforcera sa pérennité et sa compétitivité.
Pourquoi ce livre ?
Ce livre a pour objectif d’expliquer ce qu’est la gouvernance d’entreprise, de présenter de manière détaillée ses missions et de dresser un panorama complet de ses meilleures bonnes pratiques.
Cité-débat: Genève et la Gouvernance mondiale (Photo credit: Sandrine Salerno)
Véritable guide opérationnel sur lagouvernance, à la fois exhaustif et pratique, cet ouvrage permet aux entreprises de toutes tailles et aux membres de conseil d’administration ou de surveillance de répondre aux questions essentielles sur la gouvernance d’entreprise :
Comment est-elle née ? Quels sont ses fondements ?
Quelle est sa définition ? À quoi sert-elle ? Quelles sont ses missions ? Quels en sont les acteurs ?
Comment la mettre en place ? Quelles sont les obligations légales ?
Comment la pratiquer ? Quelle est l’information nécessaire ? Que signifie comply or explain ?
Quelles différences y a-t-il entre un conseil d’administration et un conseil de surveillance ?
Comment composer un conseil d’administration ? Quel est le rôle de l’administrateur ? Quelle est sa responsabilité ? Quels sont ses droits et ses obligations ? Quelles sont les qualités requises pour être administrateur ? Qu’est-ce qu’un administrateur indépendant ? Quel est le mode de rémunération des administrateurs ?
À quoi servent les « comités » spécialisés ?
Pourquoi la gouvernance de l’entreprise familiale est-elle particulière ?Qu’est-ce qu’une « bonne » gouvernance ?
À qui ce livre est-il destiné ?
Ce livre est destiné aux entreprises soucieuses de disposer des meilleurs systèmes de gouvernance, à celles qui envisagent d’instaurer une vraie gouvernance, aux dirigeants qui cherchent à mieux tirer parti du travail de son conseil, aux administrateurs en poste qui cherchent améliorer leur pratique de la gouvernance, aux administrateurs potentiels souhaitant se former à cette nouvelle fonction ; tous les acteurs de l’entreprise qui veulent trouver en un seul ouvrage l’ensemble des connaissances et des pratiques concernant la gouvernance, trouveront un intérêt à ce manuel. Ainsi, celui-ci pourra-t-il, par exemple, être utile :
à toute personne désireuse d’occuper un mandat d’administrateur ;
à un membre du conseil voulant rafraîchir ses connaissances ;
au président ayant la volonté de donner un nouveau dynamisme à son conseil ;
à une entreprise familiale envisageant d’intégrer des administrateurs indépendants ;
à un dirigeant se posant des questions sur l’apport réel de son conseil ;
à un fonds d’investissement souhaitant systématiser la gouvernance dans ses participations ;
à un opérationnel réfléchissant au rôle d’un administrateur ;
aux professionnels travaillant sur les concepts de gouvernance ;
aux particuliers voulant s’informer sur un sujet dont on parle beaucoup.
Comment cet ouvrage est-il construit ?
La méthode utilisée se veut pédagogique et pratique : les concepts nécessaires à la compréhension des mécanismes essentiels sont expliqués en termes simples et sont illustrés de nombreux exemples appliqués à l’entreprise. Le livre comprend plus de cent cinquante recommandations pratiques. L’appropriation par le lecteur des connaissances et des meilleures pratiques est ainsi systématiquement recherchée. Un processus itératif d’accumulation des connaissances rend préférable une lecture chronologique des différents chapitres, mais le lecteur averti peut parfaitement lire directement le chapitre qui l’intéresse.
La première partie permet de répondre à la question : qu’est-ce que la gouvernance ?
– le chapitre 1 présente l’origine, l’histoire et les conditions de mise en oeuvre de la gouvernance ;
– le chapitre 2 propose différentes définitions de la gouvernance, décrit le système de gouvernance et les principaux textes fondateurs ;
– le chapitre 3 analyse les facteurs structurants de la gouvernance et en dresse les caractéristiques principales par type d’organisation.
La deuxième partie présente les missions de la gouvernance : à quoi sert la gouvernance ?
– le chapitre 4 décrit les missions prioritaires de la gouvernance en présentant, pour chacune d’entre elles, objectifs, points clés, signaux d’alerte et recommandations pratiques ;
– le chapitre 5 s’intéresse aux missions classiques de la gouvernance suivant le même schéma ;
– le chapitre 6 dresse un panorama de situations particulières où la gouvernance va jouer un rôle important.
La troisième partie complète la formation du lecteur : comment exercer la gouvernance ?
– le chapitre 7 recense les informations juridiques essentielles, statut de l’administrateur, mandats, droits et obligations, conventions, responsabilité…
– le chapitre 8 présente toutes les pratiques de bonne gouvernance à chaque étape du mandat (avant, pendant, après), décrit le fonctionnement du conseil, les qualités et comportements des administrateurs et expose les principes d’une gouvernance « idéale » ;
– le chapitre 9 permet de disposer d’une vision synthétique de quelques questions clés de la gouvernance d’entreprise.
CONCLUSION
La décennie qui s’ouvre sera celle de la gouvernance d’entreprise. Agissant pour l’intérêt social et favorisant l’implication à long terme des actionnaires, la gouvernance permettra de soutenir, d’encadrer et d’accompagner les dirigeants. Elle contribuera au développement d’entreprises durables, maîtrisant leurs risques et orientées uniquement sur la création de valeur, même si aujourd’hui peu d’études ont été conduites pour évaluer l’impact de la mise en pratique d’une bonne gouvernance sur la stratégie et la création de valeur de l’entreprise.
Bousculant l’approche traditionnelle d’une gouvernance répressive et disciplinaire, uniquement centrée sur la gestion des conflits d’intérêts entre actionnaires et dirigeants, nous pensons que s’ouvre aujourd’hui l’ère d’une gouvernance différente ; ayant gagné en maturité, elle trouvera également un meilleur équilibre entre contrôle et création de valeur. Pour cela, il est indispensable que soient poursuivies les réflexions suivantes :
accepter une gouvernance adaptée selon les entreprises ;
privilégier le fond sur la forme ;
être vigilant quant au box-ticketing ;
imposer le comply or explain avec des explications argumentées ;
avoir un conseil véritablement actif ;
disposer d’administrateurs « libres ».
Alors, la gouvernance ne se contentera plus de courir derrière les nouvelles réglementations pour s’y adapter mais anticipera les évolutions futures de l’entreprise. Choisie et non pas uniquement imposée par la réglementation, la gouvernance d’entreprise jouera un rôle dans la performance économique et sociétale de l’entreprise, et à ce titre contribuera également à la sauvegarde non seulement des intérêts des actionnaires mais aussi de ceux de l’ensemble des parties prenantes.
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Pierre Cabane* est diplômé de l’EM Lyon et titulaire d’un master finance de l’université Dauphine. Ancien directeur financier chez L’Oréal, chef d’entreprise, il se consacre aujourd’hui à la mise en place de systèmes de gouvernance. Président de la commission Formation de l’Institut Français des Administrateurs (IFA), il est aussi administrateur indépendant de plusieurs sociétés et associations. Il a construit, en partenariat avec Sciences Po, le module de formation « Comment pratiquer la gouvernance en ETI ? », enseigne à l’université Paris Dauphine, et intervient comme conseil en stratégie dans les secteurs des biens de consommation, du luxe et de la pharmacie.
Voici un document phare sur l’étude des rémunérations jugées excessives dans les grandes sociétés publiques. Cette recherche, dirigée par Charles M. Elson et Craig K. Ferrere de l’Université du Delaware*, a été acceptée pour publication dans le Journal of Corporation Law.
Les auteurs présentent plusieurs arguments qui remettent en cause l’étalonnage compétitif (competitive benchmarking), une méthode d’établissement de la rémunération jugée inflationniste. Les auteurs font la démonstration que cette façon de faire n’est pas justifiée et que ses effets ont des répercussions pernicieuses sur toute la structure de rémunération. En fait, l’hypothèse selon laquelle il faut rémunérer « grassement » les hauts dirigeants afin de les retenir ne tient pas la route.
L’article recommande aux comités de rémunération de s’éloigner des méthodes traditionnelles de « benchmarking » et de développer des standards internes de rémunération basés sur les spécificités de l’entreprise, notamment son environnement compétitif unique. Les comités de rémunération aurait avantage à prendre connaissance de cette étude. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un résumé de l’article.
In setting the pay of their CEOs, boards invariably reference the pay of the executives at other enterprises in similar industries and of similar size and complexity. In what is described as « competitive benchmarking », compensation levels are generally targeted to either the 50th, 75th, or 90th percentile. This process is alleged to provide an effective gauge of « market wages » which are necessary for executive retention. As we will describe, this conception of such a market was created purely by happenstance and based upon flawed assumptions, particularly the easy transferability of executive talent. Because of its uniform application across companies, the effects of structural flaws in its design significantly affect the level of executive compensation.
President Barack Obama delivering remarks on new executive compensation restrictions. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
It has been observed in both the academic and professional communities that the practice of targeting the pay of executives to median or higher levels of the competitive benchmark will naturally create an upward bias and movement in total compensation amounts. Whether this escalation has been dramatic or merely incremental, the compounded effect has been to create a significant disparity between the pay of CEOs and what is appropriate to the companies they run. This is not surprising. By basing pay on primarily external comparisons, a separate regime which was untethered from the actual wage structures of the rest of the organization was established. Over time, these disconnected systems were bound to diverge.
The pay of a chief executive officer, however, has a profound effect on the incentive structure throughout the corporate hierarchy. Rising pay thus has costs far greater than the amount actually transferred to the CEOs themselves. To mitigate this, boards must set pay in a manner in which is more consistent with the internal corporate wage structures. An important step in that direction is to diminish the focus on external benchmarking.
We argue that: (I) theories of optimal market-based contracting are misguided in that they are predicated upon the chimerical notion of vigorous and competitive markets for transferable executive talent; (II) that even boards comprised of only the most faithful fiduciaries of shareholder interests will fail to reach an agreeable resolution to the compensation conundrum because of the unfounded reliance on the structurally malignant and unnecessary process of peer benchmarking; and, (III) that the solution lies in avoiding the mechanistic and arbitrary application of peer group data in arriving at executive compensation levels. Instead, independent and shareholder-conscious compensation committees must develop internally created standards of pay based on the individual nature of the organization concerned, its particular competitive environment and its internal dynamics.
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*Cette recherche a été financée par (1) The Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, (2) The Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute et (3) The Social Science Research Network.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un très bon article publié par Nicolas Van Praet et paru dans le Financial Post du 15 avril 2013. L’article porte sur l’état de la situation canadienne eu égard à l’adoption de politiques “Say-on-Pay” par les grandes sociétés publiques.
On y présente Yves Michaud, fondateur du Médac, comme l’un des plus grands défenseurs canadiens des principes de gouvernance exemplaire. En effet, celui-ci prêche par l’exemple en se présentant, souvent personnellement, aux assemblées annuelles des grandes sociétés afin, entre autre, de se prononcer sur l’équité de la rémunération globale de la haute direction.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article en ayant à l’esprit que la réglementation canadienne diffère de la réglementation américaine en ce sens que la consultation des actionnaires sur la rémunération est volontaire au Canada, tandis qu’elle est obligatoire aux É.U. Voici un extrait de l’article.
Quel est votre point de vue sur ce sujet ? Croyez-vous, comme Richard Leblanc, que la consultation des actionnaires sur la rémunération de la direction (Say-on Pay) peut avoir des effets bénéfiques sur les politiques de rémunération ?
« Every spring, a bespectacled little man with a silver moustache and a penchant for theatrics takes the microphone at select annual shareholder meetings in Canada and gives directors and management a multi-minute tongue-lashing about every corporate governance flaw he’s identified at their company. It’s the gospel according to Yves Michaud. This year, like last, Mr. Michaud, founder of Montreal-based shareholder rights group Médac, will try to get the investors of Power Corp. and Quebecor Inc. to adopt advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation — so-called say on pay. This time, like last, the proposal he or his Médac colleagues make will be defeated…
… Proponents insist more and more companies are adopting the voluntary practice each year, simply as a matter of good governance. Critics don’t see the point. And so while much of the world moves to a mandatory say on pay system, with some countries even making the votes binding on boards, a deep philosophical rift persists on the question in this country – making the matter tougher for regulators as they figure out the right approach for Canada…
… To date, roughly 80% of Canada’s 60 biggest publicly-traded companies have embraced say on pay, according to the most recent figures provided by Toronto-based law firm Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg…
… Still, the practice has had an impact, argues Richard Leblanc, a corporate governance specialist at York University. “The effect of say on pay has been more shareholder engagement as opposed to voting down pay packages,” says Mr. Leblanc, adding that regulators everywhere are grappling with compensation regimes, including questions like the proper ratio of executive pay to that of the average worker. “We’re not through it yet and this is not a solved problem.”
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 