Devenez blogueur invité sur mon site en gouvernance des sociétés


Aimeriez-vous agir à titre d’auteur invité (« Invited guess ») sur mon blogue en gouvernance des sociétés ? Avez-vous un article déjà écrit ou souhaitez-vous m’aider en contribuant à l’écriture d’un court billet en gouvernance de sociétés ?

Chaque jour, je publie un billet qui porte sur un sujet d’actualité récente en gouvernance; si vous êtes intéressés à ajouter de la valeur à ce blogue, vous êtes invités à me soumettre un article original portant sur un des multiples objets de la gouvernance des sociétés privées, publiques, OBNL, coopératives, PME, sociétés d’État, etc.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

 

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets, « posts », est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie. Chaque jour, je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication.

L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

 

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Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

 

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à ce jour, il a accueilli plus de 115 000 visiteurs. Depuis le début, sur une base quotidienne, j’ai œuvré à la publication de 1 039 billets. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 1er novembre 2014, il est fréquenté par plus de 4 500 visiteurs par mois.

L’année dernière, le blogue a connu une croissance de 82 %. Notons que celui-ci a obtenu la deuxième position à l’échelle canadienne parmi les blogues de la catégorie Business/marketing/médias sociaux, le seul des lauréats dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

En 2015, j’estime qu’environ 5 000 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance.

À ce rythme, on peut penser que plus de 60 000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2015. On  note que 42 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn et 45 % par différents engins de recherche. Les autres réseaux sociaux (Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr) se partagent 13 % des références.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

  1. Canada (64 %)
  2. France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
  3. Magreb (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie) (5 %)
  4. Autres pays de l’Union Européenne (2 %)
  5. États-Unis (2 %)
  6. Autres pays de provenance (7 %)

Quels sont les avantages à publier un billet sur ce blogue ?

 

  1. L’occasion de publier sur le blogue en gouvernance le plus fréquenté au Québec ainsi que sur l’un des plus réputés dans le monde francophone et au canada anglais;
  2. La possibilité d’ajouter votre Bio en incluant deux liens URL ainsi que des liens pertinents dans le texte publié;
  3. Le partage du billet sur plusieurs réseaux sociaux ainsi que sur une quinzaine de groupes de discussion professionnels de LinkedIn;
  4. La possibilité d’obtenir de la rétroaction et des commentaires de la part des lecteurs.

Directives simples

 

  1. Un texte d’environ 500 mots sur un sujet d’actualité en gouvernance;
  2. Les liens publicitaires ne sont pas autorisés;
  3. L’article doit être original et basé sur une opinion ou une recherche documentée.

Comment procéder ?

 

La procédure est très simple et rapide. J’ai besoin de vos coordonnées, du sujet du billet ainsi que d’une brève description de votre texte de 500 mots.

Je vous répondrai dans les heures qui suivent. Après entente sur la pertinence de la publication, je vous demanderai de me soumettre le texte complet dans les deux semaines qui suivent.

Si le texte soumis est susceptible d’apporter un éclairage inédit sur la gouvernance, je vous reviendrai avec un feedback ainsi qu’avec la programmation de la publication.

Vous pouvez aussi choisir une image qui illustre bien le propos du billet.

 

Cliquez ICI pour me rejoindre

La réglementation canadienne est déficiente à plusieurs égards | Richard Leblanc


Aujourd’hui, je tiens à partager avec vous le point de vue de Richard Leblanc, expert canadien de la gouvernance corporative, professeur de droit des affaires, consultant en gouvernance et observateur attentif de la scène réglementaire canadienne.

Richard nous présente cinq domaines de la règlementation canadienne qui sont déficients, ou à tout le moins  perfectibles. Ce jugement peut sembler assez sévère mais, en ce qui me concerne, je le partage entièrement, d’autant plus que plusieurs de mes billets vont dans le sens des lacunes observées par Richard.

Un document réglementaire de quatre (4) pages sur la bonne gouvernance est, en effet, un  peu restreint !

La règlementation en gouvernance au Canada, laquelle date de 10 ans, est certainement désuète eu regard aux autres règlementations des pays développés.

Voici donc cinq (5) lacunes identifiées par Richard Leblanc, qui, selon plusieurs observateurs, méritent une attention particulière, sinon une révision systématique :

  1. Déficiences au niveau des pratiques et des principes de gouvernance
  2. Manque d’importance accordée à la gestion des risques
  3. Manque d’une définition objective de l’indépendance des administrateurs
  4. Manque d’importance accordée à l’expertise requise dans le domaine de l’industrie
  5. Connaissances insuffisantes relatives aux aspects financiers et à l’audit interne.

Je vous invite à lire le compte rendu de son blogue, ci-dessous, afin de connaître les raisons invoquées.

Canada’s Corporate Governance Guidelines Are Out of Date

In my teaching, research and consulting, I no longer use “NP-58201 Corporate Governance Guidelines,” June 17, 2005 (“Guidelines”), that apply to publicly traded companies in Canada, as an example of exemplary corporate governance. I regard them as stale and dated. I cannot think of another developed country that has not updated its governance guidelines in almost 10 years. There have been more changes to governance since the financial crisis of 2008 than in a generation. And we are only about half way through all of them. Canadian regulators – including all provinces and territories – need to keep up, and step up.

Here are the deficiencies to the Guidelines as I see them:

IMG_20141013_150649

1. Lack of principles and practices:

Our Guidelines are four pages long. The UK’s new Code (September 2014) is thirty-six pages. Australia’s Principles and Recommendations (March 2014) are forty-four. South Africa’s “King III” (2009) is sixty-six pages, to pick only three examples. Quantity is not necessarily quality, but by having such succinct guidelines, the opportunity to set out (i) best practices that (ii) achieve the objective of principles is gone. It is comply or explain against a perfunctory unitary guideline, which can be – and is – gamed by reporting management. There should be more robust guidance, where the regulator explains various ways good governance can occur, from which listed companies can pick and choose according to their circumstances.

2. Lack of focus on risk management:

Take risk for example. The Canadian Guidelines simply state that the board should identify principal risks and ensure appropriate systems are in place to manage these risks. I have no idea what this actually means, nor may directors. Risk management oversight now involves an explicit risk appetite framework, internal controls to mitigate, technology, limitations, and assurance provided directly to the board and committees by independent risk, compliance, and internal audit functions. None of these practices, which are very much addressed by other regulators, appear in the 2005 Guidelines. Consequently, many public companies have immature risk management, especially in addressing non-financial risks such as cyber security, operations, terrorism and reputation. Regulatory inaction has an effect. Even a forward-thinking director may be blocked by intransigent management to devote greater resources to mitigating risk because of inadequate regulation.

3. Lack of independence of mind:

In Canada, a board can subjectively believe a director to be independent, but this belief need not be independently validated, nor tied to any objective or reasonable standard. Nowhere else can a conflict of interest lack a perceptual foundation. As a result, directors tell me how colleagues are compromised by an office, perks, vacations, gifts, jobs for friends, social relatedness, relations to major shareholders, excessive pay, excessive tenure, interlocks, and other forms of capture. If a director or chair is captured, they are owned by management and totally ineffective. If there is a difference between regulatory independence and the independence of mind of directors, the fault lies with the regulation. Regulators should implement an objective standard of director independence, not a subjective one.

4. Lack of industry expertise:

It was admitted in open forum that the original 1994 committee did little research. Sufficient industry expertise on boards is glaringly absent from the Guidelines, and consequently in many boardrooms. We are suffering from an independence legacy, perpetuated by entrenched directors, and unsupported by academic research. For example, in Australia, two academics claim has cost their country’s decline in shareholder value between 30 and 50 billion Australian dollars (“Does “Board Independence” Destroy Corporate Value,” by Peter L. Swan and David Forsberg).

Fraud, meltdowns and underperformance such as Nortel, RIM and CP all had a paucity of industry experts on their boards, including, most recently, Tesco in the UK. JP Morgan at the time of the risk management failure did not have a single independent director with banking experience. Prior to Bill Ackman’s involvement in CP, not a single independent director had rail experience. I recently assessed a similar board and not a single director had the necessary industry experience. The Guidelines should require relevant industry expertise on boards. I recommended this to OSFI when I was retained by them to examine their earlier guidelines, and this is now the law for all federally regulated financial institutions, along with risk expertise being present on boards.

5. Lack of financial literacy and internal audit:

There is no requirement to be financially literate to sit, initially, on an audit committee of a Canadian public company. This presumes someone can acquire financial literacy as opposed to having it to begin with. There is also no requirement to have an internal audit function for a Canadian public company. This should also change so audit committee members hit the ground running, and there should be a comply or explain approach to internal audit. In many compliance failures, there is a defective or non-existent internal audit function, with a weak audit committee lacking recent and relevant expertise. Regulators are now moving towards “independent coordinated assurance,” which means that reporting to, and functional oversight by, the board and committees are fulfilled by internal and external personnel who are independent of senior and operating management, including, most importantly, an effective and independent internal audit function.

Vidéo de formation sur les tendances en matière de gouvernance de sociétés au Canada et aux États-Unis | Une réalisation du CAS


Récemment, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) a répondu à la demande de l’organisme « ecoDa » (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) de produire une capsule vidéo de formation sur les tendances en matière de gouvernance de sociétés au Canada et aux États-Unis. Cette vidéo sera présentée par ecoDa à chaque offre de son cours « New Governance Challenges for Board Members in Europe » présentée en classe à Bruxelles en Belgique, siège social de l’ecoDa.

Ce mandat a été réalisé avec succès grâce à la contribution de Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du CAS, qui a réuni Mme Alexandra Lajoux, Chief Knowledge Officer de la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) aux États-Unis et M. Chris Bart, Founder and Lead Faculty du Directors College en Ontario.

 

Intitulé « Where is Corporate Governance Going : The View from Canada and the USA », cette vidéo de formation vise à sensibiliser les participants à l’évolution des pratiques de gouvernance à l’extérieur de l’Europe.

D’une durée de 20 minutes, les experts invités discutent des sujets suivants :

(1) le rôle du CA à l’égard de la stratégie et du risque

(2) la réglementation et les enjeux touchant les investisseurs

(3) les nouvelles tendances en matière de gouvernance des TI et celles touchant la gouvernance des principales sociétés œuvrant dans le secteur technologique

(4) l’importance du talent et de la diversité sur les conseils, ainsi que l’importance de la formation des administrateurs de sociétés.

La capsule vidéo (en anglais) est disponible sur la page  You Tube | CASulaval.

Bon visionnement !

 

ISS propose une nouvelle approche pour définir l’indépendance du président du CA


Quels sont les critères retenus par la firme Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) pour recommander une déviation à la règle d’indépendance du président du conseil d’administration ?

On sait qu’aux États-Unis environ 50 % des entreprises ont des situations de combinaison des rôles de président du conseil et de président et chef de la direction. J’ai souvent écrit dans ce blogue que l’indépendance du président du conseil était très difficile à réaliser aux É.U. et que la gouvernance pouvait en souffrir.

Cependant, on fait face à une résistance féroce dans ce pays et ce n’est que très graduellement que les grandes sociétés américaines se « convertissent ». Même une entreprise comme ISS, qui fait des recommandations aux actionnaires sur les questions de gouvernance, a dû repenser sa politique d’indépendance du président du CA afin de prévoir certaines exceptions.

Carol Bowie, l’auteure de cet article paru dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, est la directrice des recherches à ISS. Elle nous présente les changements apportés aux recommandations de votation aux assemblées annuelles.

En général, ISS recommande l’indépendance absolue de la présidence du conseil d’administration, sauf si l’entreprise rencontre toutes les conditions suivantes :

  1. L’entreprise désigne un administrateur principal (Lead Director) qui est élu par les administrateurs indépendants et qui est soumis à des tâches et des devoirs clairement définis;
  2. Le conseil est au moins aux deux-tiers indépendant;
  3. Les principaux comités du conseil sont complètement indépendants;
  4. L’entreprise a divulgué ses règles de gouvernance;
  5. L’entreprise ne présente pas une faible performance soutenue par rapport aux autres entreprises de son secteur d’activité;
  6. L’entreprise n’a pas de failles problématiques en matière de gouvernance.

 

Pour une compréhension plus fine des nouvelles règles de votation proposées aux actionnaires, je vous invite à lire ce court billet. Bonne lecture !

 

ISS Proposes New Approach to Independent Chair Shareholder Proposals

 

Calls for independent board chairs were the most prevalent type of shareholder proposal offered for consideration at U.S. companies’ annual meetings in 2014. As of June 30, 62 of these proposals have come to a shareholder vote, up from 55 P1030052resolutions over the same time period in 2013. Notably, the number of proposals calling for independent board chairs has more than doubled over the past five years. Under the current policy formulation, ISS recommended against 32 of these 62 proposals in 2014. In line with results from recent seasons, independent chair proposals received average support of 31.2 percent of votes cast at 2014 meetings. Only four of these proposals received the support of a majority of votes cast.

Enjeux et obligations du CA | Avis d’experts


Voici le dossier sur la gouvernance publié dans le Journal Les Affaires.

Vous y trouverez une mine d’informations sur divers sujets d’actualité en gouvernance publiés par des experts du domaine.

Bonne lecture !

 

Former un CA : enjeux et obligations

 

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Mettre sur pied un conseil d’administration est un exercice complexe : les entreprises veulent s’entourer de personnes compétentes, (…) 13 articles

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L’activisme actionnarial a connu une croissance exponentielle au cours de dernières années. « Au …
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En 2010, un examen approfondi par Davies de la structure du vote par procuration donnait naissance à un rapport …
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Vendredi après la fermeture des marchés, un concurrent important vous appelle : lundi, il annoncera …
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Souvent considéré comme une première étape avant un conseil d’administration formel …
 

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Une crise, ça se prépare. Le rôle le plus important du conseil n’est pas tant de gérer …

 

Édition du 20 Septembre 2014  |  Diane Bérard

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«Aujourd’hui, être administrateur, c’est l’fun à mort!» | Offert par Les Affaires

 

 

 

Édition du 20 Septembre 2014  |  Marie Lyan

 

La rémunération, pas le facteur numéro un | Offert par Les Affaires 

Si la participation à certains conseils peut être bénévole, comme dans la plupart des organismes à but non …

 

Une banque de 240 candidats triés sur le volet chez Desjardins | Offert par Les Affaires image

Desjardins capital de risque a mis sur pied une banque de candidats potentiels qui compte près de 240 profils, dont …

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Le choix des administrateurs est déterminant pour le bon fonctionnement du CA. Bien qu’ils soient nommés par la …

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Quelles sont les normes en ce qui a trait au nombre d’heures, de tâches et à d’autres responsabilités à confier aux …

La séparation des pouvoirs entre PCA et PCD : une règle de bonne gouvernance !


L’article de Paul Hodgson publié dans Fortune affiche est une position très nette en ce qui concerne la séparation des rôles de président du conseil d’administration (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PCD) : C’est une mauvaise stratégie sur toute la ligne !

Plusieurs études ont montré l’inefficacité de cette approche, en plus de démontrer clairement les risques de conflits entre le devoir de fiduciaire de l’administrateur et le rôle de premier dirigeant.

Alors que la plupart des modèles de gouvernance dans le monde se fondent sur la séparation des rôles, pourquoi constate-t-on une si forte résistance dans le cas des entreprises américaines ?

L’auteur apporte plusieurs arguments qui expliquent la lenteur des changements aux É.U. Voici un aperçu des grandes lignes de l’article.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.                

Should the chairman be the CEO?

Put simply, no. Splitting the roles saves money and improves a company’s performance. So why isn’t Corporate America listening?

Brian Moynihan, chairman and chief executive officer of Bank of America Corp.

A study published in 2012 found that the cost of paying one person as CEO/chairman was significantly higher than paying two people as CEO and non-executive chairman. The study also found that long-term shareholder returns were significantly better at companies that had separated the roles. This model—an executive CEO and a non-executive chairman—has been adopted in most other economies. Why is the U.S. so resistant?

So why is it important to have a separate chairman and CEO? Put simply, the CEO is the primary manager of a company and the chairman is the head of the board, which oversees management. There’s really no good reason why one person should do both jobs. And there’s really no sense in recombining the two roles when a company’s problems are resolved. It’s silly to believe that new problems, the kind that will require an independent board’s insight, won’t arise in the future.

Finally, appointing an executive chairman, especially when it is a former CEO, is just a bad idea. It puts two managers—or, in the case of Oracle, three managers—in place where one is sufficient, and there is still no independent check on management. And, really, when a former CEO becomes chair, no one is really in any doubt as to who remains in charge.

Most, if not all, companies would be wise to appoint an independent chairman and make the position permanent in the company’s bylaws, so the decision can’t be reversed without shareholder approval.

Nouvelles capsules vidéos en gouvernance : (1) le comité de gouvernance (2) l’auditeur externe


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéo.

Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule est dévoilée chaque semaine.

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement des deux plus récentes capsules d’experts qui sont maintenant en ligne. Elles ont pour thèmes « le comité de gouvernance » par M. Richard Joly, président, Leaders & Cie et «l’auditeur externe» par Mme Lily Adam, associée, Services de certification, EY.

Visionnez ces deux capsules d’experts :

Le comité de gouvernance par Richard Joly 

 

________________________________________________

La surveillance de la rémunération de la direction par les actionnaires via le Say-on-Pay


L’étude de Mathias Kronlund, professeur au département de finance de l’Université de l’Illinois à Urbana-Champaign et Shastri Sandy, professeur au département de finance de l’Université du Missouri à Columbia, aborde un sujet dont nous avons beaucoup parlé au cours des cinq dernières années : le Say-on-Pay.

Il est temps de revisiter les résultats de ce mode de consultation des actionnaires à propos des rémunérations globales des hauts dirigeants. Les auteurs font une analyse très fine des conséquences liées au Say-on-Pay.

Dans l’ensemble, les résultats montrent que cette mesure a eu des effets positifs sur les décisions des comités de rémunération qui proposent des schèmes de rémunération plus en ligne avec la performance organisationnelle.

« The net effect on total CEO pay from these changes in various pay components is positive. In other words, firms increase total CEO compensation when they face increased scrutiny, mainly as a result of the higher stock awards. Thus, to the extent that the goal of the say-on-pay mandate was to reduce total executive pay, this regulation has had the opposite effect. We generally find much weaker results among non-CEO executives compared with CEOs, which is consistent with CEO pay receiving the most scrutiny around say-on-pay votes ».

Bonne lecture !

Shareholder Scrutiny and Executive Compensation

As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, public firms must periodically hold advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (“say on pay”). One of the main goals of the say-on-pay mandate is to increase shareholder scrutiny of executive pay, and thus alleviate perceived governance problems when boards decide on executive compensation. In our paper, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Voting, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how firms change the structure and level of executive compensation depending on whether the firm will face a say-on-pay vote or not.P1030038

The theoretical impact of having a say-on-pay vote on executive compensation is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is possible that having a vote results in more efficient compensation practices, for example, in the form of stronger alignment between pay and performance, or in the form of lower pay if past pay was excessive. Say-on-pay may also improve compensation practices simply because directors pay more attention to executive compensation when they know that the pay packages they award face increased scrutiny. On the other hand, it is also possible that say-on-pay results in less efficient compensation practices. For example, having a say-on-pay vote may lead firms to excessively conform to the guidelines of proxy advisors, who tend to prefer specific pay practices that may not sufficiently account for each firm’s unique circumstances. Finally, it is possible that say-on-pay has no effect at all, either because governance problems are so severe that say-on-pay is an insufficient mechanism to improve firms’ pay practices, or conversely, because firms already have optimal pay practices and therefore have no reason to change them in response to increased scrutiny.

To examine the effect of say-on-pay on executive compensation, our identification strategy exploits within-firm variation regarding when (i.e., in which years) firms hold say-on-pay votes based on a pre-determined cyclical schedule. Specifically, many firms have elected to hold votes in cycles of every two or three years rather than every year, resulting in predictable year-to-year variation in whether a vote is held or not. Our empirical strategy then compares executive compensation across years when, according to its voting cycle, a firm is expected to hold a vote, versus the same firm in years when it is expected to not hold a vote.

Our results show that in years when firms are expected to hold a say-on-pay vote, they decrease CEO salaries, and increase stock awards. We also find that firms are significantly less likely to have change-in-control payments (“golden parachutes”) for their CEOs in years with a vote. These results are consistent with altering pay practices to better comply with proxy advisors’ guidelines. Further, deferred compensation and pension balances are higher in years with a vote, which is consistent with say-on-pay resulting in increased use of less-scrutinized components of pay.

The net effect on total CEO pay from these changes in various pay components is positive. In other words, firms increase total CEO compensation when they face increased scrutiny, mainly as a result of the higher stock awards. Thus, to the extent that the goal of the say-on-pay mandate was to reduce total executive pay, this regulation has had the opposite effect. We generally find much weaker results among non-CEO executives compared with CEOs, which is consistent with CEO pay receiving the most scrutiny around say-on-pay votes.

We also find economically large, but statistically weaker, evidence that executives choose to exercise fewer options in years when they face say-on-pay votes. Executives thus appear to shift realized pay from voting years to non-voting years—which suggests that executives believe that observers of pay (e.g., shareholders, news media) do not distinguish between awarded pay and ex-post realized pay.

One goal of the say-on-pay regulation was to foster more transparent CEO compensation and better alignment of CEO incentives with the interests of shareholders. Overall, our results show that holding a say-on-pay vote does cause firms to change how they pay executives. But despite the law’s intention of improving executive pay practices, the say-on-pay mandate has not unambiguously resulted in more efficient CEO compensation. And contrary to the goals of the say-on-pay regulation, the net result of these changes may be higher, not lower, total compensation. The fact that salaries are lower but stock awards higher is consistent with firms being particularly concerned about the optics of pay (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)) in years when compensation will be put to a vote, but is also consistent with models of optimal pay as in Dittmann and Maug (2007). Because CEOs receive more stock awards in voting years, which in turn will make their wealth more closely aligned with that of shareholders going forward, it is possible that pay in these years is more efficient, despite being higher. The fact that firms change pay practices between years with and without votes further is evidence that pay practices are not always perfectly optimal. If they were, whether a vote is held or not should be irrelevant for pay.

The full paper is available for download here.

Gouverner dans l’anxiété | Effet insoupçonné de l’actionnariat activiste ?


M. François Dauphin, directeur de projets de l’IGOPP, nous fait parvenir le billet suivant à titre de blogueur invité.

L’article insiste sur les conséquences, souvent dysfonctionnelles, de gouverner dans un climat d’appréhension relié aux probabilités d’interventions d’actionnaires activistes, qui, selon lui, sont généralement à court terme et bénéficient surtout à ces deniers.

Il semble cependant que ce phénomène continuera sa progression et que les conseils d’administration doivent être de plus en plus vigilants car les « fonds activistes savent cibler des sociétés dont les conseils d’administration n’ont pas été à la hauteur ».

Cet article apporte un éclairage très pertinent aux administrateurs de sociétés, notamment en affirmant que la peur des fonds activistes est exagérée dans les cas de sociétés qui observent des règles de gouvernance exemplaires.

Bonne lecture !

Gouverner dans l’anxiété : Serait-ce un effet insoupçonné de l’actionnariat activiste ?

Par

François Dauphin, MBA, CPA, CMA

Directeur de projets, IGOPP

En septembre dernier, nombreux sont ceux qui n’ont pu réprimer un sourire en observant la dernière salve de l’actionnaire activiste Starboard Value contre le conseil d’administration et la haute direction de Darden Restaurants (société mère qui regroupe plusieurs chaînes de restaurants, dont Olive Garden, Longhorn Steakhouse et, jusqu’à très récemment, Red Lobster). En effet, dans une présentation de près de 300 pages, l’activiste ridiculisait la façon dont l’entreprise gérait son réseau de restaurants, allant jusqu’à souligner l’incapacité des cuisiniers à bien faire cuire les pâtes ou le nombre de pains trop élevés laissé par les serveurs sur les tables.

Rappelons qu’un investisseur « activiste » est un actionnaire qui acquière une participation dans une entreprise publique, et qui utilise différentes techniques (souvent hostiles) afin de contraindre le conseil d’administration ou la direction de l’entreprise ciblée à se conformer à ses requêtes, lesquelles visent essentiellement à créer rapidement de la valeur pour les actionnaires. Les recettes sont relativement toujours les mêmes : distribuer les liquidités excédentaires sous forme de dividendes spéciaux ou de rachats d’actions ou même endetter l’entreprise pour ce faire, vendre des actifs dont le rendement apparaît insuffisant, séparer l’entreprise en deux ou plusieurs entités qui seront inscrites en bourse, forcer la vente de l’entreprise, etc. Le moyen le plus utilisé est de faire planer la menace d’une course aux procurations pour remplacer plusieurs membres du conseil si les administrateurs en place n’obtempèrent pas.

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Dans le cas de Darden, Starboard Value a gagné son pari : les 12 membres du conseil d’administration ont été remplacés, dans un résultat sans précédent pour une telle course aux procurations, surtout en considérant que Starboard ne détenait que 8,8% des votes. Le conseil d’administration de Darden n’était pas sans faute, après tout, il avait procédé à la vente de Red Lobster à peine quelque temps avant que les actionnaires ne se prononcent sur le sujet, un geste que certains qualifieront de panique en réaction aux pressions exercées par les activistes.

L’exemple de Darden est certes étonnant. Toutefois, il traduit un malaise bien réel qui tend à s’accentuer. Une étude récente de PwC (Annual Corporate Directors Survey 2014) montre que 85% des conseils d’administration d’entreprises dont les revenus excèdent les 10 milliards de dollars (75% des entreprises dont les revenus sont moins d’un milliard de dollars) ont eu des discussions au sujet de la préparation (ou de la réaction) pour faire face à un éventuel (réel) actionnaire activiste. La crainte de devoir affronter un de ces investisseurs – et de perdre, puisque les activistes, disposant de ressources sans précédent, remportent la majorité de leurs affrontements – pousse de plus en plus d’entreprises à abdiquer rapidement lorsqu’un activiste se manifeste, ou encore à agir de manière préventive en tentant d’anticiper ce qu’un activiste potentiel pourrait réclamer.

Ainsi, on constate déjà les effets de telles décisions. Du côté de ceux qui ont capitulé, on retrouve des exemples comme Hertz (3 sièges au conseil offerts à l’activiste Carl Icahn en moins d’une semaine) et Walgreen (2 sièges au conseil offerts à Jana Partners, un activiste qui ne détenait pourtant qu’une participation de 1,2%), alors que du côté des conseils d’administration préventifs (craintifs) on retrouve des exemples comme Symantec (annonce de la séparation de l’entreprise en deux entités distinctes) ou Adidas (annonce d’un programme de rachat d’actions massif à la suite d’une rumeur suggérant un intérêt de la part d’activistes).

On pourrait conclure qu’il en est ainsi parce que ces fonds activistes savent cibler des sociétés dont les conseils d’administration n’ont pas été à la hauteur.

Malheureusement, la perspective d’une capitulation massive devant la menace de ces investisseurs n’annonce rien de bien favorable. En effet, les entreprises deviendront de plus en plus réticentes à investir dans leur avenir et se concentreront davantage sur le très court terme (qui se mesure maintenant en trimestres et non en années). Si certains actionnaires pourront profiter de cette nouvelle réalité – les activistes au premier rang  –, les autres parties prenantes risquent au contraire d’en subir les contrecoups.

Les détenteurs de titres de dette, par exemple, subissent fréquemment les effets corollaires de l’activisme. Moody’s publiait déjà en 2007 un avis soulignant que la cote de crédit des émetteurs ciblés par les activistes était presque universellement revue à la baisse; de son côté, Standard & Poor’s a récemment publié un rapport soulignant que 40% des entreprises qui ont exécuté un essaimage (« spin-off » d’actifs) ont vu leur cote de crédit être révisée à la baisse sur le long terme.

Ainsi, plusieurs entreprises sont plus à risque, davantage fragilisées après le passage d’un activiste. Et voilà que des conseils d’administration optent pour des stratégies qui fragiliseront l’avenir de leur propre entreprise simplement pour éviter d’apparaître sur le radar d’un hypothétique actionnaire activiste! Si le phénomène ne s’est pas encore manifesté sous sa forme la plus acrimonieuse au Québec, cela ne signifie pas qu’il faille l’ignorer, bien au contraire!

La peur n’est généralement pas un état favorisant la prise de décision réfléchie, l’éclosion d’idées nouvelles ou le développement d’une vision d’avenir dynamisante.

Le rôle du conseil d’administration est remis en cause par cette forme d’actionnariat prônant une démocratie directe. Si le conseil d’administration comme entité mérite de préserver sa place, il devra le prouver en se renouvelant, en se montrant vigilant, aussi « activiste » que les fonds mais avec, comme objectif, l’intérêt à long terme de la société et de toutes ses parties prenantes.

Tendances en gouvernance et CA du futur | PwC’s 2014 Annual Corporate Directors Suveys


Il y a dans le document de PwC un exposé clair des principales tendances en gouvernance au cours des prochaines années. Le site de PwC  présente également les chapitres individuels du rapport.

Voici un résumé de l’échantillon des entreprises, suivi d’un rappel des 12 tendances observées. Vous trouverez beaucoup de points communs avec l’article que j’ai publié dans le journal Les Affaires : Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Bonne lecture !

In the summer of 2014, 863 public company directors responded to our survey. Of those directors, 70% serve on the boards of companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenue, and participants represented nearly two-dozen industries. In PwC’s 2014 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, directors share their views on governance trends that we believe will impact the board of the future, including: board performance and diversity, board priorities and practices, IT and cybersecurity oversight, strategy and risk oversight, and executive compensation and director communications.

Trends shaping governance and the board of the future | PwC’s 2014 Annual Corporate Directors Suveys

Board performance takes center stage

 Many boards are giving even more attention to enhancing their own performance and acting on issues identified in their self-assessments.

 

Board composition is scrutinized

Board composition is under pressure to evolve to meet new business challenges and stakeholder expectations. Today’s directors are more focused than ever on ensuring their boards have the right expertise and experience to be effective.

 

Board diversity gets attention

Stakeholders are more interested in board diversity, and boards are increasingly focused on recruiting directors with diversity of background and experience.

 

More pressure on board priorities and practices

Director performance continues to face scrutiny from investors, regulators, and other stakeholders, causing board practices to remain in the spotlight.

 

Activist shareholders get active

With over $100 billion in assets under activist management1, more directors are discussing how to deal with potential activist campaigns.

 

The influence of emerging IT grows

Companies and directors increasingly see IT as inextricably wed to corporate strategy and the company’s business. IT is now a business issue, not just a technology issue.

 

Increased concerns about the Achilles’ heel of IT—cybersecurity

Cybersecurity breaches are regularly and prominently in the news. And directors are searching for answers on how to provide effective oversight in this area.

 

It’s still all about risk management

Risk management is a top priority for investors, and they have high expectations of boards in this regard.

 

Investors question company strategies

Effective oversight requires that the board receive the right information from management to effectively address key elements of strategy.

 

Executive compensation remains a hot topic

Boards are devoting even more time and attention to the critical issue of appropriate compensation.

 

Stakeholders are showing continuing interest in how proxy advisory firms operate.

The interest of stakeholders in the proxy advisory industry is a key trend.

 

Increasing expectations about director communications

In response, boards must determine their role in stakeholder communications—and evaluate their processes and procedures governing such communications

 

Étude du Conference Board sur les récentes interventions des actionnaires activistes


Comme vous le savez, je suis désireux d’être au fait des derniers développements eu égard aux interventions des actionnaires activistes car je pense que ce mouvement peut avoir des conséquences positives sur la gouvernance des sociétés, même si le management a tendance à se défendre âprement contre les « intrusions des actionnaires activistes et opportunistes »

L’article ci-dessous, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, nous fait part d’une récente étude du Conference Board* sur l’évolution du phénomène de l’activisme aux É.U.

L’étude en question, Proxy Voting Analytics (2010-2014), montre que le mouvement, loin de s’essouffler, a continué d’avoir un impact significatif sur les relations entre les actionnaires et les dirigeants des grandes entreprises américaines.

Voici donc un résumé des faits saillants de cette étude. Bonne lecture !

The Recent Evolution of Shareholder Activism

Proxy Voting Analytics (2010-2014), a report recently released by The Conference Board in collaboration with FactSet, reviews the last five years of shareholder activism and proxy voting at Russell 3000 and S&P 500 companies.

Data analyzed in the report includes:

  1. Shareholder activism, including proxy fights, exempt solicitations, and other public agitations for change.
  2. Most frequent activist funds and their tactics.
  3. Volume, sponsors, and subjects of shareholder proposals.IMG00571-20100828-2241
  4. Voted, omitted, and withdrawn shareholder proposals.
  5. Voting results of shareholder proposals.
  6. Shareholder proposals on executive compensation.
  7. Shareholder proposals on corporate governance.
  8. Shareholder proposals on social and environmental policy.
  9. Volume and subjects of management proposals.
  10. Failed say-on-pay proposals among Russell 3000 companies.
  11. Say-on-pay proposals that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast.

Additional insights (including volume by index, industry, and sponsor, most frequent sponsors, and support levels) are offered with respect to key issues from the last few proxy seasons, including: majority voting; board declassification; supermajority vote requirements; independent board chairmen; proxy access; sustainability reporting; political issues; election of dissident’s director nominee.

The report pays special attention to trends and developments that have emerged in the last few months. In fact, what started as an unremarkable proxy voting season has blossomed into a series of developments that may influence annual general meetings for years to come.

There is a clear indication that activist investors are turning their attention to new issues. For example, in the Russell 3000, five investor-sponsored proposals restricting golden parachutes received the support of a majority of shareholders. While the volume remains low, it is the highest ever recorded on this topic and it signals that voting on executive compensation issues other than say on pay can still find its way to general meetings of shareholders. Political spending and lobbying activities, a topic virtually absent from voting ballots until a few years ago, became the most frequently submitted shareholder proposal type of 2014, with 86 voted proposals and five receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast (compared to only one in 2013). Finally, support for resolutions on proxy access reached a tipping point in the first six months of the year, with five proposals approved and four receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast in favor.

The advisory vote on executive compensation was a game changer for corporate/investor relations and, in 2014, more than ever before, shareholders have been pursuing opportunities to engage with senior management and be heard ahead of a shareholder meeting. This trend was reflected in the rate of withdrawals of shareholder proposals, which doubled from a few years ago as companies chose to preempt a vote on certain investor requests by voluntarily implementing their own reforms. It was not all a product of engagement, however, and guidelines on board responsiveness from proxy advisory firm ISS also drove the surge of management proposals on issues previously raised by activists.

Increased dialogue with senior executives and board members as well as the progress made by many large companies in the adoption of baseline corporate governance practices prompted large institutional investors to reconsider their role as agents of corporate change. For example, while some public pension funds such as the California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS) cut back significantly on their submissions in 2014, others such as the New York City Employees’ Retirement Systems remained prolific proponents and galvanized around proxy access requests. Similarly, the popularity of social and environmental policy issues observed this year is in part explained by the larger number of proposals filed by labor-affiliated investment funds, which, before the introduction of mandatory say on pay, had always concentrated on executive compensation issues. Despite the traditional focus of this type of fund on industrial sectors, in 2014, for the first time, more than 20 percent of the 86 proposals submitted by labor unions were directed at companies in the finance industry.

Social media and other new technologies allow a broad outreach that was unimaginable only a few years ago, and activists are perfecting their use. This year, a growing number of activist investors, especially hedge funds, have agitated for change without even filing a shareholder proposal, let alone waging a proxy fight. Despite the increase in activism campaign announcements, there was a sensible decline in the number of campaigns related to shareholder meetings held in the first six months of 2014. This decline suggests that, rather than urge other shareholders to oppose a director election or vote for a certain resolution, these activism campaign announcements now serve to publicize the investor’s view of the business strategy or organizational performance. It is a first step that may lead to the future filing of a proposal or the solicitation of proxies but that may also prove sufficient to persuade the company to seek dialogue and reach a compromise.

The following are the major findings of the report:

Although activism campaign announcements in the Russell 3000 were up in 2014, the number of campaigns related to a shareholder meeting declined, as some hedge funds chose to agitate for change without even filing a shareholder proposal.

 

Observations made in 2013 that hedge funds were starting to set their sights on larger companies appear disputed by numbers for 2014, when a sharp decline in activism campaign volume was recorded among S&P 500 companies.

 

Proxy contests were the only type of activist campaign related to a shareholder vote to increase among Russell 3000 companies in 2014, with a concentration in the retail trade and finance industries, and dissidents reported their highest success rates in years.

 

Engagement between corporations and investors has not curbed the most hostile forms of activism, as the volume of proposals to elect a dissident’s nominee remains fairly high.

 

Shareholder proposal volume was slightly lower this year, with a sharper decline among larger companies as investors focus on new topics and broaden their targets.

 

Excess cash on US companies’ balance sheets fueled the growth of the activist hedge fund industry, and the number of resolutions sponsored by hedge funds surpassed the record levels of 2008.

 

The 2014 proxy season marked another sharp year-over-year decline in the number of proposals submitted by multiemployer investment funds affiliated with labor unions, as those investors showed new interests, especially in social and environmental policy issues.

 

Proposals on corporate governance, once a stronghold for pension funds, were sharply reduced as more companies introduced engagement policies with large investors.

 

Shareholder resolutions on social and environmental policy rose to unprecedented levels, while some institutional investors dropped governance issues that were a staple of their past activity but never garnered widespread support.

 

The rate of withdrawals of shareholder proposals doubled from a few years ago as companies preempted some of the issues by voluntarily implementing their own reforms.

 

As large groups of institutional investors reduced their 14a-8 filings or shifted their attention to new and less popular topics, the percentage of voted proposals winning the support of a majority of shareholders reached a new low.

 

Proposals on board declassification and majority voting have become a sure bet for labor unions and public pension funds, as they are widely recognized as a baseline in corporate governance.

 

A surge in requests from corporate gadflies made the separation of CEO and chairman roles the top shareholder proposal topic by volume, but the institutional investment community remains skeptical of a one-size-fits-all approach to board leadership.

 

For the first time in the same proxy season, five investor-sponsored proposals restricting golden parachutes received majority support, signaling that voting on executive compensation issues other than say on pay may still find its way to the AGM.

 

 hareholder proposals on political spending and lobbying activities skyrocketed this year, with five receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast (compared to only one in 2013).

 

Support for shareholder proposals on proxy access rights reached a tipping point in 2014, with five proposals approved and four others receiving the support of more than 40 percent of votes cast, and a handful of companies submitted board-sponsored proposals.

 

Say-on-pay analysis confirms a significant turnover in failed votes, with several companies losing the confidence of their shareholders this year after winning the vote by a wide margin in 2013.

__________________________________________________

*Matteo Tonello is vice president at The Conference Board. This post relates to a report released jointly by The Conference Board and FactSet, authored by Dr. Tonello and Melissa Aguilar of The Conference Board. The Executive Summary is available here (the document is free but registration is required).

Débat sur la contribution des actionnaires activistes au sein des conseils d’administration


Voyez le panel de discussion sur les aspects pratiques liés aux activités des actionnaires activistes, diffusé par la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).

Cette vidéo montre comment les activistes opèrent sur les marchés mais aussi au sein des conseils d’administration. C’est une présentation vraiment très utile pour mieux saisir les différentes catégories d’activistes ainsi que les motivations qui les animent.

Excellente discussion sur la montée de l’activisme. À visionner !

Activist Shareholders in the Boardroom

Activism is on the rise. When and how can activist shareholders in the boardroom be a force for positive change? Directors need to be prepared.  Janet Clark, and Andrew Shapiro discuss the issues around strategy and corporate governance at an NACD board leadership conference.NACDlogo

The National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) is certainly a recognized authority, when it comes to discussing and establishing leading boardroom practices in the United States.

Informed by more than 35 years of experience, NACD delivers insights and resources that more than 14,000 corporate director members from the public, private and non-profit sectors rely upon to make sound strategic decisions and confidently confront complex business challenges.

Nouvelles capsules vidéos en gouvernance : (1) la gouvernance des PME (2) la présidence du CA


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéo.

Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule est dévoilée chaque semaine.

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement des deux plus récentes capsules d’experts qui sont maintenant en ligne. Elles ont pour thèmes « La gouvernance des PME » par Mme Anne-Marie Croteau, ASC, vice-doyenne responsable des relations externes à l’École de gestion John-Molson et professeure titulaire, Université Concordia, et « La présidence du CA » par M. Michel Clair, ASC, président et chef de la direction, Groupe Santé Sedna.

Visionnez ces deux capsules d’experts :

La gouvernance des PME par Anne-Marie Croteau

 

________________________________________________

L’évaluation du conseil d’administration revisitée


Aujourd’hui, nous abordons le thème de l’évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil d’administration. Il n’y a pas de doute que le processus d’évaluation est un moyen très efficace pour l’amélioration de la gouvernance des sociétés.

La presque totalité des entreprises, et toutes celles du NYSE, ont mises en place des mécanismes d’évaluation sur une base annuelle; mais encore faut-il que cette activité soit conduite avec beaucoup de compétence et de doigté par le président du conseil, ce qui n’est pas nécessairement le cas puisque beaucoup d’administrateurs ne prennent pas encore cet exercice assez au sérieux.

En effet, plusieurs études montrent que l’on ne se contente trop souvent que d’une autoévaluation sommaire, produite dans le but de satisfaire aux exigences réglementaires. Le sujet est délicat … les administrateurs sont relativement réticents à se faire évaluer … et à évaluer le travail de leurs pairs !

, dans un article paru sur le blogue de Securities & Corporate Governance Group, nous présente un rappel de l’importance de bien concevoir l’évaluation du conseil d’administration.

Il expose les principales étapes de l’évaluation, donne un exemple d’une plus grande divulgation du processus, et insiste sur l’exploitation des résultats et sur la nécessité de faire le suivi, tout en soulevant l’épineux problème de la conservation des données et des risques légaux associés à leur divulgation.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires relatifs à l’activité d’évaluation dans vos conseils sont les bienvenus.

Re-evaluating the Board Evaluation 

Board evaluations have long been standard practice among public companies. With shareholder interest in corporate governance practices at an all-time high, the focus on board evaluations is expected to increase.  Given that board evaluations can be an effective tool to improve board and company performance, now may be a good time to review your company’s current board evaluation process and the disclosure of that process.

The Evaluation Process

A recent study by PwC found that 63% of directors believe self-evaluations are mostly a “check the box” exercise.  This attitude may stem from the fact that NYSE listed companies are required to conduct evaluations on an annual basis.  (See NYSE Rule 303A.09; NASDAQ does not require an annual evaluation.)  That means that a significant number of boards may be missing out on a valuable opportunity to identify issues with and improve on various board functions.  Evaluations may provide helpful information about how the board conducts its meetings and interacts with management, what type of board education programs are needed in the upcoming year and whether the current structure of the board is appropriate in guiding and executing the company’s strategy.  The evaluations may identify small changes, like changing the order of items on board meeting agendas, or more substantive areas for improvement, like a gap in expertise and the need to add a new director.

Securities & Corporate Governance Group

Because the process should fit the board’s culture, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to designing effective board evaluations.  Furthermore, a process designed years ago may no longer fit the company’s current culture and strategic goals.  Therefore, it is necessary to re-evaluate from time to time the effectiveness of the process and implement any necessary changes.

In taking on this challenge, you should consider the following:

  1. What is the current culture?  Are director interactions formal or informal?  Are there clear leaders and followers?  Does anyone unduly dominate the meetings?  Are there factions (activist investor or private equity fund designees, long-tenured versus recently elected, etc.)?  Do some directors seem passive or prefer anonymity?
  2. What are the objectives?  Has an area of concern (like lack of board alignment) been identified? Or is the board engaging in the process to determine what, if anything, might be done better?
  3. Who will be evaluated? The board as a whole? Each committee?  Will individual directors review each other?  Will individual directors perform a self-evaluation?  Will the board solicit the opinion of members of management that have regular contact with the board?
  4. Who will do the evaluating? Recent trends show a slight increase in the retention of external advisors to conduct the evaluations, but the majority of public companies still employ an internally driven process lead by either the Chairman, Lead Independent Director, Chair of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee or General Counsel.
  5. How will they be evaluated? Typically, evaluations are conducted using written questionnaires or interviews.  Written questionnaires may include any combination of a standardized survey of questions, comment sections meant to facilitate the explanation of the standard survey of questions and open-ended questions intended to solicit feedback.  Interviews may be conducted on an individual basis or in a group setting.  The objectives of the evaluation will dictate the content of questions being solicited.  And the questions should be refreshed on an annual basis to ensure they are relevant and effective.
  6. What will be done with the results of the evaluations? This will partially depend on the method of evaluation but may include a discussion of the results, a memo summarizing the results or an individual meeting with each director.  The company should also use the results of the evaluations to resolve issues, make changes and achieve goals.

While the benefits of board evaluation are widely accepted, it is important to consider how such evaluations may impact the collegiality and trust that is vital for board room discussions, along with what, if any, impact the board evaluation process may have on director candidates.  Another consideration in designing the process is how evaluation material could be used in litigation and what the board can do to mitigate that risk.  On one hand, it is important for the board to develop a written record that demonstrates that the board acted deliberately in conducting evaluations.  On the other hand, questionnaires and other evaluation material are discoverable and may contain damaging information regarding board performance.  Accordingly, it is important to consider whether questionnaires and other evaluation material need to be retained after the evaluations have taken place. Regardless of whether the evaluation material is retained or not, it is important that the board apply this policy consistently for all evaluations – good or bad – year after year.

Enhancing Disclosure of Board Evaluation

While most U.S. public companies have a board evaluation process in place, the disclosure explaining the evaluation process (whether in the proxy statement of corporate governance guidelines) is minimal.  Recently, however, the Council of Institutional Investors released a report entitled Best Disclosure: Board Evaluation, which delineates two approaches for disclosing board evaluations that the Council believes are helpful to investors.  The first approach describes the board evaluation process and the mechanics of the board’s self-evaluations.  The second approach provides not only a description of the process employed to evaluate the board, but also the takeaways and results of the evaluation.

One U.S company that has presented a more in-depth description of its board evaluation process is General Electric.  The disclosure does not appear in the company’s proxy statement, but instead it is contained in its “Governance and Public Affairs Committee Key Practices” document.  General Electric’s proxy statement provides a high-level overview of the process and directs shareholders to the “Governance and Public Affairs Committee Key Practices” document by providing a link.  An excerpt from the disclosure is provided below:

Method of Evaluating Board and Committee Effectiveness. The committee will oversee the following self-evaluation process, which will be used by the board and by each committee of the board to determine their effectiveness and opportunities for improvement. All of the board and committee self-evaluations should be done annually at the November board and committee meetings. Every October, an independent expert in corporate governance will contact each director soliciting comments with respect to both the full board and any committee on which the director serves, as well as director performance and board dynamics. These comments will relate to the large question of how the board can improve its key functions of overseeing personnel development, financials, other major issues of strategy, risk, integrity, reputation and governance. In particular, for both the board and the relevant committee, the process will solicit ideas from directors about:

a. improving prioritization of issues;
b. improving quality of written, chart and oral presentations from management;
c. improving quality of board or committee discussions on these key matters;
d. identifying how specific issues in the past year could have been handled better;
e. identifying specific issues which should be discussed in the future; and
f. identifying any other matter of importance to board functioning.

The independent expert in corporate governance will then work with the committee chairs and the lead director to organize the comments received around options for changes at either board or committee level. At the November board and committee meetings, time will be allocated to a discussion of – and decisions relating to – the actionable items.

Robust disclosure of the board evaluation process is not yet common practice.  However, shareholders value the board evaluation process and are eager for details about the process, what the board has learned from the process and how the board intends to address issues or objectives identified in the process.  Accordingly, companies should expect to receive more interest (or pressure) to adopt a more formal evaluation process and provide more robust disclosure about the process.

Whether to address existing board effectiveness issues, to simply update outdated processes or to anticipate increased shareholder interest in board functionality, now is a good time to review your company’s board evaluation process and related public disclosures.

Proposition pour un changement significatif dans la gouvernance des sociétés | Richard Leblanc


Voici un article de Richard Leblanc, avocat, expert-conseil en gouvernance et professeur-chercheur, publié récemment dans le HuffPost Business Canada, qui alimentera les discussions portant sur les changements requis en gouvernance au Canada.

L’auteur présente un changement réglementaire qui permettrait à des actionnaires d’avoir accès à la circulaire d’information pour fins de votation aux assemblées annuelles. Présentement, les actionnaires n’ont pas la possibilité de faire inscrire des candidatures d’administrateurs dans la circulaire de la direction; cela est du ressort du conseil d’administration qui fait des propositions de candidatures basées sur les recommandations d’un comité de gouvernance formé de membres du C.A.

Cette façon de fonctionner, selon Richard Leblanc, a pour résultat de bloquer la nomination de nouveaux administrateurs issus de la base actionnariale, ouvrant ainsi la voie à de grandes batailles d’opinions lorsque les actionnaires-investisseurs activistes exigent des changements à la gouvernance des sociétés.

La proposition de Richard Leblanc permettrait l’inclusion de candidatures d’actionnaires dans le prospectus de sollicitation à certaines conditions :

(1)   L’actionnaire ou le groupe d’actionnaires doit posséder un minimum d’actions dans l’entreprise (disons environ 3 %);

(2)  Les actions doivent avoir été acquises depuis une certaine période de temps (disons trois ans);

(3)  Les actionnaires peuvent soumettre annuellement des candidatures d’administrateurs jusqu’à un maximum de 25 % des administrateurs proposés dans la circulaire (dans le cas d’une élection non contestée, c’est-à-dire dans le cas où un changement de contrôle n’est pas envisagé).

L’auteur est très conscient que le management des entreprises est susceptible de résister à un tel changement car il ne veut pas de surprises (le management veut conserver son pouvoir d’influence dans le processus …). De plus, le C.A. veut conserver ses prérogatives de choisir ses pairs !

Que pensez-vous de cette approche ? En quoi celle-ci peut-elle améliorer la gouvernance ? Les actionnaires minoritaires auront-ils un rôle significativement plus crucial à jouer ? Est-ce le bon moyen pour susciter une plus grande participation des actionnaires ?

L’argumentation pour les changements proposés est développée dans l’article de Richard Leblanc présenté ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture ! Je souhaite avoir votre opinion sur cette approche, à première vue, favorable aux actionnaires.

The Corporate Governance Game Changer That Needs to Come to Canada

I teach my students and counsel board clients that shareholders elect directors; directors appoint managers; directors are accountable to shareholders; and managers are accountable to directors. This is largely theoretical.

Here is the reality: Shareholders: (i) cannot select directors; (ii) cannot communicate with directors; and (iii) cannot remove directors, by law, without great cost and difficulty. Therefore, directors are largely homogenous groups who are selected by themselves, or, worse yet, management.

Addressing the foregoing is the one piece of reform that will change corporate governance and performance for the better. The rest is, as they say, window dressing.

I have encouraged institutional investors and regulators to consider advocating what is known as « proxy access. » This means that a shareholder, or a group of shareholders, who (i) own a modest, minimum threshold of shares (say 3 per cent, although the percentage could be higher or lower, or floating, depending on the size of the company); (ii) for a period of time (say three years, although the time period could be shorter); (iii) can select up to 25 per cent of proposed directors, of the total board size, in an uncontested election (meaning a change of control is not desired by the shareholders) in a given year.P1030704

When shareholders « select » their nominees for the board, these directors would be alongside, in the management proxy circular, in alphabetical order, with profile parity (short bios and areas of competency), the management slate of directors. Management would be obliged to include shareholder-nominated directors, at a cost to the company, not shareholders, if the above ownership and time requirements are met. There would be no costly proxy battles or dissident slates. There would be no undue influence by management to marginalize shareholder-nominated directors within or outside of the proxy. Rules of the road will be set.

Then, shareholders get to decide, as they should, on the best directors from among the management-proposed and the shareholder-proposed directors. Ideally, the selection should be as blind or neutral as possible. The focus should be solely on the qualifications, competencies and track record of the proposed directors for election at that company. May the best directors win, as should be the case in any election, versus a slate of management-nominated directors, which is the case now. Under this new regime, there will be winners and losers. The practical effect may be that legacy or unqualified directors may withdraw from this scrutiny, as Canadian Pacific directors did at the time of shareholder Pershing Square’s involvement. This is not an undesired outcome and creates a market for the most qualified directors to rise to the top.

When proxy access was proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S., management and lawyers who work for management used shareholder money to fight proxy access proposed under Dodd Frank, and won in the U.S. Court of Appeals, on the basis of an inadequate cost benefit analysis. Canadian investors and regulators should learn from this experience. Proxy access now is left to companies on a one-off basis, rather than being system wide. Meaningful proxy access has only occurred at a small number of companies as a result. The SEC should revisit proxy access. Industry Canada is currently looking at implementing proxy access at the 5 per cent level for all federally incorporated companies.

Opponents to proxy access argue that shareholders selecting directors will propose special purpose directors or directors who lack the background or experience. The evidence is the opposite. Shareholders are better at proposing directors who have the shareholder track record and industry expertise that the current board lacks. Recall Canadian Pacific, where not a single director possessed rail experience prior to shareholder involvement. There are other examples at Hess, Office Depot, Darden, Bob Evans, Abercrombie and Occidental Petroleum (see Field Experience Helps Win Board Seats), where shareholder-advocated directors were either better than incumbent ones, or caused the renewal of management-advocated ones. A director qualification dispute is welcome and will focus the lens on competencies of directors, including industry expertise, which is a good thing. Ann C. Mule and Charles Elson report in « Directors and Boards » that « One study concludes that more powerful CEOs tend to avoid independent expert directors. »

Herein lies the real resistance to proxy access: Management does not want it, and, the record shows, will fight vigorously to resist it. Management-retained advocates hired to oppose proxy access should disclose whom their client is. Directors however, when deciding to support proxy access, or not, should not be beholden to management, nor their advisors, nor act out of self-interest in entrenching themselves, but should be guided only by the best interests of the company, including its shareholders.

There is evidence that the market values strong proxy access positively, leading to an increase in shareholder wealth. If a director possesses the independence of mind, and the competency and skills to serve on the board, they should welcome proxy access. It will mean that the under performing directors on the board will be ferreted out, and current directors can avoid this uncomfortable task. Shareholders and the new competitive market for corporate directors will do it for them.

Suggestions d’ordre pratique pour l’adoption de comportements appropriés de la part des administrateurs


Doug Raymond, associé de la firme Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP et chroniqueur pour la revue Directors & Boards, nous présente une bonne revue des comportements à adopter comme membre d’un conseil d’administration.

Même si l’article revient sur des suggestions que vous connaissez bien, j’ai pensé vous faire partager les avis d’ordre pratique de l’auteur.

Bonne lecture !

Practical Dos and Don’ts for Directors

 

It isn’t exactly a “Top 10 list,” but I thought a listing of practical advice might be welcome to readers. So, recognizing that no list is perfect or exhaustive:

  1. Understand the company and its business—Directors should take the time to learn about the company’s business and the company’s industry, including its significant competitors.
  2. Do your homework—Directors should read and understand the board packet before the meeting; call if you have questions about the materials. The meeting should be used to discuss and make decisions rather than to educate directors who did not do their homework.IMG_00002057
  3. Keep the core strategy in mind—Once a strategic plan is formulated, further decisions should be evaluated by referring back to that plan. If the plan is broken or needs to be updated, be willing to suggest changing it.
  4. Directors plan and guide; management does—Directors should not confuse formulating and overseeing strategy with implementing it, which is done by management. Don’t overly defer to management in strategic matters in the planning stages, but don’t micromanage the tactics.
  5. Be constructive—Each director should be engaged at each meeting and participate in discussions without monopolizing them. Each member of the board has been chosen for his or her skills and potential to add value; for this to happen each director must be treated with courtesy, and board discussions must be open, thorough and deliberative.
  6. During board meetings, leave your iPhone in your briefcase—The board’s time is limited; don’t try to multitask during board meetings. Instead, directors should remain focused on the matters under discussion in order to appropriately discharge their duties.
  7. Don’t disappear after meetings—The job of being a director doesn’t end with the meeting. Feel free to contact your fellow directors, and, within reason, management, to stay involved with the company between meetings.
  8. Be social—Don’t skip board and management dinners and other social functions; these events help to form board culture and help the board function more effectively, particularly during hard times.
  9. Avoid conflicts of interest—Company business should never be influenced, or appear to be influenced, by personal interests; directors should avoid any implication of creating a conflict of interest, taking a company opportunity, or improperly using company knowledge or assets.
  10. No surprises—Directors should be forthcoming; if any circumstance might appear to compromise a board member or create a conflict, directors should discuss the circumstances with the board; often a mechanism to resolve or cleanse the situation will be available. Directors should also share whatever they know about issues being considered by the board.
  11. Follow the ‘elevator rule’—Much of the information that directors receive is non-public and belongs to the company or its business partners. Directors must carefully protect this information, discussing it only with people who need to know it and avoiding inappropriate discussions, including on mobile phones, and in public places such as airplanes, restaurants and elevators.
  12. No short-term trading—Directors should be long-term investors, not short-term traders. While directors are often required to own stock in the companies they serve, these holdings should be passive, absent extraordinary circumstances.
  13. Gifts—Gifts are a normal part of human interaction; however, no gift of meaningful value should ever be accepted or provided by a director, and no gift of any nature should be accepted if it might obligate, or appear to obligate, the company or any director.
  14. You are not the press secretary—Outside the boardroom, do not speak on behalf of the company unless specifically authorized to do so; directors should avoid making statements that might be perceived as company statements, even if not so intended.

The points discussed above are practical points that can contribute to being a more effective director. Of course, good directors must also have a working knowledge of the relevant legal rules, including applicable laws and company policies; standards for fiduciary duties, including those of care and loyalty; and insider trading rules, but regular readers of Directors & Boards already know that.

Guide des meilleures pratiques pour les C.A. concernant (1) les fusions et acquisitions, (2) les crises d’entreprise et (3) les difficultés financières


Voici un excellent guide, produit par Deloitte, qui porte sur les bons gestes à poser par les conseils d’administration lorsqu’ils sont aux prises avec les problématiques liées aux fusions et acquisitions, aux crises à gérer et aux problèmes financiers.

Afin de vous donner une idée du contenu du document, voici un aperçu des thèmes abordés.

  1. Les paramètres de la gouvernance évoluent
  2. Fusions et acquisitions : une bonne gouvernance à toutes les étapes du processus
  3. Gestion de crise : le manque de préparation représente clairement un risque
  4. Difficultés financières : priorité aux risques
  5. Le conseil d’administration peut relever le défi
  6. Personnes-ressources

Bonne lecture !

Un guide des meilleures pratiques pour les conseils d’administration qui porte sur les fusions et acquisitions, les crises d’entreprise et les difficultés financières

Le conseil d’administration vient d’apprendre que l’entreprise pourrait être à court de liquidités d’ici un an. Que devez-vous faire? Après une acquisition d’entreprise, le conseil d’administration est poursuivi par les actionnaires, qui l’accusent de ne pas avoir supervisé adéquatement la décision concernant le prix d’achat. Comment prévenir une telle situation? Votre entreprise traverse une crise depuis que la direction a été accusée d’avoir fourni de faux renseignements à des auditeurs externes. Quand faut-il demander conseil à des experts indépendants?

On a fait grand cas des pressions subies par les conseils d’administration dans les mois éprouvants qui ont suivi la crise financière mondiale. De nombreux facteurs ont été mis en cause, notamment la déréglementation du secteur financier, les procédures d’audit inadéquates, la confiance excessive des investisseurs, les pratiques de prêt viciées et la cupidité des entreprises. Les conseils d’administration n’ont pas échappé à cet examen, et les observateurs se demandent si une surveillance plus efficace de la part des conseils d’administration des institutions financières n’aurait pas permis de repérer et de résoudre certains des problèmes qui ont presque anéanti l’économie mondiale. Les conseils d’administration comprenaient-ils assez de membres possédant des connaissances suffisantes et appropriées? Les administrateurs ont-ils posé les bonnes questions? Ont-ils pris les bonnes mesures? Avaient-ils l’information la plus récente sur les nouveaux enjeux? Étaient-ils prêts à contester la direction? Naturellement, avec le recul, la crise financière est maintenant vue comme une tempête causée par une multitude de facteurs dont aucun n’est entièrement à blâmer, et les instances de réglementation et les entreprises appliquent encore les mesures correctives qui s’imposent. Les questions que cette crise a soulevées continuent cependant de préoccuper les conseils d’administration en général. En effet, à mesure que la crise financière devient chose du passé, les conseils d’administration s’interrogent sur d’autres questions et sur un éventail de risques et de responsabilités possibles.

Les cinq dernières années ont été le théâtre de grands bouleversements dans l’arène mondiale de la réglementation. Dans bien des secteurs, la quantité et la complexité des règles ont augmenté, de même que la rigueur avec laquelle elles sont appliquées; les entreprises ont du mal à suivre la cadence, car elles composent encore avec les effets de l’après-crise et cherchent le plus possible à limiter les risques. De leur côté, les conseils d’administration tentent également de s’adapter, malgré la transformation des attentes des parties prenantes, des organismes de réglementation et du public.

Quelles ont été les conséquences de ces événements pour l’administrateur moyen? Des pressions venant de tous les fronts. Par exemple, le rôle de l’administrateur, surtout de celui qui cumule plusieurs postes, peut être si astreignant qu’il devient ingérable et présente de plus en plus de risques du point de vue de la responsabilité. La quantité de connaissances réglementaires et spécialisées nécessaires pour siéger efficacement à un conseil d’administration va en augmentant, et les administrateurs sont souvent dépassés par l’étendue croissante de leurs tâches.

Les conseils d’administration se trouvent donc actuellement dans une position très difficile. Étant donné leur vaste mandat, ils doivent se tenir à l’affût d’une variété de plus en plus importante de renseignements, adopter de nouvelles stratégies de réponse en vertu de leur mandat et déterminer dans quelles circonstances ils doivent consulter des experts indépendants.

Le présent document est conçu pour leur venir en aide. Il examine trois questions cruciales auxquelles les conseils d’administration accordent rarement leur attention, c’est-à-dire les fusions et acquisitions, la gestion de crise et les difficultés financières. Il présente les principaux risques que les conseils d’administration devraient prendre en considération dans chaque domaine, suggère des mesures d’atténuation de ces risques et décrit les avantages d’une meilleure surveillance de leur part ainsi que les dangers d’un laxisme prolongé.

 

Deux grandes approches réglementaires à la diversité sur les C.A. : (1) les quotas ou les mesures ciblées et (2) l’obligation de divulgation


Aujourd’hui, j’aimerais partager avec vous une étude empirique vraiment très intéressante portant sur deux approches réglementaires à la diversité sur les conseils d’administration:

(1) les quotas ou les mesures ciblées et

(2) l’obligation de divulgation.

Aaron A. Dhir,  professeur associé de droit à la Osgoode Hall Law School de Toronto, présente plusieurs réflexions fort pertinentes sur l’expérience norvégienne d’imposition de quotas pour accroître le nombre de femmes sur les conseils d’administration.

Plusieurs règlementations se sont inspirées de cette approche pour prendre en compte cette variable fondamentale. La conclusion de l’auteur au sujet de cette première approche réglementaire est résumée de la façon suivante :

My study of the Norwegian quota model demonstrates the important role diversity can play in enhancing the quality of corporate governance, while also revealing the challenges diversity mandates pose.

En ce qui concerne l’approche basée sur l’obligation de divulgation des mesures de diversité adoptée par la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), il appert que la règle ne donne aucune définition de la diversité et que les entreprises peuvent l’interpréter comme bon leur semble.

L’étude montre cependant que les organisations ont tendance à définir la diversité de manière très large, notamment en faisant référence à l’expérience antérieure pertinente des administrateurs (qui n’a rien à voir avec les caractéristiques sociodémographiques telles que le genre).

L’auteur avance également que cette réglementation a donné lieu à beaucoup d’efforts de définition de la diversité :

My study shows that “diversity” carries multiple connotations for these firms. My most salient finding, however, is that when interpreting this concept in the absence of regulatory guidance, the dominant corporate discourse is experiential rather than identity-based. Firms most frequently define diversity with reference to a director’s prior experience or other non-identity-based factors rather than his or her socio-demographic characteristics. The data provide a unique window into the potential meanings of “diversity” in the corporate governance setting, as well as the limits of a strategy that permits corporations to give the term their own definition.

L’auteur nous incite à lire les chapitres 1, 4 et 6 qui ont été publiés sur le réseau SSRN (Social Science Research Network). Le chapitre 1 présente l’objet de l’étude, la méthodologie, les deux variables étudiées, les résultats sommaires et les perspectives futures eu égard au débat sur la diversité.

Bonne lecture !

Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and Diversity

The lack of gender parity in the governance of business corporations has ignited a heated global debate, leading policymakers to wrestle with difficult questions that lie at the intersection of market activity and social identity politics. In my new book, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, and Diversity (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming in 2015), I draw on semi-structured interviews with corporate board directors in Norway and documentary content analysis of corporate securities filings in the United States to investigate empirically two distinct regulatory models designed to address diversity in the boardroom—quotas and disclosure.IMG_00001049

In Chapter 4, recently made available on SSRN, I explore the quota-based approach to achieving gender balance in corporate boardrooms. Quotas and related target-based measures for publicly traded firms are currently in place in a number of countries, including Iceland, Belgium, France, Italy, and Norway and are at different stages of consideration in other jurisdictions, including Canada, the European Union, and Germany.

I present findings from my qualitative, interview-based study of Norwegian corporate directors in order to provide empirical elucidation of how quota-based regimes operate in practice. The identity narratives of Norwegian board members offer particularly rich sources of insight, given that Norway was the first jurisdiction to pursue the quota path and thus has the most mature quota regime. While highly contentious when adopted, the Norwegian quota project unquestionably set the stage for subsequent legislative developments in other countries.

I delve into the lived experiences of Norwegian directors who gained appointments as a result of Norway’s quota law, as well as those who held appointments before the law was enacted. Several questions frame my investigation. How have these individuals subjectively experienced, and made sense of, this intrusive form of regulation? How does legally required gender diversity affect their economic and institutional lives? And how has it shaped boardroom cultural dynamics and decision making, as well as the overall governance fabric of the board?

The forced repopulation of boards along gender lines has disturbed the traditional order of corporate governance systems, dislocating established hierarchies of power in key market-based institutions. Norway represents the paradigmatic case of this disturbance and has set in motion a wave of corporate governance reform unlike any other. As such, it constitutes a fascinating and appropriate case study through which to consider the implications of quota regimes. My study of the Norwegian quota model demonstrates the important role diversity can play in enhancing the quality of corporate governance, while also revealing the challenges diversity mandates pose.

In Chapter 6, also recently made available on SSRN, I explore the disclosure-based approach to addressing diversity in corporate governance. In 2009, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a rule requiring publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider diversity in identifying director nominees and, if so, how. The rule also requires firms that have adopted a diversity policy to describe how they implement the policy and assess its effectiveness. The rule does not define “diversity,” however, leaving it to corporations to give this term meaning.

I present findings from my mixed-methods content analysis of corporate disclosures submitted during the first four years of the rule in order to provide empirical elucidation of how the rule operates in practice. The research sample consists of a hand-collected dataset of the 2010–2013 definitive proxy statements of S&P 100 firms. I am interested in learning how these firms, in responding to the rule, construct the concept of diversity through their public discourse. What does diversity, viewed through the prism of legal regulation, mean to market participants? How do they interpret and understand this socio-political idea in the absence of a regulatory definition? How is diversity constituted and discursively performed?

The SEC’s disclosure rule has caused US corporations to establish a vocabulary of diversity. My study shows that “diversity” carries multiple connotations for these firms. My most salient finding, however, is that when interpreting this concept in the absence of regulatory guidance, the dominant corporate discourse is experiential rather than identity-based. Firms most frequently define diversity with reference to a director’s prior experience or other nonidentity-based factors rather than his or her socio-demographic characteristics. The data provide a unique window into the potential meanings of “diversity” in the corporate governance setting, as well as the limits of a strategy that permits corporations to give the term their own definition.

Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity aims to deepen ongoing policy conversations and offer new insights into the role law can play in reshaping the gendered dynamics of corporate governance cultures. The full version of Chapter 1 is available for download here.

Notions de gouvernance 101 | Que font les administrateurs ?


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article de Lucy P. Marcus*, experte en gouvernance, qui présente, de manière vulgarisée, en quoi consiste le travail des administrateurs de sociétés aujourd’hui.

On y trouvera une bonne définition des responsabilités des administrateurs ainsi qu’une métaphore intéressante qui montre comment le travail des administrateurs a considérablement changé au cours des vingt dernières années.

L’auteure distingue entre les activités qui sont de nature « grounding » (connaissances de bases de la performance et des obligations de conformité) et celles, toujours plus importantes, qui sont de l’ordre du « stargazing » (la vision à long terme et la stratégie).

Je vous invite à lire ce bref article qui tient lieu de notions de gouvernance 101 !

Bonne lecture !

Boardroom 101: What, exactly, do directors do?

 

The boardroom is changing at a fast pace. The agenda items we discuss, the expectations of board directors and the responsibility we hold are all areas that are going through a much needed, and, in my experience, a very welcome, transition.

When my son was around 5 years old, I was preparing for a board meeting and he asked what that was and what I was going to do there.

Lucy P. Marcus
Lucy P. Marcus*, experte en gouvernance

That’s a question many adults have, too. What, exactly, is a board and what does a board director do?

Searching for an explanation, I finally went with this: « You know about King Arthur and the Round Table? Well, like King Arthur and the Round Table, a group of wise people gather together every month or so. We sit around a table and talk about what the people we are helping have been doing and what they are planning to do next. We try to make sure they are acting honourably and following the law and doing what is best for everyone. »

He seemed fairly satisfied with that answer, but it got me thinking — was the metaphor apt? Is that really what directors are doing in practice?

It does seem sometimes like the board is an arcane and distant body. A caricature would be one where the doors open with a whoosh to reveal suited people sitting around a table in an oak panelled room, having confidential discussions in hushed tones, drawing on deep expertise and thinking big thoughts. And of course, those discussions would be spoken in a special « thee and thou » language.

There are parts of that caricature which do ring true. We board directors generally do sit around a table, and I’d like to think we generally have robust discussions. Strangely, we do often speak in formal ways, referring to “Mr Chairman” and the like. As for the “deep expertise” and “big thoughts” part, I’m not sure we are always well equipped with enough information to make decisions.

Changes afoot

The boardroom is changing at a fast pace. The agenda items we discuss, the expectations of board directors and the responsibility we hold are all areas that are going through a much needed, and, in my experience, a very welcome, transition.

Board agendas used to be rigid and mostly focused on traditional oversight topics such as compensation and compliance. That mandate has grown to include a great deal more.

To better understand the changes and how they affect our job as directors, it is useful to think of the tasks and the agenda items of the board as being broadly divided into a balance of what I call “grounding” and “stargazing”.

The “grounding” side consists of what you might think of as the tick-boxing items: questions around the structure and performance of the organisation in the “here and now”. Is it behaving legally and responsibly? Is it following the rules and regulations? Are its financial accounts in good order? Does it meet to the expectations not just of its shareholders but also of other stakeholders in the broader ecosystem in which it operates?

The “stargazing” side is about strategy. This is the essence of what and where the organisation wants to be in the future. It is about asking questions about how the sector is changing and how the organisation plans to grow. It is also about challenging it to make the necessary changes as the world around it changes too, and to be a driver of positive change. It is about building innovation and a sense of excitement about the future into the DNA.

The old agendas were heavily weighted towards the “grounding” side of the equation, but today, a good balance of “grounding” and “stargazing” is vital to preparing the organisation for the future. The board must look closely at the here and now, making sure everything is working correctly; otherwise we run the risk of missing signs of everything from neglect to malfeasance. We must also look into the next 10 to 15 years to make sure that the organisation has a robust future to look forward to.

Responsibilities increase

The world around us has changed at an exponential pace. Companies are seen as having a greater responsibility for the role they play in the health and well-being of society. They also bear some responsibility for the individuals that they touch, be it employees, partners, or people who live in the community. At the same time, social media and niche publications amplify the voices of shareholders, communities and consumers. Also, boards and companies no longer operate in a black box — with the advent of everything from Twitter to Google Earth, there is more transparency than ever before.

Partly as a consequence of these changes in the boardroom and beyond, the responsibilities and expectations of directors, particularly independent directors, have increased exponentially. It is not sufficient to skim the board papers, ask a couple of superficial questions, eat the lovely meal, and be on your merry way home.

Board directors are now, rightly, expected to read the papers, come prepared, and ask the tough questions. Though the boardroom has traditionally been a black box room, much has changed. Individual directors will increasingly find themselves being held to account for the choices that they have made in the boardroom in many areas, be it around executive compensation or “innovative” tax strategies.

It means that we as directors must be more diligent and make sure we are only voting ‘yes’ for things when we have a thorough understanding of what the implications of the ‘yes’ is — both now and in the longer term. We must take into account those whose lives are impacted directly, such as people who work for the company and those who live in the area where the company sits, as well as the people who use the company’s products and services. It also about those who are impacted indirectly, such as shareholders whose life savings may be at stake. Those are all positives, in my view.

In the end, if we are to live up to the ideal of King Arthur and the Round Table, chivalrous knights who are guided by the ideals of courtesy, courage, and honour, we must ask ourselves every time we gather, “Why are we here and who do we serve?” so that the decisions we take are made wisely and judiciously, not only to serve the needs of the few, but to ensure that we help the organisation to live up to its potential, and do so in an honourable way.

_________________________

*, CEO, Non-Exec Board Director, Prof IE Biz School, Project Syndicate & BBC columnist.

L’audit interne au cœur d’une grande bataille !


Je partage avec vous un récent article que Denis Lefort, expert conseil en gouvernance et audit interne, m’a fait parvenir, accompagné de ses commentaires.

Cet article de Mike Jacka* est paru dans Internal Auditor Magazine​​​​​​​. Toute personne préoccupée par l’importance de cette fonction devrait prendre connaissance de cette mise en garde.

« En lisant ce bref article, vous saisirez rapidement que son auteur est d’avis que l’audit interne et les autres fonctions d’assurance des organisations (gestion des risques, conformité, sécurité et autres) sont entrées dans une guerre de juridiction… Et que l’audit interne ne peut agir comme si elle était comme la Suisse, neutre et inattaquable…!!!

L’auteur est ainsi d’avis que l’audit interne doit préparer à la fois sa stratégie de défense et d’attaque pour contrer les coups durs présents et à venir… »

Bonne lecture !

Internal Audit Is in the Midst of a Great War

 

The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation recently posted an interesting piece titled « Compliance or Legal? The Board’s Duty to Assure Compliance. » I know it all sounds a little boring, but trust me on this one — there is interesting information here. Take some time to read through it before we dive in.

(One very quick, very important aside. I came across this article as a part of The IIA’s SmartBrief — a weekly « snapshot » of news and issues internal auditors might care about. To receive the newsletter you must « opt in. » I cannot urge you enough to opt in. No puffery here. Seldom does a week go by where I don’t find at least one nugget I can use. If you aren’t receiving it, you can opt in here.)

Ia Online Home

If you have been paying attention to the discussions that are going on regarding internal audit’s evolving role you were probably gobsmacked by the similarities between those discussions and what is being said in this article. Take the opening sentence: « A series of developments threaten to blur the important distinction between the corporation’s legal and compliance functions. » Make a few changes and you are talking about the dilemma internal audit is facing. « A series of developments threaten to blur the important distinction between the organization’s internal audit department and [insert your favorite assurance provider’s name here]. »

There it is in a nutshell, the crux of the battle currently being waged over the role of internal audit and others within the organization.

Wait, let’s back up a second. Did you miss that there is a war going on? Let’s take a quick look.

I have a good friend who is a CAE. In that role he is also in charge of risk management. We often talk about the potential conflict that exists with those dual roles. He is not alone. I have talked with other audit leaders who are being approached about audit taking on the role of risk. Not a bad fit. We are risk experts, we have the communication and relationship skills, and there should be a definite meshing of gears between audit and risk.

On the other hand, I have also heard from others who face the opposite issue; they are under pressure to have internal audit placed under the jurisdiction of the risk officer. « Wait a minute, » you say, « That is a very bad idea: a serious problem, a conflict of interests, a subversion of our objectivity, an invasion on our independence. » Our list of reasons why this shouldn’t happen is quite long.

When the shoe is on the other foot the bunions become just a tad more obvious.

And it is not just the risk function. While not as common, I am hearing similar discussions around such functions as compliance, corporate security, finance, quality assurance, and, yes, even legal. In some cases the discussion is around audit taking on part of the role; in others it is about audit becoming a part of the other function.

Why are we suddenly seeing this land grab?

Governance has become an important topic at the executive and board level. (Definitely a good thing.) Assurance providers (compliance, legal, risk, et al) realize the way to raise the esteem with which the board and executives hold them is to take on a greater piece of the governance pie. The pushing and shoving starts. Escalation ensues. And we find ourselves in the midst of a jurisdictional war.

And while internal audit would like to believe we are above the fray (we are independent, we are objective, we are internal audit, hear us roar), unless we recognize the existence of this war — unless we are willing to take up arms and join in the fray — we will find ourselves trivialized, the core values we provide handed off to the victors.

We think we are Switzerland. But there is no such thing as neutrality in this battle.

So, with that background, let’s return to the article previously referenced. The contents provide a good indication of the type of arguments internal audit will encounter. Two examples:

  1. The author states that a forced separation of compliance from under legal would jeopardize the ability of the organization to preserve attorney-client privilege. Cold chills went up my spine as I read this. I still vividly recall similar debates from 20 years ago when the legal department argued they should have more direct control over internal audit in order to preserve attorney-client privilege. We won. But it is obvious that the ugly head of that particular argument continues to rise again and again.
  2. The article quotes compliance thought leaders as saying that the role of « guardian of corporate reputation » is exclusively reserved for the corporate compliance officer; that the compliance officer is the organizational « subject matter expert » for ethics and culture. The author of the article states that this is « contrary to long standing public discourse that frames the lawyer’s role as a primary guardian of the organizational reputation. » My first, knee-jerk reaction is that internal audit should be the guardian of reputation and the subject matter expert. But once I put my knee back where it belongs, I realize it is probably more true that the attempt to define any one department as guardian or expert is a fool’s game. Everyone with any governance role should have the protection of reputation, ethics, and culture as their No. 1 responsibility.

There is much more in the article and many more thoughtful and reasoned arguments. And it would be quite easy to say « Let them duke it out. Their arguments are not important to us. » However, that is exactly why we should be paying attention. The article contains the points that will be used in the battle — points to be used against us and points we can use in our defense.

We are in a war. And audit cannot sit back and say, « We have independence; we are safe and above the fray. » No. They will have an eye on our « turf, » also. And who’s to say that some of their turf shouldn’t be ours. I’m not saying we break out the bayonets and start going after some of the unwounded, but I am saying we have to recognize the existence of a battle and be willing to take a stand — be willing to say what it is we do, why it is important, and why we should have those responsibilities.

What are your thoughts? What is internal audit’s role regarding the organization’s approach to risk, governance, compliance, legal, etc.? If we are more involved, is there a conflict? If the lines blur, does it have a negative impact on the company? Is there really a war brewing? And what might this have to do with the future (if there is going to be a future) of internal audit?​

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*Mike Jacka, CIA, CPA, CPCU, CLU, worked in internal audit for nearly 30 years at Farmers Insurance Group.