Selon le modèle de gouvernance des entreprises privées canadiennes et américaines, le PDG (CEO) relève du conseil d’administration (CA) de l’entreprise. En effet, ce sont les actionnaires qui, lors de l’assemblée générale annuelle (AGA), votent pour des administrateurs dont la responsabilité fiduciaire est de les représenter sur le conseil d’administration de l’entreprise.
Ainsi, lors des AGA des entreprises publiques (cotées en bourse), les actionnaires sont appelés à voter sur une recommandation du CA développée par le comité de gouvernance. Il existe également des règles qui permettent aux actionnaires de faire inscrire des candidats sur la liste présentée par le CA.
Le CA a la responsabilité de veiller aux intérêts supérieurs des actionnaires tout en considérant les intérêts des diverses parties prenantes.
Les actionnaires ne votent pas pour un PDG (CEO) ; ils votent pour des représentants en qui ils ont confiance dans la supervision de leurs affaires, notamment dans le choix du premier dirigeant (PDG – CEO).
Il est clair pour tous que c’est le CA qui a la responsabilité d’embaucher le PDG (CEO), de l’orienter, de le rémunérer, de l’évaluer et de mettre en place un processus de relève et de transition.
Personnellement, je ne crois pas approprié que le PDG soit aussi un administrateur au sein du CA, bien qu’il doive y assister à titre de premier dirigeant, mais sans droit de vote.
Cette prise de position implique, a fortiori, que le PDG ne soit pas désigné comme président (Chairman of the Board) du CA.
Bien que notre mode de gouvernance semble exclure le cumul des fonctions de président du conseil et de PDG, il n’existe aucune obligation juridique à le faire.
En fait, on suppose que la séparation des fonctions, entre la présidence du conseil et la présidence de l’entreprise (CEO), est généralement bénéfique à l’exercice de la responsabilité de fiduciaire des administrateurs, c’est-à-dire que des pouvoirs distincts permettent d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts, tout en rassurant les actionnaires.
Cependant, cette pratique cède trop souvent sa place à la volonté bien arrêtée de plusieurs PDG d’exercer le pouvoir absolu, comme c’est encore le cas pour plusieurs entreprises américaines.
Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse a opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions.
Aux États-Unis, en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 dissociaient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Plus de 50 % de ces entreprises combinent les deux fonctions !
L’article d’Yvan Allaire, publié dans le journal Les Affaires du 21 novembre 2016, mentionne « deux arguments invoqués pour appuyer la séparation des rôles » :
1- Le PDG relève du conseil qui doit en évaluer la performance, établir sa rémunération, le remplacer si cette performance est inadéquate, proposer de nouveaux membres pour le conseil ; comment peut-on, comme PDG, présider également le conseil, lequel doit prendre ces décisions critiques pour le PDG ;
Environ 50 % des grandes sociétés américaines sont présidées par un administrateur indépendant, comparativement à 23 % il y a 15 ans.
Toute la question du bien-fondé de la dualité des rôles PDG/Chairman est encore ambiguë, même si les experts de la gouvernance et les actionnaires activistes sont généralement d’accord avec la séparation des fonctions.
2- En notre époque alors que la gouvernance est plus exigeante, plus prenante de temps et d’énergie pour la société ouverte cotée en Bourse, comment une même personne peut-elle s’acquitter de ces deux rôles sans que l’un soit négligé au profit de l’autre ? Dans le nouveau contexte de gouvernance, postérieur à Sarbanes-Oxley, les exigences pour le PCA sont telles qu’il n’est pas souhaitable qu’une même personne assume ces deux fonctions (PCA et PDG).
En conséquence, 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en Bourse se sont donné un président du conseil distinct du PDG, mais dans 38 % des cas ce président du conseil ne se qualifiait pas comme indépendant. (Spencer Stuart, février 2012).
La situation n’est certainement pas limpide, mais la tendance est évidente. L’indépendance du président du conseil ainsi que la séparation du pouvoir entre Chairperson du CA et CEO devrait, selon moi, trouver son application dans tous les types d’organisations : OBNL, sociétés d’État, petites et moyennes entreprises, et coopératives.
Évidemment, chaque organisation a ses particularités, lesquelles sont ancrées dans des pratiques de gouvernance assez diverses. La séparation des rôles n’est pas une panacée; c’est une meilleure assurance d’une saine gouvernance.
Quelle est la raison d’être d’une entreprise sur le plan juridique ? À qui doit-elle rendre des comptes ?
Une entreprise est-elle au service exclusif de ses actionnaires ou doit-elle obligatoirement considérer les intérêts de ses parties prenantes (stakeholders) avant de prendre des décisions de nature stratégiques ?
On conviendra que ces questions ont fréquemment été abordées dans ces pages. Cependant, la réalité de la conduite des organisations semble toujours refléter le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires, mieux connu maintenant sous l’appellation « démocratie de l’actionnariat ».
L’article de Martin Lipton* fait le point sur l’évolution de la reconnaissance des parties prenantes au cours des quelque dix dernières années.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par les questions de gouvernance (notamment les administrateurs de sociétés) doivent être informées des enjeux qui concernent leurs responsabilités fiduciaires.
Bonne lecture. ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Whether the purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders or to operate in the interests of all of its stakeholders has been actively debated since 1932, when it was the subject of dueling law review articles by Columbia law professor Adolf Berle (shareholders) and Harvard law professor Merrick Dodd (stakeholders).
Following “Chicago School” economics professor Milton Friedman’s famous (some might say infamous) 1970 New York Times article announcing ex cathedra that the social responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, shareholder primacy was widely viewed as the purpose and basis for the governance of a corporation. My 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, arguing that the board of directors of a corporation that was the target of a takeover bid had the right, if not the duty, to consider the interests of all stakeholders in deciding whether to accept or reject the bid, was widely derided and rejected by the Chicago School economists and law professors who embraced Chicago School economics. Despite the 1985 decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware citing my article in holding that a board of directors could take into account stakeholder interests, and over 30 states enacting constituency (stakeholder) statutes, shareholder primacy continued to dominate academic, economic, financial and legal thinking—often disguised as “shareholder democracy.”
While the debate continued and stakeholder governance gained adherents in the new millennium, shareholder primacy continued to dominate. Only since the 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession has there been significant recognition that shareholder primacy has been a major driver of short-termism, encourages activist attacks on corporations, reduces R&D expenditures, depresses wages and reduces long-term sustainable investments—indeed, it promotes inequality and strikes at the very heart of our society. In the past five years, the necessity for changes has been recognized by significant academic, business, financial and investor reports and opinions. An example is the 2017 paper I and a Wachtell Lipton team prepared for the World Economic Forum, The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, whichquotes or cites many of the others.
This year we are seeing important new support for counterbalancing shareholder primacy and promoting long-term sustainable investment. Among the many prominent examples is the January 2018 annual letter from Larry Fink, Chairman of BlackRock, to CEOs:
Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will succumb to short-term pressures to distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth. It will remain exposed to activist campaigns that articulate a clearer goal, even if that goal serves only the shortest and narrowest of objectives. And ultimately, that company will provide subpar returns to the investors who depend on it to finance their retirement, home purchases, or higher education.
This was followed in March by the report of a commission appointed by the French Government recommending amendment to the French Civil Code to add, “The company shall be managed in its own interest, considering the social and environmental consequences of its activity,” following the existing, “All companies shall have a lawful purpose and be incorporated in the common interest of the shareholders.” The draft amendment is intended to establish the principle that each company should pursue its own interest—namely, the continuity of its operation, sustainability through investment, collective creation and innovation. The report notes that this amendment integrates corporate and social responsibility considerations into corporate governance and goes on to state that each company has a purpose not reducible to profit and needs to be aware of its purpose. The report recommends an amendment to the French Commercial Code for the purpose of entrusting the boards of directors to define a company’s purpose in order to guide the company’s strategy, taking into account its social and environmental consequences.
Subject to the outcome of its impact assessment, the Commission will table a legislative proposal to clarify institutional investors’ and asset managers’ duties in relation to sustainability considerations by Q2 2018. The proposal will aim to (i) explicitly require institutional investors and asset managers to integrate sustainability considerations in the investment decision-making process and (ii) increase transparency, towards end-investors on how they integrate such sustainability factors in their investment decisions in particular as concerns their exposure to sustainability risks.
Further, the Commission proposes a number of other laws or regulations designed to promote ESG, CSR and sustainable long-term investment.
In addition to these examples, there are similar policy statements by major investors and similar efforts at legislation to modulate or eliminate shareholder primacy in Great Britain and the United States. While it is not certain that any legislation will soon be enacted, it is clear that the problems have been identified, support is growing to find a way to address them and if implicit stakeholder governance does not take hold, legislation will ensue to assure it.
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*Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton.
Voici un cas publié, sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan, qui met l’accent sur une problématique particulière pouvant ébranler la réputation d’une entreprise.
Quand une déclaration d’un président sur les médias sociaux (notamment Facebook) constitue-t-elle une entorse à la saine gestion d’une entreprise ? Comment un président peut-il faire connaître son point de vue sur une politique gouvernementale sans affecter la réputation de l’entreprise ?
Qui est responsable de proposer une stratégie pour réparer les pots cassés. Dans ce cas, à mon avis, le président du conseil est appelé à intervenir pour éviter les débordements sur la place publique et résorber une crise potentielle de réputation, le président sortant Finneas a également un rôle important à jouer.
Le cas est bref, mais présente la situation de manière assez explicite ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit le président du conseil.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.
Finneas chairs a medium-sized listed company board. He has been with the company through a very successful CEO transition and is enjoying the challenge of helping the new CEO to hone his leadership of the company.
The CEO has proved a good choice and the staff are settled and productive. Recently the government announced a new policy that will most likely increase the cost of doing business and decrease export competitiveness.
The CEO is rightly concerned. He has already made some personal statements opposing the policy – calling it ‘Stupid and short-sighted industrial vandalism’ – on his Facebook page. Fortunately, the CEO keeps his Facebook account mainly for friends and family so Finneas felt the comments hadn’t attracted much attention.
At his most recent meeting with the CEO, Finneas heard that a journalist had seen the comments and called the CEO asking if he would be prepared to participate in an interview. The CEO is excited at the opportunity to stimulate public debate about the issue. Finneas is more concerned that the CEO will cause people to think poorly of himself, as a harsh critic, and of the company. There are a couple of days before the scheduled interview.
Ce matin un article de Alissa Amico*, paru sur le forum de Harvard Law School, a attiré mon attention parce que c’est sur un sujet qui fait couler beaucoup d’encre dans le domaine la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (cotées en bourse).
En effet, quels sont les moyens appropriés de diffusion et de divulgation des informations à l’ère des médias sociaux ? L’auteure fait le tour de la question en rappelant qu’il existe encore beaucoup d’ambiguïté dans l’acceptation des nouveaux outils de communication.
On le sait, la SEC a réagi promptement aux annonces de Elon Musk, PDG et Chairman de Telsa, faites par le biais de Twitter qui ont été jugées trompeuses et qui ne respectaient pas le principe d’une diffusion de l’information à la portée de tous les actionnaires.
L’auteure rappelle que l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers français a pris une position ferme à ce propos en exigeant que les entreprises divulguent leurs réseaux sociaux privilégiés de communication sur leur site Internet.
La conclusion de l’article est révélatrice de grands changements à l’égard de la diffusion d’information stratégique.
The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.
There was something Trumpian in Elon Musk’s tweet about taking Tesla private. “Am considering taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured”, he boldly and succinctly announced on August 7, claiming that the necessary capital has been confirmed from the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign fund that is seeking to become the region’s largest according to the ambitions of its government, including through the much-debated public offering of Saudi Aramco.
Like in a Mexican soap opera, news about the PIF raising fresh capital through the transfer of its 70% stake in SABIC, the Saudi $100 billion petrochemicals giant and the largest listed company in the Kingdom to Saudi Aramco, as well its talks with Tesla’s rival Lucid followed shortly, immediately highlighting the perils of instant communication. As it turns out, tweeting 280-character messages is straightforward, explaining them takes a little more character and significantly more characters.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reacted promptly, issuing a subpoena to Tesla to probe into the accuracy of its communication to investors. Elon Musk is unfortunately not the first CEO to pay for taking to Twitter. Nestle’s attempt at humor on Twitter, which likened a massacre of Mexican students to its candy bar, resulted in calls for boycott, ultimately forcing the company to erase the message and apologize. Even the CEO of Twitter itself, Jack Dorsey, has had to apologize for one of his personal tweets, which unlike Tesla and Nestle cases, had nothing to do with his company.
Indeed, the emergence of new communication channels has occurred at a faster pace than regulation on how these should be employed by companies has emerged, whilst over-excited executives have taken to social media in attempt to build hype around their companies. In the world where the number of Instagram, Twitter and Facebook followers counts more than the number of public investors, social media has the potential of becoming the main channel for communication in the corporate world.
Although this phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed, its implications need to be considered in a wider context that is beyond this immediate Bermuda Triangle involving Mr. Musk, the PIF and Tesla. In fact, this episode raises two important and distinct questions: first, who should be able to speak on behalf of public shareholding companies in order to ensure the accuracy of communication, and second, how should this communication be made such that it reaches its ultimate target, the investor community.
In developed markets such as the United States, where Tesla is incorporated, disclosure by public companies is subject to a myriad of regulations including Rule 10b-5—first issued 70 years ago—which prohibits the release or omission of material information, resulting in fraud or deceit. It is also subject to a more recent Fair Disclosure Regulation which essentially forbids companies from releasing non-public material information to third parties, effectively stamping out the practice of selective disclosure by companies to specific investors.
These regulations provide the colorful context behind the SEC’s investigation into Mr. Musk’s unfortunate tweet, allowing the regulator to question whether he had misled investors: that is, whether funding for taking Tesla private has indeed been “secured”. Another issue—and one not raised in the media—is whether Twitter can effectively be considered as an appropriate means of communication to the investor community. In the United States, where 70% of public share ownership today is in the hands of institutional investors, this is a moot point.
Indeed, the SEC has officially allowed listed companies to use social media in 2013, prompted by an investigation into a Facebook post by the Netflix CEO Reed Hastings about the company passing a billion hours watched for the first time. The SEC did not penalize him and decided that henceforth social media could be used for communicating corporate announcements as long as investors are warned that this would be the case.
In the context of emerging markets however, this position would be potentially quite dangerous. In Saudi Arabia for example, home to the PIF—Tesla’s alleged buyer—trading in the stock market is 90% retail, whereas its underlying ownership is largely institutional. Communicating company news via social media presupposes that all investors have equal access to it, which may not necessarily be the case in retail marketplaces. Regulators in emerging markets, where guidelines on the use of social media for corporate announcements are generally lacking, would do well to address this before executives take to Twitter and Facebook.
They would need to keep in mind however, that habits of emerging market investors may not have shifted fast enough to be comfortable in the world of Twitter. In Egypt for example, the officially recognised channel for publishing financial results remains the country’s newspapers. Expecting investors to run from conventional—not to say outdated—means of communication, to judiciously tracking social media announcements appears overly ambitious.
Using social media as a means of communicating material corporate news raises another non-semantic point which is equally important to address in both emerging and developed markets. It is not only tweets of CEOs like Elon Musk that have the potential to affect share prices and investor perceptions. If CFOs, CROs, CIOs, COOs and other C-suite members take to Twitter, Facebook, Instagram or other platforms to offer their interpretation of company developments, the potential impact on investors could be quite disheartening.
Just like the CEO’s or the CFO’s ability to write a cheque is circumscribed by internal controls and board oversight of material transactions related to mergers and acquisitions for instance, their ability to speak on behalf of their companies should be addressed by policies including specific approval processes. This would effectively limit the possibility of senior executives or board members using their iPhone as a Megaphone, instead requiring rigorous processes to be introduced such that social media announcements are coherent with other disclosure channels and indeed with corporate strategy.
From a governance perspective, further thought should be given to centralizing the communication function within companies in the hands of the Head of Investor Relations or equivalent. Indeed, given the value of information in our era of fast-paced communication powered by social media and fast-paced stock exchanges powered by algorithmic and high-frequency trading, the role of a Chief Communication Officer may be justified in large publicly listed companies, just as the role of a Chief Risk Officer reporting to the board has been introduced in many large organisations following the financial crisis.
While forcing companies in a straightjacket of yet more corporate governance rules on how they should handle their corporate communications may be unwise, some thought about legal distinctions and limits between what is considered personal and corporate announcements appears warranted. Investors may need to be told that unless corporate announcements come from official company channels—which personal Twitter accounts are not—their interpretation of tweets by excited executives are to be made at their own peril, not subject to usual investor protections.
Likewise, publicly-traded companies need to inform the investor community of what constitutes their official communication channels and ensure that financial and non-financial information announced through these is pre-approved, synchronized and not in conflict with existing regulations. Some regulators such as the French securities regulator, Authorité des Marches Financiers, has done so almost 5 years ago, recommending that companies specify their social media accounts on their website as well as establish a charter addressing how executives and staff are to use their personal social media accounts.
The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.
*Alissa Amico is the Managing Director of GOVERN. This post is based on a GOVERN memorandum by Ms. Amico.
Voici un article-choc publié par Chris Hughes dans la revue Bloomberg qui porte sur l’indépendance (ou le manque d’indépendance) des quatre grandes firmes d’audit dans le monde.
Il y a une sérieuse polémique eu égard à l’indépendance réelle des grandes firmes d’audit.
Cet article donne les grandes lignes de la problématique et il esquisse des avenues de solution.
Shareholders need to be the client, not company executives.
British lawmakers are pushing for a full-blown antitrust probe into the country’s four big accountancy firms following the demise of U.K. construction group Carillion Plc.
The current domination of KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY and Deloitte isn’t working for shareholders. But creating more competition among the bean counters won’t be enough on its own. The fundamental problem is who the client is. The thrust of reform should be on making auditors see that their client is the investor and not the company executive. Randgold Resources is the only FTSE 100 company not to be audited by one of the Big Four !
Carillion’s accounts weren’t completely useless. Recent annual reports contained red flags of the company’s deteriorating financial health that were apparent to the smart money. Some long funds cut their holdings and hedge funds took large short positions, as my colleague Chris Bryant points out.
If the evidence was there to those who looked hard, it’s odd that the company was given a clean bill of health from accountancy firm KPMG months before it went bust. The impression is that auditors are on the side of the company rather than the shareholder. (KPMG says it believes it conducted its audit appropriately.)
Would more competition have made a difference? Companies may have only one accountant available if the few competing firms are already working for a rival. A lack of choice in any market usually leads to lower quality.
One response would be to force the Big Four to shed clients to mid-tier firms, creating a Big Five or Big Six. The risk is this greater competition just leads to a race to the bottom on fees with no improvement in quality. Other remedies are needed first.
The combination of audit and more lucrative consultancy work has long been chided – with good reason. Consultancy creates a client-pleasing culture. That’s at odds with the auditor’s role in challenging the assumptions behind company statements.
Opponents of a separation say combining the two services helps attract talent. This is a weak argument. Further lowering the current cap on consultancy fees, or completely separating audit and consultancy, is hard to argue with.
The accountancy firm should clearly serve the non-executive directors on the company’s audit committee which, in turn, is charged with looking out for shareholders. The risk is that the auditor’s main point of contact is the executive in the form of the chief financial officer.
Shareholders already have a vote on the appointment of the auditor. But annual reports could provide more useful disclosure on the frequency and depth of the last year’s contact between the firm and the audit committee, and between the latter and shareholders.
Now consider the nature of the job itself. Companies present the accounts, auditors check them. Out pops a financial statement that gives the false impression of extreme precision. Numbers that are the based on assumptions might be better presented as a range, accompanied by a critique of the judgments applied by the company.
Creating more big audit firms may create upward pressure on quality. But so long as they aren’t incentivized to have shareholders front of mind, it won’t be a long wait for the next Carillion.
Aujourd’hui, je vous présente le point de vue de l’association Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles, eu égard aux principes de gouvernance que celle-ci entend promouvoir.
Je reproduis ici les principaux éléments de l’article publié par Anne Meyer* et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, notamment les six principes qui gouvernent leur conduite.
1 — Les CA sont redevables envers les actionnaires ;
2 — Les actionnaires doivent avoir des droits de vote qui sont proportionnels à leurs intérêts économiques ;
3 — Les CA doivent être à l’écoute des actionnaires et être proactifs dans la compréhension de leurs perspectives ;
4 — Les CA doivent avoir une solide structure de leadership indépendante ;
5 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de gouvernance qui mènent à des pratiques efficaces ;
6 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de rémunération des dirigeants qui sont alignées sur la stratégie à long terme de l’entreprise.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
In this post, we provide an overview of the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles and steps for public companies to consider when evaluating how the principles may be incorporated into their own disclosure and engagement priorities. The ISG’s website, including a link to the ISG Governance Principles, is available here. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”), a collective of large U.S.-based and international institutional investors and asset managers, announced the launch of its Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance (the “Framework”). The measure is an unprecedented attempt to establish a set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed companies (the “ISG Governance Principles”) as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors. The Framework’s effective date was January 1, 2018, in order to provide U.S. listed companies with time to adjust to the corporate governance principles prior to the 2018 proxy season.
As the 2018 proxy season gets into full swing, there is evidence that ISG members will be utilizing the Framework as a tool for evaluating the governance regimes at their portfolio companies, informing their engagement priorities, and potentially factoring compliance with the ISG Governance Principles into selected voting policies and decisions. In December, the ISG issued a press release “encouraging companies to articulate how their governance structures and practices align with the ISG’s Corporate Governance Principles and where and why they differ in approach”, leaving it to companies to determine how and where to disclose such alignment. And at least one large investor, State Street Global Advisors, has specifically highlighted that it will screen portfolio companies for compliance with the principles.
As a result, companies and their boards should continue to benchmark and understand how their specific governance practices relate to ISG Governance Principles and remain cognizant of this new regime as they prepare for engagement with investors and draft public disclosures.
Background
The ISG’s global reach and financial influence is significant; currently consisting of 50 investors representing over $22 trillion invested in the U.S. equity markets. The ISG’s signatories includes some of the largest and most influential institutional investors, including BlackRock, CalSTRS, State Street Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price, ValueAct Capital and Vanguard, among others. The Framework’s stewardship principles emphasize that these institutional investors have a vested interest and responsibility for the long-term economic success of their portfolio companies.
The ISG’s roll-out of the Framework characterized it as a “sustained initiative” and emphasized an evolutionary view of the ability of U.S. companies and investors to work together under the Framework.
Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have historically been informed by multiple regulatory and rules-based regimes. Rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stock exchange listing requirements, state corporate codes, case law and federal legislation adopted in the wake of past financial market crises, have been the primary dictating standards. More recently, shareholders and other stakeholders have played a larger role in influencing corporate governance norms at U.S. listed companies through engagement and various forms of shareholder activism. In contrast, the ISG Governance Principles are based substantially on U.K., Continental European and other non-U.S. frameworks that establish principles-based corporate governance standards and tend to rely on “comply-or-explain” accountability. [1] Advocates for this type of principles-based approach stress the flexibility that it gives for companies to adopt a tailored response to important tenets such as boardroom transparency, as opposed to responding more narrowly to prescriptive rules. As institutional investors continue to focus more attention on environmental and social matters, including related governance concerns, the Framework’s principles-based approach will be a tool, for both institutions and companies, to promote mutually agreeable objectives, particularly given the lack of rulemaking or legislation mandating more specific disclosure on trending topics such as board diversity and environmental concerns.
The ISG Governance Principles
The six ISG Governance Principles are broad principles that will not look new to those who have been following key issues in corporate governance over the past several years. Indeed, they were designed to reflect the common corporate governance principles that are already embedded in member institutions’ proxy voting and engagement guidelines. The principles emphasize the importance of boardroom effectiveness and oversight, alignment of executive compensation with long-term financial results, and board accountability demonstrated in part through the adoption of governance best practices, including a one-share one-vote capital structure and independent board leadership.
Principle 1: Boards are accountable to shareholders
This principle encompasses the annual election of directors, majority voting, proxy access and more robust disclosure surrounding board practices and corporate governance. Companies are also asked to explain how any anti-takeover measures are in the best long-term interest of the company.
Interestingly, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink recently published a letter to the CEOs at the world’s largest public companies in which he argued explicitly that boards are accountable to other stakeholders, such as employees and customers, in addition to shareholders.
Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest
This principle sets a base line of one-share one-vote and encourages companies with existing multi-class share structures to review and consider phasing out control shares.
In 2017, this issue became national news when Snap Inc. filed for an IPO of non-voting shares. Many large investors were vehemently opposed and at the urging of the Council for Institutional Investors and other investor advocates, the stock index provider FTSE Russell refused to include these shares in its indices.
Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order to understand their perspectives
Under this principle, companies are expected to implement shareholder proposals that receive “significant” support or explain why they have not done so. Independent directors are encouraged to participate in engagement on matters that are meaningful to investors, and directors may be held accountable with “against” votes in instances where investors do not feel that their concerns have been adequately addressed.
Principle 4: Boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure
There are two common independent leadership structures at U.S. companies—an independent chairperson and an independent lead director (where the role of Chairman and CEO are combined)—and the principles acknowledge that signatory investors have differing opinions on whether they provide adequate independent oversight.
The overarching position under the principles is that the role of the independent board leader should be “clearly defined and sufficiently robust to ensure effective and constructive leadership.”
Principle 5: Boards should adopt structures and practices that enhance their effectiveness
This principle encompasses an array of board structure and effectiveness issues, including: strong board composition and board diversity; board and committee responsibilities; director attentiveness, preparedness and time commitments; and board refreshment.
Board diversity, in particular gender diversity, has emerged as a high priority for most of the largest institutional investors. There has also been a focus on screening for long-tenured directors and directors that are over-boarded or have poor attendance records as a proxy for identifying directors that may not be adequately engaged or independent.
Principle 6: Boards should develop management incentive structures that are aligned with the long-term strategy of the company
This principle emphasizes that the board, in particular the compensation committee, is responsible for ensuring that drivers and performance goals that underpin the company’s long-term strategy are adequately reflected in a company’s management incentive structure.
Steps to Consider
As noted, the ISG Governance Principles are intended to provide a framework of broad, high-level principles. The individual investors that comprise the ISG have their own voting guidelines and engagement priorities that are tailored to their own investment philosophy and strategy. Even on current hot button issues, such as board diversity, investors have differing views and companies should consider the practices they adopt depending upon their specific facts and circumstances. There are, however, general steps that we recommend companies take to address the growing influence of the Framework.
These include:
Understand how the company’s corporate governance structure and practices relate to the six ISG Governance Principles.
Review the company’s public disclosure regarding corporate governance structure and practices; consider enhancements to be responsive to the ISG’s request that companies disclose how their governance aligns or differs from the ISG Governance Principles.
As with other corporate governance benchmarking exercises, companies should be particularly cognizant of how and why their practices may differ from the ISG Governance Principles and whether these differences are adequately explained in public disclosures. As investors screen their portfolio companies’ governance practices, they will often consider valid explanations, but in the absence of effective disclosure the company may be unnecessarily penalized.
Management and the board should be informed and prepared to respond to questions about the company’s alignment with the ISG Governance Principles during shareholder engagements. Companies can also consider proactively addressing the issue in written materials or prepared remarks during investor presentations.
In preparing for shareholder engagements with ISG signatories, understand how and if they are explicitly incorporating the ISG Governance Principles into engagement and voting priorities and continue to screen their individual voting and engagement policies.
Companies should determine whether, and how, they wish to address and incorporate the ISG Governance Principles based upon their own specific governance profile, disclosure regime and approach to shareholder engagement.
Endnotes
1 See in particular the UK Investor Stewardship Code, on which the US ISG Principles are largely based. The UK Code “sets out a number of areas of good practice to which … institutional investors should aspire.” Available here.
*Anne Meyer is Senior Managing Director, Don Cassidy is Executive Vice President, and Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based their recent Georgeson publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst.
Nous avons déjà abordé l’importance d’inscrire un item « huis clos » à l’ordre du jour des réunions du conseil d’administration. Celui-ci doit normalement être à la fin de la réunion et comporter une limite de temps afin d’éviter que la réunion ne s’éternise… et que les membres de la direction (qui souvent attendent la fin de la rencontre) soient mieux informés.
Ensuite, le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) devrait rencontrer le président et chef de la direction (PCD) en privé, et dans les meilleurs délais, afin de rendre compte des résultats et de la portée du huis clos. Cette responsabilité du PCA est déterminante, car les dirigeants ont de grandes attentes et un souci eu égard aux discussions du huis clos.
Plusieurs dirigeants et membres de conseil m’ont fait part de leurs préoccupations concernant la tenue des huis clos. Il y a des malaises dissimulés en ce qui a trait à cette activité ; il faut donc s’assurer de bien gérer la situation, car les huis clos peuvent souvent avoir des conséquences inattendues, voire contre-productives !
Ainsi, le huis clos :
(1) ne doit pas être une activité imprévue et occasionnelle inscrite à l’ordre du jour
(2) doit comporter une limite de temps
(3) doit être piloté par le président du conseil
(4) doit comporter un suivi systématique, et
(5) doit se dérouler dans un lieu qui permet de préserver la confidentialité absolue des discussions.
J’insiste sur cette dernière condition parce que l’on a trop souvent tendance à la négliger ou à l’oublier, carrément. Dans de nombreux cas, la rencontre du conseil a lieu dans un local inapproprié, et les dirigeants peuvent entendre les conversations, surtout lorsqu’elles sont très animées…
Au début de la séance, les membres sont souvent insoucieux ; avec le temps, certains peuvent s’exprimer très (trop) directement, impulsivement et de manière inconvenante. Si, par mégarde, les membres de la direction entendent les propos énoncés, l’exercice peut prendre l’allure d’une véritable calamité et avoir des conséquences non anticipées sur le plan des relations interpersonnelles entre les membres de la direction et avec les membres du conseil.
L’ajout d’un huis clos à l’ordre du jour témoigne d’une volonté de saine gouvernance, mais, on le comprend, il y a un certain nombre de règles à respecter si on ne veut pas provoquer la discorde. Les OBNL, qui ont généralement peu de moyens, sont particulièrement vulnérables aux manquements à la confidentialité ! Je crois que dans les OBNL, les dommages collatéraux peuvent avoir des incidences graves sur les relations entre employés, et même sur la pérennité de l’organisation.
J’ai à l’esprit plusieurs cas de mauvaise gestion des facteurs susmentionnés et je crois qu’il vaut mieux ne pas tenir le bien-fondé du huis clos pour acquis.
Ayant déjà traité des bienfaits des huis clos lors d’un billet antérieur, je profite de l’occasion pour vous souligner, à nouveau, un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : lehuis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités.
L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil. Voici les commentaires que j’exprimais à cette occasion.
«Compte tenu de la “réticence” de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.
Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites judiciaires, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.
La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.
Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact!
Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus».
Quelle est la raison d’être d’une entreprise sur le plan juridique ? À qui doit-elle rendre des comptes ?
Une entreprise est-elle au service exclusif de ses actionnaires ou doit-elle obligatoirement considérer les intérêts de ses parties prenantes (stakeholders) avant de prendre des décisions de nature stratégiques ?
On conviendra que ces questions ont fréquemment été abordées dans ces pages. Cependant, la réalité de la conduite des organisations semble toujours refléter le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires, mieux connu maintenant sous l’appellation « démocratie de l’actionnariat ».
L’article de Martin Lipton* fait le point sur l’évolution de la reconnaissance des parties prenantes au cours des quelque dix dernières années.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par les questions de gouvernance (notamment les administrateurs de sociétés) doivent être informées des enjeux qui concernent leurs responsabilités fiduciaires.
Bonne lecture. ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Whether the purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders or to operate in the interests of all of its stakeholders has been actively debated since 1932, when it was the subject of dueling law review articles by Columbia law professor Adolf Berle (shareholders) and Harvard law professor Merrick Dodd (stakeholders).
Following “Chicago School” economics professor Milton Friedman’s famous (some might say infamous) 1970 New York Times article announcing ex cathedra that the social responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, shareholder primacy was widely viewed as the purpose and basis for the governance of a corporation. My 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, arguing that the board of directors of a corporation that was the target of a takeover bid had the right, if not the duty, to consider the interests of all stakeholders in deciding whether to accept or reject the bid, was widely derided and rejected by the Chicago School economists and law professors who embraced Chicago School economics. Despite the 1985 decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware citing my article in holding that a board of directors could take into account stakeholder interests, and over 30 states enacting constituency (stakeholder) statutes, shareholder primacy continued to dominate academic, economic, financial and legal thinking—often disguised as “shareholder democracy.”
While the debate continued and stakeholder governance gained adherents in the new millennium, shareholder primacy continued to dominate. Only since the 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession has there been significant recognition that shareholder primacy has been a major driver of short-termism, encourages activist attacks on corporations, reduces R&D expenditures, depresses wages and reduces long-term sustainable investments—indeed, it promotes inequality and strikes at the very heart of our society. In the past five years, the necessity for changes has been recognized by significant academic, business, financial and investor reports and opinions. An example is the 2017 paper I and a Wachtell Lipton team prepared for the World Economic Forum, The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, whichquotes or cites many of the others.
This year we are seeing important new support for counterbalancing shareholder primacy and promoting long-term sustainable investment. Among the many prominent examples is the January 2018 annual letter from Larry Fink, Chairman of BlackRock, to CEOs:
Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will succumb to short-term pressures to distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth. It will remain exposed to activist campaigns that articulate a clearer goal, even if that goal serves only the shortest and narrowest of objectives. And ultimately, that company will provide subpar returns to the investors who depend on it to finance their retirement, home purchases, or higher education.
This was followed in March by the report of a commission appointed by the French Government recommending amendment to the French Civil Code to add, “The company shall be managed in its own interest, considering the social and environmental consequences of its activity,” following the existing, “All companies shall have a lawful purpose and be incorporated in the common interest of the shareholders.” The draft amendment is intended to establish the principle that each company should pursue its own interest—namely, the continuity of its operation, sustainability through investment, collective creation and innovation. The report notes that this amendment integrates corporate and social responsibility considerations into corporate governance and goes on to state that each company has a purpose not reducible to profit and needs to be aware of its purpose. The report recommends an amendment to the French Commercial Code for the purpose of entrusting the boards of directors to define a company’s purpose in order to guide the company’s strategy, taking into account its social and environmental consequences.
Subject to the outcome of its impact assessment, the Commission will table a legislative proposal to clarify institutional investors’ and asset managers’ duties in relation to sustainability considerations by Q2 2018. The proposal will aim to (i) explicitly require institutional investors and asset managers to integrate sustainability considerations in the investment decision-making process and (ii) increase transparency, towards end-investors on how they integrate such sustainability factors in their investment decisions in particular as concerns their exposure to sustainability risks.
Further, the Commission proposes a number of other laws or regulations designed to promote ESG, CSR and sustainable long-term investment.
In addition to these examples, there are similar policy statements by major investors and similar efforts at legislation to modulate or eliminate shareholder primacy in Great Britain and the United States. While it is not certain that any legislation will soon be enacted, it is clear that the problems have been identified, support is growing to find a way to address them and if implicit stakeholder governance does not take hold, legislation will ensue to assure it.
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*Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton.
Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui demande beaucoup d’analyse, de stratégie et de jugement.
Dans ce cas, Xandra, la présidente du comité d’audit d’une petite association professionnelle, propose une solution courageuse afin de mettre un terme au déclin du membership de l’organisation : une diminution des frais de cotisation en échange d’une hausse des frais de service et des frais associés à la formation.
La proposition a été jugée inéquitable par les membres, qui ont soulevé leur grande désapprobation, en la condamnant sur les réseaux sociaux.
Plusieurs membres insistent pour que cette décision soit mise au vote lors de l’AGA, et que le PDG soit démis de ses fonctions.
Étant donné que les règlements internes de l’organisation ne permettent pas aux membres de voter sur ces questions en assemblée générale (puisque c’est une prérogative du CA), le président du conseil demande à Xandra de préparer une défense pour le rejet de la requête.
Xandra est cependant consciente que la stratégie de communication arrêtée devra faire l’objet d’une analyse judicieuse afin de ne pas mettre la survie de l’organisation en danger.
Comment la responsable doit-elle procéder pour présenter une argumentation convaincante ?
La situation est exposée de manière assez synthétique ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit Xandra.
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part vos commentaires.
This month our case study investigates the options for a board to respond to shareholders who know that they want something but don’t quite know how to get it. I hope you enjoy thinking about the governance and strategic implications of this dilemma:
Xandra chairs the audit committee of a small professional association. She has a strong working relationship with the chair and CEO who are implementing a strategic reform based on ‘user pays services’ to redress a fall in membership numbers and hence revenue. The strategy bravely introduced a reduced membership fee compensated by charges for advisory services and an increase in the cost of member events and education.
Some members felt that this was unfair as they used more services than others and would now pay a higher total amount each year. They have voiced their concerns through the company’s Facebook page and in an ‘open’ letter addressed to the board. In the letter they have said that they want to put a motion to the next AGM asking for a vote on the new pricing strategy and for the CEO to be dismissed. They copied the letter to a journalist in a national paper. The journalist has not contacted the company for comment or published the letter.
The CEO has checked the bylaws and the open letter does not meet the technical requirements for requisitioning a motion (indeed the authors seem to have confused their right to requisition an EGM with the right of members to speak at the AGM and ask questions of the board and auditor).
As the only person qualified in directorship on the association board, the Chair has asked Xandra « how can we push back against this request? »
Xandra is not sure that it is wise to rebuff a clear request for engagement with the members on an issue that is important for the survival of their association. She agrees that putting a motion to a members’ meeting could be dangerous. She also agrees that the matter needs to be handled sensitively and away from emotive online fora where passions are running unexpectedly high
Voici un sujet d’actualité brûlant sur le harcèlement sexuel au travail et les questions que le management des entreprises doit se poser à cet égard.
L’article publié par Arthur H. Kohn* sur le site de Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance, est très pertinent, autant pour la direction des organisations, que pour les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les auteurs présentent une série de huit (8) questions fondamentales auxquelles les responsables doivent répondre afin de bien s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités.
Il faut voir les questions comme une check-list des activités de diagnostic eu égard aux situations de harcèlement sexuel et de diverses formes d’inconduite.
J’espère que cette lecture sera utile aux gestionnaires soucieux de la qualité de l’environnement de travail des entreprises.
In recent months, sexual harassment allegations against well-known figures across a growing number of industries have become a common feature in news headlines. In the wake of these allegations, many companies have concluded that their current policies and procedures related to sexual harassment and discrimination are inadequate. Against the backdrop of this rapidly evolving landscape, companies are considering how to improve their policies and procedures not only to appropriately and effectively respond to allegations of sexual harassment, but also to deter inappropriate behavior going forward and foster an environment of openness, diversity and inclusion in their workplaces. To that end, below are 8 key questions that companies should be asking themselves in developing policies and procedures to confront sexual harassment and other forms of misconduct in today’s workplace.
The 8 Questions Companies Should Be Asking Themselves
1. Have we thought broadly, globally and proactively in developing our policies and procedures about workplace harassment?
Under both U.S. federal and state law, companies are incentivized to have policies and procedures in place that address sexual harassment and contain clear guidelines about what to do in the event an employee is sexually harassed. In addition to ensuring that their sexual harassment policies comply with applicable federal and state law, companies should consider developing other internal policies and trainings for employees and executives concerning inappropriate, offensive, or abusive behavior, including:
Policies concerning bullying, discrimination, retaliation, consensual relationships and nepotism.
Code of conduct, affirmatively establishing the expected company culture.
Trainings on unconscious bias, sensitivity in the workplace and behavioral responses to harassment and discrimination (e.g., understanding the “freeze” response to harassment).
In developing these policies and trainings, consideration should be given to the fact that the public’s perception of what constitutes harassment or inappropriate behavior has already begun, and will continue, to change. Likewise, some conduct that is unlikely to provide a basis for a legal claim against a company under the current state or federal law applicable to the company, may be the subject of future legislation. In addition, thinking not just about deterring illegal conduct but about fostering an environment in which such conduct is unlikely to occur is important. Training on unconscious bias, sensitivity in the workplace and behavioral responses to harassment and discrimination are just some ways in which the culture of a company can be improved.
As part of a comprehensive approach to developing policies on harassment, companies may also consider examining perspectives on harassment in foreign jurisdictions, including looking to local rules for guidance. Global organizations should not only adopt uniform policies across geographical areas that reflect global standards of conduct, but also should make sure that any local law requirements are adopted through addenda in relevant jurisdictions.
2. Do our employees trust the company’s procedure for reporting harassment?
If the behavior complained of is not expressly covered by a company’s sexual harassment policy or applicable law, employees may not think they have recourse through the company’s reporting procedures. Even if a company has put in place a clear procedure for reporting violations, employees may not use it if they do not trust that their complaints will be investigated thoroughly and without any repercussions. Employees may have the perception that the priorities of the individuals designated to receive complaints are more aligned with the accused or that these designated individuals have an obligation to presume innocence. Employees may moreover fear that their allegations will be perceived as overreactions or that they will face retaliation, particularly where the alleged perpetrator is a senior person or high performer. Where this is the case, employees may decide to escalate their complaints by going outside of their companies’ reporting procedures, including by sharing their stories more broadly:
through the press (Harvey Weinstein);
on social media (#MeToo);
on anonymous forums that are, or may become, open to the public (the “Sh%&ty Media Men” spreadsheet, Glassdoor.com, Blind conversation app); and
calling anonymous hotlines set up by organizations outside the company (National Organizations for Women; Equal rights advocates).
In light of this, companies should take steps to ensure that their human resources (“H.R.”) functions are sufficiently staffed and trained on how to handle concerns about harassment that they encounter outside of regular reporting channels. Companies may also consider having those in H.R. functions proactively monitor forums and other websites for allegations of harassment as a complement to their existing processes. A company’s failure to respond to allegations made in the press or on social media or to provide appropriate reporting mechanisms for harassment claims may contribute to a determination that the company has not exercised reasonable care in preventing and addressing harassment, thereby exposing the company to liability. In addition to legal risks, the publication of harassment allegations can also expose a company to reputational harm, which may be mitigated by a company’s proactive response to the allegations.
Companies should also take steps to ensure that all information concerning harassment allegations, even if not raised through the company’s reporting procedures or raised anonymously, is shared with appropriate individuals within the organization and also promptly escalated to senior management or the board. In order to comprehensively address allegations of harassment or unhealthy workplace cultures, it is essential that all known information about alleged violations be promptly and regularly escalated to senior management or the board.
3. Who is responsible for receiving complaints and do they have adequate resources and training?
Even if a company’s reporting procedures designate particular individuals as responsible for receiving complaints, employees may bring allegations to non-designated employees, including their managers and mentors. Employees may also report allegations directly to senior management. For example, recently developed apps like AllVoices enable victims of sexual harassment or discrimination to anonymously report incidents to a company’s CEO and board. Companies should thus ensure that senior management, as well as all employees and others who may receive complaints of harassment, receive training on how to respond to allegations of harassment and are well-versed on how to promptly escalate complaints within the organization. Employees should be reminded that they should never discourage someone from bringing forward an allegation of harassment and that any such allegations must be taken seriously and reported properly. As noted above, companies should also ensure that all information relevant to harassment allegations is shared with the appropriate individuals and escalated to senior management or the board on a regular basis.
Companies should also consider taking steps to assess the work environment before a complaint of harassment arises. For example, companies may consider conducting anonymous surveys of employees on their experiences in the workplace and the current harassment procedures, administering “climate assessments” in particular areas of the business, including H.R., holding skip-level meetings for senior management to gain insight into the culture at various levels of the organization, and establishing a clear open door policy to encourage openness between employees and senior management.
4. Who should be in charge of conducting investigations and do those in charge have adequate resources and independence?
Substantial consideration should be given to who is in charge of conducting an investigation into complaints of sexual harassment and to whether those directing the investigation are sufficiently independent. Companies may consider forming a committee consisting of representatives from different parts of the company to direct any harassment related investigations, including determining who should have responsibility for conducting the investigation. Depending on the nature of the allegations, an investigation by personnel in an H.R. function may be appropriate and cost effective. For allegations involving senior management or that involve pervasive behavior by a group or area within a company, a company may also consider bringing in outside counsel. In that scenario, consideration should be given to who retains the counsel and whether counsel is sufficiently independent.
Companies should also ensure that their investigations are conducted with the utmost confidentiality and assure employees that their harassment complaints are confidential and that they will be protected against retaliation. If, however, a company ultimately decides to settle with a complaining employee, it may consider reevaluating the use of non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), either in settlements or in existing employment contracts, which could be perceived as “hush money” or as perpetuating abusive work environments by protecting perpetrators, and which are the subject of proposed legislation in some state legislatures.
5. Has a disclosure obligation been triggered?
Additional considerations may apply with respect to responding to and preventing misconduct by senior executives. Such misconduct can create or exacerbate an abusive work environment and lead to serious reputational injury for the company. If allegations are made against an executive officer, the company should determine when and how to involve the board in dealing with those allegations. Public companies should also keep in mind that the change in employment conditions, resignation or termination of certain executives must be disclosed on a Form 8-K in the U.S., and that other foreign jurisdictions may have similar disclosure requirements.
Companies may also consider whether to review their contracts with senior executives to ensure that the contracts include provisions that require and incentivize compliance with the company’s behavioral expectations. To that end, some companies have chosen to consider, with respect to their new and existing contracts, what rights they have to terminate senior executives for cause for violations of the company’s harassment policies and to deny indemnification in such situations. One reason to consider negotiating arrangements with these protections in place is that payment of large severance packages can cause reputational harm to a company based on the perception that it is being “soft” on executives whose behavior violated its policies or rewarding executives for inappropriate behavior. On the other hand, these negotiations may present real challenges.
6. Does senior management communicate the message that harassment of any type will not be tolerated?
The adoption of strong internal codes of conduct, policies and robust procedures will have limited efficacy if senior management does not make clear that it will not tolerate harassment of any kind or by any perpetrator. Management’s failure to swiftly investigate claims of harassment or to penalize abusive behavior can exacerbate an already hostile work environment. Further, as noted above, consideration should be given to ensuring that management cannot be reasonably perceived as rewarding senior executives who do not comply with the company’s behavioral expectations or silencing victims of abuse.
Companies should encourage senior management to takes steps to facilitate openness and increased communication with their employees even before a complaint arises. Senior management should also regularly remind employees of the existence of their company’s policies and procedures related to harassment and should participate in trainings.
7. Is the board sufficiently informed on the company’s policies and procedures relating to sexual harassment?
Board members may be exposed to claims of breach of fiduciary duty following claims of sexual harassment perpetrated by executive officers or other employees of the company. In particular, public companies may face serious financial consequences following allegations of harassment at the company as a result of such claims. Boards should also be aware that there are financial risks that are not directly tied to payment of civil damages or to legal and remediation costs related to sexual harassment. The media has recently reported numerous incidents of allegations where executives have been accused of sexual harassment and other misconduct, and the companies have seen their stock price fall or lost advertising revenue, customers and business opportunities. In light of these risks and, most importantly, to protect the safety of the company’s employees, the board should periodically review the company’s sexual harassment policies, including training and reporting channels. The board should also ensure that it is being informed of violations of these policies, as appropriate, and has a sense of the day-to-day workplace culture as it relates to sexual harassment and other forms of inappropriate workplace behavior.
8. Does the company have effective standards, policies and processes, including diligence processes, to address sexual harassment issues at potential investment targets and existing subsidiaries and/or portfolio companies?
Companies may face major reputational and financial repercussions based on the misconduct of other companies that they have acquired or in which they have invested. During the diligence process, consideration should be given to inquiring into the target’s or partner’s implementation and maintenance of harassment policies and procedures, the existence of appropriate controls, and whether the investment target or its key personnel have a history of incidents, investigations or allegations of harassment issues. In addition, in appropriate circumstances, consideration should be given to engaging local counsel for investments outside the U.S. to consider whether the company’s policies comply with applicable local rules, and the impact any non-compliance could have post acquisition.
Private equity sponsors and other similar organizations should consider reevaluating policies and procedures at existing portfolio companies and subsidiaries in light of recent developments, and may further consider putting in place reporting requirements to ensure that portfolio companies and subsidiaries have implemented effective policies and ongoing training. Companies may also consider steps that can be taken internally to effectively implement appropriate policies, procedures, and training at their portfolio companies and subsidiaries. For example, consideration should be given to whether a company can leverage its own practices and policies across its portfolio companies and subsidiaries.
Conclusion
Sexual harassment related allegations are increasingly making headlines and rapidly changing perceptions concerning harassment and abusive behaviors. While the allegations initially centered on the entertainment industry, sexual harassment in the workplace has now become a major issue in a growing number of industries, including technology and finance. Companies across all industries are responding by developing strategies for tackling harassment in the workplace and minimizing risk by implementing strong policies, procedures, and complaint systems. To do so, it is essential that companies ask the right questions.
L’une des questions prédominantes — et souvent controversées — dans l’évaluation des principes de saine gouvernance concerne l’indépendance des administrateurs.
L’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) propose une approche nouvelle et originale sur la question de l’indépendance des membres des conseils d’administration.
Dans un document « L’indépendance des conseils : un enjeu de légitimité », l’IGOPP propose que toute organisation dotée d’un conseil d’administration cherche à constituer un conseil qui soit à la fois légitime et crédible.
L’enjeu n’est pas tellement l’indépendance des conseils mais bien leur légitimité et leur crédibilité. La qualité d’indépendance ne prend son sens que si elle contribue à rehausser la légitimité d’un conseil.
C’est par sa légitimité qu’un conseil acquiert le droit et l’autorité de s’imposer à la direction d’une organisation. Les conseils d’organisations publiques ou privées, sans actionnaire ou sans actionnaire actif détenant plus de 10 % du capital-actions ordinaire, devraient être composés d’une majorité nette d’administrateurs indépendants. De plus, tous leurs comités statutaires devraient être composés exclusivement de membres indépendants.
L’article ci-dessous, écrit à la suite d’une table ronde réunissant plusieurs spécialistes de la gouvernance européenne, aborde trois sujets incontournables, en tentant de tirer des enseignements pour le futur :
(1) l’indépendance des administrateurs et la pertinence du concept
(2) les divers aspects de la rémunération et les obligations fiduciaires
(3) l’identification des actionnaires et les questions de procuration des votes
Dans ce billet, nous vous proposons les questionnements reliés à l’indépendance des administrateurs.
L’indépendance est-elle une bonne idée ?
Quels sont les problèmes liés à l’indépendance ?
Quels sont les résultats de recherche qui montrent que l’indépendance améliore la qualité de la gouvernance ?
Comment composer avec l’influence des gestionnaires et des conflits d’intérêts ?
L’article publié par Christian Strenger*est paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Govervance.
Alors, selon vous, pourquoi l’indépendance des administrateurs est-elle un gage de bonne gouvernance ?
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
L’indépendance des administrateurs : panacée ou boîte de Pandore?
Board Independence: the Quality Question and dealing with Insider Issues
Background
A reliable formula for board effectiveness has been elusive, but the importance of effective boards warrants ongoing reflection and research by both academics and practitioners.
In spite of the diversity of governance models around the world, the concept of independence plays a prominent role in most, if not all, codes of governance globally as an intrinsic component of good board structure. For example, independence features, to varying degrees of emphasis, in the governance frameworks of the US, UK, Germany and Japan. It is also reflected in global frameworks, such as the ICGN Global Governance Principles or the OECD Corporate Governance Principles.
But what does independence mean in a corporate governance context, and does it deliver what we want it to? This session seeks to challenge how we think about independence and addresses several fundamental questions relating to boards and corporate governance:
Is board independence essential to quality in corporate governance—or is independence simply a placebo that doesn’t do anything but makes us feel better?
What do we expect board independence to achieve in practical terms?
Are independent directors really in a position to monitor and control corporate insiders?
These are questions that have relevance for company managers and directors, but also for investors, regulators and stakeholders.
Role of boards
A company’s board of directors is at the core of its corporate governance. Boards play a range of advisory and control functions. This includes strategic direction and risk/control oversight, along with the monitoring and reward of executive management.
At a more overarching level, agency theory suggests that one of the key roles of the board is to serve as an agent protecting the interests of shareholders vis-à-vis company management or controlling owners. This reflects a duty of care to support the company’s long-term success and sustainable value creation and to ensure the alignment of interests between management, controlling owners, minority investors—taking into account stakeholder interests as well.
Why is independence a good idea?
Shareholders and other stakeholders expect boards to have the ability and authority to think and act independently from company executives or controlling owners. The board may be unable to serve effectively in its agency role if its directors’ judgements are not free of conflicts or any other external influence other than promoting the long-term success of the firm.
What are the problems related to independence?
It is important to recognise that independence has to be looked at in the context of how it affects board processes, decisions and overall governance. Yet spite of the inherent virtues of independence, its realisation in practice is not an easy fix; nor does it intrinsically enhance board effectiveness. A director must be able to contribute something other than independence alone, whether that is in the form of sector knowledge, commercial experience, international experience, technical skills or other areas that support the board’s oversight of company management.
Moreover, independence is ultimately a state of mind, not a product of definitions. There are many different sets of criteria that seek to define independence for individual directors. While these sorts of criteria can be useful, they can also be crude, misleading or incomplete.
The Lehman Brothers board in 2008, the year of its demise, was an example of a nominally independent board. But was this board able to operate independently of a strong Chair/CEO? Was there enough financial sector expertise amongst this group of independent directors to provide a rigorous challenge? (See Annex 1 in the complete publication).
Does independence ensure quality? What is the evidence?
Independence may be real, but it can be hard, if not impossible, to measure in a meaningful way. It is much easier to measure structural features of boards than it is to measure the quality of board processes. But sometimes what is easily measurable is not worth measuring. So while it is possible (and very common) to calculate simple ratios, such as independent directors/total directors a common gauge of board independence, they may not tell us much. Indeed, the evidence of empirical studies using simplistic/conventional measures of independence has been inconclusive (See Annex 2).
Many board attributes, including independence, which are regarded as “best practice” lack clear empirical grounding, at least in an econometric context. So, in many features of our corporate governance codes we are dealing in effect with opinions more than facts.
How to deal with insider influence and vested interests?
Insider influences can vary depending on the nature of the company. For widely-held companies, the vested interests of executive management often take the form of high pay for limited performance. In controlled companies vested interests may be the controlling owners themselves in terms of entrenchment and self-dealing.
Are independent directors really equipped to challenge these insiders? Or is that possibly asking for a bit too much? The empirical evidence cited above suggests that independent directors may not have a meaningful impact on board governance. But the evidence does suggest in the area of audit committees that independence is important. This makes logical sense, but it also suggests that for an independent director to provide meaningful oversight, independence must be combined with other important attributes, including sectoral knowledge and financial expertise. Independence as a determinant of board effectiveness therefore may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition.
Conclusion
We need to recognise that independence may be overrated, or at least not always live up to its billing. At least as it is conventionally defined, independence has not proven to be a panacea or silver bullet to ensure good corporate governance. At the same time, however, the concept of board independence is important and worth preserving, if nothing else as an aspirational ideal.
Discussion Results
Independent directors seem to be an intuitive solution for the agency problem stemming from the separation of ownership and control, but also for limiting the power of controlling shareholders in a corporation.
The starting point of the discussion was: Why do we need independence in the first place? As investors and other stakeholders want to see their interests served and protected by the board, the absence of potential conflicts of interest between non-executive directors and managers or undue influence from a major shareholder are the answers. Disclosure of meaningful ties of the non-executive directors to the management or controlling shareholders is important. The discussion also emphasized that reasonable diversity can be a contributing factor for board independence, and that truly independent board members can play a key role in avoiding too much convergence in decision making, as well as in focusing on the well-being of the company itself, and not any separate vested interests. While the discussion highlighted many benefits of board independence, it also pointed to potential costs: board independence may come with costs relating to problems in information flows, access to information and processing. Thus, it is important to complement board independence with proper board procedures and processes.
A key point of the discussion was the definition of independence itself. Besides the obligatory disclosure of relevant ties of a non-executive board member to management or controlling shareholders, regulators tried to formalize criteria to define independent board members. Academic literature also strives to evaluate how predefined criteria affect company decisions. However, results of these efforts are mixed and can hardly achieve “true” independence. The description of certain characteristics could introduce independence on paper, but may not reflect correctly the individual case of a board member. A predefined strict categorization would in practice suffer from a “ticking the box” approach. Independence from a controlling shareholder is equally hard to define as thresholds for shareholdings may not reflect the individual circumstances. The discussion also highlighted that strict definitions of independence might also require companies to replace experienced board members with new independent board members. That could lead to a temporary loss of experience and industry expertise.
Ways for the Future:
The realistic description of board independence needs a detailed assessment of the individual and a disclosure of ties of a non-executive board member to the management or controlling shareholders. Furthermore, disclosure of the selection process of the nomination committee should bring important insights for investors and the stakeholders.
The discussion further emphasized that formal characteristics alone could be misleading to determine the independence of a board member, focusing on “independence in mind” as an important aspect. As this factor is difficult to gauge or measure, investors may have to communicate with the chair in individual cases.
A sensible and company specific skillset of personnel management, industry knowledge and experience must be represented in the board as a priority, as formal independence alone is not a sufficient prerequisite for the selection process. The discussion emphasized that extensive information is key to allow proper evaluation of true independence. This should be complemented by sufficient access to the chair for communication with investors. The latest German code revision emphasizes that chairs make themselves available to investors for such supervisory board related issues.
Ways for the Future:
Full disclosure of important ties between individual board members with management and controlling shareholders should be obligatory. To properly evaluate the board member proposals, the disclosure of the skillsets of board members and the selection process would bring further important insights for investors. An idea proposed to support the process was the development of a “board skills matrix” for individual boards.
The discussion highlighted the key role of the nomination committee in the identificatio n and evaluation of independent directors. It was therefore suggested that the chair of the nomination committee should make himself available to investors. This point was controversially discussed due to possible loss of a “One Voice” communication strategy, so that communication should be confined to the chair of the supervisory board.
Another important point of the discussion was the regular evaluation of non-executive board members, as this may bring improvements for independent guidance and decision making of the full board. It could also identify areas of strength and weaknesses for an improved performance of both boards. A key prerequisite for a successful evaluation is the independence of the conducting leader.
The discussants raised the issue of the differences emerging from national governance environments, such as different shareholder structures and cultural differences. While the Anglo American approach to independence appears to work in the UK, this differs from continental European countries such as Germany and France.
Ways for the Future:
A solution to cross-country differences is the development of “local optima” that reflect the special circumstances in each country, rather from pursuing a “one fits all” approach.
Conclusion
The participants concluded that board independence remains a central issue in the corporate governance debate. The discussion identified definition issues as critical. It was also highlighted that full disclosure of the individual independence is important. Formal independence alone does not ensure board or director effectiveness. It must be accompanied with skills, knowledge and experience to obtain satisfactory board work results. Disclosure on the individual board members’ selection process and independence characteristics should be made available to investors and the other stakeholders.
*Christian Strengeris Academic Director at the Center for Corporate Governance at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. This post is based on a publication by Mr. Strenger and Jörg Rochell, President and Managing Director at ESMT Berlin, for a symposium held in Berlin on November 9, 2017, sponsored by ESMT Berlin and the Center for Corporate Governance at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management.
Voici un article très intéressant qui présente une vision différente de la gouvernance à l’« Américaine ».
Les auteurs XAVIER HOLLANDTS et BERTRAND VALIORGUE sont enseignants-chercheurs en stratégie et gouvernance des entreprises. L’article vient de paraître sur le site LesEchos.fr.
Le projet français de loi « Pacte » a pour objectif de repenser les grandes notions de gouvernance, notamment la place de la participation des salariés à titre d’administrateur à part entière.
L’article examine trois idées reçues qu’il est important de bien élucider :
(1) la participation permet d’équilibrer le rapport capital/travail
(2) la participation améliore le dialogue social
(3) la participation améliore la performance
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Voilà de quelle manière les auteurs concluent leur article :
Compte tenu de ces éléments, faut-il promouvoir la participation des salariés à la gouvernance des entreprises ? Oui car l’accroissement de cette participation nous semble nécessaire pour deux raisons. L’arrivée d’administrateurs élus par les salariés au sein des conseils d’administration va permettre de recentrer les discussions sur l’entreprise, son projet stratégique, les investissements de long terme et son apport au progrès social et environnemental. Cette arrivée va redonner tout leur sens et prérogatives aux conseils d’administration.
La participation des salariés à la gouvernance va en outre apporter des éclairages et des moyens nouveaux pour gérer l’actif clé de la performance des entreprises : le capital humain. Les administrateurs salariés vont aider les dirigeants à mieux prendre en compte et développer cet actif qui est facteur majeur de compétitivité, d’innovation et de performance durable. On objectera alors que d’autres parties prenantes jouent aussi un rôle clé dans le processus de création de valeur et que leur présence au sein des conseils d’administration serait bienvenue. Ceux-là n’auraient pas tort.
Voici un article de Karim Benessaieh publié dans la section Actualité expliquée de La Presse+ Affaires le 13 mai 2017.
L’auteur apporte les précisions requises quant aux titres et fonctions du président du conseil de Bombardier, Pierre Beaudoin.
Pierre Beaudoin était président et chef de la direction (CEO ou PDG) de Bombardier depuis 2008. En 2015, il devient le président « exécutif » du conseil d’administration de Bombardier.
Récemment, ce dernier a renoncé à la portion « exécutive » de ses fonctions. Qu’est-ce que cela implique pour le commun des mortels ?
C’est exactement ce à quoi Karim Benessaieh a tenté de répondre dans son article, reproduit ci-dessous, auquel j’ai participé.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Qu’est-ce qu’un président exécutif ? Peut-on être PDG, président du conseil d’administration et chef de la direction en même temps ? Dans la tempête qui ébranle Bombardier depuis six semaines, il est facile de se perdre dans les étiquettes. La Presse a demandé à deux experts en gouvernance d’éclairer notre lanterne.
À quoi a renoncé exactement Pierre Beaudoin en retirant la partie « exécutive » de son mandat ?
À la base, Pierre Beaudoin, fils de Laurent Beaudoin et de Claire Bombardier et donc petit-fils de Joseph-Armand Bombardier, est le président du conseil d’administration de l’entreprise depuis 2015. Son rôle est de « gérer le conseil et [d’]établir l’ordre du jour » pour les 15 membres de cette instance, comme le précise le site de Bombardier, qui ne fait aucune référence à l’aspect « exécutif » de son travail.
Dans l’avis de convocation des actionnaires, cette semaine, on reprend la formule un peu vague selon laquelle M. Beaudoin est en outre chargé de « la définition d’une orientation stratégique et [de] la gestion des relations entretenues avec certaines parties prenantes et avec la clientèle ». Ce sont ces dernières responsabilités qu’il a perdues.
Vous ne nous éclairez pas beaucoup…
Désolé, c’était la réponse officielle. C’est que le « président exécutif » est une bête un peu curieuse souvent associée aux entreprises familiales ou dont le fondateur est encore bien présent. Aux États-Unis, peu de confusion : pour 50 % des entreprises cotées en Bourse, le PDG (ou CEO) est également président du conseil d’administration. Le président du conseil, dans ces cas, est « exécutif » de facto. Au Canada, seulement 14 % des entreprises sont dirigées par un PDG qui est en même temps président du conseil d’administration.
Par contre, dans une sorte de formule mitoyenne, certaines entreprises d’ici ont donné des responsabilités élargies à leur président du conseil en lui ajoutant l’étiquette « exécutif » : il devient dans les faits un deuxième PDG.
Au Québec, CGI, Couche-Tard et Cascades ont donné ce titre à celui qui préside leur conseil d’administration. « C’est une formule hybride, résume Michel Nadeau, directeur général de l’Institut sur la gouvernance. Ça reflète généralement une situation temporaire où le nouveau PDG apprend à gérer, avec l’entrepreneur fondateur. »
Et c’est bien d’avoir un président du conseil qui se mêle d’administration ?
Un peu de contexte ici. Depuis plus d’une décennie, au Canada et en Europe, les autorités réglementaires, les experts en gouvernance et les investisseurs institutionnels comme la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec suggèrent fortement de séparer les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration et de président de l’entreprise. Aucune loi n’impose cette division des tâches, cependant.
« On veut éviter les conflits d’intérêts, explique Jacques Grisé, président de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec. Séparer les deux postes est un signe de bonne gouvernance, et on est en train de le reconnaître même aux États-Unis, où ça s’améliore graduellement. »
C’est le conseil d’administration qui embauche le PDG et fixe sa rémunération, rappelle M. Nadeau. « Le président exécutif est un peu coincé entre les deux. Quand il arrive avec une proposition de rémunération qui inclut la sienne, c’est bizarre. Quand il travaille 40 heures par semaine avec le PDG alors qu’il doit pouvoir le confronter au conseil d’administration, ça donne une situation incongrue. » C’est une « simple question de logique », estime-t-il, qu’il n’y ait pas un cumul des pouvoirs au sein d’une entreprise. « Il faut un superviseur et un supervisé, un contrepoids. »
Est-ce que les entreprises qui séparent les fonctions de président du conseil et de PDG s’en portent financièrement mieux ?
« Les études ne sont pas très claires en ce sens, mais on voit que partout dans le monde, on essaie d’implanter cette séparation », répond M. Grisé. Cette question précise fait partie d’un vaste ensemble, la bonne gouvernance, qui comprend bien d’autres exigences, rappelle M. Nadeau. « Dans le cas de Bombardier, ç’aurait été une bonne chose d’avoir un président du conseil indépendant. C’est souhaitable, mais il faut être réaliste : dans une entreprise contrôlée par une famille, c’est demander de l’héroïsme. »
_______________________________________
Karim Benessaieh est reporter économique à La Presse depuis 2000.
Ce texte provenant de La Presse+ est une copie en format web. Consultez-le gratuitement en version interactive dans l’application La Presse+.
Selon le modèle de gouvernance des entreprises privées canadiennes et américaines, le PDG (CEO) relève du conseil d’administration (CA) de l’entreprise. En effet, ce sont les actionnaires qui, lors de l’assemblée générale annuelle (AGA), votent pour des administrateurs dont la responsabilité fiduciaire est de les représenter sur le conseil d’administration de l’entreprise.
Ainsi, lors des AGA des entreprises publiques (cotées en bourse), les actionnaires sont appelés à voter sur une recommandation du CA développée par le comité de gouvernance. Il existe également des règles qui permettent aux actionnaires de faire inscrire des candidats sur la liste présentée par le CA.
Michael Sabia, PDG de la Caisse de dépôt et placement et Robert Tessier, président du conseil d’administration
Le CA a la responsabilité de veiller aux intérêts supérieurs des actionnaires tout en considérant les intérêts des diverses parties prenantes.
Les actionnaires ne votent pas pour un PDG (CEO) ; ils votent pour des représentants en qui ils ont confiance dans la supervision de leurs affaires, notamment dans le choix du premier dirigeant (PDG – CEO).
Il est clair pour tous que c’est le CA qui a la responsabilité d’embaucher le PDG (CEO), de l’orienter, de le rémunérer, de l’évaluer et de mettre en place un processus de relève et de transition.
Personnellement, je ne crois pas approprié que le PDG soit aussi un administrateur au sein du CA, bien qu’il doive y assister à titre de premier dirigeant, mais sans droit de vote.
Cette prise de position implique, a fortiori, que le PDG ne soit pas désigné comme président (Chairman of the Board) du CA.
Bien que notre mode de gouvernance semble exclure le cumul des fonctions de président du conseil et de PDG, il n’existe aucune obligation juridique à le faire.
En fait, on suppose que la séparation des fonctions, entre la présidence du conseil et la présidence de l’entreprise (CEO), est généralement bénéfique à l’exercice de la responsabilité de fiduciaire des administrateurs, c’est-à-dire que des pouvoirs distincts permettent d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts, tout en rassurant les actionnaires.
Cependant, cette pratique cède trop souvent sa place à la volonté bien arrêtée de plusieurs PDG d’exercer le pouvoir absolu, comme c’est encore le cas pour plusieurs entreprises américaines.
Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse a opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions.
Aux États-Unis, en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 dissociaient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Plus de 50 % de ces entreprises combinent les deux fonctions !
L’article d’Yvan Allaire, publié dans le journal Les Affaires du 21 novembre 2016, mentionne « deux arguments invoqués pour appuyer la séparation des rôles » :
1- Le PDG relève du conseil qui doit en évaluer la performance, établir sa rémunération, le remplacer si cette performance est inadéquate, proposer de nouveaux membres pour le conseil ; comment peut-on, comme PDG, présider également le conseil, lequel doit prendre ces décisions critiques pour le PDG ;
Environ 50 % des grandes sociétés américaines sont présidées par un administrateur indépendant, comparativement à 23 % il y a 15 ans.
Toute la question du bien-fondé de la dualité des rôles PDG/Chairman est encore ambiguë, même si les experts de la gouvernance et les actionnaires activistes sont généralement d’accord avec la séparation des fonctions.
2- En notre époque alors que la gouvernance est plus exigeante, plus prenante de temps et d’énergie pour la société ouverte cotée en Bourse, comment une même personne peut-elle s’acquitter de ces deux rôles sans que l’un soit négligé au profit de l’autre ? Dans le nouveau contexte de gouvernance, postérieur à Sarbanes-Oxley, les exigences pour le PCA sont telles qu’il n’est pas souhaitable qu’une même personne assume ces deux fonctions (PCA et PDG).
En conséquence, 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en Bourse se sont donné un président du conseil distinct du PDG, mais dans 38 % des cas ce président du conseil ne se qualifiait pas comme indépendant. (Spencer Stuart, février 2012).
La situation n’est certainement pas limpide, mais la tendance est évidente. L’indépendance du président du conseil ainsi que la séparation du pouvoir entre Chairperson du CA et CEO devrait, selon moi, trouver son application dans tous les types d’organisations : OBNL, sociétés d’État, petites et moyennes entreprises, et coopératives.
Évidemment, chaque organisation a ses particularités, lesquelles sont ancrées dans des pratiques de gouvernance assez diverses. La séparation des rôles n’est pas une panacée; c’est une meilleure assurance d’une saine gouvernance.
Quels sont les bénéfices d’une solide culture organisationnelle ?
C’est précisément la question abordée par William C. Dudley,président et CEO de la Federal Reserve Bank de New York, dans une allocution présentée à la Banking Standards Board de Londres.
Dans sa présentation, il évoque trois éléments fondamentaux pour l’amélioration de la culture organisationnelle des entreprises du secteur financier :
Définir la raison d’être et énoncer des objectifs clairs puisque ceux-ci sont nécessaires à l’évaluation de la performance ;
Mesurer la performance de la firme et la comparer aux autres du même secteur ;
S’assurer que les mesures incitatives mènent à des comportements en lien avec les buts que l’organisation veut atteindre.
Selon M. Dudley, il y a plusieurs avantages à intégrer des pratiques de bonne culture dans la gestion de l’entreprise. Il présente clairement les nombreux bénéfices à retirer lorsque l’organisation a une saine culture.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les principales raisons pour lesquelles il est important de se soucier de cette dimension à long terme. Je n’avais encore jamais vu ces raisons énoncées aussi explicitement dans un texte.
L’article a paru aujourd’hui sur le site de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.
I am convinced that a good or ethical culture that is reflected in your firm’s strategy, decision-making processes, and products is also in your economic best interest, for a number of reasons:
Good culture means fewer incidents of misconduct, which leads to lower internal monitoring costs.
Good culture means that employees speak up so that problems get early attention and tend to stay small. Smaller problems lead to less reputational harm and damage to franchise value. And, habits of speaking up lead to better exchanges of ideas—a hallmark of successful organizations.
Good culture means greater credibility with prosecutors and regulators—and fewer and lower fines.
Good culture helps to attract and retain good talent. This creates a virtuous circle of higher performance and greater innovation, and less pressure to cut ethical corners to generate the returns necessary to stay in business.
Good culture builds a strong organizational story that is a source of pride and that can be passed along through generations of employees. It is also attractive to clients.
Good culture helps to rebuild public trust in finance, which could, in turn, lead to a lower burden imposed by regulation over time. Regulation and compliance are expensive substitutes for good stewardship.
Good culture is, in short, a necessary condition for the long-term success of individual firms. Therefore, members of the industry must be good stewards and should seek to make progress on reforming culture in the near term.
La gouvernance des entreprises a beaucoup évolué au cours des vingt dernières années. Aujourd’hui, les investisseurs institutionnels détiennent 70 % des actions des corporations publiques.
L’auteure indique que l’un des seuls moyens pour les actionnaires investisseurs d’améliorer la performance des entreprises est d’agir sur la gouvernance des entreprises, en exerçant différentes pressions auprès du management et des administrateurs (« direct engagement ») et en faisant connaître leur avis via le vote par procuration.
Un sommaire de l’étude publié par Paula Loop*, directrice du Centre de la gouvernance de PricewaterhouseCoopers, nous donne un bon aperçu des principaux changements observés lors de l’enquête auprès de 886 administrateurs de grandes corporations américaines.
Voici les points saillants de l’étude :
Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark
Boards are taking more action on performance assessments
Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations
Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms
Male and female directors see strategy very differently
Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not
Seeing returns on shareholder engagement
The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity
« Against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington and growing social divisiveness, US public company directors are faced with great expectations from investors and the public. Perhaps now more than ever, public companies are being asked to take the lead in addressing some of society’s most difficult problems. From seeking action on climate change to advancing diversity, stakeholder expectations are increasing and many companies are responding.
In part, this responsiveness is driven by changes in who owns public companies today. Institutional investors now own 70% of US public company stock, much of which is held in index funds. [1] Many of these passive investors believe that seeking improvements in corporate governance is one of the only levers they have to improve company performance. And these shareholders are exerting their influence with management teams and the board through their governance policies, direct engagement and proxy voting.
But boards and shareholders don’t always agree, and the corporate governance environment itself is not immune to divisiveness. In fact, our research shows that directors are clearly out of step with investor priorities in some critical areas.
One of these areas is environmental issues. During the 2017 proxy season, a handful of shareholder proposals on environmental issues, like climate change, gained majority shareholder support. This is the first time we have seen these types of proposals pass, and they did so with the help of some of the largest institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard and Fidelity. For their part, some of the largest US companies declared their continuing commitment to take action fighting climate change, even as the US announced its withdrawal from the Paris climate accord.
About the survey
For over a decade, PwC’s Annual Corporate Directors Survey has gauged the views of public company directors from across the United States on a variety of corporate governance matters. In the summer of 2017, 886 directors participated in our survey. The respondents represent a cross-section of companies from over a dozen industries,
75% of which have annual revenues of more than $1 billion. Eighty-four percent of the respondents were men, and 16% were women. Their board tenure varied, but 60% have served on their board for five or more years.
But despite increased shareholder interest in environmental risk, there appears to be a disconnect when it comes to the views in many boardrooms. A majority of directors tell us that their boards don’t need sustainability expertise. A surprising number also say their company’s strategy isn’t being influenced by climate change or resource scarcity, and that they don’t think environmental concerns will impact their current strategy. Companies and investors may be driving the agenda, but rather than leading the way in this area, many directors are being carried along.
Gender diversity on boards has also become a clear priority for institutional investors in 2017. Shareholders like State Street Global Advisors and BlackRock recently adopted new diversity policies or guidance on board diversity. Indeed, State Street even voted against directors at hundreds of companies that it believed had not made sufficient strides in diversifying their boards. Yet despite the increased focus from institutional investors, fewer of the new board seats in 2016 went to women than in the prior year. [2] And gender parity is still a long way off, with only 25% of boards in the S&P 500 having more than two female directors. [3] Even so, about half of female directors tell us that their board is already sufficiently diverse. Which leads to the question—are female directors sufficiently championing the cause of gender diversity?
Investors are also putting the spotlight on social issues like income inequality and employee retirement security, asking companies to help develop shared economic security. But again, directors tell us that income inequality considerations should not play a part in company strategy.
PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey examines the areas where directors and investors are aligned and moving forward together, as well as the ways in which they are out of sync.
While boards have made real improvements in some areas, there is clearly more work to be done. Among our key observations:
Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark
With greater expectations of boards, directors are upping their game and are seeking to add value. More than ever, directors—particularly those who are less tenured—are also noticing that not all of their fellow directors are doing the same. Almost half of directors (46%) believe that one or more of their fellow board members should be replaced. One-fifth of directors say that two or more directors on their board should be replaced.
Boards are taking more action on performance assessments
Investors have been pushing boards to not just conduct board performance assessments, but to do something with the results. This year, more than twothirds (68%) say that their board has taken some action in response to their last board assessment—an increase of 19 percentage points over last year.
Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations
Directors on boards with non-executive chairs are more than twice as likely to say that their board decided not to re-nominate a director, or provided counsel to a director, as a result of the board’s assessment process.
Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms
While investors are talking about the impact of environmental and social issues on the bottom line, the conversations are not necessarily filtering up to the boardroom. A significant percentage of directors say that income inequality (51%), immigration (49%) and climate change (40%) should not be taken into account—at all—in company strategy.
Male and female directors see strategy very differently
Female directors are more likely to think that social issues should play a part in company strategy formation. And they are much more likely to think that issues like environmental concerns and social instability will force the company to change its strategy in the next three years.
Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not
Directors are confident that incentive plans promote long-term shareholder value. But 70% at least somewhat agree that executives in general are overpaid, and 66% say that executive compensation exacerbates income inequality. Meanwhile, executive pay continues to go up, not down. [4]
Seeing returns on shareholder engagement
In just the past year, directors have come around to a much more positive view of shareholder engagement. They are much more likely now to think that direct engagement impacts proxy voting (77% as compared to 59% in 2016). And the vast majority now say that the right representatives are present (85%) and investors are well prepared for meetings (84%)—12 and 21 percentage point increases over last year, respectively.
The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity
Male and female directors have a significant difference of opinion about the impact of board diversity on company performance. Nearly five out of six female directors (82%) believe that diversity enhances company performance, while only just over half of men agree (54%).
Challenging management is a challenge
Strategy oversight is one of the board’s core responsibilities. Investors want to know that directors are heavily involved in evaluating, challenging and monitoring the company’s strategy, and calling for a change of course when needed. Yet only 60% of directors say their board strongly challenges management assumptions on strategy as part of their oversight role.
As we analyzed the results of this year’s survey, we also looked behind the numbers at how demographic differences such as gender and length of tenure on the board affected directors’ views. Read on for our full analysis of the survey results and areas where those differences were notable. And for the results of every question in the survey, please refer to the Appendix of the complete publication.
1Institutional investors owned an average of 70% of the outstanding shares of US public companies as of June 30, 2017. PwC + Broadridge, ProxyPulse 2017 Proxy Season Review, September 2017. Forty-two percent of all US stock fund assets as of June 30, 2017 were held through index funds. Investment Company Institute.(go back)
2 The percentage of women in new board appointments at Fortune 500 companies declined two percentage points to 27.3% in 2016. Fortune, “The Share of Women Appointed to Fortune 500 Declined Last Year,” June 19, 2017.(go back)
3Spencer Stuart, 2016 Spencer Stuart Board Index, November 2016.(go back)
*Paula Loop is Leader of the Governance Insights Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a publication from the PwC Governance Insights Center.
Voici un article de Karim Benessaieh publié dans la section Actualité expliquée de La Presse+ Affaires le 13 mai 2017.
L’auteur apporte les précisions requises quant aux titres et fonctions du président du conseil de Bombardier, Pierre Beaudoin.
Pierre Beaudoin était président et chef de la direction (CEO ou PDG) de Bombardier depuis 2008. En 2015, il devient le président « exécutif » du conseil d’administration de Bombardier.
Récemment, ce dernier a renoncé à la portion « exécutive » de ses fonctions. Qu’est-ce que cela implique pour le commun des mortels ?
C’est exactement ce à quoi Karim Benessaieh a tenté de répondre dans son article, reproduit ci-dessous, auquel j’ai participé.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Qu’est-ce qu’un président exécutif ? Peut-on être PDG, président du conseil d’administration et chef de la direction en même temps ? Dans la tempête qui ébranle Bombardier depuis six semaines, il est facile de se perdre dans les étiquettes. La Presse a demandé à deux experts en gouvernance d’éclairer notre lanterne.
À quoi a renoncé exactement Pierre Beaudoin en retirant la partie « exécutive » de son mandat ?
À la base, Pierre Beaudoin, fils de Laurent Beaudoin et de Claire Bombardier et donc petit-fils de Joseph-Armand Bombardier, est le président du conseil d’administration de l’entreprise depuis 2015. Son rôle est de « gérer le conseil et [d’]établir l’ordre du jour » pour les 15 membres de cette instance, comme le précise le site de Bombardier, qui ne fait aucune référence à l’aspect « exécutif » de son travail.
Dans l’avis de convocation des actionnaires, cette semaine, on reprend la formule un peu vague selon laquelle M. Beaudoin est en outre chargé de « la définition d’une orientation stratégique et [de] la gestion des relations entretenues avec certaines parties prenantes et avec la clientèle ». Ce sont ces dernières responsabilités qu’il a perdues.
Vous ne nous éclairez pas beaucoup…
Désolé, c’était la réponse officielle. C’est que le « président exécutif » est une bête un peu curieuse souvent associée aux entreprises familiales ou dont le fondateur est encore bien présent. Aux États-Unis, peu de confusion : pour 50 % des entreprises cotées en Bourse, le PDG (ou CEO) est également président du conseil d’administration. Le président du conseil, dans ces cas, est « exécutif » de facto. Au Canada, seulement 14 % des entreprises sont dirigées par un PDG qui est en même temps président du conseil d’administration.
Par contre, dans une sorte de formule mitoyenne, certaines entreprises d’ici ont donné des responsabilités élargies à leur président du conseil en lui ajoutant l’étiquette « exécutif » : il devient dans les faits un deuxième PDG.
Au Québec, CGI, Couche-Tard et Cascades ont donné ce titre à celui qui préside leur conseil d’administration. « C’est une formule hybride, résume Michel Nadeau, directeur général de l’Institut sur la gouvernance. Ça reflète généralement une situation temporaire où le nouveau PDG apprend à gérer, avec l’entrepreneur fondateur. »
Et c’est bien d’avoir un président du conseil qui se mêle d’administration ?
Un peu de contexte ici. Depuis plus d’une décennie, au Canada et en Europe, les autorités réglementaires, les experts en gouvernance et les investisseurs institutionnels comme la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec suggèrent fortement de séparer les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration et de président de l’entreprise. Aucune loi n’impose cette division des tâches, cependant.
« On veut éviter les conflits d’intérêts, explique Jacques Grisé, président de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec. Séparer les deux postes est un signe de bonne gouvernance, et on est en train de le reconnaître même aux États-Unis, où ça s’améliore graduellement. »
C’est le conseil d’administration qui embauche le PDG et fixe sa rémunération, rappelle M. Nadeau. « Le président exécutif est un peu coincé entre les deux. Quand il arrive avec une proposition de rémunération qui inclut la sienne, c’est bizarre. Quand il travaille 40 heures par semaine avec le PDG alors qu’il doit pouvoir le confronter au conseil d’administration, ça donne une situation incongrue. » C’est une « simple question de logique », estime-t-il, qu’il n’y ait pas un cumul des pouvoirs au sein d’une entreprise. « Il faut un superviseur et un supervisé, un contrepoids. »
Est-ce que les entreprises qui séparent les fonctions de président du conseil et de PDG s’en portent financièrement mieux ?
« Les études ne sont pas très claires en ce sens, mais on voit que partout dans le monde, on essaie d’implanter cette séparation », répond M. Grisé. Cette question précise fait partie d’un vaste ensemble, la bonne gouvernance, qui comprend bien d’autres exigences, rappelle M. Nadeau. « Dans le cas de Bombardier, ç’aurait été une bonne chose d’avoir un président du conseil indépendant. C’est souhaitable, mais il faut être réaliste : dans une entreprise contrôlée par une famille, c’est demander de l’héroïsme. »
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Karim Benessaieh est reporter économique à La Presse depuis 2000.
Ce texte provenant de La Presse+ est une copie en format web. Consultez-le gratuitement en version interactive dans l’application La Presse+.
Plusieurs experts de la gouvernance des sociétés cotées se demandent ce qu’il adviendra de la législation Dodd-Frank Act, sachant que Donald Trump a promis d’effectuer un démantèlement presque total de cette réglementation qui a été mise en place à la suite de la crise financière de 2007-2008.
L’article de Gregg Gelzinis* du Center for American Progress publié sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, tente de faire la lumière sur une proposition gouvernementale appelée Financial CHOICE Act ou FCA.
L’auteur montre que les raisons invoquées pour modifier la réforme Dodd-Frank Act ne tiennent pas la route. Voici un extrait de la conclusion.
The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving.
Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16]
In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.
L’avenir nous dira ce que nous réservent les « nouvelles » règles de gouvernance prônées par la nouvelle administration américaine.
Évidemment, la réglementation canadienne, toujours très liée à celle de la SEC, devra s’ajuster, sans trop de heurts !
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés des lecteurs.
During his campaign, Donald Trump promised a near-dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, the core piece of financial reform legislation enacted following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. [1] He doubled down on that promise once in office, vowing to both “do a big number” on and give “a very major haircut” to Dodd-Frank. [2] In early February, he took the first step in fulfilling this dangerous promise by signing an executive order directing U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin to conduct a review of Dodd-Frank. [3] Per the executive order, Secretary Mnuchin will present the findings in early June. [4] While the country waits for President Trump’s plan, it is useful to analyze one prominent way Trump and Congress might choose to gut financial reform—through the Financial CHOICE Act, or FCA. [5]
Introduced in the last Congress by U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) and expected to be reintroduced in the coming weeks, the Financial CHOICE Act offers a blueprint for how Trump might view these issues. During the presidential campaign, Rep. Hensarling briefed Trump on his ideas regarding financial deregulation and was reportedly on Trump’s short list for treasury secretary. [6] The FCA would deregulate the financial industry and put the U.S. economy in the same perilous position it was in right before the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The precrisis regime of weak regulation and little oversight created an environment of unchecked financial sector risk and widespread predatory consumer practices, which precipitated the Great Recession and brought the U.S. economy to the brink of collapse. And the argument repeated by President Trump and other advocates of financial deregulatory proposals—that bank lending has been crushed under the weight of financial regulations over the past six years—has been thoroughly debunked by bank lending data. [7]
Before delving into the specifics of the Financial CHOICE Act, it is helpful to put Rep. Hensarling’s deregulatory efforts in context. To justify dismantling financial reform, President Trump and his congressional allies know that they must outline a problem. President Trump argues that the main problem with financial reform is bank lending. He believes that banks are not making enough loans due to the burdens of Dodd-Frank. What is his evidence? Nothing more than anecdotal remarks that his friends cannot get loans. [8] As Figure 1 demonstrates, a lack of loans is simply not the case. Overall lending and business lending in particular, has increased significantly since the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank. Moreover, credit card lending, auto lending, and mortgage lending have increased since 2010, when Dodd-Frank was passed. [9] Bank profits are also higher than ever. [10]
Chairman Hensarling makes similar arguments about the perceived unavailability of credit, adding that financial reform has not encouraged economic growth and has hurt community banks. [11] Again, the data contradict these charges. Figure 2 highlights the steady economic growth the country experienced under President Barack Obama. And while the scars of the devastating Great Recession remain, the financial reforms put in place to prevent the recurrence of exactly that kind of economic catastrophe have not damaged growth. Indeed, since the end of the financial crisis and the passage of Dodd-Frank, community bank lending and profitability are both up. [12] It is fair to say that the number of community banks has declined over time. This trend, however, started in the 1980s and is caused by economies of scale, technology, and long-running trends toward banking deregulation, as well as other factors—not the 2010 passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. [13]
Hensarling presents his approach as a moderate adjustment to Dodd-Frank, but in reality it is a thorough demolition of financial reform. The complete publication (available here) analyzes how Hensarling’s approach erodes the financial stability safeguards that the real economy needs to thrive, from mitigation of systemic risk to financial sector accountability and consumer protection. It also explains how the bill further concentrates—and makes even more unaccountable—economic power in the hands of those that will serve their own interests at the expense of the real economy. Finally, the report details how the FCA eliminates the consumer and investor protections that guard against the predatory financial practices that wreaked havoc on consumers and investors prior to the financial crisis.
It is necessary to note that just about every provision in the report could fit under the rubric of financial stability safeguards. For example, consumer financial protection protects ordinary consumers from abuses and the broader financial system from the proliferation of dangerous consumer loans that can bring down entire firms and markets. Similarly, the Volcker Rule is a key bulwark against the high-risk bets that brought down major firms in 2008, and yet it also aims to reorient large bank trading toward real economy-serving purposes. The report discusses certain provisions under one section rather than another should not be taken as a substantive comment on the merit or usefulness of the provision to financial stability. The report’s different sections reflect an effort to highlight how the Dodd-Frank Act and financial reform yield a broad array of public benefits. Similarthe report highlights examples of broader themes in the FCA rather than focusing on minute details: Failure to discuss any particular provision should not be read as a substantive judgment regarding its relative merits.
The report is based on the version of the Financial CHOICE Act released in September 2016, as well as a memo outlining this year’s planned changes to that version. [14] A new version, which may have some further modifications, is expected to be released in the coming weeks.
Financial reform enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act has made a lot of necessary progress since the crisis. U.S. banks have more substantial loss-absorbing capital cushions, increasingly rely on stable sources of funding, undergo rigorous stress testing, and plan for their orderly failure. President Trump’s intent to dismantle these reforms only helps Wall Street’s bottom line—ignoring the memory of every family who lost their home, every worker who lost his or her job, and every consumer who was peddled a toxic financial product. [15]
The question remains: What is the problem President Trump and his allies in Congress are trying to solve? Lending is up. Bank profits are up. Consumer credit costs are down. The economy is steadily improving. Yes, much more needs to be done to make the economy work for hard-working Americans, but financial deregulation is not the path to that end. [16] In fact, it is a path toward exactly the opposite: booms and busts that leave taxpayers holding the bag for Wall Street’s excesses, greater concentration of economic power and less accountability for wrongdoing that harms ordinary consumers and investors, and major changes to financial regulation and monetary policy that would damage the real economy. Now that is a problem.
The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.
15Wall Street is not monolithic, and firms may have differing views on the provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act, but on the whole, this agenda is clearly aligned with the interests of financial institutions and not the American public.
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*Gregg Gelzinis is a Special Assistant for the Economic Policy team at the Center for American Progress. This post is based on a Center for American Progress publication by Mr. Gelzinis, Ethan Gurwitz, Sarah Edelman, and Joe Valenti. Additional posts addressing legal and financial implications of the Trump administration are available here.
Dans son édition d’avril 2016, le magazine Financier Worldwide présente une excellente analyse de la dynamique d’un conseil d’administration efficace. Pour l’auteur, il est important que le président du conseil soit habileté à exercer un niveau de saine tension entre les administrateurs et la direction de l’entreprise.
Il n’y a pas de place pour la complaisance au conseil. Les membres doivent comprendre que leur rôle est de veiller aux « intérêts supérieurs » de l’entreprise, notamment des propriétaires-actionnaires, mais aussi d’autres parties prenantes.
Le PDG de l’entreprise est recruté par le CA pour faire croître l’entreprise et exécuter une stratégie liée à son modèle d’affaires. Lui aussi doit travailler en fonction des intérêts des actionnaires… mais c’est la responsabilité fiduciaire du CA de s’en assurer en mettant en place les mécanismes de surveillance appropriés.
La théorie de l’agence stipule que le CA représente l’autorité souveraine de l’entreprise (puisqu’il possède la légitimité que lui confèrent les actionnaires). Le CA confie à un PDG (et à son équipe de gestion) le soin de réaliser les objectifs stratégiques retenus. Les deux parties — le Board et le Management — doivent bien comprendre leurs rôles respectifs, et trouver les bons moyens pour gérer la tension inhérente à l’exercice de la gouvernance et de la gestion.
Les administrateurs doivent s’efforcer d’apporter une valeur ajoutée à la gestion en conseillant la direction sur les meilleures orientations à adopter, et en instaurant un climat d’ouverture, de soutien et de transparence propice à la réalisation de performances élevées.
Il est important de noter que les actionnaires s’attendent à la loyauté des administrateurs ainsi qu’à leur indépendance d’esprit face à la direction. Les administrateurs sont élus par les actionnaires et sont donc imputables envers eux. C’est la raison pour laquelle le conseil d’administration doit absolument mettre en place un processus d’évaluation de ces membres et divulguer sa méthodologie.
En fait, on suppose que la séparation des fonctions, entre la présidence du conseil et la présidence de l’entreprise (CEO), est généralement bénéfique à l’exercice de la responsabilité de fiduciaire des administrateurs, c’est-à-dire que des pouvoirs distincts permettent d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts, tout en rassurant les actionnaires.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) offre une formation spécialisée de deux jours sur le leadership à la présidence.
Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence | 4 et 5 mai 2017, à Montréal | 7 et 8 novembre 2017, à Québec
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article du Financier Worldwide qui illustre assez clairement les tensions existantes entre le CA et la direction, ainsi que les moyens proposés pour assurer la collaboration entre les deux parties.
In this age of heightened risk, the need for effective governance has caused a dynamic shift in the role of the board of directors. Cyber security, rapid technological growth and a number of corporate scandals resulting from the financial crisis of 2008, all underscore the necessity of boards working constructively with management to ensure efficient oversight, rather than simply providing strategic direction. This is, perhaps, no more critical than in the middle market, where many companies often don’t have the resources larger organisations have to attract board members, but yet their size requires more structure and governance than smaller companies might need.
Following the best practices of high-performing boards can help lead to healthy tension between management and directors for improved results and better risk management. We all know conflict in the boardroom might sometimes be unavoidable, as the interests of directors and management don’t necessarily always align. Add various personalities and management styles to the mix, and discussions can sometimes get heated. It’s important to deal with situations when they occur in order to constructively manage potential differences of opinion to create a healthy tension that makes the entire organisation stronger.
Various conflict management styles can be employed to ensure that any potential boardroom tension within your organisation is healthy. If an issue seems minor to one person but vital to the rest of the group, accommodation can be an effective way to handle tension. If minor issues arise, it might be best to simply avoid those issues, whereas collaboration should be used with important matters. Arguably, this is the best solution for most situations and it allows the board to effectively address varying opinions. If consensus can’t be reached, however, it might become necessary for the chairman or the lead director to use authoritarian style to manage tension and make decisions. Compromise might be the best approach when the board is pressed for time and needs to take immediate action.
The board chairperson can be integral to the resolution process, helping monitor and manage boardroom conflict. With this in mind, boards should elect chairs with the proven ability to manage all personality types. The chairperson might also be the one to initiate difficult conversations on topics requiring deeper scrutiny. That said, the chairperson cannot be the only enforcer; directors need to assist in conflict resolution to maintain a proper level of trust throughout the group. And the CEO should be proactive in raising difficult issues as well, and boards are typically most effective when the CEO is confident, takes the initiative in learning board best practices and works collaboratively.
Gone are the days of the charismatic, autocratic CEO. Many organisations have separated the role of CEO and chairperson, and have introduced vice chairs and lead directors to achieve a better balance of power. Another way to ensure a proper distribution of authority is for the board to pay attention to any red flags that might be raised by the CEO’s behaviour. For example, if a CEO feels they have all the answers, doesn’t respect the oversight of the board, or attempts to manage or marginalise the board, the chairperson and board members will likely need to be assertive, rather than simply following the CEO’s lead. Initially this might seem counterintuitive, however, in the long-run, this approach will likely create a healthier tension than if they simply ‘followed the leader’.
Everyone in the boardroom needs to understand their basic functions for an effective relationship -executives should manage, while the board oversees. In overseeing, the board’s major responsibilities include approving strategic plans and goals, selecting a CEO, determining a mission or purpose, identifying key risks, and providing oversight of the compliance of corporate policies and regulations. Clearly understanding the line between operations and strategy is also important.
Organisations with the highest performing boards are clear on the appropriate level of engagement for the companies they represent – and that varies from one organisation to the next. Determining how involved the board will be and what type of model the board will follow is key to effective governance and a good relationship with management. For example, an entity that is struggling financially might require a more engaged board to help put it back on track.
Many elements, such as tension, trust, diversity of thought, gender, culture and expertise can impact the delicate relationship between the board and management. Good communication is vital to healthy tension. Following best practices for interaction before, during and after board meetings can enhance conflict resolution and board success.
Before each board meeting, management should prepare themselves and board members by distributing materials and the board package in a timely manner. These materials should be reviewed by each member, with errors or concerns forwarded to the appropriate member of management, and areas of discussion highlighted for the chair. An agenda focused on strategic issues and prioritised by importance of matters can also increase productivity.
During the meeting, board members should treat one another with courtesy and respect, holding questions held until after presentations (or as the presenter directs). Board-level matters should be discussed and debated if necessary, and a consensus reached. Time spent on less strategic or pressing topics should be limited to ensure effective meetings. If appropriate, non-board-level matters might be handed to management for follow-up.
Open communication should also continue after board meetings. Sometimes topics discussed during board meetings take time to digest. When this happens, board members should connect with appropriate management team members to further discuss or clarify. There are also various board committee meetings that need to occur between board meetings. Board committees should be doing the ‘heavy lifting’ for the full board, making the larger group more efficient and effective. Other more informal interactions can further strengthen the relationship between directors and management.
Throughout the year, the board’s engagement with management can be broadened to include discussions with more key players. Gaining multiple perspectives by interacting with other areas of the organisation, such as general counsels, external and internal auditors, public relations and human resources, can help the board identify and address key risks. By participating in internal and external company events, board members get to know management and the company’s customers on a first-hand basis.
Of course, a strategy is necessary for the board as well, as regulatory requirements have increased, leading to greater pressure for high-quality performance. Effective boards maintain a plan for development and succession. They also implement CEO and board evaluation processes to ensure goals are being met and board members are performing optimally. In addition to the evaluation process, however, board members must hold themselves totally accountable for instilling trust in the boardroom.
Competition in today’s increasingly global and complex business environment is fierce, and calls for new approaches for success. Today’s boards need to build on established best practices and create good relationships with management to outperform competitors. The highest performing boards are clear on their functions, and understand the level of engagement appropriate for the companies they support. They are accountable and set the right tone, while being able to discern true goals and aspirations from trendiness. They are capable of understanding and dealing with the ‘big issues’ and are strategic in their planning and implementation of approaches that work for the companies they serve. With the ever-changing risk universe, the ability to work with the right amount of healthy tension is essential to effective governance.
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Hussain T. Hasan is on the Consulting Leadership team as well as a board member at RSM US LLP.