Le choix entre le couple expérience-réputation et le couple fougue-expertise | Ça dépend !


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un cas fascinant qui illustre les difficultés de choisir un nouvel administrateur d’une jeune entreprise technologique.

Ce cas de gouvernance, publié en novembre 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan*, décrit la situation d’une entreprise qui est sur le point de s’inscrire en bourse ; choisit-elle, comme nouvel administrateur, une jeune personne fougueuse avec une solide expertise technique, ou choisit-elle une personne d’expérience possédant une grande réputation de bonne gouvernance ?

Le courtier qui conseille l’entreprise sur les conditions de son entrée en bourse lui suggère impérativement le choix d’une personne de grande réputation dans le domaine des affaires.

Le cas soumis est réel et il incite trois experts à présenter des points de vue assez différents sur les avantages et les inconvénients liés à chacun des choix.

Afin de vous former une idée mieux étayée du dilemme qui met en contraste les experts en gouvernance dans ce cas, je vous invite à lire leurs opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ? Faites-vous une idée claire avant de consulter les réponses des experts.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Le choix entre le couple expérience-réputation et le couple fougue-expertise | Ça dépend !

 

 

 

This month our case study considers the dilemma of choosing between experience and potential when building a board for an IPO. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Umberto founded his company ten years ago and built a successful technology company with a product that is tested in the market and capable of further development. Potential exists to take the product global; Umberto needs to move fast to retain the advantage of IP and know-how that can’t be easily replicated. An IPO is planned within twelve months and Umberto is confident his business will make a smooth transition from private to public company status.

Umberto has an advisory board with a range of skilled directors, each of whom adds considerable expertise in a relevant topic. He has benefitted greatly from their insights, and plans to convert this group of people into a governing board as he goes through the listing process. He is keen to add a new person to his board and has spoken with an ambitious bright young executive who has recently returned after five years in Asia selling a technology similar to Umberto’s product.

The broker advising on the IPO told Umberto that his board are a -bunch of unknowns” and unlikely to inspire the confidence of private equity investors and small funds that are the target market for his equity raising. The broker suggests appointing a ‘household name’ director from a large listed company. He admits that this person would not add much to the strategic competence of the board but claims they would help to bring in investors.

Umberto is in a quandary; he feels it would be disloyal to back out after his discussions with the young potential director, can’t justify bringing in two new directors, and doesn’t want to lose any of his existing team. He understands the merit of the broker’s suggestion. Should he choose experience and reputation or energy and ability?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?


Afin de donner suite à mon billet du 20 octobre, intitulé « Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées », dans lequel Marianne Hugoo, rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’avait demandé si les 12 grandes tendances que j’avais identifiées en 2014 s’étaient effectivement avérées en 2017, au regard de la situation française.

J’avais alors préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances identifiées dans l’article du Journal Les Affaires de 2014.

Aujourd’hui, je vous fais part des résultats de l’enquête, parus dans la revue l’Hebdo des AG (no 151 | 23 octobre 2017), qui présentent la situation de la gouvernance en France.

Il m’est toujours apparu important d’avoir une vue globale des facteurs qui affectent la gouvernance dans les entreprises étrangères, notamment les entreprises françaises.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ? »

 

 

Suivant 10 axes de comparaison, l’Hebdo des AG a confronté les données factuelles sur les Conseils français après les AG 2017 avec les travaux de Jacques Grisé, Président de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (sic, président sortant) et Directeur des programmes de formation en gouvernance (sic, ex-directeur) au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS). Il identifiait en 2014 les tendances de gouvernance à mettre sous surveillance et a réagi sur les observations de notre Enquête.

La gouvernance française suit la tendance mondiale sur les grands enjeux : la prise en compte de la montée de l’activisme actionnarial, l’épée de Damoclès du Say-on-Pay comme juge de paix.

Il reste des « exceptions françaises » : l’une est la féminisation des Conseils, oui la France est en avance ! Les autres relèvent de la structure des travaux du Conseil et peut-être au poids prépondérant du dirigeant en France : les Conseils sont moins indépendants et moins ouverts à l’évaluation extérieure.

Les 4 thèmes qui inscrivent la gouvernance des entreprises françaises dans la tendance mondiale :

  1. En France comme ailleurs, l’administrateur a 59 ans en moyenne : c’est une personne à la fois expérimentée et en âge d’exercer une activité professionnelle
  2. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus formés
  3. Le Say-on-Pay joue le rôle de juge de paix sur la satisfaction des actionnaires
  4. L’enjeu aujourd’hui : le rôle des investisseurs activistes

Les 6 « exceptions françaises »,

  1. La dissociation des pouvoirs n’est toujours pas d’actualité en France — mais pas non plus aux États-Unis
  2. Les Conseils d’administration se sont féminisés, en France plus qu’ailleurs due à l’effet de la loi Copé-Zimmerman
  3. Cette féminisation est souvent allée de pair avec l’internationalisation des Conseils français, sujet qui n’est pas identifié comme tendance mondiale.
  4. La taille des Conseils en France est stable à 12-13 administrateurs, elle se réduit dans les autres pays
  5. Les Conseils français sont moins indépendants — un sujet de débat sur la définition même de l’indépendance
  6. Les Conseils ont partout mis en place des procédures d’évaluation — mais il s’agit encore souvent, en France, d’auto-évaluation

 

 

L’ENQUÊTE

 

  1. En France, comme ailleurs, l’administrateur a 59 ans en moyenne : c’est une personne à la fois expérimentée et en âge d’exercer une activité professionnelle

 

Il y a 10 ans, 28 % des Conseils américains avaient une moyenne d’âge de 59 ans ou moins contre 15 % aujourd’hui. La moyenne d’âge des administrateurs américains est de 63 ans.

L’âge moyen des administrateurs français ne bouge pas : il était de 59 ans pour le SBF 120 en 2014 et l’est toujours en 2017. Le reste des Conseils européens se situent dans la même moyenne.

Ce chiffre indique que la plupart des administrateurs français ne sont pas « retraités », mais en activité. Il exclut également, de fait, la notion d’« administrateur indépendant professionnel », vivant uniquement de ses mandats.

 

  1. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus formés

 

Selon Jacques Grisé, ce sont les « compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise qui sont très recherchées ».

En France, l’IFA a mis en place en 2010, en partenariat avec l’IEP (« Sciences Po »), une formation d’administrateur certifié. Depuis 2014, le nombre de certificats délivrés a crû de 5,56 % en passant de 108 certificats délivrés en 2014 à 114 certificats en 2016.

Déjà en 2013, le Code de Gouvernance insistait sur la formation des administrateurs : « chaque administrateur bénéficie, s’il le juge nécessaire, d’une formation complémentaire sur les spécificités de l’entreprise, ses métiers et son secteur d’activité. »

Par ailleurs, toutes les sociétés pour lesquelles s’applique le Code de gouvernance doivent mentionner les domaines de compétences de leurs administrateurs dans leur communication annuelle avec les actionnaires à travers leur document de référence.

Certaines sociétés vont encore plus loin en institutionnalisant au sein des Conseils des équipes dédiées à la recherche d’expertises clés. En effet, comme le mentionne par exemple le document de référence 2016 d’ENGIE, il a été décidé de mettre en place « le recensement des expertises clés des administrateurs ».

 

  1. Le Say-on-Pay joue le rôle de juge de paix sur la satisfaction des actionnaires

 

Jacques Grisé souligne le caractère « toujours potentiellement conflictuel » de la situation entre « les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes ».

La contestation se cristallise sur le Say-on-Pay

En France depuis la loi Sapin II, les actionnaires votent sur la rémunération des dirigeants — consultatif jusqu’ici, décisif à partir de 2018.

Pour mémoire, ils ont rejeté, en 2016, la rémunération de Carlos Ghosn, PDG de Renault, et celle de Patrick Kron, PDG d’Alstom ; en 2017, celle de Jean-Pierre Rémy, PDG de Solocal Group, et celle de Philippe Salle, PDG d’Elior. Dans chacun de ces cas, les Conseils ont révisé leur proposition.

Des scores d’élection d’administrateurs toujours très hauts : les actionnaires, quand ils sont mécontents, ne mettent pas en cause les administrateurs.

De manière générale, les actionnaires votent moins facilement les nominations de nouveaux administrateurs par rapport aux taux d’approbation de 2014. Cependant, les scores restent très hauts et il n’y a donc pas de quoi penser que les actionnaires se servent de cette tribune pour faire valoir leurs droits.

 

  1. L’enjeu aujourd’hui : le rôle des investisseurs activistes

 

Dans tous les pays, l’activisme progresse. Un point commun est le fondement de leur argumentaire : il s’agit, souvent, d’une question de transparence ou de gouvernance. La question est de savoir si les interventions de ces investisseurs activistes sont, à long terme, négatives ou positives pour la gouvernance, dans la mesure où les investisseurs obtiennent souvent une accélération de la transformation de l’entreprise, mais n’y restent pas. Une préoccupation commune à toutes les entreprises cette année.

Jacques Grisé identifie l’aiguillon des investisseurs activistes comme important, car ils « minent l’autorité du Conseil d’administration en s’adressant directement aux actionnaires ». Quatre ans plus tard, « force est de constater que l’activisme est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde et que les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques ».

 

  1. La dissociation des pouvoirs n’est toujours pas d’actualité en France — mais pas non plus aux États-Unis

 

En 2014, Jacques Grisé s’attendait à une « valorisation du rôle du Président du Conseil », faisant contrepoids au DG — dans un contexte où les PDG étaient déjà très majoritaires en France.

Au Canada, le rôle du Chairman est mis en avant. Les États-Unis, souligne Jacques Grisé, sont « plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairmen et CEO ».

La France suit sur ce point la tendance des États-Unis : le CAC 40 compte 65 % de PDG et le NEXT 80 en compte 50 %.

 

  1. Les Conseils d’administration se sont féminisés, en France, plus qu’ailleurs — l’effet de la loi Copé-Zimmerman

 

En 2014, Jacques Grisé prévoyait que « la diversité au sein du Conseil deviendrait un sujet de gouvernance incontournable ».

Jacques Grisé, en 2017, souligne que la tendance américaine « de diminution (sic, de la taille) des Conseils ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices », ce qui n’est pas le cas en France. La loi Copé-Zimmerman a imposé le quota de 40 % de femmes administrateurs.

 

  1. Cette féminisation est souvent allée de pair avec l’internationalisation des Conseils français, sujet qui n’est pas identifié comme tendance mondiale

 

Les Conseils français se sont rapidement dotés de nombreux administrateurs étrangers afin de remplir les critères de diversité recommandés par le Code de Gouvernance (Afep MEDEF).

Même si certaines sociétés, comme AMUNDI, n’ont aucun administrateur étranger au sein du Conseil, elles intègrent une représentation étrangère dans d’autres instances. Amundi a par exemple mis en place un « comité consultatif composé de grands experts économiques et politiques de renommée internationale ».  Le taux moyen d’internationalisation des Conseils du SBF 120 est passé de 16 % en 2013 à 24 % 3 n 2017.

 

  1. La taille des Conseils en France est stable à 12-13 administrateurs, elle est plus faible dans d’autres pays

 

Outre-Atlantique, la réduction de la taille des Conseils prédite par Jacques Grisé s’est confirmée au Canada. Cependant, aux États-Unis, le nombre moyen de membres par Conseil a augmenté : depuis 10 ans, la moyenne se situe autour de 10 membres pour les entreprises du S&P 500.

En France, le nombre d’administrateurs moyen par Conseil est resté stable autour de 12 ou 13, ce qui reste supérieur à la moyenne américaine.

 

  1. Les Conseils français sont moins indépendants qu’ailleurs et une bonne définition de l’indépendance persiste

 

Jacques Grisé prévoyait une plus grande indépendance des Conseils.

Pour les besoins de cette Enquête, nous retiendrons comme définition de l’indépendance celle donnée par chaque société, ce qui est la méthode retenue par l’AMF : est indépendant un administrateur qualifié par la société comme indépendant, même si des associations comme l’AFG ou des proxy advisors comme ISS ou Proxinvest ont un comptage différent.

L’indépendance des Conseils, quant à elle, augmente progressivement. En effet, elle a grimpé de 3 points entre 2014 et 2016.  Le taux moyen d’internationalisation des Conseils du SBF 120 est passé de 42 % en 2014 à 47 % en 2016.

 

  1. Les Conseils ont partout mis en place des procédures d’évaluation — mais il s’agit encore souvent, en France, d’auto-évaluation

Notre spécialiste affirme que « l’évaluation de la performance des Conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle ». En France comme aux États-Unis ou au Canada, les Conseils des sociétés cotées ont mis en place des procédures d’évaluations de leurs travaux.

Cependant, si dès 2014, Jacques Grisé notait qu’aux États-Unis « les sociétés font déjà appel à des firmes extérieures pour mener cette évaluation », il n’en est pas de même en France où la forme la plus habituelle est celle de l’auto-évaluation.

__________________________________

Enquête réalisée par Marianne Hugoo

Divulgation protégée d’un lanceur d’alerte dans une société d’État | Un cas épineux pour un président de conseil


Voici un cas de gouvernance, publié en octobre 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan*, qui présente une situation dans laquelle Tiffany, la présidente du conseil d’une grande société d’État, se demande quel plan d’action elle doit adopter avant la rencontre de son ministre responsable.

Le cas soumis est très délicat, car il présente une situation où un employé divulgue l’abus de pouvoir d’un haut dirigeant qui se rapporte au CEO. Les membres du conseil sont avisés des allégations, mais les administrateurs auraient voulu en savoir davantage. Cependant, ils comprennent que l’identité de l’informateur est protégée par leur propre politique !

Le CEO est très mécontent de la situation et il exige que ses employés lui fournissent toutes les informations relatives à cette divulgation.

Quelle approche Tiffany doit-elle privilégier lors de sa rencontre avec le ministre ? Doit-elle proposer le congédiement du CEO qui, dans l’ensemble, s’acquitte très bien de ses responsabilités de direction ? Quelles sont ses options ?

Le cas présente la situation succinctement, mais clairement ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Je vous invite donc à lire ces opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Divulgation par un lanceur d’alerte dans une société d’État

 

Our case study this month looks at how a board can establish control without losing a valuable executive. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Tiffany chairs a large government-sector company. It is subject to intense public scrutiny as it handles multi-million-dollar investments and sensitive customer information.

A few months ago, a whistle-blower made a series of protected disclosures alleging improper use of position and information by one of the CEO’s direct reports. The Senior Compliance Officer (SCO) briefed the board, and CEO, on the allegations and their investigation. The board were unhappy with the level of detail available but accepted this as an inevitable consequence of their policy which protects the identity of whistle-blowers.

Unbeknownst to Tiffany, or her board, the CEO angrily followed up with the SCO after the board meeting and said that he was embarrassed to have been unable to provide complete answers to the board’s questions. The investigation eventually exonerated the person concerned and the SCO reported to the CEO that the case was ‘closed’. The CEO responded to the news with an emailed request that he now be told who had made the allegations. The SCO refused to divulge the identity but confirmed he had reported the outcome to the whistle-blower.

The following morning the CEO asked the SCO’s secretary to forward him a copy of all documents relating to the completed inquiry and specifically requested the closure report sent to the confidential informant. The SCO found out and referred the matter to the anti-corruption authority before reporting the matter to Tiffany.

Tiffany wants to brief the Minister before the matter becomes public. She would like a plan of action before she meets the Minister. She doesn’t want to fire the CEO as he is doing well in other respects; she knows action is essential.

What are her options?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées


J’ai réalisé une entrevue avec le Journal des Affaires le 17 mars 2014. Une rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’a contacté afin de connaître mon opinion sur quelles « prédictions » se sont effectivement avérées, et lesquelles restent encore à améliorer.

J’ai préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances que j’avais identifiées le 17 mars 2014 (voir le texte ci-dessous en rouge).

J’espère que ces commentaires vous seront utiles même si mon intervention est colorée par la situation canadienne et américaine.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

 

« Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval.

Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance. Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé : »

 

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité. « Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

Cette affirmation est de plus en plus vraie. La formation certifiée en gouvernance est de plus en plus prisée. Les CA, et notamment les présidents de CA, sont de plus en plus sollicités pour expliquer leurs décisions, leurs erreurs et les problèmes de gestion de crise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance. À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

Il va de soi que la formation en gouvernance prendra plus d’importance, mais les compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise seront toujours très recherchées.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront. Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

Il existe toujours une situation potentiellement conflictuelle entre les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra. L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

Le débat est toujours ouvert, mais force est de constater que l’actionnariat activiste est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde. Les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques dans plusieurs situations de gestion déficiente.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme. De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

Cette tendance est très nette. Les CA cherchent à recruter des membres aux expertises complémentaires.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises. Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

Ici également, l’application des grands principes de gouvernance se généralise et s’applique à tous les types d’organisation, en les adaptant au contexte.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé. La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

Le rôle du Chairman est de plus en plus mis en évidence, car c’est lui qui représente le conseil auprès des différents publics. Il est de plus en plus indépendant de la direction. Les É.-U. sont plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairman et CEO.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable. Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

La diversité dans la composition des conseils d’administration est de plus en plus la norme. On a fait des progrès remarquables à ce chapitre, mais la tendance à la diminution de la taille des CA ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera. Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

Certes, l’un des rôles les plus importants des administrateurs est de voir à l’orientation de l’entreprise, en apportant une valeur ajoutée aux stratégies élaborées par la direction. Les CA sont toujours sollicités, sous une forme ou une autre, dans la conception de la stratégie.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir. Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

Les conseils d’administration accordent une attention accrue à la gouvernance par l’intermédiaire de leur comité de Gouvernance, mais aussi par leurs comités de RH et d’Audit. Les autorités réglementaires mondiales sont de plus en plus vigilantes eu égard à l’application des principes de saine gouvernance. La SEC, qui donnait souvent le ton dans ce domaine, est en mode révision de la réglementation parce que le gouvernement de Trump la juge trop contraignante pour les entreprises. À suivre !

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera. Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

C’est la voie que les CA ont empruntée. La taille des CA est de plus en plus réduite ; les conseils exécutifs sont en voie de disparition pour faire plus de place aux trois comités statutaires : Gouvernance, RH et Audit. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus engagés et ils doivent investir plus de temps dans leurs fonctions.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme. La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’auto-évaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Effectivement, l’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle dans les entreprises cotées. Celles-ci doivent d’ailleurs divulguer le processus dans le rapport aux actionnaires. On assiste à un énorme changement depuis les dix dernières années.

L’internationalisation des codes de gouvernance contribue à la clarification des rôles des activistes


Voici un article de sensibilisation à l’internationalisation des règles de bonne gouvernance et des rôles respectifs que les actionnaires-investisseurs et les conseils d’administration sont appelés à prendre en compte.

On assiste à une plus grande volonté des actionnaires, réunis en groupes d’investisseurs institutionnels, en société de prise de position importante (hedge funds ou actionnaires activistes), de s’engager dans la gouvernance des entreprises. En fait, on peut parler d’un actionnariat de plus en plus actif à l’échelle internationale.

Cet article, publié par Jennifer G. Hill, professeure de droit corporatif à l’université de Sydney, atteste clairement, à l’instar du UK Stewardship Code, de l’importance mondiale des guides de gouvernance qui réclament un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs entre les CA (fiduciaires des actionnaires) et les regroupements d’actionnaires.

Ces codes de gouvernance émanent de différentes sources, mais tous mettent l’accent sur la gestion à long terme des affaires des sociétés. L’auteure mentionne que les codes de conduite peuvent être introduits (1) par les organismes réglementaires des pays (2) par certains regroupements industriels ou (3) par les actionnaires-investisseurs eux-mêmes.

L’article conclut que l’adoption de ces nouveaux codes de Stewardship peut aider à définir de nouvelles règles de conduite qui permettront de départager les « bons activistes des mauvais activistes » !

Les conseils d’administration doivent donc être de plus en plus conscients que le phénomène de l’engagement et de l’activisme des actionnaires est un mouvement mondial, et qu’ils devront faire preuve d’ouverture dans leur rôle de fiduciaire.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes

 

Résultat de recherche d'images pour "UK Stewardship Code"

 

Conflicting attitudes toward shareholder engagement and activism have colored the ongoing debate about the effect of shareholder influence on corporate governance. In the US, a distinctly negative view of investor engagement underpins much recent discussion on this topic—from the shareholder empowerment debate to current concerns about investor activism and private ordering through shareholder-initiated bylaws.

Outside the United States, however, a powerful alternative narrative about the benefits of increased shareholder engagement in corporate governance has gained traction in many major jurisdictions. This positive narrative treats investors as having an important participatory role in corporate governance, which is integral to accountability. It supports a radically different regulatory response to its negative counterpart, suggesting that shareholders should be granted stronger rights and/or encouraged to make greater use of their existing powers to engage with the companies in which they invest.

In my recent article, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, I examine a particularly important recent manifestation of this positive view of shareholder engagement—stewardship codes. My article, which will appear in 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. (special issue on Investor Time Horizons, forthcoming December 2017), charts the rise of international Stewardship Codes and discusses the implications of this development for the balance of power between shareholders and boards in public corporations.

International Stewardship Codes, which originated in the United Kingdom following the global financial crisis, are now proliferating throughout the world, especially in Asia. These codes indicate that in some jurisdictions, the debate today is less about controlling shareholder power than about constraining board power, by encouraging shareholders to exercise their legal rights and increase their level of engagement in corporate governance. The codes represent a generalized regulatory response to a common complaint following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis—namely, “where were the shareholders?”.

Stewardship Codes seek to ensure that shareholders, particularly institutional investors, are active players in corporate governance. Proponents of these codes have made large claims about their benefits. The UK Stewardship Code has stated, for example, that “the goal of stewardship is to promote the long term success of companies” and that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole.”

Many countries have now jumped on the Stewardship Code bandwagon. The various Stewardship Codes around the world emanate, however, from different issuing bodies, and this can influence a code’s effectiveness. There are at least three distinct categories of Stewardship Code:

  1. those issued by regulators or quasi-regulators on behalf of the government;
  2. those initiated by certain industry participants; and
  3. codes adopted by investors themselves.

The United States joined this third category in January 2017, when the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG) released its Framework for US Stewardship and Governance (discussed on the Forum here). Although the ISG framework is voluntary, it has the backing of some of the world’s largest asset managers, including founding members, such as BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors and Vanguard.

Many of the Stewardship Codes that now operate around the world are based on the UK Stewardship Code or Japanese Stewardship Code. My article examines similarities and differences in these international Stewardship Codes. As the article shows, the recent adoption of the ISG Stewardship Principles in the US has not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it is part of a sustained international push for greater investor involvement in corporate governance and exemplifies the increasing globalization of corporate governance.

These developments and competing narratives concerning the role of shareholders in corporate governance have significant regulatory implications. In particular, they pose future challenges to regulators in seeking to differentiate between “good activists” and “bad activists”.

The complete article is available here.

« Benchmark » global en matière de politique de gouvernance | ISS


Subodh Mishra, Directeur exécutif à Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) a publié le résultat des études de ISS visant à établir un « benchmark » global en matière de politique de gouvernance.

Voici les cinq domaines de recherche :

  1. One-Share One-Vote Principle
  2. Gender Diversity on Boards
  3. Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals
  4. Virtual/Hybrid Meetings
  5. Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

L’étude présente les résultats sous forme de tableaux assez explicites.

 

Bonne lecture !

 

2017-2018 ISS Global Policy Survey

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « ISS annual global benchmark policy »

 

A key part of ISS’ annual global benchmark policy formulation process is a survey which is open to institutional investors, corporate executives, board members and any other interested constituencies. For the 2017-2018 policy cycle, the survey was in two parts: (1) a short, high-level Governance Principles Survey covering a limited number of topical corporate governance areas and (2) a longer, more detailed supplemental survey allowing respondents to drill down into a wider set of key issues at market and regional levels. This document summarizes the findings of the Governance Principles Survey, which closed on August 31. The supplemental survey will remain open until October 6, 2017, at 5 PM (ET).

The response to the Governance Principles Survey was strong. In total, ISS received 602 responses to the survey, from a total of 571 different organizations. Responses were received from 121 institutional investors, representing 116 organizations, including 103 asset managers and 18 asset owners. An additional 10 responses were received from organizations that represent or provide services to institutional investors; these results were aggregated with the investor responses, bringing the total investor responses to 131. Two investors provided responses to ISS after the survey’s deadline, which were not aggregated in the results. For purposes of this report, survey results are based on 129 “investor” responses.

Responses were also received from 382 corporate issuers, several of whom submitted multiple responses. Additional non-investor survey responses were received from 46 consultants/advisors to companies; 28 corporate directors; and 13 organizations that represent or provide services to issuers. Responses from these corporate constituents were aggregated with the issuer responses, bringing the total “non-investor” responses to 469.

As in past years, the largest number of respondents—more than 400 in all—were from organizations based in the United States, with 51 from groups based in Canada, and 84 from groups based in Europe and/or the U.K. Responses were also received from organizations in, but not limited to, Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Brazil, Russia and Bermuda. Many respondents have a focus that goes beyond their own home country.

Primary Market of Focus Investor Non-Investor
Global (most or all of the below) 49% 19%
U.S. 28% 62%
Continental Europe 7% 4%
Asia-Pacific 5% 3%
U.K. 4% 2%
Canada 3% 6%
Developing/emerging markets generally 2% 0%
Other (includes Australia, Switzerland, or combination of two other markets) 2% 1%
Latin America 0% 1%

The breakdown of investors by the size of their assets owned or assets under management was as follows:

Asset Size % of Investor Respondents
Under $100 million 2%
$100 million–$500 million 9%
$500 million–$1 billion 4%
$1 billion–$10 billion 19%
$10 billion–$100 billion 26%
Over $100 billion 35%
Not applicable 6%

Some of the respondents answered every survey question; others skipped one or more questions. Throughout this report, response rates are calculated as percentages of the valid responses received on each particular question from investors and from non-investor respondents, excluding blank responses. Survey participants who filled out the “Respondent Information” but did not answer any of the policy questions were excluded from the analysis and are not part of the breakdown of respondents above.

Key Findings

One-Share One-Vote Principle

The global debate over shareholders’ voting rights and multi-class share schemes has exploded in recent years thanks to a series of high-profile share issuances that deviated from one-share, one-vote. The recent initial public offering of Snap Inc. in the U.S., which offered only non-voting shares to the public, raised the stakes.

ISS solicited respondents’ views on multi-class capital structures that carry unequal voting rights.

Among investors, a large minority (43 percent) indicated that they considered unequal voting rights are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances. An equal proportion of investors (43 percent) said unequal voting rights structures may be appropriate in the limited circumstances of newly-public companies if they are subject to automatic sunset requirements or at firms more broadly if the capital structure is put up for periodic reapproval by the holders of the low-vote shares. Only five percent of investor respondents agreed with the opinion that companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit.

Among non-investors, 50 percent responded that companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit, while 27 percent responded that a multi-class structure may be appropriate at a newly public company if subject to an automatic sunset provision or more broadly if reapproved on a periodic basis by the low-vote

shareholders. Only 11 percent responded that multi-class structures with unequal voting rights are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances.

Among investors, one respondent commented that “where the existence of multiple share classes creates a ‘controlling entity’ as a minimum the board must be able to demonstrate how it can operate independently of that entity.” Several non-investor respondents indicated that companies should be allowed to choose their own corporate structure given that shareholders can choose not to invest in the issuer’s shares if they dislike the structure.

Gender Diversity on Boards

The global focus on increasing gender diversity in corporate boardrooms has grown in recent years. ISS asked respondents if they would consider it problematic if there are zero female directors on a public company board. More than two-thirds (69 percent) of investor respondents said “yes.” The lion’s share of these respondents (43 percent) said that the absence of women directors could indicate problems in the board recruitment process, while 26 percent of investor respondents said that although a lack of female directors would be problematic, their concerns may be mitigated if there is a disclosed policy/approach that describes the considerations taken into account by the board or the nominating committee to increase gender diversity on the board. Fewer than one in ten (8 percent) of investor respondents agreed with the statement that directors are best suited to determine the board composition and that a lack of women directors is not necessarily problematic.

Slightly less than one-quarter (23 percent) of the investor respondents indicated that they may find the lack of female directors on a board to be problematic based on a case-by-case analysis. Among the factors cited by investor respondents in making such a case-by-case determination were: the appropriateness of the existing directors based on their experience and skill sets; whether the board is composed of people who are capable of representing shareholders; company size; and turn-around situations.

Of the investor respondents who indicated that the lack of female directors on a public board is or could be problematic, the highest number cited engagement with the board and/or management as the most appropriate response. The second most popular response was to consider supporting a shareholder proposal aimed at increasing diversity. The investor respondents’ third-highest favored action was supporting a shareholder-nominated candidate.

A majority (54 percent) of the non-investor respondents answered “yes” when asked if the absence of a single woman director on a board is problematic, although more than half of these respondents said their concerns might be mitigated by a company’s disclosed policy or approach. Only around one of every five (19 percent) of non-investor respondents said that a lack of diversity was not a concern given that sitting directors are best suited to determine board composition. Of those non-investor respondents who indicated that the absence of female directors on the board may be problematic based on a case-by-case determination, comments often mirrored those of the investor respondents with respect to taking directors’ experience and skill sets into consideration. Other non-investor commenters expressed concern about adopting “quotas,” or a one-size-fits-all policy applicable to all industries and all types of companies.

Like the investor respondents, non-investors’ most commonly preferred investor action in response to a lack of gender diversity was engagement with the board and management. Unlike the investor respondents, however, the non-investors favored votes against members of the nominating committee rather than support for a shareholder nominee to the board.

Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals

Cross-market companies (i.e. incorporated in one country, listed in one or more others) can create unique corporate governance challenges given differences in legal requirements, listing standards and market norms. Voting on share issuances and buybacks at cross-market companies can be particularly complex given significant market-specific differences in shareholders’ rights to approve or ratify such capital allocation issues.

ISS asked survey respondents to provide their views on share issuances and buybacks as a general matter.

Among the investor respondents, 13 percent indicated that both share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board to decide. Forty-four percent of the investor respondents said that both share issuances and buybacks should generally be voted upon by shareholders. More than one-quarter (27 percent) of the investor respondents indicated their preference for shareholder votes on share issuances, but they favored leaving share buybacks to the board’s discretion. Combining these results, more than seven out of ten of the investor respondents favored votes on share issuances while less than half of them called for votes on buybacks.

Among non-investor respondents, a significant majority (61 percent) supported the view that both share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board to decide.

As a follow-up question, respondents were asked to provide their views specifically on share issuance and buyback proposals at U.S.-listed, but non-U.S.-incorporated companies.

Investors’ responses were split. More than one-third (36 percent) of the investors agreed that since the proposals are on the ballot due to the laws of the market of incorporation, the company should follow the customary practices of that market. At the other end of the spectrum, 26 percent of the respondents indicated that as long as the company follows customary U.S. capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its US-domiciled peers. One-quarter of the investors supported a hybrid approach that is less restrictive than many European markets’ best practices but that protects shareholders from excessive dilution in situations not covered by NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules.

On the other hand, a majority of the non-investor respondents (55 percent) supported the view that as long as the company follows customary U.S. capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its U.S.-domiciled peers.

Virtual/Hybrid Meetings

In the U.S., UK and some other markets worldwide, companies are permitted to use electronic means of communication to facilitate the participation of shareholders at general meetings. While there are benefits to allowing shareholders to participate remotely, some investors have raised concerns that replacing physical meetings with virtual-only meetings may hinder meaningful exchanges between board members and shareholders.

Survey respondents were asked to provide their view on the use of remote means of communication for facilitating shareholder participation at general meetings, i.e., “hybrid” or “virtual-only” shareholder meetings.

About one out of every five (19 percent) of the investors said that they would generally consider the practice of holding either “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, without reservation. At the opposite extreme, 8 percent of the investors did not support either “hybrid” or “virtual-only” meetings. More than one-third (36 percent) of the investor respondents indicated that they generally consider the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, but not “virtual-only” shareholder meetings. Another 32 percent of the investor respondents indicated that the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings is acceptable, and that they would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” shareholder meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting.

Among non-investor respondents, a plurality (42 percent) indicated that “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings are acceptable without reservation. However, among the majority of non-investor respondents who did not support that view, 22 percent indicated that, generally, the practice of holding “hybrid” meetings is acceptable, and they would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting, while 15 percent did not support the practice of holding either “hybrid” or “virtual” meetings.

Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

Barring some last minute legislative roadblock, U.S. issuers will be required to disclose the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the median company employee in their proxy statements for the 2018 season. Similar pay ratio information will also be required of UK companies from 2018. In anticipation of these new disclosures, ISS asked respondents how they intend to analyze data on pay ratios.

Somewhat surprisingly, only 16 percent indicated that they are not planning to make use of this new information. Nearly three-quarters of the investor respondents indicated that they intend to either compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors, or assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company or use both of these methodologies. Of the 12 percent of investors who selected “other” as their response, some of them indicated a wait-and-see approach while other comments indicated uncertainty or concerns regarding the usefulness of the pay ratio data.

Among non-investor respondents, a plurality (44 percent) expressed doubt about the usefulness of such pay ratio data. Many of them expressed skepticism that the data would be meaningful, with one non-investor respondent commenting: “For a company having a widespread international exposure, the pay ratio is considered irrelevant.” Other commenters cited a variety of factors that would complicate peer comparisons, including demographic and geographic disparities and the use of part-time or contract workers. Notably, however, 21 percent of the non-investor respondents indicated that they intend both to compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors and assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company.

Respondents were also asked how shareholders should use disclosed data on pay ratios. Among investor respondents, the most frequent response was to use it as one data point in determining votes on compensation-related resolutions, followed by using it as background material for engagement with the company. Among non-investor respondents, the most frequent response was that the information as disclosed will not be meaningful to shareholders.

Appendix: Detailed Survey Responses

Survey results are based on 129 investor responses (primarily asset managers and asset owners) and 469 responses from non-investors (primarily companies and their advisers), reflecting more than one response from some organizations.

For questions that allowed multiple answers, rankings are based on the number of responses for each answer choice. Percentages for other questions may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

1. One-Share, One-Vote Principle

The “one-share, one-vote principle”—the idea that long-term shareholder value is best protected by a capital structure in which voting power corresponds to each shareholder’s ownership stake and at-risk capital commitment—is increasingly under attack as some companies have sought to access public capital markets while insulating themselves and their management teams from perceived short-term pressures through differential voting rights. The recent IPO of Snap Inc. in the U.S. pushed the envelope by offering shares to the public with no voting rights at all. A number of other companies, such as Alphabet, Facebook and Blue Apron, utilize capital structures where public shareholders may only purchase low or zero voting rights shares. As stock markets increasingly find themselves in global competition for high-profile listings (e.g. Alibaba Group Holding, Saudi Aramco), they may feel pressure to relax or eliminate long-standing rules designed to protect investors. Short-term demand for a “hot” stock can potentially make it appear as if shareholders, as a group, do not place a high priority on voting rights. Some investors who purchase shares in an IPO may not prioritize good corporate governance and shareholder rights if they do not plan to hold their shares for the long term. Meanwhile, long-term shareholders who may normally prioritize good governance may nevertheless be forced to buy shares of companies with substandard shareholder rights as soon as those firms are included in a major stock index.

Which of the following represents your organization’s view of multi-class capital structures with unequal voting rights?

Investor Non-Investor
Companies should be allowed to choose whatever capital structure they see fit. 5% 50%
They are never appropriate for a public company in any circumstances. 43% 11%
They may be appropriate for certain newly-public companies, but should be subject to an automatic sunset provision based on time elapsed since the IPO. 18% 9%
They may be appropriate for certain newly-public companies, but should be subject to an automatic sunset provision based on the market capitalization of the company. 7% 5%
They may be appropriate for certain public companies, but should be subject to periodic reapproval by the holders of the low-vote shares. 18% 13%
Other 9% 12%

2. Gender Diversity on Boards

The focus on gender diversity in corporate boardrooms has increased in numerous markets in recent years. Many of these markets have implemented enhanced disclosure requirements, best practice recommendations or regulatory quotas to drive increased female representation on public company boards. Despite this heightened attention, there have been varying levels of progress amongst companies in increasing the number of female directors on boards and some institutional investors continue to express frustration with a perceived lack of progress in boosting gender diversity in certain markets or industry sectors.

Does your organization consider it to be problematic if there are zero female directors on a public company board?

Investor Non-Investor
Yes, the absence of at least one female director may indicate problems in the board recruitment process. 43% 25%
Yes, but concerns may be mitigated if there is a disclosed policy/approach that describes the considerations taken into account by the board or the nominating committee to increase gender diversity on the board. 26% 29%
No, directors are best-suited to determining the composition of the board. 8% 19%
Maybe, but the level of concern is based on a case-by-case determination (e.g., it depends on the country; type of company; industry sector or other factors) (Please specify below) 23% 27%

If your organization answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to the preceding question, what actions do you consider may be appropriate for shareholders to take at a company that lacks any gender diversity on the board, and/or has not disclosed a policy on the issue? (Check all that apply)

Investors’ Rank Non-Investors’ Rank
Engage with the board and/or management 1 (92) 1 (312)
Consider supporting a shareholder proposal aimed at increasing diversity 2 (83) 2 (82)
Consider supporting a shareholder-nominated candidate to the board 3 (60) 5 (39)
Consider voting against all members of the nominating/governance committee 5 (45) 4 (46)
Consider voting against the chair of the nominating/governance committee 4 (53) 3 (50)
Consider voting against the chair of the board or lead director 6 (42) 6 (35)
Consider voting against the Report & Accounts (in markets where this is an option) reflecting poor disclosure of gender diversity 7 (18) 8 (4)
Other 8 (3) 7 (21)

*Rankings are based on number of responses for each answer choice.

3. Share Issuance and Buyback Proposals

Rules regarding shareholder approval of share issuances and buybacks vary by market. US listing rules do not require shareholder approval for share repurchases, and only require shareholder approval for share issuances in excess of 20 percent of issued capital where such issuances are private placements at a price below book value or market value, or where the issuances will result in a change of control or are in connection with an acquisition. Any other share issuances, up to the number of shares authorized in the charter, do not require a shareholder vote. By contrast, many European markets in principle require shareholder approval of all share issuances and share buybacks, but allow companies to seek approval for annual mandates covering share issuances during the coming year, up to a specified percentage of issued capital, or share buybacks during the coming year.

These differing approaches to shareholder approval of share issuances and buybacks create challenges at cross-market companies. US-listed companies incorporated in markets such as the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands may, for example, be required by the laws of their country of legal domicile to seek shareholder approval for share issuances or share repurchases that would not otherwise be required under the rules of their stock market listing. In such a situation, ISS currently evaluates such proposals under the policy of the country of incorporation. However, such policies are generally aligned with local listing rules or codes of best practice, which may not strictly apply to companies not listed in those markets. Also under consideration however is that companies that are incorporated in markets requiring shareholder votes on issuances and repurchases often have a relatively large number of authorized but unissued shares, compared to their US-domiciled counterparts, and therefore the potential for dilution is correspondingly greater. Moreover, regulations and best practice codes, particularly in the UK and Ireland, distinguish between share issuances with and without preemptive rights, while preemptive rights have all but disappeared from the US market.

In light of these issues, ISS is currently reviewing its policies applicable to share issuances and buybacks at such cross-market companies.

As a general matter, which of the following best matches your organization’s views?

Investor Non-Investor
Share issuances and buybacks are matters for the board of directors to decide 13% 61%
Share issuances and buybacks should generally be voted upon by shareholders 44% 8%
Share issuances should be voted upon by shareholders, but share buybacks should be left to the board’s discretion 27% 14%
It depends on the market 13% 9%
Other 4% 9%

Which of the following best describes your organization’s view of share issuance and buyback proposals at US-listed, but non-US-incorporated companies?

Investor Non-Investor
As long as the company follows customary US capital market practices, the proposal should be treated as routine, so as not to disadvantage a cross-market firm vis-à-vis its US-domiciled peers. 26% 55%
As the proposals are on the ballot due to the laws of the market of incorporation, the company should follow the customary practices of that market. 36% 18%
A hybrid approach is called for, to protect shareholders from excessive dilution in situations not covered by NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, while being less restrictive than European best practices. 25% 11%
Other (please specify) 14% 16%

4. Virtual/Hybrid Meetings

In the US, UK and some other markets worldwide, companies are permitted to use electronic means of communication to facilitate the participation of shareholders at general meetings. In some cases, companies may employ technological means to allow such participation as a supplement to the physical meeting (these are known as “hybrid meetings”), while in other cases the “virtual shareholder meeting” entirely supplants the physical meeting. In the UK, a number of companies have sought or are seeking shareholder approval to amend their articles of association in order to be able to hold hybrid or virtual-only shareholder meetings. In the US, companies have generally made the switch to a hybrid or virtual-only meeting without a shareholder vote, following changes in state laws on the matter.

Currently, the practice of holding virtual shareholder meetings is rare in the UK: only one company held a virtual meeting in 2016 and 2017. In the US, the practice is more widespread: over 160 companies held virtual-only meetings in the first half of 2017, and an additional 16 companies held hybrid meetings. Allowing shareholders to take part remotely can increase participation, and eliminating the physical meeting can reduce costs. However, some investors have raised concerns about the trend toward abandoning physical meetings, arguing that virtual-only meetings may hinder meaningful exchanges between management and shareholders, or allow management to avoid uncomfortable questions.

Please describe your organization’s view on the use of remote means of communication for facilitating shareholder participation at general meetings, i.e., “hybrid” or “virtual-only” shareholder meetings.

Investor Non-Investor
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “virtual-only” or “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable. 19% 42%
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, but not “virtual-only” shareholder meetings. 36% 22%
My organization generally considers the practice of holding “hybrid” shareholder meetings to be acceptable, and would also be comfortable with “virtual-only” shareholder meetings if they provided the same shareholder rights as a physical meeting. 32% 22%
My organization does not support the practice of holding “hybrid” or “virtual” shareholder meetings. 8% 15%
Other 5% 12%

5. Pay Ratio Between Senior Executives and Employees

Beginning in 2018 (unless the rule is repealed prior to implementation), U.S. issuers will be required to report in their proxy statement the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of the median company employee. Similar rules have been proposed in the UK, where companies are already required to compare the year-on-year percentage change in compensation between the CEO and other employees (though long-term incentives are excluded). The EU Shareholder Rights Directive, which member states will have to incorporate into their local laws by 2019, requires disclosure of the annual change in each executive’s pay over five years, along with company performance and the change in average employee pay.

How does your organization intend to analyze data on pay ratios?

Investor Non-Investor
Compare the ratios across companies/industry sectors 6% 12%
Assess year-on-year changes in the ratio at an individual company 3% 8%
Both of the above 63% 21%
My organization is not planning to use this information 16% 44%
Other 12% 16%

In your organization’s view, how should shareholders use disclosed data on pay ratios? (Check all that apply)

Investors’ Rank Non-Investors’ Rank
As one data point in determining votes on compensation-related resolutions 1 (81) 3 (86)
As one data point in determining votes on directors 3 (49) 4 (29)
As background material for engagement with the company 2 (71) 2 (97)
As a risk factor to be weighed in making investment decisions 4 (46) 5 (28)
The information as disclosed will not be meaningful to shareholders 5 (16) 1 (248)
Other 6 (11) 4 (29)

*Rankings are based on number of responses for each answer choice.

 

Lettre ouverte du président des Fonds Vanguard à l’ensemble des administrateurs de compagnies publiques


F. William McNabb III is Chairman and CEO of Vanguard; Glenn Booraem is the head of Investment Stewardship and a principal at Vanguard. This post is based on an excerpt from a recent Vanguard publication by Mr. Booraem, and an open letter to directors of public companies worldwide by Mr. McNabb.

 

Cinq questions destinées au nouveau président de Vanguard

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

 

An open letter to directors of public companies worldwide

Thank you for your role in overseeing the Vanguard funds’ sizable investment in your company. We depend on you to represent our funds’ ownership interests on behalf of our more than 20 million investors worldwide. Our investors depend on Vanguard to be a responsible steward of their assets, and we promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the long-term value of their investments.

At Vanguard, a long-term perspective informs every aspect of our investment approach, from the way we manage our funds to the advice we give our investors. Our index funds are structurally long-term, holding their investments almost indefinitely. And our active equity managers—who invest nearly $500 billion on our clients’ behalf—are behaviorally long-term, with most holding their positions longer than peer averages. The typical dollar invested with Vanguard stays for more than ten years.

A long-term perspective also underpins our Investment Stewardship program. We believe that well-governed companies are more likely to perform well over the long run. To this end, we consider four pillars when we evaluate corporate governance practices:

  1. The board: A high-functioning, well-composed, independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing evaluation practices.
  2. Governance structures: Provisions and structures that empower shareholders and protect their rights.
  3. Appropriate compensation: Pay that incentivizes relative outperformance over the long term.
  4. Risk oversight: Effective, integrated, and ongoing oversight of relevant industry- and company-specific risks.

These pillars guide our proxy voting and engagement activity, and we hope that by sharing this framework with you, you’ll have a better perspective on our approach to stewardship.

I’d like to highlight a few key themes that are increasingly important in our stewardship efforts:

Good governance starts with a great board.

We believe that when a company has a great board of directors, good results are more likely to follow.

We view the board as one of a company’s most critical strategic assets. When the board contributes the right mix of skill, expertise, thought, tenure, and personal characteristics, sustainable economic value becomes much easier to achieve. A thoughtfully composed, diverse board more objectively oversees how management navigates challenges and opportunities critical to shareholders’ interests. And a company’s strategic needs for the future inform effectively planned evolution of the board.

Gender diversity is one element of board composition that we will continue to focus on over the coming years. We expect boards to focus on it as well, and their demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward. There is compelling evidence that boards with a critical mass of women have outperformed those that are less diverse. Diverse boards also more effectively demonstrate governance best practices that we believe lead to long-term shareholder value. Our stance on this issue is therefore an economic imperative, not an ideological choice. This is among the reasons why we recently joined the 30% Club, a global organization that advocates for greater representation of women in boardrooms and leadership roles. The club’s mission to enhance opportunities for women from “schoolroom to boardroom” is one that we think bodes well for broadening the pipeline of great directors.

Directors are shareholders’ eyes and ears on risk.

Risk and opportunity shape every business. Shareholders rely on a strong board to oversee the strategy for realizing opportunities and mitigating risks. Thorough disclosure of relevant and material risks—a key board responsibility—enables share prices to fully reflect all significant known (and reasonably foreseeable) risks and opportunities. Given our extensive indexed investments, which rely on the price-setting mechanism of the market, that market efficiency is critical to Vanguard and our clients.

Climate risk is an example of a slowly developing and highly uncertain risk—the kind that tests the strength of a board’s oversight and risk governance. Our evolving position on climate risk (much like our stance on gender diversity) is based on the economic bottom line for Vanguard investors. As significant long-term owners of many companies in industries vulnerable to climate risk, Vanguard investors have substantial value at stake.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach, market solutions to climate risk and other evolving disclosure practices can be valuable when they reflect the shared priorities of issuers and investors. Our participation in the Investor Advisory Group to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reflects our belief that materiality-driven, sector-specific disclosures will better illuminate risks in a way that aids market efficiency and price discovery. We believe it is incumbent on all market participants—investors, boards, and management alike—to embrace the disclosure of sustainability risks that bear on a company’s long-term value creation prospects.

Engagement builds mutual understanding and a basis for progress.

Timely and substantive dialogue with companies is core to our investment stewardship approach. We see engagement as mutually beneficial: We convey Vanguard’s views and we hear companies’ perspectives, which adds context to our analysis.

Our funds’ votes on ballot measures—171,000 discrete items in the past year alone—are an outcome of this process, not the starting point. As we analyze ballot items, particularly controversial ones, we often invite direct and open-ended dialogue with the company. We seek management’s and the board’s perspectives on the issues at hand, and we evaluate them against our principles and leading practices. To understand the full picture, we often also engage with other investors, including activists and shareholder proponents. Our goal is that a fund’s ultimate voting decision does not come as a surprise. Our ability to make informed decisions depends on maintaining an ongoing exchange of ideas in a setting in which we can cover the intention and strategy behind the issues.

Yet our engagement activities are not solely focused on the ballot. Because our funds will hold most of their portfolio companies practically permanently, it’s important for us to build relationships with boards and management teams that transcend a transactional focus on any specific issue or vote. Engagement is a process, not an event, whose value only grows over time. A CEO we engaged with once said, “You can’t wait to build a relationship until you need it,” and that couldn’t be more true.

The opportunity to articulate our perspectives and understand a board’s thinking on a range of topics—anchored at the intersection of the firm’s strategy and its enabling governance practices—is a crucial part of our stewardship obligations. Although ballot items are reduced to a series of binary choices—yes or no, for or against—engagement beyond the ballot enables us to deal in nuance and in dialogue that drives meaningful progress over time.

There is a growing role for independent directors in engagement, both on issues over which they hold exclusive purview (such as CEO compensation and board composition/succession) and on deepening investors’ understanding of the alignment between a company’s strategy and governance practices. Our interest in engaging with directors is by no means intended to interfere with management’s ownership of the message on corporate strategy and performance. Rather, we believe it’s appropriate for directors to periodically hear directly from and be heard by the shareowners on whose behalf they serve.

* * *

Our focus on corporate governance and investment stewardship has been and will continue to be a deliberate manifestation of Vanguard’s core purpose: “To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.” Our four pillars and our increased focus on climate risk and gender diversity are not fleeting priorities for Vanguard. As essentially permanent owners of the companies you lead, we have a special obligation to be engaged stewards actively focused on the long term. Our Investment Stewardship team—available at InvestmentStewardship@vanguard.com—stands ready to engage with you and your leadership teams on matters of mutual importance to our respective stakeholders. Thank you for valuing our perspective and being our partner in stewardship.

Sincerely,

William McNabb III
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Vanguard Group, Inc.

* * *

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

Our values and beliefs

“To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.”

—Vanguard’s core purpose

Vanguard’s core values of focus, integrity, and stewardship are reflected every day in the way that we engage with our clients, our crew (what we call our employees), and our community. We view our Investment Stewardship program as a natural extension of these values and of Vanguard’s core purpose. Our clients depend on us to be good stewards of their assets, and we depend on corporate boards to prudently oversee the companies in which our funds invest. That is why we believe we have a unique mission to advocate for a world in which the actions and values of public companies and of investors are aligned to create value for Vanguard fund shareholders over the long term.

We believe well-governed companies will perform better over the long term.

Effective corporate governance is more than the collection of a company’s formal provisions and bylaws. A board of directors serves on behalf of all shareholders and is critical in establishing trust and transparency and ensuring the health of a company—and of the capital markets—over time. This board-centric view is the foundation of Vanguard’s approach to investment stewardship. It guides our discussions with company directors and management, as well as our voting of proxies on the funds’ behalf at shareholder meetings around the globe. Great governance starts with a board of directors that is capable of selecting the right management team, holding that team accountable through appropriate incentives, and overseeing relevant risks that are material to the business. We believe that effective corporate governance is an important ingredient for the long-term success of companies and their investors. And when portfolio companies perform well, so do our clients’ investments.

We value long-term progress over short-term gain.

Because our funds typically own the stock of companies for long periods (and, in the case of index funds, are structurally permanent holders of companies), our emphasis on investment outcomes over the long term is unwavering. That’s why we deliberately focus on enduring themes and topics that drive long-term value, rather than solely short-term results. We believe that companies and boards should similarly be focused on long-term shareholder value—both through the sustainability of their strategy and operations, and by managing the risks most material to their long-term success.

Our approach

Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team comprises an experienced group of senior leaders and analysts who are responsible for representing Vanguard shareholders’ interests through industry advocacy, company engagement, and proxy voting on behalf of the Vanguard funds. The team also houses an internal research and communications function that is active in developing Vanguard’s views, policies, and ongoing approach to investment stewardship. Our data and technology group supports every aspect of our Investment Stewardship program.

We take a thoughtful and deliberate approach to investment stewardship.

Our team supports effective corporate governance practices in three ways:

Advocating for policies that we believe will enhance the sustainable, long-term value of our clients’ investments. We promote good corporate governance and responsible investment through thoughtful participation in industry events and discussions where we can expand our advocacy and enhance our understanding of investment issues.

Engaging with portfolio company executives and directors to share our corporate governance principles and learn about portfolio companies’ corporate governance practices. We characterize our approach as “quiet diplomacy focused on results”—providing constructive input that will, in our view, better position companies to deliver sustainable value over the long term for all investors.

Voting proxies at company shareholder meetings across each of our portfolios and around the globe. Because of our ongoing advocacy and engagement efforts, companies should be aware of our governance principles and positions by the time we cast our funds’ votes.

Our process is iterative and ongoing

Our four pillars

Board

Good governance begins with a great board of directors. Our primary interest is to ensure that the individuals who represent the interests of all shareholders are independent (both in mindset and freedom from conflicts), capable (across the range of relevant skills for the company and industry), and appropriately experienced (so as to bring valuable perspective to their roles). We also believe that diversity of thought, background, and experience, as well as of personal characteristics (such as gender, race, and age), meaningfully contributes to the board’s ability to serve as effective, engaged stewards of shareholders’ interests. If a company has a well-composed, high-functioning board, good results are more likely to follow.

Structure

We believe in the importance of governance structures that empower shareholders and ensure accountability of the board and management. We believe that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through certain governance and bylaw provisions. Among these preferred provisions are that directors must stand for election by shareholders annually and must secure a majority of the votes in order to join or remain on the board. In instances where the board appears resistant to shareholder input, we also support the right of shareholders to call special meetings and to place director nominees on the company’s ballot.

Compensation

We believe that performance-linked compensation policies and practices are fundamental drivers of the sustainable, long-term value for a company’s investors. The board plays a central role in determining appropriate executive pay that incentivizes performance relative to peers and competitors. Providing effective disclosure of these practices, their alignment with company performance, and their outcomes is crucial to giving shareholders confidence in the link between incentives and rewards and the creation of value over the long term.

Risk

Boards are responsible for effective oversight and governance of the risks most relevant and material to each company in the context of its industry and region. We believe that boards should take a thorough, integrated, and thoughtful approach to identifying, understanding, quantifying, overseeing, and—where appropriate—disclosing risks that have the potential to affect shareholder value over the long term. Importantly, boards should communicate their approach to risk oversight to shareholders through their normal course of business.

By the numbers: Voting and engagement

Engagement and voting trends

2015 proxy season 2016 proxy season  2017 proxy season
Company engagements 685 817 954
Companies voted 10,560 11,564 12,974
Meetings voted 12,785 16,740 18,905
Proposals voted 124,230 157,506 171,385
Countries voted in* 70 70 68

* The number of countries can vary each year. In certain markets, some companies do not hold shareholder meetings annually.
Note: The annual proxy season is from July 1 to June 30.

Our voting

Proxy voting reflects our governance pillars worldwide.

Meetings voted by region

Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017

Global voting activity

* Includes more than 26,000 proposals related to capitalization; 8,000 proposals related to mergers and acquisitions; 16,000 routine business proposals; and 1,000 other shareholder proposals.
Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017.

Our engagement

We engage with companies of all sizes.

Market Capitalization % of 2017 proxy season engagements
Under $1 billion 19%
$1 billion–under $10 billion 44%
$10 billion–under $50 billion 24%
$50 billion and over 13%

Our engagement with portfolio companies has grown significantly over time.

Number of engagements and assets represented

Note: Dollar figures represent the market value of Vanguard fund investments in companies with which we engaged as of June 30, 2017.

We engage on a range of topics aligned with our four pillars

Frequency of topics discussed during Vanguard engagements (%)

Note: Figures do not total 100%, as individual engagements often span multiple topics.

Boards in focus: Vanguard’s view on gender diversity

One of our most fundamental governance beliefs is that good governance begins with a great board of directors. We believe that diversity among directors—along dimensions such as gender, experience, race, background, age, and tenure—can strengthen a board’s range of perspectives and its capacity to make complex, fully considered decisions.

While we have long discussed board composition and diversity with portfolio companies, gender diversity has emerged as one dimension on which there is compelling support for positive effects on shareholder value. In recent years, a growing body of research has demonstrated that greater gender diversity on boards can lead to better company performance and governance.

Companies should be prepared to discuss—in both their public disclosures and their engagement with investors—their plans to incorporate appropriate diversity over time in their board composition. While we believe that board evolution is a process, not an event, the demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward.

Boards in focus: Gender diversity

Engagement case studies

Gender diversity on boards was an important topic of engagement for us during the 12 months ended June 30, 2017. Below are summary examples of discussions we had on the subject.

High-impact engagement on gender diversity

Over several interactions with a U.S. industrial company, our team shared Vanguard’s perspective on board composition and evaluation. The company had undergone recent leadership transitions and was open to amending elements of its governance structure to align with best practices. We expressed particular support for meaningful gender diversity and expressed concern that the board previously had only one female director in its recent history.

Right after this year’s annual general meeting, the company announced it was adding four new directors with diverse experience, including two women. This outcome is the best-case scenario: The board welcomed shareholder input, we shared our view on best corporate governance practices, and the board ultimately incorporated our perspective into its board evolution process.

A denial of diversity’s value

A Canadian materials company that had consistently underperformed was governed by an entrenched, all-male board with seemingly nominal independence from the CEO. A 2017 shareholder resolution asked the company to adopt and publish a policy governing gender diversity on the board. Before voting, Vanguard engaged with the company to learn about its board evolution process, including its perspective on gender diversity. The engagement revealed that the company understood neither the value of gender diversity nor the importance of being responsive to shareholders’ concerns. Despite verbally endorsing gender diversity, the company resisted specifying a strategy or making a commitment to achieve it. The board, when seeking new members, relied solely on recommendations from current directors, a practice that can entrench the current board’s perspective and limit diversity. Our funds voted in support of the shareholder resolution, and we will continue to engage and hold the board accountable for meaningful progress over time.

Mixed results from an ongoing engagement

A U.S. consumer discretionary company had no women on its board, a problem magnified by its medium-term underperformance relative to peers, a classified board structure, and a lengthy average director tenure. We engaged with management twice between the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings to share our perspective on the importance of gender diversity and recommend that they make it a priority for future board evolution and director searches.

In its 2017 proxy, the company described board diversity as critical to the firm’s sustainable value and named gender as an element of diversity to be considered during the director search and nomination process. The company has since added a non-independent woman to the board. Although this move is directionally correct, it does not fully address our concerns; we will continue to encourage the company to add gender diversity to its ranks of independent directors.

Risk in focus: Vanguard’s view on climate risk

As the steward of long-term shareholder value for more than 20 million investors, Vanguard closely monitors how our portfolio companies identify, manage, and mitigate risks—including climate risk. Our approach to climate risk is evolving as the world’s and business community’s understanding of the topic matures.

This year, for the first time, our funds supported a number of climate-related shareholder resolutions opposed by company management. We are also discussing climate risk with company management and boards more than ever before. Our Investment Stewardship team is committed to engaging with a range of stakeholders to inform our perspective on these issues, and to share our thinking with the market, our portfolio companies, and our investors.

Risk in focus: Climate risk

A Q&A with Glenn Booraem, Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship Officer

Vanguard is an investment management company. Why should Vanguard fund investors be concerned about climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Climate risk has the potential to be a significant long-term risk for companies in many industries. As stewards of our clients’ long-term investments, we must be finely attuned to this risk. We acknowledge that our clients’ views on climate risk span the ideological spectrum. But our position on climate risk is anchored in long-term economic value—not ideology. Regardless of one’s perspective on climate, there’s no doubt that changes in global regulation, energy consumption, and consumer preferences will have a significant economic impact on companies, particularly in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors.

Why the shift in Vanguard’s assessment of climate risk, and why now?

Mr. Booraem: We’ve been discussing climate risk with portfolio companies for several years. It has been, and will remain, one of our engagement priorities for the foreseeable future. This past year, we engaged with more companies on this issue than ever before, and for the first time our funds supported two climate-related shareholder resolutions in cases where we believed that companies’ disclosure practices weren’t on par with emerging expectations in the market. As with other issues, our point of view has evolved as the topic has matured and, importantly, as its link to shareholder value has become more clear.

What is your top concern when you learn that a company in which a Vanguard portfolio invests does not have a rigorous strategy to evaluate and mitigate climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Our concern is fundamentally that in the absence of clear disclosure and informed board oversight, the market lacks insight into the material risks of investing in that firm. It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to select the stocks they own. When we’re not confident that companies have an appropriate level of board oversight or disclosure, we’re concerned that the market may not accurately reflect the value of the investment. Because we represent primarily long-term investors, this bias is particularly problematic when underweighting long-term risks inflates a company’s value.

Now that Vanguard has articulated a clear stance on climate risk, what can portfolio companies expect?

Mr. Booraem: First, companies should expect that we’re going to focus on their public disclosures, both about the risk itself and about their board’s and management’s oversight of that risk. Thorough disclosure is the foundation for the market’s understanding of the issue. Second, companies should expect that we’ll evaluate their disclosures in the context of both their leading peers and evolving market standards, such as those articulated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). Third, they should expect that we’ll listen to their perspective on these and other matters. And finally, they should see our funds’ proxy voting as an extension of our engagement. When we consider a shareholder resolution on climate risk, we give companies a fair hearing on the merits of the proposal and consider their past commitments and the strength of their governance structure.

Engagement case studies

In the 12 months ended June 30, 2017, the topic of climate risk disclosure grew in frequency and prominence in our engagements with companies, particularly those in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors, where climate risk was addressed in nearly every conversation we had. Below are examples of our engagements on climate risk.

Two companies’ commitments to enhanced disclosure

Our team led similar engagements with two U.S. energy companies facing shareholder resolutions on climate risk. One resolution requested that the first company publish an annual report on climate risk impacts and strategy. At the second company, a resolution requested disclosure of the company’s strategy and targets for transitioning to a low- carbon economy. In both cases, when we engaged with the companies, their management teams committed to improving their climate risk disclosure. Given the companies’ demonstrated responsiveness to shareholder feedback and commitment to improving, our funds did not support either shareholder proposal. Our team will continue to track and evaluate the companies’ progress toward their commitments as we consider our votes in future years.

A vote against a risk and governance outlier For years we engaged with a U.S. energy company that lagged its peers on climate risk disclosure and board accessibility. This year, a shareholder proposal requesting that the company produce a climate risk assessment report demonstrated a compelling link between the requested disclosures and long-term shareholder value. Because the board serves on behalf of shareholders and plays a critical role in risk oversight, we believed it was appropriate to seek a direct dialogue with independent directors about climate risk. Management resisted connecting the independent directors with shareholders, making the company a significant industry outlier in good governance practice. Without the confidence that the board understood or represented our view that climate risk poses a material risk in the energy sector, our team viewed the climate risk and governance issues as intertwined. Ultimately, our funds voted for the shareholder proposal and withheld votes on relevant independent directors for failing to engage with shareholders.

A vote for greater climate risk disclosure

A shareholder proposal at a U.S. energy company asked for an annual report with climate risk disclosure, including scenario planning. Through extensive research and engagements with the company’s management, its independent directors, and other industry stakeholders, our team identified governance shortfalls and a clear connection to long-term shareholder value. The company lagged its peers in disclosure, risk planning, and board oversight and responsiveness to shareholder concerns. Crucially, although the company’s public filings identified climate risk as a material issue, it failed to articulate plans for mitigation or adaptation. A similar proposal last year garnered significant support, but the company made no meaningful changes in response. Engagement had limited effect, so our funds voted for the shareholder proposal.

* * *

This post was excerpted from a Vanguard report; the complete publication is available here.

Multiples mandats d’administrateurs sur des CA | Bénéfique ou inefficace ?


Est-ce que le fait qu’un administrateur siège à de multiples conseils le rend plus efficace dans ses fonctions de fiduciaire ? Y a-t-il une courbe d’apprentissage bénéfique pour les entreprises en question ?

Ou, est-ce que le fait de siéger à plusieurs conseils rend l’administrateur trop distrait, donc moins attentif et moins présent ?

Vous ne serez pas surpris d’apprendre que cela dépend des circonstances ! Cependant, le monde de la gouvernance (experts, firmes-conseils en votation, chercheurs) semble croire qu’il y a une limite maximale au nombre de conseils auxquels un administrateur peut contribuer positivement.

Pour Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), le maximum devrait être de cinq conseils. Ainsi, selon l’étude de Stephen P. Ferris et al*, le nombre de conseils auxquels les administrateurs des entreprises américaines siègent a diminué significativement, passant de cinq à trois sur une courte période. Ce nombre est en constante diminution depuis 10 ans.

L’auteur a entrepris une recherche à l’échelle internationale afin d’étudier les facteurs qui influencent l’efficacité des administrateurs eu égard au nombre de mandats multiples.

Les résultats montrent que le cumul des CA est un phénomène global. En effet, 70 % des entreprises échantillonnées ont des « busy boards ». Voici les quatre questions de recherche :

Examining the board appointments of a large set of international firms, in our recent paper, we develop four hypotheses regarding the nature of international boards and director busyness. First, we test whether busy boards are a global phenomenon. Second, we investigate the extent to which national cultures might explain the distribution of busy boards across countries. Related to this hypothesis, we examine more thoroughly the effect of existing corporate affiliations or desirable personal characteristics on gaining additional board seats. Our last hypothesis focuses on the extent to which busy directors affect firm value and whether their usefulness is conditional upon firm age.

Cet article ouvre une fenêtre sur les raisons susceptibles d’expliquer le comportement des administrateurs qui siègent à plusieurs conseils.

Bonne lecture !

 

Better Directors or Distracted Directors? An International Analysis of Busy Boards

 

 

 

The issue of multiple directorships on corporate boards has come under increasing scrutiny from both academicians and practitioners. There is conflicting evidence in the academic literature about the impact of multiple directorships on firm value and performance. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that busy directors require an excessively high level of compensation, which in turn, leads to poor firm performance. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find, however, no relation between the number of directorships held by a director and firm valuation as proxied by the market-to-book ratio. This evidence is disputed by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who report that firms with busy boards exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, reduced profitability, and a weakened sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. More recently, Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms, with such individuals providing significant advising abilities to younger firms. They argue that the positive benefits of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms.

The corporate world, however, appears to see busy directors as ineffective directors. Several practitioner organizations have adopted resolutions limiting the number of directorships held by directors. For instance, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) sought to place limits on multiple directorships in 2009. ISS ultimately adopted a policy beginning in 2017 that lowers limits on multiple directorships from six board seats to five. A 2012 survey by Spencer Stuart indicates that three-fourths of S&P 500 firms place restrictions on the number of directorships their directors can hold. Five years prior, in 2007, only 55% of the S&P 500 firms had such limitations. Over the period, 1999 to 2012, the average number of directorships held per director decreases from 5 to 3 for U.S. firms. This change is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant, representing as it does a 40% decrease. Although a similar reduction can be observed for non-U.S. firms, it is not as pronounced as that for U.S. firms.

The corporate finance documents conflicting evidence about the impact of multiple directorships on firm value and performance. It is important to note, however, that this literature is based on an analysis of either exclusively U.S. firms or a single country. For example, DiPietra et al. (2008) find that busy directors are associated with a higher market value of Italian firms. Andres et al. (2013), however, report that German firms with busy directors captured by their social network exhibit lower levels of firm performance. Both studies contend that busy directors are well connected through their social networks, but their findings are contradictory [1] Thus, the literature regarding the international effect of busy boards does not provided unambiguous insights or conclusions.

Yet there are important reasons to believe that both the incidence and effect of multiple directorships demonstrates meaningful international differences. The desirability and social acceptance of sitting on multiple boards can differ across countries due to cultural norms (Hostede, 1980: 1989; Schwartz, 1992). Ethical standards and their ability to influence managerial behaviors are likely to differ across borders. There will also be legal or regulatory differences regarding the ability of individuals to serve simultaneously on multiple boards. The supply of individuals sufficiently skilled and experienced to serve as directors varies across countries. Thus, the very feasibility of such appointments is likely to differ internationally. Finally, the power of the board to influence corporate activities, especially with respect to entrenched or family management is different across countries (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Hu and Kumar, 2004). All of these considerations make the desirability of directors with multiple appointments sensitive to country characteristics and institutions.

Examining the board appointments of a large set of international firms, in our recent paper, we develop four hypotheses regarding the nature of international boards and director busyness. First, we test whether busy boards are a global phenomenon. Second, we investigate the extent to which national cultures might explain the distribution of busy boards across countries. Related to this hypothesis, we examine more thoroughly the effect of existing corporate affiliations or desirable personal characteristics on gaining additional board seats. Our last hypothesis focuses on the extent to which busy directors affect firm value and whether their usefulness is conditional upon firm age.

We find that busy boards are a global phenomenon. Approximately 70% of our sample firms can be categorized as having busy boards. The incidence of busy boards is higher among firms in civil law countries than those headquartered in common law countries. We find that cultural factors help to explain the frequency with which board busyness is observed globally. Specifically, we find that cultures that are more tolerant of power inequalities and emphasize individual accomplishment have a higher incidence of busy boards. Firms headquartered in national cultures that focus more on masculinity and long-term orientation are associated with lower levels of busyness.

We also provide an analysis of what firm and personal factors account for individuals gaining multiple board seats. We find that the performance of the firms on whose boards an individual sits directly affects the number of directorships an individual holds. Further, we determine that directors serving on the boards of larger firms tend to hold more directorships. We discover that personal characteristics also matter, with status as a CEO or possession of an MBA helping an individual to gain additional board seats.

Our results also offer new insight into the ability of busy boards to provide value to their firms. We find that firms with busy boards exhibit lower market-to-book ratios and reduced profitability. Our empirical findings indicate that a one percentage increase in the number of busy independent directors on a board reduces the firm’s market-to-book ratio by 0.35, while its return on assets is about 34% lower.

When we stratify our firms by age, however, we find that the negative effect of board busyness on firm value reverses. Specifically, we determine that the benefits offered by busy directors are much more valuable to younger firms. This evidence is similar to that reported for U.S. IPO firms by Field, Lowry, Mkrtchyan (2013). We conclude that as firms mature, the demand for advising decreases while their demand for monitoring by directors increases. These results are consistent with the notion that busy directors most benefit young firms.

The complete paper is available for download here.

Note: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. We thank seminar participants and discussants at the 2016 Financial Management Association and the 2017 Financial Management Association, Europe meetings.

______________________________________

Endnotes:

1While we follow the current finance literature to construct our board busyness measurements, we acknowledge that board busyness in social networks has gained importance. Sociologists apply mathematical concepts to assess network structures (see Scott, 2000 for an overview). These methods facilitate the assessment of interpersonal relationships and their application to financial data. For example, Barnea and Guedj (2009) generate measures that account for a director’s importance in a social network and find that in firms with more connected directors, the CEO’s remuneration is higher while CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance. Subrahmanyam (2008) develops a model that links the optimal number of board memberships to social costs and benefits.


*Stephen P. Ferris is Professor and Director of the Financial Research Institute at the University of Missouri’s Scheller College of Business. Narayanan Jayaraman is Professor of Finance at Georgia Institute of Technology’s Scheller College of Business. Min-Yu (Stella) Liao is Assistant Professor at the Illinois State University. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Ferris, Professor Jayaraman, and Professor Liao.

Guide pratique à la détermination de la rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés | ICGN


Aujourd’hui, je vous suggère la lecture d’un excellent guide publié par International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). Ce document présente succinctement les grands principes qui devraient gouverner l’établissement de la rémunération des administrateurs indépendants (« non-executive »).

Il va de soi que la rémunération des administrateurs ne représente qu’une part infime du budget d’une entreprise, et celle-ci est relativement très inférieure aux rémunérations consenties aux dirigeants ! Cependant, il est vital d’apporter une attention particulière à la rémunération des administrateurs, car ceux-ci sont les fiduciaires des actionnaires, ceux qui doivent les représenter, en veillant à la saine gestion de la société.

Il est important que le comité de gouvernance se penche annuellement sur la question de la rémunération des administrateurs indépendants, et que ce comité propose une politique de rémunération qui tient compte du rôle déterminant de ces derniers. Plusieurs variables doivent être prises en ligne de compte notamment, la comparaison avec d’autres entreprises similaires, les responsabilités des administrateurs dans les différents rôles qui leur sont attribués au sein du conseil, la nature de l’entreprise (taille, cycle de développement, type de mission, circonstances particulières, etc.).

Personnellement, je suis d’avis que tous les administrateurs de sociétés obtiennent une compensation pour leurs efforts, même si, dans certains cas, les sommes affectées s’avèrent peu élevées. Les organisations ont avantage à offrir de justes rémunérations à leurs administrateurs afin (1) d’attirer de nouvelles recrues hautement qualifiées (2) de s’assurer que les intérêts des administrateurs sont en adéquation avec les intérêts des parties prenantes, et (3) d’être en mesure de s’attendre à une solide performance de leur part et de divulguer les rémunérations globales.

Le document du ICNG propose une réflexion dans trois domaines : (1) la structure de rémunération (2) la reddition de comptes, et (3) les principes de transparence.

On me demande souvent qui doit statuer sur la politique de rémunération des administrateurs, puisqu’il semble que ceux-ci déterminent leurs propres compensations !

Ultimement, ce sont les actionnaires qui doivent approuver les rémunérations des administrateurs telles que présentées dans la circulaire de procuration. Cependant, le travail en aval se fait, annuellement, par le comité de gouvernance lequel recommande au conseil une structure de rémunération des administrateurs non exécutifs. Notons que les comités de gouvernance ont souvent recours à des firmes spécialisées en rémunération pour les aider dans leurs décisions.

C’est cette recommandation qui devrait être amenée à l’assemblée générale annuelle pour approbation, même si dans plusieurs pays, la juridiction ne le requiert pas.

En tant qu’administrateur, si vous souhaitez connaître le point de vue du plus grand réseau de gouvernance à l’échelle internationale, je vous invite à lire ce document synthétique.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sur le sujet sont sollicités.

 

ICGN Guidance on Non-executive Director Remuneration – 2016

 

 

 

Un document complet sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance et de gestion d’un CA | The Directors Toolkit 2017 de KPMG


Voici la version 4.0 du document « The Directors’Toolkit 2017 » de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent en cours de mandat.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité réglementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace.

C’est un formidable document électronique interactif. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document, mais il ne semble pas en exister.

Bonne lecture !

The Directors’ Toolkit 2017 | KPMG

 

 

Now in its fourth edition, this comprehensive guide is in a user friendly electronic format. It is designed to assist directors to more effectively discharge their duties and improve board performance and decision-making.

Key topics

  1. Duties and responsibilities of a director
  2. Oversight of strategy and governance
  3. Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
  4. Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
  5. Enabling key executive appointments
  6. Managing productive meetings
  7. Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
  8. Establishing new boards.

What’s new in 2017

In this latest version, we have included newly updated sections on:

  1. managing cybersecurity risks
  2. human rights in the supply chain.

Register

Register here for your free copy of the Directors’ Toolkit.

Le leadership des présidents de conseils à l’échelle internationale


Voici un document présentant, de manière complète, les pratiques et les outils utilisés par les présidents de conseils d’administration, à l’échelle internationale.

Le rapport de cent pages, intitulé Commonalities, Différences, and Future Trend, publié sous l’égide de INSEAD Corporate Governance Initiative et de Ward Howell Talent Equity Institute Survey, par Stanislav Shekshnia et Veronika Zaviega, tente de cerner les exigences du rôle de « Chairman » ainsi que les conditions liées à l’efficacité des présidents de conseils dans un contexte mondial.

Through interviews with professional chairs in different parts of the world, the report identifies and compares specific practices and instruments used in different countries giving insights into pertinent issues surrounding the work of the chair and development of future trends over the next decade.

Bonne lecture !

 

Board Chairs’ Practices across Countries

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Chaiman of the board insead »

 

 

Relatively little is known about board chairs as most of their work is done behind closed doors. They deal with highly sensitive matters but rarely appear in public. They have no executive power but preside over the most powerful body in the organisation – the board of directors. Their performance is critically important for every company but they still need help to improve it. Yet they have no boss, no peers, no one to turn to for an advice. They learn mostly by trial and error.

To respond to this paradox, INSEAD launched “Leading from the Chair”, a specialised program held twice a year for individuals from all over the world who are keen to understand what makes a good chair. We discovered how chairs from different countries face similar challenges and that they all seek practical ways to deal with them. Our goal is to help them to identify and adopt effective practices to perform what is a very demanding job.

To provide hard data we launched a Global Chair Research Project, inviting more than 600 chairpersons to participate in a survey with a structured questionnaire. From the 132 responses received from 30 countries, we compiled the INSEAD Global Chair Survey 2015. Our research provided valuable insights into their demographics, motivation, background, remuneration and the challenges they encounter.

As a next step we wanted to identify and compare specific practices and instruments used in different countries. A team of experts were assembled to conduct interviews with professional chairs in different parts of the world – Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the United Kingdom, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands. This report presents our preliminary findings. As the research continues, we expect to publish results for 16 countries by the end of 2017.

This publication can be read either as a whole or in chapters. Each country account can be read as a stand-alone without prior knowledge of what is said elsewhere. The introduction describes our methodology, some conceptual models which facilitate understanding of the work of a chair, as well as a summary of our major findings. The “Future Trends” section offers the research team’s view on how the chair’s role and function will evolve in the next decade.

Vous pouvez télécharger le rapport en cliquant sur le lien suivant : Board Chairs’ Practices across Countries.

L’histoire récente des courants de pensée en gouvernance aux É.U.


Aujourd’hui, je ne peux passer sous silence la petite histoire de l’évolution de la pensée en gouvernance publiée par , professeur à la George Washington University Law School.

Ce court article a été publié sur le site du HLS Forum. Il décrit les grands courants de pensée et met l’accent sur les publications des bonzes universitaires américains.

Je suis assuré que cette brève chronologie des événements, à compter de 1976, vous donnera une vue d’ensemble utile de l’évolution de la discipline.

Bonne lecture !

The Ivory Tower on Corporate Governance

 

In 1976, [Directors & Boards]’s founding year, two influential academic works in corporate governance appeared: Berkeley law professor Melvin Eisenberg urged transforming the board from an advisory role to a monitoring model and mandating significant internal control systems, while University of Rochester economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling portrayed the firm as a nexus of contracts whose optimal design is for participants to choose.

 

These contrasting visions—obligatory uniformity versus free tailoring—have defined the field since, setting the boundaries of debate and helping participants think through positions. Into the early 1980s, the Eisenberg view dominated, with Columbia University law professor William Cary urging preemptive federal oversight of the field, traditionally handled by state law, and a generally pro-regulatory atmosphere imposing fiduciary mandates on independent directors and board committees.

But the nexus of contracts school soon ascended to greater influence, through the 1990s, after law professors such as Frank Easterbrook (now a judge) and Daniel Fischel, both of the University of Chicago, explored how the separation of ownership from control is a problem of agency costs, best addressed by contractual devices geared to maximizing shareholder value. Rather than federal mandates, states should experiment to offer a menu of tools for different corporations to tailor. Yale University law professor (also now judge) Ralph Winter theorized that competition among states for corporate charters constrained managers to promote shareholder interests.

While normative corporate governance scholarship has divided between the pro- and anti-regulatory camps of the 1970s and 1980s, the best academics learned from their intellectual opponents to refine stances and often forge consensus. For example, though assessments of the deal decade’s disruptive takeovers and comparative studies of non-U.S. practice found a place for non-shareholder constituents in corporate governance, a shareholder primacy norm nevertheless took root.

Even as both schools of thought contributed to the discourse, each had their heyday when current events cut in their favor. So the 1990s boom was a time of great enthusiasm for the economic approach, adding a productive trend of increasingly sophisticated empirical research, including on the value of state competition in corporate law. After the burst, however, and as widespread accounting fraud was revealed, scholars cited Eisenberg to diagnose failures to monitor and control—and prescribed cures found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). An industry-specific version of the dynamic transpired after the financial crisis, culminating in the Dodd-Frank Act.

In each case, scholarship was diverse, as pragmatic centrist resolution of pending challenges, exemplified by Columbia’s John Coffee, contended with cries on both normative sides of either too little or too much regulation (Yale’s Roberta Romano called SOX “quack governance”). Such episodes updated the Cary-Winter debate: full-scale federal preemption is probably dead but, as Harvard University law professor Mark Roe explained, less due to state competition than the threat to states of incremental federal incursion, a la SOX and Dodd-Frank.

Since 1976, scholars have helped shift power from managers to owners, especially institutional investors. Today, scholars such as Harvard Law professor Lucian Bebchuk urge continued expansion of shareholder power, while others, like UCLA law professor Stephen Bainbridge, observe and support a propensity toward director primacy instead. In the balance is the fate of shareholder activism, which though novel in some ways, at bottom raises issues debated for 40 years, particularly agency cost mitigation. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

Colloque sur la gouvernance et la performance | Une perspective internationale


C’est avec plaisir que je partage l’information et l’invitation à un important colloque intitulé « Gouvernance et performance : une perspective internationale » qui aura lieu à l’Université McGill les 11 et 12 mai 2017.

C’est mon collègue, le professeur Félix ZOGNING NGUIMEYA, Ph.D., Adm.A., qui est le responsable de l’organisation de ce colloque en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale.

À la lecture du programme, vous constaterez que les organisateurs n’ont ménagé aucun effort pour apporter un éclairage très large de ce phénomène.

Ce colloque traite des récents développements et des sujets émergents en matière de gouvernance. La gouvernance, comme thématique transversale, est abordée dans tous ses aspects : gouvernance d’entreprise, gouvernance économique, gouvernance publique, en lien avec la création de valeur ou la performance des organisations, des politiques ou des programmes concernés. Dans chacun des contextes, les travaux souligneront l’effet des mécanismes de gouvernance sur la performance des organisations, institutions ou collectivités.

La perspective internationale du colloque a pour but d’examiner les modèles et structures de gouvernance présents dans différents pays et dans les différentes organisations, selon que ces modèles dépendent fortement du système juridique, du modèle économique et social, ainsi que le poids relatif des différentes parties prenantes. Les contributions sont donc attendues des chercheurs et professionnels de plusieurs champs disciplinaires, notamment les sciences économiques, les sciences juridiques, les sciences politiques, la comptabilité, la finance, l’administration et la stratégie.

Je vous invite à consulter le site web du colloque : https://gouvernance.splashthat.com/

Vous trouverez le programme détaillé du colloque à l’adresse suivante : http://www.acfas.ca/evenements/congres/programme/85/400/449/c

Le plus gros fonds souverain au monde veut plafonner la paie des patrons | Journal de Montréal


Selon un communiqué de l’Agence France Presse, publié le 7 avril 2017 dans le Journal de Montréal, « le fonds souverain de la Norvège, le plus gros au monde, a peaufiné vendredi son image d’investisseur responsable en réclamant un plafonnement de la rémunération des patrons et la transparence fiscale des entreprises ».

Bonne lecture !

Le fonds souverain de la Norvège, le plus gros au monde, a peaufiné vendredi son image d’investisseur responsable en réclamant un plafonnement de la rémunération des patrons et la transparence fiscale des entreprises

 

Dans chaque entreprise, le « conseil d’administration devrait (…) dévoiler un plafond pour la rémunération totale » du directeur général « pour l’année à venir », estime la banque centrale norvégienne, chargée de gérer le fonds, dans un nouveau « document de position ».

À une époque où les très gros salaires décollent, cette prise de position est d’autant plus importante que le fonds est présent au capital de quelque 9 000 entreprises à travers le monde, représentant 1,3 % de la capitalisation globale.

Par son poids et par sa gestion généralement jugée exemplaire en matière de transparence et d’éthique, le mastodonte scandinave donne souvent le « pas » pour d’autres investisseurs.

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « fonds souverain norvégien »

« C’est une très bonne nouvelle », s’est réjouie Manon Aubry, porte-parole d’Oxfam France. « Il s’agit d’un levier qui peut avoir un impact important sur le comportement des entreprises », a-t-elle expliqué à l’AFP, soulignant que le fonds norvégien n’était pas le seul à avoir pris ce genre de décision.

La contestation a un effet, parfois. Le directeur général du géant pétrolier britannique BP, Bob Dudley, a ainsi vu sa rémunération diminuer de 40 % en 2016, un an après un vote des actionnaires contre une hausse de son salaire, uniquement consultatif, mais offrant un désaveu cinglant.

Sous la pression de la classe politique et des syndicats, six hauts dirigeants de Bombardier ont accepté dimanche au Canada de réduire de moitié l’augmentation de 50 % initialement promise. Volkswagen a aussi décidé le mois dernier de plafonner les salaires pour les membres de son conseil d’administration, une question souvent débattue en Allemagne.

«Say on pay»

Le principe du « say on pay » vient par ailleurs d’entrer pour la première fois dans le droit français. Le vote des actionnaires en assemblée générale sur la rémunération des dirigeants est désormais contraignant grâce à la loi « Sapin 2 », dont le décret d’application a été publié en mars.

En 2016, la rémunération des dirigeants de trois entreprises, dont Carlos Ghosn chez Renault et Patrick Kron chez Alstom, avait été rejetée par les actionnaires. Mais ces avis, alors purement consultatifs, n’avaient pas été pris en compte par les conseils d’administration.

Longtemps peu regardant en la matière, le fonds norvégien s’implique de plus en plus dans la gouvernance des entreprises dont il est actionnaire. Il a par exemple voté l’an dernier contre la politique de rémunération des dirigeants d’Alphabet (Google), Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan ou encore Sanofi, selon le Financial Times.

« Nous ne sommes plus en position, en tant qu’investisseur, de dire que c’est une question sur laquelle on n’a pas d’avis », a déclaré au FT le patron du fonds, Yngve Slyngstad, en notant que le « say on pay » se répandait dans toujours plus de pays.

Jugeant que cela contribuerait à aligner les intérêts du patron sur ceux des actionnaires, le nouveau document prône aussi pour qu’« une part significative de la rémunération totale annuelle (soit) fournie en actions bloquées pour au moins cinq ans, et de préférence dix ans, indépendamment d’une démission ou d’un départ en retraite » et sans condition de performances.

Non à l’optimisation fiscale 

Dans un autre document publié vendredi, la Banque de Norvège a aussi exigé la transparence fiscale de la part des entreprises.

« Les impôts devraient être payés là où la valeur économique est générée », souligne-t-elle notamment, visiblement hostile à l’optimisation fiscale, technique légale qui consiste à déplacer les bénéfices là où l’imposition est moindre.

Sur le Vieux Continent, des géants comme Apple, Starbucks ou Fiat ont eu ces dernières années maille à partir avec la Commission européenne pour avoir tiré parti d’avantages fiscaux indus.

Le fonds norvégien conforte ainsi son image d’investisseur responsable.

Conformément à un vote du Parlement en 2015, le fonds — alimenté, paradoxalement, par les revenus pétroliers de l’État — se refuse à investir dans les entreprises, compagnies minières ou énergéticiens, où le charbon, néfaste pour le climat, représente plus de 30 % de l’activité.

Il n’est pas non plus autorisé à investir dans les entreprises coupables de violations graves des droits de l’Homme, dans celles qui fabriquent des armes nucléaires ou « particulièrement inhumaines » ou encore dans les producteurs de tabac.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 9 mars 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 9 mars 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

 

  1. Uncapping Executive Pay
  2. The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat
  3. Focus on Annual Incentives: Metrics, Goals, and More
  4. A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?
  5. Teaming Up and Quiet Intervention: The Impact of Institutional Investors on Executive Compensation Policies
  6. The Regulatory and Enforcement Outlook for Financial Institutions in 2017
  7. The Materiality Gap Between Investors, the C-Suite and Board
  8. Pilot CEOs and Corporate Innovation
  9. Shareholder Engagement: An Evolving Landscape
  10. State Street Global Advisors Announces New Gender Diversity Guidance

The Directors Toolkit 2017 | Un document complet de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance et de gestion d’un CA


Voici la version 4.0 du document australien de KPMG, très bien conçu, qui répond clairement aux questions que tous les administrateurs de sociétés se posent dans le cours de leurs mandats.

Même si la publication est dédiée à l’auditoire australien de KPMG, je crois que la réalité réglementaire nord-américaine est trop semblable pour se priver d’un bon « kit » d’outils qui peut aider à constituer un Board efficace.

C’est un formidable document électronique interactif. Voyez la table des matières ci-dessous.

J’ai demandé à KPMG de me procurer une version française du même document, mais il ne semble pas en exister.

Bonne lecture !

The Directors’ Toolkit 2017 | KPMG

 

 

 

Now in its fourth edition, this comprehensive guide is in a user friendly electronic format. It is designed to assist directors to more effectively discharge their duties and improve board performance and decision-making.

Key topics

  1. Duties and responsibilities of a director
  2. Oversight of strategy and governance
  3. Managing shareholder and stakeholder expectations
  4. Structuring an effective board and sub-committees
  5. Enabling key executive appointments
  6. Managing productive meetings
  7. Better practice terms of reference, charters and agendas
  8. Establishing new boards.

What’s new in 2017

In this latest version, we have included newly updated sections on:

  1. managing cybersecurity risks
  2. human rights in the supply chain.

Register

Register here for your free copy of the Directors’ Toolkit.

Compte rendu hebdomadaire de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance | 23 février 2017


Voici le compte rendu hebdomadaire du forum de la Harvard Law School sur la gouvernance corporative au 23 février 2017.

J’ai relevé les principaux billets.

Bonne lecture !

 

harvard_forum_corpgovernance_small

  1. A Trump Appointed AG May Not Translate to Less Aggressive Enforcement
  2. It’s Time for the Pendulum to Swing Back
  3. SEC Enforcement in Financial Reporting and Disclosure—2016 Year in Review
  4. Tactical Approaches to Proxy Season 2017
  5. The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017
  6. Company Stock Reactions to the 2016 Election Shock: Trump, Taxes and Trade
  7. Directors Must Navigate Challenges of Shareholder-Centric Paradigm
  8. A Broader Perspective on Corporate Governance in Litigation

 

Se poser les bonnes questions en cette période incertaine | Deloitte


Deloitte a récemment publié un document très important intitulé Courage under fire : Embracing disruption (en anglais seulement) dans lequel trois administrateurs chevronnés échangent leurs points de vue sur les grandes perturbations que les organisations mondiales sont appelées à connaître en 2017.

Les questions posées sont les suivantes :

Étant donné les attentes croissantes envers les conseils d’administration, quelles devraient être les priorités des administrateurs ?

Les appels à une meilleure communication de l’information ne cessent de se faire entendre. Comment les conseils réagissent-ils ?

Les organisations sont nombreuses à subir des perturbations numériques. Est-ce un risque incontrôlable de plus à gérer ?

Les perturbations numériques créent beaucoup d’incertitude. Les conseils d’administration réussissent-ils à bien s’adapter à cette réalité ?

Vous pouvez télécharger le document ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture !

Courage under fire : Embracing disruption |  Deloitte

 

 

Départ du PDG de CPR | 100 millions $ pour mettre son expertise à contribution dans l’opération des chemins de fer aux É.U. !


Ce matin, je partage avec vous un autre excellent article d’Yvan Allaire* et de François Dauphin publié dans le Financial Post le 24 janvier.

Les auteurs reviennent sur le parcours unique de l’ex-président du CN et du CP dans le domaine de la gestion des entreprises de chemins de fer.

Il ressort de ce portrait que le PDG possède une expérience sans pareil, liée à des processus de gestion inimitables.

C’est tellement le cas que M. Harrison a décidé de quitter un emploi très rémunérateur à CP pour accepter l’offre de 118 millions $ d’un Hedge Fund.

On compte sur sa solide expertise pour réorganiser et optimiser les opérations d’une autre entreprise dans le même domaine.

Cet article fait suite à un précédent billet qui portait sur le succès d’une démarche d’activisme (A “Successful” Case of Activism at the Canadian Pacific Railway: Lessons in Corporate Governance)

Cette situation montre clairement que les fonds activistes sont continuellement à la recherche de talents uniques et qu’ils sont prêts à miser des fortunes pour bénéficier de l’expertise incontestable d’un PDG.

Et vous, quelles leçons en retirez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

 

Someone just hired Hunter Harrison for $100 million — and there’s an excellent reason why

In an unexpected turn of events, Canadian Pacific Railway announced the early departure of its CEO, Hunter Harrison, a few minutes before a conference call planned for analysts on Jan. 18. Instead of retiring as planned, Harrison leaves CP at age 72 for a new challenge, running another railway company (almost certainly CSX) on behalf of Mantle Ridge LP, a newly established hedge fund run by Paul Hilal. In his prior role at Pershing Square Capital, Hilal was instrumental in backing its investment in CP and installing Harrison’s management team.
sans-titre-hunter-harrison
CSX: Hunter Harrison Wants to Run His Fourth Railroad
Harrison thus forfeited all benefits and perquisites that he was entitled to receive from CP, including his pension, and he has agreed to surrender for cancellation almost all of his vested and unvested equity awards. Evidently the hedge fund will make him whole for the loss of this package, valued at approximately $118 million.

What makes Hunter Harrison so valuable? In the enchanted world of finance, there are of course no limits to what someone gets paid as long as it is a fraction of what the payer will gain. Still, one would think that a hedge fund manager looking for someone capable of turning around a poorly performing U.S. company would have an abundance of candidates to choose from. After all, the operating tricks that Harrison has come up with to make railroads more efficient have been described in minute detail in books he’s written. Dozens of seasoned railroad executives have worked with him and for him over the years. They must have learned quite a bit about Harrison’s recipe.

The answer to the $118-million question appears to reside in the fact that the successful transformation of these railroads (CN and CP) was the result, yes, of operational improvements, but more so of a fundamental cultural change. Harrison is a formidable change agent, a transformational leader in the truest meaning of that tired expression.

He claims to have invented a principle called “precision railroading,” which he implemented at three major railroads: Illinois Central, CN, and CP, the last with spectacular results, bringing the operating ratio (operating costs as a percentage of revenue, with a lower ratio being better) to 58.6 per cent for fiscal year 2016, down from 81.3 per cent in 2011, the last full year before Harrison’s took over.

Precision railroading, if it was easily learned from a book and replicated, would have been applied with success long ago at every North American railroad. Yet Harrison still seems to bring something that can make a difference over and above the techniques he developed and implemented. That something seems to be his skill at changing the culture of the railroad, a most difficult skill to imitate.

As a lifetime railroader himself, his decisions and actions display a deep understanding of the daily reality of the operators. He spends time meeting with the workers on the field and communicates profusely about the importance of asset optimization and the control of costs. At CP, he took many symbolic actions to instill in the whole organization the need to think and act like a railroader. For example, he relocated the corporate glass-towered headquarters to a rail yard, a move that was meant partly to cut costs but mostly to keep the employees’ focus on freight operations, and remind them daily of what the business is all about.

Managing a strategic turnaround is not an easy task. The softer, cultural element of it is often neglected, overlooked, and difficult to implement. That is where Harrison excels and why a hedge fund manager is prepared to pay big bucks to get that talent working for him.

But is money really the sole motivation for Harrison to start over at another railroad company at 72? In fact, at this stage of his career, he has more to lose reputation-wise if he fails than anything he can really earn in monetary terms.

The Memphis, Tenn. native, whose career began over five decades ago as an 18-year-old carman-oiler, may be driven by the determination to prove that the theory he has developed is replicable, no matter where. And determined to push his legacy to a new level — that of a railroad industry legend.

__________________________________

*Yvan Allaire est professeur émérite de stratégie à l’Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) et président exécutif de l’Institut de la gouvernance des organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP), François Dauphin est directeur de la recherche à l’IGOPP et chargé d’enseignement à l’UQAM.

Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous la liste des dix thèmes majeurs en gouvernance que les auteurs Kerry E. Berchem* et Rick L. Burdick* ont identifiés pour l’année 2017.

Vous êtes assurément au fait de la plupart de ces dimensions, mais il faut noter l’importance accrue à porter aux questions stratégiques, aux changements politiques, aux relations avec les actionnaires, à la cybersécurité, aux nouvelles réglementations de la SEC, à la composition du CA, à l’établissement de la rémunération et aux répercussions possibles des changements climatiques.

sans-titre-gump

Afin de mieux connaître l’ampleur de ces priorités de gouvernance pour les administrateurs de sociétés, je vous invite à lire l’ensemble du rapport publié par Akin Gump.

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Dix thèmes majeurs pour les administrateurs de sociétés en 2017

 

top-10

 

1. Corporate strategy: Oversee the development of the corporate strategy in an increasingly uncertain and volatile world economy with new and more complex risks

Directors will need to continue to focus on strategic planning, especially in light of significant anticipated changes in U.S. government policies, continued international upheaval, the need for productive shareholder relations, potential changes in interest rates, uncertainty in commodity prices and cybersecurity risks, among other factors.

2. Political changes: Monitor the impact of major political changes, including the U.S. presidential and congressional elections and Brexit

Many uncertainties remain about how the incoming Trump administration will govern, but President-elect Trump has stated that he will pursue vast changes in diverse regulatory sectors, including international trade, health care, energy and the environment. These changes are likely to reshape the legal landscape in which companies conduct their business, both in the United States and abroad.

With respect to Brexit, although it is clear that the United Kingdom will, very probably, leave the European Union, there is no certainty as to when exactly this will happen or what the U.K.’s future relationship, if any, with the EU will be. Once the negotiations begin, boards will need to be quick to assess the likely shape of any deal between the U.K. and the EU and to consider how to adjust their business model to mitigate the threats and take advantage of the opportunities that may present themselves.

3. Shareholder relations: Foster shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities to prepare for activist involvement

The current environment demands that directors of public companies remain mindful of shareholder relations and company vulnerabilities by proactively engaging with shareholders, addressing shareholder concerns and performing a self-diagnostic analysis. Directors need to understand their company’s vulnerabilities, such as a de-staggered board or the lack of access to a poison pill, and be mindful of them in any engagement or negotiation process.

4. Cybersecurity: Understand and oversee cybersecurity risks to prepare for increasingly sophisticated and frequent attacks

As cybercriminals raise the stakes with escalating ransomware attacks and hacking of the Internet of Things, companies will need to be even more diligent in their defenses and employee training. In addition, cybersecurity regulation will likely increase in 2017. The New York State Department of Financial Services has enacted a robust cybersecurity regulation, with heightened encryption, log retention and certification requirements, and other regulators have issued significant guidance. Multinational companies will continue implementation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation requirements, which will be effective in May 2018. EU-U.S. Privacy Shield will face a significant legal challenge, particularly in light of concerns regarding President-elect Trump’s protection of privacy. Trump has stated that the government needs to be “very, very tough on cyber and cyberwarfare” and has indicated that he will form a “cyber review team” to evaluate cyber defenses and vulnerabilities.

5. SEC scrutiny: Monitor the SEC’s increased scrutiny and more frequent enforcement actions, including whistleblower developments, guidance on non-GAAP measures and tougher positions on insider trading

2016 saw the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) award tens of millions of dollars to whistleblowers and bring first-of-a-kind cases applying new rules flowing from the protections now afforded to whistleblowers of potential violations of the federal securities laws. The SEC was also active in its review of internal accounting controls and their ability to combat cyber intrusions and other modern-day threats to corporate infrastructure. The SEC similarly continued its comprehensive effort to police insider trading schemes and other market abuses, and increased its scrutiny of non-GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) financial measure disclosures. 2017 is expected to bring the appointment of three new commissioners, including a new chairperson to replace outgoing chair Mary Jo White, which will retilt the scales at the commissioner level to a 3-2 majority of Republican appointees. 2017 may also bring significant changes to rules promulgated previously under Dodd-Frank.

6. CFIUS: Account for CFIUS risks in transactions involving non-U.S. investments in businesses with a U.S. presence

Over the past year, the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been particularly active in reviewing—and, at times, intervening in—non-U.S. investments in U.S. businesses to address national security concerns. CFIUS has the authority to impose mitigation measures on a transaction before it can proceed, and may also recommend that the President block a pending transaction or order divestiture of a U.S. business in a completed transaction. Companies that have not sufficiently accounted for CFIUS risks may face significant hurdles in successfully closing a deal. With the incoming Trump administration, there is also the potential for an expanded role for CFIUS, particularly in light of campaign statements opposing certain foreign investments.

7. Board composition: Evaluate and refresh board composition to help achieve the company’s goals, increase diversity and manage turnover

In order to promote fresh, dynamic and engaged perspectives in the boardroom and help the company achieve its goals, a board should undertake focused reassessments of its underlying composition and skills, including a review and analysis of board tenure, continuity and diversity in terms of upbringing, educational background, career expertise, gender, age, race and political affiliation.

8. Executive compensation: Determine appropriate executive compensation against the background of an increased focus on CEO pay ratios

Executive compensation will continue to be a hot topic for directors in 2017, especially given that public companies will soon have to start complying with the CEO pay ratio disclosure rules. Recent developments suggest that such disclosure might not be as burdensome or harmful to relations with employees and the public as was initially feared.
The SEC’s final rules allow for greater flexibility and ease in making this calculation, and a survey of companies that have already estimated their ratios indicates that the ratio might not be as high, on average, as previously reported.

9. Antitrust scrutiny: Monitor the increased scrutiny of the antitrust authorities and the implications on various proposed combinations

Despite the promise of synergies and the potential to transform a company’s future, antitrust regulators have become increasingly hostile toward strategic transactions, with the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission suing to block 12 transactions since 2015. Although directors should brace for a longer antitrust review, to help navigate the regulatory climate, work upfront can dramatically improve prospects for success. Company directors should develop appropriate deal rationales and, with the benefit of upfront work, allocate antitrust risk in the merger agreement. Merger and acquisition activity may also benefit from the Trump administration, taking, at least for certain industries, a less-aggressive antitrust enforcement stance.

10. Environmental disasters and contagious diseases: Monitor the impact of increasingly volatile weather events and contagious disease outbreaks on risk management processes, employee needs and logistics planning

While the causes of climate change remain a political sticking point, it cannot be debated that volatile weather events, environmental damage and a rise in the diseases that tend to follow, are having increasingly adverse impacts on businesses and markets. Businesses will need to account for, or transfer the risk of, the increasing likelihood of these impacts. The SEC recently announced investigations into climate-risk disclosures within the oil and gas sector to ensure that they adequately allow investors to account for these effects on the bottom line. The growing number of shareholder resolutions and suits addressing climate change confirm that investors want this information, regardless of the position of the next administration.

The complete publication is available here.


*Kerry E. Berchem is partner and head of the corporate practice, and Rick L. Burdick is partner and chair of the Global Energy & Transactions group, at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.