Pendant trois minutes, un expert du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance.
Cette semaine Sébastien Théberge, directeur principal, Affaires publiques et communication, Ivanhoé Cambridge, explique qu’une crise est l’élément le plus grave auquel fera face une organisation. Ainsi, un plan de gestion de crise est essentiel pour les administrateurs.
La responsabilité du conseil d’administration en matière de supervision des politiques générales des fonds de pension de leur entreprise devient de plus en plus importante et demande davantage de temps et d’expertise de la part des membres du conseil.
Voici un article de Barbara Shecter paru dans le Financial Post du 20 août 2013 qui décrit une situation qui préoccupe de plus en plus les banques d’investissement et les investisseurs institutionnels.
J’ai reproduit, ci-après, un extrait qui donne les grandes lignes de cet article. Bonne lecture.
Growing pension liabilities are forcing some company executives and boards to spend an increasing amount of time and energy managing their obligations to future retirees — potentially at the expense of the actual business.
As a result, the issue of managing pension risk has moved onto the agenda in discussions with investment bankers, who have traditionally focused on allocating capital to things such as debt repayments, dividends and acquisitions.
The explanation for this trend, according to those in the banking and advisory business, is that pension obligations have become an “outsized” issue for many companies. Historically low interest rates combined with choppy and unpredictable equity markets have made funding future pension obligations more challenging.
Seasoned investment bankers say discussions about how to manage these obligations, including potentially paying now to get the risk of future pension obligations off a company’s books, flow naturally out of conversations about how to manage capital.
Colin O’Connor for National PostTorstar Corp. is one of the companies around which analysts have begun to discuss pension funding when they talk about other corporate issues affecting stock price. Above, President and CEO David Holland addresses shareholders during the company’s annual general meeting in Toronto in 2010.
“When we talk with clients about how best to use capital to boost their company’s share price or valuation, we’ve traditionally focused on debt repayments, share repurchases, dividend increases, special dividends or acquisitions,” says Don Fox, managing director and head of the financial institutions investment banking at CIBC World Markets. “Over the past couple of years, however, there has been interest from some clients in allocating capital to pension obligations,” he says.
The awareness of potential challenges arising from pension obligations has spread and is no longer confined to the rarified air of pension consultancies, equity analysts have noted, and that means investors are becoming aware of how their investments could be affected.
Torstar Corp. is one of the companies around which analysts have begun to discuss pension funding when they talk about other corporate issues affecting stock price.
Voicile récent rapport annuel publié par la firme Accenture portant sur l’étude de la gestion des risques à l’échelle globale. L’étude a été effectuée auprès de 450 professionnels de la gestion des risques globaux.
Les résultats montrent que la gestion des risques devient de plus en plus intégrée dans la prise de décision notamment dans la budgétisation, les investissements et les stratégies corporatives. Les risques de nature légale sont considérés comme prédominants en ces temps incertains. Le rapport présente les résultats de manière très illustré.
J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, les quatre conclusions que les auteurs tirent de cette étude internationale. Bonne lecture.
Since publication of the first Accenture Global Risk Management Study in 2009,it is clear that many organizations have made great strides in developing risk management functions, but others have been left behind.
Our 2013 Global Risk Management Study finds nearly all surveyed firms give higher priority to risk management now than they did two years ago. But there is still much room for improvement.
There appear to be large gaps between expectations of the risk management function’s role in meeting broader goals and its perceived performance— for every organizational goal we surveyed. In the following pages we have provided a wealth of data and many examples of how others are addressing the various challenges to more effectively manage risk in an era of greater uncertainty.
The Report lays out in more detail the current market pressures, shares insights on how firms are leveraging the risk management function to respond to these challenges and provides data and examples of what it can mean to be a high performance risk function.
However, to provide some “sign-posts” as you read through the information, we identified four of the more significant key actions which are evidently helping organizations reach their risk capability goals for 2015.
1. Treat risk as a “people game,” developing risk staff with business acumen.
If the risk management function is to play its elevated role more effectively, it increasingly will rely on risk staff with a deep understanding of the broader business.
2. Look ahead, as new types of risks are relentless, and develop capabilities that match tomorrow’s risks.
Risk capability plans should aim to be at least in concert with the organization’s business development plans, and often should be leading, rather than lagging.
3. Manage regulation through a transformational lens.
Many industries are being forced to rethink their business models, processes, reporting and data structures to better enable effective regulatory solutions. Seeking the opportunities to align these efforts with the business change agenda can lessen future complexity.
4. Focus on insight, not just data and analytics, and develop the “human element” of risk technology.
It is important not to miss the forest for the trees: technology, data, and analytics can only have value if their insights can be put into action.
Je vous invite à lire cet article de Vincent Ryan paru dans Capital Markets du site CFO. On y décrit un changement significatif dans l’influence que peuvent exercer les actionnaires des grandes sociétés cotées en se rapprochant des positions des activistes, lesquels ont un solide parcours (Track Record). Voici un extrait de ce court article.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus !
Management and the board of directors may assume that a company’s institutional shareholders will be their allies in a fight against an activist investor. They shouldn’t.
Shareholder activists continue to take on boards of directors and management, especially at large companies. Of the 137 financial or board-seat activist campaigns announced as of August 12, nearly 30 percent involved companies with a market capitalization of more than $1 billion at the time the campaign was initiated, according to SharkRepellent.net, up from 20 percent in 2012.
While companies may just be more vulnerable to activist campaigns, experts say a key driver is that institutional shareholders are more often embracing these much-maligned investors instead of siding with the company against them.
“There is real change in how activists are perceived by the investing public,” says Alexander Khutorsky, managing director of The Valence Group, a specialist investment bank. In the past, if an institutional investor didn’t like a company’s performance or its management team, it “voted with its feet” and sold the shares. But now many investors are “more open to outsider influence,” says Khutorsky. “They’re willing to concede that a company could be made better through activism, so they are sticking around and voting for changes.”
A note from SharkRepellent.net highlights “an increased willingness by mainstream mutual funds and other institutional investors to side with activists, which is absolutely essential [for a hedge fund] to effect changes with a small ownership stake, as they often do when targeting larger companies.”
The goals of activists often align with investors: returning excess balance-sheet cash to shareholders, selling underperforming or noncore business units or even ousting an ineffective board of directors.
“As much as management may feel they are being attacked, their shareholders will not necessarily share that view,” Khutorsky says.
In addition, activist investors have a “good track record” of creating value, at least in the nominal sense, says Khutorsky. “The stock [often] goes up so they can show very straightforward returns; they’re not necessarily creating long-term value, but they have credibility in helping shareholders realize near-term value,” he says.
Voici un extrait du récent rapport de PwC sur l’état de la gouvernance aux États-Unis. Le sommaire exécutif reproduit ci-dessous montre clairement l’évolution de la pensée des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux thèmes suivants :
(1) Évaluation plus sévère de la performance des collègues administrateurs;
(2) Résistances quant au remplacement des collègues administrateurs;
(3) La « stimulation intellectuelle » est la principale motivation à siéger sur un conseil;
(4) Divergences d’opinions quant à la communication d’informations concernant la gouvernance, la rémunération de la direction et les nominations des administrateurs;
(5) Lacunes quant aux politiques de communications avec les parties prenantes;
(6) Peu d’administrateurs sont prêts à reconsidérer la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, même si les actionnaires questionnent la politique;
(7) Augmentation significative de la surveillance des risques par le C.A.;
(8) Différences de perception entre la direction et les administrateurs au sujet de l’influence de diverses parties prenantes sur les stratégies;
(9 Proactivité plus marquées des administrateurs en ce qui a trait aux risques de fraudes;
(10) Importance accrue accordée aux projets en TI, bien que toujours considérée comme insuffisante;
(11) Augmentation importante de l’utilisation de conseillers externes, notamment en TI;
(12) Une majorité d’administrateur (aux É-U) croit que les récentes initiatives règlementaires n’ont pas accrue la protection des investisseurs, mais elles ont contribué à accroitre significativement les coûts;
(13) L’influence des firmes de conseil spécialisées en gouvernance décline.
We are witnessing unprecedented change in the corporate governance world: new perspectives on boardroom composition, higher levels of stakeholder engagement, more emphasis on emerging risks and strategies, and the increasing velocity of change in the digital world. These factors, coupled with calls for enhanced transparency around governance practices and reporting, the very active regulatory and lawmaking environment, and the enhanced power of proxy advisors, are all accelerating evolution, and in some cases creating a revolution, in the boardroom.
In the summer of 2013, 934 public company directors responded to our 2013 Annual Corporate Directors Survey. Of those directors, 70% serve on the boards of companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. As a result, the survey’s findings reflect the practices and boardroom perspectives of many of today’s world-class companies. The focus of this year’s research not only reflects in-depth analysis of contemporary governance trends, but also emphasizes how boards are reacting to a rapidly evolving landscape.
These are the highlights:
Directors are even more critical of their fellow directors than last year: 35% now say someone on their board should be replaced (compared to only 31% in 2012). The top three reasons cited are diminished performance because of aging, a lack of required expertise, and poor preparation for meetings.
Replacing a fellow board member can be difficult; 48% cite impediments to doing so. The top inhibitor, cited nearly twice as often as any other factor, is that board leadership is uncomfortable addressing the issue.
Board service is not driven by money or ego. More than half of directors (54%) say that their primary motivation for sitting on a corporate board is intellectual stimulation, 22% see board service as a way to keep engaged, and 17% indicate they simply want to give something back. Remuneration is low on the list.
There is a dichotomy between directors who believe it’s appropriate to communicate about governance issues directly with shareholders and those who do not. Just over 30% say it’s « very appropriate » to communicate about corporate governance issues, and about a quarter say the same about executive compensation and director nominations. But the same or slightly more say director communication about these three areas is « not appropriate. »
Regarding communication with other stakeholders, nearly half of directors say their boards either have no policy or one that’s not useful. Considering the increasing frequency of stakeholder interactions, it’s not surprising that about one-quarter of those without such a policy believe there should be one.
Boards continue to take action in response to say on pay voting results (70%) but few actually reduced compensation (3%). Over one-half of directors say that it would take a negative shareholder vote of 30% or more to cause them to reconsider executive compensation.
The number of directors who believe there is a clear allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among the board and its committees (80%) improved over the prior year by 17 percentage points. Yet half of those who say that there is clarity reflected that it still could be improved.
CEOs and directors have different perspectives on who influences company strategy or what threatens their company’s growth prospects. As reported in PwC’s 16th Annual Global CEO Survey, CEOs see more influence by the media and supply chain partners, while directors believe investors have more clout. Directors are significantly more concerned about the government impairing growth prospects.
Ninety-four percent of directors say they receive information on competitor initiatives and strategy, but nearly a quarter of them wish it were better.
Three-quarters of directors said their boards took additional action to oversee fraud risks. Six of 10 held discussions regarding « tone at the top, » a 14 percentage-point increase from last year. Other actions included increased interactions with members of management below the executive level and having discussions about insider trading controls.
Directors reflected on the increasing importance of the IT revolution at their companies—15% call IT critical, up from 13% in 2012, and the amount of time directors spent overseeing IT increased correspondingly. Despite the fact that about one-third of boards spent more hours overseeing IT, 61% want to spend even more time considering related risks in the coming year, and 55% say the same about IT strategy.
There was a jump in the use of outside consultants to advise boards on IT strategy and risk: from 27% last year to 35% this year. Even more are thinking about it. While most of these were hired on a project-specific basis, the percentage of consultants engaged on a continuous basis doubled from last year.
Almost a third of directors believe their company’s strategy and IT risk mitigation is not adequately supported by a sufficient understanding of IT at the board level. And only about a quarter « very much » agree that the company provides them with adequate information for effective oversight.
The majority of directors have evolved their practices to be more engaged in overseeing traditional IT issues: the status of major IT implementations and the annual IT budget. These account for the highest levels of director engagement (80% and 63%, respectively). But directors say they are not sufficiently engaged in understanding the company’s level of cyber-security spend (24%) and competitors’ leverage of emerging technologies (22%).
Nearly two-thirds of directors (64%) believe recent regulatory and enforcement initiatives have not increased investor protections, and 77% don’t believe such actions have increased public trust in the corporate sector. In addition, 51% think these efforts have not enhanced transparency to stakeholders « very much » or at all.
Nearly three-fourths of directors feel that increased regulation and enforcement initiatives have added costs to companies that exceed the benefits, and 56% believe they have put excessive burdens on directors. Over a third (36%) responded that such initiatives have contributed to unreasonable expectations of director performance.
Despite their perceived increased influence, proxy advisory firms appear to be losing ground when it comes to their credibility with directors. Directors’ ratings of the firms’ independence, thoroughness of work, and quality of voting recommendations all declined in 2013.
A summary of selected insights reflecting the best of the boardroom is included in the first part of this report. The appendix includes other graphs and survey results.
Plusieurs articles reliés à la gouvernance des sociétés :
Cette publication électronique mensuelle au format pdf téléchargeable via le site internet a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès aux informations-clés sur les activités de l’IFA pour tous les adhérents : l’agenda des prochains évènements et séminaires, les activités en région, les actualités de la gouvernance, les dernières publications et les principaux services disponibles. Désormais la Newsletter intègre le fil des nominations des adhérents de l’IFA.
95 ASC de plus !
Mercredi 25 septembre 2013 s’est tenue la cérémonie de remise des Certificats Administrateur de Société des 95 administrateurs et futurs administrateurs ayant réussi le parcours de Certification avec succès entre novembre 2012 et juillet 2013.
Depuis 2010, date de création du Certificat Administrateur de Sociétés, 296 professionnels ont intégré le Certificat, dont 56% de femmes Leur taux de réussite auCertific at Administrateur de Sociétés est de 90%.
Le Certificat Administrateur de Sociétés créé par l’Institut Français des Administrateurs (IFA) en partenariat avec Sciences Po s’adresse aux administrateurs en place,
désireux de renforcer et professionnaliser leurs compétences, comme aux futurs administrateurs. Il comprend treize jours de formation sur six mois environ pour permettre un renforcement des compétences et l’acquisition des connaissances et savoir-faire indispensables à l’exercice d’un mandat.
Les «ASC « en bref
211 Certifiés
58% de femmes, 42% d’hommes
Moyenne d’âge : 53 ans (en France 60 ans)
Expérience professionnelle : 30 ans
65% avaient une expérience d’administrateur avant leur admission
Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au cours du troisième trimestre 2013 (juillet, août, septembre). Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés.
On y retrouve des points de vue très bien étayés sur les principaux sujets d’actualité suivants : la recherche de mandats au sein des conseils, la gestion de crises, les devoirs et les responsabilités des administrateurs, la gouvernance des OBNL, la présence des femmes dans les C.A., les fondements de la gouvernance, la réputation de l’entreprise et la fonction de secrétaire du conseil d’administration.
En terme géographique, près du quart des visiteurs sont de France ou de dizaines de pays francophones, et 58 % sont d’origine canadienne. Ceux-ci trouvent leur voie sur le site principalement via LinkedIn (47 %) ou via les engins de recherche (40 %).
Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus et ils sont grandement appréciés; je réponds toujours à ceux-ci. Bonne lecture !
Voici un excellent document publié par André Laurin de la firme Lavery, avec la collaboration d’André Vautour, sur les aspects juridiques et pratiques de la décision de nommer des administrateurs externes sur les C.A. de PME, familiales ou non.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’ouvrage ainsi qu’un résumé des points les plus importants à retenir.
Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Plusieurs PME se sont dotées d’un conseil d’administration véritable et ont invité des personnes externes à la société à y siéger. Nul ne saurait nier les bénéfices que peuvent apporter à la direction et à la création de valeurs pour l’entreprise les conseils que peuvent prodiguer des personnes dont l’expérience et les compétences sont pertinentes. Nul ne saurait nier non plus les effets positifs d’une saine gouvernance.
Toutefois, il faut bien constater que nombre d’entrepreneurs sont réfractaires à la création d’un conseil qu’ils ne contrôlent pas complètement. Très souvent, la création d’un conseil a été imposée par le prêteur, l’investisseur ou l’éventualité prochaine d’un appel public à l’épargne.
En effet, l’entrepreneur préfère souvent se passer d’un véritable conseil de crainte de perdre le contrôle et de passer trop de temps en réunions. Par ailleurs, dans certains cas, il formera un comité consultatif formel ou informel composé de certains fournisseurs de services, d’amis ou de connaissances.
Dans ce bulletin, nous rappellerons tout d’abord les devoirs dont doivent s’acquitter les administrateurs de PME et les objectifs ou bénéfices de la gouvernance, pour ensuite suggérer certains modes de fonctionnement que peuvent adopter les administrateurs pour respecter leurs devoirs dans le contexte d’une PME et se protéger contre leur responsabilité potentielle.
À RETENIR
Une saine gouvernance peut et devrait être créatrice de valeurs pour la PME
L’établissement d’une saine gouvernance peut constituer une protection contre la responsabilité potentielle de l’administrateur
Les devoirs généraux de l’administrateur d’une PME sont les mêmes que ceux de l’administrateur d’une grande société (diligence et loyauté)
Les modalités de respect des devoirs et d’implantation de la gouvernance prendront une forme simplifiée et pratique dans le contexte d’une PME
Un cadre de fonctionnement adéquat et une réceptivité de la direction constituent des conditions essentielles à l’acceptation et à l’exercice de la fonction d’administrateur externe
Plusieurs mesures peuvent et devraient être prises à l’initiative de l’administrateur externe.
Vous trouverez ci-dessous un court article de Andrea Bonime-Blanc*, PDG de GEC Risk Advisory, sur le risque réputationnel. Cet article est partagé par Denis Lefort, CPA, CA, CIA, CRMA, Expert-conseil – Gouvernance, Audit interne, Contrôle. Dans son article, l’auteur précise ce qu’est le risque de réputation et comment celui-ci peut être la résultante de sept autres catégories de risques :
Le risque politique
Le risque opérationnel
Le risque financier
Le risque technologique
Le risque légal
Le risque lié à la chaîne d’approvisionnement
Le risque lié au leadership et à la culture
Cet article est très intéressant (1) parce qu’il présente une nomenclature et une terminologie des principaux risquesorganisationnelset (2) parce qu’il montre comment chacun de ces risques peut affecter négativement la réputation de l’entreprise. Bonne lecture.
While every organisation (whether for profit, non-profit, governmental or academic) will face varied threats, it’s important to understand how universal risks might apply to a particular business or entity.
Reputation (Photo credit: krossbow)
It is safe to say that any global actor may have several or all of the following big bucket risk categories to deal with at any given time: political, operational, financial, legal, supply chain, technological, and leadership/culture.
And then there is something we loosely call “reputation risk”. What is reputation risk? Is it a separate risk category to add to the list or is it another kind of threat altogether? I would argue that it is not an additional category but a different kind of cross-cutting risk – an altogether different animal that is nevertheless interconnected with the other seven categories.
Let’s work our way through that statement. It is arguable that some of the seven categories have overlapping issues, and we could manage with fewer overall categories. Each of these major categories, however, is distinct and emanates from a different place. Let’s define these contours and then revisit how reputation risk relates back to these categories.
*Dr Andrea Bonime-Blanc is chief executive of GEC Risk Advisory, a global governance, risk and reputation consultancy to boards and the C-suite. She is chair emeritus of the Ethics and Compliance Officer Association, a member of Ethical Corporation’s editorial advisory board, a programme director at The Conference Board and a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. @GlobalEthicist
Voici une étude internationale publiée par Paul Hastings sur la place des femmes dans les conseils d’administration et sur les contenus des codes de gouvernance eu égard à la parité.
Cette étude couvre plusieurs thèmes concernant le raffermissement de la situation des femmes dans les instances de décision, notamment :
(1) éduquer les C.A. sur les impératifs d’affaires reliés à l’importance de la diversité;
(2) présenter des stratégies d’ouverture de postes sur les conseils d’administration;
(3) créer des réseaux et des banques de candidatures féminines.
Les auteurs font le point sur l’évolution de la situation des femmes dans les C.A., pays par pays. Je vous invite à consulter cet ouvrage afin de vous familiariser avec les règlementations internationales en gouvernance. On y présente un excellent résumé des codes de gouvernance :
Europe continues to be a leader on this issue. In the past year, we saw tangible progress as well as continued debate about the best approaches for promoting greater representation of women on corporate boards. 2013 showed the highest year-on-year change recorded to date in the average number of women on boards of large corporations in European Union Member States, in part due to mandatory quotas. However, several EU countries have pursued strategies other than mandatory quotas to address the gap. Austria, Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom, and Sweden favor legislation and corporate codes that allow companies to set their own targets and policies. Recent amendments to the UK’s corporate governance code more explicitly reference gender as a factor in making board appointments. The changes also require that companies report publically on their board member selection process, diversity, and gender policy as well as measurable objectives for implementing and gauging progress. In Germany, the debate over fixed quotas continues within the government and no legislation addressing gender parity is expected this year.
The United States and Canada continue to exhibit only marginal growth in the percentage of women on boards since the 2012 report. However, in the United States, there has been renewed attention and discourse in the public domain regarding the lack of women in the highest echelons of corporate leadership following several op-eds and most notably, Sheryl Sandberg’s book Lean In: Women, Work and the Will to Lead. Notably, much of the discourse has centered on private sector initiatives, rather than mandatory quotas or other legislative solutions.
In Australia, new legislation has bolstered reporting requirements: private companies with 80 or more employees must report annually regarding specific gender equality indicators. The legislation includes potential sanctions such as naming non-compliant companies in national newspapers and jeopardizing such companies’ eligibility for government contracting. In New Zealand, the proposed NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules regarding diversity have been enacted, requiring listed companies to provide a breakdown of the gender composition of their directors and officers.
Voici un excellent article publié par Geoff Beattie* et Beverly Behan** et paru dans Ivey Business Journal sur le sujet de la conduite des conseils d’administration. Les auteurs mettent l’accent sur l’importance des trois éléments suivants : (1) la conception d’un plan d’action concernant le management du CA, (2) le courage de poser des questions qui vont au-delà de l’indépendance requise des administrateurs et, (3) l’établissement d’une culture de performance et de reddition de comptes.
The role of the Board of Directors has never been more important. Boards make important decisions that affect companies, the people who work in those companies, the people who own those companies, and sometimes the economy itself. If ever there was a place where excellence is required and should be demanded, this is it. The effectiveness of a board should not be considered a nice addition to a well-managed company, but a prerequisite.
The Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
But what makes a board effective? Surprisingly simple elements that are too frequently ignored. Among them, creating a plan for the board, demanding far more than mere independence from board leadership and establishing a board culture of performance and accountability.
Geoff Beattie sits on the boards of General Electric, the Royal Bank of Canada and McCain Foods and has served on and worked with other boards throughout his career. He is the former CEO of Woodbridge and Vice-Chair of Thomson Reuters
**Beverly Behan
Bev Behan has worked with over 125 boards, primarily S&P1500s, over the past 16 years. Her latest book, Great Companies Deserve Great Boards, was named Governance Book of the Year by Directors & Boards magazine.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) offre une formation spécialement destinée aux administrateurs, hauts dirigeants et cadres du secteur des services financiers qui œuvrent dans le domaine bancaire, les assurances, les valeurs mobilières et les organismes d’encadrement légal et corporatif. Cette formation, offerte les 12 et 13 novembre à Montréal, a pour objectifs de :
Sensibiliser les participants aux particularités de la gouvernance des entreprises du secteur financier par rapport à celle des entreprises non financières.
Présenter les pratiques de bonne gouvernance et de gestion éthique dans ce secteur d’activités.
Analyser les dérives potentielles, incluant les manifestations criminelles dans le secteur des services financiers.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval (FSA ULaval) remettait, le 12 septembre 2013 au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital à Montréal, les diplômes aux 86 nouveaux administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) lors de la 8e cérémonie de remise des diplômes.
Plus de 150 invités, dont de nombreux administrateurs, formateurs, collaborateurs et partenaires du CAS, s’étaient donné rendez-vous pour l’événement. Le recteur de l’Université Laval, M. Denis Brière, et le doyen de FSA ULaval, M. Michel Gendron, ont procédé à la remise des diplômes aux finissants du programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés, attestant ainsi de leur réussite et de leur compétence pour contribuer avec assurance sur les conseils d’administration.
M. John R. Porter, président du conseil d’administration de l’Université Laval et de la Fondation du Musée national des beaux-arts du Québec était invité à titre de conférencier de cet événement. Monsieur Porter s’est adressé à l’assistance pour partager son expérience d’administrateur et a profité de l’occasion pour parler de sa récente expérience à titre de coprésident du chantier sur la Loi-cadre des universités et les enjeux de gouvernance du secteur de l’éducation.
Puis, Mme Cora Tsouflidou, fondatrice et propriétaire des Franchises Cora inc. a livré un témoignage inspiré et touchant en tant que nouvelle ASC et représentante de l’ensemble des diplômés de sa cohorte.
La remise des diplômes 2013 porte le nombre d’ASC à 589, ce qui représente la plus importante communauté d’administrateurs formés en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec. L’ensemble des ASC se retrouve dans la Banque des ASC, un outil de recherche performant pour repérer et contacter des administrateurs dotés d’expertises diverses et provenant de secteurs d’intervention variés. Il est possible de consulter leur profil en visitant le www.BanqueAdministrateurs.com.
Le document ci-dessous présente la problématique, bien réelle, de l’asymétrie de l’information entre les membres du conseil (le Board) et la direction de l’entreprise (le management). Il y a un gap naturel entre ce qui est communiqué par le management et ce qui est requis par le Board pour bien faire son travail. Ce dernier a besoin d’une information de qualité, c’est-à-dire une information complète (quoique synthétique), représentative de la réalité, la plus objective possible et, à jour.
Le rapport, préparé par la NACD (représentant le point de vue des administrateurs) et la firme comptable McGladrey (représentant le point de vue du management), présente un excellent compte rendu des problématiques soulevées par le manque de communication entre les administrateurs et la direction et propose plusieurs pratiques susceptibles de combler le gap d’information.
On y présente les résultats des « conversations » issus de quatre panels composés d’administrateurs et de membres de la haute direction. Le compte rendu fait ressortir les principaux problèmes de communication dans les domaines suivants : (1) La stratégie et le risque, (2) la rémunération des hauts dirigeants, (3) la planification de la succession du PCD, et (4) l’évaluation du Conseil.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par cette question, c’est-à-dire les administrateurs de sociétés et les membres des directions d’entreprises, devraient prendre connaissance de ce document afin d’être mieux renseignés sur les moyens à prendre pour pallier l’asymétrie de l’information.
Voici un court extrait du document. Bonne lecture.
« Effective board oversight demands information that is as current and relevant as possible. There are, however, natural gaps between what management communicates and what the board needs to know. The information flow between management and the board may not always be perfect, and board committees may have similar troubles bringing the full board « up to speed » on certain issues. The purpose of this report is to address these issues, which we call the « effectiveness gap. »…
Plus (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The goal of this report is to offer some tips and strategies to improve communications between the full board, C-suite, and committees. In particular, we focus on four areas of concern: strategy and risk, executive compensation, CEO succession planning, and board evaluations. These four areas are traditionally of high importance to board members yet have also presented challenges.
To help bridge the gaps in effectiveness, it was necessary to speak directly with individuals from both management and the board. While the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) is able to assess the director perspective, we needed the C-suite perspective as well. We partnered with McGladrey to host four small gatherings of executives and directors in an effort to find ways of improving communications and relationships. The conversations that occurred during these gatherings provided the material for this document ».
Voici les résultats d’une étude empirique réalisée par un groupe de chercheurs éminents : Lucian Bebchuk*, Harvard Law School, Alon Brav, Duke University, et Wei Jiang, Columbia Business School, et publiée dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation le 19 août 2013. Selon les auteurs, cette étude démontre que les activités des investisseurs activistes (Hedge Funds) n’ont pas d’effets négatifs sur les intérêts à long-terme des entreprises et de leurs actionnaires.
Les résultats de l’étude indiquent que les comportements des actionnaires activistes ont même des effets positifs à long terme, contrairement aux prétentions de plusieurs opposants de ces activités insuffisamment règlementées. Nous avons souvent discuté de cette problématique sur notre blogue mais c’est la première fois que nous présentons les résultats d’une recherche scientifique aussi importante.
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du résumé de cette étude en consultant le document ci-dessous.
Il y a deux grands courants de pensée qui divisent le monde de la gouvernance et qui s’opposent “royalement” :
(1) celui des investisseurs activistes qui tentent de tirer profit des failles perçues dans les orientations et la gestion des grandes entreprises cotées, en investissant massivement dans celles-ci et en proposant des changements radicaux de stratégies (fusion, restructuration, recapitalisation, contestation des PCD et des membres de conseils, etc…).
Selon ce groupe, les actionnaires sont rois et on se doit d’intervenir lorsque les entreprises ne sont pas gérées efficacement.
(2) celui des défenseurs de l’autorité des C.A. dans leurs rôles de fiduciaires, représentant les intérêts des actionnaires et des autres parties prenantes.
Selon ce groupe, ce sont les conseils d’administration qui prennent les décisions de nature stratégique en fonction de l’intérêt à long terme des entreprises. Les autorités règlementaires doivent donc intervenir pour restreindre les activités des investissements “court-termistes” […].
Voici un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism. Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document sont les suivantes :
(1) La gestion avec une perspective court-termiste représente-t-elle un problème sérieux ?
(2) Les investisseurs activistes sont-ils des joueurs court-termistes dont les actions ont des conséquences négatives pour les entreprises à long terme ?
(3) Les conseils d’administration des sociétés canadiennes doivent-ils être mieux protégés des actions des investisseurs activistes et des offres d’achat hostiles ? […]
J’ai choisi de partager avec les lecteurs un article de Holly J. Gregory, associé de Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, paru sur le blogue de Harvard Law School Forum (HLSF) on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation. Ce billet présente un solide argumentaire en faveur de la préservation d’un juste équilibre entre les principaux acteurs de la gouvernance : les actionnaires, les administrateurs, les managers, les conseillers et les autorités règlementaires.
Il est clair que le conseil d’administration, élu par les actionnaires, a toujours la responsabilité de l’orientation, de la surveillance et du suivi de l’organisation. Mais l’environnement de la gouvernance a changé et les actionnaires peuvent maintenant se référer aux avis exprimés par les firmes spécialisées de conseils en procuration pour mieux faire entendre leurs voix.L’auteur tente de clarifier les rôles de tous les acteurs en insistant sur les équilibres fragiles à préserver dans la gouvernance des sociétés […]
Dans ce billet, nous présentons une solide prise de position sur le comportement des fonds activistes (“hedge funds”) par Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, et publiée dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. L’auteur montre comment les fonds activistes peuvent souvent agir en fonction d’intérêts contraires aux actionnaires. L’auteur soulève une multitude de questions qui doivent trouver des réponses adéquates […]
Voici une excellente revue, parue dans Bloomberg Businessweek, au sujet de l’interventionnisme croissant des investisseurs institutionnels dans les décisions des conseils d’administration. On assiste à un changement significatif du comportement des grands investisseurs qui se joignent de plus en plus aux groupes d’actionnaires activistes pour exiger des changements dans le management de l’entreprise, plus particulièrement dans la conduite du PCD (CEO).
Les PCD sont de plus en plus conscients de l’influence significative des actionnaires et des grands investisseurs dans la gestion de l’entreprise; ils apprennent à reconnaître qui est le réel patron de l’organisation (le C.A., de plus en plus influencé par l’activisme des actionnaires).
L’article résume la situation de la manière suivante : “As big investors press Boards, the number of directors who failed to win majorities in shareholder votes has almost tripled since 2006″. […]
Dans son blogue, Governance Gateway, Richard Leblanc exprime son point de vue (1) sur les raisons qui incitent les actionnaires activistes à intervenir dans les activités des entreprises, et (2) sur le concept d’actionnariat au sens large. L’auteur tente de répondre à plusieurs questions fondamentales :
Quelles sont les responsabilités des conseils d’administration dans les cas d’activisme des actionnaires et d’offres d’achat non-sollicitées ?
Quel est le devoir du C.A. envers les actionnaires … et envers les parties prenantes ?
Comment définir la “valeur” des actionnaires ?
Quelle est la place des consultants dans ce processus ?
Autant de questions auxquelles l’auteur tente d’apporter des réponses sensés. Ce sont des prises de positions qui peuvent avoir de grandes incidences sur le modèle de gouvernance existant ! […]
Le Conference Board publie un compte rendu d’experts sur l’activisme des actionnaires en période d’incertitude. The recent Governance Watch webcast, Shareholder Activism in Uncertain Times, raised important questions for both management and boards to consider in the midst of an economic climate that is making many companies particularly. […]
Ci-dessous un extrait de l’article de Bebchuket al.
We recently completed an empirical study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, that tests the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance – the claim that interventions by activist shareholders, and in particular activist hedge funds, have an adverse effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. While this “myopic activists” claim has been regularly invoked and has had considerable influence, its supporters have thus far failed to back it up with evidence. Our study presents a comprehensive emp irical investigation of this claim. Our findings have important policy implications for ongoing policy debates on corporate governance and the rights and role of shareholders…
… Our study uses a dataset consisting of the full universe of approximately 2,000 interventions by activist hedge funds during the period 1994–2007. We identify for each activist effort the month (the intervention month) in which the activist initiative was first publicly disclosed (usually through the filing of a Schedule 13D). Using the data on operating performance and stock returns of public companies during the period 1991-2012, we track the operating performance and stock returns for companies during a long period – five years – following the intervention month. We also examine the three-year period that precedes activist interventions and that follows activists’ departure.
Hauser Hall (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Starting with operating performance, we find that operating performance improves following activist interventions and there is no evidence that the improved performance comes at the expense of performance later on. During the third, fourth, and fifth year following the start of an activist intervention, operating performance tends to be better, not worse, than during the pre-intervention period. Thus, during the long, five-year time window that we examine, the declines in operating performance asserted by supporters of the myopic activism claim are not found in the data. We also find that activists tend to target companies that are underperforming relative to industry peers at the time of the intervention, not well-performing ones.
We then turn to stock returns following the initial stock price spike that is well-known to accompany activist interventions. We first find that, consistent with the results obtained with respect to pre-intervention operating performance, targets of activists have negative abnormal returns during the three years preceding the intervention. We then proceed to examine whether, as supporters of the myopic activism claim believe, the initial stock price reflects inefficient market pricing that fails to reflect the long-term costs of the activist intervention and is thus followed by stock return underperformance in the long term.
In investigating the presence of negative abnormal returns during this period, we employ three standard methods used by financial economists for detecting stock return underperformance. In particular, the study examines: first, whether the returns to targeted companies were systematically lower than what would be expected given standard asset pricing models; second, whether the returns to targeted companies were lower than those of “matched” firms that are similar in terms of size and book to market; and, third, whether a portfolio based on taking positions in activism targets and holding them for five years underperforms relative to its risk characteristics. Using each of these methods, we find no evidence of the asserted reversal of fortune during the five-year period following the intervention. The long-term underperformance asserted by supporters of the myopic activism claim, and the resulting losses to long-term shareholders resulting from activist interventions, are not found in the data.
We also analyze whether activists cash out their stakes before negative stock returns occur and impose losses on remaining long-term shareholders. Because activist hedge funds have been documented to deliver adequate returns to their own investors, such a pattern is a necessary condition for long-term shareholders being made worse off by activist interventions. We therefore examine whether targets of activist hedge funds experience negative abnormal returns in the three years after an activist discloses that its holdings fell below the 5% threshold that subjects investors to significant disclosure requirements. Again using the three standard methods for detecting the existence of abnormal stock returns, we find no evidence that long-term shareholders experience negative stock returns during the three years following the partial or full cashing out of an activist’s stake.
We next turn to examine the two subsets of activist interventions that are most resisted and criticized – first, interventions that lower or constrain long-term investments by enhancing leverage, beefing up shareholder payouts, or reducing investments and, second, adversarial interventions employing hostile tactics. In both cases, interventions are followed by improvements in operating performance during the five-year period following the intervention, and no evidence is found for the adverse long-term effects asserted by opponents.
Finally, we examine whether activist interventions render targeted companies more vulnerable to economic shocks. In particular, we examine whether companies targeted by activist interventions during the years preceding the financial crisis were hit more in the subsequent crisis. We find no evidence that pre-crisis interventions by activists were associated with greater declines in operating performance or higher incidence of financial distress during the crisis.
Our findings that the data does not support the claims and empirical predictions of those holding the myopic activism view have significant implications for ongoing policy debates. Going forward, policymakers and institutional investors should not accept the validity of assertions that interventions by hedge funds are followed by long-term adverse consequences for companies and their long-term shareholders. The use of such claims as a basis for limiting shareholder rights and involvement should be rejected.
*Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. Alon Brav is Professor of Finance at Duke University. Wei Jiang, Professor of Finance at Columbia Business School. This post is based on their study, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, available here. An op-ed about the article published in the Wall Street Journal summarizing the results of the study is available here.
Voici un très court article publié par le Schreiber Bart Group sur l’importance, pour le C.A., de s’assurer de la bonne exécution des stratégies car c’est à ce niveau que la partie se joue. L’article met de l’avant certains moyens pour y arriver, notamment en s’assurant d’avoir les bonnes personnes sur le conseil, celles qui posent des questions sur les étapes d’implantation des stratégies.
English: Board of Directors (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
As we have said on many occasions before. Ninety percent of all organizational failures are due primarily to problems in executing an otherwise good-to-great strategy. Only 10% are due to having a “bad strategy”. Accordingly, we believe that it is not the strategy, but rather the strategy execution plan that the board should be focused on, approve and monitor.
After all, to simply approve something that has a 90% chance of being ineffective is just not good governance. Strategyexecution therefore is where the board’s guidance and advice can pay dividends. In fact, we think that a board’s oversight of strategy execution will become the next wave in governance.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Un numéro du Comité de vérification en bref de Deloitte aborde plusieurs sujets relatifs à l’efficacité des comités d’audit en mettant l’accent sur les principaux enjeux, notamment sur les façons de se préparer aux enquêtes internes. Le document présente les questions que les comités d’audit devraient se poser concernant chacun des dix enjeux retenus.
« Le rôle important que joue le comité de vérification dans le maintien d’une gouvernance appropriée a fait souvent l’objet de discussions dans les forums sur la gouvernance et les tables rondes du PCAOB en 2012. Le président du PCAOB, James Doty, a notamment indiqué : « Les investisseurs comptent sur les auditeurs et les comités de vérification comme agents intermédiaires pour surveiller le risque lié au processus d’information financière. Le comité de vérification surveille directement le processus de communication de l’information sur la situation financière et des résultats de la société aux investisseurs par la direction. Les auditeurs valident l’information. Naturellement, ces deux agents intermédiaires doivent se soutenir mutuellement en privilégiant une communication ouverte sur les moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour protéger les investisseurs contre les rapports trompeurs ou inadéquats établis par la direction. » [ trad.]
Les doigts du nénuphar (Photo credit: gelinh)
Les discussions sur la rotation des cabinets d’audit indépendants et le processus d’appel d’offres se poursuivent. Beaucoup estiment que le comité de vérification, qui représente les intérêts des investisseurs, doit être en mesure de contester la direction et les auditeurs et de remettre en question leurs positions au besoin. Il s’agit d’un rôle essentiel dans le processus de gouvernance de notre système financier ».
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Je vous propose la lecture d’un essai sur les principaux courants de pensées en gouvernance des sociétés au cours des soixante dernières années. Ce document, écrit par Douglas M. Branson de l’École de Droit de l’Université de Pittsburgh et paru dans le Social Science Research Network (SSRN), représente certainement l’un des points de vue les plus articulés sur la recherche d’une explication valable à la thèse de Berle et Means concernant la séparation de la propriété de celle du contrôle des firmes.
Bien que l’essai soit rédigé dans un style assez provocateur, il est fascinant à lire, pour peu que l’on soit familier avec la langue de Shakespeare et que l’on s’accommode des accents grinçants de l’auteur. Je recommande fortement la lecture de ce texte à tout étudiant de la gouvernance; c’est un must pour comprendre le champ d’étude ! J’ai obtenu l’autorisation de Douglas Branson pour la traduction de ce document.
Voici les points saillants de l’essai de Branson (en anglais, à ce stade-ci) :
Logo of the American Law Institute. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means documented the widespread dispersion of corporate shareholders, and the atomization of corporate shareholdings. They noted that in the then modern corporation “ownership has become depersonalized.” The result was that a new form of property had come into being. The person who owned the property no longer controlled it, as the farmer who owned the horse had to feed it, teach it pull the plow, and bury it when it died. “In the corporate system, the ‘owner’ of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control.” This was the fabled “separation of ownership from control.”
In one of the best known of his books (1956), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Galbraith rhetorically posed a number of solutions to the problem of unchecked corporate power, including the separation of ownership from control, although he generally did not use the Berle & Means terminology. He did not propose nationalization, as the British had done. Instead, he theorized that, indeed, corporations had grown too large, their shareholders no longer controlled them, competitive market forces no longer constrained them, and the potential for abuse was great. That potential would be checked however by the growth of countervailing power inherent in the growth of labor unions, consumer groups and government agencies. Galbraith pointed to the growth and influence of consumer cooperatives which enjoyed great growth in Scandinavia, at least in the post-War years. Essentially, those newly empowered groups would supply the controls historically owners had provided.
The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement of the Early 70s called for government intervention, as the nationalization movement had, but on discrete fronts rather than on a plenary basis. One scholar urged replacement of the one share one vote standard prevalent in U.S. corporate law with a graduated scale so that with acquisition of addition shares owners, particularly institutional owners who were perceived to be excessively mercenary would receive less and less voting power. A “power to the people” mandate would augment the power of individual owners, who generally held fewer shares but were thought to be more socially conscious. Calls for required installation of public interest directors on publicly held corporations’ boards sometimes included sub-recommendations that legislation also require that the publicly minded be equipped with offices and staffs, at corporate expense. Others proposed requirements for social auditing and for mandatory disclosure of social audit results.
Toward the second half of the 1970s, The Corporate Accountability Research Group, created and promoted by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, gathered evidence, marshaled arguments, and advocated the other, more drastic reform of the 1970s, federal chartering of large corporations. In certain of its incarnations, chartering advocates expanded the proposal’s reach, from the 500 largest enterprises to the 2000 largest U.S. corporations by revenue, to any corporation which did a significant amount of business with the federal government, and to certain categories of companies whose businesses were thought to be infected with the public interest. Whatever the universe of such corporations, these companies would have to re-register with a new federal entity, the Federal Chartering Agency. In addition, these corporations would no longer have perpetual existence as they had under state law. Instead the new federal statute corporations would have only limited life charters, good for, say, 20 or 25 years limited.
A Seismic Shift: the Swift Rise of Law and Economics Jurisprudence of the 1980s . Perhaps only once in a lifetime will one see as pronounced a jurisprudential shift as that from the corporate social responsibility and federal chartering movements to the minimalist, non-invasive take of economics on corporate law and corporate governance. Law and economics pointed to a minimalist corporate jurisprudence the core theory of which was that market forces regulated corporate and managerial behavior much better than regulation, laws, or lawsuits ever could.
An Antidote: The Good Governance Movement. The American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate Governance Project of 1994 constituted an implicit rejection of, and an antidote to, the law and economics movement. Succinctly, the ALI evinced a strong belief that, yes, corporate law does have a role to play. That belief, sometimes characterized as the constitutionalist approach, in contrast to the contractarian approach, underline and buttresses the entire ALI Project. The ALI crafted recommended rules for corporate objectives; structure, including board composition and committee structure; duty of “fair dealing” (duty of loyalty); duty of care and the business judgment rule; roles of directors and shareholders in control transactions and tender offers; and shareholders’remedies, including the derivative action and appraisal remedies.
The Early 1990s: The Emphasis on Institutional Investor Activism. Traditionally, though, institutional investors followed the “Wall Street Rule,” meaning that if they developed an aversion to a portfolio company’s performance or governance, they simply sold the stock rather than becoming embroiled in a corporate governance issue. Institutions voted with their feet. That is, they did so until portfolio positions had become so large that if an institutional investor liquidated even a sizeable portion of the portfolio’s stake in a company, the institution’s sales alone would push down the stock’s price. Thus, in the modern era, institutional investors are faced with more of a buy and hold strategy than they otherwise might prefer. So was born an opening to push for yet another proposed reform which would fill the vacuum created by the separation of ownership from control, namely, institutional activism, or “agents watching agents.” The case for institutional oversight was that because “product, capital, labor, and corporate control constraints on managerial discretion are imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and the institutions are the only institutions available.”
The Shift to an Emphasis on “Global” Convergence in Corporate Governance. In the second half of the 90s decade, the governance prognosticators did an abrupt about face, abandoning talk about the prospect of institutional shareholder activism in favor of pontification on the prospect of global convergence. The thesis went something like this. Through the process of globalization the world had become a much smaller place. Through use of media such as email and the Internet, governance advocates in Singapore now knew, or knew how to find out, what was happening on the corporate governance front in the United Kingdom and the United States. According to U.S. academics, the global model of good governance would replicate the U.S. model of corporate governance, of course…
Shift of the Emphasis to the Gatekeepers in 2001. Whatever the U.S. system was, it had a great many defects and it did not do the job for which it had been devised. In addition, of course, no sign existed that the convergence predicted had taken place. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) heads off in varying directions but a careful reader can discern that one of the legislation’s dominant themes is strengthening gatekeepers as a means of enhancing watchfulness over corporations. Thus, for example, SOX requires public corporations to have audit committees composed of independent directors, one or more of whom must be financial experts. Section 307 imposes whistleblowing duties upon attorneys who uncover wrongdoing. To enhance their independence, SOX requires that accountings firms which audit public companies no longer may provide a long list of lucrative consulting services for audit clients.
Emphasis on Independent Directors and Independent Board Committees. The movement for independent directors gathered steam with the 2002 SOX legislation, which required that SEC reporting companies, that is, most publicly held corporations, have an audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors. The New York Stock Exchange followed by amendments to its Listing Manual that listed public companies have a majority of directors who are independent, making the 1994 ALI recommendation of good practice into a hard and fast requirement. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act jumped on the independent director bandwagon with its requirement that exchanges refuse to list the shares of corporations who disclose they do not have a compensation committee comprised of independent directors. Observers who have written about the issue assume that the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement is a de facto requirement that corporations have compensation committees, albeit a backhanded sort of requirement.
L’extrait que je vous présente vous donnera une bonne idée de la teneur des propos de Branson. Vous pouvez télécharger le document de 25 pages.
Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés. Bonne lecture.
This article is a retrospective of corporate governance reforms various academics have authored over the last 60 years or so, by the author of the first U.S. legal treatise on the subject of corporate governance (Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance (1993)). The first finding is as to periodicity: even casual inspection reveals that the reformer group which controls the « reform » agenda has authored a new and different reform proposal every five years, with clock-like regularity. The second finding flows from the first, namely, that not one of these proposals has made so much as a dent in the problems that are perceived to exist. The third inquiry is to ask why this is so? Possible answers include the top down nature of scholarship and reform proposals in corporate governance; the closed nature of the group controlling the agenda, confined as it is to 8-10 academics at elite institutions; the lack of any attempt rethink or redefine the challenges which governance may or may not face; and the continued adhesion to the problem as the separation of ownership from control as Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means perceived it more than 80 years ago.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article de Paul Willmott, directeur de McKinsey paru dans Insights & Publications. Les administrateurs doivent questionner et comprendre les décisions de l’organisation dans le domaine des technologies de l’information.
L’auteur mentionne neuf questions cruciales qui doivent faire l’objet de préoccupations de tout administrateur. Pour vraiment bien comprendre l’argumentaire derrière chaque question, je vous invite à lire l’article au complet. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
1. How will IT change the basis of competition in our industry?
2. What will it take to exceed our customers’ expectations in a digital world?
3. Do our business plans reflect the full potential of technology to improve our performance?
4. Is our portfolio of technology investments aligned with opportunities and threats?
5. How will IT improve our operational and strategic agility?
6. Do we have the capabilities required to deliver value from IT?
7. Who is accountable for IT and how do we hold them to account?
8. Are we comfortable with our level of IT risk?
9. Are we making the most of our technology story?
Some organizations are creating new technology forums, building the expertise of corporate directors, and strengthening IT governance—all with the aim of allowing boards to guide management by asking the right questions about technology…
« Technology has exceeded our humanity » (Photo credit: Toban B.)
The particulars of each enterprise’s situation will, of course, determine the focus of the discussion and the detailed questions to ask. However, across industries, every corporate director—IT savvy or not—will benefit from reviewing the following questions as a starting point for shaping a fruitful conversation with management about what the company needs to do to become a technology winner.
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*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
Voici le condensé d’un rapport sur les rémunérations des administrateurs de sociétés et sur les pratiques de gouvernance (aux É.U.), publié conjointement par le Conference Board, le NASDAQ OMX et le NYSE Euronext. Ce résumé a été transmis par Matteo Tonello du Conference Board et publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
This is « a benchmarking study with more than 150 corporate governance data points searchable by company size (measurable by revenue and asset value) and 20 industrial sectors. The report is based on a survey of public companies registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance, the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), the Shareholder Forum and Compliance Week also endorsed the survey by distributing it to their members and readers ».
Voici un extrait des points se rapportant à la rémunération des administrateurs. Pour de plus amples informations, je vous invite à lire l’article du HB Law School Forum ou à communiquer avec M. Tonello du Conference Board pour le rapport intégral de 2013.
Seal of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Directors are best compensated in the energy industry, but company size can make a huge difference. Computer services companies are the most generous with full value share awards, but equity-based compensation is widely used across industries and irrespective of company size.
Stock options are not as favored as they used to be, except by the smallest companies increasing skepticism on the effectiveness of stock options and stock appreciation rights as long-term incentives has led to their decline, especially in the last few years.
Additional cash retainer for board chairmen is seldom offered by larger companies, which are more likely to reward lead directors.
A corporate program financing the matching of personal charitable contributions is the most common among the director perquisites reported by companies.
While many nonexecutive directors have C-suite experience, former or current CFOs are less represented than expected in the board of financial services companies.
*Je suis en congé jusqu’à la fin septembre. Durant cette période, j’ai décidé de rééditer les billets considérés comme étant les plus pertinents par les lecteurs de mon blogue (depuis le début des activités le 19 juillet 2011).
The goals of activists often align with investors: returning excess balance-sheet cash to shareholders, selling underperforming or noncore business units or even ousting an ineffective board of directors.
Voici un document émanant d’une présentation d’Yvan Allaire* à la conférence nationale de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (Institute of Corporate Directors) à Toronto le 22 mai 2013 dont le thème était Shareholder Activism: Short vs. Long-termism. Dans son article, l’auteur prend une position affirmative en tentant d’expliquer les comportements court-termistes des actionnaires (investisseurs) activistes. Ce document mérite que l’on s’y penche pour réfléchir à trois questions fondamentales en gouvernance. Les questions soulevées dans le document sont les suivantes :
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 