Moyens efficaces pour accroître l’implication des administrateurs

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article publié dans Harvard Business Review (HBR) par Bill Huyett et Rodney Zemmel qui montre que l’engagement accru des administrateurs dans diverses facettes de leurs activités peut avoir des retombées très positives pour l’organisation.

« McKinsey research suggests that the most effective directors are meeting these challenges by spending twice as many days a year on board activities as other directors do« .

Ainsi, l’article explore cinq (5) façons pour accroître l’implication des administrateurs :

(1) l’implication entre les réunions;

(2) l’implication dans le processus d’élaboration de la stratégie;

(3) l’implication dans la recherche de nouveaux talents;

(4) l’implication dans certains projets;

(5) l’engagement par le questionnement critique.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des détails au sujet de chaque point. Bonne lecture !

How the Best Board Directors Stay Involved

“Ask me for anything,” Napoleon Bonaparte once remarked, “but time.” Board members today don’t have that luxury either. Directors remain under pressure from activist investors and other constituents, regulation is becoming more demanding, and businesses are growing more complex. McKinsey research suggests that the most effective directors are meeting these challenges by spending twice as many days a year on board activities as other directors do.

As directors and management teams adapt, they’re bumping into limits—both on the amount of time directors can be asked to spend before the role is no longer attractive and on the scope of the activities they can undertake before creating organizational noise or concerns among top executives about micromanagement. We recently discussed some of these tensions with board members and executives at Prium, a New York-based forum for CEOs (in which McKinsey participates). The ideas that emerged, while far from definitive, provide constructive lessons for boardrooms. If there’s one overriding theme, it’s that boosting effectiveness isn’t just about spending more time; it’s also about changing the nature of the engagement between directors and the executive teams they work with.

Engaging between meetings. Maggie Wilderotter, chairman and CEO of Frontier Communications (and a member of the boards of P&G and Xerox) stresses that “it’s not just about the meetings. It’s about being able to touch base in between meetings and staying current.” Such impromptu discussions strengthen a board’s hand on the company’s pulse. Keeping board members informed also minimizes the time spent on background that slows up regular board meetings. And the communication works both ways. “I also want board members to elevate issues that they’re seeing on the horizon that we should be thinking about,” explains Wilderotter. “To me, it’s really more of a two-way street.” Directors and executive teams will need to work out what rhythm and frequency are right for them. Denise Ramos, president and CEO of ITT, notes that “conversations with board members every week or every two weeks may be too much.” For boards seeking to boost their level of engagement between meetings, experimentation and course correction when things get out of balance are likely to be necessary.

Engaging with strategy as it’s forming. Strategy, especially on the corporate-wide (as opposed to BU) level, is an area where the diverse experiences and pattern-recognition skills of experienced directors enable them to add significant value. But that’s only possible if they’re participating early in the formation of strategy and stress-testing it along the way, as opposed to reviewing a strategy that’s been fully thought through by executives. In the description of Wilderotter, strategy needs to become “a collaborative process where different opinions can be put on the table” and “different options can be reviewed and discarded.” This shifts the board’s attitude from reactive to proactive and can infuse a degree of radicalism into the boardroom. Effective directors don’t shy away from bold strategic questions, such as “What businesses should this company own?” and “What businesses should this company not own?” We were impressed by one board that even dared ask, “Should this company continue to exist?” In fact, that board concluded that the company should not continue to exist, and effected a highly successful reorganization separating the firm into several freestanding enterprises.

Engaging on talent. Directors have long assumed responsibility for selecting and replacing CEOs, both in the normal course of business and in “hit by a bus” scenarios. Many also find it useful to track succession and promotion—for example, by holding annual reviews of a company’s top 30 to 50 key executives. But to raise the bar, some boards are moving from simply observing talent to actively cultivating it. Case in point: directors who tap their networks to source new hires. Donald Gogel, the chairman and CEO of Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, explains that “our board members can operate like a highly effective search firm. There’s nothing like recruiting an executive who worked for you for a long time, particularly in some functional areas where you know that he or she is both capable and a great fit.” Other boards actively mentor high-performing executives, which allows those executives to draw upon the directors’ experience and enables the board to evaluate in-house successors more fully.

Engaging the field. Another way to enhance board engagement is to assign directors specific operational areas to engage on. Board members can assume roles in specific company initiatives, such as cybersecurity, clean technologies, or risk— becoming not only “the board’s eyes and ears,” notes Eduardo Mestre, Senior Advisor for Evercore Partners and a board director of Comcast and Avis Budget, “but really being a very active participant in the process.” Jack Krol, chairman of Delphi Automotive and former chairman and CEO of DuPont, requires board members to visit at least one business site every 12 months. At the same time, directors should be mindful not to interfere with operational teams or to supplant managers. The goal is to target specific projects that are particularly appropriate for individual directors and to encourage participating board members to be, as one director says, “collaborative, not intrusive.”

Engaging on the tough questions. We noted above the value of probing difficult strategic issues, but the importance of asking uncomfortable questions extends beyond strategy sessions to a wide range of issues. “You should have some directors—perhaps 20% of the board—who know the industry and can challenge any operating executive in that company on industry content,” says Dennis Carey, a Korn Ferry vice chairman who has served on several boards. “But the problem is not too few people on boards who know their industries. The problem is too many people who know the industries, who are looking in the rearview mirror and assuming that what made money over the past 20 years will make money again.” Michael Campbell, a former chairman, CEO, and president of Arch Chemicals, builds on this theme by adding that “every board member does not necessarily need to have industry experience. But they must have the courage in the boardroom to ask difficult questions.”

Our McKinsey colleagues have noted in past articles that understanding how a company creates (and destroys) value makes it much easier to identify critical issues promptly. In fact, it is worth asking whether everyone in the boardroom does indeed understand how the company and each of its divisions make money. Gogel even suggested that “boards should have at least one person who has the responsibility to think like an activist investor. Many boards are caught unaware because no director is playing that role.”

As boards raise and grapple with uncomfortable questions, it’s important to connect the dots between issues—perhaps by tasking one director with serving in an “integrator” role. “We get into a boardroom,” Wilderotter remarked, “and everybody’s a peer. But having a specific capacity to bring disparate points together is critical to keeping a board functional versus having it be dysfunctional.”

Ultimately, there are no shortcuts to building and maintaining well-tuned board and executive mechanics. Each of the measures requires hard work from the board members, and sometimes a CEO with thick skin. But a good director will provide the extra effort, and an effective CEO will make the most of an engaged board’s limited time.

Bill Huyett is a director in McKinsey’s Boston office. Rodney Zemmel is a director in McKinsey’s New York office.

Composition et renouvellement des CA | Une enquête de EY

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du rapport publié par Ernst & Young Center for Board Matters dans lequel on présente les résultats d’une enquête portant, entre autre, sur la composition des CA et sur les mécanismes de renouvellement des membres du conseil.

Jamais la composition des conseils d’administration n’aura été autant scrutée par les investisseurs et les actionnaires. Et ce n’est que le début des interventions des actionnaires pour l’obtention d’un Board exemplaire…

Il y a vingt ans, il y avait peu d’interrogations sur la matrice des compétences, des habiletés et des expériences des membres des conseils d’administration. De nos jours les actionnaires veulent savoir si leurs élus sont aptes (1) à accompagner la direction dans l’exécution de la stratégie et (2) à superviser la gestion des risques (voir mon billet sur ce sujet Trois étapes pour aider le CA à s’acquitter de ses obligations à l’égard de la surveillance de la gestion des risques).

Le problème du renouvellement des membres du conseil, l’absence d’une politique claire concernant le nombre limite d’années de service au conseil, ainsi que le manque flagrant de diversité sur les conseils sont des facteurs-clés qui amènent les actionnaires à exiger une plus grande divulgation des profils des administrateurs et un processus de nomination plus ouvert, lors des assemblées annuelles.

L’article a été publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. Voici une brève synthèse des résultats :

More than three-fourths of the investors we spoke with believe companies are not doing a good job of explaining why they have the right directors in the boardroom.

Companies can improve disclosures by making explicit which directors on the board are qualified to oversee key areas of risk for the company and how director qualifications align with strategy. Providing clarity around how board candidates are identified and vetted and the process for supporting board diversity goals may also strengthen investor confidence in the nomination process.

Rigorous board evaluations, including assessing the performance of individual board members, as well as the performance and composition of the board and its committees, are generally considered valuable mechanisms for stimulating thoughtful board turnover, but views about other approaches (e.g., term limits) differ widely.

L’article présente les avenues à explorer pour améliorer la composition des CA. Également, l’article propose trois bons moyens pour renforcer la divulgation liée à la composition du conseil. Enfin, l’article présente une manière originale de conceptualiser le renouvellement des conseils, en s’appuyant, notamment, sur de solides évaluations des administrateurs.

Voici des extraits de l’article. Bonne lecture !

2015 Proxy Season Insights: Board Composition

Room for improvement in making the case for board composition

Despite investor acknowledgement that some leading companies are doing an excellent job in this area, most of the investors we spoke with believe companies are generally not making a compelling enough case in the proxy statement for why their directors are the best candidates for the job.

Three ways companies can enhance board composition disclosures

Make disclosures company-specific and tie qualifications to strategy and risk: Be explicit about why the director brings value to the board based on the company’s specific circumstances. Companies should not assume that the connection between a director’s expertise and the company’s strategic and risk oversight needs is obvious. Also, explaining how the board, as a whole, is the right fit can be valuable, particularly given that most investors are evaluating boards holistically.

Provide more disclosure around the director recruitment process and how candidates are sourced and vetted: Disclosing more information around the nomination process—how directors were identified (e.g., through a search firm), what the vetting process entailed, etc.—can mitigate concerns about the recruitment process being insular and informal.

Discuss efforts to enhance gender and ethnic diversity: Many companies—nearly 60% of S&P 500 companies—say they specifically identify gender and ethnicity as a consideration when identifying director nominees, but that is not always reflected in the gender and ethnic makeup of the board. Disclosing a formal process to support board diversity, including providing clarity around what is considered an appropriate level of diversity, can highlight efforts to recruit diverse directors.

A skills matrix tied to company strategy can be a valuable disclosure tool but is not the only way to convey a thoughtful approach. A letter from the lead director or chairman that discusses the board’s succession planning and refreshment process and any recent composition changes can also be effective.

Beyond disclosure, engagement can provide investors a valuable dimension in assessing board quality. Involving key directors in conversations with shareholders can provide further insight into board dynamics, individual director strengths and composition decisions.

Views vary on mechanisms to trigger board renewal

When we asked investors what mechanisms boards can use to most effectively stimulate refreshment, the vast majority chose rigorous board evaluations as the optimal solution and director retirement ages as the least effective. However, views around the different mechanisms and how they should be used vary—as does how investors approach the topic of tenure altogether.

Some investors evaluate tenure and director succession planning as a forward-looking risk, while others focus on past company performance and decisions. The commentary below represents investor opinions on each mechanism.

One of the top takeaways from our dialogue dinners was the importance of robust board evaluations, including evaluations of individual board members, to meaningful board refreshment and board effectiveness. Some directors noted the value in bringing in an independent third party to facilitate in-depth board assessments and in changing evaluation methods as appropriate to reinvigorate the process. Some also noted that board evaluation effectiveness relies on the strength of the independent board leader leading the evaluation.

When it comes to how boards manage director tenure internally, setting expectations up front that directors’ board service will be for a limited amount of time—not necessarily until they reach retirement age—is important. We’ve heard from some directors that having periodic conversations with individual board members about their future on the board is valuable and can help provide “off ramps” and a healthy succession planning process.

Conclusion

Given investors’ increasing focus on board composition, companies may want to review and enhance proxy statement disclosures to ensure that director qualifications are explicitly tied to company-specific strategy and risks and that the board’s approach to diversity and succession planning is transparent.

Beyond disclosure, ongoing dialogue with institutional investors that involves independent board leaders may allow for a rich discussion around board composition. Also, through regular board refreshment and enhanced communications around director succession planning, companies may head off investor uncertainty and temptations to go down a rules-based path regarding director terms.

Qu’est-ce qu’une fondation-actionnaires ? | Dix points-clé

Notre pays méconnaît largement un mode de gouvernance répandu dans le reste de l’Europe. Au Danemark, en Suisse, en Allemagne, de grandes entreprises industrielles et commerciales sont couramment détenues par des fondations.

Et le modèle s’avère durable et vertueux. Pourquoi ?

Quelles sont les spécificités des fondations actionnaires ?

Les voici résumées autour de 10 mots clés.

Qu’en est-il au Québec ? Ce sera le sujet d’un autre billet.

Bonne lecture !

Découvrez les « fondations-actionnaires » (et leurs atouts) en 10 points-clé

Les fondations actionnaires (éd.Prophil) Prophil

INDUSTRIE

Ikea, Lego, Rolex, Bosch, Carlsberg : ces marques sont mondialement connues. Mais parmi leurs millions de clients, combien connaissent leur autre particularité ? Les groupes industriels à l’origine de ces « success stories » sont, depuis longtemps, tous la propriété de… fondations ! Pourtant, faire rimer économie et philanthropie ne va pas de soi, et le terme même de « fondation actionnaire » peut paraître un oxymore. Car la philanthropie s’accorde a priori avec le « don », et l’actionnariat avec l’investissement.

Le terme n’est d’ailleurs pas stabilisé, et ne correspond à aucun statut juridique propre dans les pays étudiés : les Suisses parlent de « fondation entrepreneuriale » ou de « fondation économique», les Danois évoquent les « fondations commerciales », et les anglosaxons les « industrial fondations ». Chez nos voisins, industrie et philanthropie vont assurément de pair.

MAJORITAIRE

La fondation actionnaire, telle que nous la traitons dans cette étude, désigne une fondation à but non lucratif, propriétaire d’une entreprise industrielle ou commerciale. Elle possède tout ou partie des actions, et la majorité des droits de vote et/ou la minorité de blocage.

Ce qui n’empêche donc pas les entreprises concernées d’être en partie cotées en bourse (les fondations actionnaires représentent 54% de la capitalisation boursière de Copenhague).

Dès lors, plusieurs fondations, qui certes détiennent des actions d’entreprises, sortent du champ de cette étude, notamment celles qui ont décidé de filialiser des activités connexes à leur objet, en créant des sociétés (une fondation culturelle qui, par exemple, crée une maison d’édition).

FAMILLES

Les fondations actionnaires sont essentiellement des histoires de familles, d’engagement personnel, comme les nombreux cas de cette étude en témoignent.

Dans un esprit de résistance (La Montagne), avec la volonté de protéger et développer un patrimoine industriel (Bosch), ou avec le souhait d’articuler des engagements humanistes avec une transmission sereine de l’entreprise en absence d’ayant droits (Pierre Fabre), chaque histoire est celle d’un homme, d’une famille qui se projette dans le long terme, avec la volonté de perpétuer une culture d’entreprise singulière, dans une double approche économique et sociétale.

PHILANTHROPIE

Cette transmission est, en soi, un acte de philanthropie majeur. Car les propriétaires font don de leurs titres à une structure créée à cet effet, et renoncent donc aux gains, le cas échéant substantiels, d’une vente avec plus-value. Ils sont philanthropes.

Mais la philanthropie s’exprime aussi, et surtout, dans les dons des fondations, rendus possibles par les dividendes perçus et/ou les intérêts des dotations.

Par exemple, les fondations actionnaires donnent plus de 800 millions d’euros par an au Danemark (seul pays où des études aussi précises existent) et la fondation Novo Nordisk représente, à elle seule, 120 millions d’euros. Sa dotation est telle qu’elle pourrait continuer à vivre sans même percevoir de dividendes !

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

Au Danemark, la première mission des fondations actionnaires est majoritairement de protéger et de développer l’entreprise ; la seconde, de soutenir une cause culturelle et/ou sociale.

La double mission économique et philanthropique est parfaitement assumée et le rôle de gestion de l’entreprise, prioritaire. Maintenir le patrimoine industriel dans ce petit pays, conserver des fleurons industriels, protéger l’emploi sont considérés comme des sujets d’intérêt général.

Ce n’est pas le cas en France, où intérêt général et activité commerciale ne vont pas facilement de pair. Le principe de spécialité impose en effet aux fondations françaises d’avoir une mission exclusivement d’intérêt général, qui, dans une vision encore assez restrictive, ne peut être économique.

Quant à l’Allemagne, il n’est pas obligatoire d’avoir une mission d’intérêt général pour créer une fondation, a fortiori une fondation actionnaire. Comme le dit le célèbre banquier privé Thierry Lombard, les fondations actionnaires soulèvent des questions non seulement « de loi, mais d’idéologie ».

GOUVERNANCE

C’est le sujet clé. Dans les pays étudiés, et selon le droit national, deux modes de gouvernance prédominent :

1. soit une gestion directe de l’entreprise par la fondation, qui suppose une double finalité pleinement assumée et un conseil d’administration capable de prendre des décisions économiques et philanthropiques à la fois ;

2. soit une gestion indirecte, avec une distinction nette des instances de gouvernance de l’entreprise et de la fondation, via la création d’une société holding intermédiaire. Le droit et la fiscalité sont souvent complexes et variables d’un pays à l’autre : nous avons fait appel à d’éminents spécialistes nationaux pour nous décrire leur « état du droit ».

Notons que dans les fondations actionnaires, la succession des dirigeants n’est pas un sujet aussi sensible qu’ailleurs. La question se règle en général longtemps à l’avance, au niveau de la fondation.

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

Cette performance globale n’est pas une série de bonnes actions, mais un engagement stratégique d’une entreprise, qui se préoccupe de sa contribution économique, sociale et sociétale à son environnement.

Les entreprises les plus avancées ont compris que leur intérêt particulier rencontrait ici l’intérêt général, pour peu qu’elles ne restent pas les yeux rivés sur une gestion à court terme.

Alors que la pratique de la RSE est devenu de plus en plus un exercice imposé, et trop souvent l’instrument de directions de la communication, la fondation actionnaire place, par nature, la responsabilité sociale et l’approche de long terme au coeur de sa stratégie : dans une forme de fertilisation croisée, fondation et entreprise intrinsèquement liées, s’influencent.

LONG TERME

À un monde économique de plus en plus instable et à court terme, la fondation actionnaire oppose un modèle d’actionnariat stable et durable. La menace de prédateurs est évacuée, puisque toute tentative d’OPA hostile est impossible, et une vision de long terme, dont la redistribution de dividendes n’est pas l’unique préoccupation, oriente la stratégie.

TROISIÈME VOIE

Cette aventure, les tenants de l’économie positive et les philosophes de l’économie altruiste seraient prêts à la tenter. Car intrinsèquement les fondations actionnaires devraient faire consensus : elles allient la création de valeur économique à la force du don, au service d’une économie durable et d’une cohésion sociale renforcée.

C’est pourquoi il est si important de défricher cette troisième voie qui, en France, n’est encore qu’un sentier. La fondation actionnaire peut contribuer à faire émerger un nouveau capitalisme, plus altruiste et durable. Ce paysage pour les générations à venir, beaucoup l’appellent de leurs voeux.

EFFICACITÉ

Mais peut-on conjuguer gouvernance philanthropique et efficacité économique ? Les quelques études scientifiques (voir le panorama danois) existantes tendraient à le prouver : les performances des entreprises propriétés de fondations sont meilleures que celles où l’actionnariat est dispersé*. Le phénomène est comparable dans les sociétés familiales.

D’un point de vue social, ce type d’entreprises semble mieux traverser les crises conjoncturelles. Les dirigeants peuvent en effet s’appuyer sur une meilleure implication de leurs collaborateurs, rassurés par la stabilité de l’actionnariat.

Enfin, à l’heure où les cadres sont à la recherche de sens dans leur vie professionnelle, les valeurs promues par les fondations leur donnent une bonne raison de s’investir dans l’entreprise.

___________________________________

*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

On constate que les fondations-actionnaires ne sous-performent jamais les autres types d’entreprises. Selon Steen Thomsen, auteur de l’étude dont est tirée le tableau (« Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations« ), « les fondations-actionnaires présentent un taux de rentabilité et de croissance comparable aux entreprises classiques, mais avec un niveau de sécurité financière bien plus élevé » (comme le montre le ratio « equity/assets » de 47 au lieu de 36 pour les entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé, et 38 pour les entreprises familiales).

Trois étapes pour aider le CA à s’acquitter de ses obligations à l’égard de la surveillance de la gestion des risques

Quel doit être le rôle du conseil d’administration eu égard à la surveillance de la gestion des risques ? L’article publié par Scott Hodgkins, Steven B. Stokdyk, et Joel H. Trotter dans le forum du site du Harvard Law School présente, d’une manière très concise, les trois étapes qu’un conseil doit entreprendre en matière de gestion des risques d’une société.

Les auteurs rappellent l’utilisation d’un modèle développé par le COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations de la Commission Treadway), bien connu en gouvernance, qui invite les CA à :

S’entendre avec la direction sur un niveau de risque acceptable (l’appétit pour le risque);
Comprendre les efforts de la direction dans l’exécution des pratiques de gestion des risques;
Revoir le portefeuille des risques en considérant l’appétit pour le risque;
Connaître les risques les plus importants de l’entreprise, ainsi que les stratégies de la direction pour les contrôler.

L’article discute des trois étapes que le CA doit accomplir afin de s’acquitter de son rôle en matière de gestion des risques :

Déterminer le modèle de supervision privilégié par le CA;
Convenir avec le management d’une approche appropriée à la gestion des risques et revoir l’approche retenue;
Évaluer les ressources du CA en matière de gestion de risques et éviter les biais et la pensée de groupe.

Voici donc un extrait de l’article qui précise chacune des trois étapes.

Bonne lecture !

Three Practical Steps to Oversee Enterprise Risk Management

1. Determine the board’s preferred oversight model

Typically, boards either retain primary responsibility for risk oversight or delegate initial oversight duties to a committee, such as the audit committee or a risk committee. Where the board retains primary responsibility, individual committees may provide input on specific types of risk, such as compensation risk, audit and financial risk, and regulatory and compliance risk.

In selecting between the active board model and the committee model, the board should consider those directors with the necessary expertise to oversee unique market, liquidity, regulatory, innovation, cybersecurity and other risks that may require special attention. The board should also consider whether adding duties to an existing committee, such as the audit committee, may be too burdensome in light of existing workload.

These issues are unique to each company, and the key is to ensure that the model you choose is effective for your situation.

2. Develop a stated approach to risk management

Some companies may adopt a risk management statement or policy. As with other policy statements, a risk management statement can create a tone-at-the-top benchmark for assessing value-creation opportunities as they arise and provide guideposts for management’s operational decisions.
A risk management statement should separately identify:

Acceptable strategic risks

Undesirable risks

Risk tolerances or thresholds in stated categories, such as strategic, financial, operational and compliance

In developing the company’s approach, the board should consider:

Investor expectations of the company’s risk appetite

Competitors’ apparent risk appetite

Stress-tests for risk scenarios, using historical experience and sensitivity analysis

Long-term strategy versus existing core competencies

Possible long-term market developments

Risk concentrations (e.g., customer, supplier, investment, geographic)

Effects of new business generation on desired risk profile

Strategic planning and operations compared to articulated risk appetite

Developing a stated approach to risk management requires good working relationships among the board members, the CEO and management, as well as active participation by all involved.

3. Assess board capabilities and effectiveness, reviewing for bias and groupthink

The board must evaluate its own capabilities and effectiveness, paying particular attention to the possible emergence of cognitive bias or groupthink.

In assessing board capabilities and effectiveness, the board should consider:

Directors’ skills and expertise compared to the company’s current and future operations

Possible director education initiatives or new directors with additional skills

Delegation of risk oversight in highly technical areas, such as cybersecurity

Retention of independent experts to evaluate specific risk management practices

Clear allocation of responsibility among the board committees and members

The balance between board-level risk oversight and management-level day-to-day ERM Boards must also guard against two types of bias:

Resistance to new ideas from outsiders, thus overlooking new opportunities or risks

Confirmation bias, incorrectly filtering information and confirming preconceptions

Maintaining contact with business realities also requires collegiality and open communication among management and directors.

Boards should consider their risk oversight in light of these three steps to assist in framing an effective approach to enterprise-level risk exposures.

Nouvelle formation du CAS en Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés présentera son nouveau cours Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence, les 19 et 20 mai prochains à Montréal, afin de répondre à la demande grandissante des administrateurs exerçant une fonction à la présidence d’un conseil d’administration, d’un comité du conseil ou d’un comité consultatif d’une PME.

Précédée d’un test en ligne sur le leadership, cette formation est axée sur la prise de conscience et le développement des habilités relationnelles et politiques qu’exigent les fonctions de présidence. Outre les résultats du test en ligne, des études de cas, une simulation et des témoignages seront aussi au rendez-vous.

Si vous assumez les fonctions de présidence, c’est un cours à ne pas manquer avec notre équipe de sept formateurs de haut calibre! Pour plus d’informations sur les critères d’admission, les objectifs et le contenu : consultez la page Web du cours ou le programme détaillé.

Au plaisir de vous compter parmi nous et nous vous invitons à relayer l’information aux présidents de vos conseils d’administration.

Tendances claires eu égard à la rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés

En gouvernance, on fait très souvent référence aux mécanismes de rémunération de la direction des entreprises mais on s’interroge assez peu sur la rémunération des administrateurs. Également, il y a peu d’études sur le sujet.

L’article qui suit a été publié par Ira Kay* dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. L’auteure confirme que les administrateurs de sociétés sont de plus en plus sollicités; ils sont donc appelés à investir de plus en plus de temps dans leurs fonctions et ils doivent assumer plus de risques.

La rémunération des administrateurs augmente d’environ 5 % par année et les paiements se font généralement sur une base de 50 % en argent et 50 % en actions à paiement différé.

Les tendances qui se dessinent sont claires. En voici un extrait :

Bonne lecture !

Trends in Board of Director Compensation

Summary and Key Findings

In recent years, total pay has increased by, on average, less than 5% per year

Most companies make pay changes less frequently (e.g., every two or three years)

Most large cap companies have eliminated regular meeting fees, in favor of higher annual cash/equity retainers

Equity awards, which are most often RSUs or some other type of full-value award, typically represents 55% to 60% of total pay

Near universal practice of having stock ownership and/or stock retention requirements, such as deferred stock units that are held until after board departure

Some pay practices vary widely by industry and company size; for example smaller cap companies continue to provide meeting fees and may also grant stock options

In the future, we expect annual director pay to increase, on average, by 3% to 5% and the weighting on equity awards to increase

Cash Compensation

The traditional directors’ compensation program included both an annual retainer and a separate fee provided for attending Board and Committee meetings. The presence of a meeting fee encouraged meeting attendance and automatically adjusts for workload as measured by the number of Board and Committee meetings. Meeting attendance is less of an issue today as companies disclose whether their directors attend at least 75% of meetings and proxy advisors scrutinize those directors who fail to meet the threshold. In recent years, most large companies and more mid-sized and small companies have simplified their approach to delivering cash compensation by eliminating the meeting fee element and instead providing a larger single cash retainer. The rationale for this change is to ease the administrative burden associated with paying a director a fee for each meeting attended and to communicate that meeting attendance is expected with less emphasis on actual time spent and more emphasis on the annual service provided to shareholders. We expect this shift to continue among smaller and mid-sized companies where the elimination of meeting fees is not yet a majority practice.

Equity and Cash Compensation Mix

Over time, as director compensation has increased, the trend has been to provide greater focus on equity compensation, which provides direct economic alignment to the shareholders who directors represent. Currently, it is common to have equity represent a slight majority of regular annual compensation – such as a pay mix of equity compensation 55% and cash compensation 45%. In analyzing broad market practices, we typically find directors’ total compensation allocated 40% to 50% to cash compensation and 50% to 60% to equity compensation. The emphasis on equity compensation is also directionally consistent with the typical pay mix for senior executives.

Equity Grant Design

In the early 2000s, stock options delivered most or all of director equity compensation, similar to the approach for compensating executives. The current trend has shifted to the use of full-value shares to deliver all (or at least most) of equity compensation. This shift in approach was driven by the change in accounting standards, negative views of stock options as a compensation vehicle for directors (and executives), and other factors. As a result, today, the most common market practice is to deliver equity compensation solely through full-value shares; a minority of companies (typically 25% or fewer, depending on the set of companies analyzed) continue to grant stock options.

Companies vary in the delivery of the full-value shares with the most common approaches including:

Restricted stock/units, which have a restriction period that may range from six months to three years

Deferred stock units, in which actual share are not delivered or sold until departing the Board

Outright grants, which are immediately vested at grant

The use of performance‐based awards for directors is nearly non‐existent due to the desire to avoid any misperceptions between compensation and their duties and fiduciary responsibilities.

Board Leadership Compensation

Today independent directors are either led by a Non-Executive Chairman (at companies who have separated the leadership role) or a Lead Director (for companies who maintain a combined Chairman and CEO role or an Executive Chairman). At companies who have separated the Board Chairman and CEO roles, an independent Non-Executive Chairman is appointed to lead the independent directors. The responsibilities of this position vary by company as does the amount of additional compensation, which is provided through cash, equity or a combination thereof. At the low end of the spectrum, the Non-Executive Chairman’s extra retainer is positioned modestly above the extra retainer provided to the Audit Committee Chairman (or the Lead Director, which is discussed below) or at the high end of the spectrum, the additional retainer can be significantly higher, such as an additional $200,000 or more.

For those companies who have decided to continue with a single combined role, an independent director serving in the role of Lead Director (or Presiding Director) has emerged as a best practice to lead executive sessions of independent directors. When this role emerged in the mid-2000s, the Lead Director often received no additional compensation and frequently rotated among independent Committee Chairmen or was represented by the Governance Committee Chairman. More recently, for companies to maintain the combined role of Chairman and CEO, Lead Directors have become more prominent and are now typically appointed by the independent directors and are compensated with an additional retainer.

Board Committee Chairmen are typically provided an extra retainer to compensate for the additional work with management and outside advisors in preparing to lead committee meetings. Following the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley, the extra retainer provided to the Chairman of the Audit Committee increased at a higher rate than other committee chairmen in recognition of the additional workload in terms of number of meetings and required preparation, heightened risk, and the financial expertise required of the position. Following the introduction of the enhanced proxy disclosure rules in 2006 and the Say on Pay advisory vote in 2010, extra retainers provided to the Chairman of the Compensation Committee increased to be positioned closer to (or just below) that of the Audit Committee Chairman.

Stock Ownership Guidelines and Requirements

There is near universal use of stock ownership guidelines or holding requirements for directors, which is consistent with the prevalence of requirements for senior executives. In order to align directors’ economic interests with the shareholders they represent, companies typically provide full-value equity awards and require minimum stock ownership specified as a multiple of the annual retainer or equity award value. At larger companies, the minimum stock ownership guideline is typically three to five times the annual retainer or equity award value with the expectation that this will be achieved within five years of joining the Board. Some companies also have stock holding requirements, which may be used in addition to stock ownership guidelines. For example, companies may require directors to retain net (after tax) shares upon lapse of restrictions until the minimum stock ownership guideline is achieved. Other companies may solely use stock holding requirements (such as grant equity compensation as deferred stock units) to ensure directors accumulate and retain meaningful levels of stock ownership through their tenure as a director.

Contemporary Best Practices

Over time director compensation levels and program design have evolved to address the changing regulatory environment and the enhanced role of the typical director, as described above. Director compensation arrangements have settled to a general design adopted by most companies:

– Annual cash retainer representing approximately 40% to 45% of the total program value

– Annual equity award most often delivered through full-value shares that vest after a specified time and representing approximately 55% to 60% of the total program value

– Extra cash retainers for Non-Executive Chairman, Lead Directors and Committee Chairmen

– Stock ownership guidelines representing three to five times the annual retainer, with stock holding requirements of new grants until the ownership guideline is achieved.

________________________________

*Ira Kay is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance memorandum by Steve Pakela and John Sinkular.

Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de sociétés

Les personnes intéressées par les nouvelles recherches en gouvernance des entreprises sont invitées à assister au Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de société mardi 14 avril 2015

En partenariat avec la FSA et la Chaire en gouvernance des sociétés, le CÉDÉ organise un colloque étudiant. Les étudiants du cours de Gouvernance de l’entreprise DRT-6056 du professeur Ivan Tchotourian et du cours de Gouvernance des sociétés CTB-7000 du professeur Jean Bédard présenteront lors de cet événement le bilan de travaux de recherche réalisés durant la session d’hiver 2015.

Heure : 8 h 30 à 11 h 30
Lieu : Salon Hermès de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration

L’entrée est libre.

Un document complet sur les principes d’éthique et de saine gouvernance dans les organismes à buts charitables

Plusieurs OBNL sont à la recherche d’un document présentant les principes les plus importants s’appliquant aux organismes à buts charitables.

Le site ci-dessous vous mènera à une description sommaire des principes de gouvernance qui vous servirons de guide dans la gestion et la surveillance des OBNL de ce type. J’espère que ces informations vous seront utiles.

Vous pouvez également vous procurer le livre The Complete Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice.

What are the principles ?

The Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice outlines 33 principles of sound practice for charitable organizations and foundations related to legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The Principles should be considered by every charitable organization as a guide for strengthening its effectiveness and accountability. The Principles were developed by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2007 and updated in 2015 to reflect new circumstances in which the charitable sector functions, and new relationships within and between the sectors.

The Principles Organizational Assessment Tool allows organizations to determine their strengths and weaknesses in the application of the Principles, based on its four key content areas (Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight, and Responsible Fundraising). This probing tool asks not just whether an organization has the requisite policies and practices in place, but also enables an organization to determine the efficacy of those practices. After completing the survey (by content area or in full), organizations will receive a score report for each content area and a link to suggested resources for areas of improvement.

Voici une liste des 33 principes énoncés. Bonne lecture !

Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

Laws and Regulations

Code of Ethics

Conflicts of Interest

« Whistleblower » Policy

Document Retention and Destruction

Protection of Assets

Availability of Information to the Public

Effective Governance

Board Responsibilities

Board Meetings

Board Size and Structure

Board Diversity

Board Independence

CEO Evaluation and Compensation

Separation of CEO, Board Chair and Board Treasurer Roles

Board Education and Communication

Evaluation of Board Performance

Board Member Term Limits

Review of Governing Documents

Review of Mission and Goals

Board Compensation

Strong Financial Oversight

Financial Records

Annual Budget, Financial
Performance and Investments

Loans to Directors, Officers,
or Trustees

Resource Allocation for Programs
and Administration

Travel and Other Expense Policies

Expense Reimbursement for
Nonbusiness Travel Companions

Accuracy and Truthfulness of Fundraising Materials

Responsible Fundraising

Compliance with Donor’s Intent

Acknowledgment of Tax-Deductible Contributions

Gift Acceptance Policies

Oversight of Fundraisers

Fundraiser Compensation

Donor Privacy

Première Grande soirée de la gouvernance Les Affaires

Voici un communiqué du CAS sur le choix des entreprises qui se sont démarquées dans le domaine de gouvernance.

Première Grande soirée de la gouvernance Les Affaires

Afin de souligner les meilleures pratiques des conseils d’administration, Les Affaires, en collaboration avec le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés et l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP), tenait le 1er avril dernier la Grande soirée de la gouvernance.

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux d’avoir collaboré à cette soirée célébrant la saine gouvernance. Pour la première édition de cet événement, trois conseils ont été honorés pour leurs pratiques exemplaires.

Dans la catégorie Professionnalisation, c’est le conseil d’administration de Marquis Imprimeur qui a été retenu à titre de modèle en se dotant d’un conseil plus solide pour accompagner la croissance. Le Collège tient à souligner la participation du président du CA, M. Jacques Mallette, et du PDG de l’entreprise, M. Serge Loubier, parmi ses formateurs au cours Gouvernance des PME. De plus, M. Jacques Lefebvre, ASC, siège également sur ce conseil et en préside le comité de gouvernance depuis 2009.

Le conseil d’administration de Promutuel Assurance a été, quant à lui, désigné dans la catégorie Transformation en raison de son plan d’action pour changer sa culture grâce à la formation continue. Le Collège a collaboré étroitement à la réalisation de ce plan remarquable avec M. Martin Bergeron, ASC, dans l’un de ses volets visant la formation des 200 administrateurs de l’ensemble des mutuelles.

Le conseil d’administration de Pages Jaunes Limitée s’est aussi distingué dans la catégorie Situation de crise par les actions qu’il a posé au cours des dernières années pour sortir plus fort d’une crise financière.

Explications du phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires | PwC

Mary Ann Cloyd, responsable du Center for Board Governance de PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), vient de publier dans le forum du HLS un important document de référence sur le phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires.

Son texte présente une excellente vulgarisation des activités conduites par les parties intéressées : Qui, Quoi, Quand et Comment ?

Je vous suggère de lire l’article au complet car il est très bien illustré par l’infographie. Vous trouverez ici un extrait de celui-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Shareholder Activism: Who, What, When, and How?

Who are today’s activists and what do they want?

Shareholder activism Spectrum

“Activism” represents a range of activities by one or more of a publicly traded corporation’s shareholders that are intended to result in some change in the corporation. The activities fall along a spectrum based on the significance of the desired change and the assertiveness of the investors’ activities. On the more aggressive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism that seeks a significant change to the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board. On the other end of the spectrum are one-on-one engagements between shareholders and companies triggered by Dodd-Frank’s “say on pay” advisory vote.

The purpose of this post is to provide an overview of activism along this spectrum: who the activists are, what they want, when they are likely to approach a company, the tactics most likely to be used, how different types of activism along the spectrum cumulate, and ways that companies can both prepare for and respond to each type of activism.

Hedge fund activism

At the most assertive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism, when an investor, usually a hedge fund or other investor aligned with a hedge fund, seeks to effect a significant change in the company’s strategy.

Background

Some of these activists have been engaged in this type of activity for decades (e.g., Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz). In the 1980s, these activists frequently sought the breakup of the company—hence their frequent characterization as “corporate raiders.” These activists generally used their own money to obtain a large block of the company’s shares and engage in a proxy contest for control of the board.

In the 1990s, new funds entered this market niche (e.g., Ralph Whitworth’s Relational Investors, Robert Monks’ LENS Fund, John Paulson’s Paulson & Co., and Andrew Shapiro’s Lawndale Capital). These new funds raised money from other investors and used minority board representation (i.e., one or two board seats, rather than a board majority) to influence corporate strategy. While a company breakup was still one of the potential changes sought by these activists, many also sought new executive management, operational efficiencies, or financial restructuring.

Today

During the past decade, the number of activist hedge funds across the globe has dramatically increased, with total assets under management now exceeding $100 billion. Since 2003 (and through May 2014), 275 new activist hedge funds were launched.

Forty-one percent of today’s activist hedge funds focus their activities on North America, and 32% have a focus that spans across global regions. The others focus on specific regions: Asia (15%), Europe (8%), and other regions of the world (4%).

Why?

The goals of today’s activist hedge funds are broad, including all of those historically sought, as well as changes that fall within the category of “capital allocation strategy” (e.g., return of large amounts of reserved cash to investors through stock buybacks or dividends, revisions to the company’s acquisition strategy).

How?

The tactics of these newest activists are also evolving. Many are spending time talking to the company in an effort to negotiate consensus around specific changes intended to unlock value, before pursuing a proxy contest or other more “public” (e.g., media campaign) activities. They may also spend pre-announcement time talking to some of the company’s other shareholders to gauge receptivity to their contemplated changes. Lastly, these activists (along with the companies responding to them) are grappling with the potential impact of high-frequency traders on the identity of the shareholder base that is eligible to vote on proxy matters.

Some contend that hedge fund activism improves a company’s stock price (at least in the short term), operational performance, and other measures of share value (including more disciplined capital investments). Others contend that, over the long term, hedge fund activism increases the company’s share price volatility as well as its leverage, without measurable improvements around cash management or R&D spending.

…

When is a company likely to be the target of activism?

Although each hedge fund activist’s process for identifying targets is proprietary, most share certain broad similarities:

The company has a low market value relative to book value, but is profitable, generally has a well-regarded brand, and has sound operating cash flows and return on assets. Alternatively, the company’s cash reserves exceed both its own historic norms and those of its peers. This is a risk particularly when the market is unclear about the company’s rationale for the large reserve. For multi- business companies, activists are also alert for one or more of the company’s business lines or sectors that are significantly underperforming in its market.

Institutional investors own the vast majority of the company’s outstanding voting stock.

The company’s board composition does not meet all of today’s “best practice” expectations. For example, activists know that other investors may be more likely to support their efforts when the board is perceived as being “stale”—that is, the board has had few new directors over the past three to five years, and most of the existing directors have served for very long periods. Companies that have been repeatedly targeted by non-hedge fund activists are also attractive to some hedge funds who are alert to the cumulative impact of shareholder dissatisfaction.

A company is most likely to be a target of non-hedge fund activism based on a combination of the following factors:

How can a company effectively prepare for—and respond to—an activist campaign?

Prepare

We believe that companies that put themselves in the shoes of an activist will be most able to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to an activist campaign. In our view, there are four key steps that a company and its board should consider before an activist knocks on the door:

Critically evaluate all business lines and market regions. Some activists have reported that when they succeed in getting on a target’s board, one of the first things they notice is that the information the board has been receiving from management is often extremely voluminous and granular, and does not aggregate data in a way that highlights underperforming assets.

Companies (and boards) may want to reassess how the data they review is aggregated and presented. Are revenues and costs of each line of business (including R&D costs) and each market region clearly depicted, so that the P&L of each component of the business strategy can be critically assessed? This assessment should be undertaken in consideration of the possible impact on the company’s segment reporting, and in consultation with the company’s management and likely its independent auditor.

Monitor the company’s ownership and understand the activists. Companies routinely monitor their ownership base for significant shifts, but they may also want to ensure that they know whether activists (of any type) are current shareholders.

Understanding what these shareholders may seek (i.e., understanding their “playbook”) will help the company assess its risk of becoming a target.

Evaluate the “risk factors.” Knowing in advance how an activist might criticize a company allows a company and its board to consider whether to proactively address one or more of the risk factors, which in turn can strengthen its credibility with the company’s overall shareholder base. If multiple risk factors exist, the company can also reduce its risk by addressing just one or two of the higher risk factors.

Even if the company decides not to make any changes based on such an evaluation, going through the deliberative process will help enable company executives and directors to articulate why they believe staying the course is in the best long-term interests of the company and its investors.

Develop an engagement plan that is tailored to the company’s shareholders and the issues that the company faces. If a company identifies areas that may attract the attention of an activist, developing a plan to engage with its other shareholders around these topics can help prepare for—and in some cases may help to avoid—an activist campaign. This is true even if the company decides not to make any changes.

Activists typically expect to engage with both members of management and the board. Accordingly, the engagement plan should prepare for either circumstance.

Whether the company decides to make changes or not, explaining to the company’s most significant shareholders why decisions have been made will help these shareholders better understand how directors are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, strengthening their confidence that directors are acting in investors’ best long-term interests.

These communications are often most effective when the company has a history of ongoing engagement with its shareholders. Sometimes, depending on the company’s shareholder profile, the company may opt to defer actual execution of this plan until some future event occurs (e.g., an activist in fact approaches the company, or files a Schedule 13d with the SEC, which effectively announces its intent to seek one or more board seats). Preparing the plan, however, enables the company to act quickly when circumstances warrant.

Respond

In responding to an activist’s approach, consider the advice that large institutional investors have shared with us: good ideas can come from anyone. While there may be circumstances that call for more defensive responses to an activist’s campaign (e.g., litigation), in general, we believe the most effective response plans have three components:

Objectively consider the activist’s ideas. By the time an activist first approaches a company, the activist has usually already (a) developed specific proposals for unlocking value at the company, at least in the short term, and (b) discussed (and sometimes consequently revised) these ideas with a select few of the company’s shareholders. Even if these conversations have not occurred by the time the activist first approaches the company, they are likely to occur soon thereafter. The company’s institutional investors generally spend considerable time objectively evaluating the activist’s suggestion—and most investors expect that the company’s executive management and board will be similarly open- minded and deliberate.

Look for areas around which to build consensus. In 2013, 72 of the 90 US board seats won by activists were based on voluntary agreements with the company, rather than via a shareholder vote. This demonstrates that most targeted companies are finding ways to work with activists, avoiding the potentially high costs of proxy contests. Activists are also motivated to reach agreement if possible. If given the option, most activists would prefer to spend as little time as possible to achieve the changes they believe will enhance the value of their investment in the company. While they may continue to own company shares for extensive periods of time, being able to move their attention and energy to their next target helps to boost the returns to their own investors.

Actively engage with the company’s key shareholders to tell the company’s story. An activist will likely be engaging with fellow investors, so it’s important that key shareholders also hear from the company’s management and often the board. In the best case, the company already has established a level of credibility with those shareholders upon which new communications can build. If the company does not believe the activist’s proposed changes are in the best long-term interests of the company and its owners, investors will want to know why—and just as importantly, the process the company used to reach this conclusion. If the activist and company are able to reach an agreement, investors will want to hear that the executives and directors embrace the changes as good for the company. Company leaders that are able to demonstrate to investors that they were part of positive changes, rather than simply had changes thrust upon them, enhance investor confidence in their stewardship.

Epilogue—life after activism

When the activism has concluded—the annual meeting is over, changes have been implemented, or the hedge fund has moved its attention to another target—the risk of additional activism doesn’t go away. Depending on how the company has responded to the activism, the significance of any changes, and the perception of the board’s independence and open-mindedness, the company may again be targeted. Incorporating the “Prepare” analysis into the company’s ongoing processes, conducting periodic self-assessments for risk factors, and engaging in a tailored and focused shareholder engagement program can enhance the company’s resiliency, strengthening its long-term relationship with investors.

« Vous êtes devenus l’un d’entre eux » | 15 règles qu’un administrateur doit appliquer !

Voici un article qui rappelle les règles à suivre pour un administrateur siégeant sur le conseil d’une entreprise familiale, d’une entreprise privée de capital de risque, d’une entreprise gérée par les fondateurs ou toute autre combinaison de celles-ci. L’article a initialement été publié par Jim McHugh en mars 2015 dans Private Company Director Magazine.

Pour plusieurs administrateurs, le fait de prendre position en faveur de la direction, des propriétaires dirigeants ou du management en général peut constituer un manquement aux obligations de fiduciaire, surtout si la position adoptée est contraire à celle de certains autres administrateurs qui ont des intérêts à protéger !

L’incident relaté dans l’extrait suivant est assez révélateur …

You’ve become one of them.” That’s what a fellow Director (“MoneyGuy”) said to me after one of XYZ Company’s regular board meetings. MoneyGuy was from XYZ’s lead investor group and the majority shareholder. The ’them’ MoneyGuy was speaking about was XYZ’s management team. From his tone, I knew MoneyGuy wasn’t giving me a compliment; I was being admonished because I ‘sided with management’ about a particular matter that was pivotal to the future of the company.

What had I done wrong? To find the answer, you’ll need to read the following fifteen “rules” on how to work with owners.

Ce commentaire d’un collègue administrateur a incité Jim McHugh* à proposer quinze (15) règles de conduite dans des cas similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces règles et à ajouter votre grain de sel.

Bonne lecture !

« You’ve Become One of Them » | Fifteen Rules for Directors

Here are my fifteen rules :

1. Remember your role as a fiduciary. MoneyGuy knew I had a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, not just to him and his private equity firm. They put me on the Board to be ‘an outside, independent voice.’ Somehow that slipped his mind! This brings me to Rule #2…

2. Don’t be a rubber stamp. You can get rubber stamps at Staples. MoneyGuy or any other majority shareholder should realize that you are not on the Board just to be another automatic vote for them. Another Director friend told me: “There is a fine line to walk as an independent director when those sitting around the table own the company and you are effectively their invited guest.” If management knows you are truly independent and not there to throw them under the bus, this will help build trust with all.

3. Understand the owner’s expectations and their personal and financial goals. One owner told me: “I believe the most important consideration for an outside Director is to ensure the shareholders’ goals and desires are fully understood. Private company owners are likely to have a complex mix of primary and secondary goals that often change based on circumstances impacting their lives. Multiple shareholders might present further complications which need to be blended into the stew.”

4. Understand the owners’ personalities. This is different than #3. The particular personality style of the individual majority shareholder exerts a significant influence on the board and management.

5. Get to know the management team. Is the CEO and senior team strong-willed, weak or balanced? How well does the CEO work with the company’s owners? Being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the C-Suite will help you be a better coach to the owners.

6. Understand the culture of the company. Why? Because you and your other directors do have a role in shaping it and maintaining it by your actions.

7. Be consequential. Joe White used this term in his book Boards That Excel. One CEO/owner told me: “I want Directors that challenge me and bring perspective and skills I lack. I also want them to be well-grounded. The one thing my board has lacked is someone who is very knowledgeable about the specifics of my industry, but I think that has been outweighed by Directors with broad experience who see the big picture.”

8. Understand the business model and the industry. I had recently joined the Board of a company and we were discussing changes to the distribution channels. One Director said: “That’s not how we go to market now, is it?” He had been on the Board for over ten years and did not know one of the basic aspects of the business model!

9. Be a colleague, not an adversary. You are on the Board to give your opinion and offer advice, suggestions and ideas, not to advance your own career or agenda. I disagreed with MoneyGuy, but I wasn’t being disagreeable. No grandstanding, no pontificating allowed.

10. Don’t be timid about personally coaching or mentoring the owners. Even though they own the company, they may need advice on areas they are unfamiliar with. See #7.

11. Trust your gut. It’s ok to be a nudge (…and be Columbo-like). For those of you who are too young to know who Columbo was, Google him. Don’t allow the CEO and the team to stiff arm you or ignore your questions. Hopefully you have proved to the owners that your probing is done with good intentions.

12. Prepare for and attend the meetings. How obvious is this? Don’t be a no show or empty seat.

13. Participate. Be available to the owners not only at the Board meetings but also between the meetings. Encourage honest two-way communication and feedback.

14. Embrace and use technology. Just a pet peeve of mine…I’m tired of hearing about people being ‘too old’ to learn today’s communication technologies. The cloud is something more than moisture in the air.

15. Stay fresh. Owners don’t want ‘stale’, they deserve ‘fresh’.

None of this is complicated and these rules may seem pretty basic and just common sense to you. But if that’s the case, then why have I witnessed so many Directors who don’t follow these, who behave irrationally and/or who are ineffective with ownership?

___________________________________

Jim McHugh* is an Entrepreneur, Director, CEO Coach, Optimist, Instigator of Positive Change…and Fixer of Stuck Companies. CEOs, family owners, investors and Boards enlist Jim to be their ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and confidant.

Aux É.U., il est temps de favoriser le rapprochement entre les administrateurs et les actionnaires

Voici un excellent article paru dans la section Business du The New York Times du 28 mars 2015 qui porte sur les appréhensions, relativement injustifiées, des communications (engagement) entre les administrateurs et leurs actionnaires (en dehors des assemblées annuelles).

L’article évoque le manque de communication des Boards américains avec leurs actionnaires et avec les parties prenantes, contrairement à la situation qui prévaut du côté européen. Selon l’auteure, cette grande distance entre les administrateurs et les actionnaires mène aux insatisfactions croissantes de ceux-ci, et cela se reflète dans l’augmentation du nombre d’administrateurs n’obtenant pas le soutien requis lors des assemblées annuelles.

On le sait, les actionnaires des entreprises américaines souhaitent pouvoir faire inscrire leurs propositions dans les circulaires de procuration, notamment pour présenter des candidatures aux postes d’administrateurs.

En 2015, plusieurs grandes corporations américaines permettront l’accès des grands actionnaires à leurs circulaires de procuration (voir Les conséquences inattendues de l’accès des actionnaires à la circulaire de procuration lors de l’assemblée annuelle et Proxy Access Proposals: The Next Big Thing in Corporate Governance).

Il est donc temps de revoir le mode de communication entre les deux acteurs principaux et d’exposer les avantages à collaborer à la gouvernance de l’entreprise. Plusieurs pays européens donnent l’exemple à cet égard.

Ainsi, en Suède et en Norvège, les cinq (5) plus grands actionnaires d’une entreprise reçoivent des invitations à se joindre au comité de gouvernance et de nomination afin de choisir des administrateurs potentiels.

En Europe, les actionnaires ont plus de poids; ceux qui possèdent au moins 1 % de la propriété peuvent soumettre des candidatures pour les postes d’administrateurs. De plus, dans certains pays européens, contrairement à la situation américaine, les administrateurs doivent soumettre leurs démissions s’ils ne reçoivent pas un soutien majoritaire aux élections.

Voici une politique sur la communication du CA avec les investisseurs qui pourrait être envisagée; elle présente un certain nombre de sujets jugés appropriés :

(1) la rémunération de la direction,

(2) la structure des comités du conseil,

(3) le processus de planification de la relève,

(4) le rôle du CA dans la supervision de la stratégie.

Je suis assuré que vous trouverez cet article du NYT stimulant et engageant ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Bonne lecture !

At U.S. Companies, Time to Coax the Directors Into Talking

It’s shareholder meeting season again, corporate America’s version of Groundhog Day.

This is the time of year when company directors venture out of the boardroom to encounter the investors they have a duty to serve. After the meetings are over, like so many Punxsutawney Phils, these directors scurry back to their sheltered confines for another year.

This is a bit hyperbolic, of course. But institutional investors argue that there’s a troubling lack of interaction these days between many corporate boards in the United States and their most important investors. They point to contrasting practices in Europe as evidence that it’s time for this to change.

“It’s a very different culture in the U.S.,” said Deborah Gilshan, corporate governance counsel at RPMI Railpen Investments, the sixth-largest pension fund in Britain, which has 20 billion pounds, or about $30 billion, in assets. “In the U.K., we get lots of access to the companies we invest in. In fact, I’ve often wondered why a director wouldn’t want to know directly what a thoughtful shareholder thinks.”

As Ms. Gilshan indicated, directors at European companies routinely make themselves available for investor discussions; in some countries, such meetings are required. Many directors of foreign companies even — gasp — give shareholders their private email addresses and phone numbers.

Their counterparts in the United States seem fearful of such contact. Large shareholders say that some directors of American companies refuse to meet at all, preferring to let company officials speak for them.

…

Le rôle du président du conseil lors des réunions

Dans ce blogue, j’ai souvent rappelé le rôle fondamental du président du conseil dans le bon fonctionnement des réunions du CA mais aussi dans la mise en œuvre de règles de saine gouvernance.

L’article qui suit, publié par David Ferguson et Chuanchan Ma sur le site de l’Association of Corporate Counsel, insiste sur trois points importants eu égard au rôle légal du président du conseil d’administration (PCA) :

(1) Le comportement du président lors des rencontres du conseil;

(2) Le rôle du PCA eu égard aux règles de gouvernance;

« The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues ».

(3) L’autorité du président du conseil dans le processus de gouvernance.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article afin de mieux comprendre le rôle essentiel d’un président du conseil (PCA).

Bonne lecture !

Company meetings – tips and insights: the role of the chair

Introduction

The constitutions of most companies divide the corporate powers between the board of directors, which is usually given the power to manage the company’s business, and the members, who usually have the power to appoint and remove directors and change the constitution. The powers of the board and members are usually exercised through resolutions passed at a meeting.

This article considers the role of the chair in the context of meetings as well as the broad corporate governance role allocated to an individual director appointed to the role of chair of a public company. This reveals the increased expectations of the role while noting the limited formal powers of the chair.

The chair’s role in meetings

Courts have taken the view that, generally, a meeting can only take place with more than one participant.² This reflects the fact that “according to the ordinary usage of the English language” that it is not possible for a person to have a meeting with themselves. This is the case even though the one person present holds proxies for others.³ While exceptions to this general position have been identified to enable a meeting of a single holder of a class of shares4 , the general concept of a meeting contemplates discussion between the participants and, for this reason, courts have also held that a meeting of directors or shareholders cannot proceed without a chair.

This indispensable element of any meeting was recognized in Colorado Constructions Pty Ltd v Platus⁵ where Street J identified that the chair’s role included the setting of the order of business, nomination of the person entitled to speak, putting questions to the meeting, declaring resolutions carried or not carried and declaring the meeting closed. As noted in a subsequent case, “the essence of chairmanship is actually exercising procedural control over the meeting”.6

In carrying out this role, the chair is required to act impartially to ensure that the meeting operates in a fair manner. As observed by Young J in NAB v Market Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq)7 , citing National Dwelling Society v Sykes8:

It is the duty of the chairman, and his functions, to preserve order, and to take care that the proceedings are conducted in a proper manner, that the sense of the meeting is properly ascertained with regard to any question which is properly before the meeting.

The chair’s role in corporate governance

Most public company constitutions provide that the board of directors will elect one of their number to act as chair and that the person elected also acts as chair of general meetings. While the position of chair could be filled on an ad hoc basis, there is a broader corporate governance significance to the role that the chair of a public company plays. This is reflected in the following excerpt from commentary to Recommendation 2.5 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations:

The chair of the board is responsible for leading the board, facilitating the effective contribution of all directors and promoting constructive and respectful relations between directors and between the board and management. The chair is also responsible for setting the board’s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues.

Accordingly, the role of chair in a public company is usually attributed special status and additional remuneration. Although the position can be carried out in different individual styles, the chair often acts as spokesperson for the company on high level matters and usually plays an important link between the board and management of the company. It is worth noting that the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations also express the view that the chair should be a non-executive role so as to separate the chair’s role from that of the chief executive officer and the executive management team. This article has been formulated on the assumption that the chair is a nonexecutive director, but a fuller discussion of this issue is beyond its scope.

The allocation of a broader corporate governance role has been recognised as potentially giving rise to a more extensive duty of care and diligence on the part of the chair. As noted by Austin J in reflecting on the duties of the chair of the board of One.Tel Limited:9

The court’s role, in determining liability of a defendant for his conduct as company chairman, is to articulate and apply a standard of care that reflects contemporary community expectations.

Austin J further noted that it is now commonplace to observe that the standard of care expected of company directors, both by the common law (including equity) and under statutory provisions, has been raised over the last century or so, and that “[o]ne might correspondingly expect that the standard for company chairmen has also been raised”.10

The individual requirements of the standard of care owed by the chair of a public company will depend on the allocation of corporate governance roles and responsibilities within the company and the skills and experience of the individual person carrying out the role of chair.11 In this respect, the responsibilities of the chair are not limited to delegated tasks but include the responsibilities with which the chair is entrusted by reason of his or her expertise and experience.12

The authority of the chair

Despite the essential nature of the chair’s role in the context of meetings and the elevated duty of care and diligence that may be attributed to the chair’s role within public companies, a person appointed to that role does not have authority, merely by virtue of that office, to make decisions binding on the company or to give binding directions.13 The board makes its decisions by resolutions which are carried or lost depending on a majority vote. Accordingly, unless the board has delegated powers, the chair has no more power to carry out matters on behalf of a company than any other individual non-executive director.

The chair’s authority in the context of meetings is more robust. Constitutions typically provide that the chair is elected by the board of directors and, in some cases, provide that the chair has a casting vote at meetings of directors and members. Consistent with his or her role in regulating meetings, constitutions also usually provide that the chair of a general meeting can require a vote to be taken by way of a poll and empower the chair to make certain rulings at the meeting.14 Where a company’s constitution provides that rulings by the chair on certain matters are final and the chair makes a ruling on those matters in good faith, there is no right in the meeting to challenge the ruling, although it could be overturned by a court in appropriate circumstances. Even if a decision is made by the chair in connection with the proper conduct of a meeting that does not have the protection of an express constitutional provision, courts have indicated that the decision should be regarded as correct unless the contrary is proved by a person objecting to it.15

If the chair has a casting vote at a meeting, that right must be exercised “honestly and in accordance with what (the chair) believes to be the best interests of those who may be affected by the vote”. Subject to this, the chair is entitled to exercise the casting vote as he or she thinks fit.16 While there has been a view that, because the chair has a duty to maintain impartiality, a casting vote should be used to maintain the status quo so as to allow further discussion of the relevant matter, it is doubtful that this general proposition exists.17

A number of provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) also recognize the special status of the chair’s role in meetings. For example, the Corporations Act acknowledges that the chair often receives multiple proxy appointments and therefore imposes an obligation on the chair to vote as proxy on a poll.18 It also gives greater scope for the chair, as compared to other directors, to vote proxies in connection with directors’ remuneration.

Un guide des pratiques de gouvernance dans l’Union Européenne (EU)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un guide complet des pratiques de gouvernance relatives aux entreprises de l’Union Européenne.

Il n’y a pas de version française de ce document à ce stade-ci. J’ai cependant demandé à ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) si un guide en français était en préparation. Toute personne intéressée par la gouvernance européenne trouvera ici un excellent outil d’information.

Bonne lecture !

This publication has been produced in collaboration with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa) primarily aimed at ecoDa’s membership and for supporting IFC’s work in surrounding regions with countries aspiring to understand and follow rules, standards and practices applied in the EU countries but which may be of wider relevance and interest to practitioners, policy makers, development finance institutions, investors, board directors, business reporters, and others.

A Guide to Corporate Governance Practices in the European Union

The purpose of this publication is twofold: to describe the corporate governance framework within the European Union and to highlight good European governance practices. It focuses on the particular aspects of European governance practices that distinguish this region from other parts of the world.

In addition to providing a useful source of reference, this guide is designed to be relevant to anyone interested in the evolving debate about European corporate governance. It should be of particular interest to the following parties:

Policymakers and corporate governance specialists, to assist in the identification of good practices among the member states. Improvements in corporate governance practices in a country may attract foreign direct investment.

Directors of listed and unlisted companies, to inspire them to look again at their ways of working.

Directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to assist in improving corporate governance practices prior to selling off state assets.

Bankers, to assist in the identification of good corporate governance practices to inform their lending and investing practices.

Staff within development financial institutions, to assist in the identification of good corporate

Proxy advisors and legal advisors, to assist in the identification of corporate governance compliance issues.

Investors, shareholders, stock brokers, and investment advisors, to assist in the identification of good practices in investor engagement and activism.

Senior company management, to assist in the identification of good relationship-management practices with boards of directors.

Journalists and academics within business schools, who are interested in good corporate governance practices.

Private sector and public sector stakeholders from the EU candidate and potential candidate countries in their preparation for eventual accession. Geographical areas of potential readership may include the following in particular:

The 18 Eurozone countries (listed in Appendix A);

The 28 EU member states (Appendix B);

The five EU candidate countries (Appendix C);

The three potential candidate countries

The 47 European Council Countries (Appendix E); and

Emerging markets and others seeking to increase trade or attract investment with European countries.

Les conséquences inattendues de l’accès des actionnaires à la circulaire de procuration lors de l’assemblée annuelle

Cet article est publié par David A. Katz associé de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les questions de fusions et acquisitions ainsi que dans les transactions boursières complexes. Cet article a été publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

L’auteur explique les conséquences inattendues du processus utilisé par les entreprises cotées eu égard à la modification de leurs règlements internes afin de permettre l’inscription des propositions de certains actionnaires dans les circulaires de procuration.

L’on sait que, dans le passé, il y avait beaucoup de réticence à permettre aux actionnaires de soumettre des propositions lors des assemblées annuelles et à proposer des candidatures aux postes d’administrateurs, une initiative réservée au comité de gouvernance.

Cependant, à la suite d’intenses pressions des activistes, plusieurs entreprises ont accepté de soumettre au vote de leurs actionnaires une proposition autorisant les actionnaires majeurs à proposer des administrateurs désignés. Il semble qu’il ne reste que le pourcentage de propriété qui soit en suspend à ce moment-ci : 3% ou 5%.

L’auteur discute des difficultés que ces changements pourraient engendrer, notamment le gaspillage de ressources organisationnelles, les manquements au devoir de fiduciaire, l’isolation des administrateurs désignés, les dysfonctions du CA, les tensions au sein du conseil, etc.

L’auteur fait un bon résumé des conséquences négatives éventuelles pour la gouvernance des sociétés. Je vous invite également à lire l’article paru sur le blogue du Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy : Proxy Access Proposals: The Next Big Thing in Corporate Governance. Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ?

Je vous encourage à lire l’extrait ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The Unintended Consequences of Proxy Access Elections

It’s official: Proxy access is the darling of the 2015 season. Shareholder-sponsored proxy access proposals are on the ballots of more than 100 U.S. public companies this spring. These precatory proposals seek a shareholder vote on a binding bylaw that would enable shareholders who meet certain ownership requirements to nominate board candidates and have them included in the company’s own proxy materials.

Powerful institutional investors have given the proxy access movement enormous momentum this spring, and blue chip firms such as GE, Bank of America, and Prudential have voluntarily adopted versions of proxy access in advance of their annual meetings. Companies such as Citigroup have agreed to support proxy access shareholder proposals in their definitive proxy materials. In the absence of regulatory guidance, proxy advisors such as ISS have stepped into the breach to define the terms and conditions of proxy access. As proxy access proposals proliferate—after years of controversy—the primary debate now seems to be whether a 3 percent or 5 percent ownership threshold is more appropriate.

….

Unintended Consequences

The detrimental consequences of proxy access fall into three general categories. First, there are those that occur before and during the proxy solicitation period. These include waste of corporate resources, negative publicity, the impairment of a company’s ability to attract qualified candidates to stand for election as a director, and the undermining of the company’s nominating committee and board leadership. Proxy access could cause tension among shareholders, particularly large shareholders, who disagree in public or private over whether to nominate candidates for inclusion in the proxy, and if so, which ones. It also could cause internal controversy for large shareholders; institutional investors or pension funds, for example, may find themselves pressured by certain constituencies (such as unions) to participate in proxy access for political reasons, while other constituencies support the current board’s direction on substantive grounds. The instability caused by proxy access—like that created by proxy fights—could create significant disruption in a business, as executives, managers, and employees struggle with fear and uncertainty about the future. Damaging effects on hiring, long-range planning, and employee retention can cause lasting harm to a corporation regardless of the election results.

Second, there are those consequences that relate to the composition of the board. Were proxy access to become widespread and effective, a board could become unable to ensure that it would have the necessary expertise (such as the audit committee financial expert mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or industry specialists) or make progress toward a desired diversity of skills, genders, and backgrounds. Moreover, it could create the potential for distrust and a lack of collegiality that would reduce the board’s effectiveness and distract the company’s management, and it would increase the likelihood of politicization and balkanization of directors into factions with different goals.

Third, there are those consequences that relate to the board’s ability to fulfill its legal duties and obligations. Proxy access directors would owe a duty of loyalty to all shareholders under Delaware law—as all directors do—yet they might feel themselves to be—or be expected or viewed by others to be—beholden to the particular shareholder group that nominated them and pushed for their election. In conjunction with the paramount issue of loyalty, questions of confidentiality, transparency, board committee structure, and board dynamics could arise. Complications familiar from the constituency/blockholder director context likely would be exacerbated if sponsored directors were to reach the board through proxy access. Boards would be addressing these issues in a context of significant uncertainty, both as to the legal questions of fiduciary duty and as to the factual questions of a proxy access director’s allegiance.

If proxy access directors are elected in any meaningful number, boards will be contending with an array of complications that have the potential to impair board functioning in ways that the current debate has not addressed. As the popularity of proxy access reaches a high-water mark this season, shareholders should consider carefully whether they really want what proxy access proponents are asking for. If not, now is the time for them to say so.

Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains présidents et chefs de direction (PCD) | En reprise

Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.

C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.

L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.

La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes.

La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.

Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études.

Bonne lecture !

In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.

In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…

The Dark Side of Executive Narcissism: How CEOs Destroy Companies’ Reputation and Employee Morale

If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:

The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.

La juste rémunération des hauts dirigeants d’une OBNL : une tâche délicate !

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article très intéressant d’Alice Korngold dans Huff Post – Canada, sur un sujet brûlant ! L’auteure montre les facettes positives et négatives de l’établissement d’une rémunération « juste et raisonnable » dans le contexte des OBNL américaines.

Elle propose une démarche logique pour assurer l’intégrité du processus.

Bonne lecture !

Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector: Getting It Right

« In fact, one of the most important things that nonprofit boards can do to strengthen the organizations that they govern is to get the salaries right for the CEOs of their nonprofits.
What does it mean to get compensation right? And why does it matter so much?

Getting it right is called « fair and reasonable » by the IRS. It’s what the law requires, it’s what any CEO wants, and it’s what any donor and member of the public expects ».

Qualités managériales recherchées par les conseils d’administration | Entrevue avec le PCD de Korn/Ferry

Voici un article qui met en exergue les qualités que les conseils d’administration veulent voir chez les futurs membres de la haute direction.

L’article, écrit par Lauren Weber dans les pages du The Wall Street Journal, relate un extrait de l’entrevue avec Gary Burnison, PCD de Korn/Ferry International, à propos de la recherche de talents en management à l’échelle internationale.

Le marché de la recherche des meilleurs talents de gestionnaires est en pleine expansion; il représente un marché d’environ 20 Milliards.

Toutes les grandes firmes font affaires avec des entreprises spécialisées dans la recherche des meilleurs talents, dans l’évaluation de ces derniers ainsi que dans leur rétention. De grandes firmes comme Korn/Ferry International possèdent des banques de données très à jour sur les carrières des hauts dirigeants ainsi que des outils de recherche à la fine pointe.

On est donc intéressé à connaître le point de vue du président et chef de la direction de la plus grande entreprise (1 Milliard par année) sur la croissance du marché et sur les qualités des candidatures recherchées.

On y apprend que les C.A. sont préoccupés par la plus grande diversité possible, par des candidats qui sont constamment en processus d’apprentissage, qui possèdent plusieurs réseaux d’affaires, qui savent bien s’entourer et qui ont fait leurs preuves dans des situations de gestion similaires. Le partenaire stratégique du PCD doit être le V-P Ressources humaines … et non le V-P Finance.

Je vous invite à lire l’extrait ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Korn/Ferry’s CEO: What Boards Want in Exécutives

WSJ: Your executive-search business was up in the first quarter by 9%. Are companies investing in growth, or are they mostly replacing people who leave?

Mr. Burnison: Industries like health care, technology and energy are going through massive change, and it’s going to continue for the foreseeable future. That creates a need for new positions, whether it’s about delivering health care remotely or finding new ways to tap people instantaneously through social media. Those needs didn’t exist a decade ago.

WSJ: Executive search seems like an old-fashioned, Rolodex business. Are LinkedIn and other social-networking tools going to make it obsolete?

Mr. Burnison: CEOs are in this mad fight for growth and relevancy, so they’re paying us not for finding people, but for finding out who people are. You can go lots of places to find people. But you’re going to want somebody to answer, “Okay, but what is this person really like? What do others really say about them?”

WSJ: How do you answer those questions?

Mr. Burnison: For the boardroom or the C-suite, the technical competencies are a starting point. What we’ve seen through our research is that the No. 1 predictor of executive success is learning agility. So we want to get a real line of sight into a person’s thinking style and leadership style. Right now, you’re seeing me how I want you to see me. What you really want to know is “How does Gary make decisions under pressure?”

WSJ: What is learning agility?

Mr. Burnison: It comes down to people’s willingness to grow, to learn, to have insatiable curiosity. Think about the levers of growth that a CEO has. You can consolidate, or tap [new markets], or innovate. When it comes down to the last two, particularly innovation, you want a workforce that is incredibly curious.

WSJ: What are companies getting wrong today about managing their employees?

Mr. Burnison: There’s this gap between what [executives] say and how they invest in people’s careers. They spend an enormous amount on development and performance management, but it’s not well spent.

WSJ: Where are they investing poorly in talent?

Mr. Burnison: They should be asking, how do you develop people in their careers? How do you extend the life of an employee? This is not an environment where you work for an organization for 20 years. But if you can extend it from three years to six years; that has enormous impact. [Turnover] is a huge hidden cost in a profit-and-loss statement that nobody ever focuses on. If there was a line item that showed that, I guarantee you’d have the attention of a CEO.

WSJ: Why aren’t CEOs focused on turnover?

Mr. Burnison: A CEO only has an average tenure today of five years. You have 20 quarters to show that you have a winning team. There is a trade-off between knowing in your heart that you’ve got to empower people, you’ve got to develop them. But then there’s the other side, that says, “Oh, my gosh. I’ve got to win this next game.”

WSJ: How should leaders look beyond the short-term horizon?

Mr. Burnison: The strategic partner to the CEO should be the CHRO [chief human-resources officer] in almost any organization. It shouldn’t be the CFO. The person that is responsible for people should be the biggest lever that a CEO can pull. Too often, it’s not.

WSJ: You’ve been CEO for seven years. Is the clock ticking?

Mr. Burnison: We’re all by definition “on the clock.” However, that ticking clock should never impede the journey. I am having a lot of fun and there is still an enormous amount of work to be done.

WSJ: You’re pushing to create more management products for companies. Why, and what are they?

Mr. Burnison: People are hard to scale. [Products are] very easy to scale. It’s going to be based on predictors of success. By culture, by industry, by function, around the world. It could be a program for how we assess and develop people. It could be licensing a piece of content around onboarding or hiring. Candidates could take an online assessment. You would get feedback and you could license our interviewing technology to say, “With this person, you may want to probe this area and this area when you’re interviewing them.”

WSJ: What do your search clients ask for most often?

Mr. Burnison: The No. 1 request we get in the search business is diversity. Diversity in thought. Diversity in backgrounds. Diversity, yes, in gender. Diversity yes, in race. Diversity, yes in terms of cultural upbringing. That’s got serious legs.

Recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis pour la votation aux assemblées annuelles de 2015 | En rappel

Quelles sont les avis émis par les firmes conseil en votation qui servent à évaluer la qualité de la gouvernance des entreprises cotées ? Quels sont les facteurs pris en compte par les actionnaires, les investisseurs institutionnels et les Hedge Funds pour juger de la gouvernance et de la performance globale des sociétés, et pour voter lors des assemblées annuelles des actionnaires ?

Cet article, publié dans Lexology, en collaboration avec l’association des juristes corporatifs, a été rédigé par Dykema Gossett, Robert Murphy, Mark A. Metz et D. Richard McDonald. Les auteurs présentent les recommandations des firmes ISS et Glass Lewis eu égard à des sujets chauds en gouvernance.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance des mises à jour fournies par ces deux firmes-conseil et accessibles à tous les actionnaires, notamment les recommandations relatives à l’indépendance des présidents de conseils d’administration.

Bonne lecture !

ISS and Gass Lewis proxy voting policy updates for the 2015 proxy season

The proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, recently announced updates to their respective voting policies for domestic companies for the upcoming 2015 proxy season. These two firms have risen to prominence in recent years, wielding significant power in corporate governance matters, proxy fights and takeover votes. Hedge funds, mutual fund complexes, institutional investors and similar organizations that own shares of multiple companies pay ISS and Glass Lewis to advise them regarding shareholder votes.

The ISS and Glass Lewis policy updates are effective for annual meetings on or after February 1, 2015, and January 1, 2015, respectively. For your convenience, we have summarized below the most important updates relating to corporate governance matters.

Independent Board Chairs

The most notable ISS policy change relates to shareholder proposals that seek to separate the chairman and chief executive officer positions. For the 2015 proxy season, ISS is adding new governance, board leadership and performance factors to its current analytical framework. In this regard, ISS’s policy will continue to generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” independent chair shareholder proposals after consideration in a “holistic manner” of the following factors:

– Scope of the Proposal: Whether the shareholder proposal is binding or merely a recommendation and whether it seeks an immediate change in the chairman role or can be implemented at the next CEO transition.

– Company’s Current Board Leadership Structure: The presence of an executive or non-independent chairman in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chairman, and/or a departure from a structure with an independent chairman.

– Company’s Governance Structure: The overall independence of the board, the independence of key committees, the establishment of governance guidelines, as well as board tenure and its relationship to CEO tenure.

– Company’s Governance Practices: Problematic governance or management issues such as poor compensation practices, material failures of governance and risk oversight, related party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk will be reviewed as well as corporate or management scandals and actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.

– Company Performance: One-, three- and five-year total shareholder return compared to the company’s peers and the market as a whole.

In view of its new holistic approach in evaluating these types of shareholder proposals, ISS indicates that a “For” or “Against” recommendation will not be determined by any single factor, but that it will consider all positive and negative aspects of the company based on the new expanded list of factors when assessing these proposals.

Glass Lewis generally does not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board of directors, but it encourages clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever the issue arises in a proxy statement.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments

ISS and Glass Lewis have adopted new policies pursuant to which they will generally issue negative vote recommendations against directors if the board amends the bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholder rights or otherwise impedes shareholder ability to exercise their rights (“Unilateral Amendments”).

Under the updated policy, if the board adopts a Unilateral Amendment, ISS will generally make a recommendation for an “against” or “withhold” vote on a director individually, the members of a board committee or the entire board (other than new nominees on a case-by-case basis), after considering the following nine factors, as applicable:

– the board’s rationale for adopting the Unilateral Amendment;

– disclosure by the issuer of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the Unilateral Amendment;

– the level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the Unilateral Amendment;

– the board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw and charter amendments and other entrenchment provisions;

– the issuer’s ownership structure;

– the issuer’s existing governance provisions;

– whether the Unilateral Amendment was made prior to or in connection with the issuer’s IPO;

– the timing of the Unilateral Amendment in connection with a significant business development; and

– other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to the determination of the impact of the Unilateral Amendment on shareholders.

Glass Lewis has revised its policy to provide that, depending on the circumstances, it will recommend that shareholders vote “against” the chairman of the board’s governance committee, or the entire committee, in instances where a board has amended the company’s governing documents, without shareholder approval, to “reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right” such as:

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent;

– an increase to the ownership threshold required by shareholders to call a special meeting;

– an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments;

– the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse (e.g., bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or “fee-shifting” bylaws);

– the adoption of a classified board structure; and

– the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Equity Plan Proposals

Of particular importance to management are the revised ISS and Glass Lewis policies pertaining to their voting recommendations on company proposals seeking shareholder approval of equity compensation plans. Equity compensation of management remains a central focus of many institutional investors and shareholder activists.

For 2015, ISS adopted a new “scorecard” model, referred to as Equity Plan Scorecard (“EPSC”), that considers a range of positive and negative factors in evaluating equity incentive plan proposals, rather than the current six pass/fail tests focused on cost and certain egregious practices to evaluate such proposals. The total EPSC score will generally determine whether ISS recommends “for” or “against” the proposal.

Under its new policy, ISS will evaluate equity-based compensation plans on a case-by-case basis depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, as evaluated by the EPSC factors. The EPSC factors will fall under the following three categories (“EPSC Pillars”):

– Plan Cost (45 percent weighting): The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers. ISS will measure plan cost by using ISS’s Value Transfer Model (SVT) for the company in relation to its peers. The SVT calculation assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors.

– Plan Features (20 percent weighting): The presence or absence of provisions in the plan providing for (i) automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control; (ii) discretionary vesting authority; (iii) liberal share recycling on various award types; and (iv) minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan.

– Grant Practices (35 percent weighting): The issuer’s recent grant practices under the proposed plan and all other plans including (i) the company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; (ii) vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (three-year lookback); (iii) the estimated duration of the plan based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years; (iv) the proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions; (v) whether the company maintains a clawback policy; and (vi) whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

In its updated voting policy, ISS will generally recommend voting “against” the plan proposal if the combination of the factors listed above in the EPSC Pillars indicates that the plan is not, overall, in the shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:

– awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

– the plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of prepricing – for non-listed companies);

– the plan is a vehicle for “problematic pay practices” or a “pay-for-performance disconnect;” or

– any other plan features are determined to have a “significant negative impact on shareholder interests.”

Political Contributions

In recent years, many issuers have received shareholder proposals seeking reports or other disclosure regarding political contributions, including lobbying and political activities. Under the updated policy on political contribution shareholder proposals, ISS will generally recommend that shareholders vote “for” proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, after considering:

– the company’s policies as well as management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

– the company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups where it makes political contributions; and

– recent significant controversies, fines or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Practical Considerations

Despite the policy changes discussed above, public companies should continue to tailor their individual governance policies with a view towards what is in the long-term best interests of their own shareholders as opposed to meeting the ISS and Glass Lewis guidelines. ISS notes that its 2015 policy is intended to address the recent substantial increase in bylaw/charter amendments that adversely impact shareholder rights without being subject to a shareholder vote. Companies that intend to adopt any corporate governance policies that adversely impact shareholder rights should consider seeking shareholder support before implementing such policies, if a negative ISS or Glass Lewis recommendation on re-election of directors is likely to have a material effect on the election.

Companies should review last year’s proxy compensation and governance disclosures in order to make improvements in this year’s disclosures where appropriate – particularly if the company has received comments on this disclosure from the SEC staff. The failure to address a previous year’s staff comment may provoke a more detailed review by the staff, with its attendant time delays, should it be noticed during the staff’s initial screening of the filing.

Companies should also review their corporate governance and compensation practices for potential vulnerabilities under ISS’ policy updates, such as equity compensation plans that may be up for a vote at the next annual meeting or an independent chair shareholder proposal, and decide what action, if any, to take in light of this assessment.

Companies should continue a regular dialogue with key investors, bearing in mind limitations imposed by the SEC on proxy solicitations. Shareholder engagement efforts should continue to focus on what shareholders’ greatest concerns are and the rationale for board action.

Formation en gouvernance pour les nouveaux administrateurs | Un prérequis ?

La formation en gouvernance est de plus en plus un préalable à l’exercice du rôle d’administrateur de sociétés. L’article retenu montre que l’apprentissage sur le tas est en voie de disparition dans les conseils d’administration de grandes sociétés. La formation préparatoire peut prendre différentes formes : training sur mesure, coaching, séminaires, etc.

Cependant, il semble de plus en plus évident que les programme de formation en gouvernance (tels que IoD, C.dir., ASC, IAS) menant à une certification reconnue, constituent la voie à suivre dans le futur.

L’article de Hannah Prevett, paru dans le Sunday Times, montre que les formations organisées sont de meilleurs endroits pour un apprentissage de qualité que les tables de conseils d’administration… Bonne lecture !

Soirée de remise des diplômes de la promotion 2014 — Diplômés ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés 2014

A head start for novices

The received wisdom is that new directors learn on the job. If they are not equipped with the necessary skills when they accept their first board appointment, they will need to be quick on the uptake.

Not any more: the tidal wave of new governance requirements means it is not good enough to acquire expertise over time. And, as a result, many prospective boardroom stars are seeking training to help them do the job they’re paid to do from day one. When Alan Kay learnt he was to join the executive board of Costain in 2003, he immediately began considering how to prepare for his new role at the engineering and construction group.

“A lot of people haven’t really thought about how to prepare for a board role. [They think] it’s something that happens naturally: you get on the board and then you think, I’m going to learn on the job,” said Kay, who is Costain’s technical and operations director. “But once you’re appointed, becoming competent and learning as you go takes several months, which is not ideal.”

He researched training options for new board members and came across the Institute of Directors’ accredited programmes, including the certificate and diploma in company direction. The IoD fills 6,000 places on such courses annually with representatives of both large and small organisations — not all of them young guns, as Roger Barker, head of corporate governance at the IoD, explained.

“The directors of large organisations were reluctant to undertake any form of formalised director training. These were typically seasoned former executives, with extensive experience of serving on boards as chief executives or chief financial officers. It has been difficult to persuade such individuals that director training is relevant to them,” said Barker.

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* En reprise

« McKinsey research suggests that the most effective directors are meeting these challenges by spending twice as many days a year on board activities as other directors do« .

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More than three-fourths of the investors we spoke with believe companies are not doing a good job of explaining why they have the right directors in the boardroom.

Room for improvement in making the case for board composition

Three ways companies can enhance board composition disclosures

Views vary on mechanisms to trigger board renewal

Conclusion

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INDUSTRIE

MAJORITAIRE

FAMILLES

PHILANTHROPIE

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

GOUVERNANCE

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

LONG TERME

TROISIÈME VOIE

EFFICACITÉ

*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

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1. Determine the board’s preferred oversight model

2. Develop a stated approach to risk management

3. Assess board capabilities and effectiveness, reviewing for bias and groupthink

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Summary and Key Findings

Cash Compensation

Equity and Cash Compensation Mix

Equity Grant Design

Board Leadership Compensation

Stock Ownership Guidelines and Requirements

Contemporary Best Practices

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Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

Effective Governance

Strong Financial Oversight

Responsible Fundraising

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Première Grande soirée de la gouvernance Les Affaires

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Who are today’s activists and what do they want?

Shareholder activism Spectrum

Hedge fund activism

Background

Today

Why?

How?

When is a company likely to be the target of activism?

How can a company effectively prepare for—and respond to—an activist campaign?

Prepare

Respond

Epilogue—life after activism

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Here are my fifteen rules :

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Articles d’intérêt reliés au thème de la formation en gouvernance

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