L’objectif visé par les fonds d’investissement activistes afin de profiter au maximum de leurs interventions : la vente de l’entreprise au plus offrant !


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article de Roger L. Martinex-doyen de la Rotman School of Management de l’Université de Toronto, paru dans Harvard Business Review le 20 août 2018, qui remet en question la valeur des interventions des fonds activistes au cours des dernières années.

L’auteur pourfend les prétendus bénéfices des campagnes orchestrées par les fonds activistes en s’appuyant notamment sur une étude d’Allaire qui procure des données statistiques probantes sur les rendements des fonds activistes.

Ainsi, l’étude publiée par Allaire montre que les fonds d’investissement activistes réalisent des rendements moyens de 12,4 %, comparés à 13,5 % pour le S&P 500. Le rendement était de 13,9 % pour des firmes de tailles similaires dans les mêmes secteurs industriels.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance d’une présentation PPT du professeur Allaire qui présente des résultats empiriques très convaincants : Hedge Fund Activism : Some empirical evidence.

Le résultat qui importe, et qui est très payant, pour les investisseurs activistes est la réalisation de la vente de l’entreprise ciblée afin de toucher la prime de contrôle qui est de l’ordre de 30 %.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12,4 % to a stupendous 94,3 %.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t Good for Companies or Investors, So Why Do They Exist?

 

 

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Activist hedge funds have become capital market and financial media darlings. The Economist famously called them“capitalism’s unlikely heroes” in a cover story, and the FT published an article saying we “should welcome” them.

But they are utterly reviled by CEOs. And at best, their performance is ambiguous.

The most comprehensive study of activist hedge fund performance that I have read is by Yvan Allaire at the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations in Montreal, which studies hedge fund campaigns against U.S. companies for an eight-year period (2005–2013).

Total shareholder return is what the activist hedge funds claim to enhance. But for the universe of U.S. activist hedge fund investments Allaire studied, the mean compound annual TSR for the activists was 12.4% while for the S&P500 it was 13.5% and for a random sample of firms of similar size in like industries, it was 13.9%. That is to say, if you decided to invest money in a random sample of activist hedge funds, you would have earned 12.4% before paying the hedge fund 2% per year plus 20% of that 12.4% upside. If instead you would have invested in a Vanguard S&P500 index fund, you would have kept all but a tiny fraction of 13.5%.

Since the returns that they produce underwhelm, why do activist hedge funds exist? Why do investors keep giving them money? It is an important question because the Allaire data shows the truly sad and unfortunate outcomes for the companies after the hedge funds ride off into the sunset, after a median holding period of only 423 unpleasant days. Over this span, employee headcount gets reduced by an average of 12%, while R&D gets cut by more than half, and returns don’t change.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12.4% to a stupendous 94.3%.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

But why is this such a lucrative avenue? It is because of the control premium. When a S&P500-sized company gets sold, the average premium over the prevailing stock price that is paid for the right to take over that company is in excess of 30%. This is ironic, of course, because studies show the majority of acquisitions don’t earn the cost of capital for the buyer. It is a case of the triumph of hope over reality – which is not unusual. It is not dissimilar to what happens in the National Football League where the trade price for a future draft pick is typically higher than the trade price for an accomplished successful player. That is because the acquiring team dreams that the player it will pick in the draft will be more awesome than that player is likely to turn out to be. But hope springs eternal!

The activist hedge funds have their eyes focused laser-like on the control premium — which for the S&P 500, which has a market capitalization of $23 trillion, is conservatively a $7 trillion pie assuming a 30% control premium. To get a piece of that scrumptious pie, all they need to do is pressure their victim to put itself up for sale and they will have “created shareholder value.” Of course, on average, they will have destroyed shareholder value for the acquiring firm, but they couldn’t care less. They are long gone by that time; off to the next victim.

And they have lots of friends to help them access the control premium pie. Investment bankers want to help them do the deal whether it is a good deal or not and that $7 trillion pie for hedge funds translates into a multibillion dollar annual slice for investment bankers. And for the M&A lawyers that need to opine on the deal. And the accounting firms that need to audit the deal. And for the proxy voting firms that collect the votes for and against the deal. And the consultants who get hired to do post-merger integration. And the financial press that gets to write stories about an exciting deal.

It is an entire ecosystem that sees the $7 trillion pie and wants a piece of it. It doesn’t matter a whit whether a hedge-fund inspired change of control is a good thing for customers, employees or the combined shareholders involved (selling plus acquiring). It is too lucrative a pie to pass up.

What will stop this lunacy? When shareholders come to their senses and realize that when an activist hedge fund has pressured a company intensively enough to put it up for sale, they are simply feeding the hedge fund beast and the vast majority of the time it will be at their own expense. When activist hedge funds’ access to the $7 trillion pie is shut off, they will have to rely on their ability to actually make their victims perform better. And their track record on that front is mediocre at best.

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Roger L. Martin is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute and a former . He is a coauthor of Creating Great Choices: A Leader’s Guide to Integrative Thinking.

La place des femmes sur les CA et dans la haute direction des entreprises


Voici un rapport qui fait le point sur la place des femmes dans les CA et dans des postes de haute direction des entreprises publiques (cotées) américaines et internationales.

Cet article, publié par Subodh Mishra* directeur de Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), est paru sur le forum du Harvad Law School on Corporate Governance, le 13 août 2018.

On note des progrès dans tous les domaines, mais l’évolution est encore trop lente. Eu égard à la présence des femmes sur les CA des grandes entreprises cotées, c’est la France qui remporte la palme avec 43 % de femmes sur les CA.

Les entreprises se dotent de plus en plus de politique de divulgation de la diversité sur les postes de haute direction. Le Danemark (96 %), l’Australie (91 %) et le R.U. (84 %) sont en tête de liste en ce qui concerne la présence de politique à cet égard. Les É.U. (32 %) et la Russie (22 %) ferment la marche. Le Canada est en milieu de peloton avec 63 %.

L’infographie présentée ici montre clairement les tendances dans ce domaine.

L’auteur identifie les cinq pratiques émergentes les plus significatives pour mettre en œuvre une politique de diversité exemplaire.

(1) Address subtle or unconscious bias.

Cultivating a strong culture free of subtle or unconscious bias is a fundamental step towards an inclusive work environment. A meta-analysis by the Harvard Business Review finds that subtle discrimination has as negative effects, if not more negative, than overt discrimination, as it can drain emotional and cognitive resources, it can accumulate quickly, and is difficult to address through legal recourse. The researchers suggest that structured processes and procedures around hiring, assignments, and business decisions limit the opportunity for unconscious bias to creep in. In addition, they suggest training programs and practicing techniques, such as mindfulness, to reduce bias.

(2) Establish clear diversity targets and measure progress towards goals.

Most companies with gender diversity strategies set clear, measurable targets. BP has set a goal of women representing at least 25 percent of its group leaders by 2020, while Symantecaims at having 30 percent of leadership roles occupied by women by the same year. This approach allows firms to focus on concrete performance results, while also creating a framework of accountability in the company’s gender diversity and inclusion program.

(3) Focus on key roles and redefine the path to leadership.

True meritocracy should determine the criteria for leadership roles. However, companies should recognize that there may be multiple paths to the CEO position, and should focus on their efforts on roles that lead to those paths. Women CEOs Speak, A Korn Ferry Institute study supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, identifies four different career approaches for women to prepare for the CEO role. However, the study identifies early assumption of profit-and-loss responsibilities in all four paths as a crucial experience leading to top positions.

(4) Establish mentorship and sponsorship programs.

Training and development programs within the organization can help facilitate mentorships and sponsorships, which are crucial in career development. GM’s Diversity and Inclusion Report explains how its Executive Leadership Program aims at creating a support network of female leaders, as well as training and development sessions hosted by female executives. Mentors can support employees earlier in their career with coaching and advice, while sponsors take a more active role later in one’s career to promote the individual. Gender should obviously not constitute a barrier for such mentorships and sponsorships, and organizations should take active steps to encourage such relationships across genders and remove any hesitations or biases.

(5) Provide flexibility and support towards work-life balance.

Top executive assignments often involve significant time commitments and travel that can impact an executive’s family life. In a New York Times news analysis, former McDonald’s executive Janice Fields, identified her choice not to work overseas as a handicap to becoming the CEO. Making accommodations in relation family, including both children and spouses, can remove some significant hurdles for women.

 

 

Women in the C-Suite: The Next Frontier in Gender Diversity

 

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Despite recent advances in female board participation globally, gender diversity among top executives remains disappointingly low across all markets, with some improvement discerned in the past few years. Moreover, there does not appear a correlation between board gender diversity and gender diversity in the C-Suite at the market level. Some of the markets that have implemented gender quotas on boards and have achieved the highest rates of female board participation, such as France, Sweden, and Germany, appear to have embarrassingly low rates of female top executives. In fact, many of the markets with progressive board diversity policies have lower gender diversity levels in executive positions compared to several emerging markets like South Africa, Singapore, and Thailand. Thus, achieving higher rates of gender diversity in the C-Suite will require deeper cultural shifts within organizations in order to overcome potential biases and hurdles to gender equality.

The number of female top executives remains low

 

In the past decade, gender quotas, policy initiatives, and—more recently—investor pressure have led to boards improving female board participation in Europe and North America significantly. The percentage of female directors in the Russell 3000 increased from 10 percent in 2008 to 18 percent in 2018, with most of the increase taking place since 2013. Similarly, the percentage of female directors in ISS’s core universe of widely-held European firms more than tripled from 8 percent in 2008 to 27 percent in 2018. While the recent push by policymakers, investors, and advocacy groups for greater gender diversity has primarily focused on board positions, the discussion is beginning to evolve to encompass diversity in all leadership roles, including top management. In the United States, we have observed small but significant changes in the gender composition of the C-Suite over the past five years. Since 2012, the Russell 3000 has seen a 70-percent increase in the number of female CEOs. Despite the relative increase, the number of top female executives remains disappointingly low, with only 5 percent of Russell 3000 companies having a female CEO in 2018.

 

Companies need to develop the pipeline of female executive leaders

 

The scarcity of female CEOs does not appear surprising, especially after taking a closer look at the rest of the members of the C-Suite, who often comprise the primary candidates in line for succession for the top job. These roles include the Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Head of Sales, among others. Only 9 percent of top executive positions in the Russell 3000 are filled by women, which means that companies have a long way to go towards building gender equity within the top ranks where the next generation of CEOs are cultivated. Certain sectors lag considerably more than others, with Real Estate, Telecommunications and Energy exhibiting the lowest rates of female named executive officers.

 

Within the C-Suite, gender differentiation persists in terms of executive roles

 

The picture seems even bleaker for the future of gender parity at the CEO level when examining the types of roles that female top executives currently occupy within their organizations. Female executives appear scarcer at roles with profit-and-loss responsibilities that often serve as stepping stones to the CEO role, such as COO, Head of Sales, or CEOs of business units and subsidiary groups. Meanwhile, women are more highly concentrated in positions that rarely see a promotion to the top job, such as Human Resources Officer, General Counsel, and Chief Administrative Officer.

 

 

Not surprisingly, and in conjunction with the disparity in functions described above, women who belong to the group of the five highest paid executive officers in their organization, are far more likely to rank fourth or fifth in pay rank compared to their male counterparts. Approximately 46 percent of women in the top five positions rank either fourth or fifth in pay, compared to 33 percent of male top five executives in these pay rankings.

 

Breaking down barriers to gender diversity in the C-Suite

 

Companies can take a number steps to foster gender diversity in their executive leadership, and to remove biases or potential obstacles to an inclusive management environment. Many companies have identified gender diversity in leadership positions as a key priority, and have established gender diversity strategies to achieve specific goals. While workforce diversity policies appear to become the standard across most markets, gender diversity policies at the senior management level are common only in some markets. According to ISS Environmental & Social QualityScore data, the majority of companies in developed European markets and Canada disclose gender diversity policies for senior managers. The practice has not been widely established United States, where 32 percent of the S&P 500 and only 4 percent of the remaining Russell 3000 disclose such policies.

 

 

Several companies and advocacy groups identify gender diversity and inclusion as a major driver for talent acquisition and performance. The recognition of the absence of women in top executive roles has sparked several initiatives that seek to promote inclusivity in the workplace. The Rockefeller Foundation’s 100×25 advocacy initiative aims at bringing more women to the C-Suite, with the explicit goal of having 100 Fortune 500 female CEOs by 2025. Meanwhile, Paradigm for Parity was formed by a coalition of business leaders (CEOs, founders, and board members), and set the goal of achieving full gender parity by 2030. The group has created a 5-point action plan to help companies accelerate their progress.

Based on the work of these initiatives and actual programs disclosed by companies, we identify five of the emerging best practices that companies adopt to address gender diversity in leadership roles.

Address subtle or unconscious bias. Cultivating a strong culture free of subtle or unconscious bias is a fundamental step towards an inclusive work environment. A meta-analysis by the Harvard Business Review finds that subtle discrimination has as negative effects, if not more negative, than overt discrimination, as it can drain emotional and cognitive resources, it can accumulate quickly, and is difficult to address through legal recourse. The researchers suggest that structured processes and procedures around hiring, assignments, and business decisions limit the opportunity for unconscious bias to creep in. In addition, they suggest training programs and practicing techniques, such as mindfulness, to reduce bias.

Establish clear diversity targets and measure progress towards goals. Most companies with gender diversity strategies set clear, measurable targets. BP has set a goal of women representing at least 25 percent of its group leaders by 2020, while Symantecaims at having 30 percent of leadership roles occupied by women by the same year. This approach allows firms to focus on concrete performance results, while also creating a framework of accountability in the company’s gender diversity and inclusion program.

Focus on key roles and redefine the path to leadership. True meritocracy should determine the criteria for leadership roles. However, companies should recognize that there may be multiple paths to the CEO position, and should focus on their efforts on roles that lead to those paths. Women CEOs Speak, A Korn Ferry Institute study supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, identifies four different career approaches for women to prepare for the CEO role. However, the study identifies early assumption of profit-and-loss responsibilities in all four paths as a crucial experience leading to top positions.

Establish mentorship and sponsorship programs. Training and development programs within the organization can help facilitate mentorships and sponsorships, which are crucial in career development. GM’s Diversity and Inclusion Report explains how its Executive Leadership Program aims at creating a support network of female leaders, as well as training and development sessions hosted by female executives. Mentors can support employees earlier in their career with coaching and advice, while sponsors take a more active role later in one’s career to promote the individual. Gender should obviously not constitute a barrier for such mentorships and sponsorships, and organizations should take active steps to encourage such relationships across genders and remove any hesitations or biases.

Provide flexibility and support towards work-life balance. Top executive assignments often involve significant time commitments and travel that can impact an executive’s family life. In a New York Times news analysis, former McDonald’s executive Janice Fields, identified her choice not to work overseas as a handicap to becoming the CEO. Making accommodations in relation family, including both children and spouses, can remove some significant hurdles for women.

_________________________________________________________________

*Subodh Mishra is Executive Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS Analytics publication by Kosmas Papadopoulos, Managing Editor at ISS Analytics.

La nouvelle loi californienne | Instauration de quotas pour accélérer la diversité sur les CA


Aujourd’hui, je souhaite vous familiariser avec la réalité de la nouvelle loi californienne eu égard à la mise en place de quotas pour accélérer la diversité sur les conseils d’administration.

Cet article paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, par David A. Katz et Laura A. McIntosh, associés à la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, explique le contexte menant à la nouvelle législation californienne.

La Californie se distingue par l’originalité et par le caractère affirmatif de sa loi sur la composition des conseils d’administration. Bien entendu, cette loi a ses détracteurs, notamment les chambres de commerce qui redoutent les impacts négatifs de la loi pour les plus petites entreprises qui ont des CA composés essentiellement d’hommes !

Mais, il faut noter que l’état de la Californie est le seul état américain à avoir légiféré sur la diversité des membres de conseils d’administration en proposant des mesures qui s’apparentent aux quotas imposés par plusieurs pays européens.

Voici un extrait de l’article qui résume assez bien le contenu de cette loi.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The bill that passed the California State Senate at the end of May 2018 would, if enacted, require any public company with shares listed on a major U.S. stock exchange that has its principal executive offices in California to have at least one woman on its board by December 31, 2019. By year-end 2021, such companies with five directors would be required to have two women on the board, and companies with six or more directors would be required to have three women on the board.

 

 

 

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California has made headlines this summer with legislative action toward instituting gender quotas for boards of directors of public companies headquartered in the state. The legislation has passed the state senate; to be enacted, it must be passed by the California state assembly and signed by the governor. In 2013, California became the first state to pass a precatory resolution promoting gender diversity on public company boards, and five other states have since followed suit. The current legislative effort has come under criticism for a variety of reasons, and, while it is not certain to become law, it could be a harbinger of a broader push for public company board gender quotas in the United States. It is worth considering whether quotas in this area would be beneficial or harmful to the larger goals of gender parity and board diversity.

 

The California Bill

 

The bill that passed the California State Senate at the end of May 2018 would, if enacted, require any public company with shares listed on a major U.S. stock exchange that has its principal executive offices in California to have at least one woman on its board by December 31, 2019. By year-end 2021, such companies with five directors would be required to have two women on the board, and companies with six or more directors would be required to have three women on the board.

Section 1 of the California bill (SB 826) presents an argument in favor of establishing gender quotas: More women directors would be beneficial to California’s economy in various ways, yet progress toward gender parity is too slow. The bill cites studies indicating that companies perform better with women on their boards and observes that other countries have used quotas to achieve 30 percent to 40 percent representation. The bill notes that, of California public companies in the Russell 3000 as of June 2017, 26 percent had no women on their boards, while women composed 15.5 percent of directors on boards that have at least one woman. The bill cites further studies showing that, at current rates, it could take approximately four decades to achieve gender parity on boards. And finally, Section 1 of the bill concludes by citing studies suggesting that having at least three women directors increases board effectiveness.

The Opposing View

 

The California bill has been controversial. The California Chamber of Commerce filed an opposition letter on behalf of numerous organizations arguing that the bill would violate state and federal constitutions and conflict with existing California civil rights law, on the basis that it requires a person to be promoted—and another person disqualified—simply on the basis of gender. California legislators dispute that the bill requires men to be displaced by women, noting that boards can simply increase their size. This may be easier said than done, however: Because the required quota increases with board size, a company with a four-man board that did not wish to force out a current director would need to add three women to accommodate the requirements of the law by 2021. Suddenly expanding from four to seven would entail a very significant change to board dynamics. For a previously well-functioning board, the negative effects of a change that dramatic could outweigh the benefits of gender diversity.

Further, the bill’s opponents argue that prioritizing only one element of diversity would be suboptimal, especially at time when many California companies are engaged in addressing and increasing diversity by focusing on all classifications of diversity. Advocates for greater representation of ethnic minority groups on boards have expressed concerns that prioritizing gender will be detrimental to progress toward greater ethnic diversity. For purposes of increasing overall diversity, quotas are not a solution that can be applied broadly; if quotas such as those in the California bill were established not only for gender but for ethnic and other categories of diversity, the project of board composition would soon become a near-impossible logic and recruitment puzzle, as nominating committees struggled to meet mandated quotas, expertise needs, and director independence requirements, all within the board size parameters set forth in the company’s organizing documents. Board functioning and effectiveness would be severely compromised by the legislative micromanaging of board composition.

Thanks to the establishment of quotas in various European countries over the past 15 years, there is evidence as to the effect of gender quotas for boards. A 2018 Economist study found that, despite high expectations, the effects of quotas were, in some ways, disappointing. According to the Economist, greater numbers of women on boards did not necessarily produce better performance or decision-making, nor was there a trickle-down effect of boosting women’s progress to senior management jobs.

On the other hand, fears about unqualified women being put on boards, or a few qualified women being overboarded, also did not materialize. While there is a great deal of evidence showing that having women directors does produce more effective boards—and there are even indications in Europe that diverse boards are less likely to be targeted by shareholder activists—the Economist study shows that diversity achieved through government-imposed quotas may not be as beneficial as diversity achieved through private-ordering efforts.

The Big Picture

 

Progress toward gender diversity in the board room is accelerating. In the first fiscal quarter of 2018, nearly one-third of new directorships in the Russell 3000 went to women, and for the first time, fewer than 20 percent of companies in that index had all-male boards. Institutional investors, corporate governance activists, and many large companies have been at the forefront of this progress. State Street and BlackRock have been leaders on this issue in the United States. Similarly, in the UK—a country that has made significant efforts to improve gender diversity on boards while also resisting the imposition of quotas—the large investment funds Legal & General Investment Management and Standard Life Aberdeen Plc have said that they will vote against boards that are composed of less than 25 percent or 20 percent women, respectively. British institutional investor Hermes has said that it expects boards to include at minimum 30 percent women, and it led a failed opposition to the reelection of the chairman of mining group Rio Tinto Plc due to lack of diversity on the board. Given the effectiveness of recent efforts by the private sector, and in light of the intense resistance to quotas in the business community, government intervention to establish quotas may be unnecessary as well as undesirable.

Recent research shows that simply adding women to boards does not necessarily improve board performance. As common sense would suggest, it turns out that to be a positive factor, the gender composition of the board must be considered along with the skills and knowledge of the board as a whole in the context of the organization and its stakeholders. A 2017 academic study indicated that the “right” level of gender diversity may be proportionate to the number of female stakeholders—employees, clients, and suppliers, for example—and may vary across countries and cultures. In certain circumstances, the appropriate gender diversity ratio might well be over 50 percent women. The authors of the study caution against selecting directors based on quotas if, in so doing, gender diversity is prioritized over the expertise needs of the board.

Overall board diversity, including gender and ethnic minorities, has never been higher. According to a comprehensive 2018 study by James Drury Partners, overall board diversity is now at 34 percent for America’s 651 largest corporations, as measured by revenue and market capitalization. The level of board diversity is increasing, as 49 percent of the 449 newly elected directors at these companies represent diverse groups. Of particular note, the study revealed that the diversity distribution of the 6,225 directors currently serving on the boards of these companies corresponds very closely to the diversity of the population in the executive ranks of 222 companies studied by McKinsey & Co. and LeanIn.org. While there clearly is more room for progress toward greater diversity at both the executive and board levels, this data point shows that boardrooms are indeed mirroring the increasingly diverse leadership of U.S. business.

The benefit of mandatory quotas, as the business community has seen through European examples, is that they compel companies and shareholders to focus on board composition and to establish more formal recruitment processes in order to find the necessary directors. Such developments are certainly beneficial. That said, boards can and should focus on composition and recruitment in the absence of quotas, and indeed they are doing so to a greater extent than ever before. Proponents of gender diversity can be heartened by recent developments in the United States, as organic and market-driven efforts have produced results that increase the business community’s enthusiasm for diverse boards. A real danger of legislation like the California bill is that context-free quotas may have the effect of destabilizing boards and undermining the business case for increased gender diversity. Were that to occur, then not only boards themselves, but stakeholders, the business community, and the larger societal goals of gender parity and board diversity would suffer as well.

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*David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz and Ms. McIntosh that originally appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Les fonds activistes accusés d’hypocrisie !


Il y a une pléthore d’arguments qui circulent dans la littérature sur la gouvernance et qui concernent les pour et contre des fonds activistes eu égard aux avantages pour les actionnaires.
Voici un article publié par Kai Haakon E. Liekefett*, président de Shareholder Activism Defense Team, paru dans récemment dans ethicalboardroom.
L’auteur tente de montrer l’hypocrisie des fonds activistes de type « edge fund » eu égard aux points suivants :

1. Undermining the shareholder franchise

2. Weakening board independence and diversity

– Overboarding

– Director tenure

– Mandatory retirement age

3. Inconsistency on takeover defences

 

 

The hypocrisy of hedge fund activists

 

 

 

In virtually every activism campaign, hedge fund activists don the mantle of the shareholders’ champion and accuse the target company’s board and management of subpar corporate governance.

This claim to having ‘best practices of corporate governance’ at heart is hollow – even hypocritical – as evidenced by at least three examples: hedge fund activists actually undermine the shareholder franchise, they weaken the independence and diversity of the board, and they waffle on their anti-takeover protection stance.

 

1. Undermining the shareholder franchise

 

Shareholders have a significant interest in maintaining their franchise: the right to elect directors, approve significant transactions such as a merger or the sale of all or a substantial part of the assets, or amend the charter of a corporation. Hedge fund activists promote themselves as ferocious proponents of this franchise and of ‘shareholder democracy’. In their campaigns, they demand shareholder votes on any matter that allegedly touches on shareholder rights, including areas where corporate law and the bylaws bestow authority on the board.

Yet, in most activism situations, activists seek to influence board decisions and obtain board seats through private settlement negotiations. The price of peace for the corporation is often accepting the addition of one or more activist representatives to the board to avoid the cost and disruption of a proxy contest. Notably, hedge fund activists will accuse directors of  ‘entrenchment’ if a board does not settle and instead opts to let the shareholders decide at the ballot box. This practice of entering into private settlements to appoint directors without a shareholder vote is, of course, directly contrary to the shareholder franchise. For this reason, major institutional investors have called publicly on companies to engage with a broader base of shareholders prior to settling with an activist.

In the same vein, activists habitually accuse directors of ‘disenfranchising shareholders’ when they refresh the board in the face of an activist campaign, arguing that a board must not appoint new directors without shareholder approval. Remarkably, all these concerns for the shareholder franchise quickly disappear once a company engages in settlement discussions with an activist. In private negotiations, activists commonly insist on an immediate appointment to the board. A board’s request to delay the appointment and allow shareholders to vote on an activist’s director designees at the annual meeting is usually met with fierce resistance.

“THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ‘BEST PRACTICES’ THAT ACTIVISTS TEND TO IGNORE IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CAMPAIGNS”

Note also that in these private settlement negotiations, activists almost always seek recovery of their campaign expenses and companies typically agree to some level of payment. These demands for expense reimbursement are almost never submitted to shareholders for approval. While the proxy rules expressly require dissidents to disclose ‘whether the question of such reimbursement will be submitted to a vote of security holders’, an activist hedge fund’s interest in the shareholder franchise evaporates once the fund’s own wallet is concerned. All too often, it appears that the activists’ concern for the shareholder franchise is merely for public consumption.

 

2. Weakening board independence and diversity

 

The main target of most activist campaigns is the composition of a company’s board of directors. The business model of hedge fund activism is to identify undervalued public companies whose intrinsic value is substantially higher than the share price on the stock exchange. And if the stock market undervalues a company, then it is only fair to look to those in charge of the company: the board of directors. Consequently, activists often argue that a board needs a refresh, typically calling for ‘shareholder representatives’ and ‘industry experts’ to be appointed as directors.

Of course, activists are not interested in just any type of ‘shareholder representative’ in the boardroom. The preferred director candidate is a principal or employee of the activist hedge fund itself. The reason is that activists intend to use the influence in the boardroom to push aggressively for their own agenda. And, in most cases, that agenda is to push the company to take some strategic action that will return financial value to the hedge fund in the near-term – such as a quick sale at a premium – irrespective of the company’s long-term potential.

Often, an activist will also identify the need for more ‘industry experts’ to join the board and propose experts affiliated with the activist to be added. Activists may give lip service to the need for independent director candidates but when they have to choose between placing an independent candidate or themselves on the board, their preferred candidate is an activist principal or employee. Frequently, even if they passionately argued for ‘much-needed industry expertise’ beforehand, activists are quick to drop their independent board nominee in favour of a 30-something activist employee who lacks any significant relevant experience. This is particularly true for smaller activist hedge funds but is also evident at larger companies. Last year, ISS and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC) published a study of the impact of activism on board refreshment at S&P 1500 companies targeted by activists.  The study found that activist nominees and directors appointed to boards by activists via settlements were nearly three times more likely to be ‘financial services professionals’ compared to directors appointed unilaterally by boards.

Moreover, while proxy advisory firms and key institutional investors increasingly demand more gender and ethnic diversity in boardrooms, most activist slates exclusively feature white, male director candidates. According to last year’s ISS/IRRC study, women comprised only 8.4 per cent of dissident nominees on proxy contest ballots and directors appointed via settlements with activists, and only 4.2 per cent of those candidates and directors were ethnically or racially diverse.

There are numerous other examples of corporate governance ‘best practices’ that activists tend to ignore in connection with their campaigns:

(a) Overboarding ISS, Glass Lewis and most institutional investors agree that a director should not sit on too many boards (in particular if the director is also an executive in his ‘daytime’ job). For activists, this seems to be a non-issue when it comes to themselves or their fund-nominated candidates. In addition, the practice of funds nominating the same people for various campaigns raises independence concerns. As noted in the aforementioned ISS/IRRC study: “Many of these ‘busy’ directors appear to be ‘go-to’ nominees for individual activists. The serial nomination of favourite candidates raises questions about the ‘independence’ of these individuals from their activist sponsors”.

(b) Director tenure Directors who sit on the same board for 10 years and more typically end up in the crosshairs of activist hedge funds, which argue that such directors are entrenched and cannot provide objective oversight. However, it is not uncommon for activist directors to remain on the board for many years if they cannot push the company into a sale.

(c) Mandatory retirement age Young activists frequently decry the high average age of boards and may target older directors as part of a campaign. By contrast, one rarely hears a call for age limits on the board from the more seasoned activists of the 1980s, who are pushing 70 years and beyond. In some campaigns, activists nominated director candidates who were 75 years old, 80 years old or even older.

 

3. Inconsistency on takeover defences

 

Activists love to attack companies for their takeover defences and perceived lack of ‘shareholder rights’. They crucify boards who dare to adopt a poison pill in response to a hostile bid or activist stake accumulation. They condemn bylaw amendments for ‘changing the rules of the game after the game has started’. And they deride classified boards as an outrageous entrenchment device whose sole purpose is to shield incumbent directors from the ballot box.

UNLOCKING VALUE Activist hedge funds want to deliver outsize returns within two years

Against this backdrop, it is fascinating and educational to observe what sometimes happens once activists join a board. Activists claim to hate poison pills unless, of course, they were able to acquire a large stake of 15 to 25 per cent before the pill was adopted. In these cases, an activist is sometimes perfectly fine with capping other shareholders at 10 per cent or less because it ensures that the activist remains the largest shareholder with the most influence.

It is also not usual for an activist-controlled board to maintain the very same bylaws the activist previously voraciously attacked in the campaign. Sometimes, activists will limit shareholder rights even further. The rights to act by written consent and call special meetings tend to be among the victims. If shareholders can act by written consent or call special meetings to remove the board, insurgents do not have to wait for an annual shareholder meeting to wage a proxy fight. However, once activists are in charge of a boardroom, these shareholder rights primarily constitute a threat to their own control.

The last example is the classified board (aka ‘staggered board’). In a company with a classified board, only a fraction (usually, one third) of the board members are up for re-election every year. Activists are fierce opponents of classified boards. Classification makes it harder for them to win a proxy fight. For example, it is more difficult to win an election contest for three board seats on a nine-member board if only three board seats are up for election and not all nine directorships. Activists also like the intimidation factor of threatening a proxy fight for control of a board. It makes it easier to settle for two or three seats if the activist starts by demanding seven or more seats. Everything changes, of course, once an activist is on the board. Then, many activists are perfectly comfortable with with it being a classified board. In settlement negotiations, activists often fight hard to be in the director classes that are not up for re-election in the near term. Occasionally, they even suggest a ‘reshuffling’ of the director classes to achieve this. Activists also often refuse to leave a classified board after a standstill expires, arguing that they need to be allowed to serve out their three-year term – even if they previously campaigned for annual director elections.

“ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLOAK THEMSELVES IN THE MANTLE OF SHAREHOLDER CHAMPION WHILE PRIVATELY PUSHING TO INCREASE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE”

In other words, when it comes to takeover defences, activists’ perspectives depend on whether they have control of the boardroom or not. When activists are successful in ‘conquering the castle’, there is sometimes little reluctance on their part to pull up the drawbridge.

The true reason why activists love corporate governance

 

These examples make clear that most activists really do not care about corporate governance all that much. So why are activists so focussed on corporate governance in their campaigns? For the same reason why politicians kiss babies during political campaigns: it plays well with the voters. Most institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis care deeply about governance issues. That is because they believe, with some justification, that good corporate governance will create shareholder value in the long-term. The long term, of course, is rarely the game of activist hedge funds. Most of these funds have capital with relatively short lock-ups, which means that their own investors will be breathing down their neck if they do not deliver outsize returns within a year or two.

Many activists will admit after a few drinks that their professed passion for governance is only a means to an end. Activists preach so-called ‘best practices of corporate governance’ in every proxy fight because it is an effective way to smear an incumbent board and rile up the voters who do care about governance issues.

Conclusion

 

Hedge fund activists have been able to cloak themselves in the mantle of a shareholder champion while privately pushing to increase their own influence. Institutional investors and proxy advisory firms should not look to activist hedge funds as promoters of good corporate practices. Activists are no Robin Hoods. They care about good corporate governance just as much as they care about taking from the rich and giving to the poor.

 

_____________________________________________________

Kai Haakon Liekefett* is a partner of Sidley Austin LLP in New York and the chair of the firm’s Shareholder Activism Defense Team. He has over 18 years of experience in corporate law in New York, London, Germany, Hong Kong and Tokyo. He dedicates 100% of his time to defending companies against shareholder activism campaigns and proxy contests. Kai holds a Ph.D. from Freiburg University; an Executive MBA from Muenster Business School; and an LL.M., James Kent Scholar, from Columbia Law School. He is admitted to practice in New York and Germany. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of Sidley Austin LLP or its clients.

Principes simples et universels de saine gouvernance | Rappel d’un billet antérieur


Quels sont les principes fondamentaux de la bonne gouvernance ? Voilà un sujet bien d’actualité, une question fréquemment posée, qui appelle, trop souvent, des réponses complexes et peu utiles pour ceux qui siègent à des conseils d’administration.

L’article de Jo Iwasaki, paru sur le site du NewStateman, a l’avantage de résumer très succinctement les cinq (5) grands principes qui doivent animer et inspirer les administrateurs de sociétés.

Les principes évoqués dans l’article sont simples et directs ; ils peuvent même paraître simplistes, mais, à mon avis, ils devraient servir de puissants guides de référence à tous les administrateurs de sociétés.

Les cinq principes retenus dans l’article sont les suivants :

 

(1) Un solide engagement du conseil (leadership) ;

(2) Une grande capacité d’action liée au mix de compétences, expertises et savoir-être ;

(3) Une reddition de compte efficace envers les parties prenantes ;

(4) Un objectif de création de valeur et une distribution équitable entre les principaux artisans de la réussite ;

(5) De solides valeurs d’intégrité et de transparence susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen minutieux de la part des parties prenantes.

 

« What board members need to remind themselves is that they are collectively responsible for the long-term success of their company. This may sound obvious but it is not always recognised ».

 

What are the fundamental principles of corporate governance ?

 

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Our suggestion is to get back to the fundamental principles of good governance which board members should bear in mind in carrying out their responsibilities. If there are just a few, simple and short principles, board members can easily refer to them when making decisions without losing focus. Such a process should be open and dynamic.

In ICAEW’s  recent paper (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales) What are the overarching principles of corporate governance?, we proposed five such principles of corporate governance.

Leadership

An effective board should head each company. The Board should steer the company to meet its business purpose in both the short and long term.

Capability

The Board should have an appropriate mix of skills, experience and independence to enable its members to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively.

Accountability

The Board should communicate to the company’s shareholders and other stakeholders, at regular intervals, a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of how the company is achieving its business purpose and meeting its other responsibilities.

Sustainability

The Board should guide the business to create value and allocate it fairly and sustainably to reinvestment and distributions to stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, employees and customers.

Integrity

The Board should lead the company to conduct its business in a fair and transparent manner that can withstand scrutiny by stakeholders.

We kept them short, with purpose, but we also kept them aspirational. None of them should be a surprise – they might be just like you have on your board. Well, why not share and exchange our ideas – the more we debate, the better we remember the principles which guide our own behaviour.

 

De son côté, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (OAAQ) a retenu six (6) valeurs fondamentales qui devraient guider les membres dans l’accomplissement de leurs tâches de professionnels.

Il est utile de les rappeler dans ce billet :

 

Transparence 

 

La transparence laisse paraître la réalité tout entière, sans qu’elle soit altérée ou biaisée. Il n’existe d’autre principe plus vertueux que la transparence de l’acte administratif par l’administrateur qui exerce un pouvoir au nom de son détenteur ; celui qui est investi d’un pouvoir doit rendre compte de ses actes à son auteur.

Essentiellement, l’administrateur doit rendre compte de sa gestion au mandant ou autre personne ou groupe désigné, par exemple, à un conseil d’administration, à un comité de surveillance ou à un vérificateur. L’administrateur doit également agir de façon transparente envers les tiers ou les préposés pouvant être affectés par ses actes dans la mesure où le mandant le permet et qu’il n’en subit aucun préjudice.

 

Continuité

 

La continuité est ce qui permet à l’administration de poursuivre ses activités sans interruption. Elle implique l’obligation du mandataire de passer les pouvoirs aux personnes et aux intervenants désignés pour qu’ils puissent remplir leurs obligations adéquatement.

La continuité englobe aussi une perspective temporelle. L’administrateur doit choisir des avenues et des solutions qui favorisent la survie ou la croissance à long terme de la société qu’il gère. En lien avec la saine gestion, l’atteinte des objectifs à court terme ne doit pas menacer la viabilité d’une organisation à plus long terme.

 

Efficience

 

L’efficience allie efficacité, c’est-à-dire, l’atteinte de résultats et l’optimisation des ressources dans la pose d’actes administratifs. L’administrateur efficient vise le rendement optimal de la société à sa charge et maximise l’utilisation des ressources à sa disposition, dans le respect de l’environnement et de la qualité de vie.

Conscient de l’accès limité aux ressources, l’administrateur met tout en œuvre pour les utiliser avec diligence, parcimonie et doigté dans le but d’atteindre les résultats anticipés. L’absence d’une utilisation judicieuse des ressources constitue une négligence, une faute qui porte préjudice aux commettants.

 

Équilibre

 

L’équilibre découle de la juste proportion entre force et idées opposées, d’où résulte l’harmonie contributrice de la saine gestion des sociétés. L’équilibre se traduit chez l’administrateur par l’utilisation dynamique de moyens, de contraintes et de limites imposées par l’environnement en constante évolution.

Pour atteindre l’équilibre, l’administrateur dirigeant doit mettre en place des mécanismes permettant de répartir et balancer l’exercice du pouvoir. Cette pratique ne vise pas la dilution du pouvoir, mais bien une répartition adéquate entre des fonctions nécessitant des compétences et des habiletés différentes.

 

Équité

 

L’équité réfère à ce qui est foncièrement juste. Plusieurs applications en lien avec l’équité sont enchâssées dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne. L’administrateur doit faire en sorte de gérer en respect des lois afin de prévenir l’exercice abusif ou arbitraire du pouvoir.

 

Abnégation

 

L’abnégation fait référence à une personne qui renonce à tout avantage ou intérêt personnel autres que ceux qui lui sont accordés par contrat ou établis dans le cadre de ses fonctions d’administrateur.

Pourquoi les employés ont-ils tendance à bafouer les règles d’éthique ?


Dans le contexte du nouveau code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni, les administrateurs doivent exercer une vigilance accrue de la culture des organisations.

Cet article de GUENDALINA DONDE*publié dans Board Agenda, nous rappelle certains enseignements concernant la nature des comportements éthiques dans les organisations.

Perhaps the first important lesson from behavioural ethics is to forget the idea that human beings are perfectly rational. In reality, people do not always make consistent decisions, based on strict logic or narrow self-interest. Human behaviour is complex and emotions and intuition have a significant role to play in individual decision-making.

Voici donc plusieurs facteurs qui peuvent avoir une incidence significative sur les comportements éthiques et sur la culture organisationnelle.

J’ai pensé que tous les administrateurs devraient se familiariser avec ces notions.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Business ethics: Why do good people do bad things?

 

 

 

The UK’s revised governance code will require boards to keep a watchful eye on their corporate cultures. To this end, understanding behavioural ethics can help instil the right values in employees.

There is no escaping the current increasing pressure for boards to have this question on their agenda, as the draft new UK Corporate Governance Code contains a provision requiring directors to monitor and assess their corporate culture to satisfy themselves that behaviour throughout the business is in line with the company’s values.

Perhaps the first important lesson from behavioural ethics is to forget the idea that human beings are perfectly rational.

What can be done to ensure that employee behaviour is in line with ethical values? Ethics programmes, which include the development of a code of ethics, training and communication campaigns can go some way, but even the best-intentioned ethics programmes will fail if they don’t take into account behavioural ethics—the biases that can blind us to unethical behaviour, whether ours or that of others.

 

People are likely to put aside their personal moral standards at work if they think this is what is expected of their role

 

“I was only following orders” is a classic indicator of this kind of ethical blindness. Expectations of a role can translate into pressure to compromise one’s ethical standards.

Many organisations make explicit in their code of ethics that all employees, and managers in particular, have the responsibility to be a role model for ethics in the organisation. It is important that this message is also reinforced through the communications strategy and through training for managers.

 

Ethics needs to become part of the reward, recognition and promotion system

 

Availability bias means that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of something happening because a similar event has either happened recently or because they feel emotional about a previous similar event. If employees remember that someone was promoted or rewarded for commercial results, which were achieved by unethical means, they will think that this is the norm—even if it was just a one-off event.

On the other hand, recognising and rewarding those who live up to the organisation’s ethical values, or communicating positive stories internally, can be a quick and effective way to send employees the message that ethics is important in the organisation.

 

Time pressure can negatively impact organisational culture and the ability to consider ethical implications of decisions

 

A group of seminary students were asked to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan at two adjacent buildings. In between talks, the researchers told participants that they should hurry, varying the amount of urgency between students. An actor was situated in an alleyway between the two buildings, posing as a sick man.

The results showed that time pressure had a significant impact on the students’ willingness to stop and help the sick man: in low-hurry situations, 63% helped; medium hurry, 45%; and high hurry only 10%. This was even when, ironically, they were on their way to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan.

 

Internal communications and the language used within an organisation can have a significant impact on ethical culture

 

The framing effect is a cognitive bias where individuals respond differently to the same problem depending on how it is presented. Communications manipulate perception and how a situation is interpreted or framed, making it easier for employees to rationalise their behaviour. The use of aggressive language—such as “at war with competitors”—promotes rigid framing which can, in turn, drive ethical blindness.

On the other hand, using positive language can be a driver of change—changing a whistleblowing line to a “Speak Up” line can have a significant effect on call volume.

 

In some circumstances, “nudging” ethics can be more effective than enforcing compliance

 

Nudge Theory (developed by the 2017 Nobel laureate Richard Thaler) suggests that positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions can be more effective in encouraging desired behaviour than direct instructions, legislation and enforcement.

This concept has seen many applications, especially in marketing, and it can also be used to promote an ethical culture. An approach that focuses on ethics—by communicating ethical values, explaining how and why an organisation does its business, encouraging individual judgement based on ethical values—is at least as important as having clear rules of conduct which employees must follow, and the related sanctions.

 

Individual responsibility for values and associated behaviours needs to be encouraged

 

Following the atrocities of World War II, one of the most researched behaviour patterns has been the willingness of people to put aside their own moral standards and give up responsibility for their actions if they are following the instructions of a person in a position of authority.

To prevent this kind of blind obedience, it is important that companies encourage employees to apply critical thinking and learn how to take initiative, rather than just follow orders.corporate culture, Board Agenda Culture Survey

Perhaps the most well known of these studies was by Stanley Milgram, whose electric-shock experiment showed that people are likely to follow orders given by authority figures (e.g. managers, teachers, police officers) even if it means inflicting harm on another human being.

To prevent this kind of blind obedience, it is important that companies encourage employees to apply critical thinking and learn how to take initiative, rather than just follow orders. Promoting an open culture where employees feel empowered to challenge decisions, even when they have been instructed by a superior, is paramount.

 

People determine the appropriate behaviour by looking at what others are doing

 

The phrase “everybody’s doing it” is a red flag which signifies that there may be an ethical problem. Social pressure from a majority group can cause a person to conform to a certain behaviour, and there is plenty of research to back this up, most recently from behavioural economists like Francesca Gino and Dan Ariely.

To avoid this ethical risk, training staff on ethical matters is important to create a shared systems of beliefs and to keep these issues prominent in people’s minds when they face a difficult decision.

Leadership engagement and the right “tone at the top” are also crucial. We naturally follow our leaders, and employees will be more likely to behave unethically if they perceive that their senior leaders and managers fail to “walk the talk”.

 

Doing the right thing needs to become our instinctive reaction

 

Daniel Kahneman, professor of psychology at Princeton University, proposes that most human decision-making is done intuitively and subconsciously (“System 1”) before the cognitive part of the brain engages (“System 2”).

In many circumstances, even when people feel they are making a rational decision, their cognitive System 2 is simply rationalising a decision that their intuitive System 1 has already made. Sometimes this results in a seemingly irrational decision that might increase ethical risk.

Embedding ethical values into everything the organisation does can help them become an automatic part of an employee’s System 1. Corporate culture—“the way things are done around here”—is a powerful influence upon our corporate subconscious.

Sometimes a company’s culture can actually be working against its ethical values. Looking at which behaviours are rewarded, considering how messages are framed, and setting an example at the top are all examples of how ethics can achieve saliency in an organisation.

So perhaps the question should be: Why do good people do good things? And how can we support and empower them to consider the ethical implications of their decisions?

________________________________________________________________________

Guendalina Dondè* is a senior researcher at the Institute of Business Ethics.

Le futur code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni


Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du futur code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni (R.-U.).

À cet effet, voici un billet de Martin Lipton*, paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui présente un aperçu des points saillants.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Financial Reporting Council today [July 16, 2018] issued a revised corporate governance code and announced that a revised investor stewardship code will be issued before year-end. The code and related materials are available at www.frc.org.uk.

The revised code contains two provisions that will be of great interest. They will undoubtedly be relied upon in efforts to update the various U.S. corporate governance codes. They will also be used to further the efforts to expand the sustainability and stakeholder concerns of U.S. boards.

First, the introduction to the code makes note that shareholder primacy needs to be moderated and that the concept of the “purpose” of the corporation, as long put forth in the U.K. by Colin Mayer and recently popularized in the U.S. by Larry Fink in his 2018 letter to CEO’s, is the guiding principle for the revised code:

Companies do not exist in isolation. Successful and sustainable businesses underpin our economy and society by providing employment and creating prosperity. To succeed in the long-term, directors and the companies they lead need to build and maintain successful relationships with a wide range of stakeholders. These relationships will be successful and enduring if they are based on respect, trust and mutual benefit. Accordingly, a company’s culture should promote integrity and openness, value diversity and be responsive to the views of shareholders and wider stakeholders.

Second, the code provides that the board is responsible for policies and practices which reinforce a healthy culture and that the board should engage:

with the workforce through one, or a combination, of a director appointed from the workforce, a formal workforce advisory panel and a designated non-executive director, or other arrangements which meet the circumstances of the company and the workforce.

It will be interesting to see how this provision will be implemented and whether it gains any traction in the U.S.

 

 

The UK Corporate Governance Code

 

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Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton.

Les sept attentes que les comités d’audit ont envers les chefs des finances


Une bonne relation entre le Président du comité d’Audit et le Vice-président Finance (CFO) est absolument essentielle pour une gestion financière éclairée, fidèle et intègre.

Les auteurs sont liés au Centre for Board Effectiveness de Deloitte. Dans cette publication, parue dans le Wall Street Journal, ils énoncent les sept attentes que les comités d’audit ont envers les chefs des finances.

Cet article sera certainement très utile aux membres de conseils, notamment aux membres des comtés d’audit ainsi qu’à la direction financière de l’entreprise.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The CFO and the Audit Committee: Building an Effective Relationship

 

 

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The evolution of the CFO’s role is effecting a shift in the audit committee’s expectations for the working relationship between the two. By considering their response to seven commonly held expectations audit committees have of CFOs, CFOs can begin to lay the groundwork for a more effective working relationship with their organization’s audit committee.

Typically, CFOs play four key roles within their organizations, but the amount of time CFOs allocate to each role is changing rapidly. “For CFOs high integrity of work, accuracy, and timely financial reporting are table stakes, but increasingly they are being expected to be Strategists and Catalysts in their organization,” says Ajit Kambil, global research director for Deloitte’s CFO Program. “In fact, our research indicates that CFOs are spending about 60% to 70% of their time in those roles, and that shift is both reflecting and driving higher expectations from the CEO as well as the board.”

As in any relationship, a degree of trust between CFOs and audit committee chairs serves as a foundation to an effective communication on critical issues. “In high-functioning relationships between CFOs and audit committee chairs, trust and dialogue are critical. Challenges can occur if a CFO comes to an audit committee meeting unprepared or presents a surprising conclusion to the audit committee without having sought the audit committee chair’s opinion, leaving the audit committee chair without the ability to influence that conclusion,” says Henry Phillips, vice chairman and national managing partner, Center for Board Effectiveness, Deloitte & Touche LLP.

 

Common Expectations Audit Committee Have of CFOs

 

Following are seven key expectations audit committees have of CFOs for both new and established CFOs to bear in mind.

 

(1) No Surprises: 

Audit committees do not welcome any surprises. Or, if surprises occur, the audit committee will want to be apprised of the issue very quickly. Surprises may be inevitable, but the audit committee expects CFOs to take precautions against known issues and to manage the avoidable ones and to inform them very early on when something unexpected occurs. In order to do this well, it is important for the CFO and the audit committee chair — perhaps some of the other board members — to set a regular cadence of meetings, so that they have a relationship and a context within which to work together when challenging issues arise. Don’t leave these meetings to chance. “If the audit committee chair or committee members are hearing about something of significance for the first time in a meeting, that’s problematic. Rather, the CFO should be apprising the audit committee chair as much in advance of a committee meeting as possible and talk through the issues so the audit committee chair is not surprised in the meeting,” says Phillips.

 

(2) Strong partnering with the CEO and other leaders: 

Audit committees want to see the CFO as an effective partner with the CEO, as well as with their peer executives. “The audit committee is carefully observing the CFO and how he or she interacts across the C-suite. At the same time, the audit committee also wants the CFO to be objective and to provide to the board independent perspectives on financial and business issues and not be a ‘yes’ person,” says Deb DeHaas, vice chair and national managing partner, Center for Board Effectiveness at Deloitte. A key for the CFO is to proactively manage CEO and peer relations — especially if there are challenging issues that may be brought up to the board. In that case, the CFO should be prepared to take a clear position on what the board needs to hear from management.

(3) Confidence in finance organization talent: 

 

Audit committees want visibility into the finance organization to ensure that it has the appropriate skills and experience. They also are looking to ensure that the finance organization will be stable over time, that there will be solid succession plans in place and that talent is being developed to create the strongest possible finance organization. CFOs might consider approaching these goals in several ways. One way is to provide key finance team members an opportunity to brief the audit committee on a special topic, for example, a significant accounting policy, a special analysis or another topic that’s on the board agenda. “While I encourage CFOs to give their team members an opportunity to present to the committee, it’s critical to make sure they’re well prepared and ready to address questions,” Phillips notes.

An outside-in view from audit committee members can bring significant value to the CFO — and to the organization.

 

(4) Command of key accounting, finance and business issues: 

 

Audit committees want CFOs to have a strong command of the key accounting issues that might be facing the organization, and given that many CFOs are not CPAs, such command is even more critical for the CFO to demonstrate. Toward that end, steps the CFO can take might include scheduling deep dives with management, the independent auditor, the chief accounting officer and others to receive briefings in order to better understand the organization’s critical issues from an accounting perspective, as well as to get trained up on those issues. In addition, CFOs should demonstrate a deep understanding of the business issues that the organization is confronting. There again, CFOs can leverage both internal and external resources to help them master these issues. Industry briefings are also important, particularly for CFOs who are new to an industry.

 

(5) Insightful forecasting and earnings guidance: 

 

Forecasts and earnings guidance will likely not always be precise. However, audit committees expect CFOs to not only deliver reliable forecasts, but also to articulate the underlying drivers of the company’s future performance, as well as how those drivers might impact outcomes. When CFOs lack a thorough understanding of critical assumptions and drivers, they can begin to lose support of key audit committee members. For that reason, it is important that CFOs have an experienced FP&A group to support them. In addition,audit committees and boards want to deeply understand the guidance that is being put forward, the ranges, and confidence levels. As audit committee members read earnings releases and other information in the public domain, they tend to focus on whether the information merely meets the letter of the law in terms of disclosures, or does it tell investors what they need to know to make informed decisions. This is where an outside-in view from audit committee members can bring significant value to the CFO — and to the organization. Moreover, audit committees are increasingly interested in the broader macroeconomic issues that can impact the organization, such as interest rates, oil prices, and geographic instability.

 

(6) Effective risk management: 

 

CFOs are increasingly held accountable for risk management, even when there is a chief risk officer. Further, audit committees want CFOs to provide leadership not only on traditional financial accounting and compliance risk matters, but also on some of the enterprise operational macro-risk issues — and to show how that might impact the financial statement. It is important for CFOs to set the tone at the top for compliance and ethics, oversee the control environment and ensure that from a compensation perspective, the appropriate incentives and structures are in place to mitigate risk. A key to the CFO’s effectiveness at this level is to find time to have strategic risk conversations at the highest level of management, as well as with the board.

 

(7) Clear and concise stakeholder communications: 

 

Audit committees want CFOs to be very effective on how they communicate with key stakeholders, which extend beyond the board and the audit committees. They want CFOs to be able to articulate the story behind the numbers and provide insights and future trends around the business, and to effectively communicate to the Street. CFOs can expect board members to listen to earnings calls and to observe how they interact with the CEOs, demonstrate mastery of the company’s financial and business issues, and communicate those to the Street. Moreover, a CFO who is very capable from an accounting and finance perspective should exercise the communication skills that are necessary to be effective with different stakeholders.

 

“Communication is the cornerstone for a strong CFO-audit committee chair relationship,” notes DeHaas. “Although the CFO might be doing other things very well, if there is not effective communication and a trusting relationship with the audit committee, the CFO will likely not be as effective.”

Les CA sont composés de plusieurs comités qui, ensemble, accomplissent l’essentiel des devoirs de fiduciaire


Il est maintenant bien établi que les conseils d’administration comptent au moins trois comités composés de membres du conseil qui se rapportent au CA : le comité d’audit, le comité des ressources humaines et le comité de gouvernance.

Les comités sont, en général, formés d’environ trois membres du conseil ; ils sont présidés par un administrateur et ils se réunissent aussi souvent que le CA lui-même.

Il est évident qu’une grande partie du travail des administrateurs du conseil se fait par l’intermédiaire des comités mis en place par le CA.

L’article ci-dessous, publié par Steve W. Klemash*, Kellie C. et Jamie Smith, provient d’une publication du Centre de la gouvernance EY. Les auteurs présentent les résultats d’une enquête sur les autres comités mis en place par les CA des entreprises du S&P 500, en sus des trois comités statutaires.

Les résultats sont  présentés succinctement dans le document qui suit. Ainsi, il ressort que :

(1) la plupart des autres comités sont les comités exécutifs et les comités des finances

(2) la nature du secteur industriel a une grande importance sur le type de comité additionnel mis en place

(3) les comités sur la gestion des risques et la technologie sont aussi présents dans environ 10 % des cas

(4) la plupart des nouveaux comités sont en lien avec la veille de la cybersécurité, la transformation numérique et les technologies de l’information.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des détails dans le résumé ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture !

 

A Fresh Look at Board Committees

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « A Fresh Look at Board Committees »

 

 

In this age of innovation and transformation, today’s board members face increasingly complex challenges in overseeing corporate culture, strategy and risk oversight.

The digital revolution has facilitated radical changes in business models and made cybersecurity a strategic business imperative. Intangible assets have become a primary driver of long-term value, making the talent agenda mission-critical. Companies are adapting to changes in the labor market, digitization and automation, and a growing spotlight on corporate values and purpose. And all of this is occurring against a backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions and trade policy challenges.

We have tracked board structures since 2013, examining how S&P 500 companies are using board committee structure to address oversight needs. This post is based on a review of the 418 proxy statements filed as of 15 May 2018. The same set of companies in 2018 and 2013 were examined to provide consistency in the review.

 

Findings

 

Amid sustained and unprecedented change, board committee structures stayed largely the same over the past six years. Across all industries, boards primarily rely on the three “key” committees generally required by the stock exchanges—audit, compensation, and nominating and governance. [1] Bank holding companies (BHCs) of a certain size, whether public or privately held, are required to also have separate risk committees—a “fourth key committee” so to speak. [2] Above and beyond these committees, institutions typically have one additional standing board committee (“additional committee”) (usually an executive or finance committee). During 2013-18, the portion of companies with at least one additional committee grew marginally from 74% to 76%, and the average number of additional committees remained largely consistent.

The most common committees remained the same. More than one-third of S&P 500 companies had an executive or finance committee. Use of executive committees declined slightly from 38% to 36%, while finance committees held steady at around 36%. Other committees were much less common.

Industry matters. Financial, telecommunications and utilities companies average two or more additional committees. Health care, consumer staples, industrials, consumer discretionary and materials average one to two. Energy, real estate and technology companies average less than one.

Few additional committees focus on emerging risk and innovation. Compliance, risk and technology committees grew marginally. In 2018, the overall percentage of S&P 500 companies with these committees remained low at 16%, 11% and 7%, respectively. Other types of committees largely held steady or declined.

A variety of additional committees oversee technology matters. Ten percent of companies assigned oversight of cybersecurity, digital transformation and information technology to an additional committee. These were typically technology, risk or compliance committees.

 

Our perspective

 

Today’s boards are navigating a sustained, highly disruptive and competitive environment. Board agendas have become increasingly packed with complex and evolving oversight topics, and key committee responsibilities have stretched beyond their core purview. Challenging the committee structure as part of the board assessment process may help the board determine the most effective oversight approach based on the company’s unique circumstances.

The ideal board committee structure is appropriate for the company’s specific needs and the board’s unique culture, is forward-looking, and supports the board’s ability to think strategically and comprehensively about key elements of the company business.

 

A closer look at the big banks

 

Large BHCs are unusual in that they are required to have a board- level risk committee. For these firms, other common additional committees included:

Questions for the board to consider

 

Is the board’s committee structure appropriate to forward-looking board priorities and company specific needs?

Is the board size and composition adaptable to changing committee responsibilities as needed based on the company’s evolving oversight needs?

Is the board familiar with how peer companies are addressing board oversight responsibilities?

Do assessments of board effectiveness reveal possible pressure points that might be resolved with changes in committee structure?

As committees assess their own effectiveness and performance, is their capacity, workload and areas of expertise part of that assessment?

As new directors join the board and bring new areas of expertise, does the board consider whether the current committee structure fully leverages those new director skills?

___________________________________________________

Endnotes

1Subject to certain exemptions, companies listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ must have independent audit, compensation and nominating/corporate governance committees. As an alternative to a nominating/corporate governance committee, director nominees may be selected by a majority of the independent directors for NASDAQ-listed companies.(go back)

2The Federal Reserve’s Enhanced Prudential Standards require separate risk committees for large publicly held US bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of \$10 billion or more.(go back)

________________________________________________________________

*Steve W. Klemash is Americas Leader, Kellie C. Huennekens is Associate Director, and Jamie Smith is Associate Director, at the EY Center for Board Matters. This post is based on their EY publication.

Comment un CA peut-il utiliser la technologie pour conserver son avantage concurrentiel ?


Maggie McGhee* a publié un très bon article sur l’importance croissante d’une solide connaissance des administrateurs eu égard aux perspectives offertes par les nouvelles technologies.

C’est la seule façon de s’assurer de développer ou de maintenir un avantage concurrentiel. L’article est paru sur le site de Board Agenda du 5 juillet 2018.

L’utilisation de nouvelles technologies peut varier d’une entreprise à une autre, mais aucune organisation ne peut se priver de questionner son modèle d’affaires afin de tenir compte des changements de paradigme.

L’auteure fait donc un rappel crucial aux administrateurs. De nouvelles compétences sont requises sur le Board !

Je vous invite également à lire un article, en français, sur les 10 nouvelles technologies qui ont marqué l’année 2017.

Enfin, je vous rappelle que cet article peut être traduit en français instantanément (vous n’avez qu’à cliquer sur le premier symbole dans la partie supérieure droite du navigateur Chrome de Google). La traduction est très acceptable pour une bonne compréhension de l’article pour ceux qui ont moins de facilité avec l’anglais.

Bonne lecture !

 

How boards can use technology to retain a competitive edge

 

Knowledge and skills in the boardroom must evolve with the risks and opportunities presented by technology—as well as its associated data—if companies are to remain competitive.

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « technologie »

 

For many organisations, embracing technology can be the difference between remaining relevant in their market, and being disrupted by new entrants. It represents a significant, and often the leading, business risk that boards need to address.

At the same time, by being proactive in their approach towards technology, boards may profit from what others see merely as threats. But what skills does the board need in order to provide such effective oversight, while being strategic?

In the need to remain relevant to customers and stakeholders, organisations are recognising that it is essential to adapt and embrace the opportunities that are created. Technology itself is an enabler, but it is never the solution, nor the sole driver.

 

Impact of technology

 

In our report, The Race for Relevance, we consider six technologies that are directly impacting the finance function alone. There are significantly more technologies that impact organisations as a whole.

As customer “stickiness” becomes a key tool in growth, organisations are starting to recognise the value of data created by the technologies that they own. It is an asset that is increasingly important, yet is also vulnerable to attack. Regulatory regimes are changing in order to address this. The upcoming implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018, which focuses on personal data held in the EU, is one such example.

For many organisations, technology and the data generated by it present a significant business opportunity and risk—one which deserves appropriate board-level attention. So what role should the board play in assessing the use of technology and data?

 

Insight and guidance

 

The board needs to have the capability to provide insight and guidance in a number of areas. First, in the role of technology to deliver the business strategy, and whether advantage is being taken of emerging technologies.

Then there is the appraisal of technology investments, whether they are to support growth and commercial advantage, or to protect assets.

Boards must also evaluate the data strategy of the organisation by assessing whether the financial and non-financial data used to report against strategic objectives is appropriate.

Next, the board should consider the appropriateness of the organisation’s strategies to protect existing assets and information from unauthorised access or malicious attack.

They should also appraise whether the assessments of the critically held data are appropriate, and understand how data flows in an organisation comply with legal and regulatory requirements.

Assessing the risks arising from the use of technology, and how these are monitored through the organisation’s enterprise risk-management framework and internal control structures, is also a priority.

Lastly, boards should consider whether appropriate recovery plans are in place to manage the consequences of business disruption—including the management of technology and data assets.

 

The right skills

 

In discharging their responsibilities, boards should ask whether they have the skills within their membership to assess and advise appropriately.

This responsibility can be done in one of two ways. The first is by ensuring that at least one board member has direct experience of technology in the context of the industry in which the organisation operates. Having experience of addressing the risks of projects and protecting assets is invaluable, especially in those sectors where there is a high dependency on technology.

Or as an alternative, it can be done by ensuring the board has access to those with the requisite experience to advise on the risks. These may be internal experts or third parties.

Technology is an issue that cannot be ignored by boards. While not every board member needs to be fully technology-literate, it is important that all members can appreciate where it is used to create and sustain commercial advantage.

Equally, it is important that the board takes the lead in communicating across the organisation the risk and opportunity associated with technology. Without a shared understanding of the organisation’s approach to the use of technology, it will be practically impossible to roll out a consistent approach effectively.

Technology will continue to develop and provide new opportunities. Risks will continue to evolve. Commercial strategies will change as a result.

Boards need to embrace all of this if they are to remain relevant.


Maggie McGhee* is director of professional insights at ACCA (the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants).

Les administrateurs de la nouvelle génération


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le résultat d’une enquête réalisée par SpencerStuart portant sur le renouvellement des conseils d’administration et les attentes des administrateurs de ladite nouvelle génération.

Le texte a été publié en anglais. Vous pouvez le lire dans cette langue en cliquant sur le titre ci-dessous. Je vous invite à le faire puisque le texte original contient des tableaux et des statistiques que l’on ne retrouve pas dans ma version.

Afin de faciliter la compréhension, j’ai révisé la traduction électronique produite. Je crois que cette traduction est très acceptable.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

How Next‑Generation Board Directors Are Having an Impact

 

 

Guide du Secrétariat à la jeunesse
GUIDE POUR FAVORISER LE RECRUTEMENT ET L’INTÉGRATION DES ADMINISTRATEURS DE LA RELÈVE AU SEIN DES CONSEILS D’ADMINISTRATION D’OBNL

 Consultez le guide du SAJ

 

Les conseils font l’objet des pressions croissantes pour démontrer leur pertinence à un moment où de multiples forces perturbatrices menacent les modèles d’affaires établis et créent de nouvelles possibilités d’innovation et de croissance. De plus en plus, les investisseurs s’attendent à ce que les conseils aient des processus significatifs en place pour renouveler leur adhésion et maximiser leur efficacité.

En conséquence, un nombre croissant « d’administrateurs de prochaine génération » sont nommés aux conseils d’administration à travers le monde. Beaucoup apportent des connaissances dans des domaines tels que la cybersécurité, l’IA (intelligence artificielle), l’apprentissage automatique et les technologies de l’industrie 4.0 ; d’autres ont une expérience directe de la transformation numérique, de la conception organisationnelle, de la connaissance du client ou de la communication sociale. Inévitablement, les experts de ces disciplines ont tendance à provenir d’une génération différente de celle de la majorité des membres du conseil d’administration.

Les jeunes administrateurs ont un impact sur le contenu et la dynamique du débat en salle de réunion. Ils incitent d’autres administrateurs à s’engager sur des sujets qui ne leur sont pas familiers et à apporter une approche et une perspective différentes au rôle. Tout comme les entreprises élargissent leur réflexion sur la valeur de la diversité et reconnaissent les avantages de la main-d’œuvre intergénérationnelle, les conseils bénéficient de recrutements d’administrateurs qui apportent non seulement une expertise foncièrement nécessaire, mais aussi une vision contemporaine de la façon dont les décisions affectent les parties prenantes — des employés et des fournisseurs aux clients et à la communauté. Ces administrateurs font face à un ensemble différent de défis en milieu de travail dans leurs rôles exécutifs ; en tant qu’administrateurs, ils peuvent rarement exprimer leurs préoccupations et leurs points de vue, autour de la table du conseil d’administration.

Les conseils qui choisissent sagement leurs jeunes administrateurs peuvent bénéficier grandement de leur présence. Cependant, il ne suffit pas d’amener de nouveaux administrateurs compétents dans la salle du conseil ; il est vital que les conseils les préparent au succès en combinant une intégration complète, une intégration réfléchie et une attitude ouverte, réceptive et respectueuse envers leurs contributions.

Nous avons interrogé un groupe de présidents de conseil d’administration et d’administrateurs de la prochaine génération sur plusieurs continents à propos de leur expérience de cette dernière phase de l’évolution des conseils d’administration.

 

Qu’y a-t-il pour la prochaine génération?

 

Avant de rejoindre le conseil d’administration d’une entreprise publique, il est important d’être clair sur la motivation. Pourquoi maintenant ; et pourquoi cette entreprise ? Être un administrateur non exécutif est un engagement important, et vous devez vous assurer que vous et le conseil d’administration considérez que c’est un investissement qui en vaut la peine. Nous constatons que la plupart des administrateurs next-gén sont motivés par trois choses : (1) le développement personnel. (2) la possibilité d’enrichir leur rôle exécutif avec de nouvelles idées et de nouvelles expériences acquises en tant qu’administrateur et (3) le désir de faire une contribution.

Un cadre qui commençait à se familiariser avec son propre conseil estimait qu’il était temps de se joindre à un conseil externe : « Je voulais élargir mon point de vue, acquérir des expériences différentes et voir une entreprise sous un autre angle. Je sentais que cela finirait par faire de moi un leader meilleur et plus efficace ». Une autre gestionnaire d’entreprise a souligné l’occasion unique d’apprendre d’autres personnes plus expérimentées qu’elle-même : « Je pourrais voir que je serais parmi les gens inspirants et que je serais exposé à un secteur différent, mais aussi, à une culture différente et à de nouvelles façons de faire des affaires. “Un troisième a décrit la décision de rejoindre un conseil comme” l’une des choses les plus utiles que j’ai fait dans ma vie ».

Les nouveaux administrateurs citent un certain nombre d’expériences et de compétences qu’ils espèrent acquérir en siégeant à un conseil, allant d’un style de leadership différent et travaillant avec une culture organisationnelle différente à l’apprentissage d’un nouveau secteur ou marché géographique.

Bien sûr, rejoindre un conseil d’administration doit être un exercice mutuellement bénéfique. « C’est utile pour moi parce que j’apprends sur la gouvernance, et sur le fonctionnement interne du conseil ». Je peux appliquer ce que j’apprends dans mon autre travail. Le conseil, quant à lui, obtient quelqu’un avec un ensemble différent de spécialités et une perspective légèrement plus fraîche ; ils ont quelqu’un qui veut être plus ouvert et plus direct, un peu plus non-conformiste par rapport aux autres membres du conseil.

Les présidents de conseil d’administration sont de plus en plus ouverts au recrutement de talents de prochaine génération, citant plusieurs raisons allant du besoin de compétences et de compétences spécifiques à des voix plus diverses à la table. Un président recherchait spécifiquement quelqu’un pour déplacer le centre du débat : « Un nouvel administrateur plus jeune peut voir un dilemme d’un point de vue différent, nous faisant réfléchir à deux fois. Je cherche une personne intègre qui est prête à parler ouvertement et à défier la gestion. Ce que je ne peux pas nécessairement attendre de ces personnes, bien sûr, c’est l’expérience d’avoir vu beaucoup de situations similaires sur 30-40 ans dans les affaires. C’est un compromis, et c’est l’une des raisons pour lesquelles la diversité des âges au sein du conseil est si importante. L’expertise des spécialistes doit être équilibrée avec l’expérience, et avec l’expérience vient un bon jugement ».

 

Préparation au rôle

 

Si vous êtes un dirigeant actif qui rejoint le conseil d’administration d’une entreprise publique, beaucoup de temps est en jeu (ainsi que votre réputation), vous devez donc être sûr que vous prenez la bonne décision. Un processus de vérification préalable approfondi offre non seulement cette sécurité, mais contribue également à accélérer votre préparation au rôle. « Au cours de mes entrevues, j’ai lu énormément de choses sur l’entreprise », a déclaré un administrateur récemment nommé. « J’ai regardé les appels des analystes, j’ai lu les documents de la SEC et j’ai posé beaucoup de questions, en particulier sur la dynamique du conseil. Ils m’ont fait rencontrer tous les membres du conseil d’administration et j’ai pu voir comment ils se parlaient entre eux ».

Il est important d’avoir une compréhension claire de ce que le conseil recherche et de la façon dont vos antécédents et votre expérience ajouteront de la valeur dans le contexte de l’entreprise. Par exemple, bien que les membres du conseil les plus séniors puissent avoir un aperçu raisonnable de la perturbation de l’entreprise, ils n’auront pas d’expérience pratique d’une initiative de transformation numérique. Vous êtes peut-être parfaitement placé pour fournir ces connaissances de première main, mais il se peut que le président du conseil d’administration veuille bien faire face à certaines difficultés, ait appris à relever le défi technologique d’un point de vue commercial et sache quel type de questions poser. Seule une due diligence approfondie révélera si vos attentes sont alignées avec celles du conseil et vous permettront de procéder en toute confiance.

 

Embarquement (Onboarding)

 

L’une des choses les plus courantes que nous entendons des administrateurs de prochaine génération est qu’ils auraient aimé un processus d’intégration plus approfondi avant leur première réunion — c’est quelque chose que les conseils d’administration doivent clairement aborder. Il revient souvent aux nouveaux administrateurs de prendre l’initiative et de concevoir un programme qui les aidera à s’intégrer dans l’entreprise. « Une grande partie de l’immersion dont j’ai eu besoin est venue des étapes que j’ai suivies moi-même », a déclaré un administrateur qui estimait que rencontrer quelques dirigeants et présidents de comité du conseil ainsi qu’une lecture du matériel fourni par le secrétaire de la société constituait une préparation insuffisante.

Un bon programme d’initiation comprendra des présentations de la direction sur le modèle d’affaires, la rentabilité et la performance ; visites de site ; et des réunions avec des conseillers externes tels que des comptables, des banquiers et des courtiers. Assister avec le responsable des relations avec les investisseurs pour revoir les perspectives des investisseurs et des analystes peut aussi être utile.

Les administrateurs de la prochaine génération ont demandé à rencontrer les chefs d’entreprise pour un examen plus détaillé d’une filiale ou d’une activité particulière où leur propre expérience est particulièrement pertinente. Dans une entreprise de vente au détail, par exemple, il serait logique de rencontrer le responsable du merchandising d’un magasin phare pour se familiariser avec le positionnement des produits et l’expérience client.

Le temps passé avec le PDG pour en apprendre davantage sur l’entreprise est essentiel. La plupart des chefs d’entreprise seront ravis de faire en sorte que le nouvel administrateur puisse voir directement les principaux projets et rencontrer les personnes qui les dirigent, ainsi que passer du temps avec d’autres membres de l’équipe de la haute direction. « Ils étaient complètement ouverts à la possibilité de rencontrer d’autres personnes, mais cela ne faisait pas partie du programme d’initiation formel. J’ai trouvé ces conversations les plus éclairantes parce que je me suis simplement rapproché de l’entreprise et du travail. »

Un président d’une société de produits de consommation a ajouté une touche intéressante à l’intégration d’un nouvel administrateur nommé pour son expérience de leadership en matière de commerce électronique. Il a invité la nouvelle recrue à faire une présentation à toute l’équipe de direction au sujet de son propre cheminement. « Le genre de perturbation et la vitesse à laquelle fonctionne sa société en ligne étaient stupéfiants, et cet exercice s’est avéré une source d’apprentissage pour le conseil d’administration et l’équipe de direction », a déclaré le président. « Cela a également renforcé sa crédibilité auprès du reste du conseil ».

 

Faire la transition à un rôle d’administrateur non exécutif

 

La plupart des administrateurs de la prochaine génération comprennent qu’ils devront aborder les responsabilités de leur conseil d’une manière différente d’un rôle exécutif, mais la plupart sous-estiment les difficultés à faire cette transition dans la pratique.

Il est important d’être en mesure de faire la distinction entre les questions sur lesquelles seul le conseil peut se prononcer (par exemple, la relève du chef de la direction) et les sujets que le conseil doit laisser à la direction (questions opérationnelles). La stratégie est un domaine où, dans la plupart des marchés, le conseil d’administration et la direction ont tendance à collaborer étroitement, mais il y a beaucoup d’autres moyens où les administrateurs de la prochaine génération peuvent apporter leur expertise particulière.

Cependant, il faut du temps pour apprendre comment ajouter de la valeur aux discussions du conseil sans pour autant saper l’autorité de la direction. L’écoute et l’apprentissage sont un aspect crucial pour gagner le respect et la crédibilité auprès du reste du conseil. « Il faut être très conscient du moment où il faut intervenir, quand il est nécessaire d’insister sur un sujet difficile, et quand il faut prendre du recul », explique un administrateur. « La compétence consiste à poser la bonne question de la bonne façon — à ne pas affaiblir ou à décourager la direction, mais à les encourager à voir les choses un peu différemment ».

En tant qu’administrateur non exécutif, vous devez vous engager à un niveau supérieur et de manière plus détachée que dans votre rôle exécutif. Avec des réunions mensuelles ou bimestrielles, il peut être difficile de déterminer si vous ajoutez de la valeur, ou même à quoi ressemble la valeur, surtout lorsque votre travail régulier implique de prendre la responsabilité d’une exécution de haute qualité. En tant qu’administrateur non exécutif, vous pouvez voir des choses qui doivent être prises en compte et vouloir vous impliquer plus activement, mais vous devez faire confiance en la capacité de l’équipe de direction à le faire. « J’avais l’impression que le conseil d’administration pourrait être un peu plus engagé. Nous avons des zones très précises dans lesquelles nous sommes censés contribuer à orienter les décisions et les actions, et il y en a d’autres où nous sommes plus consultatifs ; c’est une question de trouver le bon équilibre ».

Cependant, le travail des administrateurs de prochaine génération ne commence pas et ne se termine pas avec les réunions du conseil d’administration. Beaucoup interagiront avec la direction en dehors des réunions. Un directeur britannique nommé pour son expertise numérique prend le temps de se mettre à jour avec l’équipe numérique de l’entreprise lorsqu’elle est à New York « pour savoir à quoi ils travaillent, comprendre ce qui les motive et quelles sont leurs préoccupations ». Un nouvel administrateur indépendant a été invité par le PDG (CEO) à passer une journée avec l’équipe de management du développement de l’entreprise, après quoi il a passé en revue l’expérience client. « J’ai reçu des commentaires très clairs, mais je me suis contenté de l’envoyer au chef de la direction, pas à l’équipe que j’ai rencontrée ou à un autre membre du conseil ». Offrir de l’aide à l’équipe de direction de façon informelle.

Votre rôle n’est pas nécessairement de comprendre les problèmes, mais de proposer des idées et de poser des questions à l’équipe de direction.

 

Obtenir de la rétroaction

 

Les administrateurs de prochaine génération qui sont habitués à recevoir des commentaires dans leur capacité de direction peuvent avoir du mal à s’adapter à un rôle où il est moins facilement disponible. « La rétroaction est la chose la plus difficile à laquelle je me suis attaqué », explique un administrateur. « Avec votre propre entreprise, c’est un succès ou pas. Si vous êtes un employé, on vous dit si vous faites du bon travail. Ce n’est pas le cas sur un conseil ».

Les nouveaux administrateurs doivent identifier une personne avec laquelle ils se sentent à l’aise et qui peut leur offrir un aperçu de certaines des règles non écrites du conseil. Certains préfèrent une relation de mentorat plus formelle avec un membre du conseil d’administration, mais cette idée ne plaît pas à tout le monde. Des vérifications régulières auprès du président du conseil (et du chef de la direction) les aideront à évaluer leur rendement et à apprendre comment ils peuvent offrir une contribution plus utile.

Au-delà de la rétroaction individuelle informelle, le conseil peut avoir un processus pour fournir une rétroaction à chaque administrateur dans le cadre de l’auto-évaluation annuelle du conseil. Sur les conseils où cette pratique est en place, les administrateurs de la prochaine génération ont tendance à être très à l’aise avec elle et à accueillir les commentaires. S’il n’y a pas de processus de rétroaction individuelle des administrateurs en place, l’administrateur de la prochaine génération peut servir de catalyseur pour établir cette saine pratique en s’enquérant directement à ce sujet.

 

Le rôle du président du conseil

 

Les présidents de conseil ont une influence significative sur le succès des administrateurs de prochaine génération dans le rôle. Il peut être difficile d’arriver à un conseil qui compte beaucoup d’administrateurs plus âgés et plus expérimentés, en particulier s’il existe une dynamique « collégiale » établie de longue date. Le président a la double tâche de guider le nouvel administrateur, tout en s’assurant que les autres membres du conseil restent ouverts aux nouvelles idées et perspectives que celui-ci apporte au conseil. Cela peut impliquer de travailler dur pour encourager les relations à se développer à un niveau personnel, ce qui permettra ensuite d’émettre des points de vue divergents, et même dissidents sur le plan professionnel.

Un président peut faire un certain nombre de choses pour soutenir l’administrateur de la prochaine génération, par exemple : s’intéresser de près au processus d’intégration ; fournir un encadrement sur la meilleure façon de représenter les intérêts des investisseurs ; offrir des commentaires constructifs après les réunions ; et encourager le nouvel administrateur à se tenir à l’écart plutôt que de jouer la carte de la sécurité et à simplement s’aligner sur la culture existante du conseil d’administration. Comme l’a dit un président : « Certains conseils se méfient d’un nouvel administrateur qui pense différemment et qui menace, bien que respectueusement, de faire bouger les choses. Mais parfois, vous avez besoin que le nouvel administrateur perturbe le conseil avec des idées nouvelles, acceptant que cela puisse entraîner un changement culturel. C’est mon travail de laisser cela se produire ». Cela dit, si un nouvel administrateur est en désaccord avec certains éléments contenus dans la documentation du conseil d’administration ou s’il ne comprend pas, il serait sage d’en discuter avec le président du conseil en premier lieu.

Pour le nouvel administrateur, l’adaptation à la structure et à la formalité des réunions du conseil d’administration signifie adopter une approche mesurée et s’inspirer de la décision du président, en particulier à contre-courant. « Bien que je n’aie assisté qu’à trois réunions, je teste les barrières qui font que je peux être ouvert et direct, tout en en apprenant davantage sur l’entreprise », rapporte un administrateur. Un autre a défendu une position non partagée par la majorité du conseil d’administration, convaincu que le président est heureux de donner une tribune à ses opinions. Vous devez être respectueux et faire valoir votre point de vue et vos arguments, mais si ceux-ci ne prévalent pas, c’est bien aussi. Bien sûr, si cela devient une question de principe, vous êtes toujours libre de démissionner, n’est-ce pas ?

 

Vers un nouveau genre de conseil

 

Au fur et à mesure que les entreprises relèvent de nouveaux défis et qu’une jeune génération de cadres issus de milieux très différents accède à des postes d’administrateurs indépendants, les conseils d’administration devront trouver le bon équilibre entre expérience et pertinence. Ils devront également devenir plus dynamiques en matière de composition, de diversité, de discussion et d’occupation. Les administrateurs de longue date qui s’intéressent à la gouvernance et à la gestion des risques côtoieront des représentants de la prochaine génération nommés pour leur excellente connaissance du domaine ou leur expérience en temps réel des environnements transformationnels, mais le mandat de ces administrateurs sera probablement plus court que la moyenne actuelle.

Les conseils doivent être réalistes quant à la durée du mandat d’un candidat de la prochaine génération. Ils doivent également réfléchir soigneusement à la question de savoir si cet administrateur se sentirait moins isolé et plus efficace s’il était accompagné par un autre administrateur d’un âge et d’un passé similaires. « En tant que femme, j’ai été une minorité tout au long de ma carrière, donc c’est étrange d’être une minorité à cause de mon expertise numérique », a déclaré une administratrice. Tout comme la présence d’autres femmes au sein du conseil d’administration réduit le fardeau d’une femme administratrice, il y a lieu de nommer deux ou plusieurs administrateurs de la nouvelle génération.

Les conseils d’administration résolus à rester au fait des problèmes critiques affectant leurs entreprises devraient considérer les avantages potentiels de nommer au moins un administrateur de la prochaine génération, non seulement pour leur expertise, mais aussi pour leur capacité à apporter une pensée alternative et des perspectives multipartites dans la salle du conseil. Soutenus par un président du conseil attentif et par des administrateurs ouverts d’esprit, les administrateurs de la prochaine génération peuvent avoir un impact positif et durable sur l’efficacité du conseil en cette période de changement sans précédent.

Adapter le modèle de gouvernance à la réalité des OBNL de petite taille | en rappel


Il est vrai que la réalité des organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) est souvent assez éloignée des grands principes de gouvernance généralement reconnus.

Les différences principales portent essentiellement sur l’application rigoureuse de certains principes de gouvernance lorsque l’entreprise est à ses débuts ou en transition.

La distinction nette entre les activités des administrateurs et l’embryon de direction peut alors prendre une forme différente. Il est évident que pour les entreprises en démarrage, le rôle des administrateurs peut comprendre des tâches qui relèveraient normalement de la direction générale de l’entreprise.

Cependant, les administrateurs doivent toujours saisir qu’ils ont d’abord et avant tout un rôle de fiduciaire, ce qui rend leurs prestations d’autant plus délicates ! La gestion de conflits d’intérêts potentiels est à prévoir dans ces cas. Le président du conseil doit être très vigilant à cet égard.

Les administrateurs doivent accepter l’idée que l’organisation ne puisse survivre sans leur apport concret, en attendant la constitution d’une véritable structure de management avec l’embauche d’un directeur général ou d’une directrice générale.

Voici le témoignage de Sandra Dunham* qui a une longue expérience dans la direction des OBNL et qui a été invitée à contribuer au blogue de Imagine Canada.

Bonne lecture ! Ce billet est-il pertinent ? Avez-vous des interrogations ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Modèles de gouvernance du CA : oser la différence !

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « obnl imagine canada »

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « OBNL »

 

 

Lorsque j’ai débuté dans mon tout premier poste de directrice générale à la fin des années 1990, tout le monde parlait du modèle de gouvernance de Carver. À l’époque, j’ignorais tout de l’existence même d’un « modèle de gouvernance ». Les adeptes de cette théorie l’étudiaient soigneusement, élaboraient des politiques et renseignaient leurs collègues-administrateurs à son sujet. Le modèle Carver était alors considéré comme le nec plus ultra des modèles de gouvernance.

Dans l’organisation à laquelle je me joignais alors, le directeur général sortant avait participé à une formation à ce sujet et avait suggéré aux administrateurs des façons de faire pour devenir un conseil d’administration (CA) conforme au modèle Carver. À mon arrivée, les membres avaient créé une multitude de règlements superflus à propos du fonctionnement du CA, soit en raison des informations relayées par l’ancien directeur général, soit en raison de l’interprétation qu’eux-mêmes en avaient faite ou en raison de l’expertise des nouveaux administrateurs.

Encore aujourd’hui, j’entends certains administrateurs décrire leur CA comme un « CA selon Carver », mais il est devenu beaucoup plus courant de parler d’un modèle de gouvernance par politiques. Malgré la multiplication des formations en gouvernance, les administrateurs ignorent souvent à quel type de CA s’identifier, et s’ils le savent, ils ne réussissent pas toujours à agir en fonction des caractéristiques du modèle choisi.

J’estime qu’il est grand temps pour les CA d’arrêter de vouloir travailler relativement à certaines catégories qui ne correspondent pas à leur réalité et de s’excuser de leur mode de fonctionnement. Ils devraient plutôt se concentrer sur les priorités qui s’imposent compte tenu de leur étape de développement et définir clairement leur rôle dans l’organisation.

 

Politiques, opérations et entre-deux

 

Presque tous les CA remplissent d’abord une fonction opérationnelle. Puisque très peu d’organismes comptent des employés dès le jour un de leur existence, les administrateurs doivent assurer le fonctionnement de l’organisation jusqu’à ce qu’un employé rémunéré ou un nombre suffisant de bénévoles se joignent à l’équipe et libèrent les administrateurs de cette tâche. Or, de nombreux CA continuent à assumer certaines tâches opérationnelles même après l’arrivée de personnel et laissent à ces derniers le soin de mettre en œuvre les programmes offerts par l’organisme.

Puis, généralement, au fur et à mesure qu’une organisation grandit et embauche une personne responsable de la gestion quotidienne des activités, les administrateurs prennent leurs distances avec ces aspects de l’organisation (comptabilité, ressources humaines, relations avec les donateurs, etc.) et commencent à se concentrer sur la définition d’orientations stratégiques, l’élaboration de politiques de gouvernance et l’embauche et l’encadrement de la personne la plus haut placée dans l’organisation, soit le directeur général ou la directrice générale. Idéalement, le CA se serait alors déjà doté de politiques qui clarifient les relations entre lui-même et cette personne à la tête de l’organisation.

Cependant, la transition entre ces deux catégories n’est pas un processus linéaire, parfait ou permanent, et il existe autant de bonnes que de mauvaises raisons incitant un CA à tergiverser entre le modèle opérationnel et le modèle par politiques. Voici quelques situations exemplaires :

Pendant les phases de transition, de croissance significative, de changement de mandat ou de menace importante pour l’organisation, un CA qui fonctionne selon le modèle de gouvernance par politiques peut être appelé à participer aux activités opérationnelles de l’organisation.

Certains administrateurs ne reconnaissent pas la valeur de la gouvernance par politiques et ne peuvent s’empêcher de s’ingérer dans les détails des activités opérationnelles.

Si un ou plusieurs administrateurs sont en conflit personnel avec la personne directrice générale, ils pourraient essayer de s’immiscer dans les activités opérationnelles dans une tentative de recueillir des arguments pour une destitution de cette personne.

Lorsque la personne à la tête de la direction générale ne fournit pas assez d’information aux administrateurs pour leur permettre de remplir leurs obligations fiduciaires, ces derniers peuvent décider de participer davantage aux activités opérationnelles pour s’assurer que l’organisation a les reins solides.

Si le CA a réalisé son mandat stratégique et n’est pas en mesure d’amorcer une réflexion visionnaire pour créer une nouvelle stratégie à long terme, ses membres pourraient, par défaut, se tourner vers l’aspect opérationnel du travail afin de s’assurer de leur propre pertinence.

 

Comment trouver le meilleur modèle pour son CA ?

 

Dans un monde idéal, les administrateurs et la personne à la tête de la direction générale recevraient une formation exhaustive en matière de gouvernance, adopteraient et respecteraient des politiques de gouvernance adéquates et réaliseraient une autoévaluation sur une base régulière afin de s’assurer que l’organisation continue de fonctionner conformément au modèle de gouvernance retenu. En réalité, la plupart des administrateurs, voire des directeurs généraux, apprennent la gouvernance « sur le tas ». Ils se fient souvent aux informations relayées par des administrateurs ayant siégé à d’autres CA, sans l’assurance que cette information est juste.

Les organisations dont les ressources leur permettent de se prévaloir d’une formation en gouvernance adaptée à leur contexte et leurs besoins devraient en profiter. Cette formation devrait d’abord reconnaître que le modèle de gouvernance par politiques n’est pas approprié pour tous les organismes sans but lucratif et qu’il existe des modèles hybrides, alliant gouvernance opérationnelle et gouvernance par politiques, qui se prêtent davantage à certaines organisations, surtout les petites.

Pour déterminer son rôle le plus approprié dans le contexte de l’organisation, un CA peut également réviser différentes normes de certification en matière de gouvernance, une méthode très efficace et qui demande peu de ressources. Ainsi, le programme de normes d’Imagine Canada est articulé autour des règles de gouvernance les plus importantes, en plus de présenter des normes différentes et adaptées pour les petites organisations.

 

Mon CA joue un grand rôle opérationnel, et alors ?

 

Je propose que les CA de petites organisations cessent de s’excuser pour la participation de leurs administrateurs aux activités opérationnelles, car il serait totalement illogique pour une organisation avec un budget de moins de 100 000 $ de suivre le même modèle de gouvernance qu’un hôpital ou une université. Or, souvent, on évalue ces petites organisations en fonction des mêmes critères applicables aux grandes.

Les administrateurs devraient utiliser les normes définies par un programme de certification pertinent pour la taille de leur organisation comme point de référence et de comparaison. S’ils peinent à respecter ces normes, ils peuvent demander de l’aide pour ajuster leur modèle de gouvernance. Si, par contre, ils respectent toutes les normes et si leur organisation fonctionne de manière efficace et réalise ses priorités stratégiques, ils ont toutes les raisons de se montrer fiers de leur travail, de reconnaître leur propre compétence à gérer une organisation en fonction de sa taille et de mettre en lumière tout le travail que les petites organisations réussissent à faire avec peu de moyens.


À propos de l’auteure

Sandra Dunham a à son actif plus de 30 ans d’expérience dans le secteur de la bienfaisance et sans but lucratif ainsi qu’une maîtrise en administration publique de l’Université Dalhousie obtenue alors qu’elle poursuivait une carrière déjà bien entamée. Sandra est la propriétaire unique de Streamline New Perspective Solutions, une boîte de consultation spécialisée en gestion et collecte de fonds dans le secteur caritatif. Nos auteurs invités s’expriment à titre personnel. Leurs opinions ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles d’Imagine Canada.

La gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008


Voici un article publié par Lisa Andersson*, directrice de la recherche à Aktis et Stilpon Nestor, paru sur le site du Forum de Harvard Law School, qui brosse un portrait de l’évolution de la gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document illustré d’infographies très éclairantes. J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, l’introduction à l’article.

Si vous avez un intérêt pour la gouvernance dans le milieu bancaire, cet article est pour vous.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Governance of the 25 Largest European Banks a Decade After the Crisis

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance bancaire européenne »

 

 

This summer marked the 10-year anniversary of the start of the global financial crisis. Over the 18 months following August 2007, several bank collapses in the United States, Germany and Britain, culminating with the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 shook the financial system to its core. The interconnectivity of the world’s financial system meant that the repercussions would be felt globally, and on a monumental scale. The US Department of the Treasury has estimated that total household wealth would lose some $19.2 trillion following a publicly-funded government bailout program. Over the last decade governments, regulators, banks and their investors have revamped the financial system and its supervision in order to recover the public subsidy and prevent a similar crash from happening again.

In Europe, politicians and regulators at both the national and European level abandoned the path of deregulation and dramatically increased regulatory requirements and the scope of prudential supervision with an unparalleled focus on governance. The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the ensuing European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Central Bank (ECB) guidance implied stricter suitability reviews for board members and senior management, along with individual responsibility and in some cases criminal liability of non-executive directors (“NEDs”), as well as strict limits on variable remuneration. Higher regulatory requirements were compounded by the creation of a single supervisor for all systemic Eurozone banks. In many countries, especially the smaller ones, familiarity with supervisors usually allow a larger margin of forbearance and greater tolerance in assuming local sovereign risk. This has since disappeared. New rules and stricter oversight practices in the financial industry have translated into higher governance requirements and expectations for European banks’ boards of directors and senior management. So how do the boards and management committees of the top European banks measure up to their former selves? Data from the 25 largest listed banks [1] in Europe shows that boards today are smaller, work harder, and have a higher level of expertise than a decade ago.

While board sizes are getting smaller, the number of committees supporting the board has consistently grown over the years. This is in part driven by the mandatory separation of the audit and risk committee into two separate committees, but also by a general trend towards establishing more and more committees focusing on regulatory and compliance issues, as well as bank culture, conduct and reputation.

On average, 86% of board membership has been refreshed post-crisis. New board members brought with them greater independence, banking experience and general financial expertise among NEDs, as well as an improved gender balance on the board. In fact, women now comprise on average 34% of top European banks’ board membership, a development largely driven by national initiatives. Another significant change since 2007 is the fact that all the bank boards in the group now conduct regular assessments of the effectiveness of the board, a Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) requirement. The disclosure of this process has also improved significantly, with 48% of banks now disclosing specific challenges identified and actions taken to address these.

The role of a bank NED has evolved post-crisis. With increased scrutiny, boards of financial institutions are now required to adopt a more hands-on approach, requiring a greater time-commitment by their non-executive directors. On average, the workload per director has increased by over 30% compared to pre-crisis levels.

In contrast to the board, the size of management committees has grown in recent years. The top management committee now tend to include more heads of functions, reflected by the increased presence of the Chief Risk Officer, Head of Compliance and Head of Legal. Despite the positive development of a better gender balance on the board of directors, the number of women on the highest management committee has not increased significantly over the last ten years. This may suggest that the “top-down” approach of board quotas adopted in many European countries might be less than effective in promoting gender equality.


*Lisa Andersson is Head of Research of Aktis and Stilpon Nestor is Managing Director and Senior Advisor at Nestor Advisors. This post is based on their recent Nestor Advisors/Aktis publication.

 

L’indépendance des administrateurs, c’est bien ; mais, des administrateurs qui sont impérativement crédibles et légitimes, c’est mieux !


C’est avec enthousiasme que je vous recommande la lecture de cette dixième prise de position d’Yvan Allaire* au nom de l’IGOPP.

L’indépendance des administrateurs est une condition importante, mais d’autres considérations doivent nécessairement être prises en compte, notamment la légitimité et la crédibilité du conseil d’administration.

Comme l’auteur le mentionne, il faut parfois faire des arbitrages afin de se doter d’un conseil d’administration efficace.

J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, le sommaire exécutif du document. Pour plus de détails sur ce document de 40 pages, je vous invite à lire le texte au complet.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Ils orienteront les nouvelles exigences en matière de gouvernance.

 

D’indépendant à légitime et crédible : le défi des conseils d’administration

 

 

L’indépendance de la plupart des membres de conseils d’administration est maintenant un fait accompli. Bien qu’ayant contribué à un certain assainissement de la gouvernance des sociétés, force est de constater que cette sacro-sainte indépendance, dont certains ont fait la pierre angulaire, voire, la pierre philosophale de la «bonne» gouvernance, n’a pas donné tous les résultats escomptés.

Déjà en 2008, au moment de publier une première prise de position sur le thème de l’indépendance, l’IGOPP argumentait que ce qui faisait défaut à trop de conseils, ce n’était pas leur indépendance mais la légitimité et la crédibilité de leurs membres. Le fait qu’un administrateur n’ait pas d’intérêts personnels contraires aux intérêts de la société, son indépendance, devait être vu comme une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante au statut d’administrateur légitime.

Les évènements depuis lors, en particulier la crise financière de 2008, ont donné raison à cette prise de position et ont suscité de nouveaux enjeux de légitimité, comme la diversité des conseils, la représentation au conseil de parties prenantes autres que les actionnaires, le droit, contingent à la durée de détention des actions, de mettre en nomination des candidats pour le conseil, les limites d’âge et de durée des mandats comme administrateur.

Quant à la crédibilité d’un conseil, l’IGOPP proposait en 2008 que celle-ci devait s’appuyer sur «une expérience et une expertise pertinentes aux enjeux et aux défis avec lesquels l’organisation doit composer» ainsi que sur une connaissance fine «du modèle d’affaires de l’entreprise, de ses moteurs de création de valeurs économique et sociale» (Allaire, 2008). Pour l’IGOPP, la crédibilité du conseil suppose également l’intégrité et la confiance réciproque entre les membres du conseil et la direction. Donc, celle-ci devenait si importante qu’il serait acceptable, voire nécessaire, de suspendre l’exigence d’indépendance pour certains membres si c’était le prix à payer pour relever la crédibilité du conseil.

Depuis 2008

Profondément perturbés par la crise financière, les sociétés, les agences de règlementation et tous les observateurs de la gouvernance durent admettre que l’indépendance des membres du conseil et leur expérience de gestion dans des secteurs d’activités sans similarité avec l’entreprise à gouverner étaient nettement insuffisants. Ceux-ci devaient également posséder des compétences et une expérience à la mesure des enjeux et défis précis de la société qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner.Résultats de recherche d'images pour « indépendance des administrateurs »

Graduellement, pour la sélection des membres de conseil, on s’est préoccupé de leur expérience et connaissance spécifiques au type d’organisation qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner ainsi que de leur intégrité et leur fiabilité. Ainsi, l’évolution du monde de la gouvernance depuis 2008 a conforté la position de l’IGOPP et lui a donné un caractère prescient.

Toutefois, certains ont constaté que cette crédibilité pouvait être parfois difficile à concilier avec l’indépendance. En effet, si la crédibilité d’un candidat provient d’une longue expérience à œuvrer dans l’industrie à laquelle appartient la société-cible, il est bien possible que pour cette raison cette personne ne satisfasse pas à tous les desiderata d’une indépendance immaculée.

La prise de position de 2018 de l’IGOPP offre des précisions et des solutions aux nouveaux enjeux apparus depuis 2008.

Ainsi, l’IGOPP propose un net changement dans les démarches d’évaluation des conseils, dans les critères de sélection des nouveaux membres ainsi que pour l’établissement du profil de compétences recherchées.

La démarche d’évaluation du conseil

L’évaluation du conseil constitue le premier pilier d’une nécessaire réforme de la gouvernance. Cette évaluation doit répondre aux questions suivantes : le conseil est-il légitime par la façon dont les membres ont été mis en nomination? Par qui furent-ils élus ou nommés?

L‘IGOPP estime qu’une recherche de légitimité relevée et élargie pour un conseil deviendra un enjeu à plus ou moins brève échéance. Même dans le contexte juridique actuel, il est possible de s’interroger sur la qualité des démarches de mise en nomination et d’élection ainsi que du sens à donner aux variations dans le support électif reçu par les différents membres d’un conseil.

Puis, le conseil est-il crédible? L’IGOPP propose une évaluation des connaissances et de l’expérience spécifiques au type d’industries dans lequel œuvre la société que le conseil est appelé à gouverner. Il est important que la plupart des membres du conseil (tous?) possèdent des connaissances économique et financière pertinentes à ce secteur d’activités.

Un conseil d’administration n’est crédible que dans la mesure où une grande partie de ses membres peuvent soutenir un échange avec la direction sur ces aspects de performance et sur les multiples facteurs qui exercent une influence dynamique sur cette performance. Ce type de questionnement suppose, de la part du conseil, une fine et systémique compréhension du modèle d’affaires de la société.

Les critères de sélection de nouveaux membres:

Le président du conseil et le comité de gouvernance doivent s’équiper d’une grille de sélection à la mesure des enjeux actuels. Ainsi, plus de la moitié des membres doivent être indépendants et le conseil doit se préoccuper de la diversité de sa composition. Idéalement, le conseil devrait rechercher des nouveaux membres qui sont indépendants, ajoutent à la diversité du conseil et sont crédibles selon le sens donné à ce terme dans ce texte.

Toutefois, il pourra arriver qu’un conseil doive faire des arbitrages, des compromis entre ces trois qualités souhaitables pour un nouveau membre du conseil.

Si une personne par ailleurs dotée de qualités attrayantes pour le conseil ne possédait pas une expérience qui en fasse un membre crédible dès son arrivée, il faut s’assurer préalablement que celle-ci dispose du temps nécessaire, possède la formation et la rigueur intellectuelle essentielles pour acquérir en un temps raisonnable, un bon niveau de crédibilité; il est essentiel qu’un programme fait sur mesure soit mis en place pour relever rapidement la crédibilité de ce nouveau membre du conseil

Le profil d’expertise recherché:

Cette prise de position propose que le profil établi pour la recherche de nouveaux candidats pour le conseil débute par l’identification de secteurs d’activités proches de celui dans lequel œuvre la société en termes de cycle d’investissement, d’horizon temporel de gestion, de technologie, de marchés desservis (industriels, consommateurs, international), de facteurs de succès et de stratégie (leadership de coûts, différenciation/segmentation, envergure de produits).

Des dirigeants ayant une expérience de tels secteurs apprivoiseront plus rapidement les aspects essentiels d’une société œuvrant dans un secteur s’en rapprochant. Cette façon de procéder permet de concilier «indépendance» et «crédibilité».

Puis, si l’éventail des expertises au conseil indique une carence, disons, en termes de «finance», la recherche ne doit pas se limiter à identifier une personne qui fut une chef de la direction financière, mais bien une personne dont l’expérience en finance fut acquise dans le type de secteurs d’activités identifiés plus tôt. La gestion financière, des ressources humaines, des risques ou de la technologie d’information sont sans commune mesure selon que l’entreprise en est une de commerce au détail ou une minière ou une banque ou une entreprise du secteur aéronautique.

Conclusion

Notre prise de position de 2008 conserve toute sa pertinence. En fait les évènements survenus depuis 2008 appuient et confortent nos propositions d’alors. Si, à l’époque, nous étions une voix dans le désert, notre propos est maintenant sur la place publique, appuyé par des études empiriques et repris par tous ceux qui ont un peu réfléchi aux dilemmes de la gouvernance contemporaine.

Cette révision de notre prise de position de 2008 y ajoute des clarifications, aborde des enjeux devenus inévitables et veut rappeler à tous les conseils d’administration que:

«Si c’est par sa légitimité qu’un conseil acquiert le droit et l’autorité d’imposer ses volontés à la direction, c’est par sa crédibilité qu’un conseil devient créateur de valeur pour toutes les parties prenantes d’une organisation.» (Allaire, 2008).


*Ce document a été préparé et rédigé par Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, président exécutif, IGOPP

Quel client les firmes d’audit servent-elles ?


Voici un article-choc publié par Chris Hughes dans la revue Bloomberg qui porte sur l’indépendance (ou le manque d’indépendance) des quatre grandes firmes d’audit dans le monde.

Il y a une sérieuse polémique eu égard à l’indépendance réelle des grandes firmes d’audit.

Cet article donne les grandes lignes de la problématique et il esquisse des avenues de solution.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

 

 

Just Whom Does an Auditor Really Serve?

 

Shareholders need to be the client, not company executives.

L’une des quatre grandes firmes

 

British lawmakers are pushing for a full-blown antitrust probe into the country’s four big accountancy firms following the demise of U.K. construction group Carillion Plc.

The current domination of KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY and Deloitte isn’t working for shareholders. But creating more competition among the bean counters won’t be enough on its own. The fundamental problem is who the client is. The thrust of reform should be on making auditors see that their client is the investor and not the company executive. Randgold Resources is the only FTSE 100 company not to be audited by one of the Big Four !

Carillion’s accounts weren’t completely useless. Recent annual reports contained red flags of the company’s deteriorating financial health that were apparent to the smart money. Some long funds cut their holdings and hedge funds took large short positions, as my colleague Chris Bryant points out.

If the evidence was there to those who looked hard, it’s odd that the company was given a clean bill of health from accountancy firm KPMG months before it went bust. The impression is that auditors are on the side of the company rather than the shareholder. (KPMG says it believes it conducted its audit appropriately.)

Would more competition have made a difference? Companies may have only one accountant available if the few competing firms are already working for a rival. A lack of choice in any market usually leads to lower quality.

One response would be to force the Big Four to shed clients to mid-tier firms, creating a Big Five or Big Six. The risk is this greater competition just leads to a race to the bottom on fees with no improvement in quality. Other remedies are needed first.

The combination of audit and more lucrative consultancy work has long been chided – with good reason. Consultancy creates a client-pleasing culture. That’s at odds with the auditor’s role in challenging the assumptions behind company statements.

Opponents of a separation say combining the two services helps attract talent. This is a weak argument. Further lowering the current cap on consultancy fees, or completely separating audit and consultancy, is hard to argue with.

The accountancy firm should clearly serve the non-executive directors on the company’s audit committee which, in turn, is charged with looking out for shareholders. The risk is that the auditor’s main point of contact is the executive in the form of the chief financial officer.

Shareholders already have a vote on the appointment of the auditor. But annual reports could provide more useful disclosure on the frequency and depth of the last year’s contact between the firm and the audit committee, and between the latter and shareholders.

Now consider the nature of the job itself. Companies present the accounts, auditors check them. Out pops a financial statement that gives the false impression of extreme precision. Numbers that are the based on assumptions might be better presented as a range, accompanied by a critique of the judgments applied by the company.

Creating more big audit firms may create upward pressure on quality. But so long as they aren’t incentivized to have shareholders front of mind, it won’t be a long wait for the next Carillion.

__________________________________________________________

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

L’évaluation du conseil d’administration et des administrateurs | Une activité essentielle


Il y a quelques années, j’ai publié, en collaboration avec Geoffrey KIEL et James BECK (1), un guide pratique des questions clés que les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation du conseil d’administration.

Cet article est toujours d’actualité ; il met l’accent sur l’utilité d’avoir des évaluations bien menées ainsi que sur les sept étapes à suivre pour obtenir des évaluations efficaces. Vous pouvez consulter cet article sur mon blogue : « SEPT ÉTAPES À SUIVRE POUR DES ÉVALUATIONS EFFICACES D’UN CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION ET DES ADMINISTRATEURS ».

Récemment, les auteurs Geoffrey KIEL* et James BECK, ont publié un livre sur l’importance de l’évaluation du conseil d’administration dans une perspective de valeur ajoutée : « Reviewing Your Board—A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation ».

Après avoir brossé un tableau de la progression très marquée de l’activité d’évaluation, les auteurs reviennent sur l’approche conceptuelle idéale à adopter.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de cette documentation afin de valider la portée de cette activité qui relève du comité de gouvernance.

Bonne lecture !

 

Board Performance Evaluations that Add Value

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil d'administration »

 

Annual board evaluations are now commonplace for both for-profit and non-profit organizations, with specific board evaluation recommendations forming a key component in nearly every major corporate governance standard, review or report internationally.

Recent data on US boards from the global consulting firm Spencer Stuart shows that 98% of S&P 500 boards conduct a board evaluation of some type, although only about a third review the board as a whole, individual directors and committees as part of the process. [1] In the UK, the majority of boards on the FTSE 150 conduct board reviews, with 60.7% conducting their evaluations internally, while 38% of boards used an external facilitator. [2] Encouragingly, PwC reports that in 2017 68% of public company directors in the US say that the board has taken action based on the results of their last board review, which was an increase on the 49% from PwC’s survey in 2016. [3]

In a cross sector review of board effectiveness by the UK arm of Grant Thornton, more than 60% off those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that there were “adequate processes in place to evaluate the performance of the whole board.” [4] But are “adequate processes” good enough? For example, adequate processes might mean a perfunctory activity is conducted annually to meet listing requirements or pay lip service to best practice governance. And what about the 40% of boards in the UK survey that do not have adequate processes?

Our experience, having been involved in many board evaluations in large and small, for-profit and non-profit organisations, is that the effectiveness of board reviews ranges from counterproductive exercises, which exacerbate already fractious and poorly performing boards, to truly transformational change leading to superior governance and organisational outcomes. Further, our experience suggests that understanding the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different types of board reviews, and properly planning and implementing the board’s evaluation significantly increases the likelihood of positive outcomes.

 

A seven step framework for board evaluations

 

We wrote our recently released book, Reviewing Your Board—A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation, to address this need for more information about board and director evaluations to give boards and their directors the opportunity to think about board evaluations and how they can be carried out to add—rather than subtract—value to the organization.

Our approach to effective board and director evaluations uses a seven-step framework (see Figure 1) that asks the vital questions all boards should consider when planning an evaluation. [5] While these questions must be asked for all board evaluations, the combined answers can be quite different. Thus, although the seven questions may be common to each, the subsequent review processes can range markedly in their scope, complexity and cost. Further, while our framework is described sequentially, in practice, most boards will not follow such a linear process.

 

Figure 1

Framework for a board evaluation

 

Source: Kiel, et al., 2018, p. 4

 

1. What are our objectives?

 

The first (and, in our opinion, most important) aspect of any evaluation is establishing why the board is doing it. The primary motivation can be characterized as “conformance” or “value adding”:

– conformance focuses on meeting the expectations of external scrutiny through compliance with various laws and following appropriate governance standards—whether mandated or self-imposed; and

– value adding focuses on improving both organizational and board performance. For example, taking proactive steps to ensure the board is effective in bringing new talent into the boardroom to maintain a proper mix of skills.

In practice, most board reviews will be aimed at meeting both conformance and value-adding objectives.

Without a solid rationale shared by the directors, any evaluation is likely to meet resistance and/or fail. There are many aspects of its performance the board may wish to evaluate. Apart from a desire to contribute to firm performance, many boards feel that regular evaluation contributes significantly to group processes within the board. A regular board review can indicate potential problems or differences of opinion that can be addressed before they become a source of conflict.

Generally, the answer to the first question in the seven-step framework will fall into one of the following two categories:

– organizational leadership, e.g., “We want to clearly demonstrate our commitment to performance management”; or

– problem resolution, e.g., “We do not seem to have the appropriate skills, competencies or motivation on the board”.

Clearly identified objectives enable the board to set specific goals for the evaluation and make decisions about the scope of the review; e.g., the approach the board will take, how many people will be involved, how much time and money will be allocated.

 

2. Who will be evaluated?

 

Comprehensive governance evaluations can entail reviewing the performance of a wide range of individuals and groups. Boards need to consider three groups:

– the board as whole (including committees);

– individual directors (including the role of the chair); and

– key governance personnel (generally the CEO and corporate/company secretary).

Considerations such as cost or time constraints, however, may prevent reviewing all three groups.

Alternatively, a board may have a very specific objective for the review process that does not require the review of all individuals and groups identified. In both cases, an effective evaluation requires the board to select the most appropriate individuals or groups to review, based on its objectives.

 

3. What will be evaluated?

 

The third stage in establishing a framework for a board evaluation involves deciding the criteria for the evaluation process. This is necessary whether the board is seeking general or specific performance improvements, and will suit boards seeking to improve areas as diverse as board processes, director skills, competencies and motivation, or even boardroom relationships.

To cover the range of objectives the board may have, including meeting any compliance requirements, board evaluations generally use some form of leading practice framework, such as the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Key Agreed Principles [6]or the Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate Governance[7] Of course, a comprehensive list of areas for investigation will need to be balanced with the scope of the evaluation and the resources available for the process. At this stage, a realistic assessment of the resources available, a component of which is the time availability of directors and other key governance personnel, can be made.

 

4. Who will be asked?

 

The vast majority of board and director evaluations concentrate exclusively on the board as the sole sources of information for the evaluation process. However, this discounts other potentially rich sources of feedback. Participants in the evaluation can be drawn from within or from outside the organization. Internally, directors, the CEO, senior executives and, in some cases, other management personnel and employees may be able to provide useful feedback on elements of the governance system. Externally, depending on the ownership structure, shareholders may provide valuable data for the review. Similarly, in some situations, key stakeholders such as government departments or agencies, major clients and suppliers may have close links with the board and be in a position to provide useful information on its performance.

 

5. What techniques will be used?

 

Depending on the degree of formality, the objectives of the evaluation, and the resources available, boards may choose between a range of qualitative and quantitative techniques. Quantitative data are in the form of numbers. They can be used to answer questions of “how much” or “how many”. Questionnaire-based surveys are by far the most common form of quantitative technique used in board evaluations and can be an important information-gathering tool.

Questions of “what”, “how”, and “why” require qualitative research methods. The three main methods used for collecting qualitative data are:

  1. Interviews, either one-on-one or in small groups, provide an excellent way of assessing directors’ perceptions, meaning and constructions of reality by asking for information in a way that allows them to express themselves in their own terms;
  2. Board meeting observation is especially useful when the evaluation objectives relate to issues of boardroom dynamics or relationships between individuals; and
  3. Document analysis of board packs, governance policies and similar can also be a rich source of information to identify areas of improvement in board processes.

When the board evaluation’s objectives are to identify governance issues, qualitative research is particularly useful. Qualitative data does, however, have several drawbacks. The major one being that interpreting the results requires judgment and experience on the part of the person undertaking the review and analysis.

There is no best methodology. Research techniques need to be adapted to the evaluation objectives and board context. However, there are advantages to be gained from combining a questionnaire with interviews. The questionnaire (most often delivered online) allows directors to benchmark the board along a series of dimensions (e.g. very poor to very good; 1 to 5; etc.), which allows directors to see where they have differing viewpoints from other directors. This can then be followed-up by interviews to allow directors to provide further context to the topics covered in the questionnaire and to raise areas of concern not covered in the survey.

 

6. Who will do the evaluation?

 

Who conducts the evaluation process will depend on whether the review is to be conducted internally or externally and what methodology is chosen. Internal reviews are conducted within the organization, either by one or more directors or governance personnel such as the corporate secretary. External reviews are conducted by external parties, most often either specialist consulting firms in corporate governance, large generalist consulting firms or law firms.

Internal reviews are more likely to provide board members with confidence surrounding the confidentiality of the process and are likely to cost less. All of these are important considerations when making the decision.

There are, however, several limitations to an internally conducted review. The internal reviewer may lack the skills required (e.g., interview technique, survey design), they are likely to have a bias (often unconscious) that carries over into the assessment and it is a less transparent process where the review process is carried out by one of the board’s own. Perhaps most significantly, the review is likely to achieve little if the reviewer (e.g., the chair) is the source of the problems or it may not be appropriate given the objectives of the review.

An external facilitator can offer a number of advantages including that:

– a good external facilitator is more likely to have undertaken a significant number of reviews and will often provide important insights into techniques, comparison points and new ideas;

– an external party often aids transparency and objectivity;

– a good external party can play a mediating role for boards facing sensitive issues through being the messenger for difficult matters involving group dynamics and egos.

Ultimately, factors such as the complexity of the governance problems faced, the experience of the board and cost considerations will determine whether the board decides to conduct the evaluation internally or seek external advice. However, it is now becoming more and more common for boards to alternate between an internal review one year and an external review the next.

 

7. What will we do with the results?

 

The evaluation’s objectives should be the determining factor when deciding to whom the results will be released. Most often, the board’s central objective will be to agree a series of actions that it can take to improve governance. Since the effectiveness of the governance system relies on people within the organization, communicating the results to all directors and key governance personnel is critical for boards seeking performance improvement. Where the objective of the board evaluation is to assess the quality of board—management relationships, a summary of the evaluation may also be shared with the senior management team.

If the board wishes to build its reputation for transparency and/or to develop relationships with external stakeholders, a positive, focused board evaluation is an excellent way of demonstrating that it is serious about governance and is committed to improving its performance. Obviously, when considering what information to communicate externally, a balance needs to be struck between transparency on the one hand and the need for shareholders and other external stakeholders to retain faith in the board’s ability and effectiveness on the other hand. Such communication outline how the evaluation was conducted (e.g. internal or external review), the focus of the review (e.g. role fulfilment) and, perhaps, some of the major outcomes (e.g. identified need to further focus on strategy or requirements for new skills on the board).

In communicating board review outcomes, it should be remembered that the confidentiality of the process contributes significantly to full and frank insights being provided by participants and provides the board with defensible results. As such, director confidentiality must be protected.

 

Implementing the outcomes

 

Once the annual performance evaluation is over, the board’s attention will move on to other issues and any stimulus for change that may have come when the results were first delivered can dissolve. Worse still, directors along with any executives who participated in the process will feel the evaluation has been a waste of their valuable time if recommendations for improvement were accepted, but not acted on. Therefore, it is critical that any agreed actions that come out of an evaluation are implemented and monitored. Many boards include a review of action steps as an agenda item to be tracked at each meeting. Milestones can be established for the achievement of the action plans and progress reviewed until all agreed changes have been implemented.

 

Other approaches to board evaluation

 

There are a number of different approaches to evaluating board performance that may better suit a board’s objectives and differ from the “traditional” board, individual director (self and peer), chair or committee evaluations. For example, board skills assessment and board maturity assessment all serve a different purpose and can bring about significant improvements to the board’s performance if appropriately implemented.

If the board’s primary objective in undertaking a review of its performance is to focus on the current and required skills of the board, a dedicated skills analysis rather than a board evaluation would be the best way to identify the skills that currently exist on the board and consequently, highlight any skills gaps.

More recently, a new type of board review is being used, board maturity assessment. Maturity assessments involve benchmarking the board against what is regarded as good practice. Maturity models have become popular in several management disciplines. They involve establishing different levels of practice from “basic” to “advanced” over the key functions of an activity, based on contemporary views of best practice. In corporate governance, the key functions include the role of the board in relation to the CEO, risk practices, compliance, the conduct of board meetings, effective use of board committees, and so on. The governance activity of the organization in all these governance dimensions is then assessed by an external evaluator experienced in corporate governance against the maturity model to provide a current maturity rating. Directors’ views can be part of the process, with directors indicating what level of maturity is desirable for the organization given its circumstances. Looking at the gaps between the current level of governance practice and the appropriate level as agreed by directors shows where better practice may be implemented. This approach also has the benefit of indirectly educating directors as to what is good governance practice.

 

Conclusion

 

Performance evaluation is an increasingly important feature of boardrooms across the globe. These reviews have benefits for individual directors, boards and the organizations for which they work. Boards also need to recognize that the evaluation process is an effective team-building, ethics-shaping activity. Our observation is that boards often neglect the process of engagement when undertaking evaluations; unfortunately, boards that fail to engage their members are missing a major opportunity for developing a shared set of board norms and inculcating a positive board and organizational culture. In short, the process is as important as the content.

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Endnotes

1Spencer Stuart, 2017 Spencer Stuart US Board Indexwww.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/ssbi-2017, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

2Spencer Stuart, 2017 Spencer Stuart UK Board Indexwww.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/uk-board-index-2017, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

3 PwC, 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Surveyhttps://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/annual-corporate-directors-survey/assets/pwc-2017-annual-corporate–directors–survey.pdf, accessed 7 March 2018.(go back)

4Grant Thornton UK, 2017, The Board: creating and protecting valuehttps://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-kingdom/pdf/publication/board-effectiveness-report-2017.pdf, accessed 8 March 2018, p 10(go back)

5G Kiel, G Nicholson, J Tunny, and J Beck, 2018, Reviewing Your Board: A Guide to Board and Director Evaluation, Australian Institute of Company Directors, Sydney.(go back)

6National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), 2011, Key Agreed Principleshttps://www.nacdonline.org/files/PDF/KEY%20AGREED%20PRINCIPLES%202011.pdf, accessed 1 May 2018.(go back)

7Business Roundtable, 2016, Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate Governancehttps://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-2016.pdf, accessed 1 May 2018.(go back)

___________________________________________________

*Professor Geoffrey Kiel is a Specialist Advisor and James Beck is Managing Director at Effective Governance Pty Ltd. This post is based on an Effective Governance publication by Prof. Kiel and Mr. Beck.

(1) Geoffrey KIEL, James BECK et Jacques GRISÉ (1) Geoffrey Kiel, Ph.D., premier vice-chancelier délégué et doyen de l’École d’administration, University of Notre Dame, Australie, et président de la société Effective Governance Pty Ltd, James Beck, directeur général, Effective Governance Pty Ltd, Jacques Grisé, Ph.D., F.Adm.A., collaborateur spécial du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, Québec.

Conséquences à la non-divulgation d’une cyberattaque majeure


Quelles sont les conséquences de ne pas divulguer une intrusion importante du système de sécurité informatique ?

Les auteurs, Matthew C. Solomon* et Pamela L. Marcogliese, dans un billet publié sur le forum du HLS, ont étudié de près la situation des manquements à la sécurité informatique de Yahoo et ils nous présentent les conséquences de la non-divulgation d’attaques cybernétiques et de bris à la sécurité des informations des clients.

Ils exposent le cas très clairement, puis ils s’attardent aux modalités des arrangements financiers avec la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 

Comme ce sont des événements susceptibles de se produire de plus en plus, il importe que les entreprises soient bien au fait de ce qui les attend en cas de violation des obligations de divulgation.

Les auteurs font les cinq (5) constats suivants eu égard à la situation vécue par Yahoo :

 

— First, public companies should take seriously the SEC’s repeated warnings that one of its top priorities is ensuring that public companies meet their obligations to adequately disclose material cybersecurity incidents and risks. This requires regular assessment of cyber incidents and risks in light of the company’s disclosures, with the assistance of outside counsel and auditors as appropriate, and ensuring that there are adequate disclosure controls in place for such incidents and risks.

— Second, the SEC’s recently released interpretive guidance on cybersecurity disclosure is an important guidepost for all companies with such disclosure obligations. The guidance specifically cited the fact that the SEC views disclosure that a company is subject to future cybersecurity attacks as inadequate if the company had already suffered such incidents. Notably, the Yahoo settlement specifically faulted the company for this precise inadequacy in its disclosures. Similarly, the recent guidance encouraged companies to adopt comprehensive policies and procedures related to cybersecurity and to assess their compliance regularly, including the sufficiency of their disclosure controls and procedures as they relate to cybersecurity disclosure. The Yahoo settlement also found that the company had inadequate such controls.

— Third, at the same time the SEC announced the settlement, it took care to emphasize that “[w]e do not second-guess good faith exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure.” [7] The SEC went on to note that Yahoo failed to meet this standard with respect to the 2014 Breach, but by articulating a “good faith” standard the SEC likely meant to send a message to the broader market that it is not seeking to penalize companies that make reasonable efforts to meet their cyber disclosure obligations.

— Fourth, it is also notable that the SEC charges did not include allegations that Yahoo violated securities laws with respect to the 2013 Breach. Yahoo had promptly disclosed the 2013 Breach after learning about it in late 2016, but updated its disclosure almost a year later with significant new information about the scope of the breach. The SEC’s recent guidance indicated that it was mindful that some material facts may not be available at the time of the initial disclosure, as was apparently the case with respect to the 2013 Breach. [8] At the same time, the SEC cautioned that “an ongoing internal or external investigation – which often can be lengthy – would not on its own provide a basis for avoiding disclosures of a material cybersecurity incident.” [9]

— Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission did not insist on settlements with any individuals. Companies, of course, can only commit securities violations through the actions of their employees. While it is not unusual for the Commission to settle entity-only cases on a “collective negligence” theory, the SEC Chair and the Enforcement Division’s leadership have emphasized the need to hold individuals accountable in order to maximize the deterrent impact of SEC actions. [10]

 

Bonne lecture !

 

Failure to Disclose a Cybersecurity Breach

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « yahoo data breach »

 

 

On April 24, 2018, Altaba, formerly known as Yahoo, entered into a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), pursuant to which Altaba agreed to pay $35 million to resolve allegations that Yahoo violated federal securities laws in connection with the disclosure of the 2014 data breach of its user database. The case represents the first time a public company has been charged by the SEC for failing to adequately disclose a cyber breach, an area that is expected to face continued heightened scrutiny as enforcement authorities and the public are increasingly focused on the actions taken by companies in response to such incidents. Altaba’s settlement with the SEC, coming on the heels of its agreement to pay $80 million to civil class action plaintiffs alleging similar disclosure violations, underscores the increasing potential legal exposure for companies based on failing to properly disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents.

Background

As alleged, Yahoo learned in late 2014 that it had recently suffered a data breach affecting over 500 million user accounts (the “2014 Breach”). Yahoo did not disclose the 2014 Breach until September 2016. During the time period Yahoo was aware of the undisclosed breach, it entered into negotiations to be acquired by Verizon and finalized a stock purchase agreement in July 2016, two months prior to the disclosure of the 2014 Breach. Following the disclosure in September 2016, Yahoo’s stock price dropped 3% and it later renegotiated the stock purchase agreement to reduce the price paid for Yahoo’s operating business by $350 million.

In or about late 2016, following its disclosure of the 2014 Breach, Yahoo learned about a separate breach that had taken place in August 2013 and promptly announced that such breach had affected 1 billion users (the “2013 Breach”). In October 2017, Yahoo updated its disclosure concerning the 2013 Breach, announcing that it now believed that all 3 billion of its accounts had been affected.

The Settlement

Altaba’s SEC settlement centered on the 2014 Breach only. The SEC found that despite learning of the 2014 Breach in late 2014—which resulted in the theft of as many as 500 million of its users’ Yahoo usernames, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords, and security questions and answers, referred to internally as Yahoo’s “crown jewels”— Yahoo failed to timely disclose the material cybersecurity incident in any of its public securities filings until September 2016. Although Yahoo senior management and relevant legal staff were made aware of the 2014 Breach, according to the SEC, they “did not properly assess the scope, business impact, or legal implications of the breach, including how and where the breach should have been disclosed in Yahoo’s public filings or whether the fact of the breach rendered, or would render, any statements made by Yahoo in its public filings misleading.” [1] The SEC also faulted Yahoo’s senior management and legal staff because they “did not share information regarding the breach with Yahoo’s auditors or outside counsel in order to assess the company’s disclosure obligations in its public filings.” [2]

Among other things, the SEC found that Yahoo’s risk factor disclosures in its annual and quarterly reports from 2014 through 2016 were materially misleading in that they claimed the company only faced the risk of potential future data breaches, without disclosing that “a massive data breach” had in fact already occurred. [3]

The SEC also alleged that Yahoo management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (“MD&A”) in those reports was also misleading to the extent it omitted known trends or uncertainties with regard to liquidity or net revenue presented by the 2014 Breach. [4]Finally, the SEC further found that Yahoo did not maintain adequate disclosure controls and procedures designed to ensure that reports from Yahoo’s information security team raising actual incidents of the theft of user data, or the significant risk of theft of user data, were properly and timely assessed to determine how and where data breaches should be disclosed in Yahoo’s public filings. [5]

Based on these allegations, the SEC found that Yahoo violated Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act and Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. [6] To settle the charges, Altaba, without admitting or denying liability, agreed to cease and desist from any further violations of the federal securities laws and pay a civil penalty of $35 million.

Takeaways

There are several important takeaways from the settlement:

— First, public companies should take seriously the SEC’s repeated warnings that one of its top priorities is ensuring that public companies meet their obligations to adequately disclose material cybersecurity incidents and risks. This requires regular assessment of cyber incidents and risks in light of the company’s disclosures, with the assistance of outside counsel and auditors as appropriate, and ensuring that there are adequate disclosure controls in place for such incidents and risks.

— Second, the SEC’s recently released interpretive guidance on cybersecurity disclosure is an important guidepost for all companies with such disclosure obligations. The guidance specifically cited the fact that the SEC views disclosure that a company is subject to future cybersecurity attacks as inadequate if the company had already suffered such incidents. Notably, the Yahoo settlement specifically faulted the company for this precise inadequacy in its disclosures. Similarly, the recent guidance encouraged companies to adopt comprehensive policies and procedures related to cybersecurity and to assess their compliance regularly, including the sufficiency of their disclosure controls and procedures as they relate to cybersecurity disclosure. The Yahoo settlement also found that the company had inadequate such controls.

— Third, at the same time the SEC announced the settlement, it took care to emphasize that “[w]e do not second-guess good faith exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure.” [7] The SEC went on to note that Yahoo failed to meet this standard with respect to the 2014 Breach, but by articulating a “good faith” standard the SEC likely meant to send a message to the broader market that it is not seeking to penalize companies that make reasonable efforts to meet their cyber disclosure obligations.

— Fourth, it is also notable that the SEC charges did not include allegations that Yahoo violated securities laws with respect to the 2013 Breach. Yahoo had promptly disclosed the 2013 Breach after learning about it in late 2016, but updated its disclosure almost a year later with significant new information about the scope of the breach. The SEC’s recent guidance indicated that it was mindful that some material facts may not be available at the time of the initial disclosure, as was apparently the case with respect to the 2013 Breach. [8] At the same time, the SEC cautioned that “an ongoing internal or external investigation – which often can be lengthy – would not on its own provide a basis for avoiding disclosures of a material cybersecurity incident.” [9]

— Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission did not insist on settlements with any individuals. Companies, of course, can only commit securities violations through the actions of their employees. While it is not unusual for the Commission to settle entity-only cases on a “collective negligence” theory, the SEC Chair and the Enforcement Division’s leadership have emphasized the need to hold individuals accountable in order to maximize the deterrent impact of SEC actions. [10]

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Endnotes

1Altaba Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo! Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10485, Exchange Act Release No. 83096, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3937, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3937 (Apr. 24, 2018) at ¶ 14.(go back)

2Idat ¶ 15.(go back)

3Idat ¶¶ 2, 16.(go back)

4Id.(go back)

5Idat ¶ 15.(go back)

6Idat ¶¶ 22-23.(go back)

7Press Release, SEC, Altaba, Formerly Known As Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71.(go back)

8As we have previously discussed, the federal securities laws do not impose a general affirmative duty on public companies to continuously disclose material information and, as acknowledged in Footnote 37 of the interpretive guidance, circuits are split on whether a duty to update exists. However, in circuits where a duty to update has been found to exist, a distinction has often been drawn between statements of a policy nature that are within the company’s control and statements describing then current facts that would be expected to change over time. The former have been held subject to a duty to update while the latter have not. See In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he voluntary disclosure of an ordinary earnings forecast does not trigger any duty to update.”); In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1433 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Duane Reade Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 02 Civ. 6478 (NRB), 2003 WL 22801416, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Nardoff v. Duane Reade, Inc., 107 F. App’x 250 (2d Cir. 2004) (“‘company has no duty to update forward–looking statements merely because changing circumstances have proven them wrong.’”).(go back)

9See SEC, Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg 8166, 8169 (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/02/26/2018-03858/commission-statement-and-guidance-on-public- company-cybersecurity-disclosures.(go back)

10See, e.g., Steven R. Peikin, Co-Director, Div. Enf’t., SEC, Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the SEC’s Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Keynote Address at N.Y.U. Program on Corporate Law and Enforcement Conference: No Turning Back: 40 Years of the FCAP and 20 Years of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Impacts, Achievements, and Future Challenges (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peikin2017-11-09;
SEC Div. Enf’t., Annual Report A Look Back at Fiscal Year 2017, at 2 (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report2017.pdf.(go back)

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*Matthew C. Solomon and Pamela L. Marcogliese are partners and Rahul Mukhi is counsel at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb publication by Mr. Solomon, Ms. Marcogliese, Ms. Mukhi, and Kal Blassberger.

L’évolution du statut d’administrateur indépendant en 2017 | EY


Comment a évolué la situation du statut d’indépendance des administrateurs en 2017 ?

La publication d’EY est très intéressante à cet égard ; elle tente de répondre à cette question et elle brosse un tableau de la composition des conseils d’administration en 2017.

L’étude effectuée par l’équipe de Steve W. Klemash* auprès des entreprises du Fortune 100 montre clairement l’importance accrue accordée au critère d’administrateur indépendant au fil des ans.

Ainsi, au cours des deux dernières années, 80 % des administrateurs nommés par les actionnaires avaient la qualité d’administrateurs indépendants.

La plupart des nouveaux administrateurs avaient une expertise en finance et comptabilité et 44 % de ceux-ci ont été nommés sur le comité d’audit.

Cette année, 54 % des nouveaux arrivants étaient des personnes qui n’étaient pas CEO, comparativement à 51 % l’année précédente.

On compte 40 % de femmes parmi les nouveaux administrateurs en 2017.

Également, les nouveaux administrateurs sont plus jeunes : 15 % ont moins de 50 ans comparativement à 9 % l’année précédente. De plus, 85 % des nouveaux administrateurs avaient entre 50 ans et 67 ans.

Les entreprises recherchent une plus grande diversité de profils d’origine, d’expertises, d’habiletés et d’expériences.

J’ai tenté de résumer les principales conclusions de cette étude. Je vous renvoie à l’étude originale afin d’en connaître les détails.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

Independent Directors: New Class of 2017

 

 

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Companies are continuing to bring fresh and diverse perspectives into the boardroom and to enhance alignment of board composition with their forward-looking strategies.

In our second annual report, we share the results of our analysis of independent directors who were elected by shareholders to the board of a Fortune 100 company for the first time in 2017—what we refer to as the “new class of 2017.”

We looked at corporate disclosures to see what qualifications and characteristics were specifically highlighted, showcasing what this new class of directors brings to the boardroom. Our research was based on a review of proxy statements filed by companies on the 2017 Fortune 100 list. We also reviewed the same 83 companies’ class of 2016 directors to provide consistency in year-on-year comparisons.

 

Our perspective

 

What we’re hearing in the market is that boards are seeking slates of candidates who bring a diverse perspective and a range of functional expertise, including on complex, evolving areas such as digital transformation, e-commerce, public policy, regulation and talent management. As a result, boards are increasingly considering highly qualified, nontraditional candidates, such as non-CEOs, as well as individuals from a wider range of backgrounds. These developments are expanding the short lists of potential director candidates.

At the same time, companies are expanding voluntary disclosures around board composition. Our review of Fortune 100 disclosures around board composition found that:

While diverse director candidates are in high demand and related shifts in board composition are underway, these developments may be slow to manifest. For example, consider that the average Fortune 100 board has 10 seats. In this context, the addition of a single new director is unlikely to dramatically shift averages in terms of gender diversity, age, tenure or other considerations.

That said, whether a board’s pace of change is sufficient depends on a company’s specific circumstances and evolving board oversight needs. Boards should challenge their approach to refreshment, asking whether they are meeting the company’s diversity, strategy and risk oversight needs. Waiting for an open seat to nominate a diverse candidate may mean waiting for the value that diversity could bring.

In 2018, we anticipate that companies will continue to offer more voluntary disclosure on board composition, showing how their directors represent the best mix of individuals for the company—across multiple dimensions, including a diversity of backgrounds, expertise, skill sets and experiences.

 

Key findings

1. Most Fortune 100 companies welcomed a new independent director in 2017

 

This past year, over half of the Fortune 100 companies we reviewed added at least one independent director. This figure is a little lower than the prior year; but overall, during the two-year period from 2016 to 2017, over 80% of the companies added at least one independent director. Taking into account director exits—whether due to retirement, corporate restructuring, pursuit of new opportunities or other reasons—we found that nearly all of the companies experienced some type of change in board composition during this period.

2. The class of 2017 brings greater finance and accounting, public policy and regulatory, and operational skills to the table.

 

Corporate finance and accounting were the most common director qualifications cited by companies in 2017, up from fifth in 2016. A couple areas saw notable increases: government and public policy, operations and manufacturing, and transactional finance. This year, some areas tied in ranking, and in a twist, corporate references to expertise in strategy fell from third in 2016 to below the top 10 categories of expertise. Companies also made fewer references to board service or governance expertise compared to the prior year.

3. Most of the 2017 entering class was assigned to audit committees.

 

The strength of corporate finance and accounting expertise of the entering class is seen, too, with regards to key committee designations. Of the three “key committees” of audit, compensation, and nominating and governance, the 2017 entering class was primarily assigned to serve on audit committees. A closer look at the disclosures shows that 63% of the new directors that were assigned to the audit committee were formally designated as audit committee financial experts. In comparison, the corresponding figure in the prior year was 59%.

 

4. The Fortune 100 class of 2017 includes more non-CEOs.

 

While experience as a CEO is often cited as a traditional first cut for search firms, 54% of the entering class served in other roles, with non-CEO backgrounds including other executive roles or non-corporate backgrounds (academia, scientific organizations, nonprofits, government, military, etc.). This represents a slight increase from 2016 with most of the shift stemming from individuals holding or having held other senior executive positions. Approximately 30% appear to be joining a Fortune 100 public company board, having never previously served on a public company board—similar to 2016.

5. The class of 2017 is 40% female

 

As in the prior year, 40% of the entering class were women, but overall percentages were largely unchanged, with women directors averaging 28% board representation compared to 27% in 2016. Also, there was minimal age difference, with the women directors averaging 57 compared to 58 for male counterparts. Among the directors bringing the top categories of expertise, women directors accounted for over one-third of the disclosed director qualifications. In some cases, they represented over half of the disclosed category of expertise.

6. The class of 2017 tends to be younger

 

There appears to be an ongoing shift toward younger directors. For the class of 2017 entering directors, the average age of these individuals was 57, compared to 63 for incumbents and 68 for exiting directors. Of the entering class, 15% were under 50, an increase from 9% in the prior year. And, for the second consecutive year, we observe that over half of the entering class was under the age of 60. Exiting directors largely continue to be age 68 or older.

Questions for the board to consider

 

– How is the company aligning the skills of its directors—and that of the full board—to the company’s long-term strategy through board refreshment and succession planning efforts? How is the company providing voluntary disclosures around its approach in these areas?

– Does the company’s pool of director candidates challenge traditional search norms such as title, age, industry and geography?

– How is the company addressing growing investor and stakeholder attention to board diversity, and is the company providing disclosure around the diversity of the board—defined as including considerations such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality—in addition to skills and expertise?

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*Steve W. Klemash is Americas Leader, Kellie C. Huennekens is Associate Director, and Jamie Smith is Associate Director, at the EY Center for Board Matters. This post is based on their EY publication.

Le cycle de vie des sociétés régies par des classes d’actions diverses


Les études montrent que ces types d’arrangements ne sont pas immanquablement dommageables pour les actionnaires, comme nous laissent croire plusieurs groupes d’intérêt tels que le Conseil des investisseurs institutionnels et la firme de conseil Institutional Shareholder Services (« ISS »). Plusieurs militent en faveur d’une durée limitée pour de telles émissions d’actions.

Les récentes émissions d’actions à classes multiples des entreprises de haute technologie ne nous permettent pas, à ce stade-ci, de statuer sur les avantages à long terme pour les actionnaires.

Les auteurs, Martijn Cremers et coll., concluent qu’il est trop tôt pour se prononcer définitivement sur la question, et pour réglementer cette structure de capital. Voir à cet égard l’article suivant : Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms

 

 

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In our paper, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms, we consider the market valuation of dual class firms over their life cycle. Dual class financing is on the rise in recent years, particularly among high-tech firms, following Google’s seminal 2004 dual-class IPO structure. This financing choice leaves control of the firms in the hands of entrepreneurs, giving outside investors with inferior-vote shares no direct mechanism to influence the board or management. Rather, public investors buying inferior vote shares at the IPO are betting that granting the entrepreneurs such control allows them to better implement their unique vision.

However, as dual class firms mature and their vision is largely accomplished, entrepreneurs’ leadership may no longer be needed, and entrepreneurs may start self-serving behavior. Public investors’ resentment may then develop, accusing dual class firms’ controlling shareholders for wanting their money without any accountability. Such public pressure arguably recently led MSCI to issue a proposal to reduce the weight of inferior-vote shares in MSCI indices by multiplying the regular weight by the shares fractional voting power. Notably, the same MSCI also issued a report a few months ago stating that “[o]ur research shows that unequal voting stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period from November 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market indexes would have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 basis points per year over our sample period.” Obviously, confusion reigns over the merits of dual class financing.

Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017) (The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, Virginia Law Review) argue that any initial benefits of dual class structures decay with firm age, while the potential agency costs associated with dual class structures increase with time. Thus, Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel advocate sunset clauses to dual class financing. The sunset clauses would require the “non-interested” public shareholders of the firm to vote on whether or not to extend the dual class structure, some pre-determined number of years after the IPO. If the extension proposal is declined, firms would unify the low- and high-vote shares, i.e., convert all shares into a single class of shares with “one share one vote”.

In our paper, we empirically investigate the desirability of sunset provisions by examining the life-cycle of dual class firms. Using an extensive sample of all single-and dual-class firm IPOs in the U.S. during 1980-2015, and relying on comparing dual class firms to similar single class firms, we document several novel phenomena in the life cycle of dual class firms.

First, the difference in firm valuation between dual and single class firms strongly varies over the corporate life cycle. At the IPO, dual class firms tend to have higher valuations, as at the IPO year-end the market valuation of dual class firms is, on average, 11% higher than that of matched single class firms. This initial valuation premium of dual class firms dissipates in the years after the IPO, and on average it becomes insignificantly negative about six to nine years after the IPO. We also find that the difference between the voting and equity stakes of the controlling shareholders of dual class firms (the “wedge”) tends to increase as the firm ages. According to one of our estimates, the mean wedge increases from 16% one year after the IPO to 22% five years after the IPO, and to 26% nine years after the IPO. The widening of the wedge is typically associated with more severe valuation reducing agency problems—see Masulis et al. (2009) (Agency Costs and Dual-Class Companies, Journal of Finance). Bebchuk and Kastiel (2018) (The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, forthcoming Georgetown Law Review) analyze the perils of the widening wedges and advocate informing the public and capping it.

Second, we document interesting differences between dual class firms with a valuation premium (relative to their matched single class firms) at the IPO and dual class firms with a valuation discount at the IPO. Dual class firms with a valuation premium at the end of their IPO year gradually tend to lose this premium, until their valuations become very similar to those of their single class counterparts about six to nine years after the IPO. In contrast, we find no evidence for a life cycle in the relative valuation of initially discounted dual class firms, as their valuation discount persists from the time of their IPO to when they are mature dual class firms as well. The behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with a valuation premium at the IPO suggests that for some firms the dual class structure does not harm valuations, at least in the first decade after the IPO. On the other hand, the behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with an initial valuation discount, which we find is highly persistent, suggests that a mandatory sunset provision may be useful for these firms.

Third, a natural solution to possible dual class inefficiency is a voluntary firm-initiated dual class share unification, in which all share classes are transformed into “one share one vote”. We find that only about 20% of dual class firms unify their shares within 9 years after the IPO. Furthermore, voluntary unifications become rare after six years following the IPO. Most of the mature dual class firms elect to retain a dual class structure, perhaps because unification is against the interests of their controlling shareholders. This implies that some inefficient dual class structures may persist.

Our findings suggest that some sort of a sunset provision might be useful, especially for firms that trade at a valuation discount. Further, regarding the set-in time of any sunset provision, our study suggests to wait at least six years after the IPO. Regulators should also be worried about some potential negative consequences of any sunset regulation. First, some founders may be more reluctant to issue publicly traded shares if their reign over the firm is likely to be more limited in time. Public may lose the opportunity to invest in some breakthrough firms. Second, controlling shareholders may intensify their private benefits extraction in the period before their extra power expires. Third, it is possible that shareholders may elect to abolish dual class structures even when they are (still) beneficial.

Finally, our paper also documents several other interesting life cycle phenomena of dual class firms such as their higher survival rates, similar stock returns and lower likelihoods of being taken over, compared to matched single class firms. We conclude that unequal vote structures are viable financing tools.

The complete paper is available for download here.

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*Martijn Cremers* is Bernard J. Hank Professor of Finance at University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, and an ECGI research member; Beni Lauterbach is a Professor of Finance and the Raymond Ackerman Family Chair in Corporate Governance at Bar Ilan University Graduate School of Business Administration, and an ECGI research member; Anete Pajuste is an Associate Professor of Finance and Head of Accounting and Finance Department at the Stockholm School of Economics, and an ECGI research member. This post is based on their recent paper.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here) and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

Les six principes qui gouvernent la conduite des investisseurs — ISG


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente le point de vue de l’association Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles, eu égard aux principes de gouvernance que celle-ci entend promouvoir.

Je reproduis ici les principaux éléments de l’article publié par Anne Meyer* et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, notamment les six principes qui gouvernent leur conduite.

1 — Les CA sont redevables envers les actionnaires ;

2 — Les actionnaires doivent avoir des droits de vote qui sont proportionnels à leurs intérêts économiques ;

3 — Les CA doivent être à l’écoute des actionnaires et être proactifs dans la compréhension de leurs perspectives ;

4 — Les CA doivent avoir une solide structure de leadership indépendante ;

5 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de gouvernance qui mènent à des pratiques efficaces ;

6 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de rémunération des dirigeants qui sont alignées sur la stratégie à long terme de l’entreprise.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The Investor Stewardship Group’s Governance Principles

 

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In this post, we provide an overview of the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles and steps for public companies to consider when evaluating how the principles may be incorporated into their own disclosure and engagement priorities. The ISG’s website, including a link to the ISG Governance Principles, is available here. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”), a collective of large U.S.-based and international institutional investors and asset managers, announced the launch of its Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance (the “Framework”). The measure is an unprecedented attempt to establish a set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed companies (the “ISG Governance Principles”) as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors. The Framework’s effective date was January 1, 2018, in order to provide U.S. listed companies with time to adjust to the corporate governance principles prior to the 2018 proxy season.

As the 2018 proxy season gets into full swing, there is evidence that ISG members will be utilizing the Framework as a tool for evaluating the governance regimes at their portfolio companies, informing their engagement priorities, and potentially factoring compliance with the ISG Governance Principles into selected voting policies and decisions. In December, the ISG issued a press release “encouraging companies to articulate how their governance structures and practices align with the ISG’s Corporate Governance Principles and where and why they differ in approach”, leaving it to companies to determine how and where to disclose such alignment. And at least one large investor, State Street Global Advisors, has specifically highlighted that it will screen portfolio companies for compliance with the principles.

As a result, companies and their boards should continue to benchmark and understand how their specific governance practices relate to ISG Governance Principles and remain cognizant of this new regime as they prepare for engagement with investors and draft public disclosures.

 

Background

 

The ISG’s global reach and financial influence is significant; currently consisting of 50 investors representing over $22 trillion invested in the U.S. equity markets. The ISG’s signatories includes some of the largest and most influential institutional investors, including BlackRock, CalSTRS, State Street Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price, ValueAct Capital and Vanguard, among others. The Framework’s stewardship principles emphasize that these institutional investors have a vested interest and responsibility for the long-term economic success of their portfolio companies.

The ISG’s roll-out of the Framework characterized it as a “sustained initiative” and emphasized an evolutionary view of the ability of U.S. companies and investors to work together under the Framework.

Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have historically been informed by multiple regulatory and rules-based regimes. Rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stock exchange listing requirements, state corporate codes, case law and federal legislation adopted in the wake of past financial market crises, have been the primary dictating standards. More recently, shareholders and other stakeholders have played a larger role in influencing corporate governance norms at U.S. listed companies through engagement and various forms of shareholder activism. In contrast, the ISG Governance Principles are based substantially on U.K., Continental European and other non-U.S. frameworks that establish principles-based corporate governance standards and tend to rely on “comply-or-explain” accountability. [1] Advocates for this type of principles-based approach stress the flexibility that it gives for companies to adopt a tailored response to important tenets such as boardroom transparency, as opposed to responding more narrowly to prescriptive rules. As institutional investors continue to focus more attention on environmental and social matters, including related governance concerns, the Framework’s principles-based approach will be a tool, for both institutions and companies, to promote mutually agreeable objectives, particularly given the lack of rulemaking or legislation mandating more specific disclosure on trending topics such as board diversity and environmental concerns.

 

The ISG Governance Principles

 

The six ISG Governance Principles are broad principles that will not look new to those who have been following key issues in corporate governance over the past several years. Indeed, they were designed to reflect the common corporate governance principles that are already embedded in member institutions’ proxy voting and engagement guidelines. The principles emphasize the importance of boardroom effectiveness and oversight, alignment of executive compensation with long-term financial results, and board accountability demonstrated in part through the adoption of governance best practices, including a one-share one-vote capital structure and independent board leadership.

Principle 1: Boards are accountable to shareholders

This principle encompasses the annual election of directors, majority voting, proxy access and more robust disclosure surrounding board practices and corporate governance. Companies are also asked to explain how any anti-takeover measures are in the best long-term interest of the company.

Interestingly, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink recently published a letter to the CEOs at the world’s largest public companies in which he argued explicitly that boards are accountable to other stakeholders, such as employees and customers, in addition to shareholders.

Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest

This principle sets a base line of one-share one-vote and encourages companies with existing multi-class share structures to review and consider phasing out control shares.

In 2017, this issue became national news when Snap Inc. filed for an IPO of non-voting shares. Many large investors were vehemently opposed and at the urging of the Council for Institutional Investors and other investor advocates, the stock index provider FTSE Russell refused to include these shares in its indices.

Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order to understand their perspectives

Under this principle, companies are expected to implement shareholder proposals that receive “significant” support or explain why they have not done so. Independent directors are encouraged to participate in engagement on matters that are meaningful to investors, and directors may be held accountable with “against” votes in instances where investors do not feel that their concerns have been adequately addressed.

Principle 4: Boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure

There are two common independent leadership structures at U.S. companies—an independent chairperson and an independent lead director (where the role of Chairman and CEO are combined)—and the principles acknowledge that signatory investors have differing opinions on whether they provide adequate independent oversight.

The overarching position under the principles is that the role of the independent board leader should be “clearly defined and sufficiently robust to ensure effective and constructive leadership.”

Principle 5: Boards should adopt structures and practices that enhance their effectiveness

This principle encompasses an array of board structure and effectiveness issues, including: strong board composition and board diversity; board and committee responsibilities; director attentiveness, preparedness and time commitments; and board refreshment.

Board diversity, in particular gender diversity, has emerged as a high priority for most of the largest institutional investors. There has also been a focus on screening for long-tenured directors and directors that are over-boarded or have poor attendance records as a proxy for identifying directors that may not be adequately engaged or independent.

Principle 6: Boards should develop management incentive structures that are aligned with the long-term strategy of the company

This principle emphasizes that the board, in particular the compensation committee, is responsible for ensuring that drivers and performance goals that underpin the company’s long-term strategy are adequately reflected in a company’s management incentive structure.

Steps to Consider

As noted, the ISG Governance Principles are intended to provide a framework of broad, high-level principles. The individual investors that comprise the ISG have their own voting guidelines and engagement priorities that are tailored to their own investment philosophy and strategy. Even on current hot button issues, such as board diversity, investors have differing views and companies should consider the practices they adopt depending upon their specific facts and circumstances. There are, however, general steps that we recommend companies take to address the growing influence of the Framework.

These include:

Understand how the company’s corporate governance structure and practices relate to the six ISG Governance Principles.

Review the company’s public disclosure regarding corporate governance structure and practices; consider enhancements to be responsive to the ISG’s request that companies disclose how their governance aligns or differs from the ISG Governance Principles.

As with other corporate governance benchmarking exercises, companies should be particularly cognizant of how and why their practices may differ from the ISG Governance Principles and whether these differences are adequately explained in public disclosures. As investors screen their portfolio companies’ governance practices, they will often consider valid explanations, but in the absence of effective disclosure the company may be unnecessarily penalized.

Management and the board should be informed and prepared to respond to questions about the company’s alignment with the ISG Governance Principles during shareholder engagements. Companies can also consider proactively addressing the issue in written materials or prepared remarks during investor presentations.

In preparing for shareholder engagements with ISG signatories, understand how and if they are explicitly incorporating the ISG Governance Principles into engagement and voting priorities and continue to screen their individual voting and engagement policies.

Companies should determine whether, and how, they wish to address and incorporate the ISG Governance Principles based upon their own specific governance profile, disclosure regime and approach to shareholder engagement.


Endnotes

See in particular the UK Investor Stewardship Code, on which the US ISG Principles are largely based. The UK Code “sets out a number of areas of good practice to which … institutional investors should aspire.” Available here.


*Anne Meyer is Senior Managing Director, Don Cassidy is Executive Vice President, and Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based their recent Georgeson publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst.