Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une présentation Power Point que Richard Leblanc a livrée à la conférence annuelle de la Canadian Society of Corporate Secretaries, le 21 août 2013 à Halifax, NS.
Cette présentation aborde tous les points chauds dans le domaine de la rémunération des hauts dirigeants. Richard a eu la générosité de mettre cette présentation en ligne via le groupe de discussion Boards & Advisors. Il s’agit d’une mine d’information pour toute personne intéressée par l’influence de la gouvernance sur les rémunérations des dirigeants.
President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announce new limits on executive compensation. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Si vous êtes intéressés par certains aspects plus spécifiques de ces questions, je suis assuré qu’il se fera un plaisir de vous donner de plus amples informations. Voici un résumé des 10 thèmes abordés dans cette présentation. Bonne lecture.
1. Red flags and best practices;
2. Shareholder engagement and activism;
3. Changes to executive compensation;
4. Compensation of oversight functions (Canada, FSB);
5. Internal pay equity (coming in August);
6. Independent director compensation: Case;
7. Incorporating LT NF metrics into compensation: Case;
Voici les résultats d’une étude empirique réalisée par un groupe de chercheurs éminents : Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, Alon Brav, Duke University, et Wei Jiang, Columbia Business School, et publiée dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation le 19 août 2013. Selon les auteurs, cette étude démontre que les activités des investisseurs activistes (Hedge Funds) n’ont pas d’effets négatifs sur les intérêts à long-terme des entreprises et de leurs actionnaires.
Les résultats de l’étude indiquent que les comportements des actionnaires activistes ont même des effets positifs à long terme, contrairement aux prétentions de plusieurs opposants de ces activités insuffisamment règlementées. Nous avons souvent discuté de cette problématique sur notre blogue mais c’est la première fois que nous présentons les résultats d’une recherche scientifique aussi importante.
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du résumé de cette étude en consultant le document ci-dessous.
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent “royalement” :
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements “court-termistes” […].
Voici un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism. Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document sont les suivantes :
(1) La gestion avec une perspective court-termiste représente-t-elle un problème sérieux ?
(2) Les investisseurs activistes sont-ils des joueurs court-termistes dont les actions ont des conséquences négatives pour les entreprises à long terme ?
(3) Les conseils d’administration des sociétés canadiennes doivent-ils être mieux protégés des actions des investisseurs activistes et des offres d’achat hostiles ? […]
J’ai choisi de partager avec les lecteurs un article de Holly J. Gregory, associé de Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru sur le blogue de Harvard Law School Forum (HLSF) on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce billet présente un solide argumentaire en faveur de la préservation d’un juste équilibre entre les principaux acteurs de la gouvernance : les actionnaires, les administrateurs, les managers, les conseillers et les autorités règlementaires.
Il est clair que le conseil d’administration, élu par les actionnaires, a toujours la responsabilité de l’orientation, de la surveillance et du suivi de l’organisation. Mais l’environnement de la gouvernance a changé et les actionnaires peuvent maintenant se référer aux avis exprimés par les firmes spécialisées de conseils en procuration pour mieux faire entendre leurs voix.L’auteur tente de clarifier les rôles de tous les acteurs en insistant sur les équilibres fragiles à préserver dans la gouvernance des sociétés […]
Dans ce billet, nous présentons une solide prise de position sur le comportement des fonds activistes (“hedge funds”) par Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, et publiée dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. L’auteur montre comment les fonds activistes peuvent souvent agir en fonction d’intérêts contraires aux actionnaires. L’auteur soulève une multitude de questions qui doivent trouver des réponses adéquates […]
Voici une excellente revue, parue dans Bloomberg Businessweek, au sujet de l’interventionnisme croissant des investisseurs institutionnels dans les décisions des conseils d’administration. On assiste à un changement significatif du comportement des grands investisseurs qui se joignent de plus en plus aux groupes d’actionnaires activistes pour exiger des changements dans le management de l’entreprise, plus particulièrement dans la conduite du PCD (CEO).
Les PCD sont de plus en plus conscients de l’influence significative des actionnaires et des grands investisseurs dans la gestion de l’entreprise; ils apprennent à reconnaître qui est le réel patron de l’organisation (le C.A., de plus en plus influencé par l’activisme des actionnaires).
L’article résume la situation de la manière suivante : “As big investors press Boards, the number of directors who failed to win majorities in shareholder votes has almost tripled since 2006″. […]
Dans son blogue, Governance Gateway, Richard Leblanc exprime son point de vue (1) sur les raisons qui incitent les actionnaires activistes à intervenir dans les activités des entreprises, et (2) sur le concept d’actionnariat au sens large. L’auteur tente de répondre à plusieurs questions fondamentales :
Quelles sont les responsabilités des conseils d’administration dans les cas d’activisme des actionnaires et d’offres d’achat non-sollicitées ?
Quel est le devoir du C.A. envers les actionnaires … et envers les parties prenantes ?
Comment définir la “valeur” des actionnaires ?
Quelle est la place des consultants dans ce processus ?
Autant de questions auxquelles l’auteur tente d’apporter des réponses sensés. Ce sont des prises de positions qui peuvent avoir de grandes incidences sur le modèle de gouvernance existant ! […]
Le Conference Board publie un compte rendu d’experts sur l’activisme des actionnaires en période d’incertitude. The recent Governance Watch webcast, Shareholder Activism in Uncertain Times, raised important questions for both management and boards to consider in the midst of an economic climate that is making many companies particularly. […]
Ci-dessous un extrait de l’article de Bebchuket al.
We recently completed an empirical study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, that tests the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance – the claim that interventions by activist shareholders, and in particular activist hedge funds, have an adverse effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. While this “myopic activists” claim has been regularly invoked and has had considerable influence, its supporters have thus far failed to back it up with evidence. Our study presents a comprehensive emp irical investigation of this claim. Our findings have important policy implications for ongoing policy debates on corporate governance and the rights and role of shareholders…
… Our study uses a dataset consisting of the full universe of approximately 2,000 interventions by activist hedge funds during the period 1994–2007. We identify for each activist effort the month (the intervention month) in which the activist initiative was first publicly disclosed (usually through the filing of a Schedule 13D). Using the data on operating performance and stock returns of public companies during the period 1991-2012, we track the operating performance and stock returns for companies during a long period – five years – following the intervention month. We also examine the three-year period that precedes activist interventions and that follows activists’ departure.
Hauser Hall (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Starting with operating performance, we find that operating performance improves following activist interventions and there is no evidence that the improved performance comes at the expense of performance later on. During the third, fourth, and fifth year following the start of an activist intervention, operating performance tends to be better, not worse, than during the pre-intervention period. Thus, during the long, five-year time window that we examine, the declines in operating performance asserted by supporters of the myopic activism claim are not found in the data. We also find that activists tend to target companies that are underperforming relative to industry peers at the time of the intervention, not well-performing ones.
We then turn to stock returns following the initial stock price spike that is well-known to accompany activist interventions. We first find that, consistent with the results obtained with respect to pre-intervention operating performance, targets of activists have negative abnormal returns during the three years preceding the intervention. We then proceed to examine whether, as supporters of the myopic activism claim believe, the initial stock price reflects inefficient market pricing that fails to reflect the long-term costs of the activist intervention and is thus followed by stock return underperformance in the long term.
In investigating the presence of negative abnormal returns during this period, we employ three standard methods used by financial economists for detecting stock return underperformance. In particular, the study examines: first, whether the returns to targeted companies were systematically lower than what would be expected given standard asset pricing models; second, whether the returns to targeted companies were lower than those of “matched” firms that are similar in terms of size and book to market; and, third, whether a portfolio based on taking positions in activism targets and holding them for five years underperforms relative to its risk characteristics. Using each of these methods, we find no evidence of the asserted reversal of fortune during the five-year period following the intervention. The long-term underperformance asserted by supporters of the myopic activism claim, and the resulting losses to long-term shareholders resulting from activist interventions, are not found in the data.
We also analyze whether activists cash out their stakes before negative stock returns occur and impose losses on remaining long-term shareholders. Because activist hedge funds have been documented to deliver adequate returns to their own investors, such a pattern is a necessary condition for long-term shareholders being made worse off by activist interventions. We therefore examine whether targets of activist hedge funds experience negative abnormal returns in the three years after an activist discloses that its holdings fell below the 5% threshold that subjects investors to significant disclosure requirements. Again using the three standard methods for detecting the existence of abnormal stock returns, we find no evidence that long-term shareholders experience negative stock returns during the three years following the partial or full cashing out of an activist’s stake.
We next turn to examine the two subsets of activist interventions that are most resisted and criticized – first, interventions that lower or constrain long-term investments by enhancing leverage, beefing up shareholder payouts, or reducing investments and, second, adversarial interventions employing hostile tactics. In both cases, interventions are followed by improvements in operating performance during the five-year period following the intervention, and no evidence is found for the adverse long-term effects asserted by opponents.
Finally, we examine whether activist interventions render targeted companies more vulnerable to economic shocks. In particular, we examine whether companies targeted by activist interventions during the years preceding the financial crisis were hit more in the subsequent crisis. We find no evidence that pre-crisis interventions by activists were associated with greater declines in operating performance or higher incidence of financial distress during the crisis.
Our findings that the data does not support the claims and empirical predictions of those holding the myopic activism view have significant implications for ongoing policy debates. Going forward, policymakers and institutional investors should not accept the validity of assertions that interventions by hedge funds are followed by long-term adverse consequences for companies and their long-term shareholders. The use of such claims as a basis for limiting shareholder rights and involvement should be rejected.
*Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Alon Brav is Professor of Finance at Duke University. Wei Jiang, Professor of Finance at Columbia Business School. This post is based on their study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, available here. An op-ed about the article published in the Wall Street Journal summarizing the results of the study is available here.
Voici un article publié dans Branav (Shareholder advisory services) le 15 août 2013. L’auteur explique comment fonctionne deux moyens de défense spécifiques conçus pour contrer l’activisme excessif de certains investisseurs (selon la direction et le C.A.).
Avis préalable (Advanced Notice) :
Ensure that a minimum amount of notice is given by shareholders who wish to nominate alternate individuals to a board prior to the date of a shareholder meeting. In Canada that advanced notice typically means between 30-65 days in advance of a scheduled shareholder meeting. The bottom line effect of this policy is to eliminate the risk of an ambush proxy contest (of which I’ve been involved with a few), as failure to provide notice denies the right to have alternate nominations.
Raffermissement du quorum (Enhanced Quorum) :
Enhanced Quorum means introducing a by-law specifying, when the majority composition of a board is at stake, that a minimum quorum of 50% of a company’s issued & outstanding shares be involved in the director election.
Si ces deux approches vous intéressent, je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.
Boards should strongly consider introduction of these measures as it’s a lot cheaper than being blindsided by a potential proxy fight. Both of these measures provide significant protection for boards to ensure they can continue to focus on delivering shareholder value and not be distracted by potential nuisance activists, while not impeding or entrenching boards and their still being accountable to shareholders.
I’m not certain why large/mega cap companies in any sector would also not want to avail themselves of both of these measures if they have the ability as I don’t see a downside. The major proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis also agree these measures protect shareholder interests and have supported them to date. I would suggest these measures need to be implemented before an Issuer is facing a possible proxy fight (so as not to be considered entrenchment), and also boards need to be aware than any change to by-laws will open up all their by-laws to review by the proxy advisory firms. As in many of these matters, it’s important to dialogue with your legal counsel in advance of introducing these and other potential measures.
L’auteur de ce billet, Eugene Fram*, tente de décrire comment le conseil d’administration d’une OBNL peut tracer une ligne entre (1) la confiance et la liberté accordée à son PDG et (2) le rôle d’orientation et de surveillance qui lui échoit.
C’est un article pertinent car on sait que les OBNL ont souvent des problèmes à distinguer les activités qui relèvent du conseil d’administration de celles qui relèvent du PDG (CEO). En bref, les membres du C.A. doivent se questionner sur l’étendue du pouvoir à consentir à leur PDG, et savoir quand trop de pouvoir est préjudiciable à l’organisation. Pour bien circonscrire les rôles, il est essentiel que les membres du conseil soient indépendants de la direction de l’organisation.
Les recherches montrent que les PDG qui agissent sans balises précises de la part de leurs conseils d’administration sont susceptibles d’abuser de leur position en s’octroyant des bénéfices personnels ou en prenant des risques excessifs.
David Larcker and Brian Tanya**, Stanford University professors, have come to the following conclusions about CEO power and raise some pertinent questions about the role of the board, based on research mainly centered on for-profit organizations. The research literature clearly shows that having a powerful CEO creates the potential for him or her to abuse this position to extract personal benefits or engage in excessive risky activities. At the same time, the research also shows that (CE0) power is often critical to the successful completion of tasks and the achievement of corporate objectives (and nonprofit missions). To this end, powerful CEOs can ultimately be a success or a failure. Are shareholders (stakeholders of nonprofits) better or worse off with a powerful CEO?
Voici un ensemble de responsabilités qui relèvent du conseil d’administration. Il est important d’en discuter en C.A. et de s’assurer que le PDG est bien au courant de celles-ci. L’auteur insiste également sur la nécessité d’établir une solide relation de confiance entre le conseil et le PDG de l’OBNL. Bonne lecture !
• Establishes long-term organizational objective and outcomes.
• Sets overall policy affecting strategies designed to achieve objectives, outcomes and impacts.
• Employs the CEO
Red Cross Memorial (Photo credit: cliff1066™)
(2) Judges Management Actions
• Robustly evaluates short-term (annual) and long-term performance of management
• Determines whether policies and strategies are being carried out, whether outcomes and impacts are being achieved
(3) Approves management actions
• Critically reviews, approves or disapproves proposals in policy and strategic areas (for example, major capital needs or expenditures and major contracts)
• Provides formal recognition and acceptance of executive decisions when related to operational actions.
(4) Advises management
• Acts in an advisory or consultative capacity on operations when sought by management
(5) Receives information from management
• Regularly receives reports on the organization (e.g., performance, program development, external factors, concerns)
(6) Acts as a public, community or industry resource to management
• Keeps the organization attuned to the external environment in which it operates
* Eugene Fram & Vicki Brown (2011), “Policy vs. Paper Clips: How using the corporate model makes a nonprofit board more efficient and effective.” http://amzn.to/eu7nQl
**David Larcker et Brian Tanya, « Is a Powerful CEO Good or Bad for Shareholders ?« , Stanford Closer Look Series, 13 november 2012.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. L’auteur a interrogé un nombre important d’acteurs de la scène de la gouvernance (investisseurs activistes, gestionnaires de fonds privés, administrateurs, CEO) et a tenu compte des points de vue émis par plusieurs groupes d’experts dans le domaine :
« Advisory work with regulators; assessments of leading boards; expertwitness work; academic and practitioner literature; current and emerging regulations; director conferences and webinars; lectures the author has delivered to the Institute of Corporate Directors and Directors College in Canada; discussions in the author’s LinkedIn group, Board and Advisors; and research being conducted with the author and Henry D. Wolfe on building high performance public company boards ».
Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :
(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;
Je vous invite à consulter cette liste afin d’avoir un aperçu des types de changements proposés. Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus. Bonne lecture.
En rappel, vous trouverez, ci-joint, une excellente publication de la NACD (National Association of Corporate Directors) qui présente les grands défis et les enjeux qui attendent les administrateurs de sociétés au cours des prochaines années.
Ce document est un recueil de textes publiés par les partenaires de la NACD : Heidrick & Struggles International, Inc., KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute, Marsh & McLennan Companies, NASDAQ OMX, Pearl Meyer & Partners et Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.
Vous y trouverez un ensemble d’articles très pertinents sur les sujets de l’heure en gouvernance. J’ai déjà publié un billet sur ce sujet le 23 juin 2013, en référence à cette publication.
Chaque année, la NACD se livre à cet exercice et publie un document très prisé !
Voici comment les firmes expertes se sont répartis les thèmes les plus « hot » en gouvernance. Bonne lecture.
Boardroom, Tremont Grand (Photo credit: Joel Abroad)
(1) What to Do When an Activist Investor Comes Calling par Heidrick & Struggle
(2) KPMG’s Audit Committee Priorities for 2013 par KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute
(3) Board Risk Checkup—Are You Ready for the Challenges Ahead ? par Marsh & McLennan Companies
(4) Boardroom Discussions par NASDAQ OMX
(5) Paying Executives for Driving Long-Term Success par Pearl Meyer & Partners
(6) What Boards Should Focus on in 2013 par Weil, Gotshal and Manges, LLP
Today, directors are operating in a new environment. Shareholders, regulators, and stakeholders have greater influence on the boardroom than ever before. In addition, risks and crisis situations are occurring with greater frequency and amplitude. Directors have a responsibility to ensure their companies are prepared for these challenges—present and future.This compendium provides insights and practical guidance from the nation’s leading boardroom experts—the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD’s) strategic content partners—each recognized as a thought leader in their respective fields of corporate governance.
Interventionnisme des investisseurs activistes VS défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. | Un débat de fond
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».
L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.
Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?
Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.
Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as “constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)
Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”
Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…
Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets. The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”…
Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent « royalement ».
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements « court-termistes ».
L’article de Nathan Vardi, publié dans Forbes le 6 août 2013, fait le point sur la situation qui règne dans le monde des investissements à caractère « actif » (hedge funds). Il présente, selon moi, singulièrement bien les arguments invoqués par chaque partie.
Quel est votre position en regard de ces deux conceptions : celui des actionnaires activistes, représenté par Carl Icahn, ou celui des gardiens de la bonne gouvernance, représenté par Martin Lipton ?
Voici quelques extraits de l’article. Veuillez lire l’article de M. Vardi pour plus de détails. Bonne lecture.
Once disparaged as greenmailers and corporate raiders who pillage for quick profit, activist investors have become rock stars and rebranded themselves as advocates of all shareholders, taking on the kind of shareholder watchdog role that institutional investors like big pension funds and mutual funds have long resisted. They are not done rebranding themselves. Peltz, whose Trian Management oversees $6.5 billion, describes his investment style not as activism but as “constructivism.” Larry Robbins, who runs $6 billion hedge fund firm Glenview Capital Management, one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months, wants to be seen as a “suggestivist.” The idea is to appear less threatening while trying to do things like replace the management and board of directors of a company, like Robbins is trying to do at hospital company Health Management Associates. “In Hollywood terms, we are more Mr. Spock than William Wallace,” Robbins recently said. “I get a lot more out of these CEOs by not embarrassing them publicly, by not being viewed as trying to nail their scalp to the wall,” Barry Rosenstein, the prominent activist investor who runs $5 billion Jana Partners, told The Wall Street Journal.
Icahn Lab Conference Room (Photo credit: Joe Shlabotnik)
Others, however, have a different way of describing what these guys are up to. “In what can only be considered a form of extortion, activist hedge funds are preying on American corporations to create short-term increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value,” famed lawyer Martin Lipton wrote earlier this year. “The consequences of radical stockholder-centric governance and short-termism prompt a series of questions that cry out for re-examination.” Lipton, the most prominent defender of corporate boards in their battles with activist investors and the inventor of the so-called poison pill defense tactic, even suggests that the new wave of activist investors might be responsible for “a very significant part of American unemployment and a failure to achieve a GDP growth rate sufficient to pay for reasonable entitlements.”
Lipton has been blasting activist investors for decades. But last week activist investing went Hollywood as George Clooney attacked Dan Loeb, who has been criticizing the management of Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of his effort to get Sony to spin off its U.S. entertainment assets. “[Loeb] calls himself an activist investor, and I would call him a carpet bagger,” Clooney told Deadline.com. “What he’s doing is scaring studios and pushing them to make decisions from a place of fear. Why is he buying stock like crazy if he’s so down on things? He’s trying to manipulate the market.” Clooney said activist hedge fund managers like Loeb don’t create jobs, unlike the movie industry that is a significant U.S. exporter…
Nevertheless, activist-investor efforts to drive shareholder value at companies seem to be all over the financial markets. The renaissance is best typified by billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who is going stronger than ever. With more money at his disposal than ever before, Icahn, now 77, has been a huge player in financial markets in recent months. He has vigorously taken on Michael Dell’s effort to take Dell private, played a role in kicking Aubrey McClendon out of Chesapeake Energy, and is at the center of the billionaire brawl over Herbalife. He has enjoyed rich recent successes from companies ranging from CVR Energy to Netflix. His Icahn Enterprises has seen its stock rise by 57% this year. Icahn hasn’t changed his tune in years and recently argued that “what I do is good for America.”…
Activist players are continuing to push the envelope and bringing their brand of investing to new industry and geographic frontiers. Dan Loeb, whose Third Point hedge fund has been one of the best-performing hedge funds over the last 18 months or so, stormed Silicon Valley, sparking sweeping changes to the flailing Internet giant Yahoo’s management and making about $1 billion in realized and paper profits. Now, he’s off to Japan, trying to shake things up at Sony in a country that has long resisted reform at many levels. Loeb is not the only brash American to attack a foreign company and sometimes these guys even manage to win broad support for their efforts in foreign countries. Not long ago, William Ackman struck at Canadian Pacific Railway and his intervention has helped spark a huge run-up in the stock. The business magazine of Canada’s authoritative Globe and Mail newspaper didn’t call him a carpet bagger, rather they branded Ackman, who is not a corporate executive, “CEO of The Year.”
Poursuivant notre politique de collaboration avec des experts en gouvernance, nous avons demandé à Hélène Solignac*, associée responsable des activités “gouvernance” de la firme française Rivoli Consulting, d’agir à titre d’auteure invitée. Le billet proposé est récemment paru sur son blogue; l’auteure explique, dans un premier temps, pourquoi il est important de renforcer la collaboration au sein de l’équipe du conseil. La question du comment sera abordée dans un article subséquent.
Un conseil n’est pas un groupe comme les autres : de taille très variable selon le type d’organisation (sociétés par actions cotées ou non cotées, mutuelles et institutions de prévoyance, associations et fondations..), ou leur actionnariat (familial, investisseurs institutionnels, private equity, public,…), il est composé de membres dont l’expérience, l’expertise, la culture sont de plus en plus diversifiées : c’est d’ailleurs une pratique de bonne gouvernance que de nommer au sein des conseils, aux côtés des représentants des actionnaires/sociétaires, des salariés et des dirigeants de l’entreprise, des administrateurs indépendants qui apportent un regard externe et veillent à la préservation des intérêts des actionnaires minoritaires non représentés au conseil. La diversification des conseils est largement encouragée par les codes de gouvernance, et compte parmi les propositions du plan d’action de la Commission Européenne de décembre 2012.
Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.
Souvent de cultures différentes, les administrateurs ne partagent donc pas tous la culture de l’entreprise. C’est aussi fréquemment le cas du dirigeant exécutif, lorsqu’il est recruté à l’extérieur.
Par ailleurs, contrairement aux comités de direction, les membres des conseils passent très peu de temps à travailler ensemble : le nombre de séances se situe en moyenne entre 6 et 9 par an dans les sociétés cotées. Or le conseil, organe collégial, doit non seulement débattre, mais aussi être capable de prendre rapidement des décisions qui seront ensuite assumées par l’ensemble de ses membres.
Comment alors faire de ce groupe hétérogène une équipe efficace, à même de soutenir et de challenger le management, de jouer pleinement son rôle de contrôle, mais aussi de proposer des orientations, de sélectionner le dirigeant et d’évaluer sa performance, d’être le garant de l’intérêt social et de la pérennité de l’entreprise ?
Comment dépasser les enjeux de pouvoirs, les coalitions, prendre en compte tous les points de vue et parvenir au consensus ?
Comment intégrer les nouveaux membres, le conseil étant amené à se renouveler régulièrement ?
Comment gérer la relation avec l’exécutif de l’entreprise ?
Comment organiser le processus de décision pour le rendre le plus efficace possible ?
English: Helicopter view of the Crédit Lyonnais tower in Lyon (France) Français : Vue d’hélicoptère de la tour du crédit lyonnais à Lyon (France) (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Au-delà des compétences techniques, le processus de sélection des administrateurs prend désormais de plus en plus en compte les qualités personnelles du candidat : capacité à intégrer la culture et les valeurs de l’entreprise, vision d’ensemble, écoute, capacité à présenter clairement son point de vue, à poser des questions (et à obtenir des réponses), à débattre de façon constructive, capacité à travailler en équipe et à accepter la décision collective…toutes qualités utiles pour adopter la posture d’un membre du conseil, bien différente de celle d’un dirigeant exécutif habitué à décider seul en tant que responsable hiérarchique.
Le président a bien évidemment un rôle clé : organiser la prise de parole, encourager systématiquement les contributions au débat, et favoriser des prises de décision consensuelles, mais aussi fixer l’ordre du jour, veiller à la qualité de l’information et à l’intégration des nouveaux membres, recevoir régulièrement et individuellement les administrateurs, faciliter les contacts avec le management, s’assurer que les comités rendent compte de leurs travaux au conseil, gérer efficacement la relation avec l’exécutif, …
L’éventail de plus en plus large des sujets qui sont aujourd’hui du ressort du conseil, auquel répond la diversité des profils et des compétences de ses membres, nécessitent une implication de plus en plus forte du président en tant qu’animateur du conseil, afin d’obtenir les meilleures contributions individuelles possibles, et d’organiser un processus de décision efficace. Selon que les fonctions de président et de directeur général sont dissociées ou non, selon le mode de gouvernance du président, plus ou moins participatif, le travail collectif du conseil sera sensiblement différent.
Le conseil est un groupe humain dont le fonctionnement est particulièrement complexe, et les responsabilités considérables. La qualité des échanges, les attitudes des différents acteurs et les relations au sein du conseil sont déterminantes dans l’efficacité du processus de décision.
Nous reviendrons dans un prochain billet sur les moyens d’optimiser la dynamique collective du conseil et les relations entre ses membres.
________________________________
* Hélène Solignac est associée responsable des activités “gouvernance” de la firme Rivoli Consulting depuis 2009. Diplômée de Sciences Po, Hélène Solignac a exercé des responsabilités au sein du Crédit Lyonnais pendant près de 20 ans, d’abord en tant que responsable commercial auprès de grands groupes internationaux; elle a participé, comme secrétaire du conseil d’administration et des comités de direction générale, à la privatisation et à l’introduction en bourse de la banque, avant de prendre en charge le suivi des filiales et participations à la direction financière du groupe, où elle a exercé des mandats d’administrateur dans différentes filiales.
En 2006, elle a rejoint InvestorSight, conseil en communication financière, membre associé de l’Institut Français des Administrateurs, comme responsable du pôle Gouvernance ; elle a développé une activité de conseil en préparation d’assemblées générales et est notamment intervenue sur des dossiers d’activisme actionnarial ; elle a participé à différentes études sur ce thème des assemblées générales qu’elle a présentées dans le cadre de Matinales de l’IFA et a également été rédactrice de la « Lettre des AG » (analyse des assemblées générales du SBF 120).
Elle est présentement Corporate Advisory auprès de Sodali, conseillère en relations actionnariales pour les sociétés cotées, responsable de la formation « Actif humain » du Certificat Administrateur de Société Sciences Po-IFA, Co-fondatrice du Cercle des Administrateurs Sciences Po, membre de l’IFA et de l’AFGE (Association Française de Gouvernement d’Entreprise) et administratrice de l’association humanitaire Matins du Soleil.
Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en juillet 2013. Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.
On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur les principaux sujets d’actualité suivants : la recherche de mandats au sein des conseils, la gestion de crises, les responsabilités des membres du conseil, la gouvernance des OBNL, les fondements de la gouvernance, les dysfonctions d’un C.A., la formation des administrateurs et la succession du PCD.
Séance inaugurale – Colloque Gouvernance mondiale (Photo credit: Collège des Bernardins)
En terme géographique, près du tiers des visiteurs sont de France, ou de dizaines de pays francophones, et 63 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (47 %) ou via les engins de recherche (40 %).
Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !
Vous serez sûrement intéressés par les résultats de cette recherche publié par R. Christopher Small et paru dans HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Les résultats montrent que les PCD qui se retirent ont tendance à divulguer des prévisions de profits futurs plus positives et plus optimistes que lors des divulgations des années antérieures, surtout si leur rémunération incitative est élevée et si les mécanismes de suivis par le C.A. sont faibles.
C’est un article qui montre clairement la nécessité d’avoir un conseil d’administration vigilant à l’occasion du départ d’un PCD. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Theory suggests that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with short horizons with their firm have weaker incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders (Smith and Watts 1982). To date, research examining the “horizon problem” focuses on whether CEOs adopt myopic investment and accounting policies in their final years in office (e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Davidson et al. 2007; Kalyta 2009; Antia et al. 2010). In our paper, Forecasting Without Consequence? Evidence on the Properties of Retiring CEOs’ Forecasts of Future Earnings, forthcoming in The Accounting Review, we extend this line of research by investigating whether retiring CEOs are more likely to engage in opportunistic forecasting behavior in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Specifically, we contrast the properties (issuance, frequency, news, and bias) of earnings forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during pre-terminal years (where the CEO will be in office when the associated earnings are realized) with forecasts issued by retiring CEOs during their terminal year (where the CEO will no longer be in office when the associated earnings are realized). We also examine circumstances in which opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is likely to be more or less pronounced.
retirement (Photo credit: 401(K) 2013)
Our predictions are based on several incentives that arise (or increase) during retiring CEOs’ terminal year with their firm. Specifically, relative to CEOs who will continue with their firm, retiring CEOs face strong incentives to engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior in an attempt to inflate stock prices during the period leading up to their retirement. Deliberately misleading forecasts can be used to influence stock prices. Consistent with this argument, prior work shows that managers use voluntary disclosures opportunistically to influence stock prices (Noe 1999; Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) and that managers use opportunistic earnings forecasts to manipulate analysts’ (Cotter et al. 2006) and investors’ perceptions (Cheng and Lo 2006; Hamm et al. 2012) in an effort to maximize the value of their stock-based compensation (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Moreover, because SEC trading rules related to CEOs’ post-retirement security transactions are less stringent than those in effect during their tenure with the firm, post-retirement transactions can be made before the earnings associated with the opportunistic forecast are realized and with reduced regulatory scrutiny.
To test our predictions, we first identify all CEO turnover events in Execucomp from 1997 through 2009 (a total of 3,548 events). For each CEO turnover event identified, we perform detailed searches of SEC filings, executive biographies (appearing on various social media outlets such as LinkedIn, Forbes People Finder, etc.), press releases, and related disclosures to determine whether the CEO turnover was due to retirement. Our results indicate that retiring CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts of future earnings and that they issue such forecasts more frequently in their terminal year relative to other years during their tenure with the firm. Moreover, we find that retiring CEOs’ terminal-year forecasts of future earnings are more likely to convey good news and are more optimistically biased relative to pre-terminal years. Our findings, that retiring CEOs engage in opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior, represent a previously undocumented implication of the “horizon problem.” Furthermore, we find that opportunistic terminal-year forecasting behavior is more pronounced in the presence of higher CEO equity incentives and discretionary expenditure cuts in the terminal year, and less pronounced in the presence of stronger monitoring mechanisms (e.g., higher institutional ownership).
Our results should be of interest to market participants (e.g., investors, analysts, etc.) who use information from management earnings forecasts. However, market participants’ ability to use our evidence is contingent on their knowledge of (or ability to anticipate) a given CEO’s impending retirement. Our study should also be of interest to stakeholders (e.g., boards of directors, regulators, etc.) who seek to implement incentive mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts. Interestingly, our results suggest that equity incentives (a tool commonly used to align incentives and minimize agency costs) can have the unintended consequence of creating or exacerbating opportunistic forecasting. Thus, CEO and firm characteristics (such as equity incentives) may have competing effects on various horizon-problem induced behaviors.
Denis Lefort, CPA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, porte à ma connaissance un article de Ken Tysiac paru dans le Journal of accountancy qui résume les résultats du sondage mondial 2013 d’Ernst & Young portant sur l’audit interne.
Cet article identifie les attentes principales des participants au sondage, chefs de l’audit interne et membres de comités d’audit, quant à l’évolution que devrait prendre les responsabilités de l’audit interne.
“The clear message from the survey is that internal audit functions need to stop thinking about themselves as compliance specialists and start taking on a much larger, more strategic role within the organization,” Ernst & Young LLP internal audit leader Brian Schwartz said in a news release. “IA is increasingly being asked by senior management and the board to provide broader business insights and better anticipate traditional and emerging risks, even as they maintain their focus on non-negotiable compliance activities.”
New risks
As strategic opportunities emerge, internal auditors also are adjusting to new compliance duties, according to the survey. Globalization has resulted in increased revenue from emerging markets for many companies, so new regulatory, cultural, tax, and talent risks are emerging.
Internal audit will play a more prominent role in evaluating these risks, according to the survey report. Although slightly more than one-fourth (27%) of respondents are heavily involved in identifying, assessing, and monitoring emerging risks now, 54% expect to be heavily involved in the next two years.
The biggest primary risks that respondents said their organizations are tracking are:
Economic stability (54%).
Cybersecurity (52%).
Major shifts in technology (48%).
Strategic transactions in global locations (44%).
Data privacy regulations (39%).
Survey respondents said the skills most often found to be lacking in internal audit functions are:
Data analytics;
Business strategy;
Deep industry experience;
Risk management; and
Fraud prevention and detection.
“As corporate leaders demand a greater measure of strategy and insight from their internal audit functions, CAEs will need to move quickly to close competency gaps and ensure that they have the right people in the right place, at the right time.” Schwartz said. “If they fail to meet organizational expectations, they risk being left behind or consigned to more transactional compliance activities.”
Voici un article de Richard Leblanc paru dans BoardExpert.com que vous apprécierez sûrement. Comme à son habitude, Richard utilise un style direct et simple pour aborder l’une des facettes les plus complexes de la gouvernance des organisations : la rémunération incitative reliée à la performance à long terme.
L’auteur discute plus particulièrement d’un objet novateur : la rémunération des administrateurs alignée sur les intérêts des actionnaires.
Voici un extrait de l’article ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’approche qu’il suggère. Qu’en pensez-vous ?
« Most independent directors on public company boards are compensated in a blend of cash and company shares. The equity component is typically restricted or deferred until the director retires from the board, thus postponing taxes and enabling the director to amass a portion of equity in the company to align his or her interests with shareholders (it is believed). The equity can be a predetermined number of restricted shares, or a set monetary amount in the form of share “units.”
The problem with paying independent directors this way is that there is little incentive for personal performance or company performance. Directors get paid the cash and equity regardless. There is little if any downside, especially when directors can ride a stock market or Fed driven increase in overall share prices. Not surprisingly, the activists noted this lack of incentive pay.
Sometimes money is a powerful incentive. (Photo credit: wayneandwax)
It is hardly surprising that boards do not focus on value creation, strategic planning, or maximizing company performance, survey after survey, as much as they do on compliance. Their compensation structure does not incent them to. Compensation incentives drive behavior, both for management and for directors ».
Here is what is needed to align director pay with shareholder interests:
Directors should be required to issue cheques from their personal savings accounts to purchase shares in the company. Bill Ackman of Pershing Square stated that if Canadian Pacific directors were required to cut cheques for $100,000 each, the CEO would have been fired prior to Pershing Square being involved. Mr. Ackman is right. “Skin in the game” for a director does not mean shares are given to a director in lieu of service. The motivational factor to be attuned to shareholders is greater if directors are actual investors in the company. In private equity companies, non-management directors are encouraged to “buy into” the company and invest on the same terms as other investors.
For Directors’ equity to vest (the portion they did not purchase), hurdles would need to be achieved that reflect personal performance and long-term value creation of the company. Assuming you have the right directors, this sets up a situation in which Directors are forced to engage in value creation and be rewarded for doing so, similar to private equity directors. The hurdle rate provides the incentive. The vesting hurdle should be based on the underlying performance of the company, commensurate with its risk and product cycle, possibly peer based, and not simply on riding a bull market.
The long-term performance metrics for value creation should also apply to senior management, and the board should lead by example. The vast majority of performance incentives are short-term, financial and quantitative. We know that the majority of company value however is now based on intangibles. Long-term leading indicators such as innovation, reputation, talent, resilience and sustainability are being completely overlooked in compensation design. You get what you pay for.
Management has proposed “passive” pay for directors and short-term pay for themselves. Boards have acquiesced.
Cet article de Sarah Green, paru dans HBR Blog Network, présente une entrevue avec David Astorino, le directeur d’une recherche qui porte sur la probabilité de changement des membres de la haute direction selon que le nouveau président et chef de direction (PCD-CEO) provient de l’externe ou de l’interne. On verra que dans les deux cas, des changements significatifs sont à prévoir, mais pas nécessairement dans les mêmes postes.
Cet article est vraiment très intéressant car il explore un sujet-clé de la succession au sommet stratégique de l’organisation. Le PCD a besoin d’une équipe de grande compétence mais surtout de personnes en qui il a une totale confiance.
Ainsi, on notera que le PCD externe aura beaucoup plus tendance à congédier son CFO et son directeur des ressources humaines (CHRO). Également, près de la moitié des PCD externes changent de directeur des affaires juridiques et/ou secrétaire corporatif. Le chercheur ne semble pas être en mesure d’expliquer pourquoi !
President Barack Obama talks with Michael G. Morris, right, of American Electric Power Company, and David Cote in the Cross Hall of the White House, before a dinner with CEOs, Feb. 24, 2010. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Vu sous l’angle d’un membre de conseils d’administration, avez-vous une idée des raisons qui incitent les PCD à congédier leurs directeurs des affaires juridiques ?
Voici un extrait de cet article du HBR ainsi que quelques questions sous-jacentes (voir l’article pour les réponses offertes). Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
New research by RHR international shows which executives incoming CEOs are likely to replace, and highlights some differences between first-time CEOs and more seasoned chief executives. I interviewed Dr. David Astorino, Global Practice Leader for Senior Team Effectiveness, about the findings. Below is an edited version of our conversation.
Your survey showed that as much as CEOs had shaken up their senior team, looking back on it they wished they’d moved even faster. Why ?
When they look back, and you ask them what you would have done differently, they almost always say, « I knew in my gut that was not going to work with that individual, and I wish I had trusted that gut feeling and made that decision faster. » By delaying the transformation of a particular function or business unit, they’re now six months behind. That’s often where that comment comes from. There are some other factors, but that’s the main one.
What are some of those other factors ?
A lot of it relates to organizational knowledge. They hesitate because they don’t feel like they know enough about what’s going on. You’ll also see a real difference between first-time CEOs and people who’ve been a CEO before, especially if that first-time CEO is coming from outside the company. They don’t trust themselves as much, and they tend to not be as suspicious, frankly, as CEOs who have been there, done that before. They tend to wait too long. CEOs who’ve been around the block a bit more say, « I’d rather risk losing institutional knowledge and get someone in there I trust. »
HBR has published research suggesting that insider CEOs are more effective than outsiders. Could part of the reason be that outsiders replace so much of their staff with other outsiders, lacking that institutional knowledge ?
So to that point about skills, how much of this is really about bringing in new skills, and how much of it is about what you mentioned earlier — just looking for people they can trust, people they’re comfortable with ?
Speaking of functions, it wasn’t terribly surprising to me that the CHRO and the CMO are two that are likely to leave. But why the General Counsel ?
What about the difference between insider and outsider CEOs — they really seem to replace different functional heads. Insiders are much more likely to replace the COO, for instance, while outsiders are more likely to replace the CFO. Why the discrepancy ?
What are some of the other differences between first-time CEOs and more experienced CEOs ?
On le sait, la participation des salariés à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises est beaucoup plus répandue que dans l’environnement nord-américain. Cet article de Caroline Froger-Michon, publié dans Les échos | Business, fait le point sur la situation, en considérant surtout le point de vue légal.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
La loi de sécurisation de l’emploi du 14 juin 2013 marque une nouvelle étape dans la gouvernance des grandes entreprises : celle-ci impose désormais aux sociétés anonymes (SA) et sociétés en commandites par actions (SCA) dépassant certains seuils d’effectifs d’avoir des représentants des salariés au sein de leur conseil d’administration ou de surveillance.
Caroline Froger-Michon, avocat, département social, CMS Bureau Francis Lefebvre.
Plusieurs dispositifs permettaient déjà aux salariés de participer aux organes de direction (en application des statuts dans les SA, en tant que représentants des salariés actionnaires, ou en tant que représentants du comité d’entreprise). Le dispositif mis en place par la loi de sécurisation de l’emploi vient s’ajouter aux dispositifs existants et présente un caractère obligatoire.
Ainsi, désormais, les sociétés qui emploient, à la clôture de deux exercices consécutifs, au moins 5 000 salariés permanents en ce compris ceux de leurs filiales, directes ou indirectes, dont le siège social est fixé sur le territoire français, ou au moins 10 000 salariés permanents dans le monde, et qui ont pour obligation de mettre en place un comité d’entreprise, doivent prévoir dans leurs statuts que le conseil d’administration comprend des administrateurs représentant les salariés.
Toutefois, sont dispensées de cette obligation, les sociétés filiales directes ou indirectes d’une société déjà soumise à cette obligation. Au moins un représentant des salariés, doté d’une voix délibérative, doit être nommé dans les sociétés dont le nombre d’administrateurs est inférieur ou égal à douze. Les sociétés comptant plus de douze administrateurs sont, quant à elles, dans l’obligation de désigner deux représentants des salariés. Ces représentants ne sont pas pris en compte pour la détermination des nombres minimum et maximum d’administrateurs prévus par le Code de Commerce.
4 modes de désignation des représentants des salariés
C’est à l’assemblée générale que revient l’initiative d’organiser cette représentation. Elle doit le faire dans les 6 mois suivant la clôture des 2 exercices provoquant l’obligation, après avis des représentants du personnel.
Dans ce délai, l’assemblée doit modifier les statuts pour déterminer les conditions de désignation. A cet égard, la loi laisse 4 options à l’assemblée :
élection par les salariés de la société et de ses filiales ayant leur siège social sur le territoire français,
désignation par les institutions représentatives du personnel (comité de groupe, comité central d’entreprise ou comité d’entreprise),
désignation par l’organisation syndicale la plus représentative de l’entreprise,
ou, lorsqu’au moins 2 administrateurs sont à désigner, par l’une des 3 modalités précitées pour l’un et par le comité d’entreprise européen pour l’autre.
Les entreprises qui remplissent d’ores et déjà la condition d’effectif posée par la loi doivent effectuer cette modification avant le 31 décembre 2014.
Voici un article de Peter Whitehead paru dans le Financial Times du 5 juin 2013. L’auteur présente une synthèse des principales sources de risques confrontant chaque conseil d’administration. En bref, l’étude montre que les conseils d’administration sont responsables de la plupart des échecs des entreprises, notamment de ceux qui résultent en désastres majeurs.
Le rapport de la firme Reputability conclue que l’un des principaux problèmes est le manque d’information des membres des C.A. Les autres facteurs identifiés sont reliés :
– au manque de qualification (et de caractère) des membres pour comprendre les grands enjeux et les principaux risques de l’entreprise;
– au manque de sensibilité aux aspects des relations humaines, et
– à la priorité accordée aux jugements de nature quantitative.
Je vous invite donc à lire cet article en vous inscrivant gratuitement au contenu du F.T. Que pensez-vous de ces résultats ?
The root causes of most company failures lie in the boardroom, with a serious skills gap and risk blindness being the most common factors. A study of 41 corporate crises highlights repeated patterns of failure that are little understood by boards and that are rarely spotted using standard risk management techniques.
English: Enron Complex in Houston Texas (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Executive Appointments, which is running a series of features on the topic of “Better Boards” during 2013, was given an advance briefing on the analysis by Reputability, a firm specialising in organisational and behavioural risk. Its study found a lack of skills on the board and its inability to influence executives were root causes in 88 per cent of company failures. A board’s blindness to risk was a root cause in 85 per cent of the crises. Defective information flows to and from the board, and inadequate leadership on company ethos and culture, were each root causes in 59 per cent of cases.
The Reputability research builds on a 2011 “Roads to Ruin” report by Cass Business School that carried out a detailed examination of 18 corporate crises, including the collapses of Enron and Northern Rock, and events such as the BP Texas City oil refinery explosion in 2005, and the Hatfield rail crash in 2000. It looked at the underlying causes that led to disaster and the resilience of the organisation in handling the aftermath….
… Anthony Fitzsimmons, chairman of Reputability, says: “A fundamental manifestation of the problem with boards is information. A board has information, but doesn’t know if it’s accurate or has important gaps. If you don’t have the right information how can you be in control ?
Articles d’intérêt dans le domaine de l’impact des Boards :
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un billet publié par Richard Leblanc* sur son blogue Governance Gateway. Il s’agit d’une proposition de changement à trois niveaux :
(1) Renforcement du rôle du C.A. en matière de création de valeur;
(2) Imputabilité de la direction envers le C.A.;
(3) Imputabilité du C.A. envers les actionnaires.
L’auteur nous demande de faire des suggestions dans le but de peaufiner un cas qu’il est en voie de réaliser. Des suggestions concernant cette liste ?
Voici un article très pertinent sur l’étude du processus d’implication (engagement) entre les actionnaires institutionnels et les conseils d’administration des sociétés cotées. L’auteur de l’article, John Mellor, est le fondateur de la Foundation for Governance Research and Education (FGRE), une OBNL dont la mission est de développer les meilleures pratiques et les plus hauts standards d’éthique dans le domaine du leadership en gouvernance.
L’article décrit très bien les caractéristiques de « l’engagement » entre les parties, montre en quoi cet engagement est important, propose une nouvelle approche pour susciter l’implication des investisseurs à long terme, et met l’accent sur les incitatifs nécessaires à adopter pour accroître l’efficacité des pratiques d’engagement.
Nous reproduisons ici la teneur de cette publication. Bonne lecture. Quelles sont vos impressions de cette approche ?
Engagement incorporating constructive and challenging dialogue, based on trust and mutual respect between institutional shareholders and company boards, should be an integral part of stewardship. However, such engagement does not apply or is not relevant to all investment funds.
Investment funds cover a range from long-only funds to shorter term, e.g. hedge funds, high frequency trading funds. Investment strategies reflect the nature of the fund and for many, engagement is not a relevant activity. This applies particularly to those with a short term investment focus. As a guide, this may be set at no more than one or, at most, two years.
Contemporary practice of engagement indicates that it falls broadly into two categories – reactive engagement and pro-active engagement:
Reactive engagement, meaning reacting to events, is the practice most commonly observed amongst institutional shareholders.
Pro-active engagement may have one or other of two objectives.
Engagement over a limited period of time with the sole objective of driving up the company share price in the short term with a view to selling out and capturing the capital gain. This is the practice most commonly employed by so-called ‘activist’ shareholders.
Engagement with the objective of company long-term value creation. This engagement is described in 1. above and, as a result of supporting the increase in company value over the long-term, aims to benefit the economy and provide sustainable returns for investors and, ultimately, savers. This engagement is, therefore, necessarily linked into a long-term investment strategy.
Effective engagement takes place in private (rather than in public) and through shareholders acting collaboratively, usually over an extended period of time.
Samsung Electronics’ 44th Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting (Photo credit: samsungtomorrow)
Why this engagement matters
It has already been stated above that engagement linked into a long-term investment strategy has implications for the economy and savers, but the crucial point must surely be that sustained economic growth and efficient allocation of capital will not happen without it. Investment in research and development and in new industries with global growth potential, which our nation requires, is dependent upon a sustained and pragmatic relationship between capital and business. This requires a long-term investment approach and constructive engagement between the parties.
Engagement and holding company boards accountable
Engagement with boards is part of the process of holding company directors accountable and, therefore, an integral part of the corporate governance framework. It is regarded as an ingredient to the maintenance of the ‘comply or explain’ regime which underpins the UK Corporate Governance Code. Important though this is, it is ancillary to the main reason explained above of why constructive engagement over the long-term matters.
The economic case for engagement
By the very nature of the engagement which is the focus of this Paper, increase in company and investment value can only be realised over the long-term. It is, therefore, not surprising that sufficient robust evidence has yet to be accumulated to make the economic case. What evidence exists relates mainly to activist investors, such as hedge funds and focus funds, with a pro-active short-term focus on driving up the share price and selling out to realise the capital gain.
A new approach to engagement for long-only investors
This Paper is focussed upon engagement which rests on constructive and challenging dialogue between institutional shareholders and company boards, with a view to building trust and mutual respect between the parties, and with the all-important purpose of enhancing and sustaining company value to benefit the economy and savers. Necessarily, this conforms to the interest of long-only investment funds, those with a long-term perspective on investment. Specifically:
A more holistic approach to engagement needs to be adopted by aligning the dialogue more closely with the duties of directors as expressed in Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 2006, which binds directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole and, in particular, to have regard to likely consequences in the long-term of any decision.
In line with adoption of the more holistic approach, long-only investors should also take into account the capital structure and needs (equity and debt) of the company as a basis for engagement.
With a view to a more effective holistic approach to engagement, organisations should synchronise the engagement activities and practices of equity and debt (bond) fund managers.
Review of incentives
Without meaningful incentives the quality and effectiveness of engagement practice is unlikely to make significant progress. To counter asset owner inertia, and with a view to winning investment business, asset managers should devise attractive long-only investment products which incorporate engagement. These products would be structured based upon intrinsic rather than relative value models, and would, therefore, differentiate these providers from the present mass of asset managers whose offerings are structured based upon relative performance criteria.
The limitation of quarterly reporting (already a Government action) should aid a shift in thinking from the short to a longer term view of fund performance, which in turn should encourage a longer term perspective on the part of asset owners.
To encourage long-term holding of shares, a variety of incentives have over time been proposed, and remain under consideration with typically firm views for and against. Perhaps some form of tax incentive holds the greater promise, for example, that which distinguishes between short and long-term investment with the former attracting a higher rate of income tax and the latter a lower rate of capital gains tax.
Recommendations for next steps
Asset managers should:
Review what lessons for fund managers might be drawn from comparing the engagement practice of holders of private and public debt (bonds)
Explore the practical implications of more synchronisation between equity and debt (bonds) analysis and engagement
Review and take into account any differences in approach to engagement for different sectors, e.g. capital goods, consumer goods, utilities, resource companies, financial services
Give serious consideration, in the light of the above, to resourcing for engagement and, in particular, the level of skills required and the implications for training and development.
Business School education, particularly at post-graduate and executive levels, has a crucial role to play in changing culture and mind sets to value the importance of constructive engagement between capital and business and a long-term investment approach. Programmes and courses should be redesigned to meet the need for change.
A data bank on the performance of selected long-only funds, adopting the approach to engagement advocated above, should be constructed with a view to collecting records over a sufficiently long period of time (up to 10 years) to provide evidence to demonstrate the economic value of constructive engagement.
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* Dr John Mellor, is FGRE’s Founder and Director of Research. A former international banker with Citigroup, he has written and lectured extensively on governance. He is a former NatWest Visiting Senior Fellow in Corporate Leadership at the University of Exeter and Visiting Professor in Governance at the University of the West of England from 2003 to 2012.
Articles reliés au thème de l’engagement des investisseurs :
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, en primeur, un rapport exceptionnel rédigé par Julia Casson pour le compte de IBE (Institute of Business Ethics) et de EcoDa (European Confederation of Director’s Associations) qui porte sur l’éthique et la gouvernance européenne et qui sera présenté à Londres le 2 juillet. À cette occasion l’auteure présentera les grandes lignes du rapport ci-joint et discutera des questions suivantes :
Why ethics has been left out of the debate around CG in the last ten years ?
Is Corporate Governance guidance working/adequate ?
What should be done about it ?
What are boards doing in practice ?
What is the role of Directors in promoting an ethical dynamics in the companies ?
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document afin de mieux appréhender les préoccupations des conseils d’administration en matière de gouvernance.
Un document vraiment précieux pour étudier toutes les facettes de l’éthique !
IBE is holding a launch of it’s latest publication A Review of the Ethical Aspects of Corporate Governance Regulation and Guidance in the EU by Julia Casson, Director of Board Insight Limited. This IBE Occasional Paper is published in association with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa).
Institute of Business Ethics (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The purpose of governance includes encouraging robust decision making and proper risk management, and to account to those that provide capital as well as other stakeholders. To support business sustainability, explicit attention to the ethical dimensions of these goals might be considered as requisite in any corporate governance guidance and regulation.
This new report suggests, however, a general lack of ethical language in corporate governance provisions at the pan-EU level in spite of an approach which is soft law and principles based and the fact that boards are expected (though not required) to set the values which will guide their company’s operations.
The event will begin with the author reflecting on the report’s findings. This will be followed by a panel discussion around:
Would it be correct to say that ethical drivers have been largely missing from the debate around corporate governance in the last ten years? • Is corporate governance guidance working? • What are boards doing in practice to promote an ethical dynamic in companies?
Panel members include: Julia Casson; Pedro Montoya, Group Chief Compliance Officer, EADS, sponsors of the report; and Paul Moxey, Head of Corporate Governance, ACCA.
Voici un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism. Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document sont les suivantes :
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 