Les actionnaires doivent-ils être consultés sur les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants ?


Ce billet est paru dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation le 9 avril 2013. Il a été publié par Marinilka Kimbro du Department of Accounting à Seattle University et Danielle Xu du Department of Finance à Gonzaga University. Quel est votre point de vue concernant ce sujet ? Les actionnaires doivent-ils être consultés sur les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants ?

Should Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation?

In our paper, Should Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation? Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States, which was recently made publicly

The New York Stock Exchange, the world's large...
The New York Stock Exchange, the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

available on SSRN, we examine the SEC 2011 regulation requiring an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote on the compensation of the top five highest paid executives – “say-on-pay” (SOP). In July of 2010, Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) was signed into law requiring all public companies to give their shareholders the opportunity to cast a “non-binding” advisory vote to approve or disapprove the compensation of the 5 highest paid executives at least once every 3-years.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented “say-on-pay” (SOP) in January of 2011, and since then, shareholders in the US have “had their say” on executive compensation packages for two years: 2011 and 2012. To date, the SOP shareholders’ votes overwhelmingly approved the executive compensation proposals by a majority of votes (>than 50 percent) giving broad support to management pay packages (Cotter et al., 2012). Only 1.2 percent of the Russell 3000 failed the SOP proposal in 2011 and 2.5 percent failed in 2012 obtaining less than 50 percent approval. However, around 10 percent of firms received more than 30 percent opposition or “rejection” votes.

« Say on Pay » à date | Avril 2013


Ci-dessous un rapport paru dans HLS Forum et publié par Jeremy L. Goldstein de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & KatzWith sur les résultats des recommandations de ISS pour le premier trimestre 2013.

Results. According to Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) 2013 Say on Pay Snapshot released April 8, 2013, ISS has recommended against 10 percent of issuers so far this proxy season. While ISS’s study represents a relatively small sample size (473 companies), a “no” recommendation from ISS against 10 percent of companies represents a decrease in “no” recommendations of over 20 percent from last year (12.2 percent).

NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Comp...
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)

Reasons for Failure. The single largest reason that companies have received “no” recommendations from ISS continues to be a so-called pay-for-performance disconnect. In addition, ISS has recommended against an increased number of companies on the basis of a so-called lack of compensation committee communications and effectiveness. A lack of effectiveness often arises where ISS has determined that the company has not provided disclosure about actions it has taken in light of a low say on pay vote for the previous year.

Veuillez lire l’article pour d’autres informations :

Say on Pay So Far – April 2013

L’effet de l’ancienneté – comme PCD ou comme membre de C.A. – sur la performance !


Que penser de cette recherche publiée dans The Magazine de HBR par Xueming Luo, Vamsi K. Kanuri et Michelle Andrews ? Les résultats de cette recherche vous font-ils réfléchir sur les implications (positives ou négatives) liées au grand nombre d’années passées en tant que premier dirigeant (PCD-CEO), ou sur le nombre de mandats maximum des membres de conseils d’administration ? Comme vous le savez, on voit de plus en plus apparaître des politiques concernant le nombre de mandats que les membres de conseils devraient obtenir… Quel est votre point de vue à cet égard ?

The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.

Long CEO Tenure Can Hurt Performance

It’s a familiar cycle: A CEO takes office, begins gaining knowledge and experience, and is soon launching initiatives that boost the bottom line. Fast-forward a decade, and the same executive is risk-averse and slow to adapt to change—and the company’s performance is on the decline. The pattern is so common that many refer to the “seasons” of a CEO’s tenure, analogous to the seasons of the year.

Tenure
Tenure (Photo credit: Toban B.)

New research examines the causes of this cycle and shows that it’s more nuanced than that. We found that CEO tenure affects performance through its impact on two groups of stakeholders—employees and customers—and has different effects on each. The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.

We studied 356 U.S. companies from 2000 to 2010. We measured CEO tenure and calculated the strength of the firm-employee relationship each year (by assessing such things as retirement benefits and layoffs) and the strength of the firm-customer relationship (by assessing such things as product quality and safety). We then measured the magnitude and volatility of stock returns. All this allowed us to arrive at an optimal tenure length: 4.8 years.

The underlying reasons for the pattern, we believe, have to do with how CEOs learn. Previous research has shown that different learning styles prevail at different stages of the CEO life cycle. Early on, when new executives are getting up to speed, they seek information in diverse ways, turning to both external and internal company sources. This deepens their relationships with customers and employees alike.

But as CEOs accumulate knowledge and become entrenched, they rely more on their internal networks for information, growing less attuned to market conditions. And, because they have more invested in the firm, they favor avoiding losses over pursuing gains. Their attachment to the status quo makes them less responsive to vacillating consumer preferences.

« These findings have several implications for organizations. Boards should be watchful for changes in the firm-customer relationship. They should be aware that long-tenured CEOs may be skilled at employee relations but less adept at responding to the marketplace; these leaders may be great motivators but weak strategists, unifying workers around a failing course of action, for example. Finally, boards should structure incentive plans to draw heavily on consumer and market metrics in the late stages of their top executives’ terms. This will motivate CEOs to maintain strong customer relationships and to continue gathering vital market information firsthand ».

Que pensent vraiment les PCD de leur C.A. ?


Que pensent vraiment les PCD de leur C.A. ?  Les auteurs Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, Melanie Kusin* et  Elise Walton* ont procédé à des entrevues en profondeur avec une douzaine de PCD (CEO) expérimentés et ils ont publiés la synthèse de leurs résultats dans Harvard Business Review (HBR). Essentiellement, les chercheurs voulaient savoir comment les C.A. peuvent avoir une influence positive et devenir un atout stratégique. Ils ont résumé leur enquête en faisant ressortir 5 conseils à l’intention des conseils d’administration. Voici un extrait de cet article très intéressant. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !

What CEOs Really Think of Their Boards

Over the past several years, in the wake of corporate missteps that have taken a toll on shareholders and communities alike, we’ve heard plenty about how boards of directors should have been more responsible stewards. Corporate watchdogs, investors and analysts, members of the media, regulators, and pundits have proposed guidelines and new practices. But one voice has been notably missing from this chorus—and it belongs to the constituency that knows boards and their failings best. It’s the voice of the CEO.

Harkness Tower, situated in the Memorial Quadr...
Harkness Tower, situated in the Memorial Quadrangle at Yale (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

There are reasons for this silence from the chief executive camp. Few CEOs volunteer their views publicly; they know they’d risk looking presumptuous and becoming a target. They realize it would be foolhardy to draw attention to their own governance dysfunctions or seem to reveal boardroom confidences. Meanwhile, people who do make it their business to speak out on governance haven’t made much effort to elicit CEOs’ views. Extreme cases of CEO misconduct have created skepticism about whether CEOs can help fix faulty governance—a dangerous overreaction. Many observers, having seen grandiose, greedy, and corrupt CEOs protected by inattentive or complicit directors, consider excessive CEO influence on boards to be part of the problem. Others may lack the access to CEOs and the level of trust needed for frank conversations. Whatever the reasons, the omission is unfortunate. Not only do CEOs have enormous experience to draw on, but their views are the ones boards are most likely to heed.

We recently tapped our networks to bring CEOs’ opinions to light. We talked to dozens of well-regarded veteran chief executives, focusing on people with no particular reason to resent boards—we didn’t want bitterness or self-justification to color the findings. We wanted to know: What keeps a board from being as effective as it could be? Is it really the cartoon millstone around the CEO’s neck, or does it have a positive influence on the enterprise? What can a board do to become a true strategic asset?

We were surprised by the candor of the responses—even given our comfortable relationships with the CEOs and our assurances that quotes would not be attributed without express permission. Clearly, CEOs believe it is important to address problems and opportunities they’re uniquely positioned to observe. They know that their strategic visions and personal legacies can be undone by bad governance, and they have plenty to say on the subject. We’ve distilled their comments into five overarching pieces of advice for boards.

      1. Don’t Shun Risk or See It in Personal Terms
      2. Do the Homework, and Stay Consistently Plugged In
      3. Bring Character and Credentials, Not Celebrity, to the Table
      4. Constructively Challenge Strategy
      5. Make Succession Transitions Less Awkward, Not More So

« Every board is different. If you serve on one, some of these comments may strike close to home; others may not. As we listened to CEOs and reviewed our transcripts looking for patterns, we identified three important takeaways.

First, contrary to what some critics believe, CEOs do not want to keep their boards in the dark or to chip away at directors’ power. They recognize that they and their shareholders will get more value if the partnership at the top is strong. Great CEOs know that if governance isn’t working, it’s everyone’s job to figure out why and to fix it.

Second, most boards aren’t working as well as they should—and it’s not clear that any of the systemic reforms that have been proposed will remedy matters. Although governed by bylaws and legal responsibilities, interactions between CEOs and directors are still personal, and improving them often requires the sorts of honest, direct, and sometimes awkward conversations that serve to ease tensions in any personal relationship. When strong relationships are in place, it becomes easier for CEOs to speak candidly about problems—for example, if the board isn’t adding enough value to decision making, or if individual directors are unconstructive or overly skeptical. For their part, directors should be clear about what they want—whether it’s less protocol and fewer dog and pony shows or more transparency, communication, and receptivity to constructive criticism.

Third, the best leadership partnerships are forged where there is mutual respect, energetic commitment to the future success of the enterprise, and strong bonds of trust. A great board does not adopt an adversarial, “show me” posture toward management and its plans. Nor does it see its power as consisting mainly of checks and balances on the CEO’s agenda. Great boards support smart entrepreneurial risk taking with prudent oversight, wise counsel, and encouragement ».

____________________________________

Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, is the senior associate dean for executive programs and the Lester Crown Professor at Yale University’s School of Management, is the founding CEO of Yale’s Chief Executive Leadership Institute. Melanie Kusin* is the vice chairman of Korn/Ferry International’s CEO practice. Elise Walton*, is a former Yale–Korn/Ferry senior research fellow, consults on corporate governance and executive leadership.

CEO & Board of Directors: Forging An Effective Relationship (rickdacri.wordpress.com)

Boards should be concerned about their CEOs (normanmarks.wordpress.com)

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Top 10 des billets les plus lus sur mon blogue | 1er trimestre 2013


Voici un résumé introductif aux 10 billets les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au cours du premier trimestre de 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.

On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur les principaux sujets d’actualité suivants : la recherche de postes au sein des conseils, la gestion de crises, l’apport des femmes sur des C.A., la gouvernance des OBNL, les fondements de la gouvernance, la valeur de l’intégrité, les dysfonctions d’un C.A., la professionnalisation des administrateurs et la gouvernance dans une perspective de long terme.

P1030086

En terme géographique, près du tiers des visiteurs sont français (de France ou de dixaines de pays francophones) et 62 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site pricipalement via LinkedIn (57 %) ou via les engins de recherche (35 %). Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !

1 . Guide pour la recherche d’un poste sur un C.A.

Plusieurs personnes souhaitent occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration mais ne savent pas comment procéder pour y arriver. Depuis que je suis impliqué dans la formation des administrateurs de sociétés et dans la publication de ce blogue en gouvernance, c’est la question qui m’est le plus souvent posée. J’ai déjà abordé ce sujet au cours de mes billets antérieurs. Aujourd’hui, je veux porter à votre attention deux articles récents qui sont très concrets à ce propos.

Le premier article proposé a été publié le 9 janvier 2013 dans Business Insider; il traite de questions que toutes les personnes intéressées à siéger sur un C.A. se posent :

  1. Quelles raisons m’inciteraient à siéger à un conseil d’administration ?
  2. Quelles actions dois-je poser pour obtenir un poste ?
  3. Dois-je viser un poste rémunéré ou un poste sur un conseil d’OBNL ?

Le deuxième article proposé a été publié le 10 janvier 2013 sur le site de 2020 Women on Boards. Il aborde les étapes concrètes à accomplir afin de se dénicher un poste sur un C.A. Vous trouverez, ci-après, le lien vers l’article ainsi qu’une liste des gestes à poser. Veuiller lire l’article au complet pour mieux comprendre la portée de ces actions.

2. Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

Nous avons demandé à Richard Thibault*, président de RTCOMM, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité. Son billet présente sept leçons tirées de son expérience comme consultant en gestion de crise. En tant que membres de conseils d’administration, vous aurez certainement l’occasion de vivre des crises significatives et il est important de connaître les règles que la direction doit observer en pareilles circonstances.

3. Les femmes prendraient de meilleures décisions que les hommes

Selon une nouvelle recherche, publiée récemment et rapportée dans La Presse.ca sous la plume de Linda Nguyen, les femmes prendraient de meilleures décisions que les hommes. En effet, selon Chris Bart, co-auteur de l’étude et directeur des programmes du Directors College de McMaster, cette recherche ”prouvait que lorsque des femmes dirigeaient une entreprise, elles contribuaient au succès de celle-ci. Il a, du même coup, soulevé la question de savoir pourquoi les femmes étaient encore minoritaires dans les salles de direction des entreprises canadiennes”.

4. Gestion de crise : Sept conseils pour éviter les surprises

Nous avons demandé à Louis Aucoin*, associé principal chez OCTANE STRATEGIES | COMMUNICATIONS, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité. Son billet, publié sur le blogue de l’entreprise, expose sept conseils utiles aux gestionnaires et aux membres de C.A. pour éviter d’être confrontés à de mauvaises surprises dans une situation de crise. Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteur.

5. Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses

Voici le billet qui a attiré l’attention du plus grand nombre de lecteurs sur mon blogue depuis le début. Celui-ci a été publié le 30 octobre 2011. Je l’ai mis à jour afin que les nombreuses personnes intéressés par la gouvernance des OBNL puissent être mieux informées. L’Institut canadien des comptables agréés (ICCA) a produit des documents pratiques, pertinents, synthétiques et accessibles sur presque toutes les questions de gouvernance. Il est également important de noter que l’ICCA accorde une attention toute particulière aux pratiques de gouvernance des organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL = OBNL).

Ainsi, l’ICCA met à la disposition de ces organisations la collection 20 Questions pour les OSBL qui comprend des questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL=OBNL) devraient se poser concernant des enjeux importants pour la gouvernance de ce type d’organismes. Ces documents sont révisés régulièrement afin qu’ils demeurent actuels et pertinents. Si vous avez des questions dans le domaine de la gouvernance des OBNL, vous y trouverez certainement des réponses satisfaisantes.

6. Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | Version française

Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists. Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet de plus et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales.

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales. On apprend aux journalistes économiques – et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance – à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

7. Les “gardiens” de l’intégrité et de la bonne gouvernance

C’est l’âge d’or des CFE (Certified Fraud examiners), des auditeurs internes, des juricomptables, des investigateurs privés et publics, des experts en informatique et des spécialistes en fraude. Comme je l’ai souligné il y a quelques semaines, ces professions sont en forte progression depuis que de nombreux scandales ont fait les manchettes et que diverses règlementations ont été édictées.

L’article ci-dessous, paru le 5 janvier 2013 dans The Economist, brosse un portrait assez concluant de l’évolution de ces pratiques d’investigation menées par les “gardiens de l’intégrité et de la bonne gouvernance“. On y fait mention de la croissance spectaculaire de la firme Kroll, l’une des leaders dans le domaine des investigations de nature corporative. The Economist explique pourquoi ces entreprises prospèrent dans le nouvel environnement de la règlementation en gouvernance : America’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, loi Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), règlementation favorisant le “whistleblowing”, etc.

8. À propos des administrateurs dysfonctionnels !

Avez-vous déjà siégé sur des conseils d’administration avec des membres qui ne s’engagent pas vraiment et qui ne contribuent en rien à la valeur du groupe ? Si oui, vous n’êtes pas les seuls ! Cependant, en tant que membres de C.A., je crois que vous devez vous inquiéter si vous constatez certains comportements déficients tels ceux identifiés dans le billet de Jack and Suzy Welch, publié dans Bloomberg | BusinessWeek. Ces administrateurs sont souvent élus, années après années !Réfléchissons un peu; que pouvons-nous faire ?

L’article des Welch vous permettra d’identifier les cas problèmes afin de mieux évaluer la situation. Les auteurs nous rappellent que les C.A sont responsables de gérer leur efficacité ! “But imagine how much better it would be if nominating committees, usually just focused on vetting potential members, dealt with the hard cases right in front of them. After all, nothing can keep a board on its best behavior but itself”.

Voici quelques comportements dysfonctionnels d’administrateurs tels qu’identifiés par les auteurs :

  1. Ceux qui ne font rien de rien  (The Do-Nothing)
  2. Ceux qui manquent de courage (The White Flag)
  3. Ceux qui agissent à l’extérieur du C.A. en tentant de faire valoir leurs points de vue (The Cabalists)
  4. Ceux qui font du micro-management (The Meddlers)
  5. Ceux qui pontifient (The Pontificators)

9. La professionnalisation des membres de C.A.

Voici un article publié par Robert C. Pozen*, paru HBR et reproduit dans LeadingCompany le 20 février 2013. L’article aborde un sujet d’actualité : le recrutement d’administrateurs professionnels (et indépendants). Pozen propose un modèle de conseil d’administration ayant une taille réduite et s’appuyant sur un engagement beaucoup plus important des membres.

Bien sûr, les recommandations sont valables pour les entreprises publiques cotées, mais elles peuvent aussi s’appliquer à plusieurs autres types d’organisations privées ou publiques de différentes tailles. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous un extrait de cet article. Celui-ci décrit le modèle proposé et présente plusieurs arguments qui militent en faveur d’un net changement dans la composition des C.A., répondant par la même occasion à certaines objections souvent évoquées.

10. La gouvernance et le management dans une perspective de long terme

Voici un excellent article, paru dans The Economist, qui présente un plaidoyer convaincant en faveur de l’adoption d’une perspective à long terme dans la conduite des entreprises. L’auteur montre que la théorie de la maximisation du rendement des actionnaires (souvent à court terme) passe par l’implantation de stratégies alignées sur l’accroissement de la valeur des sociétés à long terme. Il donne plusieurs exemples d’entreprises qui ont optées, avec succès, pour une vision et un management à long terme, seule approche susceptible d’assurer la pérennité des entreprises.

Le conseil d’administration qui doit avoir une orientation claire à cet égard. Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce court extrait et à lire l’article au complet si cette perspective vous allume. Qu’en pensez-vous ? Peut-on, comme Peter Drucker,  concevoir une théorie du management qui prône une vue à long terme, tout en assurant  la satisfaction des actionnaires … et des autres parties prenantes ?

Questionnement sur le comportement des fonds activistes !


Solide prise de position sur le comportement des fonds activistes (« hedge funds ») rédigée par Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, et publiée dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. L’auteur montre comment les fonds activistes peuvent souvent agir en fonction d’intérêts contraires aux actionnaires.

L’auteur soulève une multitude de questions qui doivent trouver des réponses adéquates. Je vous invite à lire ce court article afin de vous sensibiliser à l’ampleur du travail à faire dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

« In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value…. It requires new thinking to address the new threat. Among the questions that must be addressed are :

1. Purpose of the American Business Corporation. Is the fundamental purpose of the American business corporation, and the proper goal of sound corporate governance, optimal long-term value creation? Or is the purpose to maximize short-term stockholder value at any time any particular stockholder—with its own goals and agenda, which are unlikely to be congruent with the interests of other stockholders—happens to demand it?

Hedge Fund Managers - Lynching Party Needed
Hedge Fund Managers – Lynching Party Needed (Photo credit: smallislander)

2. How Are “Excess” Returns Actually Obtained? Activist hedge funds are reportedly outperforming many other asset classes as their raids seem to “unlock” value through pressured transactions. Is this value actually created, or merely appropriated from fellow stockholders with longer-term investment horizons, and from other stakeholders such as employees, including by sacrificing capital spending and investment in long-term research and development?

3. Are There Really Best Practices? Is there sufficient (or any genuine) evidence that “best practices” corporate governance of the type promoted by the academics and advisory services results in enhanced long-term performance of the corporation — especially given the fact that American corporations have historically enjoyed the best long-run performance in the world? Is “best practices” corporate governance a major factor in short-termism?

4. Structural Conflict. Is there a structural conflict in a system in which stockholders exercising power over a corporation owe no legal duty to anyone and are an ever-changing group that is free to enter a stock in size without advance disclosure and exit at any time of their choosing, act in concert, or even mask their interests using derivatives and engage in empty voting? And in which the decision-makers at these stockholder bodies are themselves agents, compensated, in many cases, on the basis of the short-term performance of the investment portfolios they supervise on behalf of savers and investors?

5. The “Principal/Agent” Premise. Is the essential premise of the stockholder-centric proponents – the principal-owner/agent view of the corporate firm – accurate or reasonable, given that the legal system gives legal immunity to the “owners” (stockholders) and imposes fiduciary duties and liabilities on the “agents” (directors)?

6. The Missing Principal. Is the principal/agent structure of institutional investors imposing an unacceptable cost on corporations when the underlying beneficial holders of the managed portfolios– retirees, long-term investors and savers – play little if any role in checking the power of those running the investment intermediaries? Regulation, litigation, and public scrutiny perform powerful roles in addressing agency costs that may exist at the corporate board and management level. But given the massive intermediated ownership of public corporations today by a variety of different types of institutional investors with varied compensation and governance arrangements of their own, do we fully understand the agency costs of these investment intermediaries, who is bearing those costs and whether they are being sufficiently monitored and mitigated? And why has the academy not fixed its gaze on these powerful actors, including advisors such as ISS and Glass Lewis?

7. Trust the Directors. Is the assumption by academics that directors on corporate boards cannot be trusted based on any actual evidence, on observed anecdotal information, or just the skepticism of a group that has never (or rarely) been in the boardroom or been charged with overseeing a for-profit enterprise? And does the constant assumption and allegation of untrustworthiness in fact create both a disincentive to serve and a disinclination to act, all to the detriment of the corporate enterprise and its beneficiaries?

8. Directors’ and CEOs’ Time. Is it desirable that directors and CEOs spend a third of their time on governance? Has the governance-rather-than-performance-centric debate resulted in a new breed of lawyer-type-CEOs and box-checking “monitoring” boards rather than sophisticated and experienced “advising” boards?  

9. Escaping Governance. What part of the private equity activity wave is fairly attributable to increased costs imposed by corporate governance in the public markets that makes management for long-term value appreciation difficult or impossible in those public markets? Is that good or bad?

10. Why Do Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs NOT Choose the Academics’ Governance Model? Why do highly successful technology corporations go public with capital structures that preserve management control? To avoid the pressure for short-term performance? To avoid shareholder pressure on management? Do these companies underperform or are they our most innovative companies?

11. Economic and Business Theory. Is there any evidence that the ideas and suggestions of short-term money managers, who oversee diverse portfolios, promote long-term (or even medium-term) value creation? What happens to investment, strategic thinking and risk management in a world in which the ideas have time horizons measured in months or quarters? How do the advocates of stockholder-centric governance take account of the fact that stockholders do not have information and expertise about the corporation on a par with its directors and officers? Similarly are long-term stockholder interests and wealth creation served by intermediaries in the proxy advisory services, operating without regulation or fiduciary duty, either to the corporation or its stockholders or to investors and beneficiaries? And what to make of the elephant-in-the-room fact that activist hedge funds don’t have to eat what they cook?

12. Political Theory. At bottom, doesn’t the stockholder-centric theory hark back to the crudest 19th century aspects of laissez-faire capitalism—pressing for the legal system to recognize a single social good (maximizing rentiers’ portfolio returns) while ignoring or slighting the interests of employees, communities and societal welfare? Is stockholder-centric governance as currently promoted and practiced by the academic and governance communities, and the short-termism it imposes, responsible for a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements without a significant increase in taxes ? »

Optimal Corporate Governance in the Presence of an Activist Investor (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

La gouvernance, c’est la gouvernance !


La gouvernance, c’est la gouvernance !

Évidemment, c’est une règle générale… et mon billet d’hier présentait des données (américaines) vraiment fascinantes sur le modèle d’organisation à but non lucratif (OBNL) et sur les nuances qu’il est nécessaire d’y apporter.

Ce billet semble avoir suscité beaucoup d’intérêt auprès de mes lecteurs. Alors, pour ceux qui veulent en savoir plus sur la gestion et la gouvernance des OBNL, je vous propose la lecture de la section OBNL du Centre de la gouvernance d’entreprise | Deloitte. Voici une introduction au sujet et un aperçu de la nouvelle loi canadienne sur les organisations à but non lucratif laquelle est entrée en vigueur en octobre 2011.

Organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) | Deloitte

« Fondamentalement, la gouvernance c’est la gouvernance. Il n’existe pas de différence majeure entre l’application d’une saine gouvernance par les sociétés ouvertes et celle par les OBNL. En fait, les pratiques de gouvernance de nombreuses OBNL sont à la hauteur des pratiques exemplaires appliquées par les sociétés ouvertes.

Contrairement aux administrateurs de sociétés ouvertes, les administrateurs d’OBNL ne sont pas rémunérés pour leurs services et peuvent aussi devoir assumer leurs propres dépenses et faire des dons. Les administrateurs bénévoles ne prennent toutefois pas moins à cœur la vision, la mission et les objectifs de leur organisation que les administrateurs rémunérés de sociétés ouvertes. Les administrateurs bénévoles travaillent sans relâche, croient en ce qu’ils font et contribuent dans une large mesure au succès de l’organisation.

English: Logo of the international non profit ...
English: Logo of the international non profit organization PassWorld based in France Français : Logo de l’association française de solidarité internationale PassWorld (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Au moment de nommer des administrateurs au conseil, il est important de prendre en considération la relation qui existe entre les administrateurs éventuels et l’OBNL. Bon nombre de gens qui sont passionnés par la mission et les activités de l’organisation peuvent déjà être liés à l’organisation à titre d’agents de financement, de donateurs importants, de bénévoles, de clients, ou avoir d’autres liens avec l’organisation. Si de telles relations n’empêchent pas nécessairement les administrateurs de remplir leur mandat (selon les règlements en vigueur) ni de le remplir efficacement, elles créent toutefois un terrain propice aux jeux d’influences de la part de certains groupes de parties prenantes, ce qui peut nuire à la capacité du conseil d’exercer un jugement indépendant. Même si aucune influence indue n’est exercée dans les faits, une telle situation peut donner l’impression que l’organisation fait preuve de partialité et nuire à sa réputation aux yeux des parties prenantes.

Les OBNL doivent veiller à ce qu’un nombre suffisant d’administrateurs soient indépendants de l’organisation et qu’ils apportent un point de vue exempt de parti pris au conseil. Souvent appelés « conseillers », ces administrateurs accroissent le degré d’impartialité réel et perçu du conseil et peuvent lui apporter des compétences et un point de vue externes exceptionnels ».

La nouvelle Loi canadienne sur les organisations à but non lucratif est entrée en vigueur en octobre 2011

La nouvelle Loi fait la distinction entre les OBNL « ayant recours à la sollicitation » et les OBNL « n’ayant pas recours à la sollicitation ». Les organisations qui ont recours à la sollicitation sont des OBNL qui réalisent un revenu d’au moins 10 000 $ sous forme de dons ou de cadeaux.En vertu de la nouvelle Loi, une organisation désignée est a) une organisation ayant recours à la sollicitation dont les revenus annuels bruts ne dépassent pas 50 000 $ ou b) une organisation n’ayant pas recours à la sollicitation dont les revenus annuels bruts ne dépassent pas 1 000 000 $.Poste d’administrateur

  1. En vertu de la nouvelle Loi, le conseil d’administration se compose d’au moins un administrateur, sauf s’il s’agit d’une organisation ayant recours à la sollicitation, auquel cas le conseil doit être composé d’au moins trois administrateurs, dont au moins deux qui ne sont ni des dirigeants ni des employés de l’organisation ou de ses affiliés.
  2. Dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, les administrateurs peuvent présenter une défense selon une diligence raisonnable et de bonne foi.
  3. Les administrateurs et les dirigeants peuvent être indemnisés par l’organisation qui, à son tour, peut souscrire et maintenir une assurance responsabilité à l’intention de ses administrateurs et dirigeants.
  4. Les administrateurs et les dirigeants doivent divulguer leur intérêt dans tout contrat ou toute transaction d’importance avec l’organisation, que ce contrat ou cette transaction soit réalisé ou proposé.

Information financière

  1. Les membres doivent nommer un expert-comptable, à moins que tous les membres ayant droit de vote conviennent d’en décider autrement.
  2. L’expert-comptable doit réaliser une mission d’examen d’une organisation désignée, à moins que les membres exigent par résolution ordinaire qu’il effectue une mission d’audit.
  3. L’expert-comptable d’une organisation qui n’est pas une organisation désignée doit réaliser une mission d’audit.

Promoting Nonprofit Organizations (psypress.com)

Things Networked Nonprofit Consultants Might Do (kevinabrooks.wordpress.com)

Three Major Takeaways from Facebook’s New Nonprofit Guide (business2community.com)

L’ABC de la gouvernance des OBNL


Je reçois régulièrement des demandes d’information sur la gouvernance des OBNL/OSNL. Voici deux sources d’information précieuses sur ce type d’organisation, diffusées par le Centre de la gouvernance de Deloitte :

(1) l’état de la situation (statistiques) des OBNL aux États-Unis publié par BoardSource (Index 2012) et

(2) Un guide sur la gouvernance des OBNL publié par Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP.

Vous devrez vous enregistrer pour avoir accès à ces documents. Mais la procédure d’inscription est très simple et vous aurez ensuite accès à toutes les publications du Centre de la gouvernance de Deloitte. Malheureusement, la plupart des documents sont en anglais et ils sont souvent d’origine américaine.

Je vous invite à lire ces deux documents. Le premier des deux présente les résultats statistiques d’une vaste enquête sur les OBNL. Comme moi, vous serez probablement étonné de ce qui en ressort, notamment que le domaine des OBNL (Organismes de charité, Associations, Fondations), des plus petites aux plus grandes, est un monde où la parité des genres règne ! Et vous qu’est-ce qui vous étonne le plus ?

BoardSource Nonprofit Governance Index 2012

« Administered every two to three years, the BoardSource Nonprofit Governance Index provides the most up-to-date compendium of information on nonprofit board policies, practices, and performance from a diverse mix of organizations nationwide, and it is the only national study of nonprofit governance that includes responses from both chief executives and board chairs. This report presents data from the seventh edition of the survey, the BoardSource Nonprofit Governance Index 2012.

Key findings from the report include the following:

English: Logo of a non-profit student organiza...
English: Logo of a non-profit student organization. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Hopeful signs of recovery across the nonprofit sector

We found a sizeable reduction in the percentage of nonprofits that made negative financial adjustments (downsizing, cutting staff, reducing salaries and benefits, etc.) in the past two years, as compared to Governance Index data collected in 2010. Responses also demonstrate a modest increase in the percentage of organizations expanding or launching new initiatives.

Increased accountability and self-assessment

Positive trends continue with regard to the percentage of nonprofits that operate with basic accountability procedures, including conflict-of-interest, whistleblower, and document retention policies. More boards also are taking a systematic look at their own performance, as the number of organizations conducting board self-assessments increased 5% from 2010-2012.

Persistent patterns of inequity among nonprofit leaders by gender, age, and race/ethnicity and low levels of adoption of inclusive practices

Boards continue to struggle with finding their paths towards inclusion.Figure 5 on page 12 illustrates the almost non-existent progress in recruiting racial and ethnic minorities on boards over an 18-year period.Furthermore, the adoption of inclusive practices, such as conducting diversity training for board members, remains low and stagnant from levels we found in 2010.

Percentage of personal giving by board members is high, but fundraising efforts leave much to be desired

As in 2010, chief executives rank fundraising as the weakest area of board performance. Forty percent of CEOs indicate that board members are reluctant to take on fundraising responsibilities, and only 41% of CEOs agree that board members are comfortable meeting potential donors face-to-face. However, among nonprofits that fundraise, nearly three-quarters of respondents report 90 to 100% personal giving by board members ».

The Guide to Not-For-Profit Governance | 2012

Ce petit guide publié par Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, donne les informations essentielles de nature juridique concernant la gouvernance des OBNL. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les pricipaux points abordés dans le guide. Bonne lecture !

Background for Not-For-Profit Organizations

– Role and Purpose of the Board of Directors in Not-For-Profit Corporations

– Enforcement of Duties and Liabilities

– Liability of Directors, Officers and Trustees to Third Parties

Duties of Not-For-Profit Directors and Officers

– The Duty of Care

– The Duty of Loyalty

– The Duty of Obedience

Liabilities Imposed by the IRS: Intermediate Sanctions

Indemnification AND INSURANCE for Not-For-Profit Directors and Officers

How to Get Your Nonprofit Board to Raise Money (ventureneer.com)

Nonprofit Board Size Can Matter (nonprofitboardcrisis.typepad.com)

Promoting Nonprofit Organizations (psypress.com)

NonProfit Organization: To Be or Not to Be ? (marketing4optimization.com)

Gen Next on the Nonprofit Board (ventureneer.com)

Il faut revoir les priorités des C.A. dans une ère d’activisme !


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article paru dans DealBook | New York Times qui traite de la nouvelle réalité qui s’impose de plus en plus aux conseils d’administration des grandes entreprises publiques. Comment les C.A., à l’ère de l’activisme de groupes d’actionnaires organisés, peuvent-ils s’assurer de prendre en compte les intérêts à long terme de l’entreprise lorsque de formidables pressions s’exercent sur eux pour infléchir leurs décisions financières en faveur de gains à court terme ?

« The great challenge for today’s boards in this new era of activism is catering to all the diverse “shareholders,” which includes those with a longer investment horizon like pension funds and mutual funds, as well as those who are seeking quick profits. The board should represent all shareholders, not any one region or philosophy ».

L’article d’Ira M. Millstein* ne donne certainement pas toutes les réponses mais il invite les conseils d’administration à revoir leurs priorités stratégiques. L’Université Columbia a entrepris une vaste étude sur les motivations qui poussent les entreprises à gérer à court terme. Ainsi donc de nombreuses recherches en cours devraient apporter un éclairage nouveau sur ce phénomène. Et vous, quel est votre point de vue ?

« Columbia, along with studies at other institutions, is  trying to learn what motivates short-term investing, why the longer-term shareholders are so often silent and why the investment chain either through apathy or the wrong incentives, has created the world of short-term investing in which we live.  This undertaking will also examine the role of so-called proxy advisory firms and rating agencies in board policies. In the end, we will all gain a better understanding of shareholder influence, and what incentives can turn this economy away from short-term investing and back to long-term sustainable growth.  Corporations will be the ultimate beneficiaries of this knowledge, which will provide the understanding that will facilitate legitimate long-term planning ».

Re-examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism

« With the recent increase in activism, some on Wall Street are blaming shareholders for the short-term mentality of corporate boards. But many of these activists represent a small subset of investors in publicly held companies. As a result, corporate boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they owe their fiduciary duties. One of the major problems of this newfound activism is the focus on short-term results. That is not to say that our economy isn’t gripped by a short-term mentality, whether it’s individuals saving less and seeking immediate satisfaction or corporations forgoing long-term sustainable growth and profitability to meet investor demands for quarterly stock market returns.

GE Shareholder Meeting protest
GE Shareholder Meeting protest (Photo credit: Fuzzytek)

But as many commentators have pointed out, activist investors are manipulating the system without succeeding in increasing shareholder value or instilling better corporate governance practices. Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in extra dividends or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth. In recent years, companies including Dell, Yahoo and others have faced proxy wars or shareholder proposals to merge, divest, change boards or management or undergo a drastic reorganization…

… Academics and practitioners should be studying these questions intensely. This involves canvassing and analyzing the entire investment chain that boards face, including pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds of hundreds of varieties and ordinary investors and advisers, which one project at Columbia Law School aims to do ».

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Ira M. Millstein est co-présidente du Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership de Columbia Law School et associée sénior de la firme Weil, Gotshal & Manges.

Preserving Balance in Corporate Governance (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-term Shareholders (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Shareholder Group Makes Progress in Fight for Annual Board Elections (blogs.wsj.com)

Communications entre le C.A et les actionnaires | Prise de position de Richard Leblanc (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Règlementer ou ne pas règlementer ? | Le dilemme des autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un excellent article publié par Jennifer Brown et paru dans Canadian Lawer Magazine. Voilà un texte qui présente une vue assez équilibrée sur la nécessité ou non d’une réglementation accrue en général, mais dans ce cas-ci, concernant l’industrie des firmes de conseils en procurations (« proxy advisory industry »). Cet article discute de la grande diversité des arguments présentés à la Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). Il y a du pour et du contre ! Et vous, quel est votre point de vue dans ce débat ?

To regulate or not to regulate ?

When the Canadian Securities Administrators issued a call last summer for comment on the potential regulation of the proxy advisory industry, it was inundated with responses from general counsel, their companies, law firms, and others who seemed to have been waiting in the shadows for a chance to vent. The input received from reporting issuers, directors, and the investor relations people that work for Canadian companies shows the idea obviously hit a nerve with many Canadian public companies of all sizes, says Tuzyk. “Given the volume of comments advocating some form of action from all these issuers in response to the comment period — there are very few issues of new proposed rules that so many issuers have commented on like this — I would be very surprised if they did nothing.”…

English: proxy networks logo
English: proxy networks logo (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The question of whether the proxy advisory industry should be regulated has been a polarizing issue for some time now. Depending on who you ask, there are strong opinions on both sides. Institutional shareholders are closely aligned with the proxy firms; law firms make their bread and butter from corporate management, while issuers and academics have concerns about many aspects of the process. The CSA, which acts on behalf of the provincial securities regulators in Canada, invited input from all parties — issuers, institutional investors, proxy advisers, and other market players — on concerns over the activities of proxy advisory firms. The concerns range from a perceived lack of transparency in how they operate to conflicts of interest and inaccuracy of their work.

The activities of proxy advisory firms are unregulated in Canada. The call for consultation follows similar steps by regulators in the United States and Europe, as the perceived power of proxy firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. and Glass, Lewis & Co., which provide proxy voting advice and other services, has been debated in recent years. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission embarked upon a similar exercise in 2010, but it has not resulted in any changes to date.
Some feel companies like ISS and Glass Lewis wield too much power and have too much influence. Insiders point to issuers who have been quoted in the press making comments along the lines of, “The proxy advisory firm is my number one shareholder because they control 50 per cent of my vote.”

That sounds good as a headline but it’s not really true, says Brad Allen, of Branav Shareholder Advisory Services Inc. “People continue to reinforce this image that proxy firms have all this power. They do have influence but their primary influence is their ability to communicate to a broad range of shareholders that hold an equity interest.”

As one of many companies that submitted a written response to regulators last fall, Magna International Inc. indicated its key concerns included potential conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, and potential inaccuracies as well as limited opportunity for issuer engagement. It also has concerns about the extent to which institutional investors in Canada rely on proxy advisers’ recommendations. “Our comments were directed to say, there has to be a level playing field so the issuers know exactly what is the basis on which we are being assessed,” says Bassem Shakeel, Magna’s vice president and secretary. “Right now that is one of the biggest problems; there just isn’t enough transparency around the detail — the basis on which some parts of the analysis is being completed and/or overly broad subjective discretion which can be used to override voting guidelines.”

Others argue the proxy companies aren’t as powerful as the issuers make them out to be. “My view is these proxy advisory firms don’t necessarily have as much influence as many people say they do because a lot of times when we speak to institutional investors, who are clients, they are proud to say, ‘Yes we receive the information but we’re not robots and we do spend some time on how we’re going to vote,’” says Jonathan Feldman, a partner at Goodmans LLP. “They say, ‘If we disagree with what the proxy advisers are suggesting, we won’t just follow them blindly.’”

The issues of conflict of interest, transparency, and lack of qualitative assessment of governance quality and predictive validity on shareholder value are all reasons why the proxy firms should be regulated, says Richard Leblanc, an associate professor of law, governance, and ethics at York University. “If I asked my students to pay me to help them with their score, it’s a conflict,” he says.

He says ISS and Glass Lewis use a “mechanistic, quantitative, and volume-based” approach to their business and don’t measure things that are important to the quality of corporate governance and to shareholder performance — essentially what happens inside the boardroom. “The assumption is what they are measuring matters but often what they’re not measuring might matter more,” such as individual people and the qualities and skills of directors, says Leblanc. “As a qualitative researcher I’m seeing this volume-based model that is conflicted because of the consulting stream to improve your governance score. Their input variables are basically a proxy circular. That does not capture corporate governance.”

No supervision of proxy advisory firms (business.financialpost.com)

Pratiques exemplaires en matière de divulgation d’information concernant les administrateurs | CCGG (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

ISS, Glass Lewis, and the 2013 Proxy Season (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

L’apport déterminant des professeurs-administrateurs à la performance des entreprises


Voici un article scientifique publié dans Social Science Research Network (SSRN) par Bill Francis (1), Iftekhar Hasan (2) et Qiang Wu (3) sur un sujet très pertinent pour la gouvernance des sociétés : L’utilité de la présence de professeurs d’université sur les C.A. des entreprises publiques.

L’article montre que la présence de professeurs sur les conseils d’administration est positivement associée à une meilleure performance des entreprises. Les professeurs-administrateurs, plus particulièrement ceux qui ont une formation en administration, jouent un rôle très important de conseillers auprès de l’entreprise. Leur influence sur la performance des entreprises semble déterminante dans plusieurs domaines relatifs à la bonne gouvernance.

« Directors from academia served on the boards of more than one third of S&P 1,500 firms over the 1998-2006 period. This paper investigates the effects of academic directors on corporate governance and firm performance. We find that companies with directors from academia are associated with higher performance. In addition, we find that professors without administrative jobs drive the positive relation between academic directors and firm performance. We also show that professors’ educational backgrounds affect the identified relationship. For example, academic directors with business-related degrees have the most positive impacts on firm performance among all the academic fields considered in our regressions.

Furthermore, we show that academic directors play an important governance role through their monitoring and advising functions. Specifically, we find that the presence of academic directors is associated with higher acquisition performance, higher number of patents, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower CEO compensation, and higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Overall, our results provide supportive evidence that academic directors are effective monitors and valuable advisors, and that firms benefit from academic directors ».

Si vous souhaitez avoir plus d’information sur les objectifs, la méthodologie ou les résultats de l’étude, je vous invite à lire l’article au complet.

Professors in the Boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance

Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito Graduate Sc...
Peter F. Drucker and Masatoshi Ito Graduate School of Management (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

« This paper empirically investigates whether the presence of academic directors affects firm performance and corporate governance. Based on the independence theory, expertise theory, and diversity theory, we hypothesize that academic directors can improve board efficacy and subsequent firm performance because of their monitoring abilities and advising abilities. The key result is in line with our hypothesis. We find that the presence of directors from academia in the boardroom is associated with higher firm performance. The positive association holds after controlling for firm- and other governance-specific characteristics, and considering endogeneity issues, such as omitted variable bias, self-selection bias and causality issue. By comparing the differences in the attendance behavior and committee assignments of academic directors and other outside directors, we find that academic directors perform better than other outside directors in the boardroom.

We further examine the monitoring and advising roles of academic directors in details. We find that firms with academic directors have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, lower cash-based CEO compensation, more patent numbers, higher acquisition performance, higher stock price informativeness, and are less likely to manage their earnings. The results provide several channels through which academic directors affect firm value positively.

We also find evidence that academic directors with administrative jobs do not improve firm performance as much as academic directors without administrative jobs. Additional analysis finds that academic directors with administrative jobs have more severe board-meeting attendance problems. Furthermore, we find that academic directors’ areas of study have different impacts on firm performance ».

_______________________________________

(1) Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

(2) Schools of Business, Fordham University

(3) Bank of Finland

Que font les « bons » administrateurs pour faciliter le succès des organisations ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Un guide pour améliorer les communications entre l’entreprise et ses investisseurs | ICSA


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un document de l’Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) qui se veut un guide de bonnes pratiques en vue de faciliter les communications entre l’entreprise et ses investisseurs institutionnels. Le guide est particulièrement intéressant en ce sens qu’il met l’accent sur des moyens concrets d’accroître la qualité des rencontres entre les deux parties. Voici le sommaire exécutif du guide :

New Guidance : Enhancing Stewardship Dialogue

  1. This guidance, developed jointly by companies and institutional investors, is intended to facilitate good engagement practices. This is important in supporting long-term investment, based on increased levels of trust between a company and its owners.
  2. The guidance has been designed to provide practical advice on: (1) making meetings between companies and institutional investors more productive – helping make the best use of all participants’ time, and creating the optimum conditions for dialogue (2) creating a more meaningful dialogue between companies and institutional investors – outside of the traditional results season – on strategy and long-term performance (3) improving the feedback process – in both directions – between companies and institutional investors on the quality of meetings (4) using the learning developed as a result to improve engagement practices.
  3. The guidance emphasises four key messages: (A) The need to develop an engagement strategy (B) The importance of getting housekeeping issues right (C) Strengthening the conversation on strategy and long-term performance (D) Providing feedback in a way that adds value for all participants.
  4. A key principle of the guidance is that that there should be a regular and consistent process of engagement, over time, between a company and its key investors, in order to establish, develop and maintain relationships. For these reasons, both companies and institutional investors need to have a clear understanding of each other’s expectations in terms of the nature and frequency of engagement; avoid an automatic presumption that there is ‘no need’ to pursue engagement; and should review this understanding periodically to ensure its continuing relevance.
  5. The guidance suggests there may be benefits for a company in developing a critical mass of shareholders who can provide constructive engagement, and outlines some considerations for the use of collective meetings.
  6. The one particular area of engagement which the guidance recommends strengthening concerns the conversation on strategy and long-term sustainable performance. Once a year, a company and its owners should focus on the company’s approach to creating value, and protecting that value, looking at issues such as strategy, performance, succession, board effectiveness, culture, risk and reputation. Individual issues, such as remuneration, should be placed in that context, rather than dominating the wider strategy discussion.
  7. Feedback – in both directions – between companies and institutional investors, is an important means of assessing the degree to which each other’s expectations have been met in terms of the quality and quantity of engagement activity. Honest, nuanced, constructive and, as necessary, challenging feedback is best for all parties.

La formation en gouvernance doit aussi être adaptée aux secteurs spécialisés


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un communiqué du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) qui présente trois formations en gouvernance pour trois secteurs spécialisés lesquelles seront offertes en mai prochain.

Le CAS dispense une certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés depuis plus de sept ans; cependant plusieurs diplômés ainsi que plusieurs administrateurs et hauts dirigeants souhaitent se spécialiser en approfondissant la gouvernance dans les domaines suivants : (1) Gouvernance des services financiers, (2) Gouvernance des PME et (3) Gouvernance des régimes de retraite.

Sur une formule de deux jours intensifs, ces formations en gouvernance sont adaptées aux besoins des administrateurs et hauts gestionnaires de ces trois secteurs spécialisés.

Gouvernance des services financiers

La formation Gouvernance des services financiers aura lieu les 7 et 8 mai  2013, à Montréal. Elle est destinée aux administrateurs, hauts dirigeants et cadres du secteur des services financiers qui oeuvrent dans le domaine bancaire, les assurances, les valeurs mobilières et les organismes d’encadrement légal et corporatif. Cette formation vise à favoriser la mise en place de saines pratiques de gouvernance afin d’assurer l’efficacité, la transparence, l’intégrité, la stabilité et la crédibilité du secteur des services financiers et de préserver ainsi la confiance du grand public, des consommateurs et des investisseurs.

Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des services financiers.

The Price Building, in the old city of Quebec ...
The Price Building, in the old city of Quebec City. The building is the head office of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec and the official residence of the Premier of Québec (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Gouvernance des PME

La formation Gouvernance des PME aura lieu les 8 et 9 mai 2013, à Québec. Les chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou comités consultatifs de PME sont invités à participer à cette formation haut de gamme visant à réfléchir aux pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour ce type d’entreprise. En compagnie de formateurs de renom et de gens témoignant de leurs expériences, il s’agit d’un moment privilégié pour revoir ses grandes orientations et identifier des moyens concrets pour optimiser sa gouvernance d’entreprise, dans une ambiance conviviale.

Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des PME.

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

La formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite aura lieu les 15 et 16 mai 2013, à Montréal. Elle s’adresse aux administrateurs, mandataires et gestionnaires de régimes de retraite à cotisation ou prestations déterminées. Cette formation vise à améliorer les connaissances et compétences en gouvernance, à préciser les rôles et responsabilités qui incombent aux administrateurs et gestionnaires d’un régime de retraite, puis à développer un sens critique pour un meilleur processus décisionnel.

Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite.

Sept ordres et organismes professionnels reconnaissent la valeur de ces formations du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés dans le cadre de la formation continue de leurs membres pour une valeur de 15 heures. En savoir plus.

_________________________________________

À propos du CAS

Créé en 2005 par l’Autorité des marchés financiers, la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval et le ministère du Conseil exécutif du Québec, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés offre le seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec. Il contribue au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance et offre aux administrateurs de sociétés une formation de la plus haute qualité, un environnement dynamique de partage du savoir et une source d’informations privilégiée à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques. À ce jour, le CAS a diplômé 542 ASC. Pour information : www.cas.ulaval.ca.

La gouvernance et le management dans une perspective de long terme


Voici un excellent article, paru dans The Economist, qui présente un plaidoyer convaincant en faveur de l’adoption d’une perspective à long terme dans la conduite des entreprises. L’auteur montre que la théorie de la maximisation du rendement des actionnaires (souvent à court terme) passe par l’implantation de stratégies alignées sur l’accroissement de la valeur des sociétés à long terme. Il donne plusieurs exemples d’entreprises qui ont optées, avec succès, pour une vision et un management à long terme, seule approche susceptible d’assurer la pérennité des entreprises. Le conseil d’administration qui doit avoir une orientation claire à cet égard.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ce court extrait et à lire l’article au complet si cette perspective vous allume. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Peut-on, comme Peter Drucker,  concevoir une théorie du management qui prône une vue à long terme, tout en assurant  la satisfaction des actionnaires … et des autres parties prenantes ?

Taking the long view

« HE IS the chief executive of a multinational corporation, but Paul Polman sometimes sounds more like a spokesman for Occupy Wall Street. The boss of Unilever (an Anglo-Dutch consumer-goods firm with brands ranging from Timotei shampoo to Ben & Jerry’s ice cream) agonises about unemployment, global warming and baby-boomer greed. He puts some of the blame for these ills on the most influential management theory of the past three decades: the idea that companies should aim above all else to maximise returns to shareholders.

Paul Polman - World Economic Forum on East Asi...
Paul Polman – World Economic Forum on East Asia 2011 (Photo credit: World Economic Forum)

He appears to mean it. Since taking charge in 2009, Mr Polman has stopped Unilever from publishing full financial results every quarter. He refuses to offer earnings guidance to equity analysts. He has introduced a lengthy “sustainable living plan” and attracted a new cadre of long-term investors, particularly in emerging markets. He even told an audience in Davos that hedge-fund managers would sell their own grandmothers to make a profit.

Mr Polman was one of several titans to decry the cult of shareholder value at the Peter Drucker Forum (an annual gathering of admirers of the late Austrian-born management guru) in Vienna on November 15th and 16th. Roger Martin, the dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto, called it a “crummy principle that is undermining American capitalism”. Georg Kapsch of the Federation of Austrian Industries urged the world to abandon it. Rick Wartzman, the director of the Drucker Institute, said its critics were gaining momentum.

The cult has certainly yielded perverse results. The fashion for linking pay to share prices has spurred some bosses to manipulate those prices. For example, a manager with share options gets nothing if the share price misses its target, so he may take unwise risks to hit it. Short-termism is rife on Wall Street: the average time that people hold a stock on the New York Stock Exchange has tumbled from eight years in 1960 to four months in 2010. The emphasis on short-term results has tempted some firms to skimp on research and innovation, robbing the future to flatter this year’s profits. “Long-term results cannot be achieved by piling short-term results on short-term results,” Drucker once remarked ».

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Rational short-termism (stumblingandmumbling.typepad.com)

Do the Markets Reward Long-Term Honesty? (dailyfinance.com)

Prem Watsa on Today’s Crazy Short Term Speculative Market (valuewalk.com)

Managerial Myopia: Why Public Companies Underinvest in the Future (forbes.com)

How to stop the quarterly profits treadmill (greenbiz.com)

‘Shareholder Democracy’ Can Mask Abuses (dealbook.nytimes.com)

Bulletin de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA) | Édition de Mars 2013


Découvrez le numéro 48 de la lettre de liaison mensuelle adressée aux adhérents de l’IFA. Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles.

Newsletter de l’Institut français des administrateurs | Édition de Mars 2013

Dans ce numéro, Laurence Dors (Anthenor Partners) et Caroline de La Marnierre (Capitalcom), co-signataires de cet éditorial, tentent de répondre à une question posée par le MONDE ECONOMIE du 18 février 2013 : Comment contrôler les salaires des dirigeants ?

J’ai reproduit ci-dessous le texte paru dans la section « actualités de la gouvernance » de la lettre de l’IFA. Bonne lecture.

Le sujet du moment : Les patrons coûtent-ils trop cher ?

« Voici une question que se pose un grand nombre de nos concitoyens dans un contexte économique et social particulièrement tourmenté, mais la vraie question n’est–elle pas ailleurs : existe-t-il des critères objectifs, équitables et lisibles – à la fois pour l’entreprise et ses parties prenantes : actionnaires, salariés, partenaires et clients– susceptibles d’asseoir la rémunération d’un dirigeant de manière juste, efficace et consensuelle?

C’est tout l’enjeu du vote – consultatif ou non – de la rémunération globale des dirigeants par les actionnaires de l’entreprise en Assemblée Générale débattu sous l’appellation anglo-saxonne de Say on Pay. Alors que ce projet de loi fait couler beaucoup d’encre en France, le Say on Pay est déjà en vigueur dans 17 pays au plan mondial.

Stability, Security, Prosperity
Stability, Security, Prosperity (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

L’agitation autour des rémunérations de certains patrons du CAC 40 dans un contexte où la crise fait reculer les résultats, stagner les salaires et progresser le chômage, a naturellement joué un rôle essentiel dans l’instauration d’une dynamique en faveur du Say on Pay. Mais elle a également faussé le débat, car le Say on Pay ne saurait être un outil de modération des rémunérations des dirigeants, comme en témoignent les tendances inverses observées concrètement dans les pays où il est en vigueur.

Les détracteurs du Say on Pay objectent que ce vote reviendrait à dessaisir le Conseil d’Administration d’une large partie de ses responsabilités et prérogatives. Mais cet argument ne tient pas puisque le Conseil d’Administration aura toujours pour mission de délibérer sur les niveaux, les modalités et les critères de performance des dirigeants.

En revanche, la perspective d’un tel vote va nécessairement changer la dynamique de décision au sein du Conseil d’Administration : là où les questions de rémunération faisaient souvent l’objet de débats feutrés réservés – dans la pratique – à un cercle restreint autour du Président et du Comité des Rémunérations, le Say on Pay va obliger la collégialité du Conseil à en assumer pleinement les enjeux.

En outre, et peut-être est-ce là une opportunité que nous apporte cette disposition, le Say on Pay se révélera probablement un puissant levier d’alignement de la rémunération des dirigeants avec les intérêts de l’entreprise et de ses parties prenantes, et donc avec le projet de l’entreprise sur le moyen/long terme. En obligeant le Conseil d’Administration à investir du temps et de l’énergie sur la détermination de niveaux de rémunération lisibles, équitables et objectifs, le Say on Pay va inéluctablement favoriser une prise en compte accrue du temps long, dont le Conseil d’Administration est garant. La performance ne s’établissant de manière incontestable que dans la durée, l’étalement dans le temps du versement de certaines composantes de la rémunération va s’en trouver renforcé. Pour frustrantes qu’elles soient pour les intéressés qui porteront un risque accru, les tendances préexistantes au paiement partiel en actions – ou équivalent actions – vont apparaitre d’autant plus séduisantes aux Conseils d’Administration qu’elles diminuent le numéraire versé l’année « N », et donc l’irritabilité des actionnaires et des parties prenantes en période de crise.

Pour être alignée avec le projet d’entreprise, la rémunération des dirigeants devra également être acceptable au plan social, ce qui impliquera que les Comités de rémunérations s’extraient du champ du financier quasi confidentiel pour aborder ce sujet – particulièrement complexe – de façon élargie, c’est-à-dire en y intégrant plus largement la dimension sociale/environnementale de l’entreprise. Concrètement, cela veut dire que l’évaluation des dirigeants prendrait davantage en considération des paramètres comme l’évolution annuelle de la masse salariale du Groupe, les écarts de salaire, les flux nets d’emploi, les plans de restructuration éventuels, en plus des habituels critères sociaux, et également : l’évolution des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, de l’efficacité énergétique, de la consommation d’eau et de la préservation des ressources, etc…

Le débat au sein du Conseil d’Administration sur la rémunération des dirigeants va ainsi conduire à plus de co-construction du projet d’entreprise, à plus d’exigence dans le suivi et la prévention des risques, et à un champ de débats plus large autour de l’intérêt social de l’entreprise, qui s’inscrit dans le temps.

Loin d’une prise de gage sur les patrons, et beaucoup plus qu’un simple ajustement technique, le Say on Pay est donc surtout un levier de rénovation de la gouvernance de l’entreprise, susceptible de changer l’ambiance des Conseils d’Administration et de dynamiser l’interaction entre la Direction Générale et l’organe de contrôle.

Pour autant, le Say on Pay va-t-il clore la polémique sur les rémunérations excessives ? On peut en douter, mais il peut apporter de l’objectivation sereine. Le rodage ira-t-il sans heurt ? Là aussi, ce sera un art d’exécution avec d’inévitables tentations démagogiques ici et là. Que l’on procède par voie de code de place ou par voie législative, il faudra un temps d’adaptation, et c’est pour cela que dans sa grande sagesse, le législateur et le gouvernement semblent avoir abandonné la piste d’une mise en oeuvre obligatoire dès les Assemblées Générales 2013. Comme toute réforme de fond, celle-là doit s’élaborer dans le consensus, sans préjugé et sans fantasme.

Il est fondamental que le Say on Pay soit perçu par les dirigeants et les membres du Conseil comme une opportunité de progrès, tant en interne à travers un dialogue social enrichi, que dans la relation globale de l’entreprise avec son environnement et l’opinion publique. Rechercher les critères d’une rémunération « juste » revient clairement à centrer le débat non plus exclusivement sur la personne du dirigeant, mais sur les intérêts de l’entreprise et de ses parties prenantes ».

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Perspectives relatives à la gouvernance et à la rémunération en 2013


Ce billet, paru dans le HLS Forum, présente le sommaire exécutif d’un rapport produit par la firme Equilar sur les perspectives relatives à la gouvernance et à la rémunération en 2013. La firme Equilar est l’une des plus importantes entreprises de recherche et de publication dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Le rapport complet que vous pourriez vous procurer en vous adressant directement à l’entreprise  se décline en trois catégories : (1) Conseil d’administration, (2) Rémunération de la direction et (3) Divulgation et gouvernance.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous les principaux résultats de cette enquête (Key Findings). Bonne lecture.

2013 Compensation & Governance Outlook Report 

« Each year, Equilar looks to highlight critical areas that can potentially affect those dealing with compensation and governance issues in the upcoming year. The 2013 Compensation & Governance Outlook Report aims to cover a variety of emerging trends in the fields of executive and director pay, equity trends, and corporate governance, while also providing an array of disclosure examples to illustrate unique approaches to strategic matters. The majority of firms will not encounter all, or even most, of the trends in this report in the New Year; it is primarily intended as a starting point for discussions that will take place over the course of 2013.P1020267

… Discussions between companies and shareholders will continue to drive changes as firms ensure the story they want told is communicated through a variety of mediums and methods. Concerns surrounding fairness in a number of areas including stock structure and pay will cause struggles between conflicting parties as focus continues to shift towards the decisions in the boardroom. Topics including shareholder engagement, board dynamics, Say on Pay, and pay for performance dominate this year’s report.

As with other Equilar publications, this report relies on a variety of actual disclosure examples, chosen to highlight current trends. We organized each issue into one of three broader categories: Board of Directors, Executive Pay, and Disclosure & Governance. We organized the issues into sections to help the reader navigate the report. To avoid emphasizing any single issue, the issues in each category are organized in alphabetical order under each category ».

Key Findings

« Most companies no longer award meeting fees to directors: The prevalence of S&P 1550 companies that provide director’s regular board meeting fees decreased from 59.8 percent to 44.3 percent between 2007 and 2011. Fixed annual retainers increased from 94.6 percent to 99.7 percent over the same period.

Female representation on boards increasing: In 2011, 76 percent of companies in the S&P 1500 had one or more female board member. The percentage of boards with no female directors fell from 29 percent to 24 percent between 2009 and 2011.

Boards continue move toward single classes: 59 percent of S&P 1500 companies had declassified boards in 2011, up from 49 percent in 2007.

Equity vehicle mix shifts to include performance shares: The number of companies providing performance-based equity to chief executives increased from 42.2 percent to 54.5 percent between 2007 and 2011.

Future of multi-class share structures remains unclear: Several high-profile public offerings in 2012 brought renewed attention to multi-class share structures increased the number of companies in the S&P 1500 with multiple classes of stock to 82.

Alternative pay tables becoming more common: While not widespread, in order to better illustrate pay stories, a number of companies are providing alternative pay tables and graphs, including pay-for-performance alignment and target versus realized pay.

Compensation Discussion & Analysis length trending upward: The average CD&A word count for S&P 1500 companies increased nearly 14 percent to 7,340 words between 2009 and 2011. CD&A word length ranged from 519 (Berkshire Hathaway) to 20,022 words (Telephone & Data Systems).

Internal pay equity closer for small and mid-cap companies: CEOs make 2 times more than the next ranked NEO in small and mid-cap companies, and 2.3 times more in large cap companies.

Increase in disclosures of realized and realizable pay: Although methods of calculating realized and realizable pay are not yet consistent among public companies, many companies are employing the use of realized or realizable pay in order to better explain compensation figures.

Proxy advisors using new methods for peer group selection: Proxy advisors Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis will both use new methods for peer groupselection in 2013. While it is unclear how this will affect advisory votes on pay, it is still important for companies themselves to give clear disclosure surrounding the peer groups created.

Earnings and revenue continue to be most commonly used performance metrics: In 2011, earnings were used as a metric in 49.8 percent of all awards, while 36.5 percent of all awards used revenue.

Initially exempt companies to have first Say on Pay vote in 2013: Firms with public floats of less than $75 million will hold their first votes for Say on Pay in 2013. It remains to be seen whether the trends for larger firms, which included less than 2 percent of firms failing a Say on Pay vote, will extend down to the smaller firms.

Shareholder outreach and engagement growing: The number of companies within the S&P 500 filing amended proxies in response to negative recommendations increased from 29 in 2011 to 42 in 2012".

Pratiques exemplaires en matière de divulgation d’information concernant les administrateurs | CCGG (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Swiss vote to limit executive pay (thelocal.ch)

Executive Pay Votes May Be Harming Shareholders (dealbook.nytimes.com)

Le point de vue du secrétaire corporatif de Johnson et Johnson sur les priorités en gouvernance


J’ai récemment pris connaissance d’une entrevue conduite par   avec Douglas K. Chia*, secrétaire corporatif de la firme Johnson & Johnson. Cette entrevue aborde essentiellement quatre sujets très importants pour les parties prenantes de l’entreprise : (1) les pratiques de planification de la relève de la direction, surtout du PCD (2) les pratiques de rémunération et la préparation du document CD&A (Compensation Discussion and Analysis), (3) les relations et les discussions avec les investisseurs institutionnels et (4) les communications avec les actionnaires, notamment les aspects concernant le Say on Pay et la création de valeur à long terme.

Voici un compte rendu de cette entrevue. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

C-Suite Insight: What are the big issues that you’re considering as Johnson & Johnson prepares for proxy season?

Doug: Like many other high-profile companies, executive compensation is a critical item for us during proxy season, and we are looking at the continuum of the story that we’ve been telling for the last few years in our proxy statements. As you may have seen, there have been some major changes in our executive suite from last year to this year, specifically a succession from a long-tenured CEO, who is retiring after a remarkable 41-year career at J&J, to a new CEO. So, obviously this recent leadership succession will be a big focus area. We’ll also continue to emphasize the changes in the design of our compensation programs that have been made over the past few years, which we put a lot of effort into describing in last year’s proxy statement.

Headquarters of the Johnson & Johnson Company,...
Headquarters of the Johnson & Johnson Company, One Johnson & Johnson Plaza, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. Architect: Henry N. Cobb of the I. M. Pei Company, built 1983. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

CSI: Succession planning is a weakness in a lot of companies. So could you take us through succession planning at Johnson & Johnson, when it started, and how you worked your way through it?

Doug: For us, succession planning has always been something which has gone smoothly because it’s been thought out in advance. J&J has had only seven CEOs since becoming a public company in the early 1940s, and each one has come from the internal ranks. In the current case, we have an outgoing CEO who had served in the position for the past decade. The process of identifying potential successors for him started a number of years ago, in the 2010-2011 timeframe, and the lead candidates became apparent to the public. Our major investors were familiar and quite comfortable with the individuals who were being considered.

CSI: In succession planning and other major processes at J&J, how do you view long-term sustainable value and how do you view your engagement with shareholders?

Doug: We’ve always managed our business for the long-term, which is reflected in our culture by the fact that people tend to have very long careers at Johnson & Johnson. So, we have the benefit of being able to train up-and-coming leaders in a variety of business situations and give our Board exposure to them along the way. In terms of shareholder engagement, our major investors get exposed to many of our senior business leaders through investor conferences and meetings where they can talk in-depth about the businesses they are running. Over time, investors get familiar with a small cadre of J&J senior business leaders.

CSI: We have to mention Say on Pay. How did this issue affect you initially, and how do you address it when you’re writing a CD&A?

Doug: You cannot write the CD&A only thinking about the Say on Pay vote. This reminds me of what my teachers in school used to say: You shouldn’t “study to the test.” Instead, study the subject, master the subject, and then you will do fine on the test. So for us, writing the CD&A each year is about making sure we tell the story that reflects what’s taking place at the company, our compensation philosophy, the values we are trying to instill through our compensation plans, how our executives are paid, and what performance is being rewarded. We try to illustrate that we manage our business for the long-term and thus place a lot of focus on aligning executive compensation with our long-term investors. That being said, you do want to consider the vote outcome, keeping in mind the “advisory” nature of the vote. Suffice it to say that ours have not been where we want them to be, although we did gain support from over a majority of the votes cast in each of the last two years.

CSI: What have you done about this?

Doug: Over the past summer and fall, we had some of our Board members and senior management sit down with a diverse mix of investors, in one-on-one settings, specifically to talk about executive compensation. Through those discussions, we have been able to better understand the parts of our executive compensation program and our disclosure that could be enhanced. One point the investor discussions drove home that is important for all of us to remember when writing the CD&A is that for investors, the proxy statement is really all they have to rely on for information; they likely know very little else about the company’s pay programs.

So, we have to take a critical eye to what we’ve presented in the past and ask ourselves, “How can we tell our story better in order to make people understand the important context and rationale underlying these compensation decisions?” I think it’s fair to say that this process has helped us identify specific areas where we could have done a more effective job of telling our story. That’s something we’ll continue to work on this year and every year.

CSI: We’ve talked to major institutional investors such as TIAA-CREF and CalPERS, and also companies like BlackRock. They’ve stressed to us the importance of private engagement. In many cases, they think it’s more effective if they engage you privately. Is that your experience and what’s your view, how much do you welcome that sort of private engagement?

Doug: I think that’s right. One-on-one engagement is a very effective method of communication between companies and investors. The advantage of this direct engagement is the candid nature of the discussion that ensues when there is not an “audience” of outsiders. Over time, you can build strong relationships this way. In particular, “real-time” engagement, either by phone or in-person, provides the opportunity for the kind of constructive back-and-forth discussion that helps tease out critical issues. It helps both sides more precisely identify areas that need to be clarified. In the one-on-one meetings we had over the summer and fall, the investors we met with were able to get a real sense of just how much time and thought our Board members put into the decisions around executive compensation and how many factors come into play. Those are hard things to effectively illustrate to investors through a written document like a proxy statement.

CSI: Have these private dialogues increased in the last few years, in the era of Dodd-Frank?

Doug: Yes, I can say they have for us. We are more proactive than we had been in the past, and many of our investors have also become more proactive. Some who were not inclined to talk to us in the past are now more receptive to having a conversation.

CSI: How do you balance the tension between short-term results and a long-term commitment to spending money on R&D and creating long-term value?

Doug: It’s a tricky balance, but J&J has a long-term philosophy. It’s no secret to the investment community as we constantly emphasize that we manage the business for the long-term. So, to a certain extent, we’re expecting investors who have made significant investments in our company to have that same mindset. Most are investing in the company as a long-term play. However, when you have so many shareholders, they are not all going to agree with you on everything, so naturally there are going to be some shareholders who have a shorter-term outlook for a variety of reasons.

CSI: What sort of big picture advice would you give public companies, and in particular corporate secretaries, as they prepare for proxy season?

Doug: As far as corporate secretaries go, we exchange know-how quite a bit. One of the most rewarding parts of my job is establishing the kinds of relationships with my counterparts where we can help each other be better at what we do. On the subject of engagement, the basic message I like to convey to my peers is that they should be open to engagement with those investors who want to have real constructive dialogue. It’s a dynamic environment out there right now and you have to be thinking about how to make strategic adjustments.

Also, don’t be afraid to make a break with your past practices on what your disclosure looks like, or how much disclosure you want to give. We should all take a fresh look every year and ask ourselves, “What are people asking for and what makes sense to give to them?” These days, you can’t approach every disclosure requirement as something for which you’re only going to provide what a rule demands. If you do, your company will be missing a huge opportunity to tell its story.

Finally, for all of us, and corporate secretaries in particular, the key to the debate around executive compensation is creating an environment where your board members have everything they need to make well thought-out decisions. That’s what I think of when I hear people refer to “good governance.” We need to keep the focus on the integrity of the decisions, the underlying decision-making process, and the people who have the duty to make those decisions.

____________________________________

*Douglas K. Chia is Assistant General Counsel & Corporate Secretary at Johnson & Johnson, the world’s most comprehensive and broadly-based manufacturer of health care products, headquartered in New Brunswick, New Jersey. His responsibilities include providing legal counsel to the corporation on matters of corporate governance, securities regulation, public company disclosure, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance. Prior to joining Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Chia was Assistant General Counsel, Corporate at Tyco International. In private practice, Mr. Chia was an associate at the law firms of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett and Clifford Chance, practicing in the New York and Hong Kong offices of each firm. While in private practice, Mr. Chia provided legal counsel to issuers and underwriters on securities offerings and cross-border transactions. Mr. Chia is a member of the Board of Directors, Executive Steering Committee, Corporate Practices Committee, and Policy Advisory Committee of the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals, and is Chairman of the Society’s Membership Committee. Mr. Chia is also a member of the Corporate & Securities Law Committee of the Association of Corporate Counsel, as well as a member of the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association (NAPABA).

Engagement accru des investisseurs institutionnels avec les C.A. et les directions en 2012 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Can Anything Stop Johnson & Johnson? (dailyfinance.com)

Nouveaux principes de rémunération selon les investisseurs institutionnels britanniques


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un document publié par l’ICSA Software, une société de l’Institute of Chartered Secretaries & Administrators (ICSA) de Londres qui produit des logiciels à l’intention des entités de gestion globale et de gouvernance corporative, notamment pour les besoins des secrétaires corporatifs.

Ce document est très intéressant parce qu’il présente la position des plus gros investisseurs institutionnels britanniques, tels Hermes, NAPF, BT Pension Scheme, Railpen et USS en matière de rémunération. Le rapport élabore quatre principes qui devraient gouverner les décisions des comités de RH (et rémunération). Pour cette coalition d’investisseurs institutionnels, il s’agit d’une nouvelle façon de concevoir la rémunération, et donc un aperçu des changements à survenir.

English: shows the steps taken in determining ...
English: shows the steps taken in determining bae remuneration (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
  1. Les membres de la direction devrait détenir des actions à long terme dans leur entreprise;
  2. La rémunération devrait être alignée sur les stratégies à long terme et sur la culture organisationnelle
  3. Les systèmes de rémunération devraient être simples et faciles à comprendre;
  4. Les comités de RH et de rémunération devraient expliquer et justifier comment leurs décisions sont basées sur la réussite à long terme.

Nouveaux principes de rémunération selon les investisseurs institutionnels britanniques (Résumé)

Remuneration principles for building and reinforcing long-term business success (Rapport complet)

« Criticism of perceived inappropriate and excessive remuneration at board level has been widespread in the UK, EU and elsewhere in the last few years. In the UK a new right for shareholders to approve future pay policy and new ways of reporting on pay are being introduced from October this year. This paper is therefore timely as it will be a useful contribution to the debate »

Rémunérations des administrateurs et pratiques de gouvernance | Survey du Conference Board 2013 (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Swiss aim to tackle high pay through shareholder democracy (newstatesman.com)

Now, Switzerland moves to curb excessive executive pay packets (frontpage24x7.wordpress.com)

Que conseillez-vous à Sam ? | une analyse de cas


Voici le billet de Julie Garland McLelland publié dans l’édition de mars 2013 du Director’s Dilemma.

Que conseillez-vous à Sam ? | une analyse de cas

« Sam is an experienced manager and has worked for over twenty years in his industry. He has also sat on two not-for-profit boards and enjoys the governance role. Now he has an opportunity to buy an equity stake in a small business that has a product and service for which market demand is growing.

The business has not been growing quickly due to flat market conditions and revenue has not increased substantially as a consequence. The current owners are a husband and wife team and are tired; they have run the business for many years and want to retire.

The proposal is that Sam should purchase 40% of the company and take a seat on the board. The existing owners would retain 30% equity each and a shareholder’s agreement would stipulate that board decisions would require a 70% majority to be agreed. The current board has three members consisting of the owners and an ‘independent’ chairman who is the lawyer and a long-standing friend of the owners. The proposal is that he should remain as “he adds a lot of value and sees things we would miss”.

Sam intends not to work in the company but to be merely a shareholder and director. He has ideas for improving the growth and increasing the value of the company but wants to retain his full time employment in a larger corporation as a security measure. His employer is happy for him to take on a board seat and there is no direct competition between the two companies so Sam would have no conflict of interest; however, Sam’s boss, who is a friend and mentor to Sam, is uneasy and has suggested that Sam could find himself outmanoeuvred in the boardroom and overcharged for his equity. Sam is appreciative of the counsel but believes the shareholder agreement protects his interests. He would like to discuss board dynamics with the current owners but they seem not to be interested as they say the Chairman handles all the compliance and they just run the business so there is nothing to worry about ».

 

Quels conseil donneriez-vous à Sam ? Esquissez une réponse avant de consulter les avis des experts sur le sujet ci-dessous !

 

Doug’s Answer

Owning part of an SME is much more than an equity purchase and a board position. High level strategic and governance oversight is not enough; it takes a more ‘hands-on’ involvement.

The owners have realised they have had enough. Under the current proposal there is little in the way of resolving the typical SME succession dilemma; specifically:

  1.   Who has the skill and energy to ultimately take control and drive the business?
  2.   How to extract full value for the business which substantially funds retirement?

The board risks stalemate and conflict in decisions with a Chair aligned with current owners. Not a good outcome for the business, Sam or the current owners.

For this to be a win / win for everyone, an agreed succession plan should be part of Sam’s due diligence process along the following lines:

  1.   Sam’s intentions, post current-owners succession, should be clarified and agreed
  2.   The appointment of an independent chair and an independent director experienced in the same industry should be agreed
  3.   Untapped management talent existing within the business and a skilling, education and promotion program outlined
  4.   Recruitment program for management where gaps are identified
  5.   Current owners agree to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) where appropriate
  6.   Key client and supplier relationships transition to the wider management team.

Sam should further protect his minority interests by holding pre-emptive rights to purchase the remaining shares should they be on offer, notwithstanding the ESOP mentioned above.

By clarifying all the stakeholders’ intentions and aspirations, the business presents a unified front with management, the board and shareholders “singing from the same songbook”.

Doug Jardine provides consulting services to owner operated businesses and boards and is based in Sydney.

Julie’s Answer

There is more to a board than compliance. Managers accustomed to running things as they see fit whilst relying on a lawyer to put together a semblance of compliance at board level are not going to make good board colleagues. Sam has some good ideas but unless they are also in the shareholder agreement (with dates and budgets) they will likely never get implemented.

Already the board is set for deadlock whenever the existing directors disagree with Sam. The 70% required for decision-making is a nonsense as Sam will find he either has to conform to the wishes of a husband and wife team or try to split them. They might as well stipulate 100% consensus as that is all that will work in the circumstances. It is also a pretty good way to run a board.

I usually hate quasi-equity as it tends to complicate matters but Sam could look into having a preference share which is repayable as debt and converts to equity only when the strategy reaches certain milestones.

What he most needs to do is sit down with the current owners and talk, long, hard and deep, about what this company is really supposed to achieve. It looks as if it has always been supposed to provide a certain lifestyle and income for the owners. But what   about the future? What do they now want the company to be?

If they can agree on a vision and set aside enough of Sam’s investment to fund the new actions that must be taken to achieve the vision, then they may be able to grow the company to a stage where a profitable exit is achievable. If they can’t agree on exactly what the vision is and how they will work to achieve it – Now – In   detail – Sam should not invest.

Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

Simon’s Answer

Sam takes an equity share   to help grow the company (future nest egg). The owners (husband and wife) want to retire and secure as much money as possible from the asset sale (nest egg right now). Neither party wants any ongoing operational involvement – what is this deal really about? Are the owners serious in selling or grabbing equity dollars?

The 70% rule subjugates Sam’s rights and restricts the potential for business improvements but also terrifyingly entrenches the owners’ current policies, practices and procedures. A resolution to change anything requires the support of Sam, the Chairman (even if he/she places director duties ahead of friendship) and one of the owners – good luck with that.

There needs to be far more discussion by all parties about the fundamentals of this deal before it proceeds any further.

Sam is a minority shareholder with a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA) that lacks rigour, inclusion of, and agreement on, significant matters. The SA affords Sam no rights protection, no restriction on changes in each owner’s equity or share ownership, no restraint of trade restriction on the owners once retired and no provisions for breaking deadlocks e.g. mediation which will be inevitable   given the 70% rule.

There is no guarantee that the owners will be unified on either the quantum or timeframe for retirement and the SA needs to reconcile that fact. The owners (or one of them) could just sell the remaining 60% (30%) to another party or give the shareholding to their beneficiaries. What is the agreed owner exit strategy and succession plan? There is no first right of refusal (including terms) for Sam to buyout one or both owners.

What happens if one or both owners prematurely die/separate or become incapacitated? What happens if Sam dies or is incapacitated or simply wants to get out? These all need to be included in the SA with trigger events established, agreed timeframes and pre-calculated quantum.

Now is the time to construct a rigorous SA, if any party baulks now, better to establish that at the outset before the dollars are committed. If Sam acts in haste, he/she can repent at leisure.

Simon Pinnock is a professional and practising non-executive director and Board consultant. He is based in Melbourne, Australia.

Un « sain skepticisme » requis des administrateurs | Faire confiance mais vérifier !


Je vous invite à lire un article du blogue de Triple Ethos rédigé par Richard Lawton* portant sur le rôle crucial du conseil d’administration en matière de comportement éthique et responsable au sein de la direction des entreprises. L’article met l’accent sur l’approche d’un sain skepticisme de la part des membres de C.A. qui s’applique non seulement aux aspects financiers mais aussi à la performance sociale et environnementale de l’entreprise.

Faire confiance mais vérifier doit être l’attitude à adopter dans notre rôle d’administrateur. Il est important que les comportements de l’entreprise soient en ligne avec la mission et les valeurs publiquement affichées. L’auteur présente un cas patent, celui de l’industrie pharmaceuthique aux É.U.

Why Board Skepticism Needs to Extend Beyond Financial Statements

« The cover feature of NACD Directorship magazine is on “Honing Skepticism – Trust, but verify is the skeptics mantra.  Why professional skepticism is one of the most important skills for directors – and how to develop a questioning mind-set.” The article’s focus is primarily centered on the economic aspect – avoiding financial statement fraud. And while this is certainly critical given the well-publicized failures of fiduciary oversight in the past decade, I’d like to suggest that the scope of board skepticism should include a company’s social and environmental performance.

Skepticism
Skepticism (Photo credit: jonanamary)

The Business Roundtable notes in its 2012 Principles of Corporate Governance that “effective directors maintain an attitude of constructive skepticism; they ask incisive, probing questions and require accurate, honest answers.”  This attitude should not only apply to financial statements, it should also apply to advertising, public relations, sustainability and corporate responsibility reports with the company’s mission and values used as touchstones ».

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*Richard Lawton founded Triple Ethos in 2012 after earning an MBA in Sustainability from Antioch University New England and being named a Governance Fellow with the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).  He currently serves on the Boards of two non-profits with mission-driven earned revenue models, and recently earned his “Applying the Principles of Servant Leadership” certification from the Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership. He has served in executive-level positions with Time Inc., Barnes & Noble, and Comag Marketing Group (a joint venture between Hearst and Conde Nast) where his management responsibilities included a wide range of corporate functions including sales, marketing, marketing analysis, information systems, supply chain management, human resources, and corporate communications. Recognized by Folio magazine as “being one of the magazine industry’s top 40 influencers and innovators”, Richard led initiatives to make the retail supply chain more efficient and profitable while reducing its environmental impact.  He has presented at numerous industry conferences, published articles on improving supply chain efficiency, and served on the Magazine Publishers Association’s Environmental Task Force and Walmart’s magazine sustainability committee.

GreenBiz Forum: Sustainability is Missing a Good Story and the Right Metrics (triplepundit.com)

What Is Skepticism, Anyway? (richarddawkins.net)