Vous serez sûrement intéressés par les résultats de cette recherche publié par R. Christopher Small et paru dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Les résultats montrent que les PCD qui se retirent ont tendance à divulguer des prévisions de profits futurs plus positives et plus optimistes que lors des divulgations des années antérieures, surtout si leur rémunération incitative est élevée et si les mécanismes de suivis par le C.A. sont faibles.
C’est un article qui montre clairement la nécessité d’avoir un conseil d’administration vigilant à l’occasion du départ d’un PCD. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Theory suggests that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with short horizons with their firm have weaker incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders (Smith and Watts 1982). To date, research examining the “horizon problem” focuses on whether CEOs adopt myopic investment and accounting policies in their final years in office (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Davidson et al. 2007; Kalyta 2009; Antia et al. 2010). In our paper, Forecasting Without Consequence? Evidence on the Properties of Retiring CEOs’ Forecasts of Future Earnings, forthcoming in The Accounting Review, we extend this line of research by investigating whether retiring CEOs are more likely to engage in opportunistic forecasting behavior in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Specifically, we contrast the properties (issuance, frequency, news, and bias) of earnings forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during pre-terminal years (where the CEO will be in office when the associated earnings are realized) with forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during their terminal year (where the CEO will no longer be in office when the associated earnings are realized). We also examine circumstances in which opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is likely to be more or less pronounced.
retirement (Photo credit: 401(K) 2013)
Our predictions are based on several incentives that arise (or increase) during retiring CEOs’ terminal year with their firm. Specifically, relative to CEOs who will continue with their firm, retiring CEOs face strong incentives to engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior in an attempt to inflate stock prices during the period leading up to their retirement. Deliberately misleading forecasts can be used to influence stock prices. Consistent with this argument, prior work shows that managers use voluntary disclosures opportunistically to influence stock prices (Noe 1999; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) and that managers use opportunistic earnings forecasts to manipulate analysts’ (Cotter et al. 2006) and investors’ perceptions (Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) in an effort to maximize the value of their stock-based compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Moreover, because SEC trading rules related to CEOs’ post-retirement security transactions are less stringent than those in effect during their tenure with the firm, post-retirement transactions can be made before the earnings associated with the opportunistic forecast are realized and with reduced regulatory scrutiny.
To test our predictions, we first identify all CEO turnover events in Execucomp from 1997 through 2009 (a total of 3,548 events). For each CEO turnover event identified, we perform detailed searches of SEC filings, executive biographies (appearing on various social media outlets such as LinkedIn, Forbes People Finder, etc.), press releases, and related disclosures to determine whether the CEO turnover was due to retirement. Our results indicate that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts of future earnings and that they issue such forecasts more frequently in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Moreover, we find that retiring CEOs’ terminal-year forecasts of future earnings are more likely to convey good news and are more optimistically biased relative to pre-terminal years. Our findings, that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior, represent a previously undocumented implication of the “horizon problem.” Furthermore, we find that opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is more pronounced in the presence of higher CEO equity incentives and discretionary expenditure cuts in the terminal year, and less pronounced in the presence of stronger monitoring mechanisms (e.g., higher institutional ownership).
Our results should be of interest to market participants (e.g., investors, analysts, etc.) who use information from management earnings forecasts. However, market participants’ ability to use our evidence is contingent on their knowledge of (or ability to anticipate) a given CEO’s impending retirement. Our study should also be of interest to stakeholders (e.g., boards of directors, regulators, etc.) who seek to implement incentive mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts. Interestingly, our results suggest that equity incentives (a tool commonly used to align incentives and minimize agency costs) can have the unintended consequence of creating or exacerbating opportunistic forecasting. Thus, CEO and firm characteristics (such as equity incentives) may have competing effects on various horizon-problem induced behaviors.
L’une des plus importantes compétences et responsabilités d’un PCD est de connaître les fondements de la culture de son organisation et de s’assurer d’en faire un des éléments-clés de sa gestion.
L’article ci-dessous, publié par Jon Katzenbach and DeAnne Aguirre dans la revuestrategy+business de la firme de consultation Booz & Companyest vraiment très utile pour explorer les multiples facettes de la culture des organisations. Pourquoi ? Parce que, bien qu’assez difficile à appréhender, elle demeure le ressort le plus puissant de la performance des entreprises.
L’article présente plusieurs témoignages à cet effet, avec en prime, une petite vidéo de Douglas Conant, CEO de Campbell Soup qui nous explique comment entrer en relation avec les employés en mettant une paire de souliers de course.
Comme moi, vous serez sûrement fascinés par la lecture de cet article. Bonne lecture. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
It is striking to see how many chief executives see their most important responsibility as being the leader of the company’s culture. According to Ginni Rometty, CEO of IBM, “Culture is your company’s number one asset.” Her counterpart at Microsoft, Steve Ballmer, has said, “Everything I do is a reinforcement or not of what we want to have happen culturally.” In another typical remark from the C-suite, Starbucks Corporation CEO Howard Schultz has written that “so much of what Starbucks achieved was because of [its employees] and the culture they fostered.” Researchers such as former Harvard Business School professors John Kotter and James Heskett have also found consistent correlation between robust, engaged cultures and high-performance business results (as described in their book, Corporate Culture and Performance [Free Press, 1992]). But most business leaders don’t need that evidence; they’ve seen plenty of correlation in their own workplace every day.
Organizational Learning Culture Mind Map (Photo credit: kvalunas)
Recognizing the importance of culture in business is not the same thing as being an effective cultural chief executive. The CEO is the most visible leader in a company. His or her direct engagement in all facets of the company’s culture can make an enormous difference, not just in how people feel about the company, but in how they perform. Schultz described the CEO’s role this way in his book Onward: How Starbucks Fought for Its Life without Losing Its Soul (Rodale Books, 2012): “Like crafting the perfect cup of coffee, creating an engaging, respectful, trusting workplace culture is not the result of any one thing. It’s a combination of intent, process, and heart, a trio that must constantly be fine-tuned.”
A company’s culture is the collection of self-sustaining patterns of behaving, feeling, thinking, and believing, the patterns that determine “the way we do things around here.” At its best, an organization’s culture is an immense source of value. It enables, energizes, and enhances its employees and thus fosters ongoing high performance. At its worst, the culture can be a drag on productivity and emotional commitment, undermining long-term success. Most companies are so large and complex that the culture acts in both ways at once. Indeed, the culture of a large company is typically made up of several interwoven subcultures, all affecting and responding to one another.
Articles en lien avec le sujet de la culture organisationnelle :
Ce billet présente le résumé d’une étude, produite par le Conference Board et récemment publiée sur le site de Harvard Law School Forun on Corporate Governance and Financial Régulation, laquelle fait état de la planification de la relève des PCD (CEO). L’étude intitulée CEO Succession Practices (2013 Edition) analyse les cas de rotation des PCD dans les entreprises du S&P 500. Le rapport présente les résultats en quatre sections :
Les tendances en matière de planification de la relève de 2000 à 2012 ainsi que la relation entre la performance des entreprises et le départ ou l’arrivée d’un PCD;
Les pratiques en matière de succession du PCD en 2012 : les responsabilités du conseil, le rôle du PCD démissionnaire au conseil et la nature de la divulgation aux actionnaires;
Une analyse des particularités de plusieurs cas célèbres de succession de PCD en 2012;
Divers exemples montrant comment l’activisme des actionnaires a une influence grandissante sur le processus de la planification de la relève en 2012.
Despite steady average CEO succession rates, dismissals hit a 10-year high in 2012.
In 2012, 53 CEOs in the S&P 500 left their post. The rate of CEO succession in calendar year 2012 was 10.9 percent, consistent with the average number of annual succession announcements from 2000 through 2011. The rate of CEO dismissals varies widely across the 2000–2012 period, ranging from 40.0 percent in 2002 to 13.2 percent in 2005 (on average, 24.5 percent for the period). In 2012, 31.4 percent of all successions were non-voluntary departures, the highest rate recorded since 2003.
Companies in the services industries experienced higher than average CEO succession rates.
The rate of CEO succession had significant variation across industry groups during 2012. The services industry had a succession rate of 18.0 percent in 2012, higher than its 13-year average of 16.2 percent. By contrast, the extraction industry, which includes mining, petroleum products, and natural gas companies, had a succession rate of only 5.6 percent during 2012, lower than its 13-year average of 9.5 percent.
Companies increasingly look outside to hire their CEOs.
In 2012, 27.1 percent of S&P 500 companies that faced a CEO succession hired an outsider for the top job. While the rate confirms a trend recorded since the 1970s, it is much higher than the 19 percent reported in 2011. This finding may suggest that there is a need to continue to strengthen companies’ leadership development practices. The heated pay-for-performance debate of the last few years has induced boards of directors to increase the rigor of the CEO selection process: the growing percentage of outsiders chosen as new CEOs may show that directors don’t always like what they find within the companies’ ranks. Moreover, a number of companies that underwent a succession event in 2012 selected a director from their own board as the new CEOs. The director-turned-CEO succession model provides companies with a chief executive who is familiar with corporate strategy and key stakeholders, thereby reducing leadership transition risk.
CEO departure may offer opportunity to reconsider board leadership model.
Only 18.8 percent of successions in 2012 involved the immediate joint appointment of an individual as CEO and chairman of the board of directors. Based on succession announcements, one-third of departing CEOs remained as board chairman for at least a brief transition period, typically until the next shareholder meeting, while several departing CEOs retained significant influence with the company as board chairman. In some cases (Iron Mountain), the succession was used as an opportunity to reconsider the board leadership structure and adopt a CEO/board chairman separation model. Alternatively, the boards of Altria Group, Boston Scientific, CA Inc., and Murphy Oil retained the expertise of the departing CEO via a consulting contract rather than a position on the board.
Formal succession process is credited for the choice of new CEO, except when the CEO is hired from outside.
Perhaps surprisingly, only 22.9 percent of succession announcements among S&P 500 companies in 2012 explicitly stated that the incoming CEO was identified through the board’s succession planning process. This is noticeably lower than the 32.4 percent of successions that referred to the succession planning process in 2011. There appears to be a link between inside promotion to the CEO position and the succession planning process—31.6 percent of announcements that mention the board’s role in the succession planning process involve an insider appointment as incoming CEO, whereas no successions that involve an outside hire reference succession planning.
Mantatory CEO retirement policies remain seldom used.
Mandatory CEO retirement policies based on age are an infrequent element of CEO succession plans. Only 11.8 percent of manufacturing companies and 8 percent of nonfinancial services companies adopt an age-based mandatory retirement policy for CEOs; the number is lower in the financial industry. The highest level of policy adoption (19.4 percent) is reported by manufacturing and nonfinancial companies with annual revenue of $20 billion or greater.
WOW ! Solide prise de position de Warren Buffet en faveur du maintien de Jamie Dimon comme PCA et PCD de JPMorgan Chase, la plus grande banque américaine. L’article publié dans Bloomberg cette semaine, faisant état de la position de Buffet, montre que le fait de jouer les deux rôles, du moins aux É.U., n’est pas encore accepté comme une pratique exemplaire.
Qu’en pensez-vous ? Buffet peut certainement faire pencher la balance lors de l’assemblée des actionnaires du 21 mai…
Warren Buffett, who has said he personally owns shares of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), is backing the bank’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon as shareholders vote this month on whether to split his roles.
Warren Buffett and Jamie Dimon | Donald Bowers/Getty Images for Fortune
Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., said in November that Jamie Dimon, chief executive officer of JPMorgan Chase & Co., would be the best candidate to lead the U.S. Treasury Department in a financial crisis.
“I’m 100 percent for Jamie,” Buffett told Bloomberg Television’s Betty Liu yesterday in Omaha, Nebraska. “I couldn’t think of a better chairman.”
Calls for Dimon, 57, to relinquish the chairmanship have mounted since New York-based JPMorgan disclosed risk-control lapses on derivatives bets last year that fueled more than $6.2 billion of losses. In March, the company’s board urged investors to vote against naming a separate chairman at the May 21 meeting, saying that Dimon’s dual role remains the “most effective leadership model.”
Alexandra Wrage* s’est posée une question très pertinente : Quelles sont les raisons qui conduisent un PCD à démissionner ? Dans son article, paru sur le site de CorporateCounsel, l’auteur donne une foule de raisons pour lesquelles un PCD donne sa démission. Et, ce n’est qu’en de très rares occasions que celui-ci le fait « pour le bien de l’organisation » !
On le sait les PCD sont puissants (« forceful »), déterminés et affirmatifs. Ils ne sont généralement pas du genre à démissionner sans bonnes raisons ! Ils laissent leur position de chef et de pouvoir lorsqu’ils sentent qu’ils n’ont plus d’autres choix …
Cet article nous fait réfléchir sur l’importance du principe d’abnégation qui veut que l’intérêt de l’entreprise doit passer avant l’intérêt personnel. En ce qui me concerne, je crois que c’est ce principe qui doit guider les actions et les décisions d’un PCD qui, pour différentes raisons, ne peut plus assumer ses fonctions avec efficacité et intégrité. Ce n’est pas une décision facile … mais c’est, la plupart du temps, une sage décision. C’est alors que l’on comprend toute l’importance d’avoir un plan de relève … et une personne prête à combler le poste dans une situation de crise.
Mt. St. Helens (IGC’04) (Photo credit: Ben Garney)
For any leader to ensure that his or her departure helps bring the organization “back into calmer waters” can be a final responsible act of leadership. If the negative event happened on your watch, that won’t change—but by taking yourself out of the story, by giving the next slate of leaders a fresh start and a chance to both do the right thing and be seen to do it, you can depart with dignity and hope that history will be kind.
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*Alexandra Wrage is the president of TRACE, a nonprofit antibribery compliance organization offering practical tools and services to support the good governance efforts of multinational companies. She is a former member of the Independent Governance Committee (IGC) of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), football’s governing body. Prior to founding TRACE, Wrage was international counsel at Northrop Grumman.
Voici un article publié par Nicola F. Sharpe dans la série Illinois Public Law Research Paperqui aborde un sujet de la plus haute importance pour les experts en gouvernance de sociétés : la question de savoir comment un C.A. peut effectivement exercer son rôle « d’autorité » s’il ne contrôle pas le processus de décision managérial ?
L’article fait le constat qu’il y a une telle asymétrie de l’information entre le management et les administrateurs que ceux-ci ne sont pratiquement pas en mesure de jouer le rôle qui leur est dévolu par la loi et par les théories sur les règles de gouvernance. Ils n’ont pas les moyens, ni de leurs ambitions, ni des pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés … L’auteur se questionne sur les véritables détenteurs d’influence et d’autorité au sein des grandes sociétés publiques : (1) le conseil d’administration, (2) les actionnaires et (3) le management.
Il s’agit d’un article de fond qui pose les vraies questions mais qui n’apporte pas toutes les réponses ! En s’inspirant de l’approche des comportements organisationnels, l’auteur présente un modèle de prise de décision en cinq (5) étapes, dans lequel les conseils d’administration sont très peu présents. Son analyse l’amène à proposer un modèle plus « satisfaisant » d’exercice du pouvoir du C.A. Il identifie quatre (4) éléments, relatifs à la gestion du processus de prise de décision des conseils d’administration, qui permettraient de réduire le gap évoqué.
Je vous invite donc à une bonne réflexion sur cette problématique de gouvernance. Que pensez-vous des assertions de l’auteur ? … des arguments présentés ? … des implications et des recommandations pour les conseils d’administration ?
Voici un court résumé de l’article. Pour pouvez télécharger le document au complet (44 pages).
Writer’s Digest Book Shipment (Photo credit: AngelaShupe.com)
« Few Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) believe their boards of directors understand the strategic factors that determine their corporation’s success. In fact, some long-term directors “confess that they don’t really understand how their companies make money.” Yet broadly accepted theories of corporate governance, such as Stephen Bainbridge’s Director Primacy, are founded on the faulty premise that boards of directors have the actual authority to stop managers from behaving badly. These theories, as well as corporate law, wrongly assume that boards have practical authority over managers. This article directly challenges that assumption and argues that managers, not boards, control corporate decision-making processes.
The problem is that legal scholars and policymakers have ignored the connection between decision-making processes and practical authority. This article is the first to identify and examine this relationship, which is essential to helping boards live up to their legislative mandates.
This article argues that an effective decision-making process is essential to securing a corporate board’s actual authority. Unless boards engage in such a process, regulators will continue to expect boards to perform tasks that exceed their capabilities. Organizational behavior theory, which can be found in business literature, but is frequently ignored in law, provides the attributes of an effective decision-making process. Analyzing the components of an effective process, and identifying which components are truly controlled by boards as opposed to managers, supplies a roadmap for what boards need in order to have both de facto and de jure authority in their corporations. This article provides that original analysis ».
Cette semaine, nous avons demandé à Louise Champoux-Paillé, C.Q., F.Adm.A., ASC, MBA, Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité sur le blogue. Louise montre comment les initiatives québécoises en matière de promotion de la diversité au sein des sociétés peuvent être facilitées par des agents de changements qui ont des expertises confirmées en gouvernance des sociétés. Il en est ainsi du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) et du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC).
La mission du CAS est de contribuer au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance en offrant aux administrateurs de sociétés une formation de la plus haute qualité dans un environnement dynamique de partage du savoir, et une source d’information privilégiée à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques.
World Economic Forum visits New York Stock Exchange to mark International Women’s Day 2012 (Photo credit: World Economic Forum)
La mission du Cercle est de promouvoir la désignation Administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC) auprès des entreprises publiques et privées, des organismes publics et parapublics et des OBNL, ainsi que favoriser la nomination de ses membres à des conseils d’administration.
L’article identifie certaines réalisations remarquables eu égard à la présence des femmes sur des conseils d’administration au Québec. Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.
Le Collège et le Cercle : Des agents de changement pour atteindre les objectifs de la Table des partenaires influents
Par Louise Champoux-Paillé
Le 19 avril dernier, les membres de la Table des partenaires influents, co-présidée par Madame Monique Jérôme-Forget et M. Guy St-Pierre dévoilaient leur stratégie d’action visant à accroître la présence des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration. Celle-ci comportait notamment la proposition que les sociétés cotées en Bourse, ayant leur siège social au Québec, prennent des engagements fermes afin de favoriser une meilleure représentation des femmes dans leur organisation. La Table propose les cibles suivantes : 20 % de représentation d’ici cinq ans (2018), 30 % d’ici dix ans (2023) et 40 % d’ici quinze ans (2028).
Les circonstances ont voulu que je sois appelée par Jacques Grisé à compléter, au cours de la même semaine, un bilan de situation pour la Conférence Européenne des associations d’administrateurs (EcoDa) en regard des actions canadiennes (mais surtout québécoises) pour la promotion de la diversité et de la présence des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration.
De manière générale, les principaux Collèges et associations membres de ce regroupement (Belgique, France, Finlande) ajoutent à leurs activités de formation en gouvernance, des initiatives de mentorat pour stimuler l’atteinte d’une présence féminine accrue. Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et le Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés se comparent avantageusement à leurs homologues internationaux en ayant développé divers partenariats et ententes avec des regroupements du milieu afin d’organiser des activités de mentorat mais également des activités de sensibilisation, d’initiation à la gouvernance et d’encouragement de la relève pour les postes de direction au sein des entreprises québécoises, soit les femmes qui siégeront éventuellement à ces conseils d’administration. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un compte rendu des principales initiatives canadiennes et québécoises telles qu’elles ont été présentées dans le cadre de l’exercice de « benchmark » de EcoDa.
Cet engagement contribue sûrement à ce que les femmes constituent aujourd’hui 40 % des titulaires du titre d’Administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC) et que les nominations à des postes des conseils d’administration aient été, au cours des deux dernières années, également réparties entre les deux genres. Notons qu’au cours des deux dernières années, il y a eu 153 nominations d’administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) au sein des organisations publiques et privées.
La promotion d’une meilleure représentation féminine au sein des instances décisionnelles requiert un engagement de la part des entreprises mais également et surtout un travail constant de terrain pour accroître le vivier actuel et futur de femmes qui permettront d’atteindre les objectifs fixés par la Table des partenaires influents. Un défi de taille que nous poursuivrons avec vigueur.
Louise Champoux-Paillé, C.Q., F.Adm.A., ASC, MBA
Présidente du Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés
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Initiatives to promote diversity in boardrooms on the part of CAS | Perspectives canadiennes et québécoises
Mentoring :
No quota for enrollment in our program (CAS). However, around 40% of our graduates are women. Intensive works with business community in order to promote women for enrollment in our program and create mentoring and networking activities. In Canada, only Québec has legislated gender parity for the boards of its Crown Corporations. The target was met on December 2011. A private Canadian Senator member’s bill was tabled in 2011 to create a mandatory rule requiring boards to have at least 40 % women or men within 6 years of the legislation. The proposed legislation never won the support of the Conservative government. Recently, both Québec and Canadian Government create advisory committees composed of proeminent business people to promote women on corporate boards.
Best practices/Recommendations :
The Canadian regulators encourage diversity of experiences, competencies, genders and origins on boards. A best practice recommended is to use a background and experience matrix to balance all the needs of the organization.
Networks :
Women’s well established associations see to create activities of networking-mentoring-sponsorship and conceive directories to promote women on boards.
Other initiatives :
Shareholders proposals (MÉDAC mainly) for gender parity. In response, one bank, the National Bank of Canada, adopted in 2009 an orientation to have women nominees for half of all directorships that become vacant. Up to now, the objective was met.
Corporate Governance Model :
A mix of shareholder and stakeholder model. Main features : board members are elected by the shareholders; majority of directors are independent from the direction; Chair of the Board must preferably be independent; members of the audit committee members must be independents.
Nomination Process :
The authorities highly recommend that the members of the governance and nominating committee be independent. Usually, the nominating committee recommends as much candidates as there are seats to be filled. The nominating committee must disclose what steps are taken to identify new candidates for board nomination.
Average Board Structure :
Over the years, there has been a noticeable shift toward smaller boards. Average board size is actually 11 for big listed Canadian companies. A significant majority (85%) of companies separate the roles of board chair and CEO. International directors comprised about 22 % of all directorships in the listed companies, which translated to an average of 2 international directors per board. For the big companies, only 17 % of all directors are women. Generally, there are more boards with three or more women and fewer all-male boards. A big change in board composition for leading Canadian companies : the vast majority have three or more directors with relevant industry experience, compared to just over 10% in 1997.
Que penser de cette recherche publiée dans The Magazine de HBR par Xueming Luo, Vamsi K. Kanuri et Michelle Andrews ? Les résultats de cette recherche vous font-ils réfléchir sur les implications (positives ou négatives) liées au grand nombre d’années passées en tant que premier dirigeant (PCD-CEO), ou sur le nombre de mandats maximum des membres de conseils d’administration ? Comme vous le savez, on voit de plus en plus apparaître des politiques concernant le nombre de mandats que les membres de conseils devraient obtenir… Quel est votre point de vue à cet égard ?
The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.
It’s a familiar cycle: A CEO takes office, begins gaining knowledge and experience, and is soon launching initiatives that boost the bottom line. Fast-forward a decade, and the same executive is risk-averse and slow to adapt to change—and the company’s performance is on the decline. The pattern is so common that many refer to the “seasons” of a CEO’s tenure, analogous to the seasons of the year.
Tenure (Photo credit: Toban B.)
New research examines the causes of this cycle and shows that it’s more nuanced than that. We found that CEO tenure affects performance through its impact on two groups of stakeholders—employees and customers—and has different effects on each. The longer a CEO serves, the more the firm-employee dynamic improves. But an extended term strengthens customer ties only for a time, after which the relationship weakens and the company’s performance diminishes, no matter how united and committed the workforce is.
We studied 356 U.S. companies from 2000 to 2010. We measured CEO tenure and calculated the strength of the firm-employee relationship each year (by assessing such things as retirement benefits and layoffs) and the strength of the firm-customer relationship (by assessing such things as product quality and safety). We then measured the magnitude and volatility of stock returns. All this allowed us to arrive at an optimal tenure length: 4.8 years.
The underlying reasons for the pattern, we believe, have to do with how CEOs learn. Previous research has shown that different learning styles prevail at different stages of the CEO life cycle. Early on, when new executives are getting up to speed, they seek information in diverse ways, turning to both external and internal company sources. This deepens their relationships with customers and employees alike.
But as CEOs accumulate knowledge and become entrenched, they rely more on their internal networks for information, growing less attuned to market conditions. And, because they have more invested in the firm, they favor avoiding losses over pursuing gains. Their attachment to the status quo makes them less responsive to vacillating consumer preferences.
« These findings have several implications for organizations. Boards should be watchful for changes in the firm-customer relationship. They should be aware that long-tenured CEOs may be skilled at employee relations but less adept at responding to the marketplace; these leaders may be great motivators but weak strategists, unifying workers around a failing course of action, for example. Finally, boards should structure incentive plans to draw heavily on consumer and market metrics in the late stages of their top executives’ terms. This will motivate CEOs to maintain strong customer relationships and to continue gathering vital market information firsthand ».
Que pensent vraiment les PCD de leur C.A. ? Les auteurs Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, Melanie Kusin* et Elise Walton* ont procédé à des entrevues en profondeur avec une douzaine de PCD (CEO) expérimentés et ils ont publiés la synthèse de leurs résultats dans Harvard Business Review (HBR). Essentiellement, les chercheurs voulaient savoir comment les C.A. peuvent avoir une influence positive et devenir un atout stratégique. Ils ont résumé leur enquête en faisant ressortir 5 conseils à l’intention des conseils d’administration. Voici un extrait de cet article très intéressant. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
Over the past several years, in the wake of corporate missteps that have taken a toll on shareholders and communities alike, we’ve heard plenty about how boards of directors should have been more responsible stewards. Corporate watchdogs, investors and analysts, members of the media, regulators, and pundits have proposed guidelines and new practices. But one voice has been notably missing from this chorus—and it belongs to the constituency that knows boards and their failings best. It’s the voice of the CEO.
Harkness Tower, situated in the Memorial Quadrangle at Yale (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
There are reasons for this silence from the chief executive camp. Few CEOs volunteer their views publicly; they know they’d risk looking presumptuous and becoming a target. They realize it would be foolhardy to draw attention to their own governance dysfunctions or seem to reveal boardroom confidences. Meanwhile, people who do make it their business to speak out on governance haven’t made much effort to elicit CEOs’ views. Extreme cases of CEO misconduct have created skepticism about whether CEOs can help fix faulty governance—a dangerous overreaction. Many observers, having seen grandiose, greedy, and corrupt CEOs protected by inattentive or complicit directors, consider excessive CEO influence on boards to be part of the problem. Others may lack the access to CEOs and the level of trust needed for frank conversations. Whatever the reasons, the omission is unfortunate. Not only do CEOs have enormous experience to draw on, but their views are the ones boards are most likely to heed.
We recently tapped our networks to bring CEOs’ opinions to light. We talked to dozens of well-regarded veteran chief executives, focusing on people with no particular reason to resent boards—we didn’t want bitterness or self-justification to color the findings. We wanted to know: What keeps a board from being as effective as it could be? Is it really the cartoon millstone around the CEO’s neck, or does it have a positive influence on the enterprise? What can a board do to become a true strategic asset?
We were surprised by the candor of the responses—even given our comfortable relationships with the CEOs and our assurances that quotes would not be attributed without express permission. Clearly, CEOs believe it is important to address problems and opportunities they’re uniquely positioned to observe. They know that their strategic visions and personal legacies can be undone by bad governance, and they have plenty to say on the subject. We’ve distilled their comments into five overarching pieces of advice for boards.
Don’t Shun Risk or See It in Personal Terms
Do the Homework, and Stay Consistently Plugged In
Bring Character and Credentials, Not Celebrity, to the Table
Constructively Challenge Strategy
Make Succession Transitions Less Awkward, Not More So
« Every board is different. If you serve on one, some of these comments may strike close to home; others may not. As we listened to CEOs and reviewed our transcripts looking for patterns, we identified three important takeaways.
First, contrary to what some critics believe, CEOs do not want to keep their boards in the dark or to chip away at directors’ power. They recognize that they and their shareholders will get more value if the partnership at the top is strong. Great CEOs know that if governance isn’t working, it’s everyone’s job to figure out why and to fix it.
Second, most boards aren’t working as well as they should—and it’s not clear that any of the systemic reforms that have been proposed will remedy matters. Although governed by bylaws and legal responsibilities, interactions between CEOs and directors are still personal, and improving them often requires the sorts of honest, direct, and sometimes awkward conversations that serve to ease tensions in any personal relationship. When strong relationships are in place, it becomes easier for CEOs to speak candidly about problems—for example, if the board isn’t adding enough value to decision making, or if individual directors are unconstructive or overly skeptical. For their part, directors should be clear about what they want—whether it’s less protocol and fewer dog and pony shows or more transparency, communication, and receptivity to constructive criticism.
Third, the best leadership partnerships are forged where there is mutual respect, energetic commitment to the future success of the enterprise, and strong bonds of trust. A great board does not adopt an adversarial, “show me” posture toward management and its plans. Nor does it see its power as consisting mainly of checks and balances on the CEO’s agenda. Great boards support smart entrepreneurial risk taking with prudent oversight, wise counsel, and encouragement ».
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Jeffrey Sonnenfeld*, is the senior associate dean for executive programs and the Lester Crown Professor at Yale University’s School of Management, is the founding CEO of Yale’s Chief Executive Leadership Institute. Melanie Kusin* is the vice chairman of Korn/Ferry International’s CEO practice. Elise Walton*, is a former Yale–Korn/Ferry senior research fellow, consults on corporate governance and executive leadership.
Voici deux vidéos de Lucy P. Marcus* sur la gouvernance et la composition des conseils d’administration. Dans la première, elle explique les principales fonctions des C.A. et l’importance des conseils d’administration.
English: London Business School, UK (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Dans la deuxième vidéo, elle anime une discussion avec Lucy Dimes, PCD de Alcatel Lucent UK & Ireland, à propos des avantages et des désavantages pour un PCD de siéger sur des conseils d’administration.
*Lucy P. Marcus is a board chair and non-executive director who is challenging conventional wisdom inside and outside the board room. She has emerged as the voice setting the agenda on future proofing boardrooms and companies around the world. The CEO of Marcus Venture Consulting, she is Professor of Leadership & Governance at IE Business School and she speaks and writes about boards and leadership. Lucy has been awarded the Thinkers 50 “Future Thinkers” Award.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un articleparu dans la section Boards & Governance du site de Spencer Stuart portant sur un sujet très négligé dans le domaine de la gouvernance des entreprises : La planification de la relève du PCD (CEO).
Comme environ 80% des PCD du S&P 500 sont issus de l’interne, les organisations sont dans une bien meilleure position pour planifier la relève de la haute direction, notamment celle du PCD. L’article s’interroge sur la prédictibilité du succès du PCD et énumère plusieurs facteurs qui contribuent au manque de précision dans la définition des critères de réussite :
« The articulated strategy is too rooted in the present and often includes status quo assumptions, rather than taking a view of where the company needs to be in five to 10 years.
The criteria for the future CEO are not based on a deep, analytical review of the company’s financial performance versus industry peers; nor are they tied to the strategic, organizational and operational levers that the next CEO will need to employ.
Evaluations of succession candidates often are loose and relative to the roles executives are in today rather than mapped to the future. Complicating matters, predicting the likely success of internal succession candidates is even more challenging because the CEO role is vastly more complex than their current jobs ».
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)
Les entreprises doivent se doter d’un processus systématique de recherche et de préparation d’un successeur potentiel. L’article suggère les étapes suivantes. Veuillez lire l’article pour bieux comprendre chaque actions proposée.
■ Focuses on company performance
■ Defines criteria for the next CEO based on future performance drivers
■ Challenges traditional assumptions about succession candidates
■ Assesses succession candidates with a forward-looking lens
« Even as they adopt a more thoughtful succession planning process, boards should remember that no one individual can meet every requirement in equal measure; tradeoffs will be necessary. Boards will be in a better position to navigate these tradeoffs, and increase the odds of a successor coming from within, if they have defined success for the company — and the CEO — through a rigorous review of the performance of the company, its strategic imperatives and the necessary capabilities for the next CEO ».
Le site Boardmember.com, plus particulièrement la section intitulée The Boardroom channel, présente une vaste sélection de vidéos sur la gouvernance des sociétés. Je vous invite à consulter les nombreux vidéos présentés par des experts reconnus dans le domaine de la gouvernance. En voici une liste non-exhaustive :
À titre d’exemple, j’ai choisi un vidéo très pertinent qui présente des entrevues avec des présidents et chefs de la direction (PCD – CEO) d’entreprises connues. Dans ce vidéo, les PCD expliquent les fondements d’une solide relation entre la haute direction et le conseil d’administration. Quelles sont les attentes des PCD envers leur C.A. ?
« A compilation of interviews with respected CEOs. Hear what respected CEOs have to say about characteristics that make for an effective CEO-board relationship and their biggest expectations of their boards ».
Le document ci-dessous présente la problématique, bien réelle, de l’asymétrie de l’information entre les membres du conseil (le Board) et la direction de l’entreprise (le management). Il y a un gap naturel entre ce qui est communiqué par le management et ce qui est requis par le Board pour bien faire son travail. Ce dernier a besoin d’une information de qualité, c’est-à-dire une information complète (quoique synthétique), représentative de la réalité, la plus objective possible et, à jour.
Le rapport, préparé par la NACD (représentant le point de vue des administrateurs) et la firme comptable McGladrey (représentant le point de vue du management), présente un excellent compte rendu des problématiques soulevées par le manque de communication entre les administrateurs et la direction et propose plusieurs pratiques susceptibles de combler le gap d’information. On y présente les résultats des « conversations » issus de quatre panels composés d’administrateurs et de membres de la haute direction. Le compte rendu fait ressortir les principaux problèmes de communication dans les domaines suivants : La stratégie et le risque, la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, la planification de la succession du PCD, et l’évaluation du Conseil.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par cette question, c’est-à-dire les administrateurs de sociétés et les membres des directions d’entreprises, devraient prendre connaissance de ce document afin d’être mieux renseignés sur les moyens à prendre pour pallier l’assymétrie de l’information.
Voici un court extrait du document. Bonne lecture.
« Effective board oversight demands information that is as current and relevant as possible. There are, however, natural gaps between what management communicates and what the board needs to know. The information flow between management and the board may not always be perfect, and board committees may have similar troubles bringing the full board « up to speed » on certain issues. The purpose of this report is to address these issues, which we call the « effectiveness gap. »…
The goal of this report is to offer some tips and strategies to improve communications between the full board, C-suite, and committees. In particular, we focus on four areas of concern: strategy and risk, executive compensation, CEO succession planning, and board evaluations. These four areas are traditionally of high importance to board members yet have also presented challenges.
To help bridge the gaps in effectiveness, it was necessary to speak directly with individuals from both management and the board. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) is able to assess the director perspective, we needed the C-suite perspective as well. We partnered with McGladrey to host four small gatherings of executives and directors in an effort to find ways of improving communications and relationships. The conversations that occurred during these gatherings provided the material for this document ».
Excellente revue, parue dans Bloomberg Businessweek, au sujet de l’interventionnisme croissant des investisseurs institutionnels dans les décisions des conseils d’administration. On assiste à un changement significatif du comportement des grands investisseurs qui se joignent de plus en plus aux groupes d’actionnaires activistes pour exiger des changements dans le management de l’entreprise, plus particulièrement dans la conduite du PCD (CEO). Les PCD sont de plus en plus conscients de l’influence significative des actionnaires et des grands investisseurs dans la gestion de l’entreprise; ils apprennent à reconnaître qui est le réel patron de l’organisation (le C.A., de plus en plus influencé par l’activisme des actionnaires).
L’article résume la situation de la manière suivante : « As big investors press Boards, the number of directors who failed to win majorities in shareholder votes has almost tripled since 2006 ».
“We’re seeing a radical transformation in corporate control and the relationship between management, directors, and investors,” says Harvard Business School Professor Rakesh Khurana. “It used to be shareholders pushing against boards who were buffering the CEOs. But now investors are telling directors who should be the CEO and how management should run the company.”
Who’s the Boss? (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« Calls for more shareholder power aren’t coming just from so-called activist investors—think Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and other financiers who take stakes in companies so they can press for changes. Since the financial crisis, activists are being joined by normally passive investment managers who have long been content to let company managers call the shots. Calls for more shareholder power aren’t coming just from so-called activist investors—think Carl Icahn, Bill Ackman, and other financiers who take stakes in companies so they can press for changes. Since the financial crisis, activists are being joined by normally passive investment managers who have long been content to let company managers call the shots ».
Voici un article très intéressant, paru hier sur le blogue d’Olivier Schmouker, dans Les affaires.com. Cet article commente les donnéees d’une étude scientifique portant sur les corrélations entre les profils de PDG « diversifiés » et la rentabilité de l’entreprise. Les résultats des analyses statistiques sont étonnants : « La corrélation entre un réseau de contacts diversifié du PDG et les gains des actionnaires est forte et positive », indique l’étude. Plus le PDG jouit d’un réseau de contacts diversifiés, plus son entreprise est profitable.
Je vous encourage à lire l’article au complet. L’auteur a fait un travail de vulgarisation remarquable.
performance de l’entreprise (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
« Aujourd’hui, l’un des termes à la mode en matière de management est le mot «diversité». Celui-ci englobe un paquet de choses disparates : la disparité des sexes (ex.: le nombre de femmes qui occupent des postes de haute-direction), la disparité des ethnies (ex.: le nombre de personnes d’origine asiatique au sein de l’entreprise), etc. Et bien entendu, tout le monde s’entend pour dire que plus la diversité est grande, meilleur c’est, quel que soit le domaine concerné ».
« … l’idéal pour une entreprise et ses actionnaires, c’est que le PDG soit ouvert d’esprit, et mieux que ça, aime passer son temps avec des personnes qui n’ont a priori rien à voir avec lui. Un PDG aime prendre une bière avec un artiste peintre, manger sur le pouce le midi en compagnie d’un garagiste, suit trois fois par semaine les cours d’un moine zen, ou encore consacre tous ses congés à des sorties avec son club d’ornithologie? Tant mieux! C’est le signe que les profits vont inévitablement suivre. Du moins, nettement plus qu’un même PDG qui, lui, passerait son temps libre à ne voir que des collègues et autres partenaires d’affaires, et à ne parler que du boulot. Pourquoi ? Oui, pourquoi la diversité est-elle si profitable à tout le monde ? Mme Fang et MM. Francis et Hasan avancent trois explications dans leur étude… »
Comment le C.A. doit-il concevoir la planification de la relève et identifier le futur président et chef de la direction (PCD = CEO) ? Quel est le rôle du PCD dans cette démarche de planification de la relève ? Comment le PCD et le C.A. (comité RH) doivent-ils agir afin de s’assurer que cette importante activité soit accomplie sans susciter de résistance de la part de la personne en charge. L’article montre que le PCD a un rôle fondamental à jouer dans la recherche du meilleur candidat à l’interne et dans sa préparation à occuper la position du premier dirigeant.
#PPwomen level the playing field = asking. More CEOs + inclusion in succession planning. Take risks! (Photo credit: .inKenzo. evonne@amoration)
Il est également clair que c’est la responsabilité du C.A. de s’assurer que l’organisation possède un processus de planification de la relève du PCD, en tenant compte des candidatures externes potentielles. Quoiqu’il en soit, les auteurs sont conscients que c’est une opération délicate et qu’il est crucial de s’assurer de la collaboration du PCD dès le début de son mandat. Ce qui est particulièrement difficile, c’est de travailler à la succession du PCD actuel, en suscitant sa collaboration, en ménageant sa susceptibilité et cela… sans arrêter une date de transition !
L’article publié par Jack ‘Rusty’ O’Kelley III, Jeff Sanders et John Wood dans Heidrick & Struggles Governance Letter montre clairement l’importance pour le C.A. de mettre en place un processus de planification de la relève très tôt après la nomination du PCD.
« While the board ultimately owns the succession planning process, newly appointed CEOs have an opportunity to pleasantly surprise their boards by initiating the succession planning discussion almost as soon as they take office. In fact, we coach new CEOs to introduce the subject no later than their second meeting with the full board. The further out the time horizon for the succession, the more focused the CEO should be on recruiting and developing as many successors as possible. The day to day responsibility for this talent recruitment and development falls to the CEO, but the board should ensure that they are receiving regular talent updates and interacting with the high potential succession candidates to actively monitor the succession process. In one best practice example in a large U.S. company, the board and CEO began planning seven years out from the CEO’s expected retirement in order to ensure multiple internal candidates were ready.
Given the average tenure of CEOs — 8.4 years in 2011, down from about 10 years in 2000, according to the Conference Board — the countdown to succession is getting shorter, and in many cases may be as short as five to seven years. Because even this shorter time frame appears to be so far in the future, it is easy to put off the discussion. Further, CEOs may be understandably reluctant to start talking about their exit almost as soon as they make their entrance.
The board, too, may worry that in bringing up succession almost immediately, they will risk alienating the CEO, on whom so much depends. Nevertheless, this is a conversation that should begin early, and if the CEO does not initiate the conversation, it is the board’s responsibility to do so. They should then establish succession as a regular agenda item and map out how the process will work, thus defusing any personal sensitivities going forward and avoiding any misunderstandings that could result from the board suddenly raising the subject after the CEO has been on the job for a year or two ».
Le choix d’un PCD est la décision la plus importante qu’un conseil d’administration doit prendre. Il est donc impératif de bien connaître les facteurs considérés comme préoccupants lors d’une succession à la présidence de l’entreprise. Les auteurs Nathan Bennett et Stephen A. Miles ont examiné la question et ils ont publié un billet dans Boardmember.com qui mérite cosidération. En fait, ils se sont penchés sur cinq raisons qui peuvent inciter les C.A. à commettre des erreurs et à choisir le mauvais président et chef de la direction (PCD). Voici un résumé des faits saillants de cet article. Je vous encourage à lire l’article qui vous donne plus de détails sur les caractéristiques d’un C.A. susceptible de commettre des erreurs à ce sujet.
« Given its importance to a company’s health, it’s no surprise that CEO succession continues to be a favorite topic in the business press. That iconic companies like Apple, Hewlett-Packard, and GM have recently named new CEOs only adds to the interest. And as troubled firms such as Best Buy and Yahoo! announce new chiefs, Monday-morning quarterbacking around their selections has become a favorite pastime.
There is no shortage of advice around what a healthy CEO succession process looks like. We don’t have an issue with the advice that’s been proffered—it’s all about taking care to ensure a good outcome. Yet in spite of all the attention the topic has received, we contend there is a key missing piece. The missing piece is that the first and arguably most critical step in a succession process is ensuring that the right people are sitting around the table to execute the process. Not only should the board about to make the decision on the next CEO be experienced in such matters, but the interrelationships among the board members should also be healthy. These criteria are often overlooked.
It’s generally assumed that the board is ready for the responsibility of picking the next CEO. It may not be. And when it isn’t, we are concerned that giving the wrong people the right instructions does not foreshadow a good result. »
Voici cinq situations qui peuvent amener les C.A. à commettre des erreurs dans le choix d’un futur président et chef de la direction (PCD).
1. Y a-il un conflit interpersonnel ?
2. Y a-t-il des différences irréconciliables en ce qui concerne la vision du futur de l’entreprise ?
3. Est-ce que le PCD en place a trop d’influence dans la décision ?
4. Le niveau de diversité est-il insuffisant ?
5. Y a-t-il un manque d’expérience du C.A. en matière de sucession de PCD ? »
Lisez cet article de Mike Myatt de Forbes même si vous n’êtes pas un CEO et même si vous n’êtes pas un membre de la communauté d’affaires des É.U. ! Vous en aurez pour votre argent… euh, pour votre temps… Excellente liste des sites WEB les plus pertinents pour les administrateurs et les hauts dirigeants. Les suggestions sont regroupées en cinq catégories. Bonne lecture.
« If you want to shorten your shelf life as a CEO, it’s easy to do – be uninformed and disengaged. There’s a big world out there, and CEOs need to get out of their bubble and go see it for themselves. Too many chief executives live in an isolated world of constant travel, public policy and capital markets road shows, board and executive meetings, and management briefings – everything is filtered, packaged and fed to them. THIS IS A HUGE PROBLEM.
While many CEOs suffer from email, iPad and Smartphone addiction, the time spent on these devices is largely related to email, scheduling and logistics. The big miss here is far too little time is spent using the web as a digital learning medium. Successful CEOs don’t delegate business intelligence, learning, and listening – they do it themselves ».
En résumé, ce qui cause les échecs des présidents et chefs de la direction (PCD) de la grande majorité des entreprises est leur manque de connaissances et de savoir-faire dans le domaine des relations émotionnelles (QE). Cet article publié dans ChiefExecutive.net montre que certaines caractéristiques sont communes aux PCD (CEO) susceptibles de renconter des problèmes de rendement et de relations interpersonnelles.
« Arrogance— you think that you’re right, and everyone else is wrong.
Melodrama— you need to be the center of attention.
Volatility— you’re subject to mood swings.
Excessive Caution— you’re afraid to make decisions.
Habitual Distrust— you focus on the negatives.
Aloofness — you’re disengaged and disconnected.
Mischievousness— you believe that rules are made to be broken.
Eccentricity— you try to be different just for the sake of it.
Passive Resistance— what you say is not what you really believe.
Perfectionism— you get the little things right and the big things wrong.
Eagerness to Please— you try to win the popularity contest ».
« There are no universal ways to prevent failures, except perhaps to be alert for the warning signs. In today’s culture some executives are larger than life and expected to be perfect. Few like to admit they have flaws—even when those around them can plainly see their flaws.
Candid feedback is seen as helpful and a corrective, but who can provide this? Not employees or board members. A confidante, mentor or a trusted coach can help. But in today’s high-pressure environment, leaders need someone they can trust to tell the truth about their behavior. This is where an outside professional executive coach can help leaders reduce or eliminate blind spots and be open to constructive feedback, not only reducing the likelihood of failure, and premature burnout, but also provide an atmosphere in which the executive can express fears, failures and dreams« .
Quelle place doit occuper le VP-RH dans la haute direction d’une organisation (le sommet stratégique) ? Au-delà de toutes les considérations se rapportant à la rémunération, lesquelles sont par ailleurs fondamentales, quelle importance celui-ci doit-il accorder à la culture organisationnelle, et, surtout, quels efforts devraient être consentis à la mise en oeuvre d’un système sophistiqué de gestion des talents ? Comment le responsable de la gestion des ressources humaines (GRH) peut-il se positionner pour faire entendre sa voix auprès du conseil d’administration ?
L’importance qu’occupe le VP-RH dans l’entreprise ainsi que son influence auprès du Board dépend essentiellement de l’importance que le conseil d’administration accorde à toutes les facettes de la gestion des ressources humaines de l’entreprise. Le choix d’un Président et chef de la direction (PCD), attentif à ces aspects, est crucial à cet égard ! Cet article publié par Reza Ghazali dans TheStar.com montre que l’activité de la gestion des talents est très négligée et que le VP-RH n’a, trop souvent, pas la crédibilité requise pour mettre de l’avant cette priorité auprès du conseil. Pourquoi ? Comment corriger cette situation ?
NYC: American Intl Building and Manhattan Company Building (Photo credit: wallyg)
« How many times have you heard the common cry I want to grow and build this organisation but we simply just don’t have the right talent? The realisation that talent shortfalls can constrain growth, impede successful mergers, or derail a strategy has boards paying closer attention to talent topics than ever before. Recognising the competitive advantage a secure pipeline of engaged, diverse, and ready-to-lead talent provides, many corporate boards are extending their reach deep into human resources issues-leadership development, compensation, and succession planning reaching several levels below the chief executive officer.
There’s good reason. Talent scarcity is an obstacle that impacts virtually every large company and people issues have a direct impact on company performance. In the past, companies could bolster their advantage with a superior supply chain, strong product lines, or highly efficient facilities. Today, knowledge and the people who can leverage it are core differentiators. Having talent is not enough. Successful companies identify, attract, develop and retain the right talent effectively and consistently.
By understanding what is driving this change, the chief human resources officers (CHRO) can ensure that they are serving their board’s changing needs, and seize this opportunity to expand the influence of HR inside and outside their company-in some cases, by taking on board-level positions themselves. By that same token, CEOs had better ensure that their CHROs are board-capable and will represent the CEO and the company as a whole. As boards focus on helping to influence corporate strategy in more meaningful ways, the availability and quality of human capital join finance and operations as a risk factor. Boards are also considering whether their companies have the right people to support global growth. This ultimately falls on the shoulders of the CEO and his/her CHRO ».
Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., said in November that Jamie Dimon, chief executive officer of JPMorgan Chase & Co., would be the best candidate to lead the U.S. Treasury Department in a financial crisis.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 