Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Octobre 2014

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) du mois d’octobre 2014.

Le programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés est le seul programme universitaire offert au Québec. Il s’adresse aux administrateurs siégeant à un conseil d’administration et disposant d’une expérience pertinente.

Les administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) sont regroupés dans la Banque des ASC, un outil de recherche en ligne mis au point par le Collège, afin de faciliter le recrutement d’administrateurs sur les conseils d’administration.

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Octobre 2014

CÉRÉMONIE OFFICIELLE DE REMISE DES DIPLÔMES

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) a honoré les 78 nouveaux finissants du programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés à l’occasion de la 9e cérémonie officielle de remise des diplômes. Présenté le jeudi 11 septembre 2014 à l’hôtel Château Laurier de Québec, l’événement a réuni les nouveaux administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC), en plus d’une cinquantaine de partenaires et collaborateurs.

Au total, près de 150 invités s’étaient donné rendez-vous afin d’applaudir les diplômés de la promotion 2014 et célébrer la plus importante communauté d’administrateurs formés en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec qui se chiffre maintenant à 664 ASC (consultez le www.BanqueAdministrateurs.com pour leurs profils).

Pour tous les détails et des photos de l’événement [+]

DÉVOILEMENT DE LA 3E SÉRIE DE CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE

Le CAS est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéos. Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance.

Une capsule sera dévoilée chaque semaine par bulletin électronique. À surveiller !

Cette semaine : La présidence du CA, par Michel Clair [+]

DEUX NOUVEAUX COURS SPÉCIALISÉS EN GOUVERNANCE

Il nous fait plaisir de vous informer que deux nouveaux cours spécialisés en gouvernance sont à l’horaire dès cet automne.

GOUVERNANCE DES OBNL : Cette formation s’adresse spécifiquement aux directeurs généraux, présidents et administrateurs des organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) soucieux d’intégrer de nouvelles pratiques de gouvernance adaptées au contexte des OBNL afin d’assurer la pérennité et la performance de leur organisation.

Ce cours aura lieu à Québec, les 24 et 25 octobre prochains. Le coût d’inscription est normalement de 1 950 $ pour cette formation de deux jours. Toutefois, grâce à la participation financière de la SAQ et des partenaires du Collège, le tarif est réduit à 500 $ par participant. Détails et inscription [+]

GOUVERNANCE ET LEADERSHIP À LA PRÉSIDENCE : Cette formation est destinée aux administrateurs d’expérience exerçant la fonction de présidence du conseil d’administration, d’un des comités du conseil ou du comité consultatif d’une PME. Basé sur des études de cas, des simulations et des discussions en petits groupes, cette formation est principalement orientée sur la maîtrise des habilités relationnelles et de leadership qu’exige la fonction de présidence d’un conseil.

Ce cours se tiendra à Québec, les 13 et 14 novembre prochains et le coût d’inscription est de 1950 $ par participant. Détails et inscription [+]

Les formations spécialisées sont offertes en alternance à Québec et Montréal et sont limitées à des groupes de 20 participants. Il est aussi possible de s’inscrire à l’une ou l’autre de ces formations qui seront présentées à Montréal dès février 2015. Consulter le calendrier complet [+]

Les formations du collège et les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé

Gouvernance des OBNL | 24 et 25 octobre 2014, à Québec | 13 et 14 mars 2015, à Montréal

Gouvernance des PME | 5 et 6 novembre 2014, à Québec | 24 et 25 février 2015, à Montréal

Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence | 13 et 14 novembre 2014, à Québec | 28 et 29 mai 2015, à Montréal

Certification – Module 1 : Les rôles et responsabilités des administrateurs | 12, 13 et 14 février 2015, à Québec, et 26, 27 et 28 mars 2015, à Montréal

Petit-déjeuner conférence de l’IAS section du Québec sur « Les défis technologiques : cybersécurités, nouvelles technologies et données massives » | 15 octobre 2014, à Montréal

Conférence Femmes Leaders par Les Affaires | 15 octobre 2014, à Québec

Journée annuelle des administrateurs de l’Institut français des administrateurs sur le thème «gouvernance et compétitivité» | 21 octobre 2014, à Paris

Programme de l’ecoDa « New Governance Challenges for Board Members in Europe » | 21 et 22 octobre 2014, à Bruxelles

7e édition du Colloque régional Entreprendre Façon Femme | 22 octobre 2014, à Québec

Petit-déjeuner conférence du Cercle des ASC sur « Votre CV d’administrateur : comment mettre en valeur votre expertise? » | 23 octobre 2014, à Québec | 30 octobre 2014, à Montréal

NOMINATIONS ASC

Catherine Claveau, ASC | Barreau du Québec et Conseil du Barreau du Québec

André Boisclair, ASC | Fondation du cancer du sein du Québec

Josée De La Durantaye, ASC | P. Baillargeon ltée.

Éric Fournier, ASC | Verseau International inc.

Alain Bolduc, ASC | Capsana

Michel Lamontagne, ASC | Coffrage Saulnier

Martin Cyrenne, ASC | Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC)

Annie Tremblay, ASC | Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC)

Paulette Legault, ASC | Cercle des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC), Ordre des opticiens d’ordonnances du Québec et Chambre de la sécurité financière du Québec

Clarence Turgeon, ASC | Conseil du Patronat du Québec

Lucie Lebeuf, ASC | Ville de Laval

Éric Lavoie, ASC | Institut universitaire de cardiologie et de pneumologie de Québec

François Désy, ASC | Garde Côtière Auxiliaire Canadienne (Québec), Désy Meunier Construction Rénovation inc et Caisse populaire Desjardins de Baie-Comeau

José Mathieu, ASC | VCI Composites et NSE-Automatech

Boîte à outils pour administrateurs

Nouvelle référence mensuelle en gouvernance : Dossier spécial « Former un CA : enjeux et obligations » du Journal Les Affaires

La capsule d’expert du mois – NOUVEAUTÉ : La présidence du CA, par Michel Clair

Top 5 des billets les plus consultés au mois de septembre du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé.

Portrait d’Adm.A. sur Mme Lisane Dostie, ASC et formatrice au CAS

Bonne lecture !

____________________________________________

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

Faculté des sciences de l’administration Pavillon Palasis-Prince

2325, rue de la Terrasse, Université Laval Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

418 656-2630; 418 656-2624

info@cas.ulaval.ca

Notions de gouvernance 101 | Que font les administrateurs ?

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article de Lucy P. Marcus*, experte en gouvernance, qui présente, de manière vulgarisée, en quoi consiste le travail des administrateurs de sociétés aujourd’hui.

On y trouvera une bonne définition des responsabilités des administrateurs ainsi qu’une métaphore intéressante qui montre comment le travail des administrateurs a considérablement changé au cours des vingt dernières années.

L’auteure distingue entre les activités qui sont de nature « grounding » (connaissances de bases de la performance et des obligations de conformité) et celles, toujours plus importantes, qui sont de l’ordre du « stargazing » (la vision à long terme et la stratégie).

Je vous invite à lire ce bref article qui tient lieu de notions de gouvernance 101 !

Bonne lecture !

Boardroom 101: What, exactly, do directors do?

The boardroom is changing at a fast pace. The agenda items we discuss, the expectations of board directors and the responsibility we hold are all areas that are going through a much needed, and, in my experience, a very welcome, transition.

When my son was around 5 years old, I was preparing for a board meeting and he asked what that was and what I was going to do there.

Lucy P. Marcus*, experte en gouvernance

That’s a question many adults have, too. What, exactly, is a board and what does a board director do?

Searching for an explanation, I finally went with this: « You know about King Arthur and the Round Table? Well, like King Arthur and the Round Table, a group of wise people gather together every month or so. We sit around a table and talk about what the people we are helping have been doing and what they are planning to do next. We try to make sure they are acting honourably and following the law and doing what is best for everyone. »

He seemed fairly satisfied with that answer, but it got me thinking — was the metaphor apt? Is that really what directors are doing in practice?

It does seem sometimes like the board is an arcane and distant body. A caricature would be one where the doors open with a whoosh to reveal suited people sitting around a table in an oak panelled room, having confidential discussions in hushed tones, drawing on deep expertise and thinking big thoughts. And of course, those discussions would be spoken in a special « thee and thou » language.

There are parts of that caricature which do ring true. We board directors generally do sit around a table, and I’d like to think we generally have robust discussions. Strangely, we do often speak in formal ways, referring to “Mr Chairman” and the like. As for the “deep expertise” and “big thoughts” part, I’m not sure we are always well equipped with enough information to make decisions.

Changes afoot

The boardroom is changing at a fast pace. The agenda items we discuss, the expectations of board directors and the responsibility we hold are all areas that are going through a much needed, and, in my experience, a very welcome, transition.

Board agendas used to be rigid and mostly focused on traditional oversight topics such as compensation and compliance. That mandate has grown to include a great deal more.

To better understand the changes and how they affect our job as directors, it is useful to think of the tasks and the agenda items of the board as being broadly divided into a balance of what I call “grounding” and “stargazing”.

The “grounding” side consists of what you might think of as the tick-boxing items: questions around the structure and performance of the organisation in the “here and now”. Is it behaving legally and responsibly? Is it following the rules and regulations? Are its financial accounts in good order? Does it meet to the expectations not just of its shareholders but also of other stakeholders in the broader ecosystem in which it operates?

The “stargazing” side is about strategy. This is the essence of what and where the organisation wants to be in the future. It is about asking questions about how the sector is changing and how the organisation plans to grow. It is also about challenging it to make the necessary changes as the world around it changes too, and to be a driver of positive change. It is about building innovation and a sense of excitement about the future into the DNA.

The old agendas were heavily weighted towards the “grounding” side of the equation, but today, a good balance of “grounding” and “stargazing” is vital to preparing the organisation for the future. The board must look closely at the here and now, making sure everything is working correctly; otherwise we run the risk of missing signs of everything from neglect to malfeasance. We must also look into the next 10 to 15 years to make sure that the organisation has a robust future to look forward to.

Responsibilities increase

The world around us has changed at an exponential pace. Companies are seen as having a greater responsibility for the role they play in the health and well-being of society. They also bear some responsibility for the individuals that they touch, be it employees, partners, or people who live in the community. At the same time, social media and niche publications amplify the voices of shareholders, communities and consumers. Also, boards and companies no longer operate in a black box — with the advent of everything from Twitter to Google Earth, there is more transparency than ever before.

Partly as a consequence of these changes in the boardroom and beyond, the responsibilities and expectations of directors, particularly independent directors, have increased exponentially. It is not sufficient to skim the board papers, ask a couple of superficial questions, eat the lovely meal, and be on your merry way home.

Board directors are now, rightly, expected to read the papers, come prepared, and ask the tough questions. Though the boardroom has traditionally been a black box room, much has changed. Individual directors will increasingly find themselves being held to account for the choices that they have made in the boardroom in many areas, be it around executive compensation or “innovative” tax strategies.

It means that we as directors must be more diligent and make sure we are only voting ‘yes’ for things when we have a thorough understanding of what the implications of the ‘yes’ is — both now and in the longer term. We must take into account those whose lives are impacted directly, such as people who work for the company and those who live in the area where the company sits, as well as the people who use the company’s products and services. It also about those who are impacted indirectly, such as shareholders whose life savings may be at stake. Those are all positives, in my view.

In the end, if we are to live up to the ideal of King Arthur and the Round Table, chivalrous knights who are guided by the ideals of courtesy, courage, and honour, we must ask ourselves every time we gather, “Why are we here and who do we serve?” so that the decisions we take are made wisely and judiciously, not only to serve the needs of the few, but to ensure that we help the organisation to live up to its potential, and do so in an honourable way.

_________________________

*Lucy P. Marcus, CEO, Non-Exec Board Director, Prof IE Biz School, Project Syndicate & BBC columnist.

L’audit interne au cœur d’une grande bataille !

Je partage avec vous un récent article que Denis Lefort, expert conseil en gouvernance et audit interne, m’a fait parvenir, accompagné de ses commentaires.

Cet article de Mike Jacka* est paru dans Internal Auditor Magazine. Toute personne préoccupée par l’importance de cette fonction devrait prendre connaissance de cette mise en garde.

« En lisant ce bref article, vous saisirez rapidement que son auteur est d’avis que l’audit interne et les autres fonctions d’assurance des organisations (gestion des risques, conformité, sécurité et autres) sont entrées dans une guerre de juridiction… Et que l’audit interne ne peut agir comme si elle était comme la Suisse, neutre et inattaquable…!!!

L’auteur est ainsi d’avis que l’audit interne doit préparer à la fois sa stratégie de défense et d’attaque pour contrer les coups durs présents et à venir… »

Bonne lecture !

Internal Audit Is in the Midst of a Great War

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation recently posted an interesting piece titled « Compliance or Legal? The Board’s Duty to Assure Compliance. » I know it all sounds a little boring, but trust me on this one — there is interesting information here. Take some time to read through it before we dive in.

(One very quick, very important aside. I came across this article as a part of The IIA’s SmartBrief — a weekly « snapshot » of news and issues internal auditors might care about. To receive the newsletter you must « opt in. » I cannot urge you enough to opt in. No puffery here. Seldom does a week go by where I don’t find at least one nugget I can use. If you aren’t receiving it, you can opt in here.)

If you have been paying attention to the discussions that are going on regarding internal audit’s evolving role you were probably gobsmacked by the similarities between those discussions and what is being said in this article. Take the opening sentence: « A series of developments threaten to blur the important distinction between the corporation’s legal and compliance functions. » Make a few changes and you are talking about the dilemma internal audit is facing. « A series of developments threaten to blur the important distinction between the organization’s internal audit department and [insert your favorite assurance provider’s name here]. »

There it is in a nutshell, the crux of the battle currently being waged over the role of internal audit and others within the organization.

Wait, let’s back up a second. Did you miss that there is a war going on? Let’s take a quick look.

I have a good friend who is a CAE. In that role he is also in charge of risk management. We often talk about the potential conflict that exists with those dual roles. He is not alone. I have talked with other audit leaders who are being approached about audit taking on the role of risk. Not a bad fit. We are risk experts, we have the communication and relationship skills, and there should be a definite meshing of gears between audit and risk.

On the other hand, I have also heard from others who face the opposite issue; they are under pressure to have internal audit placed under the jurisdiction of the risk officer. « Wait a minute, » you say, « That is a very bad idea: a serious problem, a conflict of interests, a subversion of our objectivity, an invasion on our independence. » Our list of reasons why this shouldn’t happen is quite long.

When the shoe is on the other foot the bunions become just a tad more obvious.

And it is not just the risk function. While not as common, I am hearing similar discussions around such functions as compliance, corporate security, finance, quality assurance, and, yes, even legal. In some cases the discussion is around audit taking on part of the role; in others it is about audit becoming a part of the other function.

Why are we suddenly seeing this land grab?

Governance has become an important topic at the executive and board level. (Definitely a good thing.) Assurance providers (compliance, legal, risk, et al) realize the way to raise the esteem with which the board and executives hold them is to take on a greater piece of the governance pie. The pushing and shoving starts. Escalation ensues. And we find ourselves in the midst of a jurisdictional war.

And while internal audit would like to believe we are above the fray (we are independent, we are objective, we are internal audit, hear us roar), unless we recognize the existence of this war — unless we are willing to take up arms and join in the fray — we will find ourselves trivialized, the core values we provide handed off to the victors.

We think we are Switzerland. But there is no such thing as neutrality in this battle.

So, with that background, let’s return to the article previously referenced. The contents provide a good indication of the type of arguments internal audit will encounter. Two examples:

The author states that a forced separation of compliance from under legal would jeopardize the ability of the organization to preserve attorney-client privilege. Cold chills went up my spine as I read this. I still vividly recall similar debates from 20 years ago when the legal department argued they should have more direct control over internal audit in order to preserve attorney-client privilege. We won. But it is obvious that the ugly head of that particular argument continues to rise again and again.

The article quotes compliance thought leaders as saying that the role of « guardian of corporate reputation » is exclusively reserved for the corporate compliance officer; that the compliance officer is the organizational « subject matter expert » for ethics and culture. The author of the article states that this is « contrary to long standing public discourse that frames the lawyer’s role as a primary guardian of the organizational reputation. » My first, knee-jerk reaction is that internal audit should be the guardian of reputation and the subject matter expert. But once I put my knee back where it belongs, I realize it is probably more true that the attempt to define any one department as guardian or expert is a fool’s game. Everyone with any governance role should have the protection of reputation, ethics, and culture as their No. 1 responsibility.

There is much more in the article and many more thoughtful and reasoned arguments. And it would be quite easy to say « Let them duke it out. Their arguments are not important to us. » However, that is exactly why we should be paying attention. The article contains the points that will be used in the battle — points to be used against us and points we can use in our defense.

We are in a war. And audit cannot sit back and say, « We have independence; we are safe and above the fray. » No. They will have an eye on our « turf, » also. And who’s to say that some of their turf shouldn’t be ours. I’m not saying we break out the bayonets and start going after some of the unwounded, but I am saying we have to recognize the existence of a battle and be willing to take a stand — be willing to say what it is we do, why it is important, and why we should have those responsibilities.

What are your thoughts? What is internal audit’s role regarding the organization’s approach to risk, governance, compliance, legal, etc.? If we are more involved, is there a conflict? If the lines blur, does it have a negative impact on the company? Is there really a war brewing? And what might this have to do with the future (if there is going to be a future) of internal audit?

_____________________________________

*Mike Jacka, CIA, CPA, CPCU, CLU, worked in internal audit for nearly 30 years at Farmers Insurance Group.

Nouvelles capsules vidéos en gouvernance – La diversité et la gestion des risques

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéo.

Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule est dévoilée chaque semaine.

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement des deux plus récentes capsules d’experts qui sont maintenant en ligne. Elles ont pour thèmes « La diversité » par Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés, et « La gestion des risques » par M. Martin Leblanc, CA, CMC, Associé, Services-conseils – Management et Gestion des risques, KPMG.

Visionnez ces deux capsules d’experts :

La diversité, par Nicolle Forget [+]

________________________________________________

La gestion des risques, par Martin Leblanc [+]

Comment les principaux intéressés peuvent-ils évaluer la qualité d’un conseil d’administration ?

Que peut faire un actionnaire ou un investisseur pour évaluer la compétence d’un conseil d’administration et se former une opinion sur l’efficacité de son rôle de fiduciaire ?

Voici un article, publié par la rédaction d’Investopedia, qui présente un checklist en cinq points, simple mais fort utile, pour mieux savoir quoi regarder dans la documentation publique.

Bien sûr, votre évaluation ne sera pas nécessairement concluante mais je suis assuré que si vous portez une attention spéciale aux 5 éléments présentés ci-dessous, vous aurez une bien meilleure appréciation des qualités du conseil et de ses administrateurs.

Quels autres facteurs considérez-vous dans l’évaluation des compétences d’un Board ? Bonne lecture !

Evaluating The Board Of Directors

You can learn a lot from looking at the disclosures made about a company’s board of directors in its annual report, but it takes time and knowledge to pick up clues on the level of quality of a company’s governance as reflected in its board’s composition and responsibilities. (For related reading, see An Investor’s Checklist To Financial Footnotes and Footnotes: Early Warning Signs For Investors.)

In theory, the board is responsible to the shareholders and is supposed to govern a company’s management. But in many instances, the board has become a servant of the chief executive officer (CEO), who is typically also the chairman of the board. The role of the board of directors has increasingly come under scrutiny in light of corporate scandals such as those at Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth, in which the board of directors failed to act in investors’ best interests. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 made corporations more accountable, investors should still pay attention to what a corporation’s board of directors is up to. Here we’ll show you what the board of directors can tell you about how a company is being run.

The Checklist
According to an October 27, 2003, Wall Street Journal article, a checklist was developed by the Corporate Library to help investors evaluate the objectivity and effectiveness of a board. According to this checklist, investors should examine:

1. Size of the Board
There is no universal agreement on the optimum size of a board of directors. A large number of members represents a challenge in terms of using them effectively and/or having any kind of meaningful individual participation. According to the Corporate Library’s study, the average board size is 9.2 members, and most boards range from 3 to 31 members. Some analysts think the ideal size is seven.

In addition, there are two critical board committees that must be made up of independent members:

The compensation committee

The audit committee

The minimum number for each committee is three. This means that a minimum of six board members is needed so that no one is on more than one committee. Having members doing double duty may compromise the important wall between audit and compensation, which helps avoid any conflicts of interest. Members serving on a number of other boards may not devote adequate time to their responsibilities.

The seventh member is the chairperson of the board. It’s the responsibility of the chairperson to make sure the board is functioning properly and the CEO is fulfilling his or her duty and following the directives of the board. A conflict of interest is created if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board.

To staff any additional committees, such as nominating or governance, additional people may be necessary. However, having more than nine members may make the board too big to function effectively. (For background reading, see The Basics Of Corporate Structure.)

2. The Degree of Independence: Insiders and Outsiders
A key attribute of an effective board is that it is comprised of a majority of independent outsiders. While not necessarily true, a board with a majority of insiders is often viewed as being stacked with sycophants, especially in cases where the CEO is also the chairman of the board.

An outsider is someone who has never worked at the company, is not related to any of the key employees and has never worked for a major supplier, customer or service provider, such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, investment bankers, etc. While this definition of independent outsiders is clear, you’d be surprised at the number of times it is misapplied. Too often, the « outsider » label is given to the retired CEO or a relative when that person is actually an insider with conflicts of interest.The Wall Street Journal article found that independent outsiders made up 66% of all boards and 72% of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) boards. The larger the number of outside board members the better. This makes the board more independent and allows it to provide a higher level of corporate governance to shareholders, particularly if the position of chairman of the board is separated from the CEO and is held by an outsider.

3. Committees
There are four important board committees: executive, audit, compensation and nominating. There may be more committees depending on corporate philosophy, which is determined by an ethics committee and special circumstances relating to a particular company’s line of business. Let’s take a closer look at the four main committees:

The Executive Committee
The executive committee, is made up of a small number of board members that are readily accessible and easily convened, to decide on matters subject to board consideration but must be decided on expeditiously, such as a quarterly meeting. Executive committee proceedings are always reported to and reviewed by the full board. Just as with the full board, investors should prefer that independent directors make up the majority of an executive committee.

The Audit Committee
The audit committee works with the auditors to make sure that the books are correct and that there are no conflicts of interest between the auditors and the other consulting firms employed by the company. Ideally, the chair of the audit committee is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Often, a CPA is not on the audit committee, let alone on the board. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires that the audit committee include a financial expert, but this qualification is typically met by a retired banker, even though that person’s ability to catch fraud may be questionable. The audit committee should meet at least four times a year in order to review the most recent audit. An additional meeting should be held if there are other issues that need to be addressed

The Compensation Committee.
The compensation committee is responsible for setting the pay of top executives. It seems obvious that the CEO or other people with conflicts of interest should not be on this committee, but you’d be surprised at the number of companies that allow just that. It is important to check if the members of the compensation board are also on the compensation committees of other firms because of the potential conflict of interest. The compensation committee should meet at least twice a year. Having only one meeting may be a sign that the committee meets just to approve a pay package that was created by the CEO or a consultant without much debate. (To learn more, read Evaluating Executive Compensation.)

The Nominating Committee
This committee is responsible for nominating people to the board. The nomination process should aim to bring on people with independence and a skill set currently lacking on the board.M

4. Other Commitments and Time Constraints
The number of boards and committees a board member is on is a key consideration when judging the effectiveness of a member.

The following chart from the survey shows the time commitments of board members of the 1,700 largest U.S. public companies according the the study’s 2003 data. This indicates that the majority of board members sit on no more than three boards. What this data does not specify is the number of committees to which these people belong.

You’ll often find that independent board members serve on both the audit and compensation committees and are also on three or more other boards. You have to wonder how much time a board member can devote to a company’s business if the person is on multiple boards. This situation also raises questions about the supply of independent outside directors. Are these people pulling double duty because there’s a lack of qualified outsiders?

5. Related Transactions
Companies must disclose any transactions with executives and directors in a financial note entitled « Related Transactions. » This discloses actions or relationships that cause conflicts of interest, such as doing business with a director’s company or having relatives of the CEO receiving professional fees from the company.

The Bottom Line
The composition and performance of a board of directors says a lot about its responsibilities to a company’s shareholders. A board loses credibility if its objectivity and independence are compromised by material shortcomings in this checklist. Investors are poorly served by substandard governance practices.

Clarifications au sujet des deux principaux systèmes de gouvernance | One Tier vs Two Tier

Ici, en Amérique du Nord, on entend quelquefois parler des distinctions entre le modèle de gouvernance européen et le modèle de gouvernance à l’américaine. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une brève synthèse des particularités des modèles de gouvernance européens eu égard à la distinction one tier/two tier systèmes de gouvernance.

Cette conclusions est basée sur une recherche de type « Benchmarking » conduite par ecoDa* (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) auprès de ses membres des Instituts de gouvernance européens ainsi qu’auprès d’autres membres non-européens, tel que le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

À la suite de l’extrait présentant les grandes lignes de ces modèles de gouvernance, vous trouverez un portrait plus précis des principales différences entre les deux systèmes, dont les deux plus représentatifs (UK, One Tier; Allemagne, Two Tier).

Bonne lecture !

Although the European Union tries to undermine the differences, the corporate law and corporate governance is highly diversified throughout Europe, embedded in a long history of specific societal and economic approaches towards the organisation of the business world, aligning governance with these quite different societal priorities.

In the two tier system, supervisory board members control the strategy but don’t define it. In the two tier system, there is also a clear cut between management and control responsibilities. In the one tier system, the board governs the company e. g. controls the direction, defines the strategic options and can address any issues related to the performance of the company.

People advocating for the two tier model always point out that having distance between management and oversight creates independence that makes sense. People defending the one-tier system consider that having executives and non-executives on the same board provides a better flow of information and helps to overcome problems that boards can face in understanding what is going on in the company. The one-tier system would also enable the non-executive to see how executive operate together as a team. The non-executive would be more involved in forward-looking of the strategy. As a downside effect of the one tier system, it is difficult for non-executives to draw distinction between monitoring and oversight.

The one tier system is often seen as an English model while the two-tier system is more of a German style. But the reality is more complex than that over the different countries in the European Union. The Nordic Corporate Governance (CG) model is quite unique with a strictly hierarchical governance structure and a direct chain of command among the general meeting, the board and the CEO. The Italian CG model is also special with the distinction between the managing body (sole administrator or, in the collective form of a board of directors) and the controlling organ (so called “board of statutory auditors”)

One-tier board system Two-tier board system

Organisation

A single board. A supervisory body and a management body.

Composition

Mixed, executive and non-executive directors may serve on the board. Separate, executive and non-executive directors serve on separate boards (i.e., a supervisory board composed exclusively of non-executive directors and a management board composed exclusively of executive directors).

Organisation

Unitary Binary

Committees

Mandatory or recommended Supervisory and advisory committees(Mandatory) oversight and advisory committees such as the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the nomination (appointments) committee, composed of a majority of non-executive directors, one or more of whom must be independent.Supervisory committee

Optional committee entrusted with supervising the company, composed of both executive and non-executive directors.

Usually differs slightly from a true supervisory board (as found in the two-tier system) in terms of powers, composition and role.

Mostly found in countries which present characteristics of a one-tier system while incorporating certain features of a two-tier system.

OptionalHistorically not required but oversight and advisory committees are increasingly important in the two-tier system as well.

Roles

Board of directors Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking, management and oversightPerformance enhancement

Supervisory role

Accountability

Strategic and financial oversight

Management board Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking and managementPerformance enhancement

Service and strategic role

Supervisory board

Supervisory role

Accountability

Decision-taking and oversight

Monitoring role

Strategic and financial oversight

CEO duality

Allowed.The same person can serve as both CEO and chair of the board of directors (although this is generally not recommended by corporate governance practices).

Restricted.No CEO duality (although the CEO can sometimes be a member or attend meetings of the supervisory board.)

Executive directors

Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or appointments committee (if any).A director may be appointed by the board of directors when the term of office of another director comes to an end, in order to prevent the board from being paralyzed, for example if the board no longer has a sufficient number of members as required by law or the articles (co-optation procedure).The appointment of a co-opted director must be confirmed at the first general meeting of shareholders following his or her appointment. Appointed by the supervisory board or the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or the appointments committee (if there is one).

Non-Executive (supervisory directors)

Idem. Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders or, based on a proposal by the supervisory board or the appointments committee (if there is one).

Conflicts perspective

Negatively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles due to its composition (a majority of executive directors) and unitary structure.Diffusion of tasks and responsibilities weakens the non-executive directors’ ability to oversee the implementation of decisions, especially where executive and non-executive directors face the same potential legal liability.Higher risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders.

To avoid conflicts of interest, it is often recommended that the one-tier board be composed of a majority of non-executive directors, due to (i)

their experience and knowledge, (ii) their contacts, which may enhance management’s ability to secure external resources, and (iii) their independence from the CEO.

In companies which have achieved a certain level of development, risks of conflicts of interest are often reduced through the creation of committees allowing these functions to be segregated. In addition, legal provisions aimed at preventing and resolving conflict of interest exist in most jurisdictions.

Positively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles, due to the composition of the supervisory board (independent directors) which ensures independence and its binary structure.No diffusion of tasks and responsibilities.

Lower risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders.

(Dis)advantages

AdvantagesSpirit of partnership and mutual respect between directors, which allows greater interaction amongst all board members.Non-executive directors have more contact with the company itself and are more involved in the decision-making process. Non-executive directors have direct access to information.

Decision-making process is faster.

A lighter administrative burden as only a single management body needs to hold meetings and only a single set of minutes need be drawn up.

Board meetings take place more regularly.

Disadvantages

A single body is entrusted with both managing and supervising the company’s operations.

More difficult to guarantee the independence of board members and there is a greater risk of non-executive directors aligning too much with executive directors.

More liability for non-executive directors.

Advantages Clear distinction between the supervisory and management functions within the company.Clear distinctions of liabilities between the members of the supervisory and management bodies.Supervisory board members are more independent.

Clear separation of the roles of chairman and CEO.

Disadvantages

It is more difficult for directors to build relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication between the two boards.

Supervisory board members only receive limited information (from the management board) and at a later stage (decreased involvement). There is a heightened risk of the supervisory board not discovering shortcomings or discovering them too late.

Decision-making process is delayed due to less frequent supervisory board meetings.

Non-executive directors face several challenges which appear to be typical of the two-tier board model, such as difficulties (i) building relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication and flows of information between the two boards, and (ii) fully understanding and ratifying strategic initiatives by the management board, thereby frustrating the decision-making processes.

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ecoDa (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) is a not-for-profit association based in Brussels, which acts as the « European voice of directors » and represents around 60,000 board directors from across the European Union (EU) member states. The organisation acts as a forum for debate and public advocacy by influencing the public policy debate at EU level and by promoting appropriate director training, professional development and boardroom best practice.

Les modèles de gouvernance fondés sur la prise en compte des intérêts des « Stakeholders » sont-ils efficaces ?

Dans ce billet, nous attirons votre attention sur une étude remarquable, récemment publiée par Franklin Allen, professeur d’économie à l’Université de Pennsylvanie et à Imperial College, Londres; Elena Carletti, professeure de finance à l’université Bocconi ; et Robert Marquez, professeur de finance à l’Université de Californie (Davis), paru sur le blogue de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

L’étude montre que les entreprises peuvent adopter deux modèles relativement distincts de gouvernance.

Le premier modèle, celui qui règne dans les pays Anglo-Saxons, adopte la perspective de la théorie de l’agence selon laquelle il doit exister une nette séparation des pouvoirs entre les actionnaires-propriétaires et les dirigeants de l’organisation. Dans ces pays (U.S., Canada, UK, Australie), les lois précisent assez clairement que les actionnaires sont les propriétaires de l’entreprise et que les managers ont le devoir fiduciaire d’agir en fonction de leurs intérêts, tout comme les administrateurs qui sont les représentants élus des actionnaires.

La situation canadienne est un peu particulière parce que certains jugements stipulent que les administrateurs doivent aussi tenir compte des conséquences des décisions sur les diverses parties prenantes.

Il y a plusieurs pays qui adoptent un deuxième modèle de gouvernance, un modèle qui accorde une importance capitale aux parties prenantes (Stakeholders), plus particulièrement aux employés.

Par exemple, en Allemagne, le système de cogestion exige un nombre égal de sièges d’actionnaires et d’employés au conseil de supervision. Les intérêts des parties prenantes sont également pris en compte par une représentation significative d’employés en Autriche, en France, aux Pays-Bas, au Danemark, en Suède.

D’autres pays tels que la Chine et le Japon ont des modèles de gouvernance qui se fondent sur des normes se rapportant aux consensus sociaux.

Quel modèle de gouvernance peut le mieux optimiser la performance des entreprises, tout en répondant aux impératifs de rentabilité, de compétitivité et de pérennité de ces dernières ?

Vous ne serez peut-être pas étonnés d’apprendre que le modèle Anglo-Saxon, fondé sur la propriété des actionnaires, n’est pas nécessairement le plus efficace ! Mais pourquoi ?

Voilà ce que cette étude examine en profondeur. Voici quelques extraits de l’article, dont la conclusion suivante :

« If workers and shareholders are made better off by co-determination and consumers are made worse off, then it is still likely that co-determination will be implemented. The reason is that workers and shareholders are usually better organized and are in a position to lobby in favor of co-determination, whereas consumers are dispersed. Such a political economy approach can help shed light on the emergence of stakeholder governance. In turn, the present study illustrates one of the likely consequences of the adoption of a stakeholder approach to corporate governance ».

Stakeholder Governance, Competition and Firm Value

….. These differences in firms’ corporate orientation are confirmed by the results of a survey of senior managers at a sample of major corporations in Japan, Germany, France, the US, and the UK, who were asked whether “A company exists for the interest of all stakeholders” or whether “Shareholder interest should be given the first priority” (Yoshimori, 2005). The results of the survey strongly suggest that stakeholders are considered to be very important in Japan, Germany and France, while shareholders’ interests represent the primary concern in the US and the UK. The same survey reports that firm continuity and employment preservation are important concerns for managers of corporations located in Japan, Germany and France, but not for those located in the US and the UK. All these considerations suggest that in many countries the legal system or social conventions have as a common objective the inclusion of parties beyond shareholders into firms’ decision-making processes. In particular, workers are seen as important stakeholders in the firm, with continuity of employment being an important objective.

In our paper, Stakeholder Governance, Competition and Firm Value, forthcoming in the Review of Finance, we examine these issues, and provide an understanding of how imposing stakeholder governance affects firms’ behavior even when this involves a trade-off between the interests of shareholders and those of other stakeholders. Our main idea is that stakeholder firms internalize the effects of their behavior on stakeholders other than shareholders. In particular, they are concerned with the benefits that their stakeholders would lose should the firm not survive. As a consequence, stakeholder firms are more concerned with avoiding bankruptcy since this prevents their stakeholders from enjoying their benefits. The different concern for survival affects firms’ strategic behavior in the product market and, in particular, the way they behave in the presence of uncertainty.

Specifically, we develop a model where firms compete in the product market with other firms, and have to choose the prices at which to sell their goods. Firms are subject to uncertainty, and can go bankrupt if they fail to turn a profit either because the expected sales did not quite materialize, or because costs turned out to be higher than anticipated. The possibility, and fear, of bankruptcy thus induces firms to be more conservative in their pricing policies, preferring to maintain a larger cushion between their revenues and their costs, than in seeking out (possibly) larger sales but at thinner margins.

A concern for stakeholders makes a firm even more concerned about avoiding bankruptcy to the extent that it may lead to dislocation of its workers, and makes it even more conservative in its pricing policies. While the direct consequence of this is to move a firm away from the objective of maximizing profits and thus shareholder value, there is an indirect effect coming through the interaction between competing firms in the product market: when one firm becomes less aggressive, other firms have an incentive to follow suit. This reduction in aggression (i.e., competition) industry-wide benefits the stakeholder-oriented firm, so much so that shareholders may in fact be better off when their firm can commit to internalizing stakeholder concerns. In other words, stakeholders’, such as employees, and shareholders’ interests become aligned through the competitive interactions among firms, rather than being at odds as they would appear to be if one ignores firms’ product market interactions.

We use this basic idea to study a number of issues ranging from state-mandated inclusion of stakeholders in corporate governance (e.g., the case of Germany), to globalization that makes it commonplace for firms from shareholder-oriented societies to compete with those from countries with a stakeholder orientation. We also study the implications of financial constraints for the capital structure of stakeholder-oriented firms, and show that the same conservative stance in the product market translates into more conservative capital structure.

Our study raises a number of unanswered questions about the ultimate effect of stakeholders’ orientations on firm behavior and value, and suggests directions for future research. One of the interesting questions is why some countries adopt stakeholder governance while others do not, and why governments adopt such governance although it may benefit firms and employees at the expense of consumers. There is a growing literature on corporate governance and political economy that emphasizes that the political process plays a very important part in determining the corporate governance structure in a country (see, e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; and Perotti and Volpin, 2007). For example, if workers and shareholders are made better off by co-determination and consumers are made worse off, then it is still likely that co-determination will be implemented …..

Sur quoi les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler : sur la stratégie ou sur la culture ?

Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.

À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?

L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, … avant la stratégie !

Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :

(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?

(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?

If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with. We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.

Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Which To Work on First, Strategy or Culture ?

Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?

Consider the following; you are driving a boat. You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south. In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture. They are not in synch. No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win. That is what Drucker meant.

Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not. This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.

Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.

Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures. We all know the ones in these listings. They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers. All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services. No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.

We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first. What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy. It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture. What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.

…..

____________________________________

* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris. He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management. He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.

Deux capsules vidéos en gouvernance – Les médias sociaux et la planification stratégique

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéos. Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule sera dévoilée chaque semaine.

Deux nouvelles « capsules d’experts » sont maintenant en ligne; elles ont pour thèmes « Les médias sociaux » par M. Sylvain Lafrance, ASC, professeur au HEC Montréal et consultant en communications et « La planification stratégique » par M. Dominic Deneault, ASC , Trebora Conseil.

Visionnez ces deux capsules d’experts :

Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance, ASC

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La planification stratégique, par Dominic Deneault

Toute la lumière sur les attentes envers les C.A. | L’état de situation selon Lipton

Aujourd’hui, je veux vous faire partager le point de vue de Martin Lipton*, expert dans les questions de fusion et d’acquisition ainsi que dans les affaires se rapportant à la gouvernance des entreprises, sur les enjeux des C.A.. L’auteur met l’accent sur les pratiques exemplaires en gouvernance et sur les comportements attendus des conseils d’administration.

Ce texte, paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance,résume très bien les devoirs et les responsabilités des administrateurs de sociétés de nos jours et renforce la nécessité, pour les conseils d’administration, de gérer les situations d’offres hostiles.

Bonne lecture ! Êtes-vous d’accord avec les attentes énoncées ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The Spotlight on Boards

The ever evolving challenges facing corporate boards prompts an updated snapshot of what is expected from the board of directors of a major public company—not just the legal rules, but also the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have almost as much influence on board and company behavior.

Boards are expected to:

Establish the appropriate “Tone at the Top” to actively cultivate a corporate culture that gives high priority to ethical standards, principles of fair dealing, professionalism, integrity, full compliance with legal requirements and ethically sound strategic goals.

Choose the CEO, monitor his or her performance and have a succession plan in case the CEO becomes unavailable or fails to meet performance expectations.

Maintain a close relationship with the CEO and work with management to encourage entrepreneurship, appropriate risk taking, and investment to promote the long-term success of the company (despite the constant pressures for short-term performance) and to navigate the dramatic changes in domestic and world-wide economic, social and political conditions. Approve the company’s annual operating plan and long-term strategy, monitor performance and provide advice to management as a strategic partner.

Develop an understanding of shareholder perspectives on the company and foster long-term relationships with shareholders, as well as deal with the requests of shareholders for meetings to discuss governance and the business portfolio and operating strategy. Evaluate the demands of corporate governance activists, make changes that the board believes will improve governance and resist changes that the board believes will not be constructive. Work with management and advisors to review the company’s business and strategy, with a view toward minimizing vulnerability to attacks by activist hedge funds.

Organize the business, and maintain the collegiality, of the board and its committees so that each of the increasingly time-consuming matters that the board and board committees are expected to oversee receives the appropriate attention of the directors.

Plan for and deal with crises, especially crises where the tenure of the CEO is in question, where there has been a major disaster or a risk management crisis, or where hard-earned reputation is threatened by a product failure or a socio-political issue. Many crises are handled less than optimally because management and the board have not been proactive in planning to deal with crises, and because the board cedes control to outside counsel and consultants.

Determine executive compensation to achieve the delicate balance of enabling the company to recruit, retain and incentivize the most talented executives, while also avoiding media and populist criticism of “excessive” compensation and taking into account the implications of the “say-on-pay” vote.

Face the challenge of recruiting and retaining highly qualified directors who are willing to shoulder the escalating work load and time commitment required for board service, while at the same time facing pressure from shareholders and governance advocates to embrace “board refreshment”, including issues of age, length of service, independence, gender and diversity. Provide compensation for directors that fairly reflects the significantly increased time and energy that they must now spend in serving as board and board committee members. Evaluate the board’s performance, and the performance of the board committees and each director.

Determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite (financial, safety, cyber, political, reputation, etc.), oversee the implementation by management of state-of-the-art standards for managing risk, monitor the management of those risks within the parameters of the company’s risk appetite and seek to ensure that necessary steps are taken to foster a culture of risk-aware and risk-adjusted decision-making throughout the organization.

Oversee the implementation by management of state-of-the-art standards for compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, monitor compliance and respond appropriately to “red flags.”

Take center stage whenever there is a proposed transaction that creates a real or perceived conflict between the interests of stockholders and those of management, including takeovers and attacks by activist hedge funds focused on the CEO.

Recognize that shareholder litigation against the company and its directors is part of modern corporate life and should not deter the board from approving a significant acquisition or other material transaction, or rejecting a merger proposal or a hostile takeover bid, all of which is within the business judgment of the board.

Set high standards of social responsibility for the company, including human rights, and monitor performance and compliance with those standards.

Oversee relations with government, community and other constituents.

Review corporate governance guidelines and committee charters and tailor them to promote effective board functioning.

To meet these expectations, it will be necessary for major public companies

(1) to have a sufficient number of directors to staff the requisite standing and special committees and to meet expectations for diversity;

(2) to have directors who have knowledge of, and experience with, the company’s businesses, even if this results in the board having more than one director who is not “independent”;

(3) to have directors who are able to devote sufficient time to preparing for and attending board and committee meetings;

(4) to provide the directors with regular tutorials by internal and external experts as part of expanded director education; and

(5) to maintain a truly collegial relationship among and between the company’s senior executives and the members of the board that enhances the board’s role both as strategic partner and as monitor.

________________________________________________

* Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Septembre 2014

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) du mois de septembre 2014.

Seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés offert au Québec, il s’adresse aux administrateurs siégeant à un conseil d’administration et disposant d’une expérience pertinente.

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Septembre 2014

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RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉ 2013-2014

C’est avec plaisir que le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés vous présente son Rapport d’activité 2013-2014.

Vous y trouverez un bilan positif de cette neuvième année, marquée par de nombreuses actions visant à diversifier notre offre de formation, à affirmer notre statut de leader de la formation des administrateurs et à promouvoir l’excellence en gouvernance au Québec.

Consultez le rapport pour tous les détails [+]

Banques des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés

Le Collège est fier de mettre en ligne une nouvelle présentation de la Banque des Administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC). La Banque des ASC est maintenant intégrée au site Web du Collège et propose un nouvel outil de recherche bonifié, ainsi qu’un design plus ergonomique.

Plusieurs nouveautés ont été apportées à l’outil de recherche dans le but d’optimiser la recherche d’ASC selon les requêtes des recruteurs d’administrateurs.

Consultez cette nouvelle Banque des ASC [+]

DÉVOILEMENT DE LA 3E SÉRIE DE CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE

Une capsule sera dévoilée chaque semaine par bulletin électronique. À surveiller !

Cette semaine : Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance [+]

Les programmes de formation du CAS

Gouvernance des PME | 5 et 6 novembre 2014, à Québec

Certification – Module 1 : Les rôles et responsabilités des administrateurs | 12, 13 et 14 février 2015, à Québec, et 26, 27 et 28 mars 2015, à Montréal

Les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé

Inscription au programme « Réseau jeunes administrateurs » pour la cohorte d’automne | 8 septembre 2014, à Montréal

Congrès national de l’IAS sur la gouvernance transformationnelle et Gala des Fellows | 18 septembre 2014, à Montréal

Assemblée générale annuelle du Cercle des ASC et conférence « Un CA peut-il être trop avant-gardiste » par Mme Anne Darche, ASC | 23 septembre 2014, à Québec

Conférence Prestige de l’Ordre des CPA du Québec, « Leadership éthique au 21e siècle » par Mme Cynthia Cooper | 1er octobre 2014, à Montréal

Conférence Femmes Leaders par Les Affaires | 15 octobre 2014, à Québec

Programme de l’ecoDa « New Governance Challenges for Board Members in Europe » | 21 et 22 octobre 2014, à Bruxelles

NOMINATIONS ASC

Serge Bouchard, ASC | Conseil régional de l’environnement du Centre-du-Québec

Marlène Deveaux, ASC | CLD Saguenay

Sylvie Tremblay, ASC | Chambre des notaires du Québec

Richard Audet, ASC | Inforoute Santé du Canada

Marc Duchesne, ASC | Nicorp inc.

Vincent Dagnault, ASC | Signes d’Espoir

Annick Mongeau, ASC | Groupe TVA inc.

Jean-François Thuot, ASC | Société canadienne des directeurs d’association, section du Québec

Sylvain Beaudry, ASC | Institut québécois de planification financière

Lyne Laverdure, ASC | PharmaBio Développement

Louise Dostie, ASC | Caisse de l’Administration et des Services publics

Pauline D’Amboise, ASC | Solidarité rurale du Québec

Jean-Paul Gagné, ASC | Metix inc.

Denis Arcand, ASC | Caisse Desjardins Brossard

Josée De La Durantaye, ASC | Ordre des comptables professionnels agréés du Québec

Michel Verreault, ASC | Chambre des notaires du Québec

Michel Sanschagrin, ASC | Fondation des Violons du Roy et Club musical de Québec

Carl Viel, ASC | Palais Montcalm

Luc Séguin, ASC | Hydrocarbures Anticosti

Anne Darche, ASC | Groupe Germain Hospitalité et Groupe St-Hubert

DISTINCTIONS ASC et formateurs

Marie Lavigne, ASC | Chevalière de l’Ordre national du Québec

Claude Béland, formateur au CAS | Grand officier de l’Ordre national du Québec

Maurice Gosselin, ASC | Prix du ministre accordé par le ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur, de la Recherche et de la Science

Boîte à outils pour administrateurs

Nouvelle référence mensuelle en gouvernance : Rémunération des administrateurs et gouvernance : enjeux et défis, par l’IGOPP.

La capsule d’expert du mois – NOUVEAUTÉ : Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance.

Top 5 des billets les plus consultés cet été (juin, juillet et août) du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé.

Bonne lecture !

____________________________________________

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

Faculté des sciences de l’administration Pavillon Palasis-Prince

2325, rue de la Terrasse, Université Laval Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

418 656-2630; 418 656-2624

info@cas.ulaval.ca

Devenez blogueur invité sur mon site en gouvernance

Aimeriez-vous agir à titre d’auteur invité (« Invited guess ») sur mon blogue en gouvernance des sociétés ? Avez-vous un article déjà écrit ou souhaitez-vous m’aider en contribuant à l’écriture d’un court billet en gouvernance de sociétés ?

Chaque jour, je publie un billet qui porte sur un sujet d’actualité récente en gouvernance; si vous êtes intéressés à ajouter de la valeur à ce blogue, vous êtes invités à me soumettre un article original portant sur un des multiples objets de la gouvernance des sociétés privées, publiques, OBNL, coopératives, PME, sociétés d’État, etc.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie. Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication.

L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Devenez blogueur invité sur mon site en gouvernance

L’état des travaux de recherche relatifs à la contribution des investisseurs activistes

Ainsi que mon billet du 19 août en faisait état, le débat est de plus en plus vif en ce qui regarde la contribution des « Hedge Funds » à l’amélioration de la performance à long terme des entreprises ciblées.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court billet de Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui décrit la problématique et les principaux enjeux liés au comportement des investisseurs « activistes ».

L’auteur accorde une grande place aux travaux d’Yvan Allaire et de François Dauphin de l’IGOPP (Institut sur la Gouvernance d’Organisations Privées et Publiques) qui pourfendent l’approche économétrique de la recherche phare de Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang.

Le résumé ci-dessous relate les principaux jalons relatifs à cette saga !

The post puts forward criticism of an empirical study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism; this study is available here, and its results are summarized in a Forum post and in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article. As did an earlier post by Mr. Lipton available here, this post relies on the work of Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin that is available here. A reply by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang to this earlier memo and to the Allaire-Dauphin work is available here. Additional posts discussing the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study, including additional critiques by Wachtell Lipton and responses to them by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, are available on the Forum here.

The Long-Term Consequences of Hedge Fund Activism

The experience of the overwhelming majority of corporate managers, and their advisors, is that attacks by activist hedge funds are followed by declines in long-term future performance. Indeed, activist hedge fund attacks, and the efforts to avoid becoming the target of an attack, result in increased leverage, decreased investment in CAPEX and R&D and employee layoffs and poor employee morale.

Several law school professors who have long embraced shareholder-centric corporate governance are promoting a statistical study that they claim establishes that activist hedge fund attacks on corporations do not damage the future operating performance of the targets, but that this statistical study irrefutably establishes that on average the long-term operating performance of the targets is actually improved.

In two recent papers, Professor Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, has demonstrated that the statistics these professors rely on to support their theories are not irrefutable and do not disprove the real world experience that activist hedge fund interventions are followed by declines in long-term operating performance. The papers by Professor Allaire speak for themselves:

“Activist” hedge funds: creators of lasting wealth? What do the empirical studies really say?

Hedge Fund Activism and their Long-Term Consequences; Unanswered Questions to Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang

Reconsidération des indicateurs de mesure d’un « bon » conseil d’administration

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Knud B. Jensen, paru dans le numéro Juillet-Août 2014, du Ivey Business Journal, section Governance.

L’auteur a fait une analyse attentive des études établissant une relation entre l’efficacité des « Boards » et les résultats financiers de l’entreprise. Sa conclusion ne surprendra pas les experts de la gouvernance car on sait depuis un certain temps que la plupart des études sont de nature analytique et que les relations étudiées sont associatives, donc de l’ordre des corrélations statistiques.

Mais, même les résultats dits scientifiques (empiriques), n’apportent pas une réponse claire aux relations causales entre l’efficacité des conseils d’administration et les résultats attendus, à court et long terme … Pourquoi ?

L’auteur suggère qu’un modèle de gouvernance ne peut être utilisé à toutes les sauces, parce que les organisations évoluent dans des contextes (certains diront univers) éminemment différents !

L’analyse fine de l’efficacité des C.A. montre que les variables contextuelles devraient avoir une place de choix dans l’évaluation de l’efficacité de la gouvernance.

La gouvernance est une discipline organisationnelle et son analyse devrait reposer sur les « théories organisationnelles, tels que le design, la culture, la personnalité et le leadership du PDG (CEO), ainsi que sur les compétences « contextuelles » des administrateurs ». C’est plus complexe et plus difficile que de faire des analyses statistiques … ce qui n’empêche pas de poursuivre dans la voie de la recherche scientifique.

Voici un extrait de cet article. Je vous invite cependant à le lire au complet afin de bien saisir toutes les nuances.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés.

Reconceptualizing the board and its metrics

« The key to rating boards is understanding context. Most researchers and public policies assume a similar board system across industries. This assumption allows law makers and researchers to ignore inter-company board differences. Nevertheless, board functions and effectiveness must reflect the context in which an organization finds itself. After all, board processes and functions are clearly dependent on context (growth or the lack of it, competition, strategy or the lack of it, etc.). For example, after it became very clear that the functioning of the board of directors at Canadian Pacific was no longer suitable to drive company growth, an activist shareholder pushed for new directors and a reorganized board. This led to a dramatic increase in cost ratios, profit and share price. It changed the function of the board. Other illustrations where context called for a change of the board include BlackBerry (formerly RIM) and Barrick Gold….

When it comes to an effective governance model, one size does not fit all. Context is paramount. Context is both endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous variables include complexity, asset base, competitive advantage, capital structure, quality of management, and board culture and leadership. Exogenous variables include industry structures, position in growth cycle, competitive force, macroeconomics (interest rate, commodity pricing), world supply and growth, political changes, and unforeseen events (earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.). These variables are key inputs for company performance and determine whether earnings are above or below average. Simply put, companies may need a different type of board to fit with different sets of endogenous and exogenous variables.

Boards and management typically have different mandates, not to mention a different social architecture to carry them out. It is generally agreed that the CEO and the management teams run the firm, while the board approves strategy, selects the CEO and determines the incentives, sets risk management, and approves major investments and changes to the capital structure. But as discussed in Boards that Lead (2014) by Ram Charan, Dennis Casey and Michael Useen, directors must also lead the corporation on the most crucial issues. As a result, the ideal level of board involvement remains a grey area and is rarely defined. Setting boundaries when there are overlapping responsibilities is difficult. Nevertheless, how the functional relationships between the board and management work is probably far more important than board features to the growth, and sometimes survival, of the organization.

In Back to the Drawing Board (2004), Colin Carter and Jay Lorsch suggest the reason so little has resulted from the various reforms aimed at improving governance is the focus on visible variables, or what others have labeled structural issues, instead of a focus on process or inside board behavior. In other words, features have trumped functions.

The increase in complexity may be another issue. Keep in mind that directors don’t spend a lot of time together, which is a barrier to good behavior and process and makes it difficult for boards to function as a dynamic team. According to a 2013 McKinsey survey of over 700 corporate board members, directors spend an average of 22 days per year on company issues and two thirds do not think they have a complete understanding of the firm’s strategy. Clearly, there are severe limitations on boards, which have more to do than time available, especially with their limited number of board meetings packed with presentations from management.

Boards should be viewed as an organizational system, with context part of any performance judgment. This view has more merit in distinguishing between effective and ineffective boards than the structural view. Human resource metrics may hold more promise and be more important than the structural indices currently used to distinguish between effective and ineffective boards. »

________________________________________________________

*Knud B. Jensen est professeur d’administration à Ryerson University’s Ted Rogers School of Management de Toronto.

Pour une supervision efficace de la fonction audit interne | PwC

Vous trouverez ci-dessous un document de référence publié par PwC et paru dans la série Audit Committee Excellence. Ce document, partagé par Denis Lefort, CPA, CIA, CRMA, expert-conseil en Gouvernance, audit et contrôle, apporte des réponses très complètes à plusieurs questions que les membres de conseils d’administration se posent eu égard au rôle de la fonction audit interne dans l’organisation.

1. Pourquoi la surveillance de l’audit interne est-elle critique pour les comités d’audit ?

2. Quel est le rôle des administrateurs dans l’optimisation des activités de l’audit interne ?

3. Comment aider l’audit interne à mieux définir sa mission ?

4. Quelles sont les lignes d’autorité et les besoins en ressources de cette activité ?

5. Quel est le processus de révision des résultats de l’audit interne ?

6. Que faire si votre entreprise ne possède pas une fonction d’audit interne ?

Ce document sera donc très utile à tout administrateur soucieux de parfaire ses connaissances sur le rôle très important qu’un service d’audit interne peut jouer.

Voici une introduction au rapport de PwC . Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Effective oversight of the internal audit function | PwC

The audit committee’s role is not getting any easier, but an audit committee has a lot of resources in its arsenal to help meet today’s high expectations. One of these tools is the internal audit function. Directors can, and should, focus on maximizing the value proposition of this group to ensure their own success.

A lot goes on in companies — and a lot can go wrong, even when you have good people and thoughtfully designed processes. That’s why so many audit committees look to internal audit as their eyes and ears — a way to check whether things are working as they should. Some companies staff the function internally, while others choose to outsource some or all of the role. Some do not have an internal audit function at all.

For many audit committees, overseeing internal audit isn’t just the right thing to do, it’s a requirement. At NYSE companies, audit committees have to oversee internal audit’s performance and periodically meet in private sessions. NASDAQ is currently considering whether to require its listed companies to have an internal audit function and what role audit committees should play.

Whether a required function or not, we believe it’s critical that audit committees focus on internal audit. Why? PwC’s 2014 State of the internal audit profession study found that about one-third of board members believe internal audit adds less than significant value to the company, and only 64% of directors believe internal audit is performing well at delivering expectations. Even Chief Audit Executives (CAEs) are critical of their functions’ performance, with just two-thirds saying it’s performing well.

L’évaluation des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs | Sept étapes à considérer

Cet article rédigé par Geoffrey KIEL, James BECK et Jacques GRISÉ (1) et paru dans les Documents de travail de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration en 2008 est toujours d’actualité. Il présente un guide pratique des questions clés que les conseils d’administration doivent prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation.

On met l’accent sur l’utilité d’avoir des évaluations bien menées ainsi que sur les sept étapes à suivre pour des évaluations efficaces d’un conseil d’administration et des administrateurs. Bonne lecture.

SEPT ÉTAPES À SUIVRE POUR DES ÉVALUATIONS EFFICACES D’UN CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION ET DES ADMINISTRATEURS

Lorsqu’une crise se produit au sein d’une société, comme celles qu’ont connues Nortel et Hollinger International, les intervenants, les médias, les organismes de réglementation et la collectivité se tournent vers le conseil d’administration pour trouver des réponses. Étant donné que ce dernier est le chef décisionnel ultime de la société, il est responsable des actions et du rendement de la société.

Le défi actuel que doivent relever les conseils d’administration consiste à accroître la valeur des organisations qu’ils gouvernent. Grâce à l’évaluation du rendement, les conseils d’administration peuvent s’assurer qu’ils ont les connaissances, les compétences et la capacité de relever ce défi.

Plusieurs guides et normes de pratiques exemplaires reconnaissent cette notion. Ainsi, la Commission des valeurs mobilières de l’Ontario indique dans les lignes directrices sur la gouvernance des sociétés (NP 58-201) que « le conseil d’administration, ses comités et chacun de ses administrateurs devraient faire l’objet régulièrement d’une évaluation à l’égard de leur efficacité et de leur contribution ».

L’évaluation du conseil d’administration est trop souvent perçue comme un mal nécessaire – un processus mécanique consistant à cocher des points sur une liste qui, en bout de ligne, a peu de valeur réelle pour le conseil d’administration si ce n’est pour satisfaire aux exigences en matière de conformité. Toutefois… un processus efficace d’évaluation du conseil d’administration peut donner lieu à une transformation.

Une publication du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), sous forme de questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, a été conçue à l’intention des administrateurs nommés par le gouvernement du Québec comme membre d’un conseil d’administration d’une société d’État ou d’un organisme gouvernemental. Celle-ci vise à répondre aux questions les plus courantes qu’un administrateur nouvellement nommé peut légitimement se poser en matière de gouvernance. On y indique qu’ « une évaluation faite à intervalles périodiques est essentielle pour assurer le maintien d’une gouvernance efficace » (2).

Cet article offrira une approche pratique en matière d’évaluations efficaces des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs en appliquant un cadre comportant sept étapes qui pose les questions clés que tous les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération lorsqu’ils planifient une évaluation. Même les conseils d’administration efficaces peuvent tirer profit d’une évaluation bien menée.

Comme nous l’avons résumé dans le tableau 1, une évaluation menée adéquatement peut contribuer considérablement à des améliorations du rendement à trois niveaux : organisation, conseil d’administration et administrateur. Selon Lawler et Finegold « les conseils qui évaluent leurs membres et qui s’évaluent ont tendance à être plus efficaces que ceux qui ne le font pas ». Toutefois, il faut souligner que ces avantages ne sont possibles qu’au moyen d’une évaluation du conseil d’administration menée de manière appropriée; si l’évaluation n’est pas faite correctement, cela peut causer de la méfiance parmi les membres du conseil d’administration et entre le conseil lui-même et la direction.

Une publication de l’École d’administration publique du Québec (ENAP), produite en collaboration avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), présente une section traitant de l’évaluation de la performance du conseil d’administration (3).

Selon les auteurs, « L’évaluation est une composante essentielle d’une saine gouvernance d’entreprise. Elle permet de jeter un regard sur la façon dont les décisions ont été prises et sur la manière d’exercer la gestion des activités de l’organisation et ce, dans une perspective d’amélioration continue… Il incombe au président du conseil d’instaurer une culture d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance. Pour ce faire, il doit veiller à la mise en place d’un processus d’évaluation clair, à l’élaboration de règles et d’outils pertinents, à la définition des responsabilités de chaque intervenant dans le processus d’évaluation, à la diffusion de l’information et à la mise en place des correctifs nécessaires ». Dans cette publication, on présente dix outils détaillés d’évaluations (questionnaires) qui concernent les groupes cibles suivants :

1. l’évaluation du conseil

2. l’évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil

3. l’évaluation du président du conseil

4. l’évaluation d’un membre de conseil

5. l’évaluation du comité de gouvernance et d’éthique

6. l’évaluation du comité de vérification

7. l’évaluation du comité des ressources humaines

8. l’évaluation du fonctionnement d’un comité

9. l’évaluation d’un membre de comité

10. l’évaluation du président d’un comité

_______________________________________

(1) Geoffrey Kiel, Ph.D., premier vice-chancelier délégué et doyen de l’École d’administration, University of Notre Dame, Australie, et président de la société Effective Governance Pty Ltd, James Beck, directeur général, Effective Governance Pty Ltd, Jacques Grisé, Ph.D., F.Adm.A., collaborateur spécial du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, Québec.

(2) Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, Être un administrateur de sociétés d’état : 16 questions et réponses sur la gouvernance, Faculté des sciences de l’administration, Université Laval, 2007.

(3) ENAP, Les devoirs et responsabilités d’un conseil d’administration, Guide de référence, Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2007.

Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique !

Voici le deuxième billet présenté par le professeur Ivan Tchotourian de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, élaboré dans le cadre de son cours de maîtrise Gouvernance de l’entreprise.

Dans le cadre d’un programme de recherche, il a été proposé aux étudiants non seulement de mener des travaux sur des sujets qui font l’actualité en gouvernance de l’entreprise, mais encore d’utiliser un format original permettant la diffusion des résultats. Le présent billet expose le résultat des recherches menées par Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir et Nathalie Robitaille.

Ce travail revient sur les arguments échangés concernant la dissociation des fonctions de président du conseil d’administration et de chef de la direction. Ce billet alimente la discussion en faisant une actualité comparative des normes et des éléments juridiques, et en présentant les dernières statistiques en ce domaine.

Le papier initial des étudiants a été retravaillé par Nadia Abida afin qu’il correspondre au style du blogue . Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires et vos points de vue sont les bienvenus.

« Je vous en souhaite bonne lecture et suis certain que vous prendrez autant de plaisir à le lire que j’ai pu en prendre à le corriger. Merci encore à Jacques de permettre la diffusion de ce travail et d’offrir ainsi la chance à des étudiants de contribuer aux riches discussions dont la gouvernance d’entreprise est l’objet ». (Ivan Tchotourian)

Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique

Nadia Abida, Arnaud Grospeillet, Thomas Medjir, Nathalie Robitaille

Anciens étudiants du cours DRT-6056 Gouvernance de l’entreprise

La séparation entre les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration (CA) et du chef de la direction est l’un des facteurs incontournables de l’indépendance des administrateurs. Cette dernière est un indicateur de pratique de bonne gouvernance d’entreprise. Cependant, et malgré l’importance avérée de la séparation des deux fonctions, nombre d’entreprises continuent à en pratiquer le cumul. Les arguments foisonnent de part et d’autre, et ne s’accordent pas sur la nécessité de cette séparation.

redaction-des-statuts-de-sa

Un retour sur une proposition d’actionnaires de la banque JP Morgan démontre la nécessité de ne pas laisser ce sujet sans réflexions. Cette proposition en faveur d’une séparation des fonctions a été émise à la suite d’une divulgation par la société d’une perte s’élevant à 2 milliards de dollars… perte essuyée sous la responsabilité de son PDG actuel [1].

Ce n’est un secret pour personne que cette société a un passif lourd avec des pertes colossales engendrées par des comportements critiquables sur lesquels la justice a apporté un éclairage. Les conséquences de cette gestion auraient-elles été identiques si une séparation des pouvoirs avait était mise en place entre une personne agissant et une personne surveillant ?

Silence du droit et positions ambiguës

Les textes législatifs (lois ou règlements) canadiens, américains ou européens apportent peu de pistes de solution à ce débat. La plupart se montrent en effet silencieux en ce domaine faisant preuve d’une retenue étonnamment rare lorsque la gouvernance d’entreprise est débattue. Dans ses lignes directrices [2], l’OCDE – ainsi que la Coalition canadienne pour une saine gestion des Entreprises dans ses principes de gouvernance d’entreprise [3] – atteste pourtant de l’importance du cloisonnement entre les deux fonctions.

De ce cloisonnement résulte l’indépendance et l’objectivité nécessaires aux décisions prises par le conseil d’administration. Au Canada, le comité Saucier dans son rapport de 2001 et le rapport du Milstein center [4] ont mis en exergue l’importance d’une telle séparation. En comparaison, la France s’est montrée plus discrète et il n’a pas été question de trancher dans son Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (même dans sa version amendée de 2013) [5] : ce dernier ne privilégie ainsi ni la séparation ni le cumul des deux fonctions [6].

Quelques chiffres révélateurs

Les études contemporaines démontrent une nette tendance en faveur de la séparation des deux rôles. Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index [7] estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse ont opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions. Dans le même sens, le rapport Clarkson affiche que 84 % des entreprises inscrites à la bourse de Toronto ont procédé à ladite séparation [8]. Subsistent cependant encore de nos jours des entreprises canadiennes qui permettent le cumul. L’entreprise Air Transat A.T. Inc en est la parfaite illustration : M. Jean-Marc Eustache est à la fois président du conseil et chef de la direction. A contrario, le fond de solidarité de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec vient récemment de procéder à la séparation des deux fonctions. Aux États-Unis en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 (au total 221 entreprises) dissocient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Toutefois, les choses ne sont pas aussi simples qu’elles y paraissent : 27 % des entreprises de cet indice ont recombiné ces deux rôles [9]. Évoquons à ce titre le cas de Target Corp dont les actionnaires ont refusé la dissociation des deux fonctions [10].

Il faut séparer les fonctions !

Pendant longtemps, il a été d’usage au sein des grandes sociétés par actions, que le poste de président du conseil soit de l’apanage du chef de la direction. Selon les partisans du non cumul, fusionner ces deux fonctions revient néanmoins à réunir dans une seule main un trop grand pouvoir et des prérogatives totalement antagonistes, voir même contradictoires. En ce sens, Yvan Allaire [11] souligne qu’il est malsain pour le chef de la direction de présider aussi le conseil d’administration. Rappelons que le CA nomme, destitue, rémunère et procède à l’évaluation du chef de la direction. La séparation des deux fonctions trouve pleinement son sens ici puisqu’elle crée une contre mesure du pouvoir : le président du CA est chargé du contrôle permanent de la gestion, et le directeur général est en situation de subordination par rapport au CA.

Sous ce contrôle, le directeur général ne peut être que plus diligent et prudent dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, puisqu’il doit en rendre compte au CA. Des idées et décisions confrontées et débattues sont de loin plus constructives que des décisions prises de manière unilatérale. N’y a-t-il pas plus d’esprit dans deux têtes que dans une comme le dit le proverbe ? De plus, les partisans du non cumul avancent d’autres arguments. Il en va ainsi de la rémunération de la direction. Le cumul des deux fonctions irait de pair avec la rémunération conséquente. Celui qui endosse les deux fonctions est enclin à prendre des risques qui peuvent mettre en péril les intérêts financiers de la société pour obtenir une performance et un rendement qui justifieraient une forte rémunération. Par ailleurs, le cumul peut entrainer une négligence des deux rôles au profit de l’un ou de l’autre. Aussi, le choix du non cumul s’impose lorsque l’implication de la majorité ou encore, de la totalité des actionnaires ou membres dans la gestion quotidienne de la société, est faible. Cette séparation permet en effet aux actionnaires ou aux membres d’exercer une surveillance adéquate de la direction et de la gestion quotidienne de ladite société [12].

Attention à la séparation !

Nonobstant les arguments cités plus haut, la séparation des deux fonctions ne représente pas nécessairement une meilleure gestion du conseil d’administration. Les partisans du cumul clament que non seulement l’endossement des deux fonctions par une seule personne unifie les ordres et réduit les couts de l’information, mais que c’est aussi un mécanisme d’incitation pour les nouveaux chefs en cas de transition. Cela se traduit par la facilité de remplacer une seule personne qui détient les deux pouvoirs, à la place de remplacer deux personnes. Par ailleurs, la séparation limiterait l’innovation et diluerait le pouvoir d’un leadership effectif [13] en augmentant la rivalité entre les deux responsables pouvant même aller jusqu’à semer la confusion.

Coûts et flexibilité du choix

En dépit de la critique classique du cumul des fonctions, les deux types de structures sont potentiellement sources de bénéfices et de coûts, bénéfices et coûts que les entreprises vont peser dans leur choix de structure. Les coûts de la théorie de l’agence impliquent des arrangements institutionnels lorsqu’il y a séparation entre les fonctions de président et de chef de la direction [14]. Ces coûts sont occasionnés par exemple par la surveillance du CA sur le chef de la direction. Il devient plus cher de séparer les deux fonctions que de les unifier.

Cependant, une antithèse présentée par Andrea Ovans [15] soutient qu’au contraire il est plus cher d’unifier les deux fonctions que de les séparer. Comment ? Simplement à travers la rémunération (salaire de base, primes, incitations, avantages, stock-options, et les prestations de retraite). L’imperméabilité entre les deux fonctions qui apparaît comme « la » solution en matière de bonne gouvernance pourrait ne pas l’être pour toutes les entreprises.

Si le cumul des fonctions et les autres mécanismes de surveillance fonctionnement bien, pourquoi faudrait-il prévoir un changement ? De surcroit, le « one size fits all » n’est pas applicable en la matière. Devrait-on prévoir les mêmes règles en termes de séparation pour les grandes et petites entreprises ? Rien n’est moins sûr… Le cumul des fonctions apparaît plus adapté aux entreprises de petite taille : ceci est dû à la fluidité de communication entre les deux responsables et à la faiblesse de la quantité d’informations à traiter [16].

[1] Investors seek to split JP Morgan CEO, Chairman http://www.wfaa.com/news/business/192146051.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014.

[2] http://www.oecd.org/fr/gouvernementdentreprise/ae/gouvernancedesentreprisespubliques/34803478.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014. Dans le même sens, voir l’instruction générale 85-201 et le rapport Cadbury en 1992.

[3] CCGG : Principes de gouvernance d’entreprise pour la mise en place de conseils d’administration performants, http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Principes_de_gouvernance.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 juillet 2014

[4] « Split CEO/Chair Roles: The Geteway to Good Governance? », http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/ResearchCentres/ClarksonCentreforBoardEffectiveness/CCBEpublications/SplitCEO.aspx, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[5] Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées (révisé en juin 2013), http://www.medef.com/fileadmin/www.medef.fr/documents/AFEP-MEDEF/Code_de_gouvernement_d_entreprise_des_societes_cotees_juin_2013_FR.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 15 juillet 2014.

[6] L’Union européenne ne s’est pas prononcée sur la séparation des deux fonctions. Voir à ce propos Richard Leblanc.

[7] Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013, https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/Canadian-Board-Index-2013_27Jan2014.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 12 Juillet 2014 ; p. 19.

[8] Public Submissions on Governance Issues, http://www.powercorporation.com/en/governance/public-submissions-governance-issues/may-12-2014-canada-business-corporations-act/#_ftn12, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[9] Spencer Stuart Board Index 2013 (US), https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/PDF%20Files/Research%20and%20Insight%20PDFs/SSBI13%20revised%2023DEC2013.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 25 juillet 2014.

[10] Target shareholders narrowly reject splitting CEO, Chairman posts, http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2014/06/13/target-shareholders-narrowly-reject-splitting-ceo.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 18 juillet 2014.

[11] Yvan Allaire, « Un « bon » président du CA ? », http://droit-des-affaires.blogspot.ca/2007/11/un-bon-prsident-du-ca.html, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 23 juillet 2014.

[12] À ce propos, voir André Laurin, « La fonction de président de conseil d’administration », http://www.lavery.ca/upload/pdf/fr/DS_080203f.pdf, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014, p. 2.

[13] Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel and Xiaohui Gloria Liu, « CEO and Board Chair Roles: to Split or not to Split? », December 16, 2009, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412827, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 22 juillet 2014.

[14] Idem.

[15] Voir Coûts élevés associés à la combinaison des rôles du président du conseil et du président de la société : https://jacquesgrisegouvernance.com/2014/06/29/couts-eleves-associes-a-la-combinaison-des-roles-du-president-du-conseil-et-du-president-de-la-societe/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

[16] Aiyesha Dey, « What JPMorgan Shareholders Should Know About Splitting the CEO and Chair Roles », Research, http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/research-what-jpmorgan-shareho/, <en ligne>, date de consultation : 21 juillet 2014.

Quel est le rôle du conseil dans une entreprise familiale ?

La gestion des entreprises familiales est un sujet qui concerne un grand nombre d’organisations, souvent très petites mais qui ont néanmoins besoin d’une certaine configuration de gouvernance. L’article de Dan Ryan, président des pratiques réglementaires à PricewaterhouseCoopers, est basé sur une publication de PwC.

On y présente un modèle de gouvernance qui reflète l’évolution des entreprises familiales ainsi que les nombreux avantages à se doter des mécanismes de gouvernance appropriés.

Également, l’article décrit les principales réticences des entrepreneurs et des fondateurs à aller de l’avant; l’auteur tente d’apporter des réponses concrètes aux préoccupations des propriétaires-dirigeants. Enfin, l’article aborde les attentes que les entreprises doivent avoir eu égard à la mise en place d’un conseil d’administration.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de l’extrait ci-dessous et de poursuivre la lecture complète de l’article en cliquant sur le lien suivant :

What Is a Board’s Role in a Family Business?

Individual- and family-owned businesses are a vital part of our economy. If you or your family owns such a company you understand how important the company’s success is to your personal wealth and to future generations. If you’re a nonfamily executive at a family company, you also recognize that its profitability and resilience is vital to your job security and financial well-being.

We see more family companies interested in corporate governance today than we did a decade ago, as shown in changes they’ve made to their boards. While some family companies have a board only to satisfy legal compliance requirements, more are moving toward the outer rings on the family business corporate governance model, below. Ultimately, owners will choose which level best suits the company’s needs and when changing circumstances mean the company’s governance should transition to another ring.

Family Business Corporate Governance Model*

Compliance board. While most states require companies incorporated in the state to have a board, the requirement may be as simple as a board of at least one person that meets at least once per year. A company may have only the founder on its board. In the early stages of a founder-led company, this type of board may well be the best fit for the company, since the founder is usually more focused on building the business than on governance.

Insider board. Such a board often includes family members and members of senior management. This membership can better involve the family in the business, help with succession planning, and introduce additional perspectives to board discussions. The insider board may be created by the founder—who may no longer be the CEO—or by the next generation owner(s) of the company. That said, the founder/owner(s) retain decision-making authority.

Inner circle board. In this type of board the founder/owner adds directors he or she knows well. These may include an accountant, lawyer, or other business professional that guided or influenced the company, or the founder’s close friends. These directors may bring skills or experience to the board that are otherwise missing and may be in a position to challenge the founder/owner(s) in a positive way. Such boards might create an audit committee or other committees. That said, the founder/owner(s)—who may or may not be the CEO—retains decision-making authority.

Quasi-independent board. This level introduces outside/independent directors who have no employment or other tie to the company apart from their role as a director. (See the Family Business Corporate Governance Series module Building or renewing your board for a more complete discussion of independent/outside directors.) These directors introduce objectivity and accountability to the board and they expect their input to be respected. Board processes and policies will likely become more formalized with outside/independent directors on the board. The number of committees may increase. This outermost ring on the family business corporate governance model is most similar to governance at a public company.

59% of CEOs and CFOs of 147 family-owned/owner-operated companies report having a “formal board of directors that acts on behalf of company owners to oversee the business and management,” per a PwC 2013 survey.

We recognize that governance at any family company will be determined almost exclusively by what the founder (or family members who control the company) wants. You may have a compliance board or an inner circle board—and those may be entirely appropriate for where your company is at present. We’ve seen numerous family companies that benefited greatly from moving toward the outer rings in the governance model—especially when anticipating a generational transition.

In this post, we’ll help you understand how to build an effective board for your family company, and how boards can assist with some of the particularly challenging issues family companies face. This first module discusses why you might want to evolve or change your governance model and what you could expect from a board if you do so.

Each family company’s situation is unique and we can’t address every scenario. Our goal is to provide a framework of how corporate governance practices apply to family companies so you can decide what’s best for you.

___________________________________________

* Some companies also have an Advisory Board to advise management (and directors). Advisory Board members don’t vote or have fiduciary responsibilities.

…..

Comment le C.A. peut-il s’acquitter de la surveillance des cyber-risques ?

Aujourd’hui, j’attire votre attention sur un article publié par Tom Hogue, paru sur le site Cisco Blog, qui porte sur les nouvelles responsabilités qui incombent aux membres des conseils d’administration en matière de surveillance des risques cybernétiques globaux de la société..

Il existe des « guidelines » très utiles qui peuvent aider les membres de la direction (CxC), ceux qui doivent attester (signer) de la véracité des éléments de divulgation relatifs aux risques cybernétiques.

Également, il existe des moyens pour les membres de conseils d’administration de s’assurer qu’ils exercent une veille efficace de ces risques. Cet article fait écho à la conférence du Gartner Security and Risk Management Summit , plus particulièrement à la session « Finding the Sweet Spot to Balance Cyber Risk ».

Tammie Gartner Session

À mon avis, tous les administrateurs devraient se familiariser avec l’environnement et la gestion des cyber-risques car ceux-ci peuvent avoir des conséquences dramatiques sur la performance de l’organisation.

La lecture de cet article vous sensibilisera davantage à votre rôle d’administrateur et aux conséquences qui en découlent. Voici un extrait de celui-ci. Bonne lecture !

Cyber Threat Management from the Boardroom Risk: Lost in Translation

During the session, the panel had been discussing how the senior leadership teams address the problem of putting their signatures against the risk that cyber threats pose to their organizations. Tammie Leith made a point to the effect that it is just as important for our teams to tell us why we should not accept or acknowledge those risks so that we can increase investments to mitigate those risks.

What caught my attention was that the senior management teams are beginning to question the technical teams on whether or not appropriate steps have been taken to minimize the risks to the corporation. The CxO (senior leadership team that has to put their signature on the risk disclosure documents) teams are no longer comfortable with blindly assuming the increasing risks to the business from cyber threats.

To make matters worse, the CxO teams and the IT security teams generally speak different languages in that they are both using terms with meanings relevant to their specific roles in the company. In the past, this has not been a problem because both teams were performing very critical and very different functions for the business. The CxO team is focused on revenue, expenses, margins, profits, shareholder value, and other critical business metrics to drive for success. The IT security teams, on the other hand, are worried about breaches, data loss prevention, indications of compromise, denial of services attacks and more in order to keep the cyber attackers out of the corporate network. The challenge is that both teams use the common term of risk, but in different ways. Today’s threat environment has forced the risk environment to blend. Sophisticated targeted attacks and advanced polymorphic malware affect a business’s bottom line. Theft of critical information, such as credit card numbers, health insurance records, and social security numbers, result in revenue losses, bad reputation, regulatory fines, and lawsuits. Because these teams have not typically communicated very well in the past, how can we ensure that they have a converged meaning for risk when they are speaking different “languages”?

In order to fully explore the variations to the term “risk” for the business, I wanted to understand what the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) required of corporations in reporting requirements to their shareholders. The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive Order signed by President Obama, and the release of the NIST Cyber Framework seemed to be giving the SEC a new reason to revisit the topic of cyber security with a revitalized vigor.

The SEC had already published guidance on how corporations should provide cyber security risk disclosures in the CV Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 Date: October 13, 2011. However, the speech that SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar gave at the “Cyber Risks and The Boardroom Conference” at the New York Stock Exchange on June 10 discussed what the “boards of directors can, and should, do to ensure that their organizations are appropriately considering and addressing cyber risks.” In proposing a strong case for the boards of directors to take action, he discussed the “threat of litigation and potential liability for failing to implement adequate steps to protect the company from cyber-threats.” He also discussed the derivative lawsuits that were brought against companies, their officers and directors relating to data breaches. What caught my attention most about the speech is when he said, “Thus, boards that chose to ignore, or minimize, the importance of cybersecurity oversight responsibility, do so at their own peril.”

Commissioner Aguilar made a strong recommendation for corporations to voluntarily adopt the NIST Cybersecurity Framework in order to begin addressing the problem with the statement, “While the Framework is voluntary guidance for any company, some commenters have already suggested that it will likely become a baseline for best practices by companies, including assessing legal or regulatory exposure to these issues or for insurance purposes.”

I am not disagreeing with Commissioner Aguilar, but in practice, this is an incredible challenge for any board of directors as they are now being asked to provide direct cyber security oversight to the internal day-to-day operations of the organization or risk “peril.”

…..

Magazine des actualités récentes en gouvernance | La gouvernance de sociétés

Vous trouverez, ci-joint, la première ébauche d’un magazine électronique qui répertorie les meilleures publications ainsi que les références incontournables en gouvernance des sociétés.

Le magazine électronique compte maintenant 471 flips de pages et présente 448 articles sur des thèmes importants en gouvernance.

Photo du magazine Gouvernance des sociétés

Les billets sont principalement issus du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé et ils sont présentés en ordre chronologique descendant, sur une période de trois ans. J’ai l’intention de mettre cette publication à jour trimestriellement.

Le lien suivant vous conduira à la publication du document sur le site de l’application Flipboard. Si cette formule de publication électronique vous intéresse, je vous suggère de télécharger l’application sur votre Ipad ou sur une autre tablette.

One-tier board system	Two-tier board system
Organisation
A single board.	A supervisory body and a management body.
Composition
Mixed, executive and non-executive directors may serve on the board.	Separate, executive and non-executive directors serve on separate boards (i.e., a supervisory board composed exclusively of non-executive directors and a management board composed exclusively of executive directors).
Organisation
Unitary	Binary
Committees
Mandatory or recommended Supervisory and advisory committees(Mandatory) oversight and advisory committees such as the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the nomination (appointments) committee, composed of a majority of non-executive directors, one or more of whom must be independent.Supervisory committee Optional committee entrusted with supervising the company, composed of both executive and non-executive directors. Usually differs slightly from a true supervisory board (as found in the two-tier system) in terms of powers, composition and role. Mostly found in countries which present characteristics of a one-tier system while incorporating certain features of a two-tier system.	OptionalHistorically not required but oversight and advisory committees are increasingly important in the two-tier system as well.
Roles
Board of directors Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking, management and oversightPerformance enhancement Supervisory role Accountability Strategic and financial oversight	Management board Managerial roleDirection and executive actsDecision-taking and managementPerformance enhancement Service and strategic role Supervisory board Supervisory role Accountability Decision-taking and oversight Monitoring role Strategic and financial oversight
CEO duality
Allowed.The same person can serve as both CEO and chair of the board of directors (although this is generally not recommended by corporate governance practices).	Restricted.No CEO duality (although the CEO can sometimes be a member or attend meetings of the supervisory board.)
Executive directors
Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or appointments committee (if any).A director may be appointed by the board of directors when the term of office of another director comes to an end, in order to prevent the board from being paralyzed, for example if the board no longer has a sufficient number of members as required by law or the articles (co-optation procedure).The appointment of a co-opted director must be confirmed at the first general meeting of shareholders following his or her appointment.	Appointed by the supervisory board or the general meeting of shareholders, based on a proposal by the board or the appointments committee (if there is one).
Non-Executive (supervisory directors)
Idem.	Appointed by the general meeting of shareholders or, based on a proposal by the supervisory board or the appointments committee (if there is one).
Conflicts perspective
Negatively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles due to its composition (a majority of executive directors) and unitary structure.Diffusion of tasks and responsibilities weakens the non-executive directors’ ability to oversee the implementation of decisions, especially where executive and non-executive directors face the same potential legal liability.Higher risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. To avoid conflicts of interest, it is often recommended that the one-tier board be composed of a majority of non-executive directors, due to (i) their experience and knowledge, (ii) their contacts, which may enhance management’s ability to secure external resources, and (iii) their independence from the CEO. In companies which have achieved a certain level of development, risks of conflicts of interest are often reduced through the creation of committees allowing these functions to be segregated. In addition, legal provisions aimed at preventing and resolving conflict of interest exist in most jurisdictions.	Positively associated with the separation of decision-management and decision-oversight roles, due to the composition of the supervisory board (independent directors) which ensures independence and its binary structure.No diffusion of tasks and responsibilities. Lower risk of conflicts of interest between management and shareholders.
(Dis)advantages
AdvantagesSpirit of partnership and mutual respect between directors, which allows greater interaction amongst all board members.Non-executive directors have more contact with the company itself and are more involved in the decision-making process. Non-executive directors have direct access to information. Decision-making process is faster. A lighter administrative burden as only a single management body needs to hold meetings and only a single set of minutes need be drawn up. Board meetings take place more regularly. Disadvantages A single body is entrusted with both managing and supervising the company’s operations. More difficult to guarantee the independence of board members and there is a greater risk of non-executive directors aligning too much with executive directors. More liability for non-executive directors.	Advantages Clear distinction between the supervisory and management functions within the company.Clear distinctions of liabilities between the members of the supervisory and management bodies.Supervisory board members are more independent. Clear separation of the roles of chairman and CEO. Disadvantages It is more difficult for directors to build relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication between the two boards. Supervisory board members only receive limited information (from the management board) and at a later stage (decreased involvement). There is a heightened risk of the supervisory board not discovering shortcomings or discovering them too late. Decision-making process is delayed due to less frequent supervisory board meetings. Non-executive directors face several challenges which appear to be typical of the two-tier board model, such as difficulties (i) building relationships of trust, thereby potentially undermining communication and flows of information between the two boards, and (ii) fully understanding and ratifying strategic initiatives by the management board, thereby frustrating the decision-making processes.

CÉRÉMONIE OFFICIELLE DE REMISE DES DIPLÔMES

DÉVOILEMENT DE LA 3E SÉRIE DE CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE

DEUX NOUVEAUX COURS SPÉCIALISÉS EN GOUVERNANCE

Les formations du collège et les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé

NOMINATIONS ASC

Boîte à outils pour administrateurs

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RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉ 2013-2014

Banques des administrateurs de sociétés certifiés

DÉVOILEMENT DE LA 3E SÉRIE DE CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE

Les programmes de formation du CAS

Les événements en gouvernance auxquels le CAS est associé

NOMINATIONS ASC

DISTINCTIONS ASC et formateurs

Boîte à outils pour administrateurs

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Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

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Séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de chef de la direction : retour sur un grand classique

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