Voici un bref condensé préparé par Roger Baker, de IoD (UK) et diffusé par Béatrice RICHEZ-BAUM, secrétaire générale de European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa), relatif aux nouvelles directives contenues dans un code de conduite à l’intention des firmes conseils en recrutement de cadres et d’administrateurs de sociétés.
Ce nouveau code, dit volontaire, met l’accent sur la reconnaissance des efforts des sociétés du FSTE 350 eu égard à la planification de la relève des administrateurs, notamment des candidates féminines. Cette approche « soft » rejoint tout à fait le courant de pensée britannique en matière de changement dans le domaine de la gouvernance corporative (Comply or Explain).
The new Code of Conduct for Executive Search firms
The new Enhanced Voluntary Code of Conduct for Executive Search Firms gives recognition to those firms who have been most successful in the recruitment of women to FSTE 350 boards. It builds on the terms of the standard voluntary code and will also recognize the outstanding efforts of search firms working to build the pipeline of FTSE board directors of the future.
The Enhanced Voluntary Code was drawn up by the search firms themselves working with the Davies Steering Group. It contains 10 new provisions, from launching initiatives to support aspiring women to sharing of best practice and running awareness programmes within their own firms.
Under the new provisions, it is specified that:
Search firms should support chairmen and their nomination committees in developing medium-term succession plans that identify the balance of experience and skills that they will need to recruit for over the next two to three years to maximize board effectiveness. This time frame will allow a broader view to be established by looking at the whole board, not individual hires; this should facilitate increased flexibility in candidate specifications.
When taking a specific brief, search firms should look at overall board composition and, in the context of the board’s agreed aspirational goals on gender balance and diversity more broadly, explore with the chairman if recruiting women directors is a priority on this occasion.
During the selection process, search firms should provide appropriate support, in particular to first-time candidates, to prepare them for interviews and guide them through the process.
Search firms should provide advice to clients on best practice in induction and ‘onboarding’ processes to help new board directors settle quickly into their roles.
Voici un lien qui vous donnera plus de détails sur ce nouveau code ainsi qu’une vidéo de Viviane Reeding sur l’importance à accorder à l’accroissement du nombre de candidatures féminines aux conseils d’administration des sociétés européennes :
Andrea Ovans, senior editor du Harvard Business Review, a récemment publié un article d’actualité en gouvernance dans HBR Blog Network. L’auteure fait le point sur les études concernant la séparation des pouvoirs entre le PCD et les PCA.
Sa conclusion est qu’il n’y a pas de différences significatives dans le rendement des firmes, sauf lorsque l’on analyse la situation à long terme. Dans ce cas, la séparation des rôles est favorable (40 % vs 31 %) sur une période de 5 ans. L’auteure conclue que la réalisation de rendements supérieurs à long terme, lorsque les fonctions sont séparées, vient de la situation vécue par des entreprises aux prises avec les carences de leurs PCD (CEO).
Sinon, selon Mme Ovans, les résultats seront les mêmes peu importe le système de gouvernance que les actionnaires adopteront ! C’est évidemment une conclusion qui va à l’encontre des principes de bonne gouvernance. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
Il y a cependant un coût élevé à combiner les deux rôles. Le tableau présenté dans le texte ci-dessous est éloquent !
Will Netflix’s shareholders be sorry that they voted to let Reed Hastings carry on as both CEO and chairman? A look through the research on combining and separating out the two roles suggests that, much like most splits in life, the answer is… complicated.
Netflix’s shareholders notwithstanding, most people assume the right answer is to keep the two roles separate, in the interests of diversity of thinking and proper CEO oversight. And that’s how pretty much every research report starts — before going on to explain why it probably isn’t so.
Back in 2006, for instance, in an article in our magazine entitled “Before You Split that CEO/Chair…,” Robert Pozen, chairman (but not CEO) of a Boston-based investment management firm, cited three studies from three different countries (the U.S., the U.K., and Switzerland) which each found no statistically significant difference in terms of stock price or accounting income between companies that split the roles and those that combined them. These findings echoed dozens of previous ones going as far back as 1996.
Harvard Law School Langdell Library in Cambridge, Mass. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Yet over the same period, a steady stream of business thinkers and practitioners offered up reasons (if not data) for why splitting the two roles could cause trouble. In 2003, for instance, in “In Defense of the CEO Chair,”Harvard Law’s William Allen and William Berkeley (who was chairman and CEO of the eponymous insurance holding company) argued that doing so would create two armed camps that would interfere with productivity. Two years later, Jay W. Lorsch and Andy Zelleke similarly argued in the Sloan Management Review that splitting the two roles blurs lines of responsibility, distracts both parties, and creates power struggles.
Maybe that’s why the 2012 research from Matthew Semadeni and Ryan Krause at the University of Indiana’s Kelley School was so widely reported as suggesting that the roles should not be split unless the company is doing badly. But a closer look shows the findings have more in common with the “it doesn’t make any difference” camp than the headlines would suggest.
The study looked at three scenarios, all of which involved what happens when a combined CEO/chair is split. In the first, a sitting CEO/chair gives up the CEO role but remains chairman, essentially making the incoming CEO an apprentice. In the second, the incumbent CEO/chair leaves (voluntarily or not), and the positions are filled with two separate people. In the third, a CEO/chair remains CEO but gives up the chair to another (what the researchers referred to as a demotion). In that last circumstance, if the company was in difficulties, the data indicated that splitting the two roles, so that someone could ride herd over a less-than-ideal CEO, made a positive difference. But in the first two cases, once again, the data found no difference in company fortunes. From this, Krause drew a general if-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it conclusion, not because splitting the roles would cause harm but because when a company is doing well, it doesn’t appear to matter which model you follow.
That same year, though, a more obscure study from GovernanceMetrics International, highlighted by the Harvard Law School Forum, approached the question from a different angle, tracking not just the effects but the costs of splitting the two roles.
The 2012 study looked at 180 North American corporations with a market capitalization of $20 billion or more. Given the complexities of running such large businesses, it was thought, differences in cost and performance of different leadership structures would be especially marked.
And differences there were. Surprisingly, combining the two roles cost more than splitting them – much more. Median total compensation (base salary, bonus, incentives, perks, stock, stock options, and retirement benefits) of executives holding both positions was $16 million. That was nearly 60% more than the median combined compensation ($10.6 million) awarded to the two individuals in companies in which the positions were split. Considering that median income for the chair-only position was just under $500,000, it’s hard not to avoid drawing the conclusion that the order-of-magnitude $5.4 million extra the CEO receives for taking on the additional chairmanship duties is rather a lot. This impression is further strengthened by the fact that the median income for non-independent chairs was $630,930 — more than 50% higher than the $417,910 for independent chairs (making a company run by a separate CEO and independent chair a real bargain).
One might argue that differences in compensation reflect differences in corporate performance, and if that’s the case, it would be a strong argument for combining the two roles. That was so in this study – but only in the short term. Median one-year shareholder returns for companies in which the roles are combined were an impressive 11.65%, compared with a distinctly anemic 2.27% for those in which the roles were separate. Over time, however, performance for the first group lagged and the other improved such that shareholders shelling out for a combined CEO/chair received five-year returns of 31.3% while their counterparts, paying considerably less to both their CEO and chair, were enjoying an even more impressive 39.96% return.
Put all of these finding together, and perhaps the only conclusion one can draw is that the higher long-term returns for companies in which the roles are separate come from struggling companies that take steps to address the inadequacies of their CEOs (or that lower returns in companies where the roles are combined come from allowing a poor CEO too much latitude for too long).
Otherwise, most of the research suggests that Netflix’s fortunes, like most companies, will be what they will be – regardless of whichever governance system the shareholders vote in.
Aujourd’hui, je vous présente les grandes lignes de l’allocution que Mary Jo White, présidente de la US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a exposé devant les membres du Stanford Directors’ College, le 23 juin 2014.
Après avoir brièvement décrit la structure et les fonctions de la SEC, Mme White a choisi d’aborder trois thèmes très importants pour les administrateurs de sociétés :
(1) Le rôle crucial que les administrateurs de sociétés jouent en tant que gardiens des intérêts des actionnaires;
(2) La divulgation des malversations et la coopération avec les investigations de la SEC;
(3) La description du programme de dénonciation (whistleblower) de la SEC, son fonctionnement et ses relations avec le programme de conformité et de contrôle interne de la firme.
Dans ce billet, je présente le point de vue de la SEC eu égard aux rôles fondamentaux que les administrateurs jouent dans la gouvernance des entreprises. Je crois, que comme moi, vous serez intéressé de savoir ce que pense la présidente du plus puissant organisme de surveillance et de régulation des marchés des capitaux au monde. Bonne lecture !
Those of you who are directors play a critically important role in overseeing what your company is doing, and by preventing, detecting, and stopping violations of the federal securities laws at your companies, and responding to any problems that do occur. In other words, you are the essential gatekeepers upon whom your investors and, frankly, the SEC rely. We see you as our partners in the effort to ensure that investors in our capital markets can invest with confidence and, hopefully, success.
At the SEC, we typically use the term “gatekeeper” to refer to auditors, lawyers, and others who have professional obligations to spot and prevent potential misconduct. And while there are certainly other gatekeepers who may be closer to some of the action or more familiar with the details of a transaction or a disclosure document, a company’s directors serve as its most important gatekeepers. For by law, it is ultimately the fiduciary responsibility of the board of directors to oversee the business and affairs of a company.
Seal of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In discharging this important responsibility, it is essential for directors to establish expectations for senior management and the company as a whole, and exercise appropriate oversight to ensure that those expectations are met. It is up to directors, along with senior management under the purview of the board, to set the all-important “tone at the top” for the entire company.
Ensuring the right “tone at the top” for a company is a critical responsibility for each director and the board collectively. Setting the standard in the boardroom that good corporate governance and rigorous compliance are essential goes a long way in engendering a strong corporate culture throughout an organization.
How directors can most effectively instill a strong corporate culture and how challenging it is to do so will vary from company to company. CEOs come with a range of experiences and perspectives. Many, including some here in Silicon Valley, are, at heart, innovators whose day job has come to include being the business leader of a public company. As board members, one of the most important duties you have is to select the right CEO for your company and to ensure that he or she “gets it,” in terms of understanding the importance of tone at the top and a strong corporate culture. Deficient corporate cultures are often the cause of the most egregious securities law violations, and directors, both directly and through the oversight of senior management, play a key role in shaping the prevailing attitude and behaviors within a company.
As a former director and member of an audit committee of a public company, I know the heavy responsibilities you bear and the time-consuming work that is required of you. The best advice I can give for being an effective director is to learn and be engaged. As directors, you must understand your company’s business model and the associated risks, its financial condition, its industry and its competitors. You must pay attention to what senior managers say, but also listen for the things they are not saying. You have to know what is going on in your company’s industry, but also the broader market. You need to know what your company’s competitors are doing and what your shareholders are thinking.
At the risk of hearing a collective groan in response, I would also urge you to consider another outside view that would also be useful to you as a director—the view of your regulators. Listen to what they say publicly is important to them, what is problematic to them. Talk to them. Perhaps visit them. I know of an audit committee chair who visits all of his company’s major regulators once a year, including the international regulators. You may get an earful from time-to-time, but it will be invaluable input for you as a director.
To state the obvious, you must ask the difficult questions, particularly if you see something suspicious or problematic, or, simply, when you do not understand. You should never hesitate to ask more questions, and, always, insist on answers when questions arise. It also goes without saying that you should never ignore red flags. It is your job to be knowledgeable about issues, to be vigilant in protecting against wrongdoing, and to tackle difficult issues head on.
Chair Mary Jo White (Photo credit: Securities and Exchange Commission)
Of course, it is always important for you to know what your shareholders—the owners of your company—are thinking. As most boards today recognize, an open and constructive dialogue with shareholders is not only the right thing to do, but also very helpful in providing perspective on the challenges a company is facing. Many institutional shareholders have unique insights on industry dynamics, competitive challenges and how macroeconomic events are shaping the environment for your company. But it is important not to forget about your other shareholders. There is real value in listening to their views and their voice, as well.
Look thoughtfully at the proposals shareholders are submitting to your company. Ask your management team about them and about the proposals that other companies are receiving that could be relevant to your company. Look at the voting results at shareholder meetings—the percentage of votes for a shareholder– supported resolution or against a management–supported resolution are important, irrespective of whether the resolution is approved, or not.
Ethics and honesty can become core corporate values when directors and senior executives embrace them. This includes establishing strong corporate compliance programs focused on regular training of employees, effective and accessible codes of conduct, and procedures that ensure complaints are thoroughly and fairly investigated. And, it must be obvious to all in your organization that the board and senior management highly value and respect the company’s legal and compliance functions. Creating a robust compliance culture also means rewarding employees who do the right thing and ensuring that no one at the company is considered above the law. Ignoring the misconduct of a high performer or a key executive will not cut it. Compliance simply must be an enterprise-wide effort.
J’ai répertorié un article d’Andrew Saunders paru dans Management Today en juin 2014 qui décrit toute l’importance du rôle de leader du président du conseil d’administration (PCA).
Selon l’auteur, les fonctions du PCA sont de plus en plus reconnues, au point où il est souvent plus facile de trouver un PDG qu’un grand leader du conseil. L’article présente la fonction de PCA comme consubstantiel au succès de l’entreprise et montre les caractéristiques-clés de ces grands leaders.
J’ai souvent fait référence à l’importance accrue des présidents de conseil dans mes billets précédents. Cet article va plus loin, et plus en détail, sur ce qui fait le succès d’un bon patron du conseil.
Voici un extrait de cet excellent article que je vous invite à lire.
« The chief executive may get the glory and the salary, but leading the board is an increasingly important role, requiring subtlety, maturity and an iron grip on the agenda »
By contrast, the chairman’s role is less obvious and much less well understood. The task of running the board rather than running the company can appear limited and process-heavy, a lot of dull admin to be tackled while the CEO has all the fun.
But there is much more to it than that: a good chairman is at least as important for the long-term prosperity of a business as a good CEO, and often harder to find. How different might the outcome at Manchester United have been if veteran manager Sir Alex Ferguson had not been allowed to pick his own successor?
A strong chairman should influence the decision-making process, if not always its outcome, greatly for the better. And yet, by comparison with the wide-ranging executive authority enjoyed by the CEO, the chairman’s powers are distinctly limited.
‘As chairman you only really have absolute control of two things,’ says Roger Parry, the chairman of MSQ Partners and a former chairman of Johnston Press and Future Publishing, among others. ‘Firstly, you have (or should have) a lot of influence over hire and fire – you pretty much get to decide who is on the board.
‘And the second crucial thing is that, in the board meeting, you can control what is discussed and for how long. Not only the agenda itself, but the amount of time to be spent on each item. A good deal of the agenda is fixed – you have to discuss health and safety, performance against budget, remuneration and so on – but the weight of emphasis can be shifted by the chairman.’
GOOD CHAIRMEN
Do
Pick NEDs who are sufficiently diverse and strong-minded to challenge the executive directors.
Maintain a five-year perspective. The executive directors are focused on this year, the senior managers on this month. Your job is to take a longer view.
Support chief execs as best you can, know their personal circumstances, priorities and how long they want to stay.
Put your network and wider business experience at the disposal of the board.
Don’t
Dole out non-exec jobs to your old mates.
Get too chummy with CEOs: if you go on family holidays together, it will be much harder to sack them if and when the time comes.
Pull rank on a director in front of their boardroom colleagues.
Ever let the words: ‘This is how we did it when I was the chief executive …’ pass your lips in a board meeting.
Philippe MASSÉ, agent de développement de l’organisation Leadership Montréal| Conférence régionale des élus de Montréal, m’a récemment fait parvenir les résultats d’une étude réalisée sur les profils d’administrateurs recherchés par les OBNL de la région de Montréal.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’introduction au document en guise de mise en contexte.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Du 21 janvier au 7 février 2014, la Conférence régionale des élus (CRÉ) de Montréal et certains de ses partenaires ont invité des représentants d’organisations à but non lucratif (OBNL) à compléter un questionnaire relatif aux profils d’administrateurs recherchés par leur conseil d’administration. Cette démarche a été réalisée dans le cadre de l’initiative Leadership Montréal. Centraide du Grand Montréal, le Conseil des arts de Montréal et le Comité d’économie sociale de l’île de Montréal (CÉSÎM) ont participé à l’exercice et ont invité leurs membres et partenaires à répondre au questionnaire.
Montreal shining (Photo credit: Clément Belleudy)
Au total, 336 personnes ont répondu au questionnaire. De ce nombre, 264 l’ont complété, soit 78,6 % des répondants. Les données présentées dans ce document ne tiennent compte que des réponses fournies par ces 264 répondants. La démarche effectuée n’est pas scientifique et les réponses obtenues ne constituent pas un échantillon représentatif des OBNL de la région montréalaise. L’utilisation et l’interprétation des résultats doivent donc se faire avec la plus grande réserve. Les pourcentages indiqués reflètent le point de vue des répondants et ne représentent nullement l’ensemble des OBNL.
Vous trouverez ici une synthèse des réponses recueillies ainsi que quelques pistes de réflexion sur les enjeux de la relève au sein des conseils d’administration (C. A.) de la région de Montréal. Ce document compte 5 sections :
(1) Profils des organisations répondantes
(2) Profils des administrateurs recherchés
(3) Relève au conseil d’administration
(4) Attentes face aux administrateurs
(5) Accueil des nouveaux membres et reconnaissance de la contribution des administrateurs.
Voici la présentation de M.Luis A. Aguilar, commissaire à la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Le billet paru dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance sonne l’alarme en ce qui regarde les menaces posées par les cyber attaques et les rôles et responsabilités des conseils d’administration à cet égard.
C’est un article qui met en perspective les besoins d’un changement significatif dans le focus de la gouvernance des entreprises.
Ci-dessous, un extrait de l’introduction à cet article, Bonne lecture !
I am pleased to be here and to have the opportunity to speak about cyber-risks and the boardroom, a topic that is both timely and extremely important. Over just a relatively short period of time, cybersecurity has become a top concern of American companies, financial institutions, law enforcement, and many regulators. I suspect that not too long ago, we would have been hard-pressed to find many individuals who had even heard of cybersecurity, let alone known what it meant. Yet, in the past few years, there can be no doubt that the focus on this issue has dramatically increased.
Cybersecurity has become an important topic in both the private and public sectors, and for good reason. Law enforcement and financial regulators have stated publicly that cyber-attacks are becoming both more frequent and more sophisticated. Indeed, according to one survey, U.S. companies experienced a 42% increase between 2011 and 2012 in the number of successful cyber-attacks they experienced per week. As I am sure you have heard, recently there have also been a series of well-publicized cyber-attacks that have generated considerable media attention and raised public awareness of this issue. A few of the more well-known examples include:
The October 2013 cyber-attack on the software company Adobe Systems, Inc., in which data from more than 38 million customer accounts was obtained improperly;
The December 2013 cyber-attack on Target Corporation, in which the payment card data of approximately 40 million Target customers and the personal data of up to 70 million Target customers was accessed without authorization;
The January 2014 cyber-attack on Snapchat, a mobile messaging service, in which a reported 4.6 million user names and phone numbers were exposed;
The sustained and repeated cyber-attacks against several large U.S. banks, in which their public websites have been knocked offline for hours at a time; and
The numerous cyber-attacks on the infrastructure underlying the capital markets, including quite a few on securities exchanges.
Official portrait of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In addition to becoming more frequent, there are reports indicating that cyber-attacks have become increasingly costly to companies that are attacked. According to one 2013 survey, the average annualized cost of cyber-crime to a sample of U.S. companies was $11.6 million per year, representing a 78% increase since 2009. In addition, the aftermath of the 2013 Target data breach demonstrates that the impact of cyber-attacks may extend far beyond the direct costs associated with the immediate response to an attack. Beyond the unacceptable damage to consumers, these secondary effects include reputational harm that significantly affects a company’s bottom line. In sum, the capital markets and their critical participants, including public companies, are under a continuous and serious threat of cyber-attack, and this threat cannot be ignored.
As an SEC Commissioner, the threats are a particular concern because of the widespread and severe impact that cyber-attacks could have on the integrity of the capital markets infrastructure and on public companies and investors. The concern is not new. For example, in 2011, staff in the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued guidance to public companies regarding their disclosure obligations with respect to cybersecurity risks and cyber-incidents. More recently, because of the escalation of cyber-attacks, I helped organize the Commission’s March 26, 2014 roundtable to discuss the cyber-risks facing public companies and critical market participants like exchanges, broker-dealers, and transfer agents.
Today, I would like to focus my remarks on what boards of directors can, and should, do to ensure that their organizations are appropriately considering and addressing cyber-risks. Effective board oversight of management’s efforts to address these issues is critical to preventing and effectively responding to successful cyber-attacks and, ultimately, to protecting companies and their consumers, as well as protecting investors and the integrity of the capital markets.
Comment, en tant que fiduciaires et stratèges, les membres des conseils d’administration doivent-il aborder l’enjeu le plus critique de la gouvernance : La relève du président et chef de la direction PCD (CEO). C’est un sujet difficile et délicat, un sujet qui requiert toute l’attention des administrateurs, notamment de son comité des ressources humaines.
L’article dont il est question dans ce billet est basé sur les résultats du Global Strategic Leadership Forumqui s’est tenu à Atlanta en 2013 et qui a paru dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.
Vous trouverez un extrait ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !
The World Affairs Council of Atlanta’s 2013 Global Strategic Leadership Forum focused on a critical issue facing boards of directors: CEO succession. As arguably its most crucial responsibility, the board’s process for hiring and developing CEOs must be an extraordinarily thorough one that addresses the complexities of the modern global company. While there is no exact template that fits all circumstances, the board must ensure that its processes and oversight accurately reflects the organization’s future needs, identifies the skills and experience required in today’s complex global economy, and builds and closely monitors a truly robust succession plan.
The critical questions include the following: How can the board best identify what the company most needs and match a candidate to meet those needs? Who among the CEO candidates is most capable of driving the company to greater growth and performance? What are the necessary attributes, contextual experience, and values that will drive effective, positive change in the company and in the industry? Of course, a company’s specific position in its industry and its own history are important distinctions that will impact the answers to these questions. All of these topics must be viewed in the context of the escalating risk factors and competitive forces facing all companies not only in the United States, but in other countries around the world, especially in emerging market countries.
215 px (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The responsibility of the board with respect to CEO succession is a part of the board’s increasing engagement in corporate strategic decision-making and broad operational focus. Because CEO selection and monitoring is carried out in the context of the company’s risk position in all its markets, the board and the CEO should be in full agreement as to the risk appetite of the company, where the company is heading, and how it plans to get there—understood in terms of the short, medium, and long-term strategic horizon.
The Process of CEO Succession is Ongoing
While the search and selection of a new corporate leader is a major event in a company’s life, in fact the CEO succession process is not a time-limited event. Rather, it must be an ongoing process of development and discernment that is constant and systematic, driven by the company’s strategy and core values, and involving the intentional engagement of all of the board members. As boards are becoming increasingly engaged in forming the strategic trajectory of the company, they also are coupling this focus on a longer-range view of CEO succession. Connecting these two principal board duties influences the defining of CEO attributes that will support the implementation of the long-range strategy. The CEO succession process must be seen as an integral part of the broader leadership and talent identification, development, and monitoring system within the organization. Although the board’s legal responsibility resides in selecting and overseeing the work of the CEO, it has an implied responsibility to ensure that a management development system provides a clear way to identify and nurture potential corporate leaders, including a pool of potential CEO candidates. While an outside search for a CEO is also a proven pathway for CEO selection in certain circumstances, the majority of new CEOs emerge from inside the company and, hence, should come out of an established leadership development program….
The Inside/Outside Choice
The company’s current strategic position almost surely will influence the board’s decision on whether to seek a candidate for CEO from inside or outside the company. There are some circumstances in which the board may perceive a real need to find a CEO who can address internal matters of culture and motivation and that may require a different skill set from the previous or current CEO.
While there is a substantial literature on the board’s decision to focus either inside or outside the company for a CEO, there is a broad consensus that the inside candidate is preferred if the company is performing well. The outside candidate may be better if the company is not meeting its strategic objectives or if the company’s competitive position in the industry is not meeting the board’s expectations. While an inside candidate may know the corporate culture quite well, in certain circumstances, including a need for major strategic change, the CEO may need to be an inspirational change manager, a “refresher” for the corporate culture, and a motivator….
Attributes and Values of the Exemplary CEO
As the board evaluates potential CEO candidates, it should systemically and constantly refine the list of specific attributes that the future CEO should possess. Clearly, most boards want a CEO candidate who is a strong leader, who is capable of a high level of critical and holistic thinking, has unquestioned integrity, courage to act, and who perceives the necessity for innovation in products, services, and stakeholder engagement. Four principal attributes at the top of any board’s list should be: operational ability, strategic outlook, congruence with the corporate culture, and a high level of social and emotional intelligence. In all interactions, the CEO must be able to listen and learn, be open to a variety of opinions in his or her approach to decision-making, and operate well under stress. Candidates’ attributes and the board’s evaluation criteria must include the ability to handle key relationships with three “masters” in mind: customers, shareholders, and employees. The board must evaluate the potential CEO’s track record in dealing with these three key, yet very different, constituencies. While these constituencies are not involved directly in the selection process, the CEO candidate’s knowledge of them and how to strengthen ties to them should be a primary consideration in the final decision.
More than ever, the essential attributes list will include an excellent understanding of finance, including a keen ability to articulate where the company’s value is being produced, its capital structure, cost dynamics, asset utilization, and any potential resource gaps. A thorough comprehension of global financial markets is increasingly vital. Moreover, a strong financial fluency will allow the CEO to speak effectively not only with the CFO, but also with analysts and institutional investors.
Beyond industry knowledge and operational acumen necessary to lead an enterprise in a globalized market, today’s CEO must be able to have a full grasp of a wide range of issues including the drivers of the global economy, the complexity of the regulatory environment wherever the company is operating, enterprise risk management including political risk and cultural differences, corporate growth strategies, and current or potential acquisition or merger targets. A major category of concern to any CEO is compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which absorbs a lot of international companies’ corporate resources and must be managed carefully—especially in an era where the rise of whistleblowers, including the malicious ones, is a reality.
All CEOs must have a capacity to look forward, to envision what the future in the industry will look like, and anticipate, to the extent possible, the political and economic developments that may impact the company’s operations and performance. Global fluency and cross-cultural competence are essential ingredients for today’s CEO and some companies look very favorably on candidates who speak languages in addition to English.
Where CEO succession most often goes wrong is when there is not a good cultural fit, when the board uses the wrong metrics for evaluation, when the board does not know the candidate well enough, or when it fails to discerns how the candidate will react in specific and stressful situations. The candidates’ ethics and values must be clearly understood not only on their own, but also in the framework of the corporate culture.
Another critical dynamic in the selection of the CEO is to ensure that the candidate understands the impact of digitalization and the emergence of “big data” on his or her industry and company. Increasingly, the CEO must have a fulsome understanding of technology, especially those technological developments that are or will be impacting the industry….
Ci-dessous, l’extrait d’un article très simple sur les devoirs attendus de la part des actionnaires. Si vous avez décidé d’investir dans une entreprise, vous possédez une part de la propriété de celle-ci !
Il est donc important de lire la documentation fournie par le conseil d’administration et par la direction de l’entreprise afin de vous former une opinion sur sa gouvernance, et vous devriez vous faire un devoir d’exercer vos droits de votes.
L’article récemment publié par The Canadian Press saura-t-il éveiller chez vous le sens de la responsabilité de l’actionnaire ? En ce qui me concerne, j’ai décidé, il y a quelques années, de me faire un devoir de lire les documents préparatoires à l’AGA et de voter, par la poste, sur les items de l’ordre du jour qui sollicitent l’assentiment des actionnaires.
Documents sent to shareholders ahead of the meeting can include the management proxy circular, annual information form and the company’s annual report. The information form and annual report give the financial statements and an update by management on the business and the direction for the company — both key documents for shareholders.
The proxy circular includes information related to the annual meeting, including the nominees for the board of directors and the appointment of the auditors. It can also include shareholder proposals or major changes at the company that require shareholder approval.
Eleanor Farrell, director of the Office of the Investor at the Ontario Securities Commission, says shareholders have the right to vote on matters that affect the company, including the election of the board of directors. “That is a very important governance piece for the company,” Farrell says.
“The board is the one that approves the strategic plan. It sets the direction of the company. They appoint the CEO, they evaluate the CEO and they also approve the compensation plan.” Farrell says if shareholders don’t approve of a nominated director they can withhold their vote and, at most large companies, if a majority of the votes cast withhold a vote for a particular director, that director would be forced to step aside.
“Shareholders in the last few years have certainly become and gotten a lot more powerful and a lot more powers, I would say,” Farrell said. “Corporate governance has been a very big concern for institutional investors, certainly, and companies are much more concerned about corporate governance.”
The information circulars also include detailed descriptions about how much the company’s directors receive in compensation and what the senior executives are paid in salary, shares or options, as well as the size of their bonuses and the value of any other perks. The circular will also include how the board arrived at that compensation as well as comparisons with previous years. Certain provisions, such as how much a chief executive will receive if the company is taken over or if they are let go, are also often included.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous un document de réflexion publié par Sean Lyon* et paru dans la série Executive Action du Conference Board. Ce document partagé et commenté par Denis Lefort, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, fait référence à cinq (5) lignes de défense interne, soit les opérations, les fonctions de surveillance tactiques comme la gestion des risques et la conformité, les fonctions d’assurance indépendante que sont le comité d’audit, l’audit interne et les autres sous-comités du conseil, et, enfin, la direction et le conseil d’administration.
Quatre lignes de défense externe sont aussi proposées, soit: les auditeurs externes, les actionnaires, les agences de notations et les organismes de réglementation.
Le modèle des 5 lignes de défense est aussi comparé au modèle traditionnel des trois lignes de défense.
Finalement, l’auteur insiste sur l’importance pour l’ensemble des lignes de défense d’agir de façon concertée, voire intégrée, pour assurer le succès global des interventions des uns et des autres pour le bénéfice de l’organisation.
Corporate stakeholder responsibility should take intoaccount various stakeholder groups, including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, special interest groups,
communities, regulators, politicians, and, ultimately, society. Consequently, a comprehensive corporate oversight framework should be multi-faceted to safeguard the diverse interests and varied expectations of all stakeholders. Increasingly, stakeholders are demanding oversight that safeguards a multitude of their interests, be they financial, economic, social, or environmental. Such an inclusive approach should include an appreciation of the symbiotic relationship that exists between business, society, and nature.
Michael Oxley , U.S. Senator from Maryland. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Organizations should understand the complexity of this interconnectedness to fulfill their social responsibilities. A holistic focus that includes the various lines of defense approach helps provide different stakeholders with the comfort that their interests are safeguarded, if implemented appropriately. A lines-of-defense framework provides stakeholders with a comprehensive system of “checks and balances.”
The existence of such an integrated framework means that stakeholders can reasonably rely on it to ensure that the organization is fulfilling its fiduciary duties, legal obligations, and moral responsibilities, while creating durable value and sustainable economic performance in the process. For this approach to operate effectively, however, each line of defense must play its part both individually and collectively—fulfilling its oversight duties within a holistic framework.
Accordingly, each line of defense collaborates with and challenges the other (complimentary yet antagonistic) lines of defense, as it acts in its own enlightened self-interest. Enhanced cooperation and communication between these lines of defense should be facilitated by better interaction between stakeholders through regular dialogue which is based on mutual understanding of the organization’s objectives. This, however, must be achieved without allowing respective responsibilities or accountabilities to become blurred in the process.
To strengthen corporate defense capabilities, organizations should consider fortifying the second line of defense, which provides the critical link between operational line management and executive management. For many organizations, this is still perhaps the weakest link in the chain. Unfortunately, in many organizations, the defense activities at this layer are operating in a silo; they are not in alignment with other lines, but rather, operate in isolation, with little or no interaction, sharing of information, or collaboration. The activities of an effective second line of defense must be managed in a coordinated and integrated manner.
Each of the other lines of defense requires differing degrees of fortification, but this perhaps has as much to do with best practices rather than any radical makeover. The goal is to reach a more effective balance between the spirit of guidelines based on principle and the interpretation of guidelines that are legal or more prescriptive.
____________________________________
*Sean Lyons is the principal of Risk Intelligence Security Control (R.I.S.C.) International (Ireland) and a recognized corporate defense strategist. He is published internationally and has lectured and spoken at seminars and conferences in both Europe and North America. His contributions have been acknowledged in the Walker Review ofCorporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Institutions, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)’s Review of the Effectiveness of theCombined Code and the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN)’s ICGN Corporate Risk Oversight Guidelines. In 2010 Sean was shortlisted as a finalist in the GRC MVP 2009 Awards organized by US based GRC Group (SOX Institute) co-chaired by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley.
Je vous propose une lecture parue dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, publiée par Holly J. Gregory du « Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group » de la firme Sidley Austin LLP.
On y décrit les priorités que les conseils d’administration doivent considérer en 2014 :
Les investisseurs institutionnels
Le conseil d’administration
Les priorités
La performance de l’entreprise et l’orientation stratégique
La sélection du PCD, la rémunération, la relève
Les contrôles internes, la gestion du risque et la conformité
As the fallout from the financial crisis recedes and both institutional investors and corporate boards gain experience with expanded corporate governance regulation, the coming year holds some promise of decreased tensions in board-shareholder relations. With governance settling in to a “new normal,” influential shareholders and boards should refocus their attention on the fundamental aspects of their roles as they relate to the creation of long-term value.
Institutional investors and their beneficiaries, and society at large, have a decided interest in the long-term health of the corporation and in the effectiveness of its governing body. Corporate governance is likely to work best in supporting the creation of value when the decision rights and responsibilities of shareholders and boards set out in state corporate law are effectuated.
This article identifies and examines the key areas of focus that institutional investors and boards should prioritize in 2014.
Institutional Investors
Apply a long-term value approach.
Vote on a company-specific basis where possible.
Focus on core issues.
The Board
Despite increased shareholder decision rights and influence, the board’s fundamental mandate remains to direct the affairs of the company. Key areas for boards to focus on include:
Defining board priorities.
Monitoring company performance and setting strategic direction.
Selecting and compensating the CEO and planning for succession.
Attending to internal controls, risk management and compliance.
Preparing for a crisis.
Engaging with shareholders and responding to shareholder activism.
Determining board composition needs and leadership structure.
Board Priorities
Boards determine how to apportion their very limited time based on board responsibilities and the unique needs of the company. Each board must define the priorities that will shape its agenda and determine the information it needs to govern, driven by the needs of the business. Boards add value when they help management cope with the complex context in which the company operates, and when they support management in focusing on the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders.
Active board engagement in overseeing company performance, strategy and the culture of ethics should help to align the company’s approach to compensation, financial disclosure, internal controls, risk management and compliance. Therefore, in most circumstances the majority of board time should be reserved for matters related to company performance and strategy, and the ethical tone within the company.
Outside directors require considerable amounts of information as they get to know the business and the environment in which the company operates. Active involvement in prioritizing the agenda and defining information needs positions outside directors to provide objective guidance and judgment. The board should not leave decisions about the board agenda and information needs to management alone.
Company Performance and Strategic Direction
Challenges for boards include:
Reserving appropriate time for review and discussion of company performance.
Taking an active role in strategic planning while maintaining objectivity. (This is especially critical in enabling the board to assess the positions of activist shareholders versus management’s plans.)
Supporting appropriate long-term investment and prudent risk-taking in the face of significant short-term pressures for immediate returns or other conflicts.
Balancing guidance and support of management with objective assessment and constructive criticism.
Holding management accountable for results in light of the agreed strategy by determining and applying performance benchmarks.
Helping management anticipate and understand the potential for abrupt and long-term changes in the company’s economic, political and social environment.
Testing key assumptions that underpin management’s proposed strategic plans and major transactions, including assumptions about risks.
Maintaining appropriate deference to management on day-to- day operations without becoming unduly passive.
CEO Selection, Compensation and Succession
Challenges for boards include:
Setting goals for the CEO (and other key executives) in line with corporate strategy, objectives and plans.
Providing appropriate support, guidance and deference to the CEO while maintaining objectivity about performance.
Designing compensation to attract and retain talent while aligning it with performance.
Considering the CEO’s contributions in the context of the contributions of the broader team, an issue that will be highlighted with the new pay ratio disclosures.
Discussing management development and succession planning on a regular basis, even regarding a new, young or high-performing CEO.
Understanding and considering shareholder views about CEO compensation and succession without substituting those views for the board’s own objective judgment.
Ensuring that company disclosures adequately communicate the board’s views and activities regarding compensation and succession planning.
Internal Controls, Risk Management and Compliance
Challenges for boards include:
Ensuring that appropriate time is devoted to these key issues without becoming overly focused on controls and compliance.
Using board committees efficiently to address these issues while keeping the entire board appropriately informed and involved.
Remaining vigilant for red flags, which are often a series of yellow flags.
Creating incentives for management to establish and maintain an appropriate control, risk management and compliance environment.
Ensuring that the company has adopted appropriate standards of corporate social responsibility consistent with evolving societal expectations.
Monitoring compliance with legal and ethical standards.
Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.
C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.
L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.
La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes.
La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.
Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études. Bonne lecture.
In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.
In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…
If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:
The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.
Voici un document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.
Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité règlementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace. C’est un formidable document électronique de 130 pages, donc long à télécharger. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.
J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document mais il ne semble pas en exister. Bonne lecture en ce début d’été 2014.
Our business environment provides an ever-changing spectrum of risks and opportunities. The role of the director continues to be shaped by a multitude of forces including economic uncertainty, larger and more complex organisations, the increasing pace of technological innovation and digitisation along with a more rigorous regulatory environment.
At the same time there is more onus on directors to operate transparently and be more accountable for their actions and decisions.
To support directors in their challenging role KPMG has created The Directors’ Toolkit. This guide, in a user-friendly electronic format, empowers directors to more effectively discharge their duties and responsibilities while improving board performance and decision-making.
Key topics :
Duties and responsibilities of a director
Oversight of strategy and governance
Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
Enabling key executive appointments
Managing productive meetings
Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
Voici un ensemble de questions très pertinentes que vous pourriez (devriez) poser avant de vous joindre à un conseil d’administration. Cet article, rédigé par Ellen B. Richstone*, a été publié aujourd’hui dans NACD Directorship; il présente un genre de « check list » qui vous sera sûrement d’une grande utilité au moment de considérer une offre de participation à un C.A.
Je sais, on ne se préoccupe généralement pas de faire un examen (« due diligence ») aussi serré que ce qui est proposé ici mais, si vous avez la chance d’avoir une offre, pourquoi ne pas considérer sérieusement les questions ci-dessous.
C’est un prélude au genre de travail que vous aurez à faire quand vous siégerez à ce conseil : poser des questions !
L’article nous invite à se questionner sur les aspects suivants :
Question 2 (Photo credit: Blue Square Thing)
(1) La mission, la vision, les stratégies, le plan d’action
(2) La dynamique du marché et la part de marché
(3) Les produits
(4) Les compétiteurs
(5) Les clients
(6) Les aspects financiers
(7) Les aspects légaux et l’assurance-responsabilité des administrateurs
(8) Les relations entre le C.A. et la direction
(9) La structure du conseil et la nature des relations entre les administrateurs
(10) Les relations avec les actionnaires
(11) La qualité des produits et services
(12) La qualité des ressources humaines et les relations de travail
(13) Vos valeurs personnelles
(14) Le risque de réputation
(15) Le modèle de gouvernance
Après avoir obtenu des réponses à ces questions, vous devez voir si la culture organisationnelle vous sied et, surtout, si votre contribution peut constituer une valeur ajoutée à ce conseil.
You are considering joining a company’s board. You reviewed the publicly available financial, legal, and business information; spoke with management, internal and external legal counsel, and auditors; and evaluated the D&O policy.
You are all set, right? In fact, this is the beginning of your due diligence process: the hardest questions are the least measurable, but equally and sometimes more important than the measurable ones.
With many questions, a company might not want to share the details until you have actually joined the board. In those cases, focus on whether the board and management have a process in place that supports a thoughtful discussion. In particular, think about these questions against the backdrop of your board value and effectiveness.
______________________________________
* Ellen B. Richstone has extensive board and operating experience, both as a CEO and a CFO, and as a director in companies ranging in size from venture capital-backed to S&P 500, public, and private. She currently serves on the board of the NACD New England Chapter, along with several other boards.
Quels sont les principes fondamentaux de la bonne gouvernance ? Voilà un sujet bien d’actualité, une question fréquemment posée, laquelle appelle, trop souvent, des réponses complexes et peu utiles pour ceux qui siègent sur des conseils d’administration.
L’article de Jo Iwasaki, paru sur le site du NewStateman, a l’avantage de résumer très succinctement les cinq (5) grands principes qui doivent animer et inspirer les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les principes évoqués dans l’article sont simples et directs; ils peuvent même paraître simplistes mais, à mon avis, ils devraient servir de puissants guides de référence à tous les administrateurs de sociétés.
Les cinq principes retenus dans l’article sont les suivants :
Un solide engagement du conseil (leadership);
Une grande capacité d’action liée au mix de compétences, expertises et savoir être;
Une reddition de compte efficace envers les parties prenantes;
Un objectif de création de valeur et une distribution équitable entre les principaux artisans de la réussite;
De solides valeurs d’intégrité et de transparence susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen minutieux de la part des parties prenantes.
« What board members need to remind themselves is that they are collectively responsible for the long-term success of their company. This may sound obvious but it is not always recognised ».
Our suggestion is to get back to the fundamental principles of good governance which board members should bear in mind in carrying out their responsibilities. If there are just a few, simple and short principles, board members can easily refer to them when making decisions without losing focus. Such a process should be open and dynamic.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
An effective board should head each company. The Board should steer the company to meet its business purpose in both the short and long term.
Capability
The Board should have an appropriate mix of skills, experience and independence to enable its members to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively.
Accountability
The Board should communicate to the company’s shareholders and other stakeholders, at regular intervals, a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of how the company is achieving its business purpose and meeting its other responsibilities.
Sustainability
The Board should guide the business to create value and allocate it fairly and sustainably to reinvestment and distributions to stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, employees and customers.
Integrity
The Board should lead the company to conduct its business in a fair and transparent manner that can withstand scrutiny by stakeholders.
We kept them short, with purpose, but we also kept them aspirational. None of them should be a surprise – they might be just like you have on your board. Well, why not share and exchange our ideas – the more we debate, the better we remember the principles which guide our owbehaviour.
De son côté, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (OAAQ) a retenu six (6) valeurs fondamentales qui devraient guider les membres dans l’accomplissement de leurs tâches de professionnels. Il est utile de les rappeler dans ce billet :
Transparence
La transparence laisse paraître la réalité tout entière, sans qu’elle ne soit altérée ou biaisée. Il n’existe d’autre principe plus vertueux que la transparence de l’acte administratif par l’administrateur qui exerce un pouvoir au nom de son détenteur; celui qui est investi d’un pouvoir doit rendre compte de ses actes à son auteur.
Essentiellement, l’administrateur doit rendre compte de sa gestion au mandant ou autre personne ou groupe désigné, par exemple, à un conseil d’administration, à un comité de surveillance ou à un vérificateur. L’administrateur doit également agir de façon transparente envers les tiers ou les préposés pouvant être affectés par ses actes dans la mesure où le mandant le permet et qu’il n’en subit aucun préjudice.
Continuité
La continuité est ce qui permet à l’administration de poursuivre ses activités sans interruption. Elle implique l’obligation du mandataire de passer les pouvoirs aux personnes et aux intervenants désignés pour qu’ils puissent remplir leurs obligations adéquatement.
La continuité englobe aussi une perspective temporelle. L’administrateur doit choisir des avenues et des solutions qui favorisent la survie ou la croissance à long terme de la société qu’il gère. En lien avec la saine gestion, l’atteinte des objectifs à court terme ne doit pas menacer la viabilité d’une organisation à plus long terme.
Efficience
L’efficience allie efficacité, c’est-à-dire, l’atteinte de résultats et l’optimisation des ressources dans la pose d’actes administratifs. L’administrateur efficient vise le rendement optimal de la société à sa charge et maximise l’utilisation des ressources à sa disposition, dans le respect de l’environnement et de la qualité de vie.
Conscient de l’accès limité aux ressources, l’administrateur met tout en œuvre pour les utiliser avec diligence, parcimonie et doigté dans le but d’atteindre les résultats anticipés. L’absence d’une utilisation judicieuse des ressources constitue une négligence, une faute qui porte préjudice aux commettants.
Équilibre
L’équilibre découle de la juste proportion entre force et idées opposées, d’où résulte l’harmonie contributrice de la saine gestion des sociétés. L’équilibre se traduit chez l’administrateur par l’utilisation dynamique de moyens, de contraintes et de limites imposées par l’environnement en constante évolution.
Pour atteindre l’équilibre, l’administrateur dirigeant doit mettre en place des mécanismes permettant de répartir et balancer l’exercice du pouvoir. Cette pratique ne vise pas la dilution du pouvoir, mais bien une répartition adéquate entre des fonctions nécessitant des compétences et des habiletés différentes.
Équité
L’équité réfère à ce qui est foncièrement juste. Plusieurs applications en lien avec l’équité sont enchâssées dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne. L’administrateur doit faire en sorte de gérer en respect des lois afin de prévenir l’exercice abusif ou arbitraire du pouvoir.
Abnégation
L’abnégation fait référence à une personne qui renonce à tout avantage ou intérêt personnel autre que ceux qui lui sont accordés par contrat ou établis dans le cadre de ses fonctions d’administrateur.
Voici une étude internationale publiée par Paul Hastings sur la place des femmes dans les conseils d’administration et sur les contenus des codes de gouvernance eu égard à la parité.
Cette étude couvre plusieurs thèmes concernant le raffermissement de la situation des femmes dans les instances de décision, notamment :
(1) éduquer les C.A. sur les impératifs d’affaires reliés à l’importance de la diversité;
(2) présenter des stratégies d’ouverture de postes sur les conseils d’administration;
(3) créer des réseaux et des banques de candidatures féminines.
Les auteurs font le point sur l’évolution de la situation des femmes dans les C.A., pays par pays. Je vous invite à consulter cet ouvrage afin de vous familiariser avec les règlementations internationales en gouvernance. On y présente un excellent résumé des codes de gouvernance :
Europe continues to be a leader on this issue. In the past year, we saw tangible progress as well as continued debate about the best approaches for promoting greater representation of women on corporate boards. 2013 showed the highest year-on-year change recorded to date in the average number of women on boards of large corporations in European Union Member States, in part due to mandatory quotas. However, several EU countries have pursued strategies other than mandatory quotas to address the gap. Austria, Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, and Sweden favor legislation and corporate codes that allow companies to set their own targets and policies. Recent amendments to the UK’s corporate governance code more explicitly reference gender as a factor in making board appointments. The changes also require that companies report publically on their board member selection process, diversity, and gender policy as well as measurable objectives for implementing and gauging progress. In Germany, the debate over fixed quotas continues within the government and no legislation addressing gender parity is expected this year.
The United States and Canada continue to exhibit only marginal growth in the percentage of women on boards since the 2012 report. However, in the United States, there has been renewed attention and discourse in the public domain regarding the lack of women in the highest echelons of corporate leadership following several op-eds and most notably, Sheryl Sandberg’s book Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead. Notably, much of the discourse has centered on private sector initiatives, rather than mandatory quotas or other legislative solutions.
In Australia, new legislation has bolstered reporting requirements: private companies with 80 or more employees must report annually regarding specific gender equality indicators. The legislation includes potential sanctions such as naming non-compliant companies in national newspapers and jeopardizing such companies’ eligibility for government contracting. In New Zealand, the proposed NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules regarding diversity have been enacted, requiring listed companies to provide a breakdown of the gender composition of their directors and officers.
En rappel, vous trouverez, ci-joint, une excellente publication de la NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors) qui présente les grands défis et les enjeux qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années.
Ce document est un recueil de textes publiés par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. J’ai déjà publié un billet sur ce sujet le 23 juin 2013, en référence à cette publication.
Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !
Voici comment les firmes expertes se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance. Bonne lecture.
Boardroom, Tremont Grand (Photo credit: Joel Abroad)
(1) What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle
(2) KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute
(3) Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies
(4) Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX
(5) Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners
(6) What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP
Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.
Faire affaires avec l’état du Delaware pour incorporer une entreprise comporte sûrement de nombreux avantages puisque plus d’un million d’entreprises ont choisi cette voie.
On entend beaucoup parler des entreprises québécoises qui ont fait ce choix, mais on ne saisit pas toujours les principales raisons qui les ont amenés à agir ainsi.
Le site officiel (en français) du Delaware (Droit des Sociétés du Delaware) nous explique pourquoi 60 % des sociétés listées dans Fortune 500 sont constituées au Delaware. Il faut noter que les particularités du droit des sociétés du Delaware n’intéressent pas seulement les entreprises cotées en bourses aux États-Unis, mais aussi une multitude de grandes corporations internationales, dont plusieurs entreprises québécoises telles que Domtar, Vidéotron, Archambault, Sun Media, Cirque du Soleil, Desjardins, Jean Coutu, Gaz Métro, Bombardier, pour ne nommer que celles-ci. La liste inclue également des OBNL telles que la Croix-Rouge et Greenpeace.
Le site du State of Delaware présente cinq avantages à s’incorporer dans cet état. Dans l’ensemble, la règlementation offre des conditions « facilitantes » aux entreprises, notamment la primauté accordée aux décisions des conseils d’administration et l’application de la règle de l’appréciation commerciale (« Business judgment rule »), c’est-à-dire, la « consécration légale de l’idée que des juges avec de l’expérience juridique ne devraient pas remettre en cause les décisions de gestion que des administrateurs ont prises de bonne foi et de manière réfléchie », même si celles-ci s’avèrent avoir des conséquences financières malheureuses.
Puisque la constitution d’une entreprise au Delaware peut être considéré comme un moyen de défense pour les administrateurs de sociétés – et que le thème est d’actualité – j’ai pensé que les lecteurs seraient intéressés à connaître les raisons de cet engouement.
Voici un extrait du site de l’état du Delaware portant sur le sujet. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
La question est souvent posée—pourquoi le Delaware? Pourquoi ce petit état (le second plus petit aux États-Unis) occupe-t-il une place si grande dans le monde des entreprises? La question a plusieurs réponses, mais la plupart de ces réponses ne correspondent pas à ce que les gens pensent. Par exemple, le Delaware n’est pas un paradis fiscal, le Delaware ne permet pas à des sociétés secrètes d’être exemptées de toute notoriété et d’enquête publique, et le Delaware n’est généralement pas l’option la moins onéreuse pour une constitution. Nous sommes beaucoup plus comme Bergdorf Goodman ou Tiffany que comme Dollar Store. Vous payez pour la qualité et le service.
State Seal of Delaware. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Le Delaware n’est ni un « ami pour les dirigeants » ni un « ami pour les actionnaires »; son but est de conférer aux dirigeants et aux investisseurs des lois optimales pour exercer des activités éthiques et rentables, en opérant un équilibre entre le besoin de flexibilité managériale et les outils forts pour responsabiliser les dirigeants et user de cette flexibilité pour avancer dans le meilleur intérêt des investisseurs. Les juges du Delaware sont impartiaux et ne sont pas influencés par des donateurs aux intérêts particuliers ni par l’évolution des courants politiques. Contrairement à de nombreux autres états, les procès en matière de droit des sociétés sont traités au Delaware exclusivement par des juges professionnels, et non par des jurys.
Le Delaware est l’état de premier plan pour la constitution d’entreprises depuis le début des années 1990. Aujourd’hui, plus d’un million d’entreprises se sont constituées au Delaware. Bien que le nombre d’entreprises constituées au Delaware soit impressionnant, encore plus important est le fait que de nombreuses grandes sociétés importantes dont les actions sont cotées sur un marché financier majeur sont constituées au Delaware. En effet, plus de 60 pourcent des sociétés listées dans Fortune 500 sont constituées au Delaware. Cependant, la constitution au Delaware est ouverte non seulement aux entités américaines—les sociétés du monde entier peuvent tirer bénéfice des avantages du Delaware. [Voir Au-delà des Frontières: les Avantages du Delaware pour les Entreprises Internationales.]
La primauté du Delaware en matière de constitution de personnes morales résulte d’un certain nombre de facteurs.
Premièrement, la loi—la Delaware General Corporation Law (« DGCL ») est la base sur laquelle repose la législation du Delaware en matière de droit des sociétés. [Voir Les Lois Habilitantes et Solides du Delaware.] La DGCL offre de la prévisibilité et de la stabilité. Elle est conçue par des experts du droit des sociétés et est protégée de l’influence de groupes aux intérêts particuliers. Le législateur du Delaware revoit annuellement la DGCL pour s’assurer de sa capacité à rencontrer les problèmes actuels.
La DGCL est également une loi habilitante. Le droit des sociétés du Delaware ne fournit pas un corps de règles détaillées, normatives comme dans d’autres états. A la place, la DGCL comporte quelques exigences impératives importantes pour protéger les investisseurs et, par ailleurs, procure de la flexibilité aux sociétés pour mener leurs affaires. Le Delaware s’est également inspiré des principes de la DGCL pour créer des lois applicables à des personnes morales autres que les sociétés. [Voir Les Alternatives du Delaware aux Sociétés.]
Deuxièmement, les cours—aussi importants que la loi elle-même car les cours l’interprètent. Le Delaware est mondialement connu pour son système juridictionnel et ses juges expérimentés et impartiaux qui tranchent les affaires en matière de droit des sociétés. [Voir La Résolution des Litiges à la Delaware Court of Chancery et la Delaware Supreme Court.] La Delaware Court of Chancery est une cour qui applique les principes d’equity qui a une compétence particulière en matière de litiges en droit des sociétés. Dépourvue de jurys, et composée de seulement cinq juristes experts sélectionnés via un processus de sélection bipartisan, basé sur le mérite, la Court of Chancery est flexible, réceptive, appliquée et efficace. Les litiges soumis à la Court of Chancery peuvent directement faire l’objet d’un appel devant la Delaware Supreme Courte, laquelle détient le dernier mot sur le droit du Delaware. La Supreme Court a cinq juges, chacun d’entre eux ayant une expérience considérable en matière de droit des affaires du Delaware. Les cours du Delaware offrent également un certain nombre d’options pour résoudre les conflits en dehors du procès. [Voir Les Options du Delaware en Matière de Modes Alternatifs de Résolution des Conflits.]
Troisièmement, la jurisprudence—la Court of Chancery et la Delaware Supreme Court ont toutes deux une tradition historique de rendre des opinions écrites réfléchies à l’appui de leurs décisions, permettant ainsi à un important corpus de jurisprudence de s’accumuler pendant des décennies. Des juges, et non des jurys, tranchent tous les litiges en matière de droit des sociétés et doivent motiver leurs décisions. La jurisprudence qui en résulte constitue un guide détaillé et substantiel pour les sociétés et leurs conseils.
L’un des principes clés mis en place par la jurisprudence du Delaware est la « business judgment rule« , qui est une consécration légale de l’idée que des juges avec de l’expérience juridique ne devraient pas remettre en cause les décisions de gestion que des administrateurs ont prises de bonne foi et de manière réfléchie—alors même qu’elles tournent mal. A côté de cette « business judgment rule », la jurisprudence prévoit des lignes directrices pour les administrateurs pour assurer le respect de leurs obligations fiduciaires de loyauté et de précaution. [Voir La Méthode du Delaware: Respect des Décisions Commerciales des Administrateurs qui Agissent avec Loyauté et Précaution.]
Quatrièmement, la tradition légale—combiné à un système judiciaire sophistiqué, le Delaware a une réserve d’avocats experts en droit des sociétés du Delaware. Les lois et la jurisprudence du Delaware fournissent une base de connaissance pour les avocats qui se spécialisent dans les questions transactionnelles au Delaware et qui pratiquent devant les cours du Delaware. Ces professionnels aident également le législateur en révisant de manière continue les lois en matière de droit des affaires et en proposant annuellement des modifications afin de maintenir à jour le droit du Delaware. [Voir Les Lois Habilitantes et Solides du Delaware.] Peu importe l’endroit où une entité du Delaware a son siège social, elle peut trouver au Delaware des avocats experts afin de l’aider à naviguer à travers les difficultés inhérentes au droit du Delaware.
Cinquièmement, le Delaware Secretary of State—la Division of Corporations du Delaware Secretary of State’s Office existe pour fournir aux sociétés et à leurs conseils un service rapide et efficace. Les constitutions de sociétés constituent la majeure parties des revenus de l’Etat, le Delaware prend donc son rôle au sérieux. Les fonctionnaires du Département des Sociétés se comportent comme les employés d’un service commercial, et la Division of Corporations remplit les standards internationaux de qualité comme en témoigne sa certification ISO 9001.
La Division of Corporations du Delaware est ouvert 15 heures par jour afin de répondre aux demandes de dépôt provenant du monde entier; il offre des services personnalisés et accélérés (en ce compris des services en une heure, deux heures, et 24 heures) pour des dossiers urgents et dont le timing est une question sensible. [Voir Constituer une Société au Delaware.] La Division of Corporations, conjointement avec des avocats experts et expérimentés venant du Delaware qui sont au soutien des entreprises tels que les intermédiaires enregistrés du Delaware, peuvent gérer presque toutes les situations.
Ce matin, je tente de répondre à de nombreuses interrogations concernant le rôle et les fonctions d’un secrétaire du conseil. En premier lieu, voici une présentation faite par Richard Leblanc auprès des membres de la Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries (CSCS) – Société canadienne des secrétaires corporatifs (SCSC) lors d’un panel à Toronto.
Je constate que le président du conseil est un acteur clé dans la conduite des activités des secrétaires. Comme le président assume la responsabilité des communications entre le conseil et la direction, son rôle se confond souvent avec celui de secrétaire.
C’est le président qui établit l’ordre du jour avec le PCD et qui, souvent, rédige ou supervise étroitement les procès-verbaux, une tâche normalement accomplie par le secrétaire. Ainsi, dans beaucoup de cas, le secrétaire joue le rôle d’adjoint au président du conseil pour la gestion administrative des affaires du conseil.
Français : Cabinet du Secrétaire Perpétuel de l’Académie nationale de Médecine, Paris, France (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
En cherchant à connaître davantage la description de tâche d’un secrétaire du conseil, j’ai trouvé, parmi les publications de notre partenaire IFA (Institut Français des Administrateurs), un document qui répond très bien à cette préoccupation et qui peut convenir à tous les types d’organisations.
Le document de l’IFA est le fruit d’une enquête menées auprès de 149 secrétaires du conseil; il traite (1) du statut, (2) de la fonction, (3) des moyens et (4) du profil du secrétaire du conseil. Vous pouvez télécharger le document au bas du communiqué de l’IFA.
Les fonctions de Secrétaire du Conseil et des comités du conseil, couvrent par ordre d’importance, les travaux suivants :
rédige les procès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil et s’assure avant leur approbation qu’ils reflètent fidèlement le déroulement des séances ;
est en relation avec les administrateurs en dehors du Conseil, répond à leurs questions, s’assure de leur présence pour le quorum, suit leurs questions matérielles et réglementaires (jetons de présence, suivi des déclarations pour les opérations sur titres etc.) ;
met au point le calendrier des réunions du Conseil, prépare les ordres du jour et convoque les administrateurs ;
prépare l’ordre du jour et organise le déroulement de la séance du Conseil avec le Président ;
prépare ou contribue à l’élaboration des différents documents mis à la disposition des actionnaires en vue de l’Assemblée Générale ;
organise matériellement les réunions, y compris hors du siège social ;
surveille les règles de déontologie et de conformité ;
organise le processus d’évaluation du fonctionnement du Conseil ;
assure le suivi des relations avec les actionnaires individuels, les institutionnels;
est le « Gardien de la gouvernance dans le Groupe » et
assure le secrétariat du Conseil de chaque filiale.
Voici les recommandations qui émanent de cette enquête :
1. La fonction de Secrétaire du Conseil doit être formalisée par le Conseil (plutôt que par des textes réglementaires). Son rôle doit être défini dans le Règlement Intérieur du Conseil et sa nomination entérinée lors d’une séance du Conseil.
2. Lorsque des comités spécialisés existent, il est recommandé que le Secrétaire du Conseil soit aussi le secrétaire de tous les comités. Dans le cas contraire, des comptes rendus des travaux de chaque comité doivent être établis et le Secrétaire du Conseil doit en être destinataire.
3. Dans les entreprises cotées, son poste doit évoluer vers un poste à plein temps et les moyens nécessaires à l’exercice de sa fonction doivent lui être donnés. Budgétairement et en comptabilité analytique, un centre de coût spécifique doit lui être attribué (frais de missions, de formation, jetons de présence …)
4. Le Secrétaire du Conseil doit être disponible et, si possible, rattaché directement au Président du Conseil (exécutif ou non) afin de favoriser une plus grande indépendance et un meilleur fonctionnement du Conseil.
5. Si son poste n’est pas à plein temps, il peut être rattaché à d’autres directions dans le cadre de ses autres fonctions.
6. Il est apparu utile qu’un lieu permanent de rencontre et d’échange (mais aussi d’information et de formation) soit mis à la disposition des Secrétaires du Conseil dans le cadre de l’IFA.
La formation en gouvernance est de plus en plus un préalable à l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés. L’article retenu montre que l’apprentissage sur le tas est en voie de disparition dans les conseils d’administration de grandes sociétés. La formation préparatoire peut prendre différentes formes : training sur mesure, coaching, séminaires, etc.
Cependant, il semble de plus en plus évident que les programme de formation en gouvernance (tels que IoD, C.dir., ASC, IAS) menant à une certification reconnue, constituent la voie à suivre dans le futur.
L’article de Hannah Prevett, paru dans le Sunday Times, montre que les formations organisées sont de meilleurs endroits pour un apprentissage de qualité que les tables de conseils d’administration… Bonne lecture !
Diplômés ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés 2012
The received wisdom is that new directors learn on the job. If they are not equipped with the necessary skills when they accept their first board appointment, they will need to be quick on the uptake.
Not any more: the tidal wave of new governance requirements means it is not good enough to acquire expertise over time. And, as a result, many prospective boardroom stars are seeking training to help them do the job they’re paid to do from day one. When Alan Kay learnt he was to join the executive board of Costain in 2003, he immediately began considering how to prepare for his new role at the engineering and construction group.
“A lot of people haven’t really thought about how to prepare for a board role. [They think] it’s something that happens naturally: you get on the board and then you think, I’m going to learn on the job,” said Kay, who is Costain’s technical and operations director. “But once you’re appointed, becoming competent and learning as you go takes several months, which is not ideal.”
He researched training options for new board members and came across the Institute of Directors’ accredited programmes, including the certificate and diploma in company direction. The IoD fills 6,000 places on such courses annually with representatives of both large and small organisations — not all of them young guns, as Roger Barker, head of corporate governance at the IoD, explained.
“The directors of large organisations were reluctant to undertake any form of formalised director training. These were typically seasoned former executives, with extensive experience of serving on boards as chief executives or chief financial officers. It has been difficult to persuade such individuals that director training is relevant to them,” said Barker.
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* En reprise
Articles d’intérêt reliés au thème de la formation en gouvernance
Voici un excellent article publié par Jeffrey Gandz, Mary Crossan, Gerard Seijts et Mark Reno* dans la revue Ivey Business Journal. Les auteurs insistent sur trois critères d’évaluation du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés : (1) compétences, (2) engagement et (3) caractère.
Bien que ces trois critères soient déterminants dans l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur, la dimension la plus difficile à appréhender est le leadership qui se manifeste par le « caractère » d’un administrateur.
Les auteurs décrivent 11 caractéristiques-clés dont il faut tenir compte dans le recrutement, la sélection, l’évaluation et la rotation des administrateurs.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article. En voici un extrait. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« When it comes to selecting and assessing CEOs, other C-suite level executives or board members, the most important criteria for boards to consider are competencies, commitment and character. This article focuses on the most difficult of these criteria to assess – leadership character – and suggests the eleven key dimensions of character that directors should consider in their governance roles ».
Competencies matter. They define what a person is capable of doing; in our assessments of leaders we look for intellect as well as organizational, business, people and strategic competencies. Commitment is critical. It reflects the extent to which individuals aspire to the hard work of leadership, how engaged they are in the role, and how prepared they are to make the sacrifices necessary to succeed. But above all, character counts. It determines how leaders perceive and analyze the contexts in which they operate. Character determines how they use the competencies they have. It shapes the decisions they make, and how these decisions are implemented and evaluated.
Seasonal Reflection on Ivey Business building (Photo credit: Marc Foster)
Focus on character
Our research has focused on leadership character because it’s the least understood of these three criteria and the most difficult to talk about. Character is foundational for effective decision-making. It influences what information executives seek out and consider, how they interpret it, how they report the information, how they implement board directives, and many other facets of governance.
Within a board, directors require open, robust, and critical but respectful discussions with other directors who have integrity, as well as a willingness to collaborate and the courage to dissent. They must also take the long view while focusing on the shorter-range results, and exercise excellent judgment. All of these behaviors hinge on character.
Our research team at Ivey was made very conscious of the role of character in business leadership and governance when we conducted exploratory and qualitative research on the causes of the 2008 financial meltdown and the subsequent recession. In focus groups and conference-based discussions, where we met with over 300 business leaders on three continents, participants identified character weaknesses or defects as being at the epicenter of the build-up in financial-system leverage over the preceding decade, and the ensuing meltdown. Additionally, the participants identified leadership character strengths as key factors that distinguished the companies that survived or even prospered during the meltdown from those that failed or were badly damaged.
Participants in this research project identified issues with character in both leadership and governance. Among them were:
Overconfidence bordering on arrogance that led to reckless or excessive risk-taking behaviors
Lack of transparency and in some cases lack of integrity
Sheer inattention to critical issues
Lack of accountability for the huge risks associated with astronomical individual rewards
Intemperate and injudicious decision-making
A lack of respect for individuals that actually got in the way of effective team functioning
Hyper-competitiveness among leaders of major financial institutions
Irresponsibility toward shareholders and the societies within which these organizations operated.
These character elements and many others were identified as root or contributory causes of the excessive buildup of leverage in financial markets and the subsequent meltdown. But the comments from the business leaders in our research also raise important questions about leadership character. Among them:
What is character? It’s a term that we use quite often: “He’s a bad character”; “A person of good character”; “A character reference.” But what do we really mean by leadership “character”?
Why is it so difficult to talk about someone’s character? Why do we find it difficult to assess someone’s character with the same degree of comfort we seem to have in assessing their competencies and commitment?
Can character be learned, developed, shaped and molded, or is it something that must be present from birth – or at least from childhood or adolescence? Can it change? What, if anything, can leaders do to help develop good character among their followers and a culture of good character in their organizations?
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*Jeffrey Gandz is a Professor of Strategic Leadership and Managing Director, Program Design, in Ivey Business School’s Executive Development division at Western University, Mary Crossan is Professor of Strategic Management and the Taylor/Mingay Chair in Business Policy at Ivey Business School, Gerard Seijts is a Professor of Organizational Behavior, holds the Ian O. Ihnatowycz Chair in Leadership, and is Executive Director of the Ian O. Ihnatowycz Institute of Leadership at the Ivey Business School, Mark Reno is a post-doctoral fellow at Ivey Business School working on several leadership-related projects.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 