Les conséquences juridiques du Brexit

Au lendemain du référendum mené en Grande-Bretagne (GB), on peut se demander quelles sont les implications juridiques d’une telle décision. Celles-ci sont nombreuses ; plusieurs scénarios peuvent être envisagés pour prévoir l’avenir des relations entre la GB et l’Union européenne (UE).

Ben Perry* de la firme Sullivan & Cromwell a exploré toutes les facettes légales de cette nouvelle situation dans un article paru hier sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

C’est un article très poussé sur les répercussions du Brexit. On doit admettre que le processus de retrait de l’UE est complexe, qu’il y a plusieurs modèles dont la GB peut s’inspirer (Suisse, Norvégien, Islandais, Liechtenstein), et que le vote n’a pas d’effets légaux immédiats. En fait, le processus de sortie et de renégociation peut durer trois ans !

Je vous invite à lire ce très intéressant article afin d’être mieux informés sur les principales avenues conséquentes au retrait de la GB de l’UE.

Bonne lecture !

Brexit: Legal Implications

In a referendum held in the UK on June 23, 2016, a majority of those voting voted for the UK to leave the EU. This post briefly summarizes some of the main legal implications of the “leave” vote and is primarily for the benefit of those outside the UK who have not followed the referendum campaign in detail.

The “leave” vote has no immediate legal effect under either UK or EU law

The UK currently remains a member of the EU and there will not be any immediate change in either EU or UK law as a consequence of the “leave” vote. EU law does not govern contracts and the UK is not part of the EU’s monetary union.

However, the “leave” vote now heralds the beginning of a lengthy process under which (i) the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from, and future relationship with, the EU are negotiated and (ii) legislation to implement the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is enacted (primarily in the UK, but also at the EU level and in other EU member states to the extent necessary).

The terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU will need to be negotiated

The ultimate legal impact of the “leave” vote will depend on the terms that are negotiated in relation to the UK’s future relationship with the EU, as described below. This is currently the principal source of uncertainty as to the legal implications of the “leave” vote. Each of the UK government and the EU will need to formulate their respective positions for the withdrawal negotiations over the coming months. Once this is done, the likely direction for the UK’s future relationship with the EU will become clearer, allowing for a sharper focus on the legal implications.

It is not yet clear what terms the UK will seek to negotiate with the EU (or what the EU will offer to the UK) in relation to its withdrawal from, and future relationship with, the EU. To date, there has been no consensus, even among “leave” campaigners, as to the terms which the UK should seek in these negotiations. The key factor is the extent to which the UK wishes to continue to benefit from any part of the EU single market (i.e., the current EU regime which allows for free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, and freedom of establishment, within the EU).

There are several different existing models that could be adopted, either alone or in combination with one another. These include the following:

Total exit: the UK leaves the EU and does not continue to benefit from any part of the single market. The UK either relies solely on the rules of the World Trade Organization (which include rules governing the imposition of tariffs on goods and services) as the basis for trading with the EU or negotiates a new bilateral trade deal with the EU.

The Norwegian model: the UK leaves the EU but joins the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA is constituted by the EEA Agreement among the 28 EU member states and three countries which are not EU member states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), and extends the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons beyond the EU to those three countries. Under this arrangement, EU law relating to these four freedoms (which could be modified by the EU without the UK’s consent) would largely continue to apply to the UK, and the UK would continue to have full access to the single market.

The Swiss model: the UK leaves the EU and does not join the EEA as described above. It may instead rejoin EFTA (an intergovernmental organization comprised of European countries who are not members of the EU—the UK was a member of EFTA before it joined the EU in 1973). Currently, only Switzerland is a member of EFTA but not a member of the EEA. Switzerland has (on its own behalf rather than as a member of EFTA) negotiated a large number of sector-specific bilateral agreements with the EU and has access to some parts of the single market, but is excluded from the single market in some major sectors (for example, Switzerland is not part of the single market in the financial services sector).

Although the EU treaty provides a framework for a member state to withdraw from the EU, this particular framework has never been used before and it is therefore not certain how it will operate in practice

The EU treaty provides (in article 50) a mechanism whereby a member state can withdraw from the EU and notify the European Council of its intention to do so. The giving of such a notice triggers the start of a two year time period for the negotiation of a withdrawal agreement between that member state and the EU. The withdrawal agreement is required to be approved by (i) the 27 EU member states excluding the withdrawing member state (by qualified majority rather than unanimously) and (ii) the European Parliament (by simple majority).

No announcement has yet been made by the UK government as to when it intends to deliver any notice of withdrawal under article 50.

The withdrawal of the UK from the EU would take effect either on the effective date of the withdrawal agreement or, in the absence of agreement, two years after the article 50 notice referred to above, unless the UK and all the other EU member states agreed to extend this date.

Although the timescale is not at all clear at this stage, it appears likely that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU (both the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement and the arrangements for the UK’s future relationship with the EU) will take more than two years to negotiate and conclude. Even the withdrawal of Greenland (an autonomous country within the state of Denmark) from the EU, where the issues were far more limited, took three years from the relevant referendum vote to come into effect.

The UK will need to decide the extent to which existing EU law should continue to apply in the UK

Since 1973, the UK has implemented a vast number of EU directives into UK law. These will remain effective as UK law unless they are amended or repealed. This means that, in a total exit, or if the Swiss model were to be adopted, there will of necessity be a massive exercise, spanning several years, in which the UK government will need to determine which aspects of these EU directives it wishes to either (i) retain, (ii) amend or (iii) repeal.

In addition, the UK would need to enact new laws to the extent it wished to retain:

any EU laws which had been enacted by means of EU regulations, which are currently directly applicable in the UK without any implementing measures; or

any other EU laws which had direct effect in the UK without any implementing measures (e.g., provisions of the EU treaty, or EU directives which had not been implemented in the UK within the required timeframe but which were sufficiently clear and precise, unconditional and did not give member states substantial discretion in their application).

This is because those EU laws would, absent any such further UK laws being enacted, automatically cease to have effect in the UK on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU becoming effective.

The current relationship between EU law and UK law is principally governed by a UK statute (the European Communities Act 1972) which, among other things:

provides for the direct application of EU regulations and the direct effect of those EU laws which are stated to have direct effect;

gives the UK government power to introduce delegated legislation to implement EU law generally; and

provides for the supremacy of EU law over UK law.

However, repealing the European Communities Act on its own would not avoid the need for the extensive review of existing UK laws implementing EU directives as described above. There have been some suggestions by “leave” campaigners prior to the referendum that the UK government should seek to repeal the European Communities Act prior to an agreement having been reached on the withdrawal arrangements and future relationship of the UK with the EU, although this would be a politically charged move.

If the Norwegian model were adopted, however, EU law relating to the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons would be likely to continue to largely apply in the UK.

If the UK were not a full participant in the single market, the ability of EU nationals to work in the UK, or the ability of UK nationals to work in the EU, would likely be affected

In a total exit, EU nationals would lose the automatic right to work in the UK, and UK nationals would lose the automatic right to work in the EU, subject to transitional arrangements which would presumably need to be put in place for an interim period. New immigration rules would therefore need to be implemented (i) in the UK in relation to EU nationals and (ii) in the other EU member states in relation to UK nationals.

If the Norwegian model were adopted, as part of having full access to the single market, the UK would likely continue to be bound by the EU treaty principle of free movement of persons, which would continue to enable EU nationals to work in the UK without requiring authorization.

If the Swiss model were adopted, the UK would need to enter into an agreement with the EU setting out the extent to which EU nationals would have the right to work in the UK, and UK nationals would have the right to work in the EU.

There are two related areas which, as they are matters of UK national sovereignty, would not be affected in the same way as the right of non-EU nationals to work in the UK.

First, the current visa requirements for non-EU nationals to work in the UK would remain in place, although additional restrictions on immigration from outside the EU could be imposed by the UK government in any event, and to the extent that nationals of any country had the right to work in the UK as a result of a bilateral agreement between that country and the EU (e.g., Switzerland) that right would cease to apply and new arrangements would need to be negotiated between the UK and that country.

Second, the UK’s current tax regime for individuals who are resident but not domiciled in the UK is not a creation of EU law and would not fall away as a consequence of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

One of the areas of law potentially most affected will likely be the regulation of financial services

Those areas which will be potentially most affected will be those where the EU has embarked on its most significant harmonization efforts in recent years, in particular the regulation of financial services.

Unless the Norwegian model were adopted, the UK government would need to decide whether to retain, amend or repeal a number of significant pieces of EU financial services legislation, notwithstanding that many of these are Basel-based. These include, among others, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV and other aspects of the bank supervisory regime, the Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID) II and other aspects of the investment firms’ supervisory regime, the Solvency II Directive and other aspects of the insurance supervisory regime, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ Directive (AIFMD) and other aspects of the alternative investment management supervisory regime, the cap on bankers’ bonuses, the Prospectus Directive and the Transparency Directive and other aspects of the capital markets regime, and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and other aspects of the derivatives regime.

In addition, unless the Norwegian model were adopted or the application of the Norwegian model had been specifically negotiated for a transitional period as part of the withdrawal arrangements, there would be no right for UK-authorized firms or individuals to provide financial services in the EU on a “passported” basis. Any non-EU financial institution currently using a UK-authorized person to provide financial services elsewhere in the EU would need to obtain authorization from an EU member state by either establishing an authorized branch in an EU member state or obtaining authorization for one of its subsidiaries in an EU member state. The impact of any loss of “passporting” rights would be more serious for some financial institutions than for others.

It is very difficult to predict the overall impact on the UK financial services sector as a whole because, irrespective of whether the UK remains part of the single market for financial services, there are other factors which have historically helped the development of the financial services sector in the UK (such as the availability of talent, support services and other infrastructure and the use of English as the global language for financial services) which will continue to be present.

Other areas of law which would potentially be affected include, among others: M&A and corporate law; capital markets; competition law; and tax. In each of these areas, the extent of the impact will depend on the model which is adopted for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.

There is potential for contractual disputes to arise

While it is not possible to anticipate all of the events which may arise as a consequence of the “leave” vote, there may, in some cases, be circumstances which arise which cause parties to claim that provisions either excusing the performance of contractual obligations, or triggering a right to terminate contracts, are capable of being invoked. Any such issues will require careful consideration in light of the relevant contracts as a whole and the possibility that circumstances may continue to change rapidly.

______________________________

*Ben Perry is a partner in the London office of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication.

Le scandale de Volkswagen vu sous l’angle de la gouvernance corporative | Raymonde Crête

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article paru dans la revue European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR) qui scrute le scandale de Volkswagen sous l’angle juridique, mais, surtout, sous l’angle des manquements à la saine gouvernance.

Me Raymonde Crête, auteure de l’article, est professeure à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université Laval et elle dirige le Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (GRDSF).

Le texte se présente comme un cas en gouvernance et en management. Celui-ci devrait alimenter les réflexions sur l’éthique, les valeurs culturelles et les effets des pressions excessives à la performance.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’intégralité de l’article avec le consentement de l’auteure. Je n’ai pas inclus les références, qui sont très abondantes et qui peuvent être consultées sur le site de la maison d’édition lexxion.

Bonne lecture !

The Volkswagen Scandal from the Viewpoint of Corporate Governance

par Me Raymonde Crête

I. Introduction

Like some other crises and scandals that periodically occur in the business community, the Volkswagen (“VW”) scandal once again highlights the devastating consequences of corporate misconduct, once publicly disclosed, and the media storm that generally follows the discovery of such significant misbehaviour by a major corporation. Since the crisis broke in September 2015, the media have relayed endless détails about the substantial negative impacts on VW on various stakeholder groups such as employees, directors, investors, suppliers and consumers, and on the automobile industry as a whole (1)

The multiple and negative repercussions at the economic, organizational and legal levels have quickly become apparent, in particular in the form of resignations, changes in VW’s senior management, layoffs, a hiring freeze, the end to the marketing of diesel-engined vehicles, vehicle recalls, a decline in car sales, a drop in market capitalization, and the launching of internal investigations by VW and external investigations by the public authorities. This comes in addition to the threat of numerous civil, administrative, penal and criminal lawsuits and the substantial penalties they entail, as well as the erosion of trust in VW and the automobile industry generally (2).

FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company's headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn — FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn

A scandal of this extent cannot fail to raise a number of questions, in particular concerning the cause of the alleged cheating, liable actors, the potential organizational and regulatory problems related to compliance, and ways to prevent further misconduct at VW and within the automobile industry. Based on the information surrounding the VW scandal, it is premature to capture all facets of the case. In order to analyze inmore depth the various problems raised, we will have to wait for the findings of the investigations conducted both internally by the VW Group and externally by the regulatory authorities.

While recognizing the incompleteness of the information made available to date by VW and certain commentators, we can still use this documentation to highlight a few features of the case that deserve to be studied from the standpoint of corporate governance.

This Article remains relatively modest in scope, and is designed to highlight certain organizational factors that may explain the deviant behaviour observed at VW. More specifically, it submits that the main cause of VW’s alleged wrongdoing lies in the company’s ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees to reach those targets. Arguably, the corporate strategy and pressures exerted on VW’s employees may have led them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards. And this corporate misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected.

Although limited in scope, this inquiry may prove useful in identifying means to minimize, in the future, the risk of similar misconduct, not only at VW but wihin other companies as well (3). Given the limited objectives of the Article, which focuses on certain specific organizational deficiencies at VW, the legal questions raised by the case will not be addressed. However, the Article will refer to one aspect of the law of business corporations in the United States, Canada and in the EU Member States in order to emphasize the crucial role that boards in publicly-held companies must exercise to minimize the risk of misconduct (4).

II. A Preliminary Admission by VW: Individual Misconduct by a few Software Engineers

When a scandal erupts in the business community following a case of fraud, embezzlement, corruption, the marketing of dangerous products or other deviant behaviour, the company concerned and the regulatory authorities are required to quickly identify the individuals responsible for the alleged misbehaviour. For example, in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia scandals of the early 2000s, the investigations revealed that certain company senior managers had acted fraudulently by orchestrating accounting manipulations to camouflage their business’s dire financial situation (5).

These revelations led to the prosecution and conviction of the officers responsible for the corporations’ misconduct (6). In the United States, the importanace of identifying individual wrongdoers is clearly stated in the Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice which provide guidelines for prosecutions of corporate misbehaviour (7). On the basis of a memo issued in 2015 by the Department of Justice (the “Yatesmemo”) (8), these principles were recently revised to express a renewed commitment to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.While recognizing the importance of individual prosecutions in that context, the strategy is only one of the ways to respond to white-collar crime. From a prevention standpoint, it is essential to conduct a broader examination of the organizational environment in which senior managers and employees work to determine if the enterprise’s culture, values, policies, monitoring mechanisms and practices contribute or have contributed to the adoption of deviant behaviour (9).

In the Volkswagen case, the company’s management concentrated first on identifying the handful of individuals it considered to be responsible for the deception, before admitting few weeks later that organizational problems had also encouraged or facilitated the unlawful corporate behaviour. Once news broke of the Volkswagen scandal, one of VW’s officers quickly linked the wrongdoing to the actions of a few employees, but without uncovering any governance problems or misbehaviour at the VW management level (10).

In October 2015, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the VW Group in the United States, Michael Horn, stated in testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee: “[t]his was a couple of software engineers who put this for whatever reason » […]. To my understanding, this was not a corporate decision. This was something individuals did » (11). In other words, the US CEO considered that sole responsibility for the scandal lay with a handful of engineers working at the company, while rejecting any allegation tending to incriminate the company’s management.

This portion of his testimony failed to convince the members of the Subcommittee, who expressed serious doubts about placing sole blame on the misbehaviour of a few engineers, given that the problem had existed since 2009. As expressed in a sceptical response from one of the committee’s members: « I cannot accept VW’s portrayal of this as something by a couple of rogue software engineers […] Suspending three folks – it goes way, way higher than that » (12).

Although misconduct similar to the behaviour uncovered at Volkswagen can often be explained by the reprehensible actions of a few individuals described as « bad apples », the violation of rules can also be explained by the existence of organizational problems within a company (13).

III. Recognition of Organizational Failures by VW

In terms of corporate governance, an analysis of misbehaviour can highlight problems connected with the culture, values, policies and strategies promoted by a company’s management that have a negative influence on the behaviour of senior managers and employees. Considering the importance of the organizational environment in which these players act, regulators provide for several internal and external governance mechanisms to reduce the risk of corporate misbehaviour or to minimize agency problems (14). As one example of an internal governance mechanism, the law of business corporations in the U.S., Canada and the EU Member States gives the board of directors (in a one-tier board structure, as prescribed Under American and Canadian corporation law) and the management board and supervisory board (in a two tier board structure, as provided for in some EU Member States, such as Germany) a key role to play in monitoring the company’s activities and internal dealings (15). As part of their monitoring mission, the board must ensure that the company and its agents act in a diligent and honest way and in compliance with the regulations, in particular by establishing mechanisms or policies in connection with risk management, internal controls, information disclosure, due diligence investigation and compliance (16).

When analysing the Volkswagen scandal from the viewpoint of its corporate governance, the question to be asked is whether the culture, values, priorities, strategies and monitoring and control mechanisms established by the company’s management board and supervisory board – in other words « the tone at the top »-, created an environment that contributed to the emergence of misbehaviour (17).

In this saga, although the initial testimony given to the Congressional Subcommittee by the company’s U.S. CEO, Michael Horn, assigned sole responsibility to a small circle of individuals, « VW’s senior management later recognized that the misconduct could not be explained simply by the deviant behaviour of a few people, since the evidence also pointed to organizational problems supporting the violation of regulations (18). In December 2015, VW’s management released the following observations, drawn from the preliminary results of its internal investigation:

« Group Audit’s examination of the relevant processes indicates that the software-influenced NOx emissions behavior was due to the interaction of three factors:

– The misconduct and shortcomings of individual employees

– Weaknesses in some processes

– A mindset in some areas of the Company that tolerated breaches of rules » (19).

Concerning the question of process,VW released the following audit key findings:

« Procedural problems in the relevant subdivisions have encouraged misconduct;

Faults in reporting and monitoring systems as well as failure to comply with existing regulations;

IT infrastructure partially insufficient and antiquated. » (20)

More fundamentally, VW’s management pointed out at the same time that the information obtained up to that point on “the origin and development of the nitrogen issue […] proves not to have been a one-time error, but rather a chain of errors that were allowed to happen (21). The starting point was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal means the stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United States within the required timeframe and budget » (22).

In other words, this revelation by VW’s management suggests that « the end justified the means » in the sense that the ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees encouraged those employees to use illegal methods in operational terms to achieve the company’s objective. And this misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected. Among the reasons given to explain the crisis, some observers also pointed to the excessive centralization of decision-making powers within VW’s senior management, and an organizational culture that acted as a brake on internal communications and discouraged mid-level managers from passing on bad news (23).

IV. Organizational Changes Considered as a Preliminary Step

In response to the crisis, VW’s management, in a press release in December 2015, set out the main organizational changes planned to minimize the risk of similar misconduct in the future. The changes mainly involved « instituting a comprehensive new alignment that affects the structure of the Group, as well as is way of thinking and its strategic goals (24).

In structural terms, VW changed the composition of the Group’s Board of Management to include the person responsible for the Integrity and Legal Affairs Department as a board member (25). In the future, the company wanted to give « more importance to digitalization, which will report directly to the Chairman of the Board of Management, » and intended to give « more independence to brand and divisions through a more decentralized management (26). With a view to initiating a new mindset, VW’s management stated that it wanted to avoid « yes-men » and to encourage managers and engineers « who are curious, independent, and pioneering » (27). However, the December 2015 press release reveals little about VW’s strategic objectives: « Strategy 2025, with which Volkswagen will address the main issues for the future, is scheduled to be presented in mid 2016 » (28).

Although VW’s management has not yet provided any details on the specific objectives targeted in its « Strategy 2025 », it is revealing to read the VW annual reports from before 2015 in which the company sets out clear and ambitious objectives for productivity and profitability. For example, the annual reports for 2007, 2009 and 2014 contained the following financial objectives, which the company hoped to reach by 2018.

In its 2007 annual report,VW specified, under the heading « Driving ideas »:

“Financial targets are equally ambitious: for example, the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand aims to increase its unit sales by over 80 percent to 6.6 million vehicles by 2018, thereby reaching a global market share of approximately 9 percent. To make it one of the most profitable automobile companies as well, it is aiming for an ROI of 21 percent and a return on sales before tax of 9 percent.” (29).

Under the same heading, VW stated in its 2009 annual report:

“In 2018, the Volkswagen Group aims to be the most successful and fascinating automaker in the world. […] Over the long term, Volkswagen aims to increase unit sales to more than 10 million vehicles a year: it intends to capture an above-average share as the major growth markets develop (30).

And in its 2014 annual report, under the heading « Goals and Strategies », VW said:

“The goal is to generate unit sales of more than 10 million vehicles a year; in particular, Volkswagen intends to capture an above-average share of growth in the major growth markets.”

Volkswagen’s aim is a long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8% so as to ensure that the Group’s solid financial position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods (31).

Besides these specific objectives for financial performance, the annual reports show that the company’s management recognized, at least on paper, the importance of ensuring regulatory compliance and promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability (31). However, after the scandal broke in September 2015, questions can be asked about the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms, especially of the reporting and monitoring systems put in place by VW to achieve company goals in this area (33). In light of the preliminary results of VW’s internal investigation (34), as mentionned above, it seems that, in the organizational culture, the commitment to promote compliance, CSR and sustainability was not as strong as the effort made to achieve the company’s financial performance objectives.

Concerning the specific and challenging priorities of productivity and profitability established by VW’s management in previous years, the question is whether the promotion of financial objectives such as these created a risk because of the pressure it placed on employees within the organizational environment. The priorities can, of course, exert a positive influence and motivate employees to make an even greater effort to achieve the objectives (35). On the other hand, the same priority can exert a negative influence by potentially encouraging employees to use all means necessary to achieve the performance objectives set, in order to protect their job or obtain a promotion, even if the means they use for that purpose contravene the regulations. In other words, the employees face a « double bind » or dilemma which, depending on the circumstances, can lead them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards.

In the management literature, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the beneficial effects of the setting of specific and challenging goals on employee motivation and performance within a company (36). However, while recognizing these beneficial effects, some authors point out the unwanted or negative side effects they may have.

As highlighted by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky and Bazerman, specific goal setting can result in employees focusing solely on those goals while neglecting other important, but unstated, objectives (37). They also mention that employees motivated by « specific, challenging goals adopt riskier strategies and choose riskier gambles than do those with less challenging or vague goals (38). As an additional unwanted side effet, goal setting can encourage unlawful or unethical behaviour, either by inciting employees to use dishonest methods to meet the performance objectives targeted, or to “misrepresent their performance level – in other words, to report that they met a goal when in fact they fell short (39). Based on these observations, the authors suggest that companies should set their objectives with the greatest care and propose various ways to guard against the unwanted side effects highlighted in their study. This approach could prove useful for VW’s management which will once again, at some point, have to define its objectives and stratégies.

V. Conclusion

In the information released to the public after the emissions cheating scandal broke, as mentioned above, VW’s management quickly stated that the misconduct was directly caused by the individual misbehaviour of a couple of software engineers. Later, however, it admitted that the individual misconduct of a few employees was not the only cause, and that there were also organizational deficiencies within the company itself.

Although the VW Group’s public communications have so far provided few details about the cause of the crisis, the admission by management that both individual and organizational failings were involved constitutes, in our opinion, a lever for understanding the various factors that may have led to reprehensible conduct within the company. Based on the investigations that will be completed over the coming months, VW’s management will be in a position to identify more precisely the nature of these organizational failings and to propose ways to minimize the risk of future violations. During 2016, VW’s management will also announce the objectives and stratégies it intends to pursue over the next few years.

Éthique, démission et parachutes dorés | une délicate alchimie

Le séminaire à la maîtrise de Gouvernance de l’entreprise (DRT-7022) dispensé par Ivan Tchotourian*, professeur en droit des affaires de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, entend apporter aux étudiants une réflexion originale sur les liens entre la sphère économico-juridique, la gouvernance des entreprises et les enjeux sociétaux actuels.

Le séminaire s’interroge sur le contenu des normes de gouvernance et leur pertinence dans un contexte de profonds questionnements des modèles économique et financier. Dans le cadre de ce séminaire, il est proposé aux étudiants de l’hiver 2016 d’avoir une expérience originale de publication de leurs travaux de recherche qui ont porté sur des sujets d’actualité de gouvernance d’entreprise.

Cette publication numérique entend contribuer au partage des connaissances en gouvernance à une large échelle. Le présent billet expose le résultat des recherches de Margaux Mortéo et de Léonie Pamerleau sur les liens entre la rémunération des dirigeants, les effets de la démission du PDG et les questions éthiques sous-jacentes.

Dans le cadre de ce billet, les auteurs reviennent sur l’affaire Volkswagen, notamment sur la légitimité des parachutes dorés dans les cas de démission « obligée ». Ils se questionnent également sur les valeurs éthiques dans de tels cas.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

Éthique, démission et parachutes dorés | une délicate alchimie

par

Margaux Mortéo et Léonie Pamerleau

La légitimité des parachutes dorés : Le cas de Volkswagen

Volkswagen, une entreprise automobile leader sur le marché, a fait face à l’un des plus gros scandales dans ce secteur^{^[1]}. À la suite de la découverte des tricheries utilisées par la firme afin de commercialiser des véhicules diesel tout en cachant leurs effets polluants, le PDG de Volkswagen (Martin Winterkorn) a décidé le 23 septembre 2015 de démissionner de son poste. Or, cette démission, qui s’inscrit dans un processus quasi habituel des dirigeants face à de telles circonstances, ne semble pas si légitime au regard de certains aspects en raison de l’énorme parachute doré, aussi appelé golden parachute. Cela soulève en effet plusieurs aspects, notamment la responsabilité d’un dirigeant face à des dégâts causés à l’environnement et ce que cela engendre au regard de la réputation de l’entreprise, « actif stratégique le plus important sur le plan de la création de valeur » [2].

Une démission en quête de légitimité ?

Cette pratique est loin d’être un cas isolé. En juillet dernier, le PDG de Toshiba (Hisao Tanaka) a démissionné de ses fonctions suite à un scandale comptable [3]. Cette pratique démontre une quête de légitimité de la part des puissants dirigeants de sociétés. La raison est simple : ces derniers semblent entachés d’une immunité du fait de leur position, mais décident cependant de céder leur place pour le bien-être de leur entreprise, en portant sur leurs épaules le poids de l’entière responsabilité. Martin Winterkorn a même déclaré que son départ avait pour but de permettre à Volkswagen de « (…) prendre un nouveau départ ».

Cette décision, très médiatisée, tente de redorer l’image de l’entreprise, sans compter le fait que le PDG n’a pas tout perdu dans l’affaire.

L’étonnante attribution d’un parachute doré confortable

Démissionner semble honorable, mais quand Martin Winterkorn a la garantie d’obtenir près de 28,5 millions d’euros et de prétendre jusqu’à 60 millions d’euros, les objectifs de son départ peuvent avoir le mérite d’être revus. Bien que paraissant légitime, la démission d’un dirigeant de société cotée est souvent accompagnée de golden parachute. Ce qui est intéressant c’est que le contrat qui instituait Winterkorn à la tête d’une des plus importantes sociétés automobiles prévoyait que ce parachute doré lui serait accordé… quelles que soient les raisons de son départ.

La presse n’a pas manqué à son devoir d’information du public en dénonçant cette situation d’autant plus que « (…) les parachutes dorés ainsi que les bonus et primes des dirigeants sont de plus en plus élevés et dépassent ce que l’on peut imaginer » [4] et que l’échec (et le départ) d’un dirigeant fait « (…) partie des risques normaux du métier de patron » [5].

Face à d’énormes scandales, comme celui de Volkswagen, il est normal de se questionner sur la légitimité de telles sommes. Bien que le dirigeant ait pour ambition un nouveau départ de la société, pourquoi dans ce cas bénéficier de bonus qui coûtent à la société ? L’illusion est bonne, mais elle n’est somme toute pas parfaite. Martin Winterkorn a laissé croire que son intérêt n’était porté que vers les actionnaires, les administrateurs et les parties prenantes, mais le fait de pouvoir prétendre à 60 millions d’euros remet tout en cause.

Et l’éthique dans tout cela ?

Si la loi permet de telles sommes de départ, et ce même en cas de fraude, quand est-il de l’éthique ? Ces indemnités de départ, quel que soit leur nom sont-elles légitimes dans un contexte de prise de conscience de la responsabilité sociétale des entreprises (RSE) ? Les parties prenantes sont-elles respectées face à ce genre de comportement ?

Sachant qu’à l’heure actuelle il est impossible d’ignorer complètement les enjeux entourant la RSE, il est normal de se questionner relativement à la légitimité de parachutes dorés [6]. Dans le cas de Volkswagen plus précisément, il est possible de voir les actionnaires se lever et tenter d’empêcher le président d’obtenir son golden parachute, notamment au regard des résultats boursiers moyens de l’entreprise [7].

Vont-ils le faire ? Ne sont-ce pas aux administrateurs eux-mêmes à réagir [8] ? Tant de questions et d’interrogations en réponse au scandale du géant automobile allemand restent en attente de réponses.

[1] Frank Zeller, « Tests manipulés : Volkswagen savait », LaPresse, 27 septembre 2015, en ligne : http://auto.lapresse.ca/actualites/volkswagen/201509/27/01-4904281-tests-manipules-volkswagen-savait.php (consulté le 30 novembre 2015).

[2] Olivier Mondet, « La réputation de l’entreprise est-elle un actif spécifique ? », CREG Versailles, vendredi 21 mars 2014, en ligne : http://www.creg.ac-versailles.fr/spip.php?article732 (consulté le 30 novembre 2015).

[3] « Démission du patron de Toshiba, impliqué dans un vaste scandale comptable », L’OBS à la une, 21 juillet 2015, en ligne : http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/topnews/20150721.AFP4308/scandale-toshiba-demission-du-pdg-hisao-tanaka-et de-deux-de-ses-predecesseurs.html (consulté le 30 novembre 2015).

[4] Ivan Tchotourian, « Une décennie d’excès des dirigeants en matière de rémunération : repenser la répartition des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise : une solution perse porteuse de risques », Paris, LGDJ, 2011, p. 9, en ligne : https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/5208/ChapitreRemunerationetPouvoirs2011_IT.pdf (consulté le 10 décembre 2015).

[5] J. El Ahdab, « Les parachutes dorés et autres indemnités conventionnelles de départ des dirigeants : approche pluridisciplinaire et comparée », Rev. Sociétés, 2004, p. 18.

[6] Christine Neau-Leduc, « La responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise : quels enjeux juridique ? » Droit social, 2006, p. 956.

[7] Jena McGregor, « Outgoing Volkswagen CEO’s exit package could top $67 million », Washington Post, 24 septembre 2015.

[8] « Boards are responsible for limiting excess pay », Financial Times, 17 avril 2016, en ligne : http://www.ft.com/cms/s/194a5de6-02fa-11e6-af1d-c47326021344, Authorised=false.html?siteedition=uk&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F194a5de6-02fa-11e6-af1d-c47326021344.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&iab=barrier-app#ixzz4677JCobn (consulté le 18 avril 2015).

______________________

*Ivan Tchotourian, professeur en droit des affaires, codirecteur du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ), membre du Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (www.grdsf.ulaval.ca), Faculté de droit, Université Laval.

Mieux connaître la relation entre l’anxiété et la performance | Congrès de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose de méditer sur le billet de Scott Stossel*, paru le 6 janvier 2014 dans HBR Blog Network, que j’avais déjà publié en janvier 2014. Celui-ci aborde un sujet intrigant et très pertinent à quiconque se préoccupe de performance optimale.

Ce sujet de discussion est particulièrement approprié à l’aube du Congrès de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés (OAAQ) des 18 et 19 février 2016, dont le thème est : « La performance | Au-delà des chiffres ! », auquel je vous invite à participer.

On connaît la relation entre l’anxiété (ce sentiment diffus d’appréhension souvent injustifiée et infondée) et la performance — dans l’accomplissement d’une tâche. La performance est optimale lorsque l’on réussit à équilibrer l’intensité de l’anxiété : généralement, trop d’anxiété est nuisible à l’exécution de l’activité ; peu d’anxiété conduit à une plus faible performance.

La maîtrise de l’anxiété est très importante dans la conduite de nos vies, plus particulièrement dans les activités liées à la performance au travail. Les administrateurs et les managers doivent apprendre à en bien connaître la manifestation, eux dont les tâches consistent à assurer une solide performance et une gouvernance exemplaire.

Si vous croyez être sujets à des accès d’angoisses immotivées, vous n’êtes pas les seuls… et il existe des moyens pour y faire face. Cet article vous ouvrira plusieurs voies d’accommodement possibles ; bref, si vous expérimentez ce sentiment diffus d’anxiété — et que cela influence négativement votre travail — cet article est pour vous. Je vous invite aussi à lire les excellents commentaires à la fin de l’article.

En quoi ce sujet concerne-t-il la gouvernance ?

Donnez votre point de vue. Bonne lecture !

The Relationship Between Anxiety and Performance

An influential study conducted a hundred years ago by two Harvard psychologists, Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson, demonstrated that moderate levels of anxiety improve performance in humans and animals: too much anxiety, obviously, impairs performance, but so does too little. Their findings have been experimentally demonstrated in both animals and humans many times since then.

“Without anxiety, little would be accomplished,” David Barlow, founder of the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders at Boston University, has written. “The performance of athletes, entertainers, executives, artisans, and students would suffer; creativity would diminish; crops might not be planted. And we would all achieve that idyllic state long sought after in our fast-paced society of whiling away our lives under a shade tree. This would be as deadly for the species as nuclear war.”

So how do you find the right balance? How do you get yourself into the performance zone where anxiety is beneficial? That’s a really tough question. For me, years of medication and intensive therapy have (sometimes, somewhat) taken the physical edge off my nerves so I could focus on trying to do well, not on removing myself from the center of attention as quickly as possible. For those who choke during presentations to board members or pitches to clients, for example, but probably aren’t what you’d call clinically anxious, the best approach may be one akin to what Beilock has athletes do in her experiments: redirecting your mind, in the moment, to something other than how you’re comporting yourself, so you can allow the skills and knowhow you’ve worked so hard to acquire to automatically kick into gear and carry you through. Your focus should not be on worrying about outcomes or consequences or on how you’re being perceived but simply on the task at hand. Prepare thoroughly (but not too obsessively) in advance; then stay in the moment. If you’re feeling anxious, breathe from your diaphragm in order to keep your sympathetic nervous system from revving up too much. And remember that it can be good to be keyed up: the right amount of nervousness will enhance your performance.

* Scott Stossel est l’éditeur de la revue The Atlantic et l’auteur du volume My Age of Anxiety: Fear, Hope, Dread, and the Search for Peace of Mind (Knopf 2014).

Un guide sur la préparation de la relève dans les entreprises familiales

On le sait, la planification de la relève dans les entreprises familiales peut être très négligée, tabou même !

Une étude conduite par le Boston Consulting Group (BCG) montre que les conséquences liées à l’absence de préoccupation à cet égard peuvent être désastreuses pour beaucoup d’organisations.

Le vide créé par le manque de leadership peut sérieusement affecter la performance de la firme. La recherche montre que plus de 40 % des entreprises familiales ont mal planifié leur relève au cours de la dernière décennie.

Dans leur article paru dans bcg.perspectives, les auteurs Vikram Bhalla et Nicolas Kachaner ont trouvé que les entreprises qui avaient mal planifié leurs transitions subissaient une diminution de revenu de 14 % au cours des deux dernières années.

Voici un guide de dix (10) principes qui devraient aider les entreprises familiales aux prises avec des problèmes de succession :

Succeeding with Succession Planning in Family Businesses

Start early

Families may hesitate to plan succession because they are uncertain how the interests, choices, and decisions of different family members will play out over years or decades. But succession planning should start as soon as possible despite this uncertainty. Although things may change along the way, leaders can often anticipate the potential scenarios for how the family will evolve. Issues to consider when developing scenarios include the number of children in the next generation and whether those individuals are interested in the family business as a source of full- or part-time employment or purely as an investment. Families should also consider how the scenarios would be affected by marriages or the sudden demise of a family member or potential successor. It is important to plan a succession process and outcome that will work for the different foreseeable scenarios.

Set expectations, philosophy, and values upfront

Although setting expectations, philosophy, and values is central to many family-business issues, we have found that doing so is essential when it comes to succession planning and must be done up front, even if the specific mechanics of succession come later. In our experience, the family businesses that thrive and succeed across generations are those that possess a core philosophy and set of values linked not to wealth creation but to a sense of community and purpose.

Long before decisions will be made about specific potential successors, the family must agree on overarching issues such as whether family unity will take precedence over wealth creation, whether all branches of the family will have an equal ownership right and voice in decisions, and whether decisions will be based purely on merit and the best interests of the business. These guiding principles will provide the framework for more specific decisions.

Understand individual and collective aspirations

Understanding family members’ aspirations, individually and collectively, is critical to defining the right succession process. Leaders of the succession process should meet with family members and discuss their individual aspirations for involvement in the business. For example, does an individual want to work for the business or lead the business, or, alternatively, focus on the family’s philanthropic work? Or does an individual want to chart his or her own course outside of the business? The family’s collective aspirations can emerge from the effort to establish a philosophy and values. Does the family want its business to be the largest company in the industry? Is maintaining the business as a family-owned-and-operated company of paramount importance, or does the family want to relinquish operational responsibility in the coming years? Understanding these aspirations helps in managing expectations and defining priorities in the succession process.

Independently assess what’s right for the business

Although the best interests of the business and the family may seem indistinguishable to some family members, in reality the optimal decisions from the business’s perspective may differ from what family members want for themselves. This distinction makes it essential to consider what is right for the business independent of family preferences when developing a succession plan. It is therefore important to think about succession from a purely business perspective before making any adjustments based on family preferences. This allows leaders to be transparent and deliberate in the trade-offs they may have to make to manage any competing priorities.

Develop the successor’s capabilities broadly

A family business should invest in developing the successor’s capabilities and grooming him or her for leadership. The preparation should occur in phases starting at a young age—even before the successor turns 18.

The challenges of leading a family business are even greater than those faced by leaders of other businesses. In addition to leadership and entrepreneurship, a successor needs to develop values aligned with the family’s aspirations for the business and its role in society—capabilities that constitute stewardship of the company. Given the rapidly increasing complexity of business in the twenty-first century, we often strongly recommend that potential successors gain experience outside the family business in order to broaden their perspective.

Some of the best-managed family businesses have elaborate career-development processes for family members that are the equal of world-class talent-management and capability-building processes.

Define a clear and objective selection process

A company needs to define a selection process to implement its succession model—whether selecting a successor exclusively from the family or considering nonfamily executives as well. The selection process should be based on articulated criteria and delineate clear roles among family governance bodies and business leaders, addressing who will lead the process, propose candidates, and make decisions.

An early start is especially important if several family members are under consideration or the potential exists to divide the business to accommodate leadership aspirations. To obtain an objective perspective on which members of the younger generation have the greatest leadership potential, some families have benefited from the support of external advisors in evaluating talent and running the selection process.

It is important to note that the selection process, while critical, is the sixth point on this list. Points one through five are prerequisites for making the selection process itself more robust and effective.

Find creative ways to balance business needs and family aspirations

Striking the right balance between the business’s needs and family members’ aspirations can be complex. Addressing this complexity often calls for creative approaches—beyond the traditional CEO-and-chairperson model.

For example, the leader of one BCG client split his conglomerate into different companies, each to be led by one of his children; the split occurred without acrimony and in a planned, transparent manner. Beyond helping family members fulfill their aspirations, such a planned split can often greatly enhance value for the business. Another client systematically expanded its business portfolios as the family grew and tapped family members to take over the additions, thus ensuring that several members of the family had a role in the leadership of the businesses.

Stepping into an executive position is not the only way family members can contribute to the business or help the family live its values. As an alternative, family members can serve on the board of directors or take leading roles in the family office or its philanthropic activities.

Build credibility through a phased transition

Successors should build their credibility and authority through well-defined phases of a transition into the leadership role. They can start with a phase of shadowing senior executives to learn about their routines, priorities, and ways of operating. Next, we suggest acting more as a chief operating officer, managing the operations closely but still deferring to the incumbent leaders on strategic decisions. Ultimately, the successor can take over as the CEO and chairperson and drive the family business forward.

It is important to emphasize that the family member who assumes leadership of the business does not necessarily also become the head of the family, with responsibility for vision setting, family governance and alignment, and wealth management. The transition of family leadership can be a distinct process.

Each phase of the transition often takes between two and six months. The transition should be defined by clear milestones and commensurate decision rights. A sudden transition can be disruptive, which is especially harmful if the intent is to maintain continuity in the family business’s direction and strategy.

Ask departing leaders to leave but not disappear

Most leaders bring something distinctive to a family business. Holding onto this distinctiveness in a transition is essential but requires a delicate balance. Although departing leaders should relinquish managerial responsibility for the business, they should remain connected to one or two areas where they bring the truly distinctive value that made the family business successful under their guidance. However, the leaders should be involved in these activities through a formal process, rather than at their own personal preference and discretion. Departing leaders should stay available to guide the new leader if he or she seeks their advice.

To help leaders strike this balance and overcome their reluctance to let go, companies can create a “glide path” plan that sets out how they will turn over control in phases and transition into other activities while the successor assumes control and builds credibility.

Family businesses should also consider the need to adjust aspects of the company’s governance model when the departing leader hands over the reins. Although such adjustments can be made outside the context of succession, they often become particularly relevant after transitions to the second or third generation. A strong leader’s hands-on governance approach is often no longer sustainable for the next generation, creating the need to divide and formalize roles and institutionalize many business processes.

Motivate the best employees and foster their support

Managing the company’s most talented nonfamily executives is especially challenging during the succession process. The company needs to ensure that these executives have opportunities to develop professionally and take on new responsibilities and that morale remains high. Involving executives in the succession process can help to foster their support for the new leader. For example, they can be asked to serve as mentors for the successor or lead special projects relating to the succession. Surrounding the new leader with a strong and supportive senior team is a key ingredient for success, and the departing leader should ensure that such a team is in place.

Assessing the Status of Succession Planning Today

As an initial “health check” to assess the current status of their succession planning, family businesses should consider a number of issues:

Has the company defined a succession model and determined the timing for selecting a successor so that he or she has a sufficient opportunity to prepare for the leadership role and build credibility before the current leader retires?

Has the current leader committed to a fixed retirement date?

Has the family clearly articulated its values and the principles that will guide its decisions and succession process?

Has the family evaluated the pipeline of leadership talent within its younger generation? Has it looked at potential leaders who come from within the business but not within the family?

Does the family understand how it will accommodate the aspirations of family members not selected for leadership roles, in order to maintain harmony and avoid discord during the transition to new leadership?

In many cases, family businesses will find that the answers to questions like these indicate the need to devote much more time and attention to succession planning. Most important, the current leader, other family members, and the top management team will need to begin having an open and candid discussion about succession-related issues to enable the business to thrive for generations to come. These discussions are never easy, but they are essential. Getting succession wrong can be an irreversible and often fatal mistake for a family business.

Quatre grandes tendances mondiales susceptibles de déboulonner nos paradigmes !

Aujourd’hui, je veux vous faire partager un aperçu de l’univers qui confrontera nos organisations dans le futur.

Cet extrait d’un nouveau livre publié par Richard Dobbs, James Manyika, et Jonathan Woetzel*, tous trois directeurs d’un des groupes du McKinsey Global Institute, expose les quatre grandes forces susceptibles de fracasser les paradigmes existants.

Les auteurs expliquent comment l’ampleur et l’interdépendance des changements provoqueront une redéfinition de nos sociétés, et comment nos dirigeants devront s’ajuster à la nouvelle réalité. Ils doivent en être conscients maintenant !

Voici les quatre tendances chocs :

1. La montée fulgurante de l’urbanisation

2. L’accélération des changements technologiques

3. La réalité d’une population vieillissante

4. Un réseau d’interconnections globales

Je vous invite à lire ce court extrait présenté par les auteurs.

The four global forces breaking all the trends

In the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, one new force changed everything. Today our world is undergoing an even more dramatic transition due to the confluence of four fundamental disruptive forces—any of which would rank among the greatest changes the global economy has ever seen. Compared with the Industrial Revolution, we estimate that this change is happening ten times faster and at 300 times the scale, or roughly 3,000 times the impact. Although we all know that these disruptions are happening, most of us fail to comprehend their full magnitude and the second- and third-order effects that will result. Much as waves can amplify one another, these trends are gaining strength, magnitude, and influence as they interact with, coincide with, and feed upon one another. Together, these four fundamental disruptive trends are producing monumental change.

1. Beyond Shanghai: The age of urbanization

The first trend is the shifting of the locus of economic activity and dynamism to emerging markets like China and to cities within those markets. These emerging markets are going through simultaneous industrial and urban revolutions, shifting the center of the world economy east and south at a speed never before witnessed. As recently as 2000, 95 percent of the Fortune Global 500—the world’s largest international companies including Airbus, IBM, Nestlé, Shell, and The Coca-Cola Company, to name a few—were headquartered in developed economies. By 2025, when China will be home to more large companies than either the United States or Europe, we expect nearly half of the world’s large companies—defined as those with revenue of $1 billion or more—to be headquartered in emerging markets. “Over the years, people in our headquarters, in Frankfurt, started complaining to me, ‘We don’t see you much around here anymore,’” said Josef Ackermann, the former chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank. “Well, there was a reason why: growth has moved elsewhere—to Asia, Latin America, the Middle East.”

Perhaps equally important, the locus of economic activity is shifting within these markets. The global urban population has been rising by an average of 65 million people annually during the past three decades, the equivalent of adding seven Chicagos a year, every year. Nearly half of global GDP growth between 2010 and 2025 will come from 440 cities in emerging markets—95 percent of them small- and medium-size cities that many Western executives may not even have heard of and couldn’t point to on a map.¹ 1.For more, see Urban world: Cities and the rise of the consuming class, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2012. Yes, Mumbai, Dubai, and Shanghai are familiar. But what about Hsinchu, in northern Taiwan? Brazil’s Santa Catarina state, halfway between São Paulo and the Uruguayan border? Or Tianjin, a city that lies around 120 kilometers southeast of Beijing? In 2010, we estimated that the GDP of Tianjin was around $130 billion, making it around the same size as Stockholm, the capital of Sweden. By 2025, we estimate that the GDP of Tianjin will be around $625 billion—approximately that of all of Sweden.

2. The tip of the iceberg: Accelerating technological change

The second disruptive force is the acceleration in the scope, scale, and economic impact of technology. Technology—from the printing press to the steam engine and the Internet—has always been a great force in overturning the status quo. The difference today is the sheer ubiquity of technology in our lives and the speed of change. It took more than 50 years after the telephone was invented until half of American homes had one. It took radio 38 years to attract 50 million listeners. But Facebook attracted 6 million users in its first year and that number multiplied 100 times over the next five years. China’s mobile text- and voice-messaging service WeChat has 300 million users, more than the entire adult population of the United States. Accelerated adoption invites accelerated innovation. In 2009, two years after the iPhone’s launch, developers had created around 150,000 applications. By 2014, that number had hit 1.2 million, and users had downloaded more than 75 billion total apps, more than ten for every person on the planet. As fast as innovation has multiplied and spread in recent years, it is poised to change and grow at an exponential speed beyond the power of human intuition to anticipate.

Processing power and connectivity are only part of the story. Their impact is multiplied by the concomitant data revolution, which places unprecedented amounts of information in the hands of consumers and businesses alike, and the proliferation of technology-enabled business models, from online retail platforms like Alibaba to car-hailing apps like Uber. Thanks to these mutually amplifying forces, more and more people will enjoy a golden age of gadgetry, of instant communication, and of apparently boundless information. Technology offers the promise of economic progress for billions in emerging economies at a speed that would have been unimaginable without the mobile Internet. Twenty years ago, less than 3 percent of the world’s population had a mobile phone; now two-thirds of the world’s population has one, and one-third of all humans are able to communicate on the Internet.² 2.Smartphone Users Worldwide Will Total 1.75 Billion in 2014,” eMarketer, January 16, 2014, emarketer.com; The state of broadband 2012: Achieving digital inclusion for all, Broadband Commission September 2012, broadbandcommission.org. Technology allows businesses such as WhatsApp to start and gain scale with stunning speed while using little capital. Entrepreneurs and start-ups now frequently enjoy advantages over large, established businesses. The furious pace of technological adoption and innovation is shortening the life cycle of companies and forcing executives to make decisions and commit resources much more quickly.

3. Getting old isn’t what it used to be: Responding to the challenges of an aging world

The human population is getting older. Fertility is falling, and the world’s population is graying dramatically. While aging has been evident in developed economies for some time—Japan and Russia have seen their populations decline over the past few years—the demographic deficit is now spreading to China and soon will reach Latin America. For the first time in human history, aging could mean that the planet’s population will plateau in most of the world. Thirty years ago, only a small share of the global population lived in the few countries with fertility rates substantially below those needed to replace each generation—2.1 children per woman. But by 2013, about 60 percent of the world’s population lived in countries with fertility rates below the replacement rate. This is a sea change. The European Commission expects that by 2060, Germany’s population will shrink by one-fifth, and the number of people of working age will fall from 54 million in 2010 to 36 million in 2060, a level that is forecast to be less than France’s. China’s labor force peaked in 2012, due to income-driven demographic trends. In Thailand, the fertility rate has fallen from 5 in the 1970s to 1.4 today. A smaller workforce will place a greater onus on productivity for driving growth and may cause us to rethink the economy’s potential. Caring for large numbers of elderly people will put severe pressure on government finances.

4. Trade, people, finance, and data: Greater global connections

The final disruptive force is the degree to which the world is much more connected through trade and through movements in capital, people, and information (data and communication)—what we call “flows.” Trade and finance have long been part of the globalization story but, in recent decades, there’s been a significant shift. Instead of a series of lines connecting major trading hubs in Europe and North America, the global trading system has expanded into a complex, intricate, sprawling web. Asia is becoming the world’s largest trading region. “South–south” flows between emerging markets have doubled their share of global trade over the past decade. The volume of trade between China and Africa rose from $9 billion in 2000 to $211 billion in 2012. Global capital flows expanded 25 times between 1980 and 2007. More than one billion people crossed borders in 2009, over five times the number in 1980. These three types of connections all paused during the global recession of 2008 and have recovered only slowly since. But the links forged by technology have marched on uninterrupted and with increasing speed, ushering in a dynamic new phase of globalization, creating unmatched opportunities, and fomenting unexpected volatility.

Resetting intuition

These four disruptions gathered pace, grew in scale, and started collectively to have a material impact on the world economy around the turn of the 21st century. Today, they are disrupting long-established patterns in virtually every market and every sector of the world economy—indeed, in every aspect of our lives. Everywhere we look, they are causing trends to break down, to break up, or simply to break. The fact that all four are happening at the same time means that our world is changing radically from the one in which many of us grew up, prospered, and formed the intuitions that are so vital to our decision making.

This can play havoc with forecasts and pro forma plans that were made simply by extrapolating recent experience into the near and distant future. Many of the assumptions, tendencies, and habits that had long proved so reliable have suddenly lost much of their resonance. We’ve never had more data and advice at our fingertips—literally. The iPhone or the Samsung Galaxy contains far more information and processing power than the original supercomputer. Yet we work in a world in which even, perhaps especially, professional forecasters are routinely caught unawares. That’s partly because intuition still underpins much of our decision making.

Our intuition has been formed by a set of experiences and ideas about how things worked during a time when changes were incremental and somewhat predictable. Globalization benefited the well established and well connected, opening up new markets with relative ease. Labor markets functioned quite reliably. Resource prices fell. But that’s not how things are working now—and it’s not how they are likely to work in the future. If we look at the world through a rearview mirror and make decisions on the basis of the intuition built on our experience, we could well be wrong. In the new world, executives, policy makers, and individuals all need to scrutinize their intuitions from first principles and boldly reset them if necessary. This is especially true for organizations that have enjoyed great success.

While it is full of opportunities, this era is deeply unsettling. And there is a great deal of work to be done. We need to realize that much of what we think we know about how the world works is wrong; to get a handle on the disruptive forces transforming the global economy; to identify the long-standing trends that are breaking; to develop the courage and foresight to clear the intellectual decks and prepare to respond. These lessons apply as much to policy makers as to business executives, and the process of resetting your internal navigation system can’t begin soon enough.

There is an urgent imperative to adjust to these new realities. Yet, for all the ingenuity, inventiveness, and imagination of the human race, we tend to be slow to adapt to change. There is a powerful human tendency to want the future to look much like the recent past. On these shoals, huge corporate vessels have repeatedly foundered. Revisiting our assumptions about the world we live in—and doing nothing—will leave many of us highly vulnerable. Gaining a clear-eyed perspective on how to negotiate the changing landscape will help us prepare to succeed.

____________________________________

Richard Dobbs is a director of the McKinsey Global Institute and a director in McKinsey’s London office, James Manyika is a director of the McKinsey Global Institute and a director in the San Francisco office, and Jonathan Woetzel is a director of the McKinsey Global Institute and a director in the Shanghai office.

This article is an edited excerpt from No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends, to be be published on May 12 by PublicAffairs. To learn more about it and preorder copies, please visit Amazon, Barnes & Noble, or other leading bookstores.

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crises | Richard Thibault

Nous avons demandé à Richard Thibault*, président de RTCOMM, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité. Son billet présente sept leçons tirées de son expérience comme consultant en gestion de crise.

En tant que membres de conseils d’administration, vous aurez certainement l’occasion de vivre des crises significatives et il est important de connaître les règles que la direction doit observer en pareilles circonstances.

Voici donc, en reprise, l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteur.

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

Par Richard Thibault*

La crise la mieux gérée est, dit-on, celle que l’on peut éviter. Mais il arrive que malgré tous nos efforts pour l’éviter, la crise frappe et souvent, très fort. Dans toute situation de crise, l’objectif premier est d’en sortir le plus rapidement possible, avec le moins de dommages possibles, sans compromettre le développement futur de l’organisation.

Voici sept leçons dont il faut s’inspirer en matière de communication de crise, sur laquelle on investit généralement 80% de nos efforts, et de notre budget, en de telles situations.

(1) Le choix du porte-parole

Les médias voudront tout savoir. Mais il faudra aussi communiquer avec l’ensemble de nos clientèles internes et externes. Avoir un porte-parole crédible et bien formé est essentiel. On ne s’improvise pas porte-parole, on le devient. Surtout en situation de crise, alors que la tension est parfois extrême, l’organisation a besoin de quelqu’un de crédible et d’empathique à l’égard des victimes. Cette personne devra être en possession de tous ses moyens pour porter adéquatement son message et elle aura appris à éviter les pièges. Le choix de la plus haute autorité de l’organisation comme porte-parole en situation de crise n’est pas toujours une bonne idée. En crise, l’information dont vous disposez et sur laquelle vous baserez vos décisions sera changeante, contradictoire même, surtout au début. Risquer la crédibilité du chef de l’organisation dès le début de la crise peut être hasardeux. Comment le contredire ensuite sans nuire à son image et à la gestion de la crise elle-même ?

(2) S’excuser publiquement si l’on est en faute

S’excuser pour la crise que nous avons provoqué, tout au moins jusqu’à ce que notre responsabilité ait été officiellement dégagée, est une décision-clé de toute gestion de crise, surtout si notre responsabilité ne fait aucun doute. En de telles occasions, il ne faut pas tenter de défendre l’indéfendable. Ou pire, menacer nos adversaires de poursuites ou jouer les matamores avec les agences gouvernementales qui nous ont pris en défaut. On a pu constater les impacts négatifs de cette stratégie utilisée par la FTQ impliquée dans une histoire d’intimidation sur les chantiers de la Côte-Nord, à une certaine époque. Règle générale : mieux vaut s’excuser, être transparent et faire preuve de réserve et de retenue jusqu’à ce que la situation ait été clarifiée.

(3) Être proactif

Dans un conflit comme dans une gestion de crise, le premier à parler évite de se laisser définir par ses adversaires, établit l’agenda et définit l’angle du message. On vous conseillera peut-être de ne pas parler aux journalistes. Je prétends pour ma part que si, légalement, vous n’êtes pas obligés de parler aux médias, eux, en contrepartie, pourront légalement parler de vous et ne se priveront pas d’aller voir même vos opposants pour s’alimenter. En août 2008, la canadienne Maple Leaf, compagnie basée à Toronto, subissait la pire crise de son histoire suite au décès et à la maladie de plusieurs de ses clients. Lorsque le lien entre la listériose et Maple Leaf a été confirmé, cette dernière a été prompte à réagir autant dans ses communications et son attitude face aux médias que dans sa gestion de la crise. La compagnie a très rapidement retiré des tablettes des supermarchés les produits incriminés. Elle a lancé une opération majeure de nettoyage, qu’elle a d’ailleurs fait au grand jour, et elle a offert son support aux victimes. D’ailleurs, la gestion des victimes est généralement le point le plus sensible d’une gestion de crise réussie.

(4) Régler le problème et dire comment

Dès les débuts de la crise, Maple Leaf s’est mise immédiatement au service de l’Agence canadienne d’inspection des aliments, offrant sa collaboration active et entière pour déterminer la cause du problème. Dans le même secteur alimentaire, tout le contraire de ce qu’XL Foods a fait quelques années plus tard. Chez Maple Leaf, tout de suite, des experts reconnus ont été affectés à la recherche de solutions. On pouvait reprocher à la compagnie d’être à la source du problème, mais certainement pas de se trainer les pieds en voulant le régler. Encore une fois, en situation de crise, camoufler sa faute ou refuser de voir publiquement la réalité en face est décidément une stratégie à reléguer aux oubliettes. Plusieurs années auparavant, Tylenol avait montré la voie en retirant rapidement ses médicaments des tablettes et en faisant la promotion d’une nouvelle méthode d’emballage qui est devenue une méthode de référence aujourd’hui.

(5) Employer le bon message

Il est essentiel d’utiliser le bon message, au bon moment, avec le bon messager, diffusé par le bon moyen. Les premiers messages surtout sont importants. Ils serviront à exprimer notre empathie, à confirmer les faits et les actions entreprises, à expliquer le processus d’intervention, à affirmer notre désir d’agir et à dire où se procurer de plus amples informations. Si la gestion des médias est névralgique, la gestion de l’information l’est tout autant. En situation de crise, on a souvent tendance à s’asseoir sur l’information et à ne la partager qu’à des cercles restreints, ou, au contraire, à inonder nos publics d’informations inutiles. Un juste milieu doit être trouvé entre ces deux stratégies sachant pertinemment que le message devra évoluer en même temps que la crise.

(6) Être conséquent et consistant

Même s’il évolue en fonction du stade de la crise, le message de base doit pourtant demeurer le même. Dans l’exemple de Maple Leaf évoqué plus haut, bien que de nouveaux éléments aient surgi au fur et à mesure de l’évolution de la crise, le message de base, à savoir la mise en œuvre de mesures visant à assurer la santé et la sécurité du public, a été constamment repris sur tous les tons. Ainsi, Maple Leaf s’est montrée à la fois consistante en respectant sa ligne de réaction initiale et conséquente, en restant en phase avec le développement de la situation.

(7) Être ouvert d’esprit

Dans toute situation de crise, une attitude d’ouverture s’avérera gagnante. Que ce soit avec les médias, les victimes, nos employés, nos partenaires ou les agences publiques de contrôle, un esprit obtus ne fera qu’envenimer la situation. D’autant plus qu’en situation de crise, ce n’est pas vraiment ce qui est arrivé qui compte mais bien ce que les gens pensent qui est arrivé. Il faut donc suivre l’actualité afin de pouvoir anticiper l’angle que choisiront les médias et s’y préparer en conséquence.

En conclusion

Dans une perspective de gestion de crise, il est essentiel de disposer d’un plan d’action au préalable, même s’il faut l’appliquer avec souplesse pour répondre à l’évolution de la situation. Lorsque la crise a éclaté, c’est le pire moment pour commencer à s’organiser. Il est essentiel d’établir une culture de gestion des risques et de gestion de crise dans l’organisation avant que la crise ne frappe. Comme le dit le vieux sage, » pour être prêt, faut se préparer ! »

____________________________________

* Richard Thibault, ABCP

Président de RTCOMM, une entreprise spécialisée en positionnement stratégique et en gestion de crise

Menant de front des études de Droit à l’Université Laval de Québec, une carrière au théâtre, à la radio et à la télévision, Richard Thibault s’est très tôt orienté vers le secteur des communications, duquel il a développé une expertise solide et diversifiée. Après avoir été animateur, journaliste et recherchiste à la télévision et à la radio de la région de Québec pendant près de cinq ans, il a occupé le poste d’animateur des débats et de responsable des affaires publiques de l’Assemblée nationale de 1979 à 1987.

Richard Thibault a ensuite tour à tour assumé les fonctions de directeur de cabinet et d’attaché de presse de plusieurs ministres du cabinet de Robert Bourassa, de conseiller spécial et directeur des communications à la Commission de la santé et de la sécurité au travail et de directeur des communications chez Les Nordiques de Québec.

En 1994, il fonda Richard Thibault Communications inc. (RTCOMM). D’abord spécialisée en positionnement stratégique et en communication de crise, l’entreprise a peu à peu élargi son expertise pour y inclure tous les champs de pratique de la continuité des affaires. D’autre part, reconnaissant l’importance de porte-parole qualifiés en période trouble, RTCOMM dispose également d’une école de formation à la parole en public. Son programme de formation aux relations avec les médias est d’ailleurs le seul programme de cette nature reconnu par le ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec, dans un contexte de communication d’urgence. Ce programme de formation est aussi accrédité par le Barreau du Québec.

Richard Thibault est l’auteur de Devenez champion dans vos communications et de Osez parler en public, publié aux Éditions MultiMondes et de Comment gérer la prochaine crise, édité chez Transcontinental, dans la Collection Entreprendre. Praticien reconnu de la gestion des risques et de crise, il est accrédité par la Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII).

Spécialités : Expert en positionnement stratégique, gestion des risques, communications de crise, continuité des affaires, formation à la parole en public.

http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=46704908&locale=fr_FR&trk=tyah

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crises | Richard Thibault

Voici donc, en reprise, l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteur.

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

Par Richard Thibault*

Voici sept leçons dont il faut s’inspirer en matière de communication de crise, sur laquelle on investit généralement 80% de nos efforts, et de notre budget, en de telles situations.

(1) Le choix du porte-parole

(2) S’excuser publiquement si l’on est en faute

(3) Être proactif

(4) Régler le problème et dire comment

(5) Employer le bon message

(6) Être conséquent et consistant

(7) Être ouvert d’esprit

En conclusion

____________________________________

* Richard Thibault, ABCP

Président de RTCOMM, une entreprise spécialisée en positionnement stratégique et en gestion de crise

Spécialités : Expert en positionnement stratégique, gestion des risques, communications de crise, continuité des affaires, formation à la parole en public.

http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=46704908&locale=fr_FR&trk=tyah

Guide sur les responsabilités des administrateurs au Canada

Voici un excellent guide sur les responsabilités et les obligations des administrateurs de sociétés au Canada produit par Osler.

Vous pouvez visionner la vidéo (en français) produite par Osler en cliquant su le lien suivant : Responsabilités des administrateurs au Canada

La version écrite, présentée ci-dessous, est en anglais (la version française sera bientôt disponible).

Bonne lecture !

Directors’ Responsibilities in Canada | Osler

Le guide Responsabilités des administrateurs au Canada, issu de la collaboration entre Osler et l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés, est un outil de référence de choix dont tous les administrateurs ont besoin pour comprendre les pratiques exemplaires en matière de gouvernance et pour s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités, dans le contexte actuel des tendances commerciales en constante évolution et des changements dans le marché.

Le guide couvre :

les devoirs et l’obligation de rendre compte des administrateurs, et le rôle des actionnaires

les questions de gouvernance, y compris les conflits d’intérêts des administrateurs, les lois sur les valeurs mobilières et les exigences des marchés boursiers

les obligations d’information des sociétés ouvertes

les questions de financement, de marchés des capitaux et d’offres publiques d’achat

les responsabilités imposées par la loi, y compris les opérations d’initiés, la législation sur l’environnement et les questions d’ordre fiscal

la responsabilité pour les infractions en vertu des lois sur les sociétés

la gestion du risque

Inscrivez-vous pour obtenir un exemplaire en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous. Il vous sera envoyé par courriel dès sa publication.

Responsabilités des administrateurs au Canada | Osler

Voici un excellent guide sur les responsabilités et les obligations des administrateurs de sociétés au Canada produit par Osler.

La version présentée ici est en anglais (la version française sera bientôt disponible).

Bonne lecture !

Directors’ Responsibilities in Canada : Osler

Le guide Responsabilités des administrateurs au Canada, issu de la collaboration entre Osler et l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés, est un outil de référence de choix dont tous les administrateurs ont besoin pour comprendre les pratiques exemplaires en matière de gouvernance et pour s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités, dans le contexte actuel des tendances commerciales en constante évolution et des changements dans le marché.

Le guide couvre :

les devoirs et l’obligation de rendre compte des administrateurs, et le rôle des actionnaires

les questions de gouvernance, y compris les conflits d’intérêts des administrateurs, les lois sur les valeurs mobilières et les exigences des marchés boursiers

les obligations d’information des sociétés ouvertes

les questions de financement, de marchés des capitaux et d’offres publiques d’achat

les responsabilités imposées par la loi, y compris les opérations d’initiés, la législation sur l’environnement et les questions d’ordre fiscal

la responsabilité pour les infractions en vertu des lois sur les sociétés

la gestion du risque

Inscrivez-vous pour obtenir un exemplaire en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous. Il vous sera envoyé par courriel dès sa publication.

Guide des meilleures pratiques pour les C.A. concernant (1) les fusions et acquisitions, (2) les crises d’entreprise et (3) les difficultés financières

Voici un excellent guide, produit par Deloitte, qui porte sur les bons gestes à poser par les conseils d’administration lorsqu’ils sont aux prises avec les problématiques liées aux fusions et acquisitions, aux crises à gérer et aux problèmes financiers.

Afin de vous donner une idée du contenu du document, voici un aperçu des thèmes abordés.

Les paramètres de la gouvernance évoluent
Fusions et acquisitions : une bonne gouvernance à toutes les étapes du processus
Gestion de crise : le manque de préparation représente clairement un risque
Difficultés financières : priorité aux risques
Le conseil d’administration peut relever le défi
Personnes-ressources

Bonne lecture !

Un guide des meilleures pratiques pour les conseils d’administration qui porte sur les fusions et acquisitions, les crises d’entreprise et les difficultés financières

Le conseil d’administration vient d’apprendre que l’entreprise pourrait être à court de liquidités d’ici un an. Que devez-vous faire? Après une acquisition d’entreprise, le conseil d’administration est poursuivi par les actionnaires, qui l’accusent de ne pas avoir supervisé adéquatement la décision concernant le prix d’achat. Comment prévenir une telle situation? Votre entreprise traverse une crise depuis que la direction a été accusée d’avoir fourni de faux renseignements à des auditeurs externes. Quand faut-il demander conseil à des experts indépendants?

On a fait grand cas des pressions subies par les conseils d’administration dans les mois éprouvants qui ont suivi la crise financière mondiale. De nombreux facteurs ont été mis en cause, notamment la déréglementation du secteur financier, les procédures d’audit inadéquates, la confiance excessive des investisseurs, les pratiques de prêt viciées et la cupidité des entreprises. Les conseils d’administration n’ont pas échappé à cet examen, et les observateurs se demandent si une surveillance plus efficace de la part des conseils d’administration des institutions financières n’aurait pas permis de repérer et de résoudre certains des problèmes qui ont presque anéanti l’économie mondiale. Les conseils d’administration comprenaient-ils assez de membres possédant des connaissances suffisantes et appropriées? Les administrateurs ont-ils posé les bonnes questions? Ont-ils pris les bonnes mesures? Avaient-ils l’information la plus récente sur les nouveaux enjeux? Étaient-ils prêts à contester la direction? Naturellement, avec le recul, la crise financière est maintenant vue comme une tempête causée par une multitude de facteurs dont aucun n’est entièrement à blâmer, et les instances de réglementation et les entreprises appliquent encore les mesures correctives qui s’imposent. Les questions que cette crise a soulevées continuent cependant de préoccuper les conseils d’administration en général. En effet, à mesure que la crise financière devient chose du passé, les conseils d’administration s’interrogent sur d’autres questions et sur un éventail de risques et de responsabilités possibles.

Les cinq dernières années ont été le théâtre de grands bouleversements dans l’arène mondiale de la réglementation. Dans bien des secteurs, la quantité et la complexité des règles ont augmenté, de même que la rigueur avec laquelle elles sont appliquées; les entreprises ont du mal à suivre la cadence, car elles composent encore avec les effets de l’après-crise et cherchent le plus possible à limiter les risques. De leur côté, les conseils d’administration tentent également de s’adapter, malgré la transformation des attentes des parties prenantes, des organismes de réglementation et du public.

Quelles ont été les conséquences de ces événements pour l’administrateur moyen? Des pressions venant de tous les fronts. Par exemple, le rôle de l’administrateur, surtout de celui qui cumule plusieurs postes, peut être si astreignant qu’il devient ingérable et présente de plus en plus de risques du point de vue de la responsabilité. La quantité de connaissances réglementaires et spécialisées nécessaires pour siéger efficacement à un conseil d’administration va en augmentant, et les administrateurs sont souvent dépassés par l’étendue croissante de leurs tâches.

Les conseils d’administration se trouvent donc actuellement dans une position très difficile. Étant donné leur vaste mandat, ils doivent se tenir à l’affût d’une variété de plus en plus importante de renseignements, adopter de nouvelles stratégies de réponse en vertu de leur mandat et déterminer dans quelles circonstances ils doivent consulter des experts indépendants.

Le présent document est conçu pour leur venir en aide. Il examine trois questions cruciales auxquelles les conseils d’administration accordent rarement leur attention, c’est-à-dire les fusions et acquisitions, la gestion de crise et les difficultés financières. Il présente les principaux risques que les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération dans chaque domaine, suggère des mesures d’atténuation de ces risques et décrit les avantages d’une meilleure surveillance de leur part ainsi que les dangers d’un laxisme prolongé.

La saga d’American Apparel | Une affreuse gouvernance

Voici un article publié par Gael O’Brien dans Business Ethics sur la saga de la gouvernance à American Apparel. Le fondateur Charney est en guerre contre son conseil d’administration pour une foule de raisons, valables à mon point de vue.

La situation est d’autant plus saugrenue que le président Charney est responsable de la nomination des membres du C.A. !

Je vous invite à une lecture pimentée d’une situation surréelle dont vous trouverez un extrait ci-dessous.

American Apparel: Sex, Power and Terrible Corporate Governance

The American Apparel story gets crazier by the moment.

Actions taken by the company’s board two weeks ago to attempt to remove founder Dov Charney as chairman and CEO have prompted him to launch a counteroffensive to regain control of American Apparel. Working with hedge fund investors, Charney has borrowed money to increase his shares in the company to 43 percent and is threatening a proxy fight. But the hedge fund investors working with Charney are now negotiating with the very board that fired him – and there’s a possibility that a new management team could be appointed that does not include Charney.

Whether Charney is successful or not, the result of his past leadership is an American Apparel characterized by two faces in opposition to each other. When that happens, the worst face eventually outweighs the best. The retail company’s attempts at socially responsible practices — clothes touted as ethically made in the United States – have ended up being plowed under by the repugnant behavior of its leader, who sexualized the workplace as a stalking ground for employee relationships called consensual, disregarding disparity of age and power.

American Apparel’s drama illustrates two key problems: In companies where there is a dominant founder running the company according to the beat of his (or her) own drum, how hands-on can a hand-picked board be when it is necessary to reign in the founder? And, when ethical issues surface in a company with a sexually provocative brand image, how does a hand-picked board ensure a clear stand is taken?

Charney’s hand-picked board supported him for years through several very public sexual harassment lawsuits — not appearing to reign in his philosophy that a sexually-charged workplace fosters creativity; it authorized a quiet, internal investigation this year which uncovered examples where they said Charney misused company funds and didn’t prevent the posting of naked photos of a former employee who had sued him for sexual harassment a few years before.

___________________________________________________

Gael O’Brien, a Business Ethics Magazine columnist, is a consultant, executive coach, and presenter focused on building leadership, trust, and reputation. She publishes the The Week in Ethics and is The Ethics Coach columnist for Entrepreneur Magazine.

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise **

Nous avons demandé à Richard Thibault *, président de RTCOMM, d’agir à titre d’auteur invité. Son billet présente sept leçons tirées de son expérience comme consultant en gestion de crise.

Voici donc l’article en question, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteur. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

Par Richard Thibault*

Voici sept leçons dont il faut s’inspirer en matière de communication de crise, sur laquelle on investit généralement 80% de nos efforts, et de notre budget, en de telles situations.

(1) Le choix du porte-parole

(2) S’excuser publiquement si l’on est en faute

(3) Être proactif

(4) Régler le problème et dire comment

(5) Employer le bon message

(6) Être conséquent et consistant

(7) Être ouvert d’esprit

En conclusion

____________________________________

* Richard Thibault, ABCP

Président de RTCOMM, une entreprise spécialisée en positionnement stratégique et en gestion de crise

Spécialités : Expert en positionnement stratégique, gestion des risques, communications de crise, continuité des affaires, formation à la parole en public.

http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=46704908&locale=fr_FR&trk=tyah

** Article en reprise

La réputation de l’entreprise : un actif intangible à protéger *

Vous trouverez, ci-joint, la dernière version du Rapport Bourgogne, publié par CIRANO, un centre de recherche multidisciplinaire qui a pour mission l’accélération du transfert des savoirs entre le monde de la recherche et celui de la pratique.

L’étude réalisée par Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin, professeure agrégée à l’École Polytechnique de Montréal et vice-présidente au CIRANO et Serban Teodoresco, Président de Preventa Inc., présentent, en une page, les principales conclusions tirées d’une analyse documentaire des recherches menées au cours des 12 dernières années et les résultats d’une étude exploratoire de 80 grandes sociétés au Québec. À lire.

La réputation de l’entreprise : un actif intangible à protéger

« La réputation de l’entreprise est de plus en plus définie comme l’actif stratégique le plus important sur le plan de la création de valeur. L’intérêt des scientifiques à l’égard du concept de réputation de l’entreprise a contribué à quintupler le nombre d’articles et d’études évalués par des pairs au cours de la dernière décennie (Barnett et al., 2006). Pourtant, aucune définition n’est généralement acceptée.

English: Reputation management graphic that breaks down the elements of reputation management and how they fit together. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Nous proposons une définition de la réputation de l’entreprise fondée sur des sources universitaires et des travaux d’experts : La réputation de l’entreprise est un actif incorporel acquis avec le temps et représente la valeur et la confiance accordées à l’organisation par les parties prenantes.

C’est un élément-clé qui favorise l’atteinte d’objectifs stratégiques, dont la création de valeur, la croissance rentable et l’avantage concurrentiel durable. Notre sondage, mené au Québec, montre que seulement la moitié des sociétés interrogées reconnaissent l’importance de la réputation. Aucune ne semble gérer la réputation de façon proactive… Le présent ouvrage propose un plan d’action à l’intention des sociétés désireuses d’effectuer la transition entre la gestion réactive et la gestion proactive de la réputation ».

______________________________________________

* En reprise

Comment résoudre les conflits potentiels dans les entreprises familiales ? *

Voici un article très intéressant publié par Barney Jordaan dans les publications de Corporate Governance Forum sur l’importance de bien comprendre les enjeux de gouvernance propres aux entreprises familiales.

L’article illustre particulièrement bien le contexte managérial dans lequel les entreprises familiales évoluent. Il y a de nombreux avantages pour une PME à ne pas se soucier de procédures, de règles, de structures, … au début ! Mais un jour ou l’autre, l’entreprise devra faire face à un plus grand besoin de structure et d’organisation et à l’utilisation de mécanismes de règlements de conflits.

L’auteur explique quatre réponses susceptibles d’être envisagées lors de l’émergence de conflits; il propose un processus de médiation adapté aux entreprises familiales dans le règlement des différents.

Également, l’article présente plusieurs mesures préventives concrètes à mettre en place avant que les conflits se manifestent. Enfin, l’auteur présente un cadre conceptuel très utile pour mieux saisir les relations entre (1) la confiance et (2) la formalisation. Les personnes qui œuvrent dans des entreprises familiales comprendront aisément l’analyse de M. Jordaan !

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait des grandes lignes de l’argumentation de l’auteur.

Resolving Differences in Family-Owned Businesses

« Some of the same aspects of family-owned businesses that can give them a competitive advantage are also the factors that contribute to the high levels of destructive conflict that often occur in them. For example, close family ties can contribute to strong bonds of trust and cooperation, but they also can add emotional fuel to the fire when conflicts arise. Barney Jordaan argues that the best cure for these conflicts is prevention—through establishing basic family governance structures and, failing that, dispute resolution processes that are sensitive to the distinctive dynamic and singular needs of a family-owned business.

Small Business Administration Awards Luncheon (Photo credit: MDGovpics)

Corporate governance is often, and wrongly, regarded as the exclusive domain of large corporations with shares that are traded in global stock exchanges. Perhaps this is because the data of those corporations are public and available for scrutiny by investors, journalists, and academics. However, the need for better governance is even more important for smaller, nonlisted family businesses. Listed companies are as visible as the tip of an iceberg, but below the waterline we find a much larger number of companies, mostly family-controlled. In Brazil, for example, about 400 companies are listed on BM&F Bovespa Stock Exchange, whereas 55,000 medium and large (more than 100 employees) companies are not listed. In the United States, unofficial statistics show that 5.6 million family businesses produce 57 percent of the gross domestic product and employ 63 percent of the workforce. Financially, they outperform listed companies and are a perpetual source of much-needed innovation and entrepreneurship.

Listed companies must comply with an extensive set of laws and regulations and are under permanent supervision. Nonlisted family businesses, by contrast, are less subject to external controls and are notoriously light in their use of bureaucracy, as noted in Barney Jordaan’s paper. Yet they have the same governance needs of listed companies, and a few more needs of their own. One of the biggest strategic advantages a family business can have is its bloodline. Family corporations, when run by a few tightly knit family members, can almost always move far faster than corporate bureaucracies can. In case of conflicts, relationships between family members must be preserved, and judicial solutions must be regarded as a last, not first alternative. On the other hand, the nature of family relationships adds several degrees of complexity to such issues as related-party transactions, employment of family members, private use of company assets, and dividend decisions, just to mention a few. These problems are aggravated by ownership and managerial succession issues as well as by the participation of different generations. Corporate governance conflicts in family businesses often involve corporate and family law. Corporate legal advice will often destroy family relationships, and it is practically impossible for judicial decisions to be constructive in both areas, all of which builds a positive case for nonjudicial approaches. Jordaan describes the financial and nonfinancial consequences of conflicts and typical responses. He makes a strong case for mediation as a cost-saving and relationships-repairing mechanism between family members, either by involving a trained professional mediator in the dispute or by having ongoing involvement of the mediator to facilitate family council meetings ». _____________________________________ * En reprise

Document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014

Voici le document de consultation de l’OCDE sur la révision des principes de gouvernance |2014, présenté à Paris le 17 mars 2014. Ce document est en version anglaise seulement. Après la révision, l’OCDE produira des versions dans toutes les langues !

Celui-ci explicite les objectifs de politiques publiques en gouvernance, explore le nouveau paysage qui commande des changements en gouvernance et suggère sept (7) domaines susceptibles d’engendrer des changements importants au document Principe de gouvernance de 2004 (OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).

Je vous invite à participer à cette consultation si vous croyez utile de le faire. Ci-dessous, une introduction, suivie des 7 développements qui influeront sur la nouvelle version des principes de gouvernance de l’OCDE.

The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance is a public policy instrument intended to assist governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate governance. As formulated in the mandate that was given to the OECD Corporate Governance Committee in 2010, the objective is to contribute to « economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability ». In practice, this objective is achieved by formulating principles for policies that give market participants sound economic incentives to perform their respective roles within a framework of checks and balances where transparency, supervision and effective enforcement provides confidence in market practices and institutions.

English: The logo of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While the Principles may inspire voluntary initiatives and influence practices in individual companies, the Principles do not aspire to include a shopping list of what individual market participants, such as shareholders, boards, managers and other stakeholders, from their unique perspectives, may consider good business judgment or sound commercial practices. What works in one company or for one investor may not necessarily be generally applicable as public policy or of systemic economic importance to society.

In order to be relevant and effective, the legal and regulatory framework must be shaped with respect to the economic reality in which it will be implemented. This is true also for the recommendations made in the Principles. And since they were last revised in 2004, the world has experienced a number of important events and structural developments in both the financial and corporate sectors. This obviously includes the financial crisis. But equally important for the review of the Principles are the far reaching changes in corporate ownership and investment practices. In some respects, these changes have come to challenge conventional wisdom and the relevance of current corporate governance standards. Several of these developments have been documented and analysed by the Corporate Governance Committee and the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables and some of the background reports that have been written to support the review are annexed to this note for reference.

Seven main events and developments of importance to the review of the Principles can be identified:

The financial crisis.

The financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business practices. Corporate governance weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights played an important role in the development of the financial crisis and such weaknesses extended not only to the financial sector, but to companies more generally. The lessons from the financial crisis are discussed in the Committee’s report « Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Conclusions and Emerging Good Practices to Enhance Implementation of the Principles » (2010).

Developments in institutional ownership, investment strategies and trading techniques.

Since the Principles were revised in 2004, assets under management by institutional investors have increased considerably. We have also seen a surge in new types of institutional investors, investment vehicles and trading techniques. Taken together, these developments have affected the character and quality of ownership engagement. Many of the largest institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds use indexing as the prime investment strategy. A special, and increasingly popular, version of indexing is the use of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which increased by more than 1000 percent between 2004 and 2011. A common characteristic of these investment practices is that they motivate investors to pay little or no attention to the fundamentals of individual companies, since the composition of the index is pre-defined and adjustments in the portfolio is not by active choice but rather a result of the index weighting. The same effect results from the surge in so-called high frequency trading where the investment strategy and ultra-short holding periods do not motivate any corporate specific analysis or ownership engagement. A fourth development that has attracted a lot of interest and debate is co-location of brokers, data vendors and other participants’ computer capacity within the stock exchanges’ data centres. This has raised concerns about confidence in a level playing field among different categories of investors with respect to market information. These developments and their implications for the economic incentives for ownership engagement among institutional investors are further discussed in « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013).

Developments in the investment chain and the use of service providers.

The real world of ownership characterised by institutional (or intermediary) investors is a very different reality than the model textbook world of company law and economics, which assumes a strict and uncompromised alignment of interest between the performance of the company and the income of the ultimate shareholder. Instead of a straight line from « from profit to pocket », which is assumed in theory, we have an extended and sometimes very complex investment chain where different actors may have different incentives. The implications for the quality of ownership engagement are discussed in the background report « Institutional Investors as Owners – Who Are They and What Do They Do? » (2013). Among other aspects, the report highlights the possible implications of cross-investments between different institutional investors and the extensive use of proxy advisers, which is sometimes argued to impose a box ticking culture of « one-size-fits-all ». The last couple of decades have also seen an increase in outsourcing of asset management to external asset managers who may also be charged with carrying out the ownership functions. The complexity of the investment chain is also influenced by changes in stock market structures, trading practices and investment strategies. One example is the increased use of dark pools and off-exchange trading platforms that has increased concerns about the quality of the price discovery process and equal access to market information, which is so essential for efficient allocation of capital.

Developments in shareholder rights and participation.

Since the last review of the Principles, shareholder rights in many countries have been strengthened and there is a general trend to empower the shareholder meeting in the corporate decision-making process, particularly with respect to board nomination and remuneration policies. Technological advancements have also contributed to facilitating shareholder participation in the shareholder meetings. As documented in the report « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013), several studies illustrate a relatively high level of participation in shareholder meetings in most OECD countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States that have predominantly dispersed ownership at corporate level. Today, the discussion on shareholder participation is mainly focused on the actual quality of shareholder monitoring and engagement, with the exception of issues related to shareholder co-operation. In some countries, particularly in emerging market economies, it is also argued that ownership engagement is impeded by difficulties with respect to placing items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting; the rules for convening shareholders’ meetings; limited access to relevant documentation and restrictions on share ownership by institutional investors.

Developments in corporate characteristics and business models.

Investments in fixed assets, such as machinery and buildings, have for decades been seen as the main source of capital formation. A recent OECD study1, however, shows that business investment in intangible assets has been increasing faster than investments in fixed assets for a number of years in many OECD countries and already accounts for more than half of the total business investment in some countries. The result is an increased dependence on human capital and intangible assets for innovation and value creation at firm level. At the same time, there has been significant number of acquisitions by some large established companies in more intangible-asset-intensive industries, partly through their venture units. Together with the decrease in the number of new listings in advanced stock markets, these developments have raised concerns about the ability of growth companies to develop and expand as independent companies. One preliminary indicator is the decrease in the share of young companies as percentage of the total number of companies in the US by 16% over the last decade. Another important development in terms of corporate characteristics and business models is the creation and surge of alternative corporate structures, mainly in the form of partnerships. This includes publicly traded partnerships (PTPs) and master limited partnerships (MSPs) that trade on securities exchanges.

Developments in corporate ownership.

Traditionally, the international corporate governance debate has focused on situations with dispersed ownership where the conflict is a zero sum game between dispersed owners on the one hand and incumbent management on the other hand. This « agency » approach has its merits but it also has important weaknesses. One important weakness is that most listed companies around the world are not characterized by dispersed ownership. Rather, they have a controlling or dominant owner. This is particularly true in emerging markets. But controlling owners are also common in most advanced economies, including the US and continental Europe. It has been argued that the focus on dispersed ownership is of limited help when addressing corporate governance issues in companies that have a controlling owner. The presence of controlling owners is generally assumed to provide strong incentives for informed ownership engagement and to overcome the fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. There are also arguments that the incentives for controlling owners to assume the costs for this ownership engagement are weakened by restrictions on the possibilities of controlling owners to exercise their rights and be properly compensated for their efforts to monitor. Some of these are discussed in the background paper « The Law and Economics of Controlling Owners in Corporate Governance » (2013). At the same time, there are concerns that controlling owners in a weak regulatory framework may take advantage of minority shareholders through abusive related party transactions. This is discussed in the report « Related Party Transactions and Minority Shareholder Rights » (2012).

Developments in the functioning of public stock markets.

Corporate governance policies are focused on companies that are traded on the public stock market. To understand the functioning and structure of public stock markets is therefore essential for getting the corporate governance rules right. And today, stock markets look very different from what they did when the OECD Principles were first established. The developments are well documented in the background reports « Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets » (2013) and « Making Stock markets Work to Support Economic Growth » (2013), which address issues such as market fragmentation, increased use of dark pools, changes in « tick-size », high-frequency trading and co-location. The reports also show that during the last decade, some of the leading stock markets in the world have lost as much as half of their listed companies and that the average size of companies that find their way to the stock market has increased. At the same time, stock exchanges in emerging markets, notably in Asia, have increased the number of listed companies significantly. Between 2008 and 2012 a majority of all new listings in the world were in emerging markets. Since the free float (the portion of outstanding shares regularly available for public trading) is relatively small in these markets, one consequence of this development is an increase in the number of publicly traded companies that have a controlling owner. Another important development is the occurrence of cross-listings and secondary listings, which raises issues related to the standards and procedures for recognizing of corporate governance standards in primary listing venues and the allocation of supervisory obligations between listing stock exchanges. We have also seen a development where stock exchanges have demutualised and become listed companies on themselves; so called self-listing. At the same time, there has been a certain degree of consolidation through mergers of regulated exchanges both at national and international level, which was coupled with the emergence of new venues for trading; such as alternative trading venues and dark pools.

2014 Review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

First released in May 1999 and last revised in 2004, the OECD Corporate Governance Committee has launched a further review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The review process starts in 2014 with the objective of conclusion within one year.

The OECD Principles are one of the 12 key standards for international financial stability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and form the basis for the corporate governance component of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes of the World Bank Group.

The rationale for the review is to ensure the continuing high quality, relevance and usefulness of the Principles taking into account recent developments in the corporate sector and capital markets. The outcome should provide policy makers, regulators and other rule-making bodies with a sound benchmark for establishing an effective corporate governance framework.

The basis for the review will be the 2004 version of the Principles, which embrace the shared understanding that a high level of transparency, accountability, board oversight, and respect for the rights of shareholders and role of key stakeholders is part of the foundation of a well-functioning corporate governance system. These core values should be maintained and, as appropriate, be strengthened to reflect experiences since 2004.

As the Principles are a global standard also adopted by the FSB, all FSB member jurisdictions are invited to participate in the review as Associates and have the same decision-making rights as OECD members.

The review will benefit from consultations with stakeholders, including the business sector, investors, professional groups at national and international levels, trade unions, civil society organisations and other international standard setting bodies.

Peer reviews – In response to the corporate governance challenges that came into focus in the wake of the financial crisis, the Corporate Governance Committee launched a thematic review process designed to facilitate the effective implementation of the OECD Principles and to assist market participants and policy makers to respond to emerging corporate governance risks. These peer reviews will provide valuable background support to the review.

OECD Forecasts During and After the Financial Crisis: A Post Mortem

Préoccupations des C.A. eu égard à la cybersécurité ?

Voici un document du National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) qui aborde une question cruciale sur le rôle des conseils d’administration en matière de prévention et de réactions à la suite de problèmes de sécurité informatique.

computer security (Photo credit: justonlysteve)

Le document de 10 pages est disponible gratuitement sur le site du NACD si vous vous inscrivez. Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des principales questions qu’un administrateur devrait poser à la direction.

Voici un extrait de l’article, notamment les questions concernant la planification d’une attaque à la sécurité, et d’autres questions concernant les mesures à prendre à la suite de ces problèmes.

Cybersecurity: Boardroom Implications

Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management in Planning for a Breach

How will we know we have been hacked or breached, what makes us certain or how will we find out?
What are best practices for cybersecurity and where do our practices differ?
In management’s opinion, what is the biggest weakness in our IT systems? If we wanted to deal the most damage to the company, how would we go about it?
Does our external auditor indicate we have deficiencies in IT? If so, where?
Where do management and our IT team disagree on cybersecurity?
Were we told of cyber attacks that already occurred and how severe they were? For significant breaches, is the communication adequate as information is obtained regarding the nature and type of breach, the data impacted, and potential implications to the company and the response plan?
What part of our IT infrastructure can contribute to a significant deficiency or material weakness?
What do we consider our most valuable assets; how does our IT system interact with those assets; do we think there is adequate protection in place if someone wanted to get them or damage them; what would it take to feel comfortable that they were protected? Do we believe we can ever fully protect those assets? How should we monitor the status of their protection?
Are we investing enough so our corporate operating and network systems are not easy targets by a determined hacker?
Where can we generate more revenue and marginal profitability by making changes in IT?

Ten Questions Directors Can Ask Management Once a Breach Is Found

How did we learn about the breach? Were we notified by an outside agency or was the breach found internally?
What do we believe was stolen?
What has been affected by the breach?
Have any of our operations been compromised?
Is our crisis response plan in action, and is it working as planned?
Whom do we have to notify about this breach (materiality), whom should we notify, and is our legal team prepared for such notifications?
What steps is the response team taking to ensure that the breach is under control and the hacker no longer has access to the internal network?
Do we believe the hacker was an internal or external actor?
What were the weaknesses in our system that allowed it to occur (and why)?
What steps can we take to make sure this type of breach does not happen again,

Mieux connaître la relation entre l’anxiété et la performance … pour en assurer la maîtrise !

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose de méditer sur le billet de Scott Stossel* paru le 6 janvier 2014 dans HBR Blog Network qui aborde un sujet intrigant et très pertinent à quiconque se préoccupe de performance optimale.

On connaît la relation entre l’anxiété (ce sentiment diffus d’appréhension souvent injustifiée et infondée) et la performance – dans l’accomplissement d’une tâche. La performance est optimale lorsque l’on réussit à équilibrer l’intensité de l’anxiété : généralement, trop d’anxiété est nuisible à l’exécution de l’activité; peu d’anxiété conduit à une plus faible performance.

Si vous croyez être sujets à des accès d’angoisses immotivées, vous n’êtes pas les seuls … et il existe des moyens pour y faire face. Cet article vous ouvrira plusieurs voies d’accommodement possibles; bref, si vous expérimentez ce sentiment diffus d’anxiété – et que cela influence négativement votre travail – cet article est pour vous. Je vous invite aussi à lire les excellents commentaires à la fin de l’article.

En quoi ce sujet concerne-t-il la gouvernance ? Donnez votre point de vue. Bonne lecture !

The Relationship Between Anxiety and Performance

An influential study conducted a hundred years ago by two Harvard psychologists, Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson, demonstrated that moderate levels of anxiety improve performance in humans and animals: too much anxiety, obviously, impairs performance, but so does too little. Their findings have been experimentally demonstrated in both animals and humans many times since then.

“Without anxiety, little would be accomplished,” David Barlow, founder of the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders at Boston University, has written. “The performance of athletes, entertainers, executives, artisans, and students would suffer; creativity would diminish; crops might not be planted. And we would all achieve that idyllic state long sought after in our fast-paced society of whiling away our lives under a shade tree. This would be as deadly for the species as nuclear war.”

So how do you find the right balance? How do you get yourself into the performance zone where anxiety is beneficial? That’s a really tough question. For me, years of medication and intensive therapy have (sometimes, somewhat) taken the physical edge off my nerves so I could focus on trying to do well, not on removing myself from the center of attention as quickly as possible. For those who choke during presentations to board members or pitches to clients, for example, but probably aren’t what you’d call clinically anxious, the best approach may be one akin to what Beilock has athletes do in her experiments: redirecting your mind, in the moment, to something other than how you’re comporting yourself, so you can allow the skills and knowhow you’ve worked so hard to acquire to automatically kick into gear and carry you through. Your focus should not be on worrying about outcomes or consequences or on how you’re being perceived but simply on the task at hand. Prepare thoroughly (but not too obsessively) in advance; then stay in the moment. If you’re feeling anxious, breathe from your diaphragm in order to keep your sympathetic nervous system from revving up too much. And remember that it can be good to be keyed up: the right amount of nervousness will enhance your performance.

* Scott Stossel est l’éditeur de la revue The Atlantic et l’auteur du volume My Age of Anxiety: Fear, Hope, Dread, and the Search for Peace of Mind (Knopf 2014).

Message aux abonnés du blogue ainsi qu’aux membres du groupe « Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance » de LinkedIn

Chers membres et abonnés,

Voici, au 26 décembre 2013, certaines informations concernant notre blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’un message de notre groupe de discussion LinkedIn Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance.

1. Le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Depuis le début de la parution du blogue, le 19 juillet, j’ai publié 820 billets en gouvernance et suscité l’intérêt d’environ 75 000 personnes. Le blogue a eu trois fois plus de visiteurs dans la dernière année. Beaucoup d’abonnés au blogue se servent de l’outil de recherche (situé au bas de la page) afin d’obtenir des informations pertinentes et d’actualité sur leurs questionnements en gouvernance. À ce stade-ci, mon objectif est d’avoir plus de 50 000 visiteurs pour l’année 2014.

Le référencement se fait principalement par LinkedIn (43 %) et par des engins de recherche tels que Google (43 %); le reste (14 %) se réparti entre plusieurs autres réseaux sociaux.

Le partage des billets se fait par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn (40 %), Twitter (29 %), Facebook (22 %) et Tumblr (9 %).

Le site est fréquenté par des visiteurs provenant :

du Canada (59 %)
de la France (20 %) (incluant Suisse et Belgique)
du Magreb (4 %) (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie)
d’autres pays de diverses provenance (17 %).

J’en profite pour remercier à nouveau tous les lecteurs qui, par leurs votes, ont exprimé leur appréciation du blogue lors du concours organisé par Made In Blog (MiB) à l’échelle canadienne. Notre blogue a obtenu la deuxième position parmi les soixante-cinq (65) blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul candidat finaliste dans le domaine de la gouvernance. Nous sommes honorés de cette marque de reconnaissance.

Blog Image

Rappelons que ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revues, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant aux lecteurs une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes

2. Le groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn | Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance

Notre groupe de discussion sur LinkedIn, Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance, sous l’égide du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), a connu une croissance remarquable au cours des dernières années, passant de 372 membres, au 1er septembre 2012, à 858 membres au 26 décembre 2013.

Notre objectif est de demeurer le groupe francophone de référence en gouvernance le plus actif et le plus influent en 2014 sur LinkedIn.

Au cours de cette période, nous avons réussi à maintenir un haut niveau de respect dans nos échanges, et à provoquer de saines discussions sur des thèmes relatifs à la gouvernance de tous les types d’entreprises évoluant dans des environnements règlementaires différents (USA, CANADA, UK, UE).

En tant qu’administrateur et contributeur principal de ce groupe, je vous remercie vivement de vos contributions à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

Au nom du CAS, et en mon nom personnel, je vous souhaite un excellent temps des Fêtes et une année 2014 à la hauteur de vos aspirations.

Merci encore de votre présence soutenue au blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé ainsi qu’au groupe de discussion Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance du CAS.

8 Ways to Track Your Social Media Performance (financialsocialmedia.com)

LinkedIn: The 25 Hottest Skills That Got People Hired in 2013 (alexfreelancer.wordpress.com)

Le cas d’un nouveau président du conseil d’administration (PCA) d’une société d’État

Voici un cas qui intéressera sûrement tous les membres de conseils d’administration de sociétés d’État. Même si le cas en gouvernance origine du site australien de Julie Garland McLellan, je crois que celui-ci s’applique très bien à la situation des sociétés d’État québécoises.

Voici donc un cas original tiré d’une situation vécue dans une entreprise d’État. Comment un président du conseil (PCA – Chairman) et son conseil peuvent-ils arriver à gérer une situation critique créée par ses prédécesseurs, une situation qui a le potentiel de nuire à l’organisation et de discréditer le conseil et le gouvernement.

Qu’en pensez-vous ? Que feriez-vous à la place de Brian pour faire évoluer le conseil ?

Ce cas a été analysé par trois experts de la gouvernance (Voir les avis des experts dans le texte ci-dessous). Quelle analyse vous semble la plus appropriée dans notre contexte ?

Le cas du nouveau président du conseil d’administration (PCA) d’une société d’État

Brian is chairman of a government owned company. Succession has been ‘actively managed’ with directors rotating on and off the board. This has given access to new skills including marketing and modern media but has resulted in a board with relatively little corporate history. Brian is the longest serving member and has only been on the board for five years.

Walmart Chairman of the Board Discusses Making a Difference (Photo credit: Walmart Corporate)

Six years ago the company terminated the employment of the then CFO due to allegations of improper accounting which had resulted in revalued assets and a large profit being declared in the prior year triggering payment of bonuses to the then CFO and CEO.
The former CEO left shortly after receiving the bonus. The replacement CEO decided to investigate the accounting treatment. The investigation was conducted by the outsourced internal audit firm and concluded that the accounting treatment did not meet guidelines or even generally accepted accounting standards. The statutory auditors agreed. The asset revaluations were subsequently reversed which led to a large loss, no dividends or tax equivalent payments that year, and great embarrassment.

The former CFO was terminated and the matter referred to the police as a possible fraud. A new CFO was appointed. She is a pleasant and efficient person whom the board like and respect. She is considered a potential successor to the current CEO. The police decided not to pursue the fraud allegations as they believed these lacked sufficient evidence. The former CFO is suing for wrongful dismissal, the lawyers believe he may win, and the current CFO is worried because the union is calling for the former CFO to be reinstated.

The board is looking to Brian, who also chairs the remuneration committee, for guidance on what to do. The current CEO has offered his resignation but nobody wants to accept it. How can Brian help the board to move forward ?

Six raisons qui militent en faveur du choix d’administrateurs externes au C.A. (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

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I. Introduction

II. A Preliminary Admission by VW: Individual Misconduct by a few Software Engineers

III. Recognition of Organizational Failures by VW

IV. Organizational Changes Considered as a Preliminary Step

V. Conclusion

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Éthique, démission et parachutes dorés | une délicate alchimie

Margaux Mortéo et Léonie Pamerleau

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Resetting intuition

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Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise

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Articles reliés au rôle des présidents de conseils administrateurs :

The Man Inside « The Board » (docireport.org)

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