On y retrouve beaucoup d’informations sur les activités du Collège au cours des dernières semaines et des semaines à venir :
Le CAS félicite les 33 finissants du programme « Administrateurs de la relève » offert par le Regroupement des jeunes chambres de commerce du Québec (RJCCQ), en collaboration avec le Collège.
La grande majorité des actionnaires de compagnies publiques ne sont pas impliqués dans la gouvernance et dans le management des entreprises dans lesquelles ils ont investi. On peut dire qu’ils font confiance aux mesures prises par les actionnaires plus activistes et par les fonds d’investissement pour garantir un comportement de bon citoyen corporatif et pour prendre des décisions qui auront pour effet d’augmenter la valeur de leur investissement.
Alors quelles seront les priorités des activistes en 2014 pour assurer que les entreprises travaillent dans le meilleur intérêt des actionnaires, petits, moyens et gros …
L’article rédigé par Eleanor Bloxham, PCD de The Value Alliance, dans Fortune présente un sommaire des entrevues que l’auteure a faites avec les principaux actionnaires activistes aux É.U.
Que retrouve-t-on sur l’agenda de ces investisseurs ? Plusieurs priorités en fonction des intérêts que ces groupes d’investisseurs défendent. Cependant, il ressort un certain consensus sur les thèmes suivants :
« Board diversity, executive pay, transparency on political contributions, and human rights improvements »
Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous, dont je produis un court extrait :
Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards. But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.
Many of us free ride on actions taken by active, long-term shareholders. These unsung heroes goad managers and boards to reach better decisions, make available desirable employment opportunities and, overall, push them to act like good corporate citizens. These active investors accomplish these things by talking to companies, preparing proxy proposals for all shareholders to consider, and offering recommendations on director elections and company-sponsored proxy measures.
What shape can we expect their efforts to take this year? Overall, we can expect more sophisticated requests of companies than we’ve ever seen before, and more direct board member interaction with shareholders.
To get the behind-the-scenes skinny, I asked shareholders and others who know what’s in store this upcoming proxy season. Here are their informed, excerpted, and edited comments:
Photo: Jetta Productions/Getty Images
Également, je vous invite à visionner cette vidéo de 7 minutes produite par Lucy Marcus qui porte sur ce que le Board peut faire pour se préparer à la nouvelle offensive qui s’annonce en 2014 ?
Activist shareholders are stockpiling record amounts of cash this year, determined to take on below-par boards. But industry expert Lucy Marcus asks if directors are going too far on the defensive.
Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.
C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.
L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.
La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes. La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.
Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études. Bonne lecture.
In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.
In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…
If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:
The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.
Ce matin, Richard Leblanc nous présente un « draft » de son nouveau syllabus de cours offert à l’Université York sur la gouvernance des OBNL et des entreprises/sociétés d’état.
Ce n’est pas qu’il n’y a pas de cours dans ce domaine – loin de là – mais je puis vous assurer qu’il n’y en pas de si complets … et de si exigeants.
Voyez par vous-même en suivant le lien ci-dessous pour vous rendre sur le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors de LinkedIn et ouvrir le document présentant le syllabus.
Si vous êtes dans le domaine de la consultation, du coaching et de la formation en gouvernance, notamment des OBNL, les éléments de contenu de ce syllabus ainsi que les nombreuses références qu’il contient vous intéressera sûrement. Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Operation of the Board, Board and Committee Meetings, and Staff Relations
Development and Retirement of Directors
Fundraising and Donor Stewardship
Financial Oversight, Anti-Fraud, External Audit, and Internal Audit
Values, Mandate, Strategy and Prerogative
Risk, Internal Controls, and Assurance
Organizational Performance, CEO Succession, and Executive Compensation
Stakeholder Accountability of Crown Corporations and Other Public Entities: Government as Sole Shareholder, Taxpayors; Members, Donors, Funding Agencies, Beneficiaries, Volunteers, Staff, Partners, Sponsors, Community
Fraud, Corruption, Lack of Oversight, and Misbehavior Case Analysis: The Senate of Canada, The Quebec Corruption Inquiry, Ontario Power Generation, the Mayor of Toronto
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu, rédigé par Elizabeth Mullen dans le magazine du NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors), et résultant d’une table ronde portant sur le phénomène des investisseurs activistes.
On notera que plusieurs experts, dans certaines circonstances, considèrent les activistes comme des agents de changement. Voici quelques extraits très intéressants :
Directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy.
While it is widely accepted that directors’ primary duty is to protect shareholder interests, directors must take care to balance their business acumen against shareholders’ opinions, new governance developments, proxy advisory firms’ recommendations, and management’s strategy, participants said in a recent National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) roundtable, presented in partnership with AIG and WilmerHale.
Ellen B. Richstone (left), Jeffrey Rudman, and Steve Maggiacomo
“Shareholder activist” and “shareholder activism” are umbrella terms that encompass a range of groups, interests, and modes of action, so boards’ responses naturally will vary depending on their particular situations. Some companies may face the Icahns and Ackmans of the world, who purchase ownership stakes in companies with the hope of gaining board seats and strategic control; or institutional investors like CalPERS, which are vocal in their opinions of the companies in which they invest; and retail investors with less influence but important opinions of their own.
“Fidelity is more likely to be at your feet while Icahn is more likely to be at your throat,” said WilmerHale’s Jeffrey Rudman. Even the types of shareholder activism can vary, said Martin M. Coyne II, ranging from Harvard Business School’s Shareholder Rights Project, to derivative suits following an M&A event, to family-owned companies facing strategic differences, to private companies with initial investors who are highly involved in strategic planning, to highly influential proxy firms.
While all these voices deserve to be heard, Coyne advised boards to remain focused on an end goal, rather than trying to satisfy all parties involved. “When that topic becomes omnipresent and goes from a discussion topic that should be discussed by the board and decided upon—and you start making bad business decisions to satisfy—what it does is take away from succession planning discussions, strategy discussions, operational discussions. It distracts the board and becomes an operational weakness,” he said.
The opinions of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Glass, Lewis & Co., and other proxy advisors should be considered guidelines, not scripture; ensuring a solid reasoning process behind decisions is more important, participants said. Their influence can be a “good wake-up call,” said Shaun B. Higgins, to reevaluate governance practices, such as joint CEO-chair roles or certain types of compensation plans that proxy firms often campaign against. Bringing up these opinions is a jumping-off point for boards to ensure their policies are sound and defensible, and communicate those justifications to shareholders.
“What they bring is awareness to boards that there are certain issues of concern to the public that they have to address thoroughly,” said James J. Morris. “If the board can have a good rationale of why they want it that way, they’re going to be okay.”…
… Boards today must also consider investors’ and stakeholders’ interests beyond the bottom line, particularly when it comes to environmental concerns. Higgins noted that today’s reports and disclosures are more extensive than ever: “If you told me back in 2000 we were going to put corporate social responsibility in the annual report I would have said, ‘Are you kidding me?’ It wasn’t even on our radar screen.”
Participants à la table ronde :
Martin M. Coyne II, Director, Akamai Technologies, RockTech
Peter T. Francis, Director, Dover Corp., Stanford Graduate School of Business
Shaun B. Higgins, Director, Aryzta AG, Carmine Labriola
Scott Hunter, FCA, Director, Allied World Assurance Company Holdings
James G. Jones, CFA, Founder/Portfolio Manager Sterling Investment Advisors; Director, CFA Institute
Jerry L. Levens, Director, Hancock Holding Co.
Steve Maggiacomo, SVP Financial Lines, AIG
James J. Morris, Principal, 2 Ventures; Director, Esterline Technologies, JURA Corp., LORD Corp.
Craig W. Nunez, Chairman and CEO, Bocage Group; Director, Goodwill Industries of Houston, Medical Bridges
Steve Pannucci, Professional Liability Underwriting Manager, AIG
Donald K. Peterson, Director, Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, TIAA-CREF
Ellen B. Richstone, Director, ERI, OpEx Engine, NACD New England
Andrea Robinson, Partner, WilmerHale
Jeffrey Rudman, Partner, WilmerHale
Carole J. Shapazian, Director, Baxter International
Richard Szafranski, Director, Corporate Office Properties Trust, Cleared Solutions
En ce début d’année 2014, voici un court billet de Tom Okarma, président fondateur de Vantage Point | For NonProfit, exposant certaines idées pour accroître l’efficacité de C.A. d’OBNL.
Ci-dessous, un extrait de son billet ainsi que quelques liens utiles pour améliorer la performance des « Boards ». Bonne lecture !
Here are a few ideas to help ministry and nonprofit leaders work more closely (and pleasurably) with their boards. Who knows, maybe everyone will actually start enjoying board meetings!
Nonprofit_Expo_01 (Photo credit: shawncalhoun)
Reconnect regularly with each director, one-to-one if possible, to tap into their wisdom, learn their perspective, and gain valuable confidential input
Invest to improve on your strengths through seminars, workshops, or conferences…like CLA 2014
Identify existing nonprofit board best practices and install the top two that you feel add the most value to your organization
When meeting with key external stakeholders, ask how they think the organization is performing
Be more available to your staff, volunteers, and key community partners
Become a director on another nonprofit or ministry board and gain valuable perspective of just what that is like
Review your calendar monthly and the organization’s budget to determine if you are allocating time and treasure in line with the year’s goals
Conduct periodic board update (they hate “training”) sessions
For a few other easy and effective ideas on how to improve board relations and effectiveness in 2014, read :
Voici un rapport de recherche de PwC qui tend à démontrer que les administrateurs et les investisseurs partagent les mêmes points de vue sur les plusieurs priorités, dont les suivantes :
There is considerable alignment between directors’ and investors’ views on the important issues directors should be focusing on in the coming year, according to the report. Both groups include strategic planning, risk management, and succession planning as top priorities. Ninety-five percent of investors say strategic planning is the “most or a very important” area for director focus while nearly eight of 10 directors say they want to spend more time in that area going forward.
In the area of IT, more than three-quarters of investors believe directors should be at least “moderately” focused on new business models enabled by IT, but only 45% of directors say they are very or moderately engaged in doing so.
For director Mike Monahan, deciding on how to provide oversight of new IT-enabled business models versus major IT project implementations is not black and white.
“They are both important, and the relative importance depends a great deal on the core mission and market characteristics of the company,” said Monahan, audit committee chair for CMS Energy.
He points to a development at a large public gas and electric utility where he sits on the board. “We are in the process of installing a so-called smart energy system whereby the company will provide meters with the capability of providing significant value to customers by enabling them to better manage their energy consumption,” he said. “The communication regime with the customer is important, but the IT-based development and installation project is more important. Without an effective application there would be no smart energy system.”
Other key findings from the PwC comparison of the director and investor surveys include:
Compensation
Directors and investors both believe that compensation consultants are “very influential” over board decisions on executive compensation (41% and 37%, respectively). And, each group had similar views on the influence of institutional shareholders, rating them “very influential” at 22% and 18%, respectively. However, by a margin of 38 percentage points investors are more likely than directors to believe that CEO pressure has a “very influential” effect on board decisions about compensation.
At least 70% of directors and investors indicate that some type of action was taken by their company in response to say on pay voting results. But investors believe that directors should reconsider their companies’ executive compensation plan at relatively lower levels of negative voting.
Regulatory and enforcement
Forty-seven percent of investors and 64% of directors say recent legislative, regulatory and enforcement initiatives have increased investor protections “not very much” or “not at all,” with very few (2% and 4%, respectively) indicating that they have helped “very much.” At the same time, one-third of directors and almost one in five investors think the costs to companies of such increased activities have “very much” exceeded the potential benefits. Eighty percent of investors and three-fourths of directors also conclude these initiatives have increased public trust in the corporate sector “not very much” or “not at all.”
Board composition, structure and performance
Twenty-eight percent of directors say the ability of boards to provide effective oversight has increased in the last 12 months, compared to 19% of investors. Similarly, 33% of directors say that board effectiveness in overseeing risk has increased compared to 27% of investors.
Nineteen percent of investors indicate the board should reconsider re-nomination of a director if he/she receives between 11% and 15% negative shareholder voting, compared to only 8% of directors who would use the same benchmark.
The report also compares CEO viewpoints alongside directors and investors regarding company strategy and risk management. It showed that all three parties believe customers and clients have the most significant influence on company strategy. As for the greatest impediment to growth, directors and investors said it is “uncertain or volatile economic growth” (91%) while CEOs said it is government response to “fiscal deficit and debt burden” (93%).
Ce matin, je vous convie à une lecture révélatrice des facteurs qui contribuent aux changements de fond observés dans la gouvernance des grandes sociétés cotées, lesquels sont provoqués par les interventions croissantes des grands investisseurs activistes.
Cet article de quatre pages, publié par John J. Madden de la firme Shearman & Sterling, et paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, présente les raisons de l’intensification de l’influence des investisseurs dans la stratégie et la direction des entreprises, donc de la gouvernance, un domaine du ressort du conseil d’administration, représentants des actionnaires … et des parties prenantes.
English: Study on alternative investments by institutional investors. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Après avoir expliqué l’évolution récente dans le monde de la gouvernance, l’auteur brosse un tableau plutôt convainquant des facteurs d’accélération de l’influence des activistes eu égard aux orientations stratégiques.
Les raisons qui expliquent ces changements peuvent être résumées de la manière suivante :
Un changement d’attitude des grands investisseurs, représentant maintenant 66 % du capital des grandes corporations, qui conduit à des intérêts de plus en plus centrés sur l’accroissement de la valeur ajoutée pour les actionnaires;
Un nombre accru de campagnes (+ de 50 %) initiées par des activistes lesquelles se traduisent par des victoires de plus en plus éclatantes;
Un retour sur l’investissement élevé (13 % entre 2009 et 2012) accompagné par des méthodes analytiques plus sophistiquées et plus crédibles (livres blancs);
Un accroissement du capital disponible notamment par l’apport de plus en plus grand des investisseurs institutionnels (fonds de pension, compagnies d’assurance, fonds commun de placement, caisses de retraite, etc.);
Un affaiblissement dans les moyens de défense des C.A. et une meilleure communication entre les actionnaires;
Un intérêt de plus en plus marqué des C.A. et de la direction par un engagement avec les investisseurs activistes.
À l’avenir, les activistes vont intensifier leurs efforts pour exiger des changements organisationnels significatifs (accroissement des dividendes, réorganisation des unités d’affaires, modification des règles de gouvernance, présence sur les conseils, séparation des rôles de PCD et PCA, alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec la performance, etc.).
Ci-dessous, un extrait des passages les plus significatifs. Bonne lecture !
One of the signal developments in 2012 was the emerging growth of the form of shareholder activism that is focused on the actual business and operations of public companies. We noted that “one of the most important trendline features of
2012 has been the increasing amount of strategic or operational activism. That is, shareholders pressuring boards not on classic governance subjects but on the actual strategic direction or management of the business of the corporation.”… Several of these reform initiatives of the past decade continue to be actively pursued. More recently, however, the most significant development in the activism sphere has been in strategically-focused or operationally-focused activism led largely by hedge funds.
The 2013 Acceleration of “Operational” Activism
Some of this operational activism in the past few years was largely short-term return focused (for example, pressing to lever up balance sheets to pay extraordinary dividends or repurchase shares), arguably at the potential risk of longer-term corporate prosperity, or simply sought to force corporate dispositions; and certainly there continues to be activism with that focus. But there has also emerged another category of activism, principally led by hedge funds, that brings a sophisticated analytical approach to critically examining corporate strategy and capital management and that has been able to attract the support of mainstream institutional investors, industry analysts and other market participants. And this growing support has now positioned these activists to make substantial investments in even the largest public companies. Notable recent examples include ValueAct’s $2.2 billion investment in Microsoft (0.8%), Third Point’s $1.4 billion investment in Sony (7%), Pershing Square’s $2 billion investment in Procter & Gamble (1%) and its $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals (9.8%), Relational Investor’s $600 million investment in PepsiCo (under 1%), and Trian Fund Management’s investments of $1.2 billion in DuPont (2.2%) and of more than $1 billion in each of PepsiCo and Mondelez. Interestingly, these investors often embark on these initiatives to influence corporate direction and decision-making with relatively small stakes when measured against the company’s total outstanding equity—as in Microsoft, P&G, DuPont and PepsiCo, for example; as well as in Greenlight Capital’s 1.3 million share investment in Apple, Carl Icahn’s 5.4% stake in Transocean, and Elliot Management’s 4.5% stake in Hess Corp.
In many cases, these activists target companies with strong underlying businesses that they believe can be restructured or better managed to improve shareholder value. Their focus is generally on companies with underperforming share prices (often over extended periods of time) and on those where business strategies have failed to create value or where boards are seen as poor stewards of capital.
Reasons for the Current Expansion of Operational Activism
Evolving Attitudes of Institutional Investors.
… Taken together, these developments have tended to test the level of confidence institutional investors have in the ability of some boards to act in a timely and decisive fashion to adjust corporate direction, or address challenging issues, when necessary in the highly competitive, complex and global markets in which businesses operate. And they suggest a greater willingness of investors to listen to credible external sources with new ideas that are intelligently and professionally presented.
Tangible evidence of this evolution includes the setting up by several leading institutional investors such as BlackRock, CalSTRS and T. Rowe Price of their own internal teams to assess governance practices and corporate strategies to find ways to improve corporate performance. As the head of BlackRock’s Corporate Governance and Responsible Investor team recently commented, “We can have very productive and credible conversations with managements and boards about a range of issues—governance, performance and strategy.”
Increasing Activist Campaigns Generally; More Challenger Success. The increasing number of activist campaigns challenging incumbent boards—and the increasing success by challengers—creates an encouraging market environment for operational activism. According to ISS, the resurgence of contested board elections, which began in 2012, continued into the 2013 proxy season. Proxy contests to replace some or all incumbent directors went from 9 in the first half of 2009 to 19 in the first half of 2012 and 24 in the first half of 2013. And the dissident win rate has increased significantly, from 43% in 2012 to 70% in 2013. Additionally, in July 2013, Citigroup reported that the number of $1 billion + activist campaigns was expected to reach over 90 for 2013, about 50% more than in 2012.
Attractive Investment Returns; Increasing Sophistication and Credibility. While this form of activism has certainly shown mixed results in recent periods (Pershing Square’s substantial losses in both J.C. Penney and Target have been among the most well-publicized examples of failed initiatives), the overall recent returns have been strong. Accordingly to Hedge Fund Research in Chicago, activist hedge funds were up 9.6% for the first half of 2013, and they returned an average of nearly 13% between 2009 and 2012.
In many instances, these activists develop sophisticated and detailed business and strategic analyses—which are presented in “white papers” that are provided to boards and managements and often broadly disseminated—that enhance their credibility and help secure the support, it not of management, of other institutional shareholders.
Increasing Investment Capital Available; Greater Mainstream Institutional Support. The increasing ability of activist hedge funds to raise new money not only bolsters their firepower, but also operates to further solidify the support they garner from the mainstream institutional investor community (a principal source of their investment base). According to Hedge Fund Research, total assets under management by activist hedge funds has doubled in the past four years to $84 billion today. And through August this year their 2013 inflows reached $4.7 billion, the highest inflows since 2006. Particularly noteworthy in this regard, Pershing Square’s recent $2.2 billion investment in Air Products & Chemicals was funded in part with capital raised for a standalone fund dedicated specifically to Air Products, without disclosing the target’s name to investors.
In addition to making capital available, mainstream institutions are demonstrating greater support for these activists more generally. In a particularly interesting vote earlier this year, at the May annual meeting of Timken Co., 53% of the shareholders voting supported the non-binding shareholder proposal to split the company in two, which had been submitted jointly by Relational Investors (holding a 6.9% stake) and pension fund CalSTRS (holding 0.4%). To build shareholder support for their proposal, Relational and CalSTRS reached out to investors both in person and through the internet. Relational ran a website (unlocktimken . com) including detailed presentations and supportive analyst reports. They also secured the support of ISS and Glass Lewis. Four months after the vote, in September, Timken announced that it had decided to spin off its steel-making business.
The Timken case is but one example of the leading and influential proxy advisory firms to institutional investors increasingly supporting activists. Their activist support has been particularly noticeable in the context of activists seeking board representation in nominating a minority of directors to boards.
These changes suggest a developing blurring of the lines between activists and mainstream institutions. And it may be somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of unsolicited takeovers, which were largely shunned by the established business and financial communities in the early 1980s, although once utilized by a few blue-chip companies they soon became a widely accepted acquisition technique.
Weakened Board-Controlled Defenses; Increasing Communication Among Shareholders. The largely successful efforts over the past decade by certain pension funds and other shareholder-oriented organizations to press for declassifying boards, redeeming poison pills and adopting majority voting in director elections have diminished the defenses available to boards in resisting change of control initiatives and other activist challenges. Annual board elections and the availability of “withhold” voting in the majority voting context increases director vulnerability to investor pressure.
And shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders and their representative organizations, are better organized today for taking action in particular situations. The increasing and more sophisticated forms of communication among shareholders—including through the use of social media—is part of the broader trend towards greater dialogue between mainstream institutions and their activist counterparts. In his recent op-ed article in The Wall Street Journal, Carl Icahn said he would use social media to make more shareholders aware of their rights and how to protect them, writing that he had set up a Twitter account for that purpose (with over 80,000 followers so far) and that he was establishing a forum called the Shareholders Square Table to further these aims.
Corporate Boards and Managements More Inclined to Engage with Activists. The several developments referenced above have together contributed to the greater willingness today of boards and managements to engage in dialogue with activists who take investments in their companies, and to try to avoid actual proxy contests.
One need only look at the recent DuPont and Microsoft situations to have a sense of this evolution toward engagement and dialogue. After Trian surfaced with its investment in DuPont, the company’s spokesperson said in August 2013: “We are aware of Trian’s investment and, as always, we routinely engage with our shareholders and welcome constructive input. We will evaluate any ideas Trian may have in the context of our ongoing initiatives to build a higher value, higher growth company for our shareholders.” Also in August, Microsoft announced its agreement with ValueAct to allow the activist to meet regularly with the company’s management and selected directors and give the activist a board seat next year; thereby avoiding a potential proxy contest for board representation by ValueAct. Soon thereafter, on September 17, Microsoft announced that it would raise its quarterly dividend by 22% and renew its $40 billion share buyback program; with the company’s CFO commenting that this reflected Microsoft’s continued commitment to returning cash to its shareholders.
What to Expect Ahead
The confluence of the factors identified above has accelerated the recent expansion of operational activism, and there is no reason in the current market environment to expect that this form of activism will abate in the near term. In fact, the likelihood is that it will continue to expand… Looking ahead, we fully expect to see continuing efforts to press for the structural governance reforms that have been pursued over the past several years. Campaigns to separate the Chair and CEO roles at selected companies will likely continue to draw attention as they did most prominently this year at JPMorgan Chase. And executive compensation will remain an important subject of investor attention, and of shareholder proposals, at many companies where there is perceived to be a lack of alignment between pay and performance. We can also expect that the further development of operational activism, and seeing how boards respond to it, will be a central feature of the governance landscape in the year ahead.
Articles reliés au sujet des actionnaires activistes :
Dans cet article paru sur mon blogue l’an dernier, je soulignais que de plus en plus d’administrateurs d’organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) sont intéressés à en savoir davantage sur les règles de gouvernance et sur les modes de fonctionnement de ces types d’organisations.
Chez les professionnels de la gestion ainsi que chez les membres d’ordres professionnels, rares sont ceux qui ne sont pas membres de conseils d’administration d’OBNL. Il existe plusieurs entreprises québécoises qui s’intéressent aux OBNL, mais il y en a une qui se consacre en priorité à la formation des membres de ces organisations avec beaucoup de succès et qui a publié des volumes qui sont devenus, au fil des ans, des références auprès des administrateurs et des directeurs généraux d’organismes à but non lucratif.
Je vous invite à consulter le lien ci-dessous pour en connaître davantage portant sur la formation et sur les publications la gouvernance de ce type d’organisation très répandu.
“Quand vous acceptez un poste d’administrateur, savez-vous à quoi vous vous engagez ? Est-ce que les associations et les organismes sans but lucratif ont des règles de bonne gouvernance ? Est-ce que la reddition de compte se fait de façon responsable ? Face au déficit d’imputabilité dans notre société, les associations et autres organismes sans but lucratif, tant privés que publics, ont peu de pratiques de performance leur permettant d’assurer leur crédibilité et d’inspirer confiance”.
Série Gouvernance – Guides pratiques
Les Guides pratiques pour une Gouvernance Stratégique ® se veulent des publications qui abordent des aspects sensibles de la gestion d’OSBL et pour lesquelles on retrouve moins facilement des réponses. La série comprendra, au fil des années, une dizaine de titres.
Aujourd’hui, veille de Noel, je vous présente les sommaires des Think-tank produit par Board Intelligence, une firme spécialisée dans les informations sur les conseils d’administration. Celle-ci a tenu une série de débats sur la réinvention des règles de gouvernance en demandant aux panels de se prononcer sur la question suivante :
“If you could rip up the rule book, what would good governance look like ?”
Voici les résumés des résultats les plus remarquables présentés dans FT.com. Bonne lecture et Joyeux Noel !
Stressing the importance of company boards can weaken the sense of accountability among management and staff, according to participants in a recent debate.
They agreed there is a strong case for saying an organisation lives or dies by the actions and inactions of its management team, rather than the board, and that employees were a better indicator of how a company is run than scrutiny of the board.
An alternative boardroom model was suggested, drawing on the way some executive committees operate, where the chief executive seeks consultation rather than consensus. Perhaps the chairman could have a similar function.
Chairmen of the Bored (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
This might also reflect the reality of the near-impossible task faced by non-executive directors. One participant said: “A non-executive is on a hiding to nothing – and to do the job properly, they need smaller portfolios and better pay. When things go wrong, they can expect to be tried in the court of public opinion.”
It was argued that this is becoming such a trend that many talented candidates are no longer willing to take on the role. “I wouldn’t take a non-executive role in a big and complex global bank. The mismatch between what you are accountable for and your ability to affect it is enormous,” one commented.
“To do the job of the non-exec properly you have to get out of the boardroom and into the organisation. You have to experience the business for yourself and not just take management’s word for it.”
There were also complaints about the amount of time required to do the job of the non-executive: “It’s not 12 days a year at £1,500 per day – it’s at least 30 days. Given the opportunity cost of what an accomplished person could be doing with their time, and given the risk you carry as a non-executive, why do it?”
If we don’t go so far as to rip up the governance rule book, at least we should make it shorter, they agreed. Rules will always have unintended consequences and breed perverse outcomes – and fear of falling foul of the rules can
lead boards to document as little as possible to maintain “plausible deniability”.
At a subsequent debate it was proposed there should be a register to name and shame – and praise – the performance of non-executives. At present, shareholders’ opinion of a non-executive and their decision on re-electing them is based on gut feeling. A public register would be helpful in forming a judgment, listing statistics about the number of boards the non-executive is on, the time they allocate to each and notable events that took place on their watch
There are chairmen with such large portfolios they could not possibly allocate sufficient time to each board, they argued. A public register would make this much more transparent.
Débats entre cinq présidents de conseils et un PCD
The five chairmen and chief executives attending a recent think-tank discussion accepted that even improved boards cannot prevent all corporate crises and expressed concern at this overly “defensive” role. They argued that “stopping bad things happening” must be tempered by helping “good things happen”.
The participants agreed that non-executives must have the confidence to challenge the chairman and chief executive. One said: “Having sat on the board of my employer as an executive, I have come to the conclusion that it is a hopeless role. When the chief executive is sitting opposite, it is fairly obvious how you’re supposed to respond to the question ‘what do you think?’
“Board meetings are not a good use of time. We don’t question why we’re doing what we’re doing.”
The group concluded that “small is beautiful: small boards, small briefing packs, small agenda, and small rule book”.
At a subsequent dinner, also attended by chairmen and chief executives, a call was made for boards to be more realistic about their limitations and to be more discerning about where they focus their efforts
For example, boards attempt to scrutinise specific investment decisions when the information they can absorb and the time available for discussion mean substantive challenge or insights are unlikely.
On the other hand, it was pointed out that boards are also held liable for the detail as well as the big picture. Even so, attempting to meet these conflicting responsibilities by “clogging up the board agenda with too many matters to explore properly” cannot be the answer, they agreed.
The participants argued that the governance rule book is ineffective and that boards should instead be subject to an annual review of their effectiveness.
A need for “better memories, rather than better rules or regulations”, was stressed and the recommendation that non-executives should stand down after nine years was criticised for institutionalising the short-term memory of the boardroom.
One said: “When our bank repeated its mistakes from the early 1990s, it wasn’t the bank that suffered from amnesia – it was just the board.”
The chairmen and chief executives concluded that UK business suffers from a short-term “sell-out” culture. It was argued that in the US, business leaders who are successful will strive to be yet more successful and in Germany, successful businesses are nurtured for the next generation. But in the UK, business people aspire to have just enough to “retire to the Old Rectory”. One said: “We lack the ambition – or greed – of the Americans and we don’t feel the duty of the Germans. We need to raise the level of ambition – and sense of duty.”
Débats entre présidents de conseils
Boards are failing at strategy and becoming increasingly focused on costs, according to a think-tank debate attended by chairmen. One said: “We need the conversation in the boardroom to be two levels ‘higher’. Many of our largest companies are sitting on cash and they need to get back to strategy and invest in the future – or there won’t be one.”
It was suggested that advisory boards, unfettered by concerns of liability and governance, might be better at tackling strategy – and might attract creative people who would otherwise be put off joining boards by the burden of governance.
The chairmen also asked whether more of a board’s work could be handled by committees, as they can be more focused and effective.
They also questioned whether age and experience should continue to take precedence over training and education when appointing board members. One view was that boardroom skills are becoming more specialised and need to be learned.
Regulators came under fire from the chairmen. They were accused of not understanding the businesses they are regulating and of treating non-executives as executives.
The meeting also referred to the spread of regulation from the financial services sector. One said: “We have a two-tier corporate world: financial services and the rest. But what starts as regulation of financial services bleeds through to the rest.”
The participants warned that because boards are out of touch with society, there is a danger of a backlash and the emergence of an “anti-business” movement.
The relationship between society and business was also raised at a subsequent debate. One view was that the future of the corporation depends on it being redesigned and finance returned to its proper, subservient role of supporting the wider economy.
All businesses should demonstrate public benefit – just as charities have to show a public benefit in return for charitable status, businesses should do the same, perhaps in return for limited liability status.
Another view was that voluntary sector leaders should be encouraged to join corporate boards, because of their specific skills, including in reputation and risk management.
Participants went on to call for younger, more vibrant boards. “You should see the faces of the future – not just the past,” said one. The concern that young executives are too busy to join boards was rejected and some chairmen were blamed for claiming to support diversity of age but then not allowing their executives to join someone else’s board.
It was also argued that businesses and boards need permission to fail. “What business or person can achieve great things without the possibility of failure?” one asked.
Vous pouvez lire les résultats des dix autres débats en vous référant à l’article en référence.
Voici un article choc publié par Dena Aubin et diffusé par l’agence Reuters le 10 décembre 2013. Il est ici question d’une recherche universitaire menée par deux professeurs de l’Université de Tilburg aux Pays-Bas qui montre que 40 % des administrateurs responsables de la supervision des affaires financières entretiennent des liens sociaux très étroits avec la haute direction de l’entreprise, laissant une impression de non-indépendance et de possibilité de conflit d’intérêt entre des personnes qui ont des liens d’amitié et d’affinité.
De là à penser que ces administrateurs seront plus susceptibles d’adopter des positions plus favorables à la direction, il n’y a qu’un pas à franchir. Et les chercheurs n’ont pas hésité à pousser leur investigation dans ce sens.
L’étude montre que ces situations de « proximité » peuvent donner lieu à de plus faibles contrôles financiers, notamment à des manipulations comptables, suivies de tentatives d’étouffer la vérité.
Ce sont des études comme celle-ci qui amène les autorités règlementaires à resserrer les critères d’indépendance des membres des comités d’audit.
Bonne lecture; vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
NEW YORK (Reuters) – Almost 40 percent of U.S. corporate directors with responsibility for monitoring the profit-and-loss ledger have social ties to the chief executive, a study says, making them look more like lapdogs than watchdogs.
Conducted by two accounting professors at Tilburg University in The Netherlands, the study reinforces long-held perceptions of a clubby culture on U.S. corporate boards, where members seldom challenge the executives they are meant to police.
The study looked at about 2,000 U.S. companies and their board audit committees, which are responsible for overseeing outside auditors and making sure financial reports are accurate. It found that personal friends of senior managers were often appointed to these committees, making the directors more likely to go along with the company’s reporting practices.
Where that was the case, earnings manipulation was more frequent and problems such as weak financial controls were covered up, the study found.
Tilburg University (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Regulations put in place over a decade ago after accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom required audit committees to be made up only of independent directors. That meant they were never employed by the company or a firm doing business with it.
Even so, audit committee members often have long-standing social ties to executives, belonging to the same elite clubs or charity boards, the study found.
« Although such firms appear to have independent audit committees, in reality these committees offer little to no monitoring at all, » the study found.
The study, by accounting professors Liesbeth Bruynseels and Eddy Cardinaels, researched social ties with BoardEx, a business intelligence service. It appears in the January 2014 issue of the American Accounting Association’s Accounting Review.
The professors suggested that legislators consider requiring more disclosure about social connections between audit committees and CEOs, given the committees’ importance.
Charles Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance in Newark, Delaware, said it would be difficult for regulators to define social ties.
« Is it one lunch a week, is it two lunches? Inevitably, social ties will develop when you’re on a board – you have to see that person on a regular basis, » he said.
The United States made a major push to improve audit committees’ effectiveness with the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which tightened membership requirements.
More recently, regulators in Europe and the United Kingdom have been trying to get audit committees to be more rigorous in choosing outside auditors and monitoring them.
À chaque année, la firme Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) revoit son processus d’établissement des recommandations qui guide les actionnaires dans leurs votes aux assemblées annuelles.
On entend souvent parler des politiques de ISS concernant la gouvernance des sociétés mais on ne saisit pas toujours la méthodologie derrière les recommandations aux actionnaires.
Le document ci-dessous présente les mises à jour des recommandations qui s’adressent aux entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse. Je crois que c’est un document de référence majeur pour les actionnaires qui doivent se doter d’un conseil d’administration exemplaire et de règles de gouvernance en relation avec les intérêts des actionnaires. Bonne lecture !
Ci-dessous, vous trouverez le sommaire du processus de formulation des politiques de ISS, suivi des éléments constituant la table des matières.
Each year, ISS’ Global Policy Board conducts a robust, inclusive, and transparent global policy formulation process that produces the benchmark proxy voting guidelines that will be used during the upcoming year.
The policy review and update process begins with an internal review of emerging issues and notable trends across global markets. Based on data gathered throughout the year (particularly from client and issuer feedback), ISS forms policy committees by governance topics and markets. As part of this process, the policy team examines academic literature, other empirical research, and relevant commentary. ISS also conducts surveys, convenes roundtable discussions, and posts draft policies for review and comment. Based on this broad input, ISS’ Global Policy Board reviews and approves final drafts and policy updates for the following proxy year. Annual updated policies are announced in November and apply to meetings held on and after February 1 of the following year.
Also, as part of the process, ISS collaborates with clients with customized approaches to proxy voting. ISS helps these clients develop and implement policies based on their organizations’ specific mandates and requirements. In addition to the ISS regional benchmark (standard research) policies, ISS’ research analysts apply more than 400 specific policies, including specialty policies for Socially Responsible Investors, Taft-Hartley funds and managers, and Public Employee Pension Funds, as well as hundreds of fully customized policies that reflect clients’ unique corporate governance philosophies. The vote recommendations issued under these policies often differ from those issued under the ISS benchmark policies. ISS estimates that the majority of shares that are voted by ISS’ clients fall under ISS’ custom or specialty recommendations.
This document presents the changes being made to ISS’ Benchmark Canadian Corporate Governance Policies. The full text of the updates, detailed results from the Policy Survey, and comments received during the open comment period, are all available on ISS’ Web site under the Policy Gateway.
Table des matières du document de mise à jour
BOARD
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Definition of Independence – TSX and TSXV
2014 ISS Canadian Definition of Independence
Persistent Problematic Audit Related Practices – TSX
Voting on Directors for Egregious Actions – TSX and TSXV
Board Responsiveness – TSX and TSXV
Director Attendance & Overboarding – TSX
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS & DEFENSES
Advance Notice Requirement for Director Nominations – TSX and TSXV
Enhanced Shareholder Meeting Quorum for Contested Director Election – TSX and TSXV
Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada. De plus, c’est un document publié en français.
Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document sur le site de l’entreprise.
Depuis la diversité au sein des conseils jusqu’aux risques liés aux marchés émergents, en passant par l’activisme actionnarial, cette troisième édition du Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance, notre compte rendu annuel, analyse l’actualité sur de nombreuses questions d’intérêt pour les conseils d’administration et les observateurs du paysage de la gouvernance au Canada.
Dans le premier chapitre, Administrateurs et conseils d’administration, nous faisons le point sur l’évolution de la composition des conseils d’administration au Canada, les appels à la diversité au sein de ces conseils et des équipes de direction ainsi que les idées proposées par les autorités de réglementation et les investisseurs à cet égard. Dans le chapitre intitulé Rémunération des membres de la haute direction et des administrateurs, nous faisons état de la popularité grandissante du vote consultatif sur la rémunération de la haute direction et proposons des mesures que peuvent prendre les conseils d’administration pour éviter d’être pris de court par le résultat d’un tel vote. Dans le chapitre intitulé Questions relatives au vote des actionnaires, nous nous intéressons aux nouveautés concernant la question de l’intégrité du vote des actionnaires au Canada, les initiatives de réglementation des agences de conseil en vote et la pratique du vote à la majorité parmi les émetteurs. Dans le chapitre intitulé Initiatives des actionnaires, nous mettons en lumière les tendances et les questions d’actualité comme l’« achat de votes », la rémunération offerte aux administrateurs par les dissidents et le « vote vide » ainsi que les règlements de préavis. Dans le chapitre intitulé Surveillance des risques : les activités sur les marchés émergents, nous examinons comment les émetteurs gèrent les risques associés à leurs activités sur les marchés émergents ainsi que les nouveautés importantes touchant la législation et la mise en application de la loi en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Enfin, dans le chapitre intitulé Régimes de droits : gouvernance et changement de contrôle, nous analysons les deux cadres de réglementation des régimes de droits en situation de prise de contrôle proposés cette année par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières.
Voici un article très intéressant sur un sujet peu abordé dans ce blogue et peu discuté dans les « actualités » en gouvernance; il s’agit des nouvelles réglementations susceptibles d’affecter la gestion des grandes firmes d’audit.
Rappelons que les BIG-FOUR étaient auto réglementées avant 2002. La loi Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) a limité les mandats de consultation que les firmes d’audit effectuaient pour le compte de leurs clients de services d’audit, en plus de mettre sur pied une nouvelle autorité de réglementation, le « Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) ».
Les autorités réglementaires américaines et européennes étudient diverses propositions de changement dont les suivantes :
l’ajout d’une section dans le rapport d’audit qui soulignerait clairement les éléments critiques à considérer, du genre : « Qu’est ce qui empêche les auditeurs de dormir la nuit »;
la réduction de la portion que les firmes d’audit peuvent sous-contracter à d’autres firmes sans faire de divulgation, réduction de 25 % à 5 %;
la divulgation de l’identité de l’associé responsable de chaque audit;
l’obligation de la rotation des firmes d’audit : (1) obligation pour une société d’aller en appel d’offre tous les dix ans et (2) obligation de changer de firme d’audit tous les 20 ans (15 ans pour les entreprises du secteur financier).
Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous publié dans The Economist le 5 décembre 2013. Voici également un extrait de cet article.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
American Accounting Association (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
EVERY financial meltdown prompts a hunt for scapegoats. In the wake of the most recent one, calls to reform accounting have grown particularly loud, and action is on the way. In the coming months both America and the European Union are expected to introduce new rules aimed at enhancing auditors’ independence. But for all the heated debate over the changes, any improvement is likely to be modest.
America’s bean-counters were effectively self-regulating until 2002. That year, following a wave of accounting scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley act to reform corporate governance. It limited the consulting work firms could do for their audit clients and set up a new regulator, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. At a meeting on December 4th it outlined three policies it expects to implement by the end of 2014.
Yet even the most vocal advocates of mandatory rotation concede that it is no cure-all. Auditors have a conflict of interest at the heart of their business—they are paid by the companies they are supposed to assess objectively. Unless that changes, there will be no substitute for investors doing their own due diligence.
Aujourd’hui, on fait le point sur le Say on Pay en France. Le numéro de décembre 2013 du Bulletin de l’IFA présente, à la une, un bon compte rendu du rapport de la Commission Internationale de l’IFA. Bonne lecture !
La Commission Internationale de l’IFA publie aujourd’hui le rapport de son groupe de travail sur « Say on Pay : Comparaisons internationales et bonnes pratiques » en versions française et anglaise, disponibles dès à présent sur le site de l’IFA.
La Commission Européenne a inscrit le SOP dans son « Action plan : European company law and corporate governance ». En France, le SOP, sous forme d’un vote annuel consultatif de l’Assemblée Générale sur les rémunérations versées aux dirigeants mandataires sociaux, a constitué l’une des principales innovations du nouveau code Afep-Medef publié en Juin 2013.
European Commission (Photo credit: tiseb)
Au moment où les grandes entreprises françaises vont se doter d’un tel système, le rapport apporte une valeur ajoutée pratique avec :
• une vision synthétique et comparée des modalités opérationnelles de mise en application du Say On Pay dans une vingtaine de pays de cultures diverses et de maturités différentes sur ce sujet : cette comparaison internationale a été réalisée avec l’appui des réseaux d’Ecoda (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) et de la CCI Paris Ile-de-France (Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de région Paris Ile-de-France),
• une dizaine de bonnes pratiques identifiées comme permettant un fonctionnement efficient du SOP, à partir d’interviews, essentiellement auprès des membres du Club IFA des présidents de comités des rémunérations, complétées par des échanges avec quelques institutions de place, notamment l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF).
« De toute évidence, nous vivons une crise de gouvernance dans les institutions et organismes de l’État québécois. Selon des problématiques qui leur sont propres, le Fonds de solidarité, le CHUM, le CUSM, Tourisme Montréal, les universités ont subi de vives critiques pour une gouvernance jugée déficiente, et cette liste n’est ni exhaustive ni achevée.
Comment expliquer ce phénomène, au terme de dix ans d’ergotage sur la gouvernance dans le secteur public ? Les raisons sont trop nombreuses pour en traiter convenablement dans un court texte, mais voici une piste :
La lenteur ou l’incapacité des gouvernements à imposer aux multiples organismes, institutions et entreprises de l’État québécois les mêmes règles et principes de gouvernance auxquels sont soumises depuis 2006 les sociétés d’État.
Rappelons les principales obligations de gouvernance que la loi 53 adoptée en 2006 impose à quelque 23 sociétés ou organismes »
Également, il est très intéressant de lire le billet de Gaétan Frigon dans la Presse qui vient à la défense de M. Parisien.
« En exigeant que Jacques Parisien quitte son poste de Président du conseil d’administration de la Société des célébrations du 375e anniversaire de Montréal, c’est toute la communauté d’affaires de Montréal que monsieur le maire a insultée en lui envoyant un message lourd de conséquences. D’ailleurs, avant d’aborder la «saga Tourisme Montréal», qui a mené à cette demande de démission, voyons voir qui est Jacques Parisien.
On ne compte plus les millions de dollars recueillis par Jacques Parisien dans des collectes de fonds pour toutes sortes de causes. Dans le milieu, on l’appelle «Monsieur Montréal» tellement il aime cette ville. Il est de tous les combats quand vient le temps de la soutenir, d’en faire la promotion et d’aider ceux qui y vivent ».
Que pensez-vous des arguments invoqués pour défendre le président d’un conseil d’administration ?
Voici un billet de David A. Bell, associé de la firme Fenwick & West LLP qui a récemment été publié sur le blogue du Harvard LawSchool.Ce texte est un résumé de la publication Corporate Governance Practices and Trends: A Comparison of Large Public Companies and Silicon Valley Companies (2013) dont le texte complet est disponible ici.
Depuis 2003, Fenwick fait l’inventaire des pratiques de gouvernance issues des corporations du Standard & Poor’s 100 Index (S&P 100) qui sont pertinentes pour les entreprises de haute technologie cotées de la Silicon Valley 150 Index (SV 150). Vous trouverez dans le document ci-joint des données comparatives, souvent étonnantes et très significatives, entre les deux groupes sur les thèmes suivants :
Composition du conseil d’administration;
Nombre d’administrateurs exécutifs sur le conseil;
Diversité du membership, notamment la proportion de femmes;
La taille et le nombre de réunions du C.A. et de ses comités statutaires;
Les pratiques du « majority voting » et du « board classification »;
L’utilisation de la structure du vote à classes multiples;
Les directives concernant l’actionnariat des administrateurs;
La fréquence ainsi que le nombre de propositions des actionnaires activistes.
Je vous invite à lire cet extrait, puis si vous souhaitez en savoir plus, lisez aussi le résumé du HLS. Enfin, si l’étude détaillée vous intéresse vous pouvez vous procurer le rapport complet ici.
In each case, comparative data is presented for the S&P 100 companies and for the high technology and life science companies included in the SV 150, as well as trend information over the history of the survey. In a number of instances we also present data showing comparison of the top 15, top 50, middle 50 and bottom 50 companies of the SV 150 (in terms of revenue), illustrating the impact of scale on the relevant governance practices.
Significant Findings
Governance practices and trends (or perceived trends) among the largest companies are generally presented as normative for all public companies. However, it is also somewhat axiomatic that corporate governance practices should be tailored to suit the circumstances of the individual company involved. Among the significant differences between the corporate governance practices of the SV 150 high technology and life science companies and the uniformly large public companies of the S&P 100 are:
English: Apple’s headquarters at Infinite Loop in Cupertino, California, USA. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The number of executive officers tends to be substantially lower in the SV 150 than in the S&P 100 (in the 2013 proxy season, average of 6.5 compared to 11.2). In both groups there has been a long-term, slow but steady decline in the average number of executive officers per company, as well as a narrowing in the range of the number of executive officers in each group.
While there has been a general downward trend in both groups, the SV 150 companies continue to be substantially less likely to have a combined board chair/CEO than S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 37% compared to 72%). Where there is a separate chair, they are also substantially more likely to be a non-insider at SV 150 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 69% compared to 21%). Lead directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 85% compared to 44%).
The S&P 100 companies tend to have larger boards than SV 150 companies (average of 12.0 compared to average of 8.1 in the 2013 proxy season), and tend toward larger primary committees (audit, compensation and nominating). They are also substantially more likely to have other standing committees (83% of S&P 100 companies do, compared to 23% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season).
Female directors are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies whether measured in terms of average number of female directors (in the 2013 proxy season, 2.4 compared to 0.8) or in terms of average percentage of each board that are women (in the 2013 proxy season, 19.9% compared to 9.1%). While female board membership peaked among SV 150 companies in the 2008 proxy season (average of 12.3% compared to 17.2% for the S&P 100), the overall trend is clearly upward in both groups (compared to averages of 10.9% in the S&P 100 and 2.1% in the SV 150 in the 1996 proxy season). From the 1996 through 2013 proxy seasons, the percentage of companies with no women directors declined from 11% to 2% in the S&P 100 and 82% to 43% in the SV 150.
SV 150 companies continue to have more insiders as a percentage of the full board, while S&P 100 companies continue to have more insider directors measured in absolute numbers (while there has been and longer term downward trend in insiders, both groups have held essentially steady over the past five proxy seasons).
While there is a clear trend toward adoption of some form of majority voting in both groups, the rate of adoption is substantially higher among S&P 100 companies (92% compared to 44% of SV 150 companies in the 2013 proxy season), although it declined 5% from the 2011 proxy season (compared to a 7% increase for the SV 150).
Stock ownership guidelines for executive officers are substantially more common among S&P 100 companies (in the 2013 proxy season, 95% compared to 53%), although that is a substantial increase for both groups over the course of the survey (compared to 58% for the S&P 100 and 8% for the SV 150 in 2004), including a 9% increase in the SV 150 over the last year. Similar trends hold for stock ownership guidelines covering board members (although the S&P 100 percentage is about 20% lower for directors over the period of the survey).
While classified boards used to be similarly common among both groups (about 44% for S&P 100 and 47% for SV 150 in 2004), there has been a marked long-term decline in the rate of their use among S&P 100 companies but not among SV 150 companies (11% for S&P 100 compared to 45% for SV 150 in the 2013 proxy season). Our data shows that within the SV 150, the rate of adoption fairly closely tracks with the size of company (measured by revenue).
Stockholder activism, measured in the form of proposals included in the proxy statements of companies, continues to be substantially lower among the high technology and life science companies in the SV 150 than among S&P 100 companies (whether measured in terms of frequency of inclusion of any such proposals or in terms of number of proposals). However, over the last two proxy seasons, the largest companies in the SV 150 have closed the gap and are now comparable to the S&P 100 in terms of frequency of having a least one such proposal.
Il semble que les conseils d’administration dotés de personnes ayant une solide expérience des affaires, notamment à titre de PCD (CEO), mènent à des entreprises plus fortes et plus profitables. Tel est le constat que l’on peut faire à la suite de la lecture de l’article de Tom Groenfeldt, contributeur au magazine Forbes.
L’enquête menée par JamesDruryPartners auprès des cinq cent (500) plus grandes entreprises américaines montre que celles-ci se tournent davantage vers des PCD (CEO) en exercice ou retraités pour siéger sur les conseils d’administration, après avoir expérimenté diverses configurations de C.A. Les résultats peuvent être consultés sur le site de JamesDruryPartners.
L’article explique pourquoi il en est ainsi et décrit, en détail, les principaux changements dans la composition des C.A., en insistant sur la croissance des charges et responsabilités des membres de conseils. Par exemple, en 1990, les CEO siégeaient sur 2,2 conseils d’administration et 51 % participaient à quatre conseils ou plus. Aujourd’hui, ceux-ci siègent sur 1,2 conseil et seulement le quart (25%) participent à quatre conseils.
La recrudescence de cet engouement pour le recrutement de CEO, comme administrateurs, laisse peu de place aux femmes sur les conseils puisque la population de femmes CEO est encore très faible. L’étude montre que la recherche de CFO est également très faible en regard de la popularité des CEO.
The report notes that “A fundamental premise of our report is that we value business experience more highly than non-business experience in measuring governance capacity. Our research shows that the more accomplished a director is in business achievement, the more likely that director is to engage the CEO, management team, and other directors in rigorous discussion regarding critical business issues.”
The report also includes ways to improve ranking, and shows the companies that have had the greatest increases in their scores and the greatest declines. It is a detailed look at boards and has some excellent discussion of what makes for strong governance capacity. Boards can increase their capacity by enlarging its board if it is too small and upgrading its boardroom talent by adding directors of more substantive business accomplishment, particularly if active and retired CEOs are under-represented on the board.
Je remercie vivement tous les lecteurs qui ont exprimés, par vote, leur appréciation de mon blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne.
Dans un premier temps, notre blogue s’est classé parmi les dix (10) finalistes dans la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, une catégorie large à souhait ! Puis, aujourd’hui, nous apprenions le classement final du jury d’experts.
Le choix du jury a été effectué à partir de critères précis et d’un processus rigoureux : l’esthétique, l’ergonomie, la convivialité, la fonctionnalité, l’interactivité, la présence d’informations sur l’auteur, l’originalité du contenu, la clarté et l’écriture, la saisonnalité des articles, la transparence et authenticité, l’orthographe, la grammaire, l’esthétique des blog-posts, la forme, l’engagement, l’audience et influence du blogue.
Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65)blogues de sa catégorie, le seul des trois lauréats dans le domaine de la gouvernance.
Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance. Merci !
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
Par Jacques Grisé, Ph.D, F.Adm.A.
Collaborateur spécial au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés
Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernancedans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un document de la firme Thomson Reuters (White Paper) très intéressant sur le rôle de l’audit interne dans l’identification des risques émergents.
C’est un rôle très stimulant pour les administrateurs et les gestionnaires prêts à relever les défis. Voici un extrait du document. Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Reinsurance company Swiss Re defines emerging risks as “newly developing or changing risks which are difficult to quantify and which may have a major impact on the organisation.” This identifies their key elements.
Emerging risks may be entirely new, such as those posed by social media or technological innovation. Or they may come from existing risks that evolve or escalate – for example, the way counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk sky-rocketed during the 2008 financial crisis.
Newly developing risks lack precedent or history, and their precise form may not be immediately clear, which makes them difficult to measure or model. Changing risks are at least familiar in their shape and nature, although the rate of transformation and intensity can make them hard to quantify.
The final key element of emerging risks is their potential impact. New or changing risks can be as menacing as those the organisation deals with on a daily basis, and sometimes even more so. To give just one example, the way in which the music business failed to address the implications of digital downloads allowed a complete outsider, the computer company Apple, to step in and define and dominate the new market.
Emerging risks also threaten through their apparent remoteness or their obscurity. US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld distinguished between things we know we do not know (‘known unknowns’), and things we do not know we do not know (‘unknown unknowns’). In the first category are risks whose shape might be familiar, but where we do not necessarily understand all of their elements – causes, potential impact, probability or timing. Unknown unknowns are events that are so out of left field or seemingly farfetchedthat it takes great insight or a leap of the imagination to even articulate them. These include the ‘black swan’ events highlighted by the investor-philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb, where the human tendency is to dismiss them as improbable beforehand, then rationalise them after they occur. The 9/11 terrorist attack, or the financial crash of 2008, or the invention of the internet show that not only do black swan events happen, but they do so more frequently than is generally recognised, and they have an historically significant impact (and not always negative).
Many emerging risks are characterised by their global nature, their scale or their longer-term horizon – climate change is an example that displays all of these elements. In other cases, it is less the individual events themselves, some of which may be relatively moderate or manageable on their own, as the conflation of circumstances that creates a ‘perfect storm’.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 