Lettre ouverte du président des Fonds Vanguard à l’ensemble des administrateurs de compagnies publiques


F. William McNabb III is Chairman and CEO of Vanguard; Glenn Booraem is the head of Investment Stewardship and a principal at Vanguard. This post is based on an excerpt from a recent Vanguard publication by Mr. Booraem, and an open letter to directors of public companies worldwide by Mr. McNabb.

 

Cinq questions destinées au nouveau président de Vanguard

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

 

An open letter to directors of public companies worldwide

Thank you for your role in overseeing the Vanguard funds’ sizable investment in your company. We depend on you to represent our funds’ ownership interests on behalf of our more than 20 million investors worldwide. Our investors depend on Vanguard to be a responsible steward of their assets, and we promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the long-term value of their investments.

At Vanguard, a long-term perspective informs every aspect of our investment approach, from the way we manage our funds to the advice we give our investors. Our index funds are structurally long-term, holding their investments almost indefinitely. And our active equity managers—who invest nearly $500 billion on our clients’ behalf—are behaviorally long-term, with most holding their positions longer than peer averages. The typical dollar invested with Vanguard stays for more than ten years.

A long-term perspective also underpins our Investment Stewardship program. We believe that well-governed companies are more likely to perform well over the long run. To this end, we consider four pillars when we evaluate corporate governance practices:

  1. The board: A high-functioning, well-composed, independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing evaluation practices.
  2. Governance structures: Provisions and structures that empower shareholders and protect their rights.
  3. Appropriate compensation: Pay that incentivizes relative outperformance over the long term.
  4. Risk oversight: Effective, integrated, and ongoing oversight of relevant industry- and company-specific risks.

These pillars guide our proxy voting and engagement activity, and we hope that by sharing this framework with you, you’ll have a better perspective on our approach to stewardship.

I’d like to highlight a few key themes that are increasingly important in our stewardship efforts:

Good governance starts with a great board.

We believe that when a company has a great board of directors, good results are more likely to follow.

We view the board as one of a company’s most critical strategic assets. When the board contributes the right mix of skill, expertise, thought, tenure, and personal characteristics, sustainable economic value becomes much easier to achieve. A thoughtfully composed, diverse board more objectively oversees how management navigates challenges and opportunities critical to shareholders’ interests. And a company’s strategic needs for the future inform effectively planned evolution of the board.

Gender diversity is one element of board composition that we will continue to focus on over the coming years. We expect boards to focus on it as well, and their demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward. There is compelling evidence that boards with a critical mass of women have outperformed those that are less diverse. Diverse boards also more effectively demonstrate governance best practices that we believe lead to long-term shareholder value. Our stance on this issue is therefore an economic imperative, not an ideological choice. This is among the reasons why we recently joined the 30% Club, a global organization that advocates for greater representation of women in boardrooms and leadership roles. The club’s mission to enhance opportunities for women from “schoolroom to boardroom” is one that we think bodes well for broadening the pipeline of great directors.

Directors are shareholders’ eyes and ears on risk.

Risk and opportunity shape every business. Shareholders rely on a strong board to oversee the strategy for realizing opportunities and mitigating risks. Thorough disclosure of relevant and material risks—a key board responsibility—enables share prices to fully reflect all significant known (and reasonably foreseeable) risks and opportunities. Given our extensive indexed investments, which rely on the price-setting mechanism of the market, that market efficiency is critical to Vanguard and our clients.

Climate risk is an example of a slowly developing and highly uncertain risk—the kind that tests the strength of a board’s oversight and risk governance. Our evolving position on climate risk (much like our stance on gender diversity) is based on the economic bottom line for Vanguard investors. As significant long-term owners of many companies in industries vulnerable to climate risk, Vanguard investors have substantial value at stake.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach, market solutions to climate risk and other evolving disclosure practices can be valuable when they reflect the shared priorities of issuers and investors. Our participation in the Investor Advisory Group to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reflects our belief that materiality-driven, sector-specific disclosures will better illuminate risks in a way that aids market efficiency and price discovery. We believe it is incumbent on all market participants—investors, boards, and management alike—to embrace the disclosure of sustainability risks that bear on a company’s long-term value creation prospects.

Engagement builds mutual understanding and a basis for progress.

Timely and substantive dialogue with companies is core to our investment stewardship approach. We see engagement as mutually beneficial: We convey Vanguard’s views and we hear companies’ perspectives, which adds context to our analysis.

Our funds’ votes on ballot measures—171,000 discrete items in the past year alone—are an outcome of this process, not the starting point. As we analyze ballot items, particularly controversial ones, we often invite direct and open-ended dialogue with the company. We seek management’s and the board’s perspectives on the issues at hand, and we evaluate them against our principles and leading practices. To understand the full picture, we often also engage with other investors, including activists and shareholder proponents. Our goal is that a fund’s ultimate voting decision does not come as a surprise. Our ability to make informed decisions depends on maintaining an ongoing exchange of ideas in a setting in which we can cover the intention and strategy behind the issues.

Yet our engagement activities are not solely focused on the ballot. Because our funds will hold most of their portfolio companies practically permanently, it’s important for us to build relationships with boards and management teams that transcend a transactional focus on any specific issue or vote. Engagement is a process, not an event, whose value only grows over time. A CEO we engaged with once said, “You can’t wait to build a relationship until you need it,” and that couldn’t be more true.

The opportunity to articulate our perspectives and understand a board’s thinking on a range of topics—anchored at the intersection of the firm’s strategy and its enabling governance practices—is a crucial part of our stewardship obligations. Although ballot items are reduced to a series of binary choices—yes or no, for or against—engagement beyond the ballot enables us to deal in nuance and in dialogue that drives meaningful progress over time.

There is a growing role for independent directors in engagement, both on issues over which they hold exclusive purview (such as CEO compensation and board composition/succession) and on deepening investors’ understanding of the alignment between a company’s strategy and governance practices. Our interest in engaging with directors is by no means intended to interfere with management’s ownership of the message on corporate strategy and performance. Rather, we believe it’s appropriate for directors to periodically hear directly from and be heard by the shareowners on whose behalf they serve.

* * *

Our focus on corporate governance and investment stewardship has been and will continue to be a deliberate manifestation of Vanguard’s core purpose: “To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.” Our four pillars and our increased focus on climate risk and gender diversity are not fleeting priorities for Vanguard. As essentially permanent owners of the companies you lead, we have a special obligation to be engaged stewards actively focused on the long term. Our Investment Stewardship team—available at InvestmentStewardship@vanguard.com—stands ready to engage with you and your leadership teams on matters of mutual importance to our respective stakeholders. Thank you for valuing our perspective and being our partner in stewardship.

Sincerely,

William McNabb III
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Vanguard Group, Inc.

* * *

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

Our values and beliefs

“To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.”

—Vanguard’s core purpose

Vanguard’s core values of focus, integrity, and stewardship are reflected every day in the way that we engage with our clients, our crew (what we call our employees), and our community. We view our Investment Stewardship program as a natural extension of these values and of Vanguard’s core purpose. Our clients depend on us to be good stewards of their assets, and we depend on corporate boards to prudently oversee the companies in which our funds invest. That is why we believe we have a unique mission to advocate for a world in which the actions and values of public companies and of investors are aligned to create value for Vanguard fund shareholders over the long term.

We believe well-governed companies will perform better over the long term.

Effective corporate governance is more than the collection of a company’s formal provisions and bylaws. A board of directors serves on behalf of all shareholders and is critical in establishing trust and transparency and ensuring the health of a company—and of the capital markets—over time. This board-centric view is the foundation of Vanguard’s approach to investment stewardship. It guides our discussions with company directors and management, as well as our voting of proxies on the funds’ behalf at shareholder meetings around the globe. Great governance starts with a board of directors that is capable of selecting the right management team, holding that team accountable through appropriate incentives, and overseeing relevant risks that are material to the business. We believe that effective corporate governance is an important ingredient for the long-term success of companies and their investors. And when portfolio companies perform well, so do our clients’ investments.

We value long-term progress over short-term gain.

Because our funds typically own the stock of companies for long periods (and, in the case of index funds, are structurally permanent holders of companies), our emphasis on investment outcomes over the long term is unwavering. That’s why we deliberately focus on enduring themes and topics that drive long-term value, rather than solely short-term results. We believe that companies and boards should similarly be focused on long-term shareholder value—both through the sustainability of their strategy and operations, and by managing the risks most material to their long-term success.

Our approach

Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team comprises an experienced group of senior leaders and analysts who are responsible for representing Vanguard shareholders’ interests through industry advocacy, company engagement, and proxy voting on behalf of the Vanguard funds. The team also houses an internal research and communications function that is active in developing Vanguard’s views, policies, and ongoing approach to investment stewardship. Our data and technology group supports every aspect of our Investment Stewardship program.

We take a thoughtful and deliberate approach to investment stewardship.

Our team supports effective corporate governance practices in three ways:

Advocating for policies that we believe will enhance the sustainable, long-term value of our clients’ investments. We promote good corporate governance and responsible investment through thoughtful participation in industry events and discussions where we can expand our advocacy and enhance our understanding of investment issues.

Engaging with portfolio company executives and directors to share our corporate governance principles and learn about portfolio companies’ corporate governance practices. We characterize our approach as “quiet diplomacy focused on results”—providing constructive input that will, in our view, better position companies to deliver sustainable value over the long term for all investors.

Voting proxies at company shareholder meetings across each of our portfolios and around the globe. Because of our ongoing advocacy and engagement efforts, companies should be aware of our governance principles and positions by the time we cast our funds’ votes.

Our process is iterative and ongoing

Our four pillars

Board

Good governance begins with a great board of directors. Our primary interest is to ensure that the individuals who represent the interests of all shareholders are independent (both in mindset and freedom from conflicts), capable (across the range of relevant skills for the company and industry), and appropriately experienced (so as to bring valuable perspective to their roles). We also believe that diversity of thought, background, and experience, as well as of personal characteristics (such as gender, race, and age), meaningfully contributes to the board’s ability to serve as effective, engaged stewards of shareholders’ interests. If a company has a well-composed, high-functioning board, good results are more likely to follow.

Structure

We believe in the importance of governance structures that empower shareholders and ensure accountability of the board and management. We believe that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through certain governance and bylaw provisions. Among these preferred provisions are that directors must stand for election by shareholders annually and must secure a majority of the votes in order to join or remain on the board. In instances where the board appears resistant to shareholder input, we also support the right of shareholders to call special meetings and to place director nominees on the company’s ballot.

Compensation

We believe that performance-linked compensation policies and practices are fundamental drivers of the sustainable, long-term value for a company’s investors. The board plays a central role in determining appropriate executive pay that incentivizes performance relative to peers and competitors. Providing effective disclosure of these practices, their alignment with company performance, and their outcomes is crucial to giving shareholders confidence in the link between incentives and rewards and the creation of value over the long term.

Risk

Boards are responsible for effective oversight and governance of the risks most relevant and material to each company in the context of its industry and region. We believe that boards should take a thorough, integrated, and thoughtful approach to identifying, understanding, quantifying, overseeing, and—where appropriate—disclosing risks that have the potential to affect shareholder value over the long term. Importantly, boards should communicate their approach to risk oversight to shareholders through their normal course of business.

By the numbers: Voting and engagement

Engagement and voting trends

2015 proxy season 2016 proxy season  2017 proxy season
Company engagements 685 817 954
Companies voted 10,560 11,564 12,974
Meetings voted 12,785 16,740 18,905
Proposals voted 124,230 157,506 171,385
Countries voted in* 70 70 68

* The number of countries can vary each year. In certain markets, some companies do not hold shareholder meetings annually.
Note: The annual proxy season is from July 1 to June 30.

Our voting

Proxy voting reflects our governance pillars worldwide.

Meetings voted by region

Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017

Global voting activity

* Includes more than 26,000 proposals related to capitalization; 8,000 proposals related to mergers and acquisitions; 16,000 routine business proposals; and 1,000 other shareholder proposals.
Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017.

Our engagement

We engage with companies of all sizes.

Market Capitalization % of 2017 proxy season engagements
Under $1 billion 19%
$1 billion–under $10 billion 44%
$10 billion–under $50 billion 24%
$50 billion and over 13%

Our engagement with portfolio companies has grown significantly over time.

Number of engagements and assets represented

Note: Dollar figures represent the market value of Vanguard fund investments in companies with which we engaged as of June 30, 2017.

We engage on a range of topics aligned with our four pillars

Frequency of topics discussed during Vanguard engagements (%)

Note: Figures do not total 100%, as individual engagements often span multiple topics.

Boards in focus: Vanguard’s view on gender diversity

One of our most fundamental governance beliefs is that good governance begins with a great board of directors. We believe that diversity among directors—along dimensions such as gender, experience, race, background, age, and tenure—can strengthen a board’s range of perspectives and its capacity to make complex, fully considered decisions.

While we have long discussed board composition and diversity with portfolio companies, gender diversity has emerged as one dimension on which there is compelling support for positive effects on shareholder value. In recent years, a growing body of research has demonstrated that greater gender diversity on boards can lead to better company performance and governance.

Companies should be prepared to discuss—in both their public disclosures and their engagement with investors—their plans to incorporate appropriate diversity over time in their board composition. While we believe that board evolution is a process, not an event, the demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward.

Boards in focus: Gender diversity

Engagement case studies

Gender diversity on boards was an important topic of engagement for us during the 12 months ended June 30, 2017. Below are summary examples of discussions we had on the subject.

High-impact engagement on gender diversity

Over several interactions with a U.S. industrial company, our team shared Vanguard’s perspective on board composition and evaluation. The company had undergone recent leadership transitions and was open to amending elements of its governance structure to align with best practices. We expressed particular support for meaningful gender diversity and expressed concern that the board previously had only one female director in its recent history.

Right after this year’s annual general meeting, the company announced it was adding four new directors with diverse experience, including two women. This outcome is the best-case scenario: The board welcomed shareholder input, we shared our view on best corporate governance practices, and the board ultimately incorporated our perspective into its board evolution process.

A denial of diversity’s value

A Canadian materials company that had consistently underperformed was governed by an entrenched, all-male board with seemingly nominal independence from the CEO. A 2017 shareholder resolution asked the company to adopt and publish a policy governing gender diversity on the board. Before voting, Vanguard engaged with the company to learn about its board evolution process, including its perspective on gender diversity. The engagement revealed that the company understood neither the value of gender diversity nor the importance of being responsive to shareholders’ concerns. Despite verbally endorsing gender diversity, the company resisted specifying a strategy or making a commitment to achieve it. The board, when seeking new members, relied solely on recommendations from current directors, a practice that can entrench the current board’s perspective and limit diversity. Our funds voted in support of the shareholder resolution, and we will continue to engage and hold the board accountable for meaningful progress over time.

Mixed results from an ongoing engagement

A U.S. consumer discretionary company had no women on its board, a problem magnified by its medium-term underperformance relative to peers, a classified board structure, and a lengthy average director tenure. We engaged with management twice between the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings to share our perspective on the importance of gender diversity and recommend that they make it a priority for future board evolution and director searches.

In its 2017 proxy, the company described board diversity as critical to the firm’s sustainable value and named gender as an element of diversity to be considered during the director search and nomination process. The company has since added a non-independent woman to the board. Although this move is directionally correct, it does not fully address our concerns; we will continue to encourage the company to add gender diversity to its ranks of independent directors.

Risk in focus: Vanguard’s view on climate risk

As the steward of long-term shareholder value for more than 20 million investors, Vanguard closely monitors how our portfolio companies identify, manage, and mitigate risks—including climate risk. Our approach to climate risk is evolving as the world’s and business community’s understanding of the topic matures.

This year, for the first time, our funds supported a number of climate-related shareholder resolutions opposed by company management. We are also discussing climate risk with company management and boards more than ever before. Our Investment Stewardship team is committed to engaging with a range of stakeholders to inform our perspective on these issues, and to share our thinking with the market, our portfolio companies, and our investors.

Risk in focus: Climate risk

A Q&A with Glenn Booraem, Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship Officer

Vanguard is an investment management company. Why should Vanguard fund investors be concerned about climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Climate risk has the potential to be a significant long-term risk for companies in many industries. As stewards of our clients’ long-term investments, we must be finely attuned to this risk. We acknowledge that our clients’ views on climate risk span the ideological spectrum. But our position on climate risk is anchored in long-term economic value—not ideology. Regardless of one’s perspective on climate, there’s no doubt that changes in global regulation, energy consumption, and consumer preferences will have a significant economic impact on companies, particularly in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors.

Why the shift in Vanguard’s assessment of climate risk, and why now?

Mr. Booraem: We’ve been discussing climate risk with portfolio companies for several years. It has been, and will remain, one of our engagement priorities for the foreseeable future. This past year, we engaged with more companies on this issue than ever before, and for the first time our funds supported two climate-related shareholder resolutions in cases where we believed that companies’ disclosure practices weren’t on par with emerging expectations in the market. As with other issues, our point of view has evolved as the topic has matured and, importantly, as its link to shareholder value has become more clear.

What is your top concern when you learn that a company in which a Vanguard portfolio invests does not have a rigorous strategy to evaluate and mitigate climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Our concern is fundamentally that in the absence of clear disclosure and informed board oversight, the market lacks insight into the material risks of investing in that firm. It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to select the stocks they own. When we’re not confident that companies have an appropriate level of board oversight or disclosure, we’re concerned that the market may not accurately reflect the value of the investment. Because we represent primarily long-term investors, this bias is particularly problematic when underweighting long-term risks inflates a company’s value.

Now that Vanguard has articulated a clear stance on climate risk, what can portfolio companies expect?

Mr. Booraem: First, companies should expect that we’re going to focus on their public disclosures, both about the risk itself and about their board’s and management’s oversight of that risk. Thorough disclosure is the foundation for the market’s understanding of the issue. Second, companies should expect that we’ll evaluate their disclosures in the context of both their leading peers and evolving market standards, such as those articulated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). Third, they should expect that we’ll listen to their perspective on these and other matters. And finally, they should see our funds’ proxy voting as an extension of our engagement. When we consider a shareholder resolution on climate risk, we give companies a fair hearing on the merits of the proposal and consider their past commitments and the strength of their governance structure.

Engagement case studies

In the 12 months ended June 30, 2017, the topic of climate risk disclosure grew in frequency and prominence in our engagements with companies, particularly those in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors, where climate risk was addressed in nearly every conversation we had. Below are examples of our engagements on climate risk.

Two companies’ commitments to enhanced disclosure

Our team led similar engagements with two U.S. energy companies facing shareholder resolutions on climate risk. One resolution requested that the first company publish an annual report on climate risk impacts and strategy. At the second company, a resolution requested disclosure of the company’s strategy and targets for transitioning to a low- carbon economy. In both cases, when we engaged with the companies, their management teams committed to improving their climate risk disclosure. Given the companies’ demonstrated responsiveness to shareholder feedback and commitment to improving, our funds did not support either shareholder proposal. Our team will continue to track and evaluate the companies’ progress toward their commitments as we consider our votes in future years.

A vote against a risk and governance outlier For years we engaged with a U.S. energy company that lagged its peers on climate risk disclosure and board accessibility. This year, a shareholder proposal requesting that the company produce a climate risk assessment report demonstrated a compelling link between the requested disclosures and long-term shareholder value. Because the board serves on behalf of shareholders and plays a critical role in risk oversight, we believed it was appropriate to seek a direct dialogue with independent directors about climate risk. Management resisted connecting the independent directors with shareholders, making the company a significant industry outlier in good governance practice. Without the confidence that the board understood or represented our view that climate risk poses a material risk in the energy sector, our team viewed the climate risk and governance issues as intertwined. Ultimately, our funds voted for the shareholder proposal and withheld votes on relevant independent directors for failing to engage with shareholders.

A vote for greater climate risk disclosure

A shareholder proposal at a U.S. energy company asked for an annual report with climate risk disclosure, including scenario planning. Through extensive research and engagements with the company’s management, its independent directors, and other industry stakeholders, our team identified governance shortfalls and a clear connection to long-term shareholder value. The company lagged its peers in disclosure, risk planning, and board oversight and responsiveness to shareholder concerns. Crucially, although the company’s public filings identified climate risk as a material issue, it failed to articulate plans for mitigation or adaptation. A similar proposal last year garnered significant support, but the company made no meaningful changes in response. Engagement had limited effect, so our funds voted for the shareholder proposal.

* * *

This post was excerpted from a Vanguard report; the complete publication is available here.

Dilemme de gouvernance d’OBNL | Respect des rôles et responsabilités du DG


Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui expose un problème bien connu dans plusieurs organisations, notamment dans les OBNL qui ont souvent une gouvernance plus « décontractée ». Comment le CA peut-il obtenir la bonne dose de contrôle/surveillance afin de bien s’acquitter de ses obligations fiduciaires ?

La situation décrite dans ce cas se déroule dans une organisation à but non lucratif (OBNL) qui vient de recruter une excellente directrice générale qui provient d’une OBNL comparable, mais avec une faible gouvernance. La DG avait pris l’habitude de prendre toutes les décisions et d’en aviser le CA après coup !

La gouvernance des OBNL révèle des lacunes qui les rendent souvent plus fragiles et, contrairement au cas présenté ici, ce sont les administrateurs qui ont trop souvent tendance à empiéter sur les tâches de direction.

Dans notre cas, c’est la nouvelle DG qui a outrepassé ses responsabilités en octroyant d’importants contrats sans en discuter avec le conseil. Le président du conseil est outré de la situation, d’autant plus qu’il avait déjà soulevé ces questions avec elle deux fois auparavant.

Même si les décisions prises semblent avantageuses pour l’OBNL, le président doit remettre les pendules à l’heure !

Comment Scott, le président du conseil, doit-il agir afin de rétablir l’équilibre des responsabilités entre le CA et le management et prévenir les activités de cover-up ?

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez simple et explicite ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit Scott.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part vos commentaires.

Bonne lecture !

 

Un dilemme de gouvernance

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Dilemme gouvernance OBNL »

Our case study this month looks at how a board can establish control without losing a valuable executive. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Scott is the Chair of a not-for-profit board that has recently recruited a new CEO from a rival organisation.

The CEO is very well qualified and the board are delighted to have her on their executive team. She came from another NFP in the same industry sector. That NFP had a very weak board with directors who were committed to the organisation and its mission but who did not put any effort into establishing good governance. The CEO has become accustomed to making her own decisions and telling the board about them afterwards.

Scott’s board are equally committed to their organisation and mission; they are also diligent and effective directors who have established formal controls that are appropriate for an organisation receiving government and donor funding.

The new CEO has now overstepped her financial and legal delegations for the fourth time. The head of the Audit, Risk and Governance Committee is almost incandescent with rage after hearing about it from the CFO.

Scott is disappointed; last time this happened the board and CEO had a very difficult conversation and she promised not to overstep her delegations again. Less than two months after that event Scott has discovered that she has signed a contract that exceeds her delegated authority in both its length and the quantum of the contract sum.

It is a great contract to have entered into. It will position the organisation for continued growth. The board would have approved had they been asked for permission; but they haven’t been. Even worse, Scott knows that the tender process would have been underway at the time of their last discussion and yet the CEO didn’t disclose the existence of the tender even when they were talking about the need for her to comply with the delegations.

How can Scott re-establish appropriate board control and prevent any more ‘covert operations’?

 

Rôle des administrateurs dans la prévention de risques à la santé | un cas vécu dans une OBNL


À nouveau, je vous présente un cas de gouvernance, publié en juin 2017, sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui décrit une situation dans laquelle un membre de conseil d’une OBNL évalue les conséquences d’une décision pouvant entraîner des risques pour la santé des clients et conduire à une perte de réputation.

Les administrateurs connaissent maintenant le contexte de la décision prise par le conseil. Cependant, une nouvelle administratrice n’est pas « confortable » avec la décision ; elle se questionne sur le risque occasionné à la santé des athlètes à la suite d’une prise de position du conseil trop peu contraignante.

Notons que la directrice de la sécurité de l’entreprise avait qualifié d’infondée les arguments invoqués par une équipe sportive de ne pas utiliser les mesures de protection suggérées.

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Que devrait faire la nouvelle administratrice Pandora dans les circonstances ?

Je vous invite à lire les opinions des experts en allant sur le site de Julie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Rôle des administrateurs dans la prévention de risques à la santé | un cas vécu dans une OBNL

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « risques des obnl »

 

Pandora is a new NED on a peak sporting body board. She loves the sport and is thrilled to contribute. However, she is a bit worried about the risks of a recent board conversation.

Her sport has physical risks and is very dangerous if proper precautions are not taken; these include the use of personal protective equipment. At her most recent board meeting the directors discussed the revised sports safety guidelines which mandate the wearing of personal protective equipment during competitions. One of the directors mentioned that a large local club routinely participates in competitions with players who are clearly not wearing safety gear. Another director stated that the club had objected to the draft guidelines on the basis that, in some circumstances, the safety equipment might hamper players’ movements and create other risks. The safety manager, who was presenting to the board, clarified that the club had, indeed, made that claim but that it was, in her opinion, spurious.

The board then discussed the issues associated with banning the non-compliant club from competitions. This was considered a difficult action because the club is very successful and their absence would upset fans. Also, the club is in a high socio economic demographic and contributes funds and political connections to the sport.

Pandora is worried because the discussion was minuted and the decision was to write to the club and remind them of the need to wear safety equipment but not to threaten expulsion from the competition. Is her board now at risk and has she let down the whole sport by being a party to this conversation and failing to persuade her board colleagues to take firmer action?

What can Pandora do?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Lutte de pouvoir entre le président du conseil et les actionnaires | Un cas délicat


Voici un cas de gouvernance, publié en mai 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui présente une situation dans laquelle le président du conseil d’une société publique se place en porte-à-faux avec les membres de son conseil, et éventuellement avec les actionnaires.

Les administrateurs ont été à l’écoute des principaux actionnaires en mettant en place une procédure acceptable pour les deux parties. Cependant, Oliver constate que le processus adopté a pour effet de décourager certains candidats.

De plus, il semble que le président du conseil a sa petite idée sur le choix du candidat que le conseil devrait promouvoir. Il invoque également le fait que, comme président du comité des ressources humaines, il aura le dernier mot !

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Lutte de pouvoir entre le président du conseil et les actionnaires | Un cas délicat

 

Our case study this month looks at a listed company that has inadvertently triggered a power struggle between its chair and its shareholders.

Oliver is a board member and audit committee chair of a medium sized listed company; he also sits on the nominations and remuneration committee which is chaired by the board Chairman. Some of the larger shareholders complained after the last board renewal that they had not been given any chance to influence the selection criteria or, as one director stood for one vacancy, any real choice.

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « boards and shareholders »

The board took these complaints seriously and when looking to recruit another new director they engaged with these shareholders to agree selection criteria, appointment of a consultant to help the board source from a wider pool of potential applicants, and a process. It was agreed that the board would put two candidates to the AGM so that shareholders had a meaningful choice and only the candidate with the most votes would be appointed. This strategy was not popular with the applicants and several withdrew because they felt it would harm their reputations to stand for, and then fail to gain, a competitive board election.

However, the process continued and the board now has two excellent candidates who are willing to give the shareholders a choice at the AGM. The Chairman is very keen on one of the applicants and less keen on the other. He has asked the board to put forward only his preferred candidate as “the chair should have the final say on composition of his board”. The board meeting discussion got quite heated and the Chairman stamped out of the room in a fit of temper.

Oliver’s colleagues are looking to him, as the longest serving director, to lead the board out of this mess.

How should he start?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Pourquoi un haut dirigeant devrait-il faire appel à un coach professionnel ?


Voici un excellent article de Ray B. Williams, paru dans Psychology Today, sur les raisons qui devraient inciter les présidents et chefs de direction (PCD – CEO) à faire appel à un coach.

C’est un article de vulgarisation basé sur plusieurs recherches empiriques qui fait la démonstration de la quasi nécessitée, pour un haut dirigeant, d’avoir les conseils d’un professionnel du coaching.

Voici quelques références sur le coaching professionnel des dirigeants :

  1. Coaching exécutif de leaders et dirigeants
  2. Diriger un cabinet de coaching pour hauts dirigeants c’est avant tout… être coach
  3. Le coaching du dirigeant
  4. Coaching d’entreprise: Définition de coach de dirigeants, management, coaching d’entreprise
  5. L’accompagnement des managers et des dirigeants
  6. Coaching de gestion

Vous serez étonné d’apprendre que c’est probablement l’un des secrets les mieux gardés et que c’est l’une des raisons qui expliquent le succès de plusieurs grands gestionnaires. À lire.

Bonne lecture !

Why Every CEO Needs a Coach ?

 

« Paul Michelman, writing in the Harvard Business Review Working Knowledge, cites the fact that most major companies now make coaching a core part of their executive development programs. The belief is that one-on-one personal interaction with an objective third party can provide a focus that other forms of organizational support cannot. A 2004 study by Right Management Consultants found 86% of companies used coaches in their leadership development program.

Eric Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of Google, who said that his best advice to new CEOs was « have a coach. » Schmidt goes on to say « once I realized I could trust him [the coach] and that he could help me with perspective, I decided this was a great idea…

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Douglas McKenna, writing in Forbes magazine, argues that the top athletes in the world, and even Barack Obama, have coaches. In his study of executive coaching, McKenna, who is CEO and Executive Director for the Center for Organizational Leadership at The Oceanside Institute, argues that executive coaches should be reserved for everyone at C-level, heads of major business units or functions, technical or functional wizards and high-potential young leaders.

Despite its popularity, many CEOs and senior executives are reluctant to report that they have a coach, says Jonathan Schwartz, one-time President and CEO of Sun Microsystems, who had an executive coach himself. Steve Bennett, former CEO of Intuit says, “At the end of the day, people who are high achievers—who want to continue to learn and grow and be effective—need coaching.”

John Kador, writing in CEO Magazine, argues that while board members can be helpful, most CEOs shy away from talking to the board about their deepest uncertainties. Other CEOs can lend a helping ear, but there are barriers to complete honesty and trust. Kador writes, “No one in the organization needs an honest, close and long term relationship with a trusted advisor more than a CEO.”

Kador reports conversations with several high profile CEOs: “Great CEOs, like great athletes, benefit from coaches that bring a perspective that comes from years of knowing [you], the company and what [you] need to do as a CEO to successfully drive the company forward,” argues William R. Johnson, CEO of the H.J. Heinz Co., “every CEO can benefit from strong, assertive and honest coaching.”

The cost of executive coaches, particularly a good one, is not cheap, but “compared to the decisions CEOs make, money is not the issue,” says Schwartz, “if you have a new perspective, if you feel better with your team, the board and the marketplace, then you have received real value.”

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada en 2016 | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips Vineberg


Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada durant la dernière année.

Le document qui vient de sortir est en anglais mais la version française devrait suivre dans peu de temps.

Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document de 100 pages sur le site de l’entreprise.

Cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2016

 

Davies Governance Insights 2016, provides analysis of the top governance trends and issues important to Canadian boards, senior management and governance observers.

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The 2016 edition provides readers with our take on important topics ranging from shareholder engagement and activism to leadership diversity and the rise in issues facing boards and general counsel. We also provide practical guidance for boards and senior management of public companies and their investors on these and many other corporate governance topics that we expect will remain under focus in the 2017 proxy season.

 

Les devoirs des administrateurs eu égard à un climat de travail malsain | Un cas pratique


Voici un cas de gouvernance publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui illustre les contradictions entre les valeurs énoncées par une école privée et celles qui semblent animer les administrateurs et les parents.

Le cas montre comment un administrateur, nouvellement élu sur un CA d’une école privée, peut se retrouver dans une situation embarrassante impliquant des comportements de harcèlement et de menaces qui affectent la santé mentale et le bien-être des employés.

Cette situation semble se présenter de plus en plus fréquemment dans les institutions d’enseignement qui visent des rendements très (trop !) élevés.

Comment Ignacio peut-il s’y prendre pour bien faire comprendre aux administrateurs de son CA leurs devoirs et leurs obligations légales d’assurer un climat de travail sain, absent d’agression de la part de certains parents ?

Le cas présente, de façon claire, une situation de culture organisationnelle déficiente ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux administrateurs qui vivent des expériences similaires.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Un cas culture organisationnelle déficiente !

 

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Ignacio is an old boy of a private school with a proud sporting tradition. He was invited onto the board last year when a long-serving director retired. The school is well run with a professional principal who has the respect of the staff as well as many of the boys.

The school has worked hard to develop academic excellence and its place in rankings has improved with a greater percentage of boys qualifying for university.

At the last board meeting the CEO was absent. The chairman explained that he had taken stress leave because he couldn’t cope with bullying from some of the parents. Some directors sniggered and the rest looked embarrassed. There were a few comments about ‘needing to grow a backbone’, ‘being a pansy’, and ‘not having the guts to stand up to parents or lead the teams to victory on the field’.

Ignacio was aghast – he asked about the anti-harassment and workplace health and safety policies and was given leave by the chair « to look into ‘covering our backs’ if necessary ».

Ignacio met with the HR manager and discovered the policies were out of date and appeared to have been cut and pasted from the original Department of Education advice without customisation. From his experience running a business Ignacio is aware of the importance of mental health issues in the modern workplace and also of the legal duty of directors to provide a workplace free from bullying and harassment. School staff are all aware of a discrepancy between the stated School values and those of the board and some parents. The HR manager tells him that recent bullying by parents has become more akin to verbal and even physical assault. Staff believe the board will not support them against fee paying parents even though the school is, in theory, a not-for-profit institution.

How can Ignacio help lead his board to an understanding of their duty to provide a safe workplace?

 

Chris’s Answer  …..

 

Julie’s Answer ….

 

Leanne’s Answer ….

*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

 

Quelle est la rémunération globale des administrateurs canadiens ?


Quelle est la rémunération globale des administrateurs canadiens ?

C’est une question que beaucoup de personnes me posent, et qui n’est pas évidente à répondre !

L’article ci-dessous, publié par Martin Mittelstaedt, chercheur et ex-rédacteur au Globe and Mail, apporte un éclairage très intéressant sur la question de la rémunération des administrateurs canadiens.

Les études sur le sujet sont rares et donnent des résultats différents compte tenu de la taille, de la nature privée ou publique des entreprises, du secteur d’activité, des différentes composantes de la rémunération globale, etc.

De manière générale, il semble que les rémunérations des administrateurs canadiens et américains soient similaires et que les postes d’administrateurs des entreprises publiques commandent une rémunération globale d’environ quatre fois la rémunération offerte par les entreprises privées.

Une étude montre que la base médiane de la rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés privées au Canada est de 25 000 $, avec un jeton de présence de 1 500 $ et quatre réunions annuelles. Le nombre d’administrateurs est de six, incluant trois administrateurs indépendants et une femme ! La somme de la rémunération globale s’établirait à environ 31 000 $ US. Mais on parle ici de grandes entreprises privées…

Le montant de la rémunération dépend aussi beaucoup des plans de distribution d’actions, des privilèges, des bonis, etc.

Évidemment, pour toute entreprise publique, il est facile de connaître la rémunération détaillée des administrateurs et des cinq hauts dirigeants puisque ces renseignements se retrouvent dans les circulaires aux actionnaires.

Je vous encourage à lire cet article. Vous en saurez plus long sur les raisons qui font que les informations sont difficiles à obtenir dans le secteur privé.

Bonne lecture !

How much is a director worth ?

 

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Determining director compensation at private companies is more of an art than a science, with a wide range of practices and no one-size-fits-all formula.

Unlike publicly traded companies, where detailed information about director remuneration is as close as the nearest proxy circular, compensation at private boards is like “a black box,” according to Steve Chan, principal at Hugessen Consulting, who says retainers, meeting fees and share-based awards “are all over the map.”

Not much is known about private director compensation “for good reason,” observes David Anderson, president of Anderson Governance Group. “There is not a lot of data out there.”

PRIVATELY UNDERPAID?

Private company directorships can be prized assignments because they don’t involve the heavy compliance and regulatory burdens that occupy increasing amounts of time at public company boards.

But what private boards should be paid is difficult to determine, when there is little research to guide individual directors or companies. Some of the available data suggest private directors are being underpaid, at least relative to their public counterparts. But this information does not include the fact that the work may be different and much of the compensation at public boards may not ultimately pay off because it is linked to share price performance.

It is difficult to benchmark best practices with so little hard data, making it unsurprising that how best to set private company directors’ compensation is the most frequently asked question made by members to the ICD.

One of the few ongoing attempts to analyze compensation indicates remuneration is far higher at public boards, about four times higher in fact, although the amounts are skewed by the heavy use of stock-linked awards at publicly traded companies.

The private company survey, by Lodestone Global, was based on a questionnaire posed to members of the Young Presidents’ Organization, an international group of corporate présidents and CEOs, including many from Canada.

The Lodestone survey looked at medium-sized family or closely held firms, companies that are more established than early-stage startups, but smaller than large global corporations.

“The survey is not casually designed. The data is pretty rigorous and it’s global,” says Bernard Tenenbaum, managing partner at Princeton, N.J.-based Lodestone.

Tenenbaum says he started investigating private company board compensation because of the paucity of data on the subject. No one seemed to know what was going on. “People kept asking me, ‘Well how much should we pay directors?’ I’d say: ‘I don’t know. How much do you pay them now?’ And I started surveying.”

The firm’s most recent survey, based on 2014 data, had responses from more than 250 private companies, including 19 from Canada. The median revenue at the Canadian companies was $100-million, with the median number of employees at 325.

According to Tenenbaum, the median Canadian retainer was $25,000, with a $1,500 meeting fee and four meetings annually. The median number of directors was six, with three independent and one woman. The total of fees and retainers came to $31,000 (all dollar figures U.S.)

Interestingly, the overall U.S. compensation figure matched the Canadian one, but with a different composition. The median U.S. retainer was lower at $21,000, but the meeting fee was higher at $2,500. Including a few other miscellaneous items, like teleconference fees, U.S. compensation was $33,000, compared to $32,250 in Canada, a closeness that Tenenbaum termed “a kissing distance.”

The Lodestone figures give an indication of director compensation, although it is worth cautioning that the sample size is small, the figures are based on the median or middle-ranked firm, and there was a wide variety in size among the companies, given that they included a few smaller tech and industrial firms.

To benchmark private company director compensation, it is worthwhile to look at what comparable publicly traded companies are paying. One useful comparator is the smaller companies embedded in the BDO 600 survey of director compensation at medium-sized public companies. It has access to highly accurate data based on shareholder proxy circulars.

BDO’s 2014 survey found that among firms with revenue between $25-million and $325-million, cash compensation through retainer and committee fees averaged $54,000, while directors typically received another $65,000 in stock awards and options for a total of $119,000.

There is a small amount of information available in Canada on private board compensation, but the amount of data isn’t large enough to make generalized statements on remuneration and involves larger companies.

For example, in its director compensation, Canadian Tire Corp. breaks out amounts paid to the company’s non-publicly traded banking subsidiary, Canadian Tire Bank. In 2014, three directors on both boards were paid about $55,000 each for retainers and meeting fees for serving at the bank. Similarly, Loblaw Companies Ltd. paid $58,000 to a director who also served on President’s Choice Bank, a privately-held subsidiary.

The amounts are relatively low for blue-chip Canadian companies, but both banks are far smaller than their parent companies, with Canadian Tire Bank at $5.6-billion in assets and PC Bank at $3.3-billion.

Hugessen’s Chan says that in his experience, the larger, family-run private companies that have global operations compensate directors at roughly the same amounts as similarly sized public firms.

“Among the larger public companies versus the private companies, they’re comparable,” Chan says.

PUBLICLY EXPOSED

Tenenbaum says that based on his research and the figures from BDO, directors are being paid about $20,000 annually for taking on the added hassle of serving on a public company. He discounted the value of the stock-based compensation because it is conditional on share-price performance.

“There is a premium that you pay a director for taking the risk” of public company exposure, Tenenbaum says.

Directors also need to take into account some of the non-monetary factors of the board experience. Given that so much time on a public board is spent on compliance with regulatory requirements, being freed of this responsibility has value.

“When you’re on a private board, you don’t need to worry about all of the compliance that you have to worry about on a public company board,” says Larry Macdonald, who has served on both types of boards in the oil and gas sector. “You can spend more time on the issues which are probably more important to the company on a private board than you can on public board.”

Macdonald currently chairs publicly-traded Vermilion Energy Inc., but has also served on several private and volunteer boards.

One consequence of the difference in focus is that private boards can often have fewer members because directors can be more focused on company business needs, rather than on compliance requirements. Decision making can also be quicker and easier.

Macdonald says a public board may need eight to 10 people to handle the volume of work, compared to only five or six on a similar private company. As an example of the efficiency of a private board, a company that has a particularly good year and wants to pay employees a bonus can easily decide to do so.

At a public company, however, making this payment wouldn’t be as straightforward. Directors would have to compile a detailed explanation of why they wanted to pay the bonus and include it in shareholder circulars.

While some companies are downgrading the importance of meeting fees, Macdonald thinks they are necessary, with a range of $1,000 to $1,500 being sufficient. “There should be a permeeting fee. You want your directors to show up in person, if at all possible, and if you’re not going to give them a permeeting fee they’re going to be phoning it in or not showing up, so you’ve got to keep everybody interested,” he says.

EQUITY COMPENSATION

He would set the retainer with an eye to any equity compensation. “If there is a pretty good option plan, I would think that $10,000 a year would be adequate, but if the option plan is weaker, you have to up the annual fee,” Macdonald says.

The amount of equity reserved for directors in private companies is a disputed topic. Tenenbaum says equity compensation at private companies, in his experience, is rare. But Chan says a figure often used is to allocate 10 percent of the equity for directors and executives.

If the director is “pounding the pavement with the CEO, a big chunk ofthe [equity] pool might go to directors,” Chan says.

The amount of equity reserved for executives and the board could be as high as 20 percent to 30 percent in the early life of a technology company, but lower than 10 percent in a capital intensive business. “It all depends on size. You’re not going to give 10 percent away of a $1-billion company,” he says.

Macdonald considers the 10 percent of stock reserved for management and directors a good ball park figure. The bulk of the stock typically goes to management, with one or two percent earmarked for directors, he says.

RICHER REWARDS

Public boards are typically egalitarian, with all directors receiving the same base compensation. Private boards, however, can and do pay differing amounts, depending on the specialized skills companies are trying to assemble among their directors. Macdonald says a private oil company looking to pick up older fields, which may have environmental issues, might award extra compensation to attract a director with recognized skills in health, safety and environment.

To be sure, compensation is only one factor in attracting directors to a board. Tenenbaum says academic research has found that the reasons directors cite to join boards are led by the quality of top management, the opportunity to learn and to be challenged. Personal prestige, compensation and stock ownership are far down the list.

These factors may explain why many people want to serve on private boards. “The qualitative experience of private company directors is quite different from public company directors,” says Anderson.

“They avoid a lot of the perceived risk of public company boards and they get the benefit of doing what, as business people, they really like doing, which is thinking about the business and applying their knowledge and experience to business problems.”


This article originally appeared in the Director Journal, a publication of the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD). Permission has been granted by the ICD to use this article for non-commercial purposes including research, educational materials and online resources. Other uses, such as selling or licensing copies, are prohibited.

 

La relève dans une entreprise familiale | Une possibilité de conflits de rôles !


Voici un cas de gouvernance publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui concerne les relations entre la présidente du conseil et sa fille nouvellement nommée comme CEO de cette entreprise privée de taille moyenne.

Le cas illustre le processus de transition familiale et les efforts à exercer afin de ne pas interférer avec les affaires de l’entreprise.

Il s’agit d’un cas très fréquent dans les entreprises familiales. Comment Hannah peut-elle continuer à faire profiter sa fille de ses conseils tout en s’assurant de ne pas empiéter sur ses responsabilités ?

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Cas de relève familiale

 

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Hannah prepared for the transition. She did a course of director education and understands her duties as a non-executive. She loves her daughter, trusts her judgement as CEO and genuinely wants to see her succeed. Nothing is going wrong but Hannah can’t help interfering. She is bored and longs for the days when she could visit customers or sit and strategise with her management team. 

Once a week she has a formal meeting with the CEO in her office. In between times she is in frequent contact. Although by mutual agreement these contacts should be purely social or family oriented Hannah finds herself talking business and is hurt when her daughter suggests they leave it for the weekly meeting or put it onto the board agenda.

Over the past few months Hannah has improved governance, record-keeping, training and succession planning systems but she is running out of projects she can do without undermining her daughter. She also recognises that, as a medium sized unlisted business, the company does not need any more governance structures.

How can Hannah find fulfilment in her new role?

 

 

Paul’s Answer  …..

 

Julie’s Answer ….

 

Jakob’s Answer ….

*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

 

Malaise au conseil | Les effets pervers de l’obligation de divulgation des rémunérations de la haute direction (en rappel)


Aujourd’hui, je cède la parole à Mme Nicolle Forget*, certainement l’une des administratrices de sociétés les plus chevronnées au Québec (sinon au Canada), qui nous présente sa vision de la gouvernance « réglementée » ainsi que celle du rôle des administrateurs dans ce processus.

L’allocution qui suit a été prononcée dans le cadre du Colloque sur la gouvernance organisée par la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés le 6 juin 2014. Je pensais tout d’abord faire un résumé de son texte, mais, après une lecture attentive, j’en ai conclu que celui-ci exposait une problématique de fond et constituait une prise de position fondamentale en gouvernance. Il me semblait essentiel de vous faire partager son article au complet.

Nous avons souvent abordé les conséquences non anticipées de la réglementation, principalement celles découlant des exigences de divulgation en matière de rémunération. Cependant, dans son allocution, l’auteure apporte un éclairage nouveau, inédit et audacieux sur l’exercice de la gouvernance dans les sociétés publiques.

Elle présente une solide argumentation et expose clairement certains malaises vécus par les administrateurs eu égard à la lourdeur des mécanismes réglementaires de gouvernance. Les questionnements présentés en conclusion de l’article sont, en grande partie, fondés sur sa longue expérience comme membre de nombreux conseils d’administration.

Comment réagissez-vous aux constats que fait Mme Forget ? Les autorités réglementaires vont-elles trop loin dans la prescription des obligations de divulgation ? Pouvons-nous éviter les effets pervers de certaines dispositions sans pour autant nuire au processus de divulgation d’informations importantes pour les actionnaires et les parties prenantes.

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Je vous souhaite une bonne lecture.

 

MALAISE AU CONSEIL | Les effets pervers de l’obligation de divulgation en matière de rémunération

 par

Nicolle Forget*

 

Merci aux organisateurs de ce colloque de me donner l’occasion de partager avec vous quelques constatations et interrogations qui m’habitent depuis quatre ou cinq ans concernant diverses obligations imposées aux entreprises à capital ouvert (inscrites en Bourse). Je souligne d’entrée de jeu que la présentation qui suit n’engage que moi.

Depuis l’avènement de quelques grands scandales financiers, ici et ailleurs, on en a mis beaucoup sur le dos des administrateurs de sociétés. On voudrait qu’un administrateur soit un expert en semblable matière.  Il ne l’est pas.  Il arrive avec son bagage, c’est pourquoi on l’a choisi.  On lui prépare un programme de formation pour lui permettre de comprendre l’entreprise au conseil de laquelle il a accepté de siéger, mais il n’en saura jamais autant que la somme des savoirs de l’entreprise.  C’est utopique de s’attendre au contraire.  Même un administrateur qui ne ferait que cela, siéger au conseil de cette entreprise, ne le pourrait pas.

nicolle-forget

Des questions reviennent constamment dans l’actualité : où étaient les administrateurs ? N’ont-ils rien vu venir ou rien vu tout court?  Ont-ils rempli leur devoir fiduciaire?  Tout juste si on ne conclut pas qu’ils sont tous des incompétents.  Les administrateurs étaient là.  Ils savaient ce que l’on a bien voulu leur faire savoir. (ex. Saccage de la Baie-James. Les administrateurs de la SEBJ, convoqués en Commission parlementaire à Québec, au printemps 1983,  ont appris, par un avocat venu y témoigner, l’existence d’un avis juridique qu’il avait préparé à la demande de la direction.  La SEBJ poursuivait alors les responsables du saccage et un très long procès était sur le point de commencer.  Avoir eu connaissance de son contenu, au moment où il a été livré au PDG, aurait eu un impact sur nos décisions.  J’étais alors membre du conseil d’administration).

Posons tout de suite que la meilleure gouvernance qui soit n’empêchera jamais des dirigeants qui veulent cacher au conseil certains actes d’y parvenir — surtout si ces actes sont frauduleux. Même avec de belles politiques et de beaux codes d’éthique, plusieurs directions d’entreprise trouvent encore qu’un conseil d’administration n’est rien d’autre qu’un mal nécessaire.  Les administrateurs sont parfois perçus comme s’ingérant dans les affaires de la direction ou dans les décisions qu’elle prend. Aussi, ces dirigeants ont-ils tendance à placer les conseils devant des faits accomplis ou des dossiers tellement bien ficelés qu’il est difficile d’y trouver une fissure par laquelle entrevoir une faille dans l’argumentation au soutien de la décision à prendre. Pourtant, et nous le verrons plus loin, en vertu de la loi, le conseil « exerce tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour gérer les activités et les affaires internes de la société ou en surveiller l’exécution ».

Les conseils d’administration, comme les entreprises et leurs dirigeants, sont soumis à quantité de législations, réglementations, annexes à celles-ci, avis, lignes directrices et autres exigences émanant d’autorités multiples — et davantage les entreprises œuvrent dans un secteur d’activités qui dépasse les frontières d’une province ou d’un pays. Et, selon ce que l’on entend, il faudrait que l’administrateur ait toujours tout vu, tout su…

Malaise!

En 2007, Yvan Allaire écrivait que « … la gouvernance par les conseils d’administration est devenue pointilleuse et moins complaisante, mais également plus tatillonne, coûteuse et litigieuse ; les dirigeants se plaignent de la bureaucratisation de leur entreprise, du temps consacré pour satisfaire aux nouvelles exigences » 1. Denis Desautels, lui, signalait que « Certains prétendent que le souci de la conformité aux lois et aux règlements l’emporte sur les discussions stratégiques et sur la création de valeur.  Et d’autres, que l’adoption ou l’endossement des nouvelles normes n’est pas toujours sincère et, qu’au fond, la culture de l’entreprise n’a pas réellement changé » 2.

Pour mémoire, voyons quelques obligations (de base) d’un administrateur de sociétés.

Au Québec, la Loi sur les sociétés par actions (L.r.Q., c. S-31.1) prévoit que les affaires de la société sont administrées par un conseil d’administration qui « exerce tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour gérer les activités et les affaires internes de la société ou en surveiller l’exécution » (art. 112) et que, « Sauf dans la mesure prévue par la loi, l’exercice de ces pouvoirs ne nécessite pas l’approbation des actionnaires et ceux-ci peuvent être délégués à un administrateur, à un dirigeant ou à un ou plusieurs comités du conseil. »

De façon générale, les administrateurs de sociétés sont soumis aux obligations auxquelles est assujetti tout administrateur d’une personne morale en vertu du Code civil. « En conséquence, les administrateurs sont notamment tenus envers la société, dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, d’agir avec prudence et diligence de même qu’avec honnêteté et loyauté dans son intérêt » (art. 119). L’intérêt de la société, pas l’intérêt de l’actionnaire.  La loi fédérale présente des concepts semblables.  (La Cour Suprême du Canada a d’ailleurs rappelé dans l’affaire BCE qu’il n’existe pas au Canada de principe selon lequel les intérêts d’une partie — les actionnaires, par exemple — doivent avoir priorité sur ceux des autres parties.)

Si la société fait appel publiquement à l’épargne, elle devient un émetteur assujetti. Alors s’ajoutent les règles de la Bourse concernant les exigences d’inscription initiale ainsi que celles concernant le maintien de l’inscription. S’ajoutent aussi les obligations édictées dans la Loi sur les valeurs mobilières (L.R.Q., c. V-1.1), de même que les règlements qui en découlent, et dont l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) est chargée de l’application. L’émetteur assujetti est tenu aux obligations d’information continue. Si vous êtes un administrateur ou un haut dirigeant d’un tel émetteur ou même d’une filiale d’un tel émetteur, vous êtes un initié avec des obligations particulières.

L’article 73 de cette Loi stipule que tel émetteur « … fournit, conformément aux conditions et modalités déterminées par règlement, l’information périodique au sujet de son activité et de ses affaires internes, dont ses pratiques en matière de gouvernance, l’information occasionnelle au sujet d’un changement important et toute autre information prévue par règlement. ». «L’émetteur assujetti doit organiser ses affaires conformément aux règles établies par règlement en matière de gouvernance». (art.73.1)

La mission de l’Autorité, (entendre ici AMF) telle qu’énoncée à l’article 276.1 de la Loi sur les valeurs mobilières se décline comme suit :

  1. Favoriser le bon fonctionnement du marché des valeurs mobilières ;
  2. Assurer la protection des épargnants contre les pratiques déloyales, abusives et frauduleuses ;
  3. Régir l’information des porteurs de valeurs mobilières et du public sur les personnes qui font publiquement appel à l’épargne et sur les valeurs émises par celles-ci ;
  4. Encadrer l’activité des professionnels des valeurs mobilières et des organismes chargés d’assurer le fonctionnement d’un marché des valeurs mobilières.

Dans sa loi constituante, l’Autorité a une mission plus élaborée qui reprend sensiblement les mêmes thèmes, mais en appuyant davantage sur la protection des consommateurs de produits et utilisateurs de services financiers. (art.4, L.R.Q., c. A-33.2)

Aux termes de la législation en vigueur, « L’Autorité exerce la discrétion qui lui est conférée en fonction de l’intérêt public» (art.316, L.R.Q., c. V-1.1) et un règlement pris en vertu de la présente loi confère un pouvoir discrétionnaire à l’Autorité » (art.334).  En outre, toujours selon cette Loi, « Les instructions générales sont réputées constituer des règlements dans la mesure où elles portent sur un sujet pour lequel la loi nouvelle prévoit une habilitation réglementaire et qu’elles sont compatibles avec cette loi et les règlements pris pour son application. »

Je vous fais grâce du Règlement sur les valeurs mobilières (Décret 660-83 ; 115 G.O.2, 1511) ; quant à l’Annexe (51-102A5), portant sur la Circulaire de sollicitation de procuration par la direction, et celle (51-102A6) portant spécifiquement sur la Déclaration de la rémunération de la haute direction, j’y reviendrai plus loin.

Ceci pour une société qui ne fait affaire qu’au Québec, et à l’exclusion de toutes les autres législations et les nombreux règlements portant sur un secteur d’activité en particulier. Pensons juste aux activités qui peuvent affecter l’environnement, même de loin.  Alors, si une société fait affaire ailleurs au Canada et aux É.-U. ou sur plusieurs continents — ajoutez des obligations, des modes différents de divulgation de l’information — et cela peut vous donner une petite idée de « l’industrie » qu’est devenue la gouvernance d’entreprise avec l’obligation de livrer l’information en continu et sous une forme de plus en plus détaillée.  Et les administrateurs devraient tout savoir, avoir tout vu…

Les très nombreuses informations que nous publions rencontrent-elles l’objectif à l’origine de ces exigences ? Carol Liao soutient que « les autorités réglementaires sont par définition orientées vers l’actionnaire ce qui aurait mené à une augmentation des droits de ces derniers, bien au-delà de ce que les lois canadiennes (sur les sociétés) envisageaient. »  On a vu plus haut que la Loi sur les sociétés par actions édicte que « les administrateurs sont notamment tenus envers la société dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, d’agir avec prudence et diligence de même qu’avec honnêteté et loyauté dans son intérêt ».  Se pourrait-il que « ce qui est dans l’intérêt supérieur des actionnaires ne coïncide pas avec une meilleure gouvernance ? (doesn’t align with better governance – that’s where the practice falls down »3.)

J’aime à croire que l’origine de l’obligation qui est faite aux entreprises de dire qui elles sont, ce qu’elles font, comment elles le font, et avec qui elles le font, est la protection du petit investisseur — vous et moi qui plaçons nos économies en prévision de nos vieux jours — comme disaient les anciens.

À moins d’y être obligé par son travail, qui comprend le contenu des circulaires de sollicitation de procuration par la direction, émises à l’intention des actionnaires ? Les Notices annuelles ? D’abord, qui les lit?  Chaque fois que l’occasion m’en est donnée, je pose la question  – et partout le même commentaire :  si je n’avais pas les lire je ne les lirais pas. La quantité de papier rebute en partant ; la complexité des informations à publier en la forme prescrite est difficile à comprendre pour un non-expert, alors imaginez pour un petit investisseur.  Si même  il s’aventure à lire le document.

Donc, si tant est que les circulaires et les notices ne soient pratiquement lues que par ceux qui n’ont pas le choix de le faire, il serait peut-être temps de se demander à quoi, ou plutôt, à qui elles servent ? Et à quels coûts pour l’entreprise. A-t-on une idée de combien d’experts s’affairent avec le personnel de l’entreprise à préparer ces documents sans compter les réunions des comités d’Audit, de Ressources humaines, de Gouvernance et du conseil qui se pencheront sur diverses versions des mêmes documents ?

Encore une fois, pour quoi ? Pour qui ?

Pourquoi pas aux activistes de toutes origines ?

La dernière crise financière (2008/2009) semble avoir été l’accélérateur de l’activisme de groupes, autour des actionnaires, de même que l’arrivée d’experts de toutes sortes en gouvernance d’entreprise. Une industrie venait de naître!  Le Rapport sur la gouvernance 2013, de Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg, s.e. n.c. r. l., soutient qu’il s’agit d’une tendance alimentée surtout « par le nombre accru d’occasions d’activisme découlant de certaines  tendances actuelles de la législation et des pratiques à vouloir que plus de questions soient soumises à l’approbation des actionnaires » 4.

Mais, l’a-t-on oublié ? Les administrateurs ont un devoir de fiduciaire envers la société, pas juste envers les actionnaires.  Ils doivent assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise et pas juste afficher un rendement à court terme qui entraîne des effets pervers sur la gestion des ressources humaines et ne tient pas suffisamment compte d’une saine gestion des risques.  Question :  est-ce que la mesure de l’efficacité consiste en une reddition de compte trimestrielle ? Est-ce que cette reddition de compte, toute formatée, n’est pas en train de remplacer la responsabilité et l’engagement personnel des hauts dirigeants ? La pression  mise sur les conseils d’administration, par certains activistes (d’ailleurs pas toujours actionnaires de l’entreprise !), et de leurs conseillers divers, pour discuter avec le président du conseil et le président du comité de ressources humaines est perçue comme une tentative de la part de ces activistes d’imposer leur programme — au détriment des autres actionnaires et de l’intérêt même de l’émetteur.  Et comme certains fournisseurs de ces activistes (agences de conseils en vote) produisent des analyses pour leur clientèle en vue d’une recommandation de vote lors d’une assemblée annuelle — cette démarche peut être interprétée comme une pression à la limite de l’intimidation.

Venons-en aux obligations de divulgation portant sur la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés.

Les prêteurs, les actionnaires, ont le droit de connaître — à terme — les obligations de l’entreprise, y compris celles envers ses hauts dirigeants. Remarquez, ils ont aussi le droit de savoir s’il y a exagération ou abus. Mais, ont-ils besoin, entre autres, de connaître dans le détail les objectifs personnels fixés à Monsieur X ou à Madame Y?; pour quel % cela compte-t-il dans la rémunération incitative à court terme?; à quel % tels objectifs ont-ils été rencontrés?; pourquoi l’ont-ils été à ce %?.  Peut-on sérieusement croire qu’une entreprise va publier que telle ou telle personne n’est pas à la hauteur, 12 à 15 mois après les faits?.  Ou bien cette personne a rencontré les objectifs fixés de façon satisfaisante ou bien elle n’est plus là.  Denis Desautels avance, dans le texte cité plus haut, qu’il « n’est pas sage d’appuyer les régimes de rémunération sur des formules trop quantitatives ou mathématiques et d’allouer une trop grande portion de la rémunération globale à la partie variable ou à risque de la rémunération ».  Pourtant, les pressions ne cessent d’augmenter pour que cela soit le cas (Pay for Performance) et que ce soit basé sur des mesures objectives et connues comme le cours de l’action ou le résultat par action… le tout par rapport au groupe de référence.  Performance devient le nouveau leitmotiv.  S’est-on jamais demandé ce que cette divulgation pouvait avoir comme effet d’« emballement » sur la rémunération des hauts dirigeants?  Et les politiques de rémunération doivent continuellement s’ajuster.

Le Règlement 51-102, à son Annexe A6 (Déclaration de la rémunération de la haute direction) prescrit non seulement le contenu, mais aussi la forme que doit prendre cette déclaration :

L’ensemble de la rémunération payée, payable, attribuée, octroyée, donnée ou fournie de quelque autre façon, directement ou indirectement, par la société ou une de ses filiales à chaque membre de la haute direction visé et chaque administrateur, à quelque titre que ce soit, notamment l’ensemble de la rémunération en vertu d’un plan ou non, les paiements directs ou indirects, la rétribution, les attributions d’ordre financier ou monétaire, les récompenses, les avantages, les cadeaux ou avantages indirects qui lui sont payés, payables, attribués, octroyés, donnés ou fournis de quelque autre façon pour les services rendus et à rendre, directement ou indirectement, à la société ou à une de ses filiales. (art. 1.3 par, 1 a).

L’émetteur assujetti doit, en outre, produire une analyse de la rémunération, laquelle doit :

1) Décrire et expliquer tous les éléments significatifs composant la rémunération attribuée, payée, payable aux membres de la haute direction visés, ou gagnée par ceux-ci, au cours du dernier exercice, notamment les suivants :

  1. a) les objectifs de tout programme de rémunération ou de toute stratégie en la matière ;
  2. b) ce que le programme de rémunération vise à récompenser ;
  3. c) chaque élément de la rémunération ;
  4. d) les motifs de paiement de chaque élément ;
  5. e) la façon dont le montant de chaque élément est fixé, en indiquant la formule, le cas échéant ;
  6. f) la façon dont chaque élément de la rémunération et les décisions de la société sur chacun cadrent avec les objectifs généraux en matière de rémunération et leur incidence sur les décisions concernant les autres éléments.

2) Le cas échéant, expliquer les actions posées, les politiques établies ou les décisions prises après la clôture du dernier exercice qui pourraient influencer la compréhension qu’aurait une personne raisonnable de la rémunération versée à un membre de la haute direction visé au cours du dernier exercice.

3) Le cas échéant, indiquer clairement la référence d’étalonnage établie et expliquer les éléments qui la composent, notamment les sociétés incluses dans le groupe de référence et les critères de sélection.

4) Le cas échéant, indiquer les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires qui sont fondés sur des mesures objectives et connues, comme le cours de l’action de la société ou le résultat par action. Il est possible de décrire les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires qui sont subjectifs sans indiquer de mesure précise.

Si les objectifs de performance ou les conditions similaires publiés ne sont pas des mesures financières conformes aux PCGR, en expliquer la méthode de calcul à partir des états financiers de la société.

Et le tout dans un langage clair, concis et « présenté de façon à permettre à une personne raisonnable, faisant des efforts raisonnables de comprendre (…)

  1. a) la façon dont sont prises les décisions concernant la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés et des administrateurs ;
  2. b) le lien précis entre la rémunération des membres de la haute direction visés et des administrateurs et la gestion et la gouvernance de la société (par. 10). »

L’Instruction générale relative au règlement 51-102 sur les obligations d’information continue définit, en son article 1.5, ce qu’il faut entendre par langage simple.  C’est en quatorze points ; je vous en fais grâce.  Je rappelle ici qu’une instruction générale est réputée constituer un règlement.

Trop, c’est comme pas assez. C’est aussi ce que  pourrait se dire la personne raisonnable après avoir fait des efforts raisonnables pour comprendre tout cela. Cette personne pour laquelle l’entreprise publie toutes les informations réclamées par le législateur/autorité réglementaire poussé par l’industrie de la gouvernance qui, elle, bénéficie de la complexification des règles.

L’émetteur est placé devant ces obligations auxquelles il veut bien se conformer, mais pas au point de livrer des éléments importants de ses stratégies de développement au premier lecteur venu. Ce qui pourrait même être contre l’intérêt des actionnaires, et finalement ne bénéficier qu’à la concurrence.  Ce qui fait que l’on en est rendu à se demander comment éviter de divulguer « les secrets de familles », si je puis dire, sans indisposer les autorités réglementaires — surtout si on doit aller au marché dans les mois qui suivent.

Malaise!

Si mon souvenir est bon, les pressions sont venues de groupes divers (investisseurs institutionnels, gestionnaires de fonds et autres) qui jugeaient les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants extravagantes et non méritées. Pour eux, les administrateurs étaient responsables de cet état de fait. Alors, on a légiféré, réglementé, permis le Say on Pay et diverses propositions d’actionnaires.  La rémunération a-t-elle baissé ? Non. Les parachutes ont-ils disparu?  Non.  Chacun se compare à l’autre et ne voit pas pourquoi il ne serait pas rémunéré comme son vis-à-vis de l’entreprise Z.  Et les PDG de se négocier un contrat blindé — pourquoi pas?  Ils sont assis sur un siège éjectable.

Ne pourrait-on pas se demander maintenant si partie ou toutes ces exigences ne produisent pas davantage d’effets pervers que de bénéfices ? (Dans le plan d’affaires 2013-2016 des ACVM. Les deux dernières priorités sont :  réglementation des marchés ; et efficacité des mesures d’application de la loi).

Ne pourrait-on pas aussi se demander si exiger une durée minimale de détention de l’actionnariat pour obtenir le droit de vote à une assemblée générale ne serait pas souhaitable ?

Si publier les résultats deux fois l’an, au lieu de quatre, ne donnerait pas un peu d’oxygène aux entreprises — un début de délivrance de la tyrannie du rendement à court terme ? Et, quant à y être, pourquoi continuer de publier l’information telle qu’exigée, si elle n’est pas lue ?

Et puis, à quoi servent les administrateurs si les actionnaires peuvent s’immiscer dans la gestion d’une entreprise et imposer leurs volontés en tout temps ?

Et à quel actionnaire permettre quoi ? Un Hedge Fund qui achète et vend des millions d’actions par minute ? Un fond mutuel qui garde des actions quelques années ?  Un retraité qui conserve ses actions depuis 20 ans ?

D’ici à ce que l’on ait réfléchi à tout cela, ne peut-on pas marquer le pas ?


  1. 1. Allaire, Yvan, Pourquoi cette vague de privatisation d’entreprises cotées en Bourse, La Presse, mars 2007.
  2. 2. Desautels, Denis, OC, FCA, Les défis les plus difficiles des administrateurs de sociétés, Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, Conférence annuelle, 11 mars 2009.
  3. 3. Carol Liao, A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance, Where do shareholders really stand? Director Journal, January/February 2014, p. 37
  4. 4. p. 55.

*Nicolle Forget siège au conseil d’administration du Groupe Jean Coutu (PJC) Inc., de Valener Inc. et de ses filiales et du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés. Elle a, entre autres, fait partie d’un comité d’éthique de la recherche et des nouvelles technologies et de comités d’éthique clinique, de même que du Groupe de travail sur l’éthique, la probité et l’intégrité des administrateurs publics et a présidé le Groupe de travail sur les difficultés d’accès au financement pour les femmes entrepreneuses.

Madame Forget a été chargée de cours à l’École des Hautes Études commerciales et elle est l’auteure de cas en gestion de même que de quelques ouvrages biographiques. Madame Forget a d’abord fait du journalisme à Joliette avant de se consacrer à la gestion d’organismes de recherche et de formation durant les années 1970. Elle a aussi été membre (juge administratif) de tribunaux administratif et quasi judiciaire durant les années 1980 et 1990.

Madame Forget est diplômée de l’UQÀM (brevet d’enseignement spécialisé en administration), des HEC (baccalauréat en sciences commerciales) et de l’Université de Montréal (licence en droit et DESS en bioéthique). Elle fût membre du Barreau du Québec jusqu’en 2011.

Madame Forget a siégé à de nombreux conseils d’administration dont : Fédération des femmes du Québec, Conseil économique du Canada, SEBJ, Hydro-Québec, Hydro-Québec International, Gaz Métro Inc., Agence québécoise de valorisation industrielle de la recherche, Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs du Québec, Université de Montréal, École polytechnique, Innotermodal. Elle a, de plus, présidé les conseils de Accesum Inc., Nouveler Inc., Accès 51, Ballet Eddy Toussaint, Festival d’été de Lanaudière et Association des consommateurs du Québec.

Le point sur la gouvernance au Canada en 2016 | Rapport de Davies Ward Phillips Vineberg


Le rapport annuel de Davies est toujours très attendu car il brosse un tableau très complet de l’évolution de la gouvernance au Canada durant la dernière année.

Le document qui vient de sortir est en anglais mais la version française devrait suivre dans peu de temps.

Je vous invite donc à en prendre connaissance en lisant le court résumé ci-dessous et, si vous voulez en savoir plus sur les thèmes abordés, vous pouvez télécharger le document de 100 pages sur le site de l’entreprise.

Cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Rapport de Davies sur la gouvernance 2016

 

Davies Governance Insights 2016, provides analysis of the top governance trends and issues important to Canadian boards, senior management and governance observers.

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The 2016 edition provides readers with our take on important topics ranging from shareholder engagement and activism to leadership diversity and the rise in issues facing boards and general counsel. We also provide practical guidance for boards and senior management of public companies and their investors on these and many other corporate governance topics that we expect will remain under focus in the 2017 proxy season.

 

Les devoirs des administrateurs eu égard à un climat de travail malsain | Un cas pratique


Voici un cas de gouvernance publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui illustre les contradictions entre les valeurs énoncées par une école privée et celles qui semblent animer les administrateurs et les parents.

Le cas montre comment un administrateur, nouvellement élu sur un CA d’une école privée, peut se retrouver dans une situation embarrassante impliquant des comportements de harcèlement et de menaces qui affectent la santé mentale et le bien-être des employés.

Cette situation semble se présenter de plus en plus fréquemment dans les institutions d’enseignement qui visent des rendements très (trop !) élevés.

Comment Ignacio peut-il s’y prendre pour bien faire comprendre aux administrateurs de son CA leurs devoirs et leurs obligations légales d’assurer un climat de travail sain, absent d’agression de la part de certains parents ?

Le cas présente, de façon claire, une situation de culture organisationnelle déficiente ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux administrateurs qui vivent des expériences similaires.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Un cas culture organisationnelle déficiente !

 

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Ignacio is an old boy of a private school with a proud sporting tradition. He was invited onto the board last year when a long-serving director retired. The school is well run with a professional principal who has the respect of the staff as well as many of the boys.

The school has worked hard to develop academic excellence and its place in rankings has improved with a greater percentage of boys qualifying for university.

At the last board meeting the CEO was absent. The chairman explained that he had taken stress leave because he couldn’t cope with bullying from some of the parents. Some directors sniggered and the rest looked embarrassed. There were a few comments about ‘needing to grow a backbone’, ‘being a pansy’, and ‘not having the guts to stand up to parents or lead the teams to victory on the field’.

Ignacio was aghast – he asked about the anti-harassment and workplace health and safety policies and was given leave by the chair « to look into ‘covering our backs’ if necessary ».

Ignacio met with the HR manager and discovered the policies were out of date and appeared to have been cut and pasted from the original Department of Education advice without customisation. From his experience running a business Ignacio is aware of the importance of mental health issues in the modern workplace and also of the legal duty of directors to provide a workplace free from bullying and harassment. School staff are all aware of a discrepancy between the stated School values and those of the board and some parents. The HR manager tells him that recent bullying by parents has become more akin to verbal and even physical assault. Staff believe the board will not support them against fee paying parents even though the school is, in theory, a not-for-profit institution.

How can Ignacio help lead his board to an understanding of their duty to provide a safe workplace?

 

Chris’s Answer  …..

 

Julie’s Answer ….

 

Leanne’s Answer ….

*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

 

Quelle est la rémunération globale des administrateurs canadiens ?


Quelle est la rémunération globale des administrateurs canadiens ?

C’est une question que beaucoup de personnes me posent, et qui n’est pas évidente à répondre !

L’article ci-dessous, publié par Martin Mittelstaedt, chercheur et ex-rédacteur au Globe and Mail, apporte un éclairage très intéressant sur la question de la rémunération des administrateurs canadiens.

Les études sur le sujet sont rares et donnent des résultats différents compte tenu de la taille, de la nature privée ou publique des entreprises, du secteur d’activité, des différentes composantes de la rémunération globale, etc.

De manière générale, il semble que les rémunérations des administrateurs canadiens et américains soient similaires et que les postes d’administrateurs des entreprises publiques commandent une rémunération globale d’environ quatre fois la rémunération offerte par les entreprises privées.

Une étude montre que la base médiane de la rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés privées au Canada est de 25 000 $, avec un jeton de présence de 1 500 $ et quatre réunions annuelles. Le nombre d’administrateurs est de six, incluant trois administrateurs indépendants et une femme ! La somme de la rémunération globale s’établirait à environ 31 000 $ US. Mais on parle ici de grandes entreprises privées…

Le montant de la rémunération dépend aussi beaucoup des plans de distribution d’actions, des privilèges, des bonis, etc.

Évidemment, pour toute entreprise publique, il est facile de connaître la rémunération détaillée des administrateurs et des cinq hauts dirigeants puisque ces renseignements se retrouvent dans les circulaires aux actionnaires.

Je vous encourage à lire cet article. Vous en saurez plus long sur les raisons qui font que les informations sont difficiles à obtenir dans le secteur privé.

Bonne lecture !

How much is a director worth ?

 

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Determining director compensation at private companies is more of an art than a science, with a wide range of practices and no one-size-fits-all formula.

Unlike publicly traded companies, where detailed information about director remuneration is as close as the nearest proxy circular, compensation at private boards is like “a black box,” according to Steve Chan, principal at Hugessen Consulting, who says retainers, meeting fees and share-based awards “are all over the map.”

Not much is known about private director compensation “for good reason,” observes David Anderson, president of Anderson Governance Group. “There is not a lot of data out there.”

PRIVATELY UNDERPAID?

Private company directorships can be prized assignments because they don’t involve the heavy compliance and regulatory burdens that occupy increasing amounts of time at public company boards.

But what private boards should be paid is difficult to determine, when there is little research to guide individual directors or companies. Some of the available data suggest private directors are being underpaid, at least relative to their public counterparts. But this information does not include the fact that the work may be different and much of the compensation at public boards may not ultimately pay off because it is linked to share price performance.

It is difficult to benchmark best practices with so little hard data, making it unsurprising that how best to set private company directors’ compensation is the most frequently asked question made by members to the ICD.

One of the few ongoing attempts to analyze compensation indicates remuneration is far higher at public boards, about four times higher in fact, although the amounts are skewed by the heavy use of stock-linked awards at publicly traded companies.

The private company survey, by Lodestone Global, was based on a questionnaire posed to members of the Young Presidents’ Organization, an international group of corporate présidents and CEOs, including many from Canada.

The Lodestone survey looked at medium-sized family or closely held firms, companies that are more established than early-stage startups, but smaller than large global corporations.

“The survey is not casually designed. The data is pretty rigorous and it’s global,” says Bernard Tenenbaum, managing partner at Princeton, N.J.-based Lodestone.

Tenenbaum says he started investigating private company board compensation because of the paucity of data on the subject. No one seemed to know what was going on. “People kept asking me, ‘Well how much should we pay directors?’ I’d say: ‘I don’t know. How much do you pay them now?’ And I started surveying.”

The firm’s most recent survey, based on 2014 data, had responses from more than 250 private companies, including 19 from Canada. The median revenue at the Canadian companies was $100-million, with the median number of employees at 325.

According to Tenenbaum, the median Canadian retainer was $25,000, with a $1,500 meeting fee and four meetings annually. The median number of directors was six, with three independent and one woman. The total of fees and retainers came to $31,000 (all dollar figures U.S.)

Interestingly, the overall U.S. compensation figure matched the Canadian one, but with a different composition. The median U.S. retainer was lower at $21,000, but the meeting fee was higher at $2,500. Including a few other miscellaneous items, like teleconference fees, U.S. compensation was $33,000, compared to $32,250 in Canada, a closeness that Tenenbaum termed “a kissing distance.”

The Lodestone figures give an indication of director compensation, although it is worth cautioning that the sample size is small, the figures are based on the median or middle-ranked firm, and there was a wide variety in size among the companies, given that they included a few smaller tech and industrial firms.

To benchmark private company director compensation, it is worthwhile to look at what comparable publicly traded companies are paying. One useful comparator is the smaller companies embedded in the BDO 600 survey of director compensation at medium-sized public companies. It has access to highly accurate data based on shareholder proxy circulars.

BDO’s 2014 survey found that among firms with revenue between $25-million and $325-million, cash compensation through retainer and committee fees averaged $54,000, while directors typically received another $65,000 in stock awards and options for a total of $119,000.

There is a small amount of information available in Canada on private board compensation, but the amount of data isn’t large enough to make generalized statements on remuneration and involves larger companies.

For example, in its director compensation, Canadian Tire Corp. breaks out amounts paid to the company’s non-publicly traded banking subsidiary, Canadian Tire Bank. In 2014, three directors on both boards were paid about $55,000 each for retainers and meeting fees for serving at the bank. Similarly, Loblaw Companies Ltd. paid $58,000 to a director who also served on President’s Choice Bank, a privately-held subsidiary.

The amounts are relatively low for blue-chip Canadian companies, but both banks are far smaller than their parent companies, with Canadian Tire Bank at $5.6-billion in assets and PC Bank at $3.3-billion.

Hugessen’s Chan says that in his experience, the larger, family-run private companies that have global operations compensate directors at roughly the same amounts as similarly sized public firms.

“Among the larger public companies versus the private companies, they’re comparable,” Chan says.

PUBLICLY EXPOSED

Tenenbaum says that based on his research and the figures from BDO, directors are being paid about $20,000 annually for taking on the added hassle of serving on a public company. He discounted the value of the stock-based compensation because it is conditional on share-price performance.

“There is a premium that you pay a director for taking the risk” of public company exposure, Tenenbaum says.

Directors also need to take into account some of the non-monetary factors of the board experience. Given that so much time on a public board is spent on compliance with regulatory requirements, being freed of this responsibility has value.

“When you’re on a private board, you don’t need to worry about all of the compliance that you have to worry about on a public company board,” says Larry Macdonald, who has served on both types of boards in the oil and gas sector. “You can spend more time on the issues which are probably more important to the company on a private board than you can on public board.”

Macdonald currently chairs publicly-traded Vermilion Energy Inc., but has also served on several private and volunteer boards.

One consequence of the difference in focus is that private boards can often have fewer members because directors can be more focused on company business needs, rather than on compliance requirements. Decision making can also be quicker and easier.

Macdonald says a public board may need eight to 10 people to handle the volume of work, compared to only five or six on a similar private company. As an example of the efficiency of a private board, a company that has a particularly good year and wants to pay employees a bonus can easily decide to do so.

At a public company, however, making this payment wouldn’t be as straightforward. Directors would have to compile a detailed explanation of why they wanted to pay the bonus and include it in shareholder circulars.

While some companies are downgrading the importance of meeting fees, Macdonald thinks they are necessary, with a range of $1,000 to $1,500 being sufficient. “There should be a permeeting fee. You want your directors to show up in person, if at all possible, and if you’re not going to give them a permeeting fee they’re going to be phoning it in or not showing up, so you’ve got to keep everybody interested,” he says.

EQUITY COMPENSATION

He would set the retainer with an eye to any equity compensation. “If there is a pretty good option plan, I would think that $10,000 a year would be adequate, but if the option plan is weaker, you have to up the annual fee,” Macdonald says.

The amount of equity reserved for directors in private companies is a disputed topic. Tenenbaum says equity compensation at private companies, in his experience, is rare. But Chan says a figure often used is to allocate 10 percent of the equity for directors and executives.

If the director is “pounding the pavement with the CEO, a big chunk ofthe [equity] pool might go to directors,” Chan says.

The amount of equity reserved for executives and the board could be as high as 20 percent to 30 percent in the early life of a technology company, but lower than 10 percent in a capital intensive business. “It all depends on size. You’re not going to give 10 percent away of a $1-billion company,” he says.

Macdonald considers the 10 percent of stock reserved for management and directors a good ball park figure. The bulk of the stock typically goes to management, with one or two percent earmarked for directors, he says.

RICHER REWARDS

Public boards are typically egalitarian, with all directors receiving the same base compensation. Private boards, however, can and do pay differing amounts, depending on the specialized skills companies are trying to assemble among their directors. Macdonald says a private oil company looking to pick up older fields, which may have environmental issues, might award extra compensation to attract a director with recognized skills in health, safety and environment.

To be sure, compensation is only one factor in attracting directors to a board. Tenenbaum says academic research has found that the reasons directors cite to join boards are led by the quality of top management, the opportunity to learn and to be challenged. Personal prestige, compensation and stock ownership are far down the list.

These factors may explain why many people want to serve on private boards. “The qualitative experience of private company directors is quite different from public company directors,” says Anderson.

“They avoid a lot of the perceived risk of public company boards and they get the benefit of doing what, as business people, they really like doing, which is thinking about the business and applying their knowledge and experience to business problems.”


This article originally appeared in the Director Journal, a publication of the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD). Permission has been granted by the ICD to use this article for non-commercial purposes including research, educational materials and online resources. Other uses, such as selling or licensing copies, are prohibited.

 

La relève dans une entreprise familiale | Une possibilité de conflits de rôles !


Voici un cas de gouvernance publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan* qui concerne les relations entre la présidente du conseil et sa fille nouvellement nommée comme CEO de cette entreprise privée de taille moyenne.

Le cas illustre le processus de transition familiale et les efforts à exercer afin de ne pas interférer avec les affaires de l’entreprise.

Il s’agit d’un cas très fréquent dans les entreprises familiales. Comment Hannah peut-elle continuer à faire profiter sa fille de ses conseils tout en s’assurant de ne pas empiéter sur ses responsabilités ?

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez succincte, mais explicite ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Cas de relève familiale

 

spb-cinq-conditions-gagnantes-assurer-releve-entreprise-familiale_2

 

Hannah prepared for the transition. She did a course of director education and understands her duties as a non-executive. She loves her daughter, trusts her judgement as CEO and genuinely wants to see her succeed. Nothing is going wrong but Hannah can’t help interfering. She is bored and longs for the days when she could visit customers or sit and strategise with her management team. 

Once a week she has a formal meeting with the CEO in her office. In between times she is in frequent contact. Although by mutual agreement these contacts should be purely social or family oriented Hannah finds herself talking business and is hurt when her daughter suggests they leave it for the weekly meeting or put it onto the board agenda.

Over the past few months Hannah has improved governance, record-keeping, training and succession planning systems but she is running out of projects she can do without undermining her daughter. She also recognises that, as a medium sized unlisted business, the company does not need any more governance structures.

How can Hannah find fulfilment in her new role?

 

 

Paul’s Answer  …..

 

Julie’s Answer ….

 

Jakob’s Answer ….

*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia.

 

Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : un retour sur un grand classique !


Voici le deuxième billet présenté par le professeur Ivan Tchotourian de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, élaboré dans le cadre de son cours de maîtrise Gouvernance de l’entreprise.

Dans le cadre d’un programme de recherche, il a été proposé aux étudiants non seulement de mener des travaux sur des sujets qui font l’actualité en gouvernance de l’entreprise, mais encore d’utiliser un format original permettant la diffusion des résultats. Le présent billet expose le résultat des recherches menées par Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir et Nathalie Robitaille.

Ce travail revient sur les arguments échangés concernant la dissociation des fonctions de président du conseil d’administration et de chef de la direction. Ce billet alimente la discussion en faisant une actualité comparative des normes et des éléments juridiques, et en présentant les dernières statistiques en ce domaine.

Le papier initial des étudiants a été retravaillé par Nadia Abida afin qu’il correspondre au style du blogue . Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires et vos points de vue sont les bienvenus.

« Je vous en souhaite bonne lecture et suis certain que vous prendrez autant de plaisir à le lire que j’ai pu en prendre à le corriger. Merci encore à Jacques de permettre la diffusion de ce travail et d’offrir ainsi la chance à des étudiants de contribuer aux riches discussions dont la gouvernance d’entreprise est l’objet ».  (Ivan Tchotourian)

 

Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique

 

Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir, Nathalie Robitaille

Anciens étudiants du cours DRT-6056 Gouvernance de l’entreprise

 

La séparation entre les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration (CA) et du chef de la direction est l’un des facteurs incontournables de l’indépendance des administrateurs. Cette dernière est un indicateur de pratique de bonne gouvernance d’entreprise. Cependant, et malgré l’importance avérée de la séparation des deux fonctions, nombre d’entreprises continuent à en pratiquer le cumul. Les arguments foisonnent de part et d’autre, et ne s’accordent pas sur la nécessité de cette séparation.

P1120057

Un retour sur une proposition d’actionnaires de la banque JP Morgan démontre la nécessité de ne pas laisser ce sujet sans réflexions. Cette proposition en faveur d’une séparation des fonctions a été émise à la suite d’une divulgation par la société d’une perte s’élevant à 2 milliards de dollars… perte essuyée sous la responsabilité de son PDG actuel [1].

Ce n’est un secret pour personne que cette société a un passif lourd avec des pertes colossales engendrées par des comportements critiquables sur lesquels la justice a apporté un éclairage. Les conséquences de cette gestion auraient-elles été identiques si une séparation des pouvoirs avait était mise en place entre une personne agissant et une personne surveillant ?

 

Silence du droit et positions ambiguës

 

Les textes législatifs (lois ou règlements) canadiens, américains ou européens apportent peu de pistes de solution à ce débat. La plupart se montrent en effet silencieux en ce domaine faisant preuve d’une retenue étonnamment rare lorsque la gouvernance d’entreprise est débattue. Dans ses lignes directrices [2], l’OCDE – ainsi que la Coalition canadienne pour une saine gestion des Entreprises dans ses principes de gouvernance d’entreprise [3] – atteste pourtant de l’importance du cloisonnement entre les deux fonctions.

De ce cloisonnement résulte l’indépendance et l’objectivité nécessaires aux décisions prises par le conseil d’administration. Au Canada, le comité Saucier dans son rapport de 2001 et le rapport du Milstein center [4] ont mis en exergue l’importance d’une telle séparation. En comparaison, la France s’est montrée plus discrète et il n’a pas été question de trancher dans son Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (même dans sa version amendée de 2013) [5] : ce dernier ne privilégie ainsi ni la séparation ni le cumul des deux fonctions [6].

 

Quelques chiffres révélateurs

 

Les études contemporaines démontrent une nette tendance en faveur de la séparation des deux rôles. Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index [7] estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse ont opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions. Dans le même sens, le rapport Clarkson affiche que 84 % des entreprises inscrites à la bourse de Toronto ont procédé à ladite séparation [8]. Subsistent cependant encore de nos jours des entreprises canadiennes qui  permettent le cumul. L’entreprise Air Transat A.T. Inc en est la parfaite illustration : M. Jean-Marc Eustache est à la fois président du conseil et chef de la direction. A contrario, le fond de solidarité de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec vient récemment de procéder à la séparation des deux fonctions. Aux États-Unis en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 (au total 221 entreprises) dissocient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Toutefois, les choses ne sont pas aussi simples qu’elles y paraissent : 27 % des entreprises de cet indice ont recombiné ces deux rôles [9]. Évoquons à ce titre le cas de Target Corp dont les actionnaires ont refusé la dissociation des deux fonctions [10].

 

Il faut séparer les fonctions !

 

Pendant longtemps, il a été d’usage au sein des grandes sociétés par actions, que le poste de président du conseil soit de l’apanage du chef de la direction. Selon les partisans du non cumul, fusionner ces deux fonctions revient néanmoins à réunir dans une seule main un trop grand pouvoir et des prérogatives totalement antagonistes, voir même contradictoires. En ce sens, Yvan Allaire [11] souligne qu’il est malsain pour le chef de la direction de présider aussi le conseil d’administration. Rappelons que le CA nomme, destitue, rémunère et procède à l’évaluation du chef de la direction. La séparation des deux fonctions trouve pleinement son sens ici puisqu’elle crée une contre mesure du pouvoir : le président du CA est chargé du contrôle permanent de la gestion, et le directeur général est en situation de subordination par rapport au CA.

Sous ce contrôle, le directeur général ne peut être que plus diligent et prudent dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, puisqu’il doit en rendre compte au CA. Des idées et décisions confrontées et débattues sont de loin plus constructives que des décisions prises de manière unilatérale. N’y a-t-il pas plus d’esprit dans deux têtes que dans une comme le dit le proverbe ? De plus, les partisans du non cumul avancent d’autres arguments. Il en va ainsi de la rémunération de la direction. Le cumul des deux fonctions irait de pair avec la rémunération conséquente. Celui qui endosse les deux fonctions est enclin à prendre des risques qui peuvent mettre en péril les intérêts financiers de la société pour obtenir une performance et un rendement qui justifieraient une forte rémunération. Par ailleurs, le cumul peut entrainer une négligence des deux rôles au profit de l’un ou de l’autre. Aussi, le choix du non cumul s’impose lorsque l’implication de la majorité ou encore, de la totalité des actionnaires ou membres dans la gestion quotidienne de la société, est faible. Cette séparation permet en effet aux actionnaires ou aux membres d’exercer une surveillance adéquate de la direction et de la gestion quotidienne de ladite société [12].

 

Attention à la séparation !

 

Nonobstant les arguments cités plus haut, la séparation des deux fonctions ne représente pas nécessairement une meilleure gestion du conseil d’administration. Les partisans du cumul clament que non seulement l’endossement des deux fonctions par une seule personne unifie les ordres et réduit les couts de l’information, mais que c’est aussi un mécanisme d’incitation pour les nouveaux chefs en cas de transition. Cela se traduit par la facilité de remplacer une seule personne qui détient les deux pouvoirs, à la place de remplacer deux personnes. Par ailleurs, la séparation limiterait l’innovation et diluerait le pouvoir d’un leadership effectif [13] en augmentant la rivalité entre les deux responsables pouvant même aller jusqu’à semer la confusion.

 

Coûts et flexibilité du choix

 

En dépit de la critique classique du cumul des fonctions, les deux types de structures sont potentiellement sources de bénéfices et de coûts, bénéfices et coûts que les entreprises vont peser dans leur choix de structure. Les coûts de la théorie de l’agence impliquent des arrangements institutionnels lorsqu’il y a séparation entre les fonctions de président et de chef de la direction [14]. Ces coûts sont occasionnés par exemple par la surveillance du CA sur le chef de la direction. Il devient plus cher de séparer les deux fonctions que de les unifier.

Cependant, une antithèse présentée par Andrea Ovans [15] soutient qu’au contraire il est plus cher d’unifier les deux fonctions que de les séparer. Comment ? Simplement à travers la rémunération (salaire de base, primes, incitations, avantages, stock-options, et les prestations de retraite). L’imperméabilité entre les deux fonctions qui apparaît comme « la » solution en matière de bonne gouvernance pourrait ne pas l’être pour toutes les entreprises.

Si le cumul des fonctions et les autres mécanismes de surveillance fonctionnement bien, pourquoi faudrait-il prévoir un changement ? De surcroit, le « one size fits all » n’est pas applicable en la matière. Devrait-on prévoir les mêmes règles en termes de séparation pour les grandes et petites entreprises ? Rien n’est moins sûr… Le cumul des fonctions apparaît plus adapté aux entreprises de petite taille : ceci est dû à la fluidité de communication entre les deux responsables et à la faiblesse de la quantité d’informations à traiter [16].


[1] Investors seek to split JP Morgan CEO, Chairman http://www.wfaa.com/news/business/192146051.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014.

[2] http://www.oecd.org/fr/gouvernementdentreprise/ae/gouvernancedesentreprisespubliques/34803478.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014. Dans le même sens, voir l’instruction générale 85-201 et le rapport Cadbury en 1992.

[3] CCGG : Principes de gouvernance d’entreprise pour la mise en place de conseils d’administration performants, http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Principes_de_gouvernance.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014

[4] « Split CEO/Chair Roles: The Geteway to Good Governance? », http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/ResearchCentres/ClarksonCentreforBoardEffectiveness/CCBEpublications/SplitCEO.aspx, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[5] Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (révisé en juin 2013), http://www.medef.com/fileadmin/www.medef.fr/documents/AFEP-MEDEF/Code_de_gouvernement_d_entreprise_des_societes_cotees_juin_2013_FR.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 15 juillet 2014.

[6] L’Union européenne ne s’est pas prononcée sur la séparation des deux fonctions. Voir à ce propos Richard Leblanc.

[7] Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013, https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/Canadian-Board-Index-2013_27Jan2014.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014 ; p. 19.

[8] Public Submissions on Governance Issues, http://www.powercorporation.com/en/governance/public-submissions-governance-issues/may-12-2014-canada-business-corporations-act/#_ftn12, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[9] Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013 (US), https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/SSBI13%20revised%2023DEC2013.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 25 juillet 2014.

[10] Target shareholders narrowly reject splitting CEO, Chairman posts, http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2014/06/13/target-shareholders-narrowly-reject-splitting-ceo.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[11] Yvan Allaire, « Un « bon » président du CA ? », http://droit-des-affaires.blogspot.ca/2007/11/un-bon-prsident-du-ca.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 23 juillet 2014.

[12] À ce propos, voir André Laurin, « La fonction de président de conseil d’administration », http://www.lavery.ca/upload/pdf/fr/DS_080203f.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014, p. 2.

[13] Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel and Xiaohui Gloria Liu, « CEO and Board Chair Roles: to Split or not to Split? », December 16, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412827, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 22 juillet 2014.

[14] Idem.

[15] Voir Coûts élevés associés à la combinaison des rôles du président du conseil et du président de la société : https://jacquesgrisegouvernance.com/2014/06/29/couts-eleves-associes-a-la-combinaison-des-roles-du-president-du-conseil-et-du-president-de-la-societe/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

[16] Aiyesha Dey, « What JPMorgan Shareholders Should Know About Splitting the CEO and Chair Roles », Research, http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/research-what-jpmorgan-shareho/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | En rappel


Plusieurs administrateurs et formateurs me demandent de leur proposer un document de vulgarisation sur le sujet de la gouvernance. J’ai déjà diffusé sur mon blogue un guide à l’intention des journalistes spécialisés dans le domaine de la gouvernance des sociétés à travers le monde. Il a été publié par le Global Corporate Governance Forum et International Finance Corporation (un organisme de la World Bank) en étroite coopération avec International Center for Journalists.

Je n’ai encore rien vu de plus complet et de plus pertinent sur la meilleure manière d’appréhender les multiples problématiques reliées à la gouvernance des entreprises mondiales. La direction de Global Corporate Governance Forum m’a fait parvenir le document en français le 14 février.

Qui dirige l’entreprise : Guide pratique de médiatisation du gouvernement d’entreprise — document en français

 

Ce guide est un outil pédagogique indispensable pour acquérir une solide compréhension des diverses facettes de la gouvernance des sociétés. Les auteurs ont multiplié les exemples de problèmes d’éthiques et de conflits d’intérêts liés à la conduite des entreprises mondiales.

On apprend aux journalistes économiques — et à toutes les personnes préoccupées par la saine gouvernance — à raffiner les investigations et à diffuser les résultats des analyses effectuées. Je vous recommande fortement de lire le document, mais aussi de le conserver en lieu sûr car il est fort probable que vous aurez l’occasion de vous en servir.

Vous trouverez ci-dessous quelques extraits de l’introduction à l’ouvrage. Bonne lecture !

Who’s Running the Company ? A Guide to Reporting on Corporate Governance

À propos du Guide

schema_DD_lightbox

 

« This Guide is designed for reporters and editors who already have some experience covering business and finance. The goal is to help journalists develop stories that examine how a company is governed, and spot events that may have serious consequences for the company’s survival, shareholders and stakeholders. Topics include the media’s role as a watchdog, how the board of directors functions, what constitutes good practice, what financial reports reveal, what role shareholders play and how to track down and use information shedding light on a company’s inner workings. Journalists will learn how to recognize “red flags,” or warning  signs, that indicate whether a company may be violating laws and rules. Tips on reporting and writing guide reporters in developing clear, balanced, fair and convincing stories.

 

Three recurring features in the Guide help reporters apply “lessons learned” to their own “beats,” or coverage areas:

– Reporter’s Notebook: Advise from successful business journalists

– Story Toolbox:  How and where to find the story ideas

– What Do You Know? Applying the Guide’s lessons

Each chapter helps journalists acquire the knowledge and skills needed to recognize potential stories in the companies they cover, dig out the essential facts, interpret their findings and write clear, compelling stories:

  1. What corporate governance is, and how it can lead to stories. (Chapter 1, What’s good governance, and why should journalists care?)
  2. How understanding the role that the board and its committees play can lead to stories that competitors miss. (Chapter 2, The all-important board of directors)
  3. Shareholders are not only the ultimate stakeholders in public companies, but they often are an excellent source for story ideas. (Chapter 3, All about shareholders)
  4. Understanding how companies are structured helps journalists figure out how the board and management interact and why family-owned and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), may not always operate in the best interests of shareholders and the public. (Chapter 4, Inside family-owned and state-owned enterprises)
  5. Regulatory disclosures can be a rich source of exclusive stories for journalists who know where to look and how to interpret what they see. (Chapter 5, Toeing the line: regulations and disclosure)
  6. Reading financial statements and annual reports — especially the fine print — often leads to journalistic scoops. (Chapter 6, Finding the story behind the numbers)
  7. Developing sources is a key element for reporters covering companies. So is dealing with resistance and pressure from company executives and public relations directors. (Chapter 7, Writing and reporting tips)

Each chapter ends with a section on Sources, which lists background resources pertinent to that chapter’s topics. At the end of the Guide, a Selected Resources section provides useful websites and recommended reading on corporate governance. The Glossary defines terminology used in covering companies and corporate governance ».

Here’s what Ottawa’s new rules for state-owned buyers may look like (business.financialpost.com)

The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value (greenbackd.com)

Effective Drivers of Good Corporate Governance (shilpithapar.com)

Attention aux huis clos ! (en rappel)


Nous avons déjà abordé l’importance d’inscrire un item « huis clos » à l’ordre du jour des réunions du conseil d’administration. Celui-ci doit normalement être à la fin de la réunion et comporter une limite de temps afin d’éviter que la réunion ne s’éternise… et que les membres de la direction (qui souvent attendent la fin de la rencontre) soient mieux informés.

Ensuite, le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) devrait rencontrer le président et chef de la direction (PCD) en privé, et dans les meilleurs délais, afin de rendre compte des résultats et de la portée du huis clos. Cette responsabilité du PCA est déterminante, car les dirigeants ont de grandes attentes et un souci eu égard aux discussions du huis clos.

Plusieurs dirigeants et membres de conseil m’ont fait part de leurs préoccupations concernant la tenue des huis clos. Il y a des malaises dissimulés en ce qui a trait à cette activité ; il faut donc s’assurer de bien gérer la situation, car les huis clos peuvent souvent avoir des conséquences inattendues, voire contre-productives !

Ainsi, le huis clos :

(1) ne doit pas être une activité imprévue et occasionnelle inscrite à l’ordre du jour

(2) doit comporter une limite de temps

(3) doit être piloté par le PCA

(4) doit comporter un suivi systématique et

(5) doit se dérouler dans un lieu qui permet de préserver la confidentialité absolue des discussions.

J’insiste sur cette dernière condition parce que l’on a trop souvent tendance à la négliger ou à l’oublier, carrément. Dans de nombreux cas, la rencontre du conseil a lieu dans un local inapproprié, et les dirigeants peuvent entendre les conversations, surtout lorsqu’elles sont très animées…

Au début de la séance, les membres sont souvent insoucieux ; avec le temps, certains peuvent s’exprimer très (trop) directement, impulsivement et de manière inconvenante. Si, par mégarde, les membres de la direction entendent les propos énoncés, l’exercice peut prendre l’allure d’une véritable calamité et avoir des conséquences non anticipées sur le plan des relations interpersonnelles entre les membres de la direction et avec les membres du conseil.

registre-conseils-d-administration

L’ajout d’un huis clos à l’ordre du jour témoigne d’une volonté de saine gouvernance, mais, on le comprend, il y a un certain nombre de règles à respecter si on ne veut pas provoquer la discorde. Les OBNL, qui ont généralement peu de moyens, sont particulièrement vulnérables aux manquements à la confidentialité ! Je crois que dans les OBNL, les dommages collatéraux peuvent avoir des incidences graves sur les relations entre employés, et même sur la pérennité de l’organisation.

J’ai à l’esprit plusieurs cas de mauvaise gestion des facteurs susmentionnés et je crois qu’il vaut mieux ne pas tenir le bien-fondé du huis clos pour acquis.

Ayant déjà traité des bienfaits des huis clos lors d’un billet antérieur, je profite de l’occasion pour vous souligner, à nouveau, un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités.

L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil. Voici les commentaires que j’exprimais à cette occasion.

«Compte tenu de la “réticence” de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites judiciaires, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact!

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus».

Are you using in-camera meetings ?

Le rôle du comité exécutif vs le rôle du conseil d’administration | En rappel


Voici une discussion très intéressante paru sur le groupe de discussion LinkedIn Board of Directors Society, et initiée par Jean-François Denaultconcernant la nécessité de faire appel à un comité exécutif.

Je vous invite à lire les commentaires présentés sur le fil de discussion du groupe afin de vous former une opinion.

Personnellement, je crois que le comité exécutif est beaucoup trop souvent impliqué dans des activités de nature managériale.

Dans plusieurs cas, le CA pourrait s’en passer et reprendre l’initiative !

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

____________________________________________________

 

La situation exposée par  est la suivante (en anglais) :

I’m looking for feedback for a situation I encountered.
I am a board member for a non-profit. Some of us learned of an issue, and we brought it up at the last meeting for an update.IMG_20141013_145537
We were told that it was being handled by the Executive Committee, and would not be brought up in board meetings.
It is my understanding that the executive committee’s role is not to take issues upon themselves, but to act in interim of board meetings. It should not be discussing issues independently from the board.
Am I correct in thinking this? Should all issues be brought up to the board, or can the executive committee handle situations that it qualifies as « sensitive »?

 

The Role of the Executive Committee versus the main board of directors

Alan Kershaw

Chair of Regulatory Board

Depends whether it’s an operational matter I guess – e.g. a staffing issue below CEO/Director level. If it’s a matter of policy or strategy, or impacts on them, then the Board is entitled to be kept informed, surely, and to consider the matter itself. 

 

John Dinner

John T,  Dinner Board Governance Services

Helping boards improve their performance and contributionI’ll respond a bit more broadly, Jean-François. While I am not opposed to the use of executive committees, a red flag often goes up when I conduct a governance review for clients and review their EC mandate and practices. There is a slippery slope where such committees find themselves assuming more accountability for the board’s work over time. Two classes of directors often form unintentionally as a result. Your situation is an example where the executive committee has usurped the board’s final authority. While I don’t recommend one approach, my inclination is to suggest that boards try to function without an executive committee because of the frequency that situations similar to the one you describe arise at boards where such committees play an active role. There are pros and cons, of course, for having these committees, but I believe the associated risk often warrants reconsideration of their real value and need.

 

Chuck Molina

Chief Technology Officer at DHI

I currently sit on the EC and have been in that role with other boards. Although I can see the EC working on projects as a subset of the board we Always go back to the full board and disclose those projects and will take items to the full board for approval. The board as a whole is accountable for decisions! There has to be transparency on the board! I found this article for you. http://www.help4nonprofits.com/BrainTeaser/BrainTeaser-Role_of_Executive_Committee.htm , which concurs to John’s comment. If used correctly the EC or a subset of the board can work on board issues more efficiently then venting through the full board, but they should always go back to the Full board for consideration or approval.  

 

Dave Chapman

CHM and CEO of NorthPoint ERM

I have experienced couple of EB’s and unless the company is in deep financial or legal trouble for the most part the took away from the main board and in the whole worked ok but not great. If the board has over 10 to 15 board members it is almost a requirement but the board them is there for optics more than or effective and efficient decision making

Experienced CEO & Board member of Domestic and European companies.

I think Mr. Dinner, Mr. Molina, and Mr. Chapman summed it up beautifully:
– You cannot have two classes of Directors
– You have to have transparency and every Board member is entitled to the same information
– A Board of 10-15 members is inefficient and may need committees, but that does not change the fact that all Board members are entitled to have input into anything that the Board decides as a body.
– An Executive Committee is a sub-committee of the entire Board, not an independent body with extraordinary powers.

 

Al Errington

Entrepreneur & Governance Advocate

I agree with John, executive committees tend to be a slippery slope to bad governance. The board of directors has the responsibility of direction and oversight of the business or organization. If anything goes substantially wrong, the board of directors will also be accountable, legally. The rules of thumb for any and all committees is
– Committees must always be accountable to the board of directors, not the other way around.
– Committees must always have limits defined by the board of directors on authority and responsibility, and should have limits on duration.
– Committees should always have a specific reason to exist and that reason should be to support the board of directors in addressing it’s responsibilities. 

 

Emerson Galfo

Consulting CFO/COO / Board Member/Advisor

Judging from the responses, we need to clearly define the context of what an Executive Committee is. Every organization can have it’s own function/view of what an Executive Committee is.

From my experience, an Executive Committee is under the CEO and reflects a group of trusted C-level executives that influence his decisions. I have had NO experience with Executive Boards other than the usual specific Board Committees dealing with specific realms of the organization.

So coming from this perspective, the Executive Committee is two steps down from the organizational pecking order and should be treated or viewed in that context.. 

 

Terry Tormey

President & CEO at Prevention Pharmaceuticals Inc.

I concur with Mr. James Clouser (above).
They should be avoided except in matters involving a performance question regarding C-Level Executive Board member, where a replacement may be sought.

 

John Baily

Board of Directors at RLI Corp

James hit the nail on the head. Executive committees are a throwback to times when we didn’t have the communication tools we do now. They no longer have a reason for their existence. All directors, weather on a not for profit or a corporate board have equal responsibilities and legal exposures. There is no room or reason for a board within a board in today’s world.

 

Chinyere Nze

Chief Executive Officer

My experience is; Board members have the last say in all policy issues- especially when it concerns operational matter. But in this case, where there is Executive Committee, what it sounds like is that, the organization in question has not clearly identified, nor delineated the roles of each body- which seem to have brought up the issue of ‘conflict’ in final decision- making. Often Executive Committees are created to act as a buffer or interim to the Board, this may sometime cause some over-lapping in executive decision-making.

My suggestion is for the organization to assess and evaluate its current hierarchy- clearly identify & define roles-benefits for creating and having both bodies, and how specific policies/ protocol would benefit the organization. In other words, the CEO needs to define the goals or benefits of having just a Board or having both bodies, and to avoid role conflict or over-lap, which may lead to confusion, as it seems to have been the case here. 

 

STEPHEN KOSMALSKI

CEO / PRESIDENT/BOARD OF DIRECTORS /PRIVATE EQUITY OPERATING PARTNER known for returning growth to stagnant businesses

The critical consideration for all board members is ‘ fiduciary accountability’ of all bod members. With that exposure , all bod members should be aware of key issues . 

 

Thomas Brattle « Toby » Gannett

President and CEO at BCR Managment

I think for large organizations, that executive committees still have an important role as many board members have a great deal going on and operational matters may come up from time to time that need to be handled in a judicial manner. While I think that the Executive committee has an important, at times critical role for a BOD, it is also critical that trust is built between the executive Committee and the BOD. This is only done when the executive committee is transparent, and pushes as many decisions that it can to the full board. If the committee does not have time to bring a matter to the full BOD, then they must convey to the BOD the circumstances why and reasoning for their decision. It is the executive committees responsibility to build that trust with the BOD and work hard to maintain it. All strategic decisions must be made by the full BOD. It sounds like you either have a communication failure, governance issue, or need work with your policies and procedures or a combination of issues.

 

Top 15 des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au deuxième trimestre de 2016


Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au deuxième trimestre de 2016.

Cette liste de 15 billets constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et les plus récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et des sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

 

Revue-de-presse-630x350

 

Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 192000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 30 juin 2016, il était fréquenté par des milliers de visiteurs par mois. Depuis le début, jai œuvré à la publication de 1373 billets.

En 2016, j’estime qu’environ 5000 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de sinformer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser quenviron 60000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2016. 

On note que 80 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de différents moteurs de recherche et 20 %  par LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

  1. Canada (64 %)
  2. France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
  3. Maghreb [Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie] (5 %)
  4. Autres pays de l’Union européenne (3 %)
  5. États-Unis [3 %]
  6. Autres pays de provenance (5 %)

En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog [MiB Awards] : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix [10] finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance. Il n’y avait pas de concours en 2015.

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

N.B. Vous pouvez vous inscrire ou faire des recherches en allant au bas de cette page.

Bonne lecture !

 Voici les Tops 15 du second trimestre de 2016 du blogue en gouvernance

 

 1.       Vous siégez à un conseil d’administration | comment bien se comporter ?
2.       Cinq (5) principes simples et universels de saine gouvernance ?
3.       Le rôle du comité exécutif versus le rôle du conseil d’administration
4.       Taille du CA, limite d’âge et durée des mandats des administrateurs
5.       Les conséquences juridiques du Brexit
6.       LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7.       Composition du conseil d’administration d’OSBL et recrutement d’administrateurs | Une primeur
8.       La composition du conseil d’administration | Élément clé d’une saine gouvernance
9.       Un guide essentiel pour comprendre et enseigner la gouvernance | En reprise
10.   L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A.
11.   Il ne faut pas attendre d’être à la retraite pour convoiter des postes sur des conseils d’administration !
12.   Attention au syndrome du « bon gars » dans la gouvernance des OBNL !
13.   Quinze (15) astuces d’un CA performant
14.   Comment procéder à l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs | Un sujet d’actualité !
15.   Performance et dynamique des conseils d’administration | Yvan Allaire

Le scandale de Volkswagen vu sous l’angle de la gouvernance corporative | Raymonde Crête


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article paru dans la revue European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR) qui scrute le scandale de Volkswagen sous l’angle juridique, mais, surtout, sous l’angle des manquements à la saine gouvernance.

Me Raymonde Crête, auteure de l’article, est professeure à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université Laval et elle dirige le Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (GRDSF).

Le texte se présente comme un cas en gouvernance et en management. Celui-ci devrait alimenter les réflexions sur l’éthique, les valeurs culturelles et les effets des pressions excessives à la performance.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’intégralité de l’article avec le consentement de l’auteure. Je n’ai pas inclus les références, qui sont très abondantes et qui peuvent être consultées sur le site de la maison d’édition lexxion.

Bonne lecture !

The Volkswagen Scandal from the Viewpoint of Corporate Governance

par Me Raymonde Crête

I. Introduction

Like some other crises and scandals that periodically occur in the business community, the Volkswagen (“VW”) scandal once again highlights the devastating consequences of corporate misconduct, once publicly disclosed, and the media storm that generally follows the discovery of such significant misbehaviour by a major corporation. Since the crisis broke in September 2015, the media have relayed endless détails about the substantial negative impacts on VW on various stakeholder groups such as employees, directors, investors, suppliers and consumers, and on the automobile industry as a whole (1)

The multiple and negative repercussions at the economic, organizational and legal levels have quickly become apparent, in particular in the form of resignations, changes in VW’s senior management, layoffs, a hiring freeze, the end to the marketing of diesel-engined vehicles, vehicle recalls, a decline in car sales, a drop in market capitalization, and the launching of internal investigations by VW and external investigations by the public authorities. This comes in addition to the threat of numerous civil, administrative, penal and criminal lawsuits and the substantial penalties they entail, as well as the erosion of trust in VW and the automobile industry generally (2).

FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company's headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn
FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn

A scandal of this extent cannot fail to raise a number of questions, in particular concerning the cause of the alleged cheating, liable actors, the potential organizational and regulatory problems related to compliance, and ways to prevent further misconduct at VW and within the automobile industry. Based on the information surrounding the VW scandal, it is premature to capture all facets of the case. In order to analyze inmore depth the various problems raised, we will have to wait for the findings of the investigations conducted both internally by the VW Group and externally by the regulatory authorities.

While recognizing the incompleteness of the information made available to date by VW and certain commentators, we can still use this documentation to highlight a few features of the case that deserve to be studied from the standpoint of corporate governance.

This Article remains relatively modest in scope, and is designed to highlight certain organizational factors that may explain the deviant behaviour observed at VW. More specifically, it submits that the main cause of VW’s alleged wrongdoing lies in the company’s ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees to reach those targets. Arguably, the corporate strategy and pressures exerted on VW’s employees may have led them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards. And this corporate misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected.

Although limited in scope, this inquiry may prove useful in identifying means to minimize, in the future, the risk of similar misconduct, not only at VW but wihin other companies as well (3). Given the limited objectives of the Article, which focuses on certain specific organizational deficiencies at VW, the legal questions raised by the case will not be addressed. However, the Article will refer to one aspect of the law of business corporations in the United States, Canada and in the EU Member States in order to emphasize the crucial role that boards in publicly-held companies must exercise to minimize the risk of misconduct (4).

II. A Preliminary Admission by VW: Individual Misconduct by a few Software Engineers

When a scandal erupts in the business community following a case of fraud, embezzlement, corruption, the marketing of dangerous products or other deviant behaviour, the company concerned and the regulatory authorities are required to quickly identify the individuals responsible for the alleged misbehaviour. For example, in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia scandals of the early 2000s, the investigations revealed that certain company senior managers had acted fraudulently by orchestrating accounting manipulations to camouflage their business’s dire financial situation (5).

These revelations led to the prosecution and conviction of the officers responsible for the corporations’ misconduct (6). In the United States, the importanace of identifying individual wrongdoers is clearly stated in the Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice which provide guidelines for prosecutions of corporate misbehaviour (7). On the basis of a memo issued in 2015 by the Department of Justice (the “Yatesmemo”) (8), these principles were recently revised to express a renewed commitment to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.While recognizing the importance of individual prosecutions in that context, the strategy is only one of the ways to respond to white-collar crime. From a prevention standpoint, it is essential to conduct a broader examination of the organizational environment in which senior managers and employees work to determine if the enterprise’s culture, values, policies, monitoring mechanisms and practices contribute or have contributed to the adoption of deviant behaviour (9).

In the Volkswagen case, the company’s management concentrated first on identifying the handful of individuals it considered to be responsible for the deception, before admitting few weeks later that organizational problems had also encouraged or facilitated the unlawful corporate behaviour. Once news broke of the Volkswagen scandal, one of VW’s officers quickly linked the wrongdoing to the actions of a few employees, but without uncovering any governance problems or misbehaviour at the VW management level (10).

In October 2015, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the VW Group in the United States, Michael Horn, stated in testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee: “[t]his was a couple of software engineers who put this for whatever reason » […]. To my understanding, this was not a corporate decision. This was something individuals did » (11). In other words, the US CEO considered that sole responsibility for the scandal lay with a handful of engineers working at the company, while rejecting any allegation tending to incriminate the company’s management.

This portion of his testimony failed to convince the members of the Subcommittee, who expressed serious doubts about placing sole blame on the misbehaviour of a few engineers, given that the problem had existed since 2009. As expressed in a sceptical response from one of the committee’s members: « I cannot accept VW’s portrayal of this as something by a couple of rogue software engineers […] Suspending three folks – it goes way, way higher than that » (12).

Although misconduct similar to the behaviour uncovered at Volkswagen can often be explained by the reprehensible actions of a few individuals described as « bad apples », the violation of rules can also be explained by the existence of organizational problems within a company (13).

III. Recognition of Organizational Failures by VW

In terms of corporate governance, an analysis of misbehaviour can highlight problems connected with the culture, values, policies and strategies promoted by a company’s management that have a negative influence on the behaviour of senior managers and employees. Considering the importance of the organizational environment in which these players act, regulators provide for several internal and external governance mechanisms to reduce the risk of corporate misbehaviour or to minimize agency problems (14). As one example of an internal governance mechanism, the law of business corporations in the U.S., Canada and the EU Member States gives the board of directors (in a one-tier board structure, as prescribed Under American and Canadian corporation law) and the management board and supervisory board (in a two tier board structure, as provided for in some EU Member States, such as Germany) a key role to play in monitoring the company’s activities and internal dealings (15). As part of their monitoring mission, the board must ensure that the company and its agents act in a diligent and honest way and in compliance with the regulations, in particular by establishing mechanisms or policies in connection with risk management, internal controls, information disclosure, due diligence investigation and compliance (16).

When analysing the Volkswagen scandal from the viewpoint of its corporate governance, the question to be asked is whether the culture, values, priorities, strategies and monitoring and control mechanisms established by the company’s management board and supervisory board – in other words « the tone at the top »-, created an environment that contributed to the emergence of misbehaviour (17).

In this saga, although the initial testimony given to the Congressional Subcommittee by the company’s U.S. CEO, Michael Horn, assigned sole responsibility to a small circle of individuals, « VW’s senior management later recognized that the misconduct could not be explained simply by the deviant behaviour of a few people, since the evidence also pointed to organizational problems supporting the violation of regulations (18). In December 2015, VW’s management released the following observations, drawn from the preliminary results of its internal investigation:

« Group Audit’s examination of the relevant processes indicates that the software-influenced NOx emissions behavior was due to the interaction of three factors:

– The misconduct and shortcomings of individual employees

– Weaknesses in some processes

– A mindset in some areas of the Company that tolerated breaches of rules » (19).

Concerning the question of process,VW released the following audit key findings:

« Procedural problems in the relevant subdivisions have encouraged misconduct;

Faults in reporting and monitoring systems as well as failure to comply with existing regulations;

IT infrastructure partially insufficient and antiquated. » (20)

More fundamentally, VW’s management pointed out at the same time that the information obtained up to that point on “the origin and development of the nitrogen issue […] proves not to have been a one-time error, but rather a chain of errors that were allowed to happen (21). The starting point was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal means the stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United States within the required timeframe and budget » (22).

In other words, this revelation by VW’s management suggests that « the end justified the means » in the sense that the ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees encouraged those employees to use illegal methods in operational terms to achieve the company’s objective. And this misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected. Among the reasons given to explain the crisis, some observers also pointed to the excessive centralization of decision-making powers within VW’s senior management, and an organizational culture that acted as a brake on internal communications and discouraged mid-level managers from passing on bad news (23).

IV. Organizational Changes Considered as a Preliminary Step

In response to the crisis, VW’s management, in a press release in December 2015, set out the main organizational changes planned to minimize the risk of similar misconduct in the future. The changes mainly involved « instituting a comprehensive new alignment that affects the structure of the Group, as well as is way of thinking and its strategic goals (24).

In structural terms, VW changed the composition of the Group’s Board of Management to include the person responsible for the Integrity and Legal Affairs Department as a board member (25). In the future, the company wanted to give « more importance to digitalization, which will report directly to the Chairman of the Board of Management, » and intended to give « more independence to brand and divisions through a more decentralized management (26). With a view to initiating a new mindset, VW’s management stated that it wanted to avoid « yes-men » and to encourage managers and engineers « who are curious, independent, and pioneering » (27). However, the December 2015 press release reveals little about VW’s strategic objectives: « Strategy 2025, with which Volkswagen will address the main issues for the future, is scheduled to be presented in mid 2016 » (28).

Although VW’s management has not yet provided any details on the specific objectives targeted in its « Strategy 2025 », it is revealing to read the VW annual reports from before 2015 in which the company sets out clear and ambitious objectives for productivity and profitability. For example, the annual reports for 2007, 2009 and 2014 contained the following financial objectives, which the company hoped to reach by 2018.

In its 2007 annual report,VW specified, under the heading « Driving ideas »:

“Financial targets are equally ambitious: for example, the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand aims to increase its unit sales by over 80 percent to 6.6 million vehicles by 2018, thereby reaching a global market share of approximately 9 percent. To make it one of the most profitable automobile companies as well, it is aiming for an ROI of 21 percent and a return on sales before tax of 9 percent.” (29).

Under the same heading, VW stated in its 2009 annual report:

“In 2018, the Volkswagen Group aims to be the most successful and fascinating automaker in the world. […] Over the long term, Volkswagen aims to increase unit sales to more than 10 million vehicles a year: it intends to capture an above-average share as the major growth markets develop (30).

And in its 2014 annual report, under the heading « Goals and Strategies », VW said:

“The goal is to generate unit sales of more than 10 million vehicles a year; in particular, Volkswagen intends to capture an above-average share of growth in the major growth markets.”

Volkswagen’s aim is a long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8% so as to ensure that the Group’s solid financial position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods (31).

Besides these specific objectives for financial performance, the annual reports show that the company’s management recognized, at least on paper, the importance of ensuring regulatory compliance and promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability (31). However, after the scandal broke in September 2015, questions can be asked about the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms, especially of the reporting and monitoring systems put in place by VW to achieve company goals in this area (33). In light of the preliminary results of VW’s internal investigation (34), as mentionned above, it seems that, in the organizational culture, the commitment to promote compliance, CSR and sustainability was not as strong as the effort made to achieve the company’s financial performance objectives.

Concerning the specific and challenging priorities of productivity and profitability established by VW’s management in previous years, the question is whether the promotion of financial objectives such as these created a risk because of the pressure it placed on employees within the organizational environment. The priorities can, of course, exert a positive influence and motivate employees to make an even greater effort to achieve the objectives (35). On the other hand, the same priority can exert a negative influence by potentially encouraging employees to use all means necessary to achieve the performance objectives set, in order to protect their job or obtain a promotion, even if the means they use for that purpose contravene the regulations. In other words, the employees face a « double bind » or dilemma which, depending on the circumstances, can lead them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards.

In the management literature, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the beneficial effects of the setting of specific and challenging goals on employee motivation and performance within a company (36). However, while recognizing these beneficial effects, some authors point out the unwanted or negative side effects they may have.

As highlighted by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky and Bazerman, specific goal setting can result in employees focusing solely on those goals while neglecting other important, but unstated, objectives (37). They also mention that employees motivated by « specific, challenging goals adopt riskier strategies and choose riskier gambles than do those with less challenging or vague goals (38). As an additional unwanted side effet, goal setting can encourage unlawful or unethical behaviour, either by inciting employees to use dishonest methods to meet the performance objectives targeted, or to “misrepresent their performance level – in other words, to report that they met a goal when in fact they fell short (39). Based on these observations, the authors suggest that companies should set their objectives with the greatest care and propose various ways to guard against the unwanted side effects highlighted in their study. This approach could prove useful for VW’s management which will once again, at some point, have to define its objectives and stratégies.

V. Conclusion

In the information released to the public after the emissions cheating scandal broke, as mentioned above, VW’s management quickly stated that the misconduct was directly caused by the individual misbehaviour of a couple of software engineers. Later, however, it admitted that the individual misconduct of a few employees was not the only cause, and that there were also organizational deficiencies within the company itself.

Although the VW Group’s public communications have so far provided few details about the cause of the crisis, the admission by management that both individual and organizational failings were involved constitutes, in our opinion, a lever for understanding the various factors that may have led to reprehensible conduct within the company. Based on the investigations that will be completed over the coming months, VW’s management will be in a position to identify more precisely the nature of these organizational failings and to propose ways to minimize the risk of future violations. During 2016, VW’s management will also announce the objectives and stratégies it intends to pursue over the next few years.