En rappel | Le C.A. doit clarifier les rôles de chef de la conformité (CCO) et de chef des affaires juridiques (General Counsel)

On note une ambigüité de rôle croissante entre les fonctions de chef de la conformité (CCO) et de chef du contentieux (General Counsel). Cet article de Michael W. Peregrine, associé de la firme McDermott Will & Emery vise à souligner les responsabilités réciproques de chaque poste ainsi qu’à montrer que celles-ci ont intérêt à être mieux définies afin d’éviter les risques de conflits associés à leur exécution.

L’auteur suggère que le rôle de chef de la conformité prend une place de plus en plus prépondérante dans la structure des organisations, en vertu du caractère « d’indépendance » rattaché à cette fonction. Les deux postes doivent donc être dissociés, le chef du contentieux se rapportant au PDG et le chef de la conformité se rapportant au conseil d’administration !

L’article insiste sur une meilleure description de ces deux postes et sur le rôle que doit jouer le conseil d’administration à cet égard.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article paru sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance afin de mieux connaître la nature des arguments invoqués. Bonne lecture !

Compliance or Legal? The Board’s Duty to Assure Clarity

Key Developments

Government Positions. The first, and perhaps most pronounced, of these developments has been efforts of the federal government to encourage (and, in some cases, to require) that the positions of compliance officer and general counsel be separate organizational positions held by separate officers; that the compliance officer not report to the general counsel; and that the compliance officer have a direct reporting relationship to the governing board.

There also appears to be a clear trend—while certainly not universal—among many corporations to follow the government’s lead and adopt the “separate relationship” structure, for a variety of valid and appropriate reasons. Yet, the focus on compliance officer “independence” obscures the need for compliance programs to have leadership from, coordination of or other connection to, the general counsel.

Another concern arises from the (dubious) perspective that the compliance officer should not have a reporting relationship to the general counsel. One of the underlying premises here is that the general counsel somehow has at least a potential, if not actual, conflict of interest with respect to advice that the compliance officer may provide to management or the board. However, this perspective ignores critical professional responsibility obligations of the general counsel (e.g., Rules 1.6, 1.7 and 1.13).

The third, and potentially most significant of these potential concerns relates to the preservation of the attorney-client privilege when the chief compliance officer is not the general counsel. In a recent published article, a leading corporate lawyer argues persuasively that the forced separation of the compliance and legal functions jeopardizes the ability to preserve the privilege in connection with corporate compliance based investigations.

Corporate Guardian. A second, and more subtle, development has been a series of public comments by compliance industry thought leaders suggesting that the role of “guardian of the corporate reputation” is exclusively reserved for the corporate compliance officer; that the compliance officer is the organizational “subject matter expert” for ethics and culture, as well as compliance. This “jurisdictional claim” appears to be premised on the questionable perspective that “lawyers tell you whether you can do something, and compliance tells you whether you should”.

This perspective ignores the extent to which the general counsel is specifically empowered to provide such advice by virtue of the rules of professional responsibility; principally Rule 2.1 (“Advisor”). It is also contrary to long standing public discourse that frames the lawyer’s role as a primary guardian of the organizational reputation. For example, the estimable Ben Heineman, Jr. has described the role of the general counsel as the “lawyer-statesman”, the essence of which is the responsibility to “move beyond the first question—‘is it legal?’—to the ultimate question—‘is it right?’”

Job Descriptions. The third significant development is efforts by compliance industry commentators to extend the portfolio of the CCO, to a point where it appears to conflict with the expanding role of the general counsel. As one prominent compliance authority states, “The CCO mandate is ambitious, broad, and complex; no less than to oversee the organization’s ability to ‘prevent and detect misconduct’”.

This point of view is being used to justify greater compliance officer involvement in matters such as internal investigations, corporate governance, conflict of interest resolution, the development of codes of ethics, and similar areas of organizational administration.

The debate over roles and responsibilities is exacerbated by the extent to which the term “compliance” continuously appears in the public milieu in the form of “shorthand”. In this way, the term appears to reference some sort of broad organizational commitment to adherence with applicable law; i.e., more as a state of corporate consciousness than as an executive-level job description. To the extent that “compliance” is used loosely in the business and governance media, it serves to confuse corporate leadership about the real distinctions between accepted legal and compliance components.

Expansive definitions of the compliance function are also at odds with new surveys that depict the expanding organizational prominence of the general counsel. These new surveys lend empirical support to the view that the general counsel of a sophisticated enterprise (such as a health care system) has highly consequential responsibilities, and thus should occupy a position of hierarchical importance within the organization.

The Board’s Role

As developments cause the roles and responsibilities of the compliance officer and the general counsel to become increasingly blurred, the board has an obligation to establish clarity and reduce the potential for organizational risk. The failure to clearly delineate the respective duties of these key corporate officers can create administrative waste and inefficiency; increase internal confusion and tension; jeopardize application of the attorney-client privilege, and “draw false distinctions between organizational and legal risk”.

An effective board response would certainly include directing the compliance officer and general counsel, with the support of the CEO and outside advisors, to prepare for board consideration a set of mutually acceptable job descriptions for their respective positions. This would include a confirmation of the board reporting rights of both officers. It would also include the preparation of a detailed communication protocol that would address important GC/CCO coordination issues.

The perceptive board may also wish to explore, with the support of external advisors, the very sensitive core issues associated with compliance officer independence, and with the hierarchical position of the compliance officer; i.e., should that position be placed in the corporate hierarchy on an equal footing with the corporate legal function, or in some subordinate or other supporting role.

The board can and should be assertive in adopting measures that support the presence of a vibrant, effective compliance program that teams productively with the general counsel.

La sauvegarde des grands principes de gouvernance : le mirage du changement | En rappel

Voici un article qui présente la conduite des actionnaires activistes comme relativement symbolique, c’est-à-dire exempte de véritables enjeux critiques, paru récemment sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Les auteurs Marcel Kahan et Edward Rock, professeurs de droit des affaires à l’Université de Pennsylvanie, ont observé que l’ensemble des positions des différents acteurs (actionnaires, activistes, administrateurs, dirigeants …) renforcent les grands principes de la gouvernance corporative en limitant les effets trop drastiques de leurs actions, tout en préservant l’intérêt des principaux protagonistes.

Les revendications des activistes, du point de vue de la gouvernance, sont largement symboliques et ont pour résultats la préservation de la primauté d’une « gouvernance orientée vers les intérêts des actionnaires », une gouvernance qui met l’accent sur les besoins des actionnaires.

La synthèse de l’article est présentée clairement au dernier paragraphe du texte ci-dessous. Quel est votre opinion à ce sujet ?

Croyez-vous que les manœuvres des activistes et des dirigeants donnent lieu à peu de changements significatifs et que celles-ci consistent surtout à renforcer le point de vue d’une gouvernance centrée sur le pouvoir des actionnaires plutôt que sur le pouvoir du conseil d’administration ?

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics

Corporate governance politics display a peculiar feature: while the rhetoric is often heated, the material stakes are often low. Consider, for example, shareholder resolutions requesting boards to redeem poison pills. Anti-pill resolutions were the most common type of shareholder proposal from 1987–2004, received significant shareholder support, and led many companies to dismantle their pills. Yet, because pills can be reinstated at any time, dismantling a pill has no impact on a company’s ability to resist a hostile bid. Although shareholder activists may claim that these proposals vindicate shareholder power against entrenched managers, we are struck by the fact that these same activists have not made any serious efforts to impose effective constraints on boards, for example, by pushing for restrictions on the use of pills in the certificate of incorporation. Other contested governance issues, such as proxy access and majority voting, exhibit a similar pattern: much ado about largely symbolic change.

What accounts for this persistent gap between rhetoric and reality? In our article, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, we consider several explanations drawn from “public interest” and “public choice” perspectives. Ultimately, we conclude that Thurman Arnold’s “symbolic” view of politics, developed in his magnum opus, The Folklore of Capitalism, complements these explanations to provide a fuller understanding.

From a “public interest” perspective, the pursuit by shareholder activists of reforms with minimal direct impact can be rationalized in a number of ways. For one, the cost of such activism is low, both in relation to the value of public companies and in relation to the portfolio on institutional investors. Moreover, even largely symbolic reforms can have a larger indirect impact: they may educate investors, directors, and managers about the importance of shareholder-centric governance; they may serve as show of strength of shareholder power and thereby lead directors, managers, and policy makes to pay more attention to shareholder interests; or they may be a first step in a longer battle for more meaningful reform.

From a “public choice” perspective, shareholder activists may pursue activism for its own sake, to keep themselves busy (and employed). And even if the stakes are low, pro-management forces may oppose meaningless changes to prove loyalty to their clients and generate business.

These explanations, however, leave several questions unanswered: Why the heated rhetoric? What explains the selection of the largely symbolic issues that are being pursued? If these issues are (wrongly) depicted as important, won’t their pursuit divert energy from other issues that are more consequential?

Thurman Arnold’s theory of the role of symbols, myth, and folklore can provide some answers. As a society, Arnold would argue, we need to believe that managers are held accountable even—and especially—in the largest corporations. It is only because “shareholders” exercise ultimate control over managers that it is acceptable that a small group of managers control huge concentrations of capital and get paid princely sums for doing so. This creates a tension. On the one hand, individual shareholders do not, in fact, play that role. On the other hand, large concentrations of capital are necessary for many businesses operating in world product and capital markets. It thus becomes necessary to develop a procedure for reconciling the ideal with practical reality by constantly attacking “the separation of ownership and control” on rational legal and economic ground, while at the same time never really interfering with it. The battles over shareholder power fulfill this function.

But to serve the ceremonial function of asserting shareholder control, shareholder activists must pick issues where the chances of success are reasonably high. Symbolic activism thus serves everyone’s interests. For shareholder activists, who lack strong monetary incentives that directly reward them for increasing share values, symbolic affirmations of shareholder power has allure and is likely to be supported by other shareholders. For managerialists, losing is acceptable and actual (as opposed to rhetorical) resistance is not too high. Activism keeps the activists busy. Plausible arguments for shareholder benefit, combined with low potential costs, assure little internal opposition.

Our analysis has several implications for governance debates. First, the rhetoric used by activists on all sides should be taken with a large pinch of salt: most issues described as momentous generally are not. Second, one should be aware that symbolic battles may divert attention (for better or for worse) from more meaningful reform. Third, shareholder activists and managers and their defenders all have more complex motivations than maximizing firm value or protecting privileges. Rather than epic battles between the forces of good and evil, governance debates typically involve disputes between different shades of grey. Finally, looking out through Thurman Arnold’s eyes, one may observe all the battles and conclude that we live, if not in the best of all possible worlds, then at least in a pretty good one. Despite the back and forth, corporate governance in the U.S. is characterized by a high degree of stability and slow paced, gradual change. Because we ritually affirm the principle of shareholder control—maintained by the symbolic, and largely harmless, disputes we have discussed in this article—the current system of corporate governance enjoys widespread support. Shareholder activism, rather than undermining the legitimacy of the current system, serves an important, legitimating function by showing that shareholders have power and that reform for the better is possible.

The full paper is available for download here.

Indicateurs de mesure d’un « bon » conseil d’administration | Quelques éléments à considérer

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Knud B. Jensen, paru dans le numéro Juillet-Août 2014, du Ivey Business Journal, section Governance.

L’auteur a fait une analyse attentive des études établissant une relation entre l’efficacité des « Boards » et les résultats financiers de l’entreprise. Sa conclusion ne surprendra pas les experts de la gouvernance car on sait depuis un certain temps que la plupart des études sont de nature analytique et que les relations étudiées sont associatives, donc de l’ordre des corrélations statistiques.

Mais, même les résultats dits scientifiques (empiriques), n’apportent pas une réponse claire aux relations causales entre l’efficacité des conseils d’administration et les résultats attendus, à court et long terme … Pourquoi ?

L’auteur suggère qu’un modèle de gouvernance ne peut être utilisé à toutes les sauces, parce que les organisations évoluent dans des contextes (certains diront univers) éminemment différents !

L’analyse fine de l’efficacité des C.A. montre que les variables contextuelles devraient avoir une place de choix dans l’évaluation de l’efficacité de la gouvernance.

La gouvernance est une discipline organisationnelle et son analyse devrait reposer sur les « théories organisationnelles, tels que le design, la culture, la personnalité et le leadership du PDG (CEO), ainsi que sur les compétences « contextuelles » des administrateurs ». C’est plus complexe et plus difficile que de faire des analyses statistiques … ce qui n’empêche pas de poursuivre dans la voie de la recherche scientifique.

Voici un extrait de cet article. Je vous invite cependant à le lire au complet afin de bien saisir toutes les nuances.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont grandement appréciés.

Reconceptualizing the board and its metrics

« The key to rating boards is understanding context. Most researchers and public policies assume a similar board system across industries. This assumption allows law makers and researchers to ignore inter-company board differences. Nevertheless, board functions and effectiveness must reflect the context in which an organization finds itself. After all, board processes and functions are clearly dependent on context (growth or the lack of it, competition, strategy or the lack of it, etc.). For example, after it became very clear that the functioning of the board of directors at Canadian Pacific was no longer suitable to drive company growth, an activist shareholder pushed for new directors and a reorganized board. This led to a dramatic increase in cost ratios, profit and share price. It changed the function of the board. Other illustrations where context called for a change of the board include BlackBerry (formerly RIM) and Barrick Gold….

When it comes to an effective governance model, one size does not fit all. Context is paramount. Context is both endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous variables include complexity, asset base, competitive advantage, capital structure, quality of management, and board culture and leadership. Exogenous variables include industry structures, position in growth cycle, competitive force, macroeconomics (interest rate, commodity pricing), world supply and growth, political changes, and unforeseen events (earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.). These variables are key inputs for company performance and determine whether earnings are above or below average. Simply put, companies may need a different type of board to fit with different sets of endogenous and exogenous variables.

Boards and management typically have different mandates, not to mention a different social architecture to carry them out. It is generally agreed that the CEO and the management teams run the firm, while the board approves strategy, selects the CEO and determines the incentives, sets risk management, and approves major investments and changes to the capital structure. But as discussed in Boards that Lead (2014) by Ram Charan, Dennis Casey and Michael Useen, directors must also lead the corporation on the most crucial issues. As a result, the ideal level of board involvement remains a grey area and is rarely defined. Setting boundaries when there are overlapping responsibilities is difficult. Nevertheless, how the functional relationships between the board and management work is probably far more important than board features to the growth, and sometimes survival, of the organization.

In Back to the Drawing Board (2004), Colin Carter and Jay Lorsch suggest the reason so little has resulted from the various reforms aimed at improving governance is the focus on visible variables, or what others have labeled structural issues, instead of a focus on process or inside board behavior. In other words, features have trumped functions.

The increase in complexity may be another issue. Keep in mind that directors don’t spend a lot of time together, which is a barrier to good behavior and process and makes it difficult for boards to function as a dynamic team. According to a 2013 McKinsey survey of over 700 corporate board members, directors spend an average of 22 days per year on company issues and two thirds do not think they have a complete understanding of the firm’s strategy. Clearly, there are severe limitations on boards, which have more to do than time available, especially with their limited number of board meetings packed with presentations from management.

Boards should be viewed as an organizational system, with context part of any performance judgment. This view has more merit in distinguishing between effective and ineffective boards than the structural view. Human resource metrics may hold more promise and be more important than the structural indices currently used to distinguish between effective and ineffective boards. »

________________________________________________________

*Knud B. Jensen est professeur d’administration à Ryerson University’s Ted Rogers School of Management de Toronto.

L’état des travaux de recherche relatifs à la contribution des investisseurs activistes | En rappel

Ainsi que mon billet du 19 août 2014 en faisait état, le débat est de plus en plus vif en ce qui regarde la contribution des « Hedge Funds » à l’amélioration de la performance à long terme des entreprises ciblées.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court billet de Martin Lipton, partenaire fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui décrit la problématique et les principaux enjeux liés au comportement des investisseurs « activistes ».

L’auteur accorde une grande place aux travaux d’Yvan Allaire et de François Dauphin de l’IGOPP (Institut sur la Gouvernance d’Organisations Privées et Publiques) qui pourfendent l’approche économétrique de la recherche phare de Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang.

Le résumé ci-dessous relate les principaux jalons relatifs à cette saga !

The post puts forward criticism of an empirical study by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang on the long-term effects of hedge fund activism; this study is available here, and its results are summarized in a Forum post and in a Wall Street Journal op-ed article. As did an earlier post by Mr. Lipton available here, this post relies on the work of Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin that is available here. A reply by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang to this earlier memo and to the Allaire-Dauphin work is available here. Additional posts discussing the Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study, including additional critiques by Wachtell Lipton and responses to them by Professors Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang, are available on the Forum here.

The Long-Term Consequences of Hedge Fund Activism

The experience of the overwhelming majority of corporate managers, and their advisors, is that attacks by activist hedge funds are followed by declines in long-term future performance. Indeed, activist hedge fund attacks, and the efforts to avoid becoming the target of an attack, result in increased leverage, decreased investment in CAPEX and R&D and employee layoffs and poor employee morale.

Several law school professors who have long embraced shareholder-centric corporate governance are promoting a statistical study that they claim establishes that activist hedge fund attacks on corporations do not damage the future operating performance of the targets, but that this statistical study irrefutably establishes that on average the long-term operating performance of the targets is actually improved.

In two recent papers, Professor Yvan Allaire, Executive Chair of the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations, has demonstrated that the statistics these professors rely on to support their theories are not irrefutable and do not disprove the real world experience that activist hedge fund interventions are followed by declines in long-term operating performance. The papers by Professor Allaire speak for themselves:

“Activist” hedge funds: creators of lasting wealth? What do the empirical studies really say?

Hedge Fund Activism and their Long-Term Consequences; Unanswered Questions to Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang

Quelques mythes persistants à propos de la culture de gouvernance | En rappel

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article tout à fait pertinent et intéressant, paru sur le site de INC.COM et publié par le Young Entrepreneur Council.

Voici onze (11) affirmations, ou mythes, à propos de la culture organisationnel et comment les administrateurs de sociétés peuvent tirer profit de ces enseignements.

Bonne lecture !

« Culture is a manifestation of your company’s values, and it impacts everything from talent recruiting to innovation. Unfortunately, some founders and CEOs, especially at early-stage startups, confuse culture with perks or, worse, believe that defining a company’s culture is a task best left up to someone else. Eleven founders from the Young Entrepreneur Council (YEC) call out the most persistent culture myths–and what you can do to overcome them »

11 Stubborn Myths About Company Culture

1. Perks = Culture

« Many startup founders mistakenly think that fun perks automatically make for a good culture. Don’t get me wrong–happy hours, Ping-Pong tables and catered lunches are great, but they’re not going to keep employees happy unless you work to create a fundamental culture of respect. It’s a lot easier to provide perks than it is to make sure that employees feel motivated and valued. » —Jared Feldman, Mashwork

2. Culture Doesn’t Start With You

« Most CEOs don’t realize that they are defining the culture by how they are behaving. Snap at people often? Anger will become part of your culture. Undermine your staff? Bureaucracy will invade your culture. Pretend everything is always amazing? You’ll create a culture full of fakes. If you want a culture that is always evolving and becoming more beautiful, invest in doing so yourself. » —Corey Blake, Round Table Companies

3. Employee Feedback Isn’t Important

« Some CEOs do not treat employee feedback as if it was as important as their own thoughts, because they are not viewed as equals. Though it is clear a CEO’s role is more expansive then other positions, the culture of a company can be negatively affected if people’s ideas and thoughts are suppressed. Each employee has a unique view of the organization, and the culture of sharing views is important to the company’s success. » —Phil Chen, Systems Watch

4. Remote Work Doesn’t Impact Culture

« I’ve worked for several companies remotely for years, and none of them have worked out long term. You always have things going on, and you are never as productive as when you’re together in a group. Working with others next to you is the best way for your company culture to grow. If you have to work remotely, find a way to get to the office at least twice a week to improve culture. » —John Rampton, Adogy

5. Someone Else Owns It

« They assume it’s someone else’s problem to deal with. HR doesn’t own culture. Employees don’t own culture. Everyone owns culture, and senior leaders have an enormous impact on how business gets done in the day-to-day. CEOs who don’t understand this are destined to live with whatever they get. CEOs who do understand their roles are better equipped to be intentional about the culture they create in ways that drive performance. »–Chris Cancialosi, GothamCulture

6. Culture Doesn’t Need to Be Defined

« Chris Wood of Paige Technologies says it best, ‘Organizations are really only a representation of the people in them; employers must be diligent about mapping culture.’ Products and services can be duplicated, but people can’t. Your people drive your culture and they are the one defining difference of a company. CEOs forget to understand and define the culture that they have in place early on. » —Jason Grill, JGrill Media | Sock 101

7. Culture Is Just a Set of Values

« We help many growing companies build culture, and the one thing most CEOs get wrong is forgetting to operationalize it. Culture isn’t just a set of core values on the wall–it’s a set of consistent behaviors. You have to be clear what those values look like in practice (we call them work rules) so current and future employees see culture in action and understand how works gets done in the company and align the company to them. » —Susan LaMotte, Exaqueo

8. Culture Only Matters When You Reach X Size

« Most CEOs think they don’t have to worry about company culture until their business meets certain profit or growth margins. In reality, company culture is affecting your bottom line regardless of your margins. I’ll say it again: Your company’s culture is inextricable from your company’s success. Focus on hiring the right people and offering them a place to thrive. With the wrong staff or an unmotivated staff, your company will go nowhere. » —Sean Kelly, HUMAN

9. You Can’t Hire for Culture

« You have to carefully select the type of people you add to your team if you’re going for a particular culture. For instance, if you’re a fashion company, you probably want to hire people that are actually passionate about fashion. It’s good to have people with different ideas, but generally they should have a shared common interest. With that shared interest, you can build a culture that your team members and customers can get behind. » —Andy Karuza, Brandbuddee

10. Compensation Is the Only Motivator

« Once they reach a certain salary, most non-sales employees could honestly care less about additional compensation. Employees work to feel needed, so remind them that they are your company. Recognize them, and make it public recognition. » —Justin Gray, LeadMD

11. Culture Will Wait for You to Create It

« The interesting thing about a company culture is that it will create itself if you don’t create it first. CEOs need to define and personify the company culture and instill it at every level of the organization. The best companies all have a culture based on their mission, and all employees know why they’re working so hard. When the opposite is true, the culture will create itself–and it may not be the culture you envisioned. » —Andrew Thomas, SkyBell Technologies, Inc.

En rappel | Les C.A de petites tailles performent mieux !

Selon une étude du The Wall Street Journal publié par Joann S. Lublin, les entreprises qui comptent moins d’administrateurs ont de meilleurs résultats que les entreprises de plus grandes tailles.

Bien qu’il n’y ait pas nécessairement de relation de type cause à effet, il semble assez clair que la tendance est à la diminution de nombre d’administrateurs sur les conseils d’administration des entreprises publiques américaines. Pourquoi en est-il ainsi ?

Il y a de nombreuses raisons dont l’article du WSJ, ci-dessous, traite. Essentiellement, les membres de conseils de petites tailles :

sont plus engagés dans les affaires de l’entité
sont plus portés à aller en profondeur dans l’analyse stratégique
entretiennent des relations plus fréquentes et plus harmonieuses avec la direction
ont plus de possibilités de communiquer entre eux
exercent une surveillance plus étroite des activités de la direction
sont plus décisifs, cohésif et impliqués.

Les entreprises du domaine financier ont traditionnellement des conseils de plus grandes tailles mais, encore là, les plus petits conseils ont de meilleurs résultats.

La réduction de la taille se fait cependant très lentement mais la tendance est résolument à la baisse. Il ne faut cependant pas compter sur la haute direction pour insister sur la diminution de la taille des C.A. car il semblerait que plusieurs PCD s’accommodent très bien d’un C.A. plus imposant !

Il faut cependant réaliser que la réduction du nombre d’administrateurs peut constituer un obstacle à la diversité si l’on ne prend pas en compte cette importante variable. Également, il faut noter que le C.A. doit avoir un président du conseil expérimenté, possédant un fort leadership. Un conseil de petite taille, présidé par une personne inepte, aura des résultats à l’avenant !

Voici deux autres documents, partagés par Richard Leblanc sur son groupe de discussion LinkedIn Boards and Advisors, qui pourraient vous intéresser :

« Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors« : http://people.stern.nyu.edu/eofek/PhD/papers/Y_Higher_JFE.pdf

« Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms« : http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1403&context=facpub

Je vous convie donc à la lecture de l’article du WSJ dont voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture !

Smaller Boards Get Bigger Returns

Size counts, especially for boards of the biggest U.S. businesses.

Companies with fewer board members reap considerably greater rewards for their investors, according to a new study by governance researchers GMI Ratings prepared for The Wall Street Journal. Small boards at major corporations foster deeper debates and more nimble decision-making, directors, recruiters and researchers said. Take Apple Inc. In the spring when BlackRock founding partner Sue Wagner was up for a seat on the board of the technology giant, she met nearly every director within just a few weeks. Such screening processes typically take months.

But Apple directors move fast because there only are eight of them. After her speedy vetting, Ms. Wagner joined Apple’s board in July. She couldn’t be reached for comment.

Smaller boards at major corporations have more nimble decision-making processes, directors, recruiters and academic researchers say. Eric Palma

Among companies with a market capitalization of at least $10 billion, typically those with the smallest boards produced substantially better shareholder returns over a three-year period between the spring of 2011 and 2014 when compared with companies with the biggest boards, the GMI analysis of nearly 400 companies showed.

Companies with small boards outperformed their peers by 8.5 percentage points, while those with large boards underperformed peers by 10.85 percentage points. The smallest board averaged 9.5 members, compared with 14 for the biggest. The average size was 11.2 directors for all companies studied, GMI said.

« There’s more effective oversight of management with a smaller board, » said Jay Millen, head of the board and CEO practice for recruiters DHR International. « There’s no room for dead wood. »

Many companies are thinning their board ranks to improve effectiveness, Mr. Millen said. He recently helped a consumer-products business shrink its 10-person board to seven, while bringing on more directors with emerging-markets expertise.

GMI’s results, replicated across 10 industry sectors such as energy, retail, financial services and health care, could have significant implications for corporate governance.

Small boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs for poor performance—a threat that declines significantly as boards grow in numbers, said David Yermack, a finance professor at New York University’s business school who has studied the issue.

It’s tough to pinpoint precisely why board size affects corporate performance, but smaller boards at large-cap companies like Apple and Netflix Inc. appear to be decisive, cohesive and hands-on. Such boards typically have informal meetings and few committees. Apple directors, known for their loyalty to founder Steve Jobs, have forged close ties with CEO Tim Cook, according to a person familiar with the company. Mr. Cook frequently confers with individual directors between board meetings « to weigh the pros and cons of an issue, » an outreach effort that occurs quickly thanks to the board’s slim size, this person said.

Mr. Cook took this approach while mulling whether to recruit Angela Ahrendts, then CEO of luxury-goods company Burberry Group PLC for Apple’s long vacant position of retail chief. Private chats with board members helped him « test the thought » of recruiting her, the person said. She started in April.

Ms. Wagner, Apple’s newest director, replaced a retiring one. The board wants no more than 10 members to keep its flexibility intact, according to the person familiar with the company, adding that even « eye contact and candor change » with more than 10 directors.

Apple returns outperformed technology sector peers by about 37 cumulative percentage points during the three years tracked by GMI. An Apple spokeswoman declined to comment.

Netflix, with seven directors, demonstrated equally strong returns, outperforming sector peers by about 32 percentage points. Board members of the big video-streaming service debate extensively before approving important management moves, said Jay Hoag, its lead independent director.

« We get in-depth, » he said. « That’s easier with a small group. »

Netflix directors spent about nine months discussing a proposed price increase, with some pushing back hard on executives about the need for an increase, Mr. Hoag said. Netflix increased prices this spring for new U.S. customers of the company’s streaming video plan, its first price bump since 2011.

A board twice as big wouldn’t have time for « diving deeper into the business on things that matter, » Mr. Hoag said.

….

En rappel | Les relations d’amitié entre un administrateur et son PCD (CEO) peuvent-elles influer sur ses obligations de diligence ?

Voici un compte rendu, paru dans le NYT, d’un article scientifique, publié dans The Accounting Review en juillet 2014, qui montre que les administrateurs ayant des relations d’amitié avec le président et chef de la direction (PCD) de l’entreprise sont moins enclins à exercer une supervision serrée des activités de la direction.

Cependant, le fait de divulguer ces relations personnelles n’a pas pour effet de raffermir les devoirs de diligence et de vigilance des administrateurs, mais sert plutôt de prétexte pour les dédouaner en leur permettant d’être encore plus tolérants envers certaines actions de leur PCD.

Les auteurs tirent deux conclusions de ces résultats :

(1) le fait de divulguer des conflits ou des relations personnelles n’élimine pas les conséquences négatives reliées à cette divulgation

(2) les actionnaires doivent se méfier des liens trop étroits que certains administrateurs entretiennent avec leur PCD.

Rappelons-nous que trop près n’est pas préférable à trop loin. Un juste équilibre doit s’imposer !

L’étude “Will Disclosure of Friendship Ties between Directors and CEOs Yield Perverse Effects? » a été conduite par Jacob M. Rose et Anna M. Rose de Bentley University, Carolyn Strand Norman de Virginia Commonwealth University et Cheri R. Mazza de Sacred Heart University.

En voici quelques extraits. Bonne lecture !

The C.E.O. Is My Friend. So Back Off

…

But the research makes a counterintuitive finding as well. The conventional wisdom holds that when you disclose personal ties, you create transparency and better governance. The experiment found that when social relationships were disclosed as part of director-independence regulations, board members didn’t toughen their oversight of their chief-executive pals. Rather, the directors went easier on the C.E.O., perhaps believing that they had done their duty by disclosing the Relationship.

…

Now for the results: Among the directors who counted the C.E.O. as a friend, 46 percent said they would cut research and development by one-quarter or more to ensure a bonus payout to their pal. By contrast, only 6 percent of directors with no personal ties to the chief executive agreed to reduce research and development to generate a bonus.

That’s to be expected.

The results get more interesting when disclosure is added to the mix. An astonishing 62 percent of directors who disclosed a friendship with the C.E.O. said they would cut $10 million or more from the budget — the amount necessary to generate a bonus. Only 28 percent of the directors who had not disclosed their relationship with the executive agreed to make the cuts necessary to generate a bonus.

Only one director with no ties to the executive agreed to cut the budget by $10 million or more.

Mr. Rose, an author of the paper, said he and his colleagues were surprised that so many directors said they’d be willing to put the company at risk to ensure a bonus for their pal, the C.E.O. “If just by mentioning that you’re friends with the C.E.O. it affects their decision-making, we think the effects going on in the real world are much, much larger than what we picked up in the lab,” Mr. Rose said in an interview last week.

Even more disturbing, he said, was that so many directors seemed to think that disclosing their friendships with the C.E.O. gave them license to put the executive’s interests ahead of the company’s.

“When you disclose things, it may make you feel you’ve met your obligations,” Mr. Rose said. “They’re not all that worried about doing something to help out the C.E.O. because everyone has had a fair warning.”

…

Le point de vue sans équivoque de l’activiste Carl Icahn | en rappel

Depuis quelques années, on parle souvent d’activistes, d’actionnaires activistes, d’investisseurs activistes ou de Hedge Funds pour qualifier la philosophie de ceux qui veulent assainir la gouvernance des entreprises et redonner une place prépondérante aux « actionnaires-propriétaires » !

Pour ceux qui sont intéressés à connaître le point de vue et les arguments d’un actionnaire activiste célèbre, je vous invite à lire l’article écrit par Carl Icahn le 22 août 2014 sur son site Shareholders’ Square Table (SST).

Vous aurez ainsi une très bonne idée de cette nouvelle approche à la gouvernance qui fait rage depuis quelque temps.

Je vous invite aussi à lire l’article de Icahn qui s’insurge contre la position de Warren Buffet de ne pas intervenir dans la décision de la rémunération globale « excessive » à Coke, suivi de la réponse de Buffet.

My article from Barron’s on Warren Buffett’s abstention from a vote on Coke’s executive-pay plan

À vous de vous former une opinion sur ce sujet ! Bonne lecture !

The Bottom Line | Carl Icahn

Among other things, I’m known to be a “reductionist.” In my line of work you must be good at pinpointing what to focus on – that is, the major underlying truths and problems in a situation. I then become obsessive about solving or fixing whatever they may be. This combination is what perhaps has lead to my success over the years and is why I’ve chosen to be so outspoken about shareholder activism, corporate governance issues, and the current economic state of America.

Currently, I believe that the facts “reduce” to one indisputable truth which is that we must change our system of selecting CEOs in order to stay competitive and get us out of an extremely dangerous financial situation. With exceptions, I believe that too many companies in this country are terribly run and there’s no system in place to hold the CEOs and Boards of these inadequately managed companies accountable. There are numerous challenges we are facing today whether it be monetary policy, unemployment, income inequality, the list can go on and on… but the thing we have to remember is there is something we can do about it: Shareholders, the true owners of our companies, can demand that mediocre CEOs are held accountable and make it clear that they will be replaced if they are failing.

I am convinced by our record that this will make our corporations much more productive and profitable and will go a long way in helping to solve our unemployment problems and the other issues now ailing our economy.

…….

Enquête sur le leadership du conseil d’administration | Korn Ferry

Ce billet publié par Robert E. Hallagan et Dennis Carey, vice-présidents de Korn Ferry, présente une partie d’une étude conduite par l’Institut Korn Ferry en 2014 portant sur le leadership du C.A.

On constatera que la séparation des fonctions de président du conseil et de président et chef de la direction s’effectue lentement chez nos voisins du sud ! En effet, bien que tous les experts de la gouvernance reconnaissent le bien fondé d’avoir un président du conseil indépendant, on note un certain progrès à cet égard mais il y a encore loin de la coupe aux lèvres, surtout dans les grandes entreprises cotées aux ÉU.

Voici un aperçu de l’introduction de cette étude. Je vous invite à lire le document complet pour avoir une meilleure idée des résultats de l’enquête. Bonne lecture !

Survey of Board Leadership 2014

This is our second annual report on board leadership.

The numbers and trends are interesting but the subtleties and substance behind them are extremely valuable as the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) and Korn Ferry continue their study of high-performing boards. The thoughtful selection and performance of board leaders is one of two pillars of leadership that drive long-term shareholder value—the other being the CEO of the company.

There is universal agreement that each board must have an independent leader but how each company has achieved this takes many shapes.

In this year’s report, we see continued evidence of a slow and deliberate trend toward separation of the roles, higher in mid-cap companies than the large-cap S&P 500. Key catalysts included activism, and a transition of CEO leadership that prompted the board to elect to separate the roles.

…

There is universal agreement that each board must have an independent leader but how each company has achieved this takes many shapes.

In our first report we stated our commitment to remaining an honest broker of facts in the performance debate. Many proponents of separation claim it will enhance long-term shareholder value, yet no study to date has rendered conclusive evidence in either direction. We have now isolated companies that have made the change, documented their performance before and after, and will soon be comfortable debating the results. While we clearly understand the danger in relying solely on numbers and acknowledge that there are many potential ways to slice the data, we believe our attempt to get at the “facts” will generate engaged, healthy debate among our members and clients. We look forward to a rich dialogue at NACD conferences to come.

Methodology and approach

This study examined changes to and trends in board leadership structure for 900 US companies, namely the constituents of Standard & Poor’s Large Cap 500 Index (S&P 500) and the Mid-Cap Index (the S&P 400) as of December 31, 2012. Companies are added to the S&P 500 if they have unadjusted market capitalization of $4.6 billion or more, and to the S&P 400 if they have unadjusted market capitalization of between $1.2 billion and $5.1 billion. The S&P 500 Index represents a barometer of the state of the largest publicly traded US corporations, and the majority of the research and analysis in this study focuses on this group. To expand the scope beyond large-cap companies, and thus broaden the findings of the research, the constituents of the S&P 400 were also examined in detail.

For each company, we looked at the type of board leadership structure in place at the time of its proxy filing for each year between 2008 and 2012. This report focuses primarily on the leadership structure in place as of year-end 2012, and examines each company’s overall leadership approach as it pertains to the roles of chairman, CEO, and lead director (if at all). Proxy filings, annual reports, and the corporate governance section of company websites comprise the source documents for these determinations. Please note that numbers shown in this report reflect actual statistics and not data projected from a random sampling of companies.

In addition, each company that had a change in its leadership structure since January 1, 2003 (by replacing either the CEO or chairman) was investigated to understand the reason for the change, and additional details—such as tenure, age, education, committee responsibilities—were sought for the incoming chairman. Company and outside press reports and news articles were used to determine the reason for an executive’s departure, and executive biographical and company data were culled from secondary sources, including Reuters, Businessweek, MarketWatch, and Morningstar.

The trend to separate roles continues to move steadily forward.

Though board composition is not likely to be an area marked by rapid, significant change, the slow and steady trend to separate chairman and CEO roles continued in 2012. By the end of 2012, 56% of S&P 500 chairmen also held the position of CEO. This marks a significant departure from 2009, when 63% of all chairmen also held the company’s highest executive office. The change comes almost equally from increases in non-executive chairmen and chairmen who have some past affiliation with the company; additional analysis in this report will examine what types of companies are likely to favor the different approaches.

While it is reasonable to expect this gradual trend to continue, particularly as activist shareholders keep pushing for separation, some large companies, including IBM, Disney, and Urban Outfitters, are moving in the opposite direction and are recombining roles. In the case of IBM and Disney, the recombinations are part of longterm succession, though IBM Chairman-CEO Ginny Rometty added the Chairman role just 10 months after becoming CEO—faster than many expected. In the case of Urban Outfitters, founder Richard Hayne reclaimed the CEO role after his successor had difficulty maintaining the main brand’s appeal to young people. Our continued perspective is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to board leadership and that careful analysis and trusted advisors should be leveraged to find the appropriate structure for each organization.

In our opinion, chairmen must meet several criteria to qualify as truly “non-executive” or independent. They must not currently hold an executive role (CEO or other), must not be former executives, and must not be founders or family members of founders. From time to time, companies may characterize these types of chairmen as “non-executive” in the language of their proxy reports or even in the chairman’s title, but our analysis re-characterizes them per the criteria above. The idea of an independent chairman is that he or she can bring an impartial and objective perspective to the board, and our experience finds that founders, family members of founders, and former executives tend not to possess that objectivity. This particular debate on nomenclature is a classic case of saying it doesn’t make it so. Being independent in title is not necessarily a reflection of reality. An analysis of the types of chairmen found in the S&P 500 in 2012 is described in Figure 2.

The trend toward separation of the chairman and CEO has been more pronounced over time within the mid-cap companies in the S&P 400 than it has been in the S&P 500. Separation rates in both groups rose by two points in 2012, to 44% in the S&P 500 and 55% in the S&P 400.

….

Deux livres phares sur la gouvernance d’entreprise

On me demande souvent de proposer un livre qui fait le tour de la question eu égard à ce qui est connu comme statistiquement valide sur les relations entre la gouvernance et le succès des organisations (i.e. la performance financière !)

Le volume publié par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, professeurs au Graduate School de l’Université Stanford, en est à sa deuxième édition et il donne l’heure juste sur l’efficacité des principes de gouvernance.

Je vous recommande donc vivement ce volume.

Également, je profite de l’occasion pour vous indiquer que je viens de recevoir la dernière version des Principes de gouvernance d’entreprise du G20 et de l’OCDE en français et j’ai suggéré au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) d’inclure cette publication dans la section Nouveauté du site du CAS.

Il s’agit d’une publication très attendue dans le monde de la gouvernance. La documentation des organismes internationaux est toujours d’abord publiée en anglais. Ce document en français de l’OCDE sur les principes de gouvernance est la bienvenue !

Voici une brève présentation du volume de Larcker. Bonne lecture !

Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences (2nd edition)

This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date reference for implementing and sustaining superior corporate governance. Stanford corporate governance experts David Larcker and Bryan Tayan carefully synthesize current academic and professional research, summarizing what is known and unknown, and where the evidence remains inconclusive.

Corporate Governance Matters, Second Edition reviews the field’s newest research on issues including compensation, CEO labor markets, board structure, succession, risk, international governance, reporting, audit, institutional and activist investors, governance ratings, and much more. Larcker and Tayan offer models and frameworks demonstrating how the components of governance fit together, with updated examples and scenarios illustrating key points. Throughout, their balanced approach is focused strictly on two goals: to “get the story straight,” and to provide useful tools for making better, more informed decisions.

This edition presents new or expanded coverage of key issues ranging from risk management and shareholder activism to alternative corporate governance structures. It also adds new examples, scenarios, and classroom elements, making this text even more useful in academic settings. For all directors, business leaders, public policymakers, investors, stakeholders, and MBA faculty and students concerned with effective corporate governance.

Selected Editorial Reviews

An outstanding work of unique breadth and depth providing practical advice supported by detailed research.

Alan Crain, Jr., Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Baker Hughes

Extensively researched, with highly relevant insights, this book serves as an ideal and practical reference for corporate executives and students of business administration.

Narayana N.R. Murthy, Infosys Technologies

Corporate Governance Matters is a comprehensive, objective, and insightful analysis of academic and professional research on corporate governance.

Professor Katherine Schipper, Duke University, and former member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board

Un guide sur la préparation de la relève dans les entreprises familiales | En rappel

On le sait, la planification de la relève dans les entreprises familiales peut être très négligée, tabou même !

Une étude conduite par le Boston Consulting Group (BCG) montre que les conséquences liées à l’absence de préoccupation à cet égard peuvent être désastreuses pour beaucoup d’organisations.

Le vide créé par le manque de leadership peut sérieusement affecter la performance de la firme. La recherche montre que plus de 40 % des entreprises familiales ont mal planifié leur relève au cours de la dernière décennie.

Dans leur article paru dans bcg.perspectives, les auteurs Vikram Bhalla et Nicolas Kachaner ont trouvé que les entreprises qui avaient mal planifié leurs transitions subissaient une diminution de revenu de 14 % au cours des deux dernières années.

Voici un guide de dix (10) principes qui devraient aider les entreprises familiales aux prises avec des problèmes de succession :

Succeeding with Succession Planning in Family Businesses

Start early

Families may hesitate to plan succession because they are uncertain how the interests, choices, and decisions of different family members will play out over years or decades. But succession planning should start as soon as possible despite this uncertainty. Although things may change along the way, leaders can often anticipate the potential scenarios for how the family will evolve. Issues to consider when developing scenarios include the number of children in the next generation and whether those individuals are interested in the family business as a source of full- or part-time employment or purely as an investment. Families should also consider how the scenarios would be affected by marriages or the sudden demise of a family member or potential successor. It is important to plan a succession process and outcome that will work for the different foreseeable scenarios.

Set expectations, philosophy, and values upfront

Although setting expectations, philosophy, and values is central to many family-business issues, we have found that doing so is essential when it comes to succession planning and must be done up front, even if the specific mechanics of succession come later. In our experience, the family businesses that thrive and succeed across generations are those that possess a core philosophy and set of values linked not to wealth creation but to a sense of community and purpose.

Long before decisions will be made about specific potential successors, the family must agree on overarching issues such as whether family unity will take precedence over wealth creation, whether all branches of the family will have an equal ownership right and voice in decisions, and whether decisions will be based purely on merit and the best interests of the business. These guiding principles will provide the framework for more specific decisions.

Understand individual and collective aspirations

Understanding family members’ aspirations, individually and collectively, is critical to defining the right succession process. Leaders of the succession process should meet with family members and discuss their individual aspirations for involvement in the business. For example, does an individual want to work for the business or lead the business, or, alternatively, focus on the family’s philanthropic work? Or does an individual want to chart his or her own course outside of the business? The family’s collective aspirations can emerge from the effort to establish a philosophy and values. Does the family want its business to be the largest company in the industry? Is maintaining the business as a family-owned-and-operated company of paramount importance, or does the family want to relinquish operational responsibility in the coming years? Understanding these aspirations helps in managing expectations and defining priorities in the succession process.

Independently assess what’s right for the business

Although the best interests of the business and the family may seem indistinguishable to some family members, in reality the optimal decisions from the business’s perspective may differ from what family members want for themselves. This distinction makes it essential to consider what is right for the business independent of family preferences when developing a succession plan. It is therefore important to think about succession from a purely business perspective before making any adjustments based on family preferences. This allows leaders to be transparent and deliberate in the trade-offs they may have to make to manage any competing priorities.

Develop the successor’s capabilities broadly

A family business should invest in developing the successor’s capabilities and grooming him or her for leadership. The preparation should occur in phases starting at a young age—even before the successor turns 18.

The challenges of leading a family business are even greater than those faced by leaders of other businesses. In addition to leadership and entrepreneurship, a successor needs to develop values aligned with the family’s aspirations for the business and its role in society—capabilities that constitute stewardship of the company. Given the rapidly increasing complexity of business in the twenty-first century, we often strongly recommend that potential successors gain experience outside the family business in order to broaden their perspective.

Some of the best-managed family businesses have elaborate career-development processes for family members that are the equal of world-class talent-management and capability-building processes.

Define a clear and objective selection process

A company needs to define a selection process to implement its succession model—whether selecting a successor exclusively from the family or considering nonfamily executives as well. The selection process should be based on articulated criteria and delineate clear roles among family governance bodies and business leaders, addressing who will lead the process, propose candidates, and make decisions.

An early start is especially important if several family members are under consideration or the potential exists to divide the business to accommodate leadership aspirations. To obtain an objective perspective on which members of the younger generation have the greatest leadership potential, some families have benefited from the support of external advisors in evaluating talent and running the selection process.

It is important to note that the selection process, while critical, is the sixth point on this list. Points one through five are prerequisites for making the selection process itself more robust and effective.

Find creative ways to balance business needs and family aspirations

Striking the right balance between the business’s needs and family members’ aspirations can be complex. Addressing this complexity often calls for creative approaches—beyond the traditional CEO-and-chairperson model.

For example, the leader of one BCG client split his conglomerate into different companies, each to be led by one of his children; the split occurred without acrimony and in a planned, transparent manner. Beyond helping family members fulfill their aspirations, such a planned split can often greatly enhance value for the business. Another client systematically expanded its business portfolios as the family grew and tapped family members to take over the additions, thus ensuring that several members of the family had a role in the leadership of the businesses.

Stepping into an executive position is not the only way family members can contribute to the business or help the family live its values. As an alternative, family members can serve on the board of directors or take leading roles in the family office or its philanthropic activities.

Build credibility through a phased transition

Successors should build their credibility and authority through well-defined phases of a transition into the leadership role. They can start with a phase of shadowing senior executives to learn about their routines, priorities, and ways of operating. Next, we suggest acting more as a chief operating officer, managing the operations closely but still deferring to the incumbent leaders on strategic decisions. Ultimately, the successor can take over as the CEO and chairperson and drive the family business forward.

It is important to emphasize that the family member who assumes leadership of the business does not necessarily also become the head of the family, with responsibility for vision setting, family governance and alignment, and wealth management. The transition of family leadership can be a distinct process.

Each phase of the transition often takes between two and six months. The transition should be defined by clear milestones and commensurate decision rights. A sudden transition can be disruptive, which is especially harmful if the intent is to maintain continuity in the family business’s direction and strategy.

Ask departing leaders to leave but not disappear

Most leaders bring something distinctive to a family business. Holding onto this distinctiveness in a transition is essential but requires a delicate balance. Although departing leaders should relinquish managerial responsibility for the business, they should remain connected to one or two areas where they bring the truly distinctive value that made the family business successful under their guidance. However, the leaders should be involved in these activities through a formal process, rather than at their own personal preference and discretion. Departing leaders should stay available to guide the new leader if he or she seeks their advice.

To help leaders strike this balance and overcome their reluctance to let go, companies can create a “glide path” plan that sets out how they will turn over control in phases and transition into other activities while the successor assumes control and builds credibility.

Family businesses should also consider the need to adjust aspects of the company’s governance model when the departing leader hands over the reins. Although such adjustments can be made outside the context of succession, they often become particularly relevant after transitions to the second or third generation. A strong leader’s hands-on governance approach is often no longer sustainable for the next generation, creating the need to divide and formalize roles and institutionalize many business processes.

Motivate the best employees and foster their support

Managing the company’s most talented nonfamily executives is especially challenging during the succession process. The company needs to ensure that these executives have opportunities to develop professionally and take on new responsibilities and that morale remains high. Involving executives in the succession process can help to foster their support for the new leader. For example, they can be asked to serve as mentors for the successor or lead special projects relating to the succession. Surrounding the new leader with a strong and supportive senior team is a key ingredient for success, and the departing leader should ensure that such a team is in place.

Assessing the Status of Succession Planning Today

As an initial “health check” to assess the current status of their succession planning, family businesses should consider a number of issues:

Has the company defined a succession model and determined the timing for selecting a successor so that he or she has a sufficient opportunity to prepare for the leadership role and build credibility before the current leader retires?

Has the current leader committed to a fixed retirement date?

Has the family clearly articulated its values and the principles that will guide its decisions and succession process?

Has the family evaluated the pipeline of leadership talent within its younger generation? Has it looked at potential leaders who come from within the business but not within the family?

Does the family understand how it will accommodate the aspirations of family members not selected for leadership roles, in order to maintain harmony and avoid discord during the transition to new leadership?

In many cases, family businesses will find that the answers to questions like these indicate the need to devote much more time and attention to succession planning. Most important, the current leader, other family members, and the top management team will need to begin having an open and candid discussion about succession-related issues to enable the business to thrive for generations to come. These discussions are never easy, but they are essential. Getting succession wrong can be an irreversible and often fatal mistake for a family business.

LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) DES CÉGEP

Nous publions ici le troisième article de Danielle Malboeuf* qui nous avait déjà soumis ses réflexions sur les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux les 23 et 27 novembre 2013, à titre d’auteure invitée.

D’où les propositions adressées à la Fédération des cégeps et aux C.A. pour élaborer un profil de compétences et pour faire appel à la Banque d’administrateurs certifiés du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), le cas échéant. Un autre enjeu identifié dans ce billet concernait la remise en question de l’indépendance des administrateurs internes.

Le deuxième article publié le 27 novembre 2013 abordait l’enjeu entourant l’exercice de la démocratie par différentes instances au moment du dépôt d’avis au conseil d’administration.

Ce troisième article, reproduit ici avec la permission de l’auteure, porte sur l’efficacité du rôle du président du conseil d’administration (PCA).

Voici donc l’article en question. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture.

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LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES INSTITUTIONS D’ENSEIGNEMENT COLLÉGIAL

par Danielle Malboeuf*

Le réseau des Collèges d’enseignement général et professionnel (Cégep) doit se préoccuper du rôle assumé par le président ou la présidente du conseil d’administration (C.A.) car cette personne est appelée à jouer un rôle central d’animation et de coordination des activités du conseil. Mais qu’en est-il dans les faits ?

La Loi sur les Cégep encadre le rôle du PCA ainsi : « le président du conseil préside les réunions du conseil et assume les autres fonctions que le conseil lui assigne par règlement. » [i]

Présentement, les présidents de C.A. pourraient être tentés de se limiter à jouer un rôle d’animateur de réunions. Heureusement, certains s’engagent déjà dans de nouvelles pratiques pour améliorer la gouvernance de ces institutions. Ils s’inspirent des approches préconisées par le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), par l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organismes privés et publics (IGOPP), et celles inscrites dans la Loi sur la gouvernance des sociétés d’état.

À ce sujet, monsieur Yvan Allaire, président de l’IGOPP, dans un article publié dans le Devoir le 6 décembre dernier, « Des conseils d’administration défaillants? Crise de gouvernance dans le secteur public » encourage nos institutions publiques à adopter des principes de saine gouvernance comme ceux imposés aux sociétés d’État et à exiger leur mise en place dans toutes les instances de l’État québécois.

Rappelons que la finalité recherchée dans la mise en place d’une meilleure gouvernance est de permettre aux C.A. de participer activement à la mission première d’une institution d’enseignement qui est celle de donner une formation pertinente et de qualité où l’étudiant et sa réussite éducative sont au cœur des préoccupations. À cet égard, le C.A. s’assure entre autres que les objectifs sont clairs et que les stratégies sont pertinentes. Il se donne également les moyens pour faire le suivi des activités et des résultats.

Parmi les principes à mettre en place, on retient le profil de compétences recherché chez un président de C.A.. On exige de cette personne d’être expérimentée, aux états de service éprouvés, dotée d’un bon leadership [ii]. En présence de ce type de personnes, on assiste à une évolution de leur rôle. En plus d’assurer le bon fonctionnement du C.A., cette personne relève un défi majeur, celui de faire connaître auprès de toutes les instances du milieu, le mandat confié au C.A. et ainsi, contribuer à la légitimité de cette entité de gouvernance. Puis, afin de faire jouer au C.A. son rôle de surveillance et d’être un contributeur important à la création de valeur de l’institution, le PCA anime et coordonne le travail des administrateurs et ce, en mettant à contribution leurs compétences. En sus du comité d’audit, il doit encourager la création d’un comité de gouvernance et d’un comité de ressources humaines car cela lui permet de mettre à contribution ces compétences et de s’appuyer sur les travaux de ces comités pour améliorer la gouvernance. Finalement, cette personne inscrit ses actions sous la forme de soutien et de conseil auprès de la directrice ou du directeur général sans faire ombrage à son autorité.

Pour assurer une gouvernance efficiente et stratégique, il est donc impératif que les présidentes et présidents de C.A. s’inscrivent dans la mise en place des grands principes de gouvernance et ce, avec l’appui des directions. La Fédération des Cégeps joue un rôle majeur dans cette démarche en fournissant aux présidents de C.A., le soutien, la formation et les outils appropriés.

Par ailleurs, considérant le niveau de compétences attendues, l’accroissement de leurs responsabilités qui exigera plus de disponibilités et de temps et l’évaluation qui sera faite de leur travail, il serait normal de considérer la rémunération de ces personnes. Les présidents de certaines sociétés d’état ont déjà accès à une telle rémunération.

[i] Loi sur les collèges d’enseignement général et professionnel, article 14.

[ii] Yvan Allaire, président de l’IGOPP

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*Danielle Malboeuf est consultante et formatrice en gouvernance; elle possède une grande expérience dans la gestion des CEGEP et dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégial et universitaire. Elle est CGA-CPA, MBA, ASC, Gestionnaire et administratrice retraité du réseau collégial et consultante.

___________________________

Articles sur la gouvernance des CEGEP :

(1) Les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux

(2) L’exercice de la démocratie dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux

Le rôle du comité exécutif versus le rôle du conseil d’administration | En rappel

Voici une discussion très intéressante paru sur le groupe de discussion LinkedIn Board of Directors Society, et initiée par Jean-François Denault, concernant la nécessité de faire appel à un comité exécutif.

Je vous invite à lire les commentaires présentés sur le fil de discussion du groupe afin de vous former une opinion.

Personnellement, je crois que le comité exécutif est beaucoup trop souvent impliqué dans des activités de nature managériale.

Dans plusieurs cas, le CA pourrait s’en passer et reprendre l’initiative !

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

____________________________________________________

La situation exposée par Jean-François Denault est la suivante (en anglais) :

I’m looking for feedback for a situation I encountered.

I am a board member for a non-profit. Some of us learned of an issue, and we brought it up at the last meeting for an update.

We were told that it was being handled by the Executive Committee, and would not be brought up in board meetings.

It is my understanding that the executive committee’s role is not to take issues upon themselves, but to act in interim of board meetings. It should not be discussing issues independently from the board.

Am I correct in thinking this? Should all issues be brought up to the board, or can the executive committee handle situations that it qualifies as « sensitive »?

The Role of the Executive Committee versus the main board of directors

Alan Kershaw

Chair of Regulatory Board

Depends whether it’s an operational matter I guess – e.g. a staffing issue below CEO/Director level. If it’s a matter of policy or strategy, or impacts on them, then the Board is entitled to be kept informed, surely, and to consider the matter itself.

John Dinner

John T, Dinner Board Governance Services

Helping boards improve their performance and contributionI’ll respond a bit more broadly, Jean-François. While I am not opposed to the use of executive committees, a red flag often goes up when I conduct a governance review for clients and review their EC mandate and practices. There is a slippery slope where such committees find themselves assuming more accountability for the board’s work over time. Two classes of directors often form unintentionally as a result. Your situation is an example where the executive committee has usurped the board’s final authority. While I don’t recommend one approach, my inclination is to suggest that boards try to function without an executive committee because of the frequency that situations similar to the one you describe arise at boards where such committees play an active role. There are pros and cons, of course, for having these committees, but I believe the associated risk often warrants reconsideration of their real value and need.

Chuck Molina

Chief Technology Officer at DHI

I currently sit on the EC and have been in that role with other boards. Although I can see the EC working on projects as a subset of the board we Always go back to the full board and disclose those projects and will take items to the full board for approval. The board as a whole is accountable for decisions! There has to be transparency on the board! I found this article for you. http://www.help4nonprofits.com/BrainTeaser/BrainTeaser-Role_of_Executive_Committee.htm , which concurs to John’s comment. If used correctly the EC or a subset of the board can work on board issues more efficiently then venting through the full board, but they should always go back to the Full board for consideration or approval.

Dave Chapman

CHM and CEO of NorthPoint ERM

I have experienced couple of EB’s and unless the company is in deep financial or legal trouble for the most part the took away from the main board and in the whole worked ok but not great. If the board has over 10 to 15 board members it is almost a requirement but the board them is there for optics more than or effective and efficient decision making

James Clouser

Experienced CEO & Board member of Domestic and European companies.

I think Mr. Dinner, Mr. Molina, and Mr. Chapman summed it up beautifully:
– You cannot have two classes of Directors
– You have to have transparency and every Board member is entitled to the same information
– A Board of 10-15 members is inefficient and may need committees, but that does not change the fact that all Board members are entitled to have input into anything that the Board decides as a body.
– An Executive Committee is a sub-committee of the entire Board, not an independent body with extraordinary powers.

Al Errington

Entrepreneur & Governance Advocate

I agree with John, executive committees tend to be a slippery slope to bad governance. The board of directors has the responsibility of direction and oversight of the business or organization. If anything goes substantially wrong, the board of directors will also be accountable, legally. The rules of thumb for any and all committees is
– Committees must always be accountable to the board of directors, not the other way around.
– Committees must always have limits defined by the board of directors on authority and responsibility, and should have limits on duration.
– Committees should always have a specific reason to exist and that reason should be to support the board of directors in addressing it’s responsibilities.

Emerson Galfo

Consulting CFO/COO / Board Member/Advisor

Judging from the responses, we need to clearly define the context of what an Executive Committee is. Every organization can have it’s own function/view of what an Executive Committee is.

From my experience, an Executive Committee is under the CEO and reflects a group of trusted C-level executives that influence his decisions. I have had NO experience with Executive Boards other than the usual specific Board Committees dealing with specific realms of the organization.

So coming from this perspective, the Executive Committee is two steps down from the organizational pecking order and should be treated or viewed in that context..

Terry Tormey

President & CEO at Prevention Pharmaceuticals Inc.

I concur with Mr. James Clouser (above).
They should be avoided except in matters involving a performance question regarding C-Level Executive Board member, where a replacement may be sought.

John Baily

Board of Directors at RLI Corp

James hit the nail on the head. Executive committees are a throwback to times when we didn’t have the communication tools we do now. They no longer have a reason for their existence. All directors, weather on a not for profit or a corporate board have equal responsibilities and legal exposures. There is no room or reason for a board within a board in today’s world.

Chinyere Nze

Chief Executive Officer

My experience is; Board members have the last say in all policy issues- especially when it concerns operational matter. But in this case, where there is Executive Committee, what it sounds like is that, the organization in question has not clearly identified, nor delineated the roles of each body- which seem to have brought up the issue of ‘conflict’ in final decision- making. Often Executive Committees are created to act as a buffer or interim to the Board, this may sometime cause some over-lapping in executive decision-making.

My suggestion is for the organization to assess and evaluate its current hierarchy- clearly identify & define roles-benefits for creating and having both bodies, and how specific policies/ protocol would benefit the organization. In other words, the CEO needs to define the goals or benefits of having just a Board or having both bodies, and to avoid role conflict or over-lap, which may lead to confusion, as it seems to have been the case here.

STEPHEN KOSMALSKI

CEO / PRESIDENT/BOARD OF DIRECTORS /PRIVATE EQUITY OPERATING PARTNER known for returning growth to stagnant businesses

The critical consideration for all board members is ‘ fiduciary accountability’ of all bod members. With that exposure , all bod members should be aware of key issues .

Thomas Brattle « Toby » Gannett

President and CEO at BCR Managment

I think for large organizations, that executive committees still have an important role as many board members have a great deal going on and operational matters may come up from time to time that need to be handled in a judicial manner. While I think that the Executive committee has an important, at times critical role for a BOD, it is also critical that trust is built between the executive Committee and the BOD. This is only done when the executive committee is transparent, and pushes as many decisions that it can to the full board. If the committee does not have time to bring a matter to the full BOD, then they must convey to the BOD the circumstances why and reasoning for their decision. It is the executive committees responsibility to build that trust with the BOD and work hard to maintain it. All strategic decisions must be made by the full BOD. It sounds like you either have a communication failure, governance issue, or need work with your policies and procedures or a combination of issues.

Éloge à la confiance du PCD envers son CA | En reprise

Voici le point de vue de Liam McGee paru récemment dans la section Leadership de la revue du Harvard Business School (HBR). L’auteur relate son expérience alors qu’il était le président et chef de la direction (PCD) de la Hartford Financial Services Group.

Selon lui, tous les PCD tentent de « gérer leur CA » en utilisant diverses approches basées sur le contrôle et le pouvoir de l’information. Cependant, depuis une dizaine d’années, les conseils d’administration ont progressivement repris leurs droits ! Ils cherchent à maintenir une plus grande distance entre leurs rôles de fiduciaires et ceux qui incombent à la direction de l’organisation.

Pour l’auteur, il n’y a qu’une façon de réconcilier les deux parties : le partenariat. Celui-ci est fondé sur la confiance, et la confiance ne s’acquiert pas du jour au lendemain ! Il faut élaborer une stratégie et mettre en œuvre des mécanismes qui renforceront graduellement la confiance entre le CA et la haute direction. Selon lui, il vital que le PCD ait confiance en son CA.

Toute la carrière de l’auteur a été consacrée à l’établissement de liens de confiance essentiels aux bonnes pratiques de gouvernance. C’est de son expérience dont il est question dans ce bref extrait. Bonne lecture !

CEOs, Stop Trying to Manage the Board

It’s understandable that most CEOs try to manage their boards. With directors often attempting to take a more active role in decisions these days, CEOs naturally feel a bit threatened. They’re trying to lead a group of people who typically lack the time or expertise to fully understand what’s going on — but who have real power.

At most companies, despite all the best intentions, managing the board usually means keeping directors at arm’s length. Most CEOs I’ve known are inclined to give out just enough information to satisfy their fiduciary obligations, often in highly structured meetings that leave little to chance. They hold off on revealing the deeper challenges or complexities that might provoke tough questions.

But as I learned over the course of my career, there’s a better approach with boards. A CEO can work in partnership with directors without sacrificing his or her authority — and thereby accomplish far more than is possible with an arm’s-length relationship. It’s all a matter of developing trust. In my five years as CEO of The Hartford, a Fortune 100 insurer, winning trust was crucial to turning around the company in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Building trust can be a delicate thing, but it isn’t magic. You don’t need special charisma. All you really need is courage and self-confidence.

The first step is to show that you trust your directors. In practical terms, that means not trying to stage-manage board interactions. When I took over at The Hartford, the management team took up most of our board meetings going through long slide decks. I got rid of that barrier. We distilled the most important information into pre-reads for the directors to study in advance. The meetings themselves, aside from the CFO’s report on financials, focused on discussions of the main issues. Real transparency, I learned, isn’t so much in the numbers, but in open conversation.

That wasn’t easy at first for my executives, who were used to wielding their slide decks to control their presentations. I had to coach them not to worry and to remember that directors were genuinely interested in their businesses and in getting to know them as managers. So they should just be open to the discussions that came up.

These unscripted meetings not only freed directors to ask more questions, but also gave them more of a window into the company. They got to see the other executives in action, including my potential successors.

It’s important to remember that boards see only a small part of you, and even less of the company. They visit for a day or two and get a snapshot. How you work with them is often as important as the substance of what you say. If you give the board unfettered access to executives, you’ll build trust with the directors as well as with your management team. Openness and transparency in board meetings over time can go a long way toward making everyone comfortable with everyone else.

Still, those steps weren’t enough for me to build a strong basis of trust. It’s one thing to allow open discussion on the usual company topics. But what about the issues that involved me personally? How could I get the directors to trust me on my own performance? Obviously a CEO will want to maintain some discretion here. But openness on even these issues can pay off enormously.

A year into my tenure, a senior executive quit abruptly and, on the way out, criticized my management style to the board. I was concerned enough to get a coach, who conducted a full 360-degree feedback process for me. But instead of just telling the directors about the coaching, I decided to give them an overview of my coach’s findings. Her report was generally positive, but it had some tough parts in it, and I decided to discuss these openly. It may have been risky, but it helped to break the ice. The board members felt relaxed enough to give me some feedback of their own. My lead director even became something of a second coach. All of this was invaluable, and it wouldn’t have happened if I hadn’t made myself vulnerable in the first place.

That trust made a big difference in 2012, when an activist investor challenged us to restructure the company. We were still in the process of developing our new strategy, and the stock price was disappointingly low. The controversy could have led to my departure and, more important, a costly delay in the company’s revival. Instead the board stayed unified and we stuck to our plan, which turned out to be a better approach than the strategy the activist was pushing.

All along the way, as we developed trust, I grew to welcome the board members’ tough questions. I could see they were focused on helping me protect and improve the company. A CEO’s job is hard enough. One of your biggest responsibilities is to avoid making dumb decisions. Wouldn’t you want all the directors to feel comfortable challenging you and each other?

*Liam McGee was chairman and CEO of the Hartford Financial Services Group (“The Hartford”) from 2009 to June of 2014. He died in February 2015.

Vous accédez à un nouveau poste ? Bravo, mais attention aux premiers 100 jours !

Le 12 juin 2015, j’ai demandé à Philippe Sarrazin* d’agir à titre de blogueur invité sur mon site. Compte tenu de la popularité de cette publication sur mon blogue, j’ai décidé de vous le présenter à nouveau.

Philippe a écrit un billet très intéressant qui porte sur les aléas d’une prise de postes. L’auteur présente plusieurs conseils très pratiques afin d’éviter les erreurs que beaucoup de nouveaux dirigeants font.

Les cent premiers jours sont déterminants, mais les premières semaines le sont encore plus !

Bonne lecture. Philippe et moi souhaiterions avoir vos commentaires.

100 jours pour réussir votre prise de fonctions

Par Philippe Sarrazin

Vous prenez un nouveau poste ? Bravo, mais attention :

La prise de poste, cette fameuse période des 100 jours, est une étape cruciale pour réussir dans vos nouvelles fonctions. En effet, durant cette période délicate, il vous faut :

Installer efficacement et durablement votre leadership auprès de l’ensemble des acteurs et des parties prenantes.
Eviter de commettre certaines erreurs qui pourraient marquer négativement et vous pénaliser dans l’accomplissement de votre mission.

La réussite ou l’échec de votre prise de poste va ainsi fortement conditionner votre légitimité, et donc votre capacité à obtenir l’adhésion et à être suivi.

Or, l’expérience montre que 5 erreurs sont fréquemment commises :

Arriver avec trop de certitudes du fait de ses compétences ou parce que l’on connaît déjà bien l’entreprise (nomination interne).
Ne pas tenir compte de l’inquiétude légitime des équipes face à l’arrivée d’un nouveau dirigeant, fut-il déjà connu.
Négliger les acquis de son prédécesseur au poste et vouloir immédiatement imprimer sa marque, notamment en insufflant sans attendre des changements dans les équipes, l’organisation ou les process de fonctionnement.
Ne pas s’appliquer à construire dès le départ une relation durable avec les différents acteurs et parties prenantes.
Ne pas prendre le temps de découvrir et de s’imprégner de la culture de l’entreprise.

Bien entendu, cette liste n’est pas exhaustive et les risques de faux-pas ne manquent pas.

En ce sens, fondé sur une méthodologie éprouvée, le coaching de prise de poste vous apporte des clés essentielles qui vous permettent de baliser votre route et surtout d’éviter certains pièges, notamment au niveau relationnel. Le coaching vous permet de voir clair et de savoir quoi faire.

Cela vous sécurise et vous met dans les meilleures conditions pour réussir dans vos nouvelles fonctions.

*Pour toute information sur le coaching de prise de poste, vous pouvez me contacter en m’écrivant à phs@sarrazin-coaching.com .

PS : J’ai été récemment interviewé par Action Co sur le coaching de dirigeants en situation de crise. Vous pouvez retrouver cette interview en cliquant ici.

sarrazin-coaching.com
1 bis, villa Alexandrine
92100 Boulogne
RCS Nanterre B 423 053 867

La gouvernance des entreprises et les responsabilités accrues des administrateurs | En reprise : Implications du projet de loi 26

Le séminaire à la maîtrise de Gouvernance de l’entreprise (DRT-7022) dispensé par Ivan Tchotourian*, professeur en droit des affaires de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, entend apporter aux étudiants une réflexion originale sur les liens entre la sphère économico-juridique, la gouvernance des entreprises et les enjeux sociétaux actuels**.

Ce travail a traité du projet de loi 26 faisant écho aux travaux de la commission Charbonneau et à la nécessaire réaction face aux phénomènes de corruption et de collusion.

Ce billet entend contribuer au partage des connaissances à une large échelle et montrer comment la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs est l’un des leviers mis à la disposition du législateur.

Il expose le résultat des recherches de Mohamed Soumano et de Shadi J. Wazen, étudiants du cours de gouvernance de l’entreprise (DRT-7022).

La gouvernance des entreprises et les responsabilités accrues des administrateurs | Les implications du projet de loi 26

Par

Mohamed Soumano et Shadi J. Wazen

La gouvernance d’entreprise renvoie à l’ensemble des structures, processus, lois et institutions destinés à encadrer la manière dont l’entreprise est dirigée, administrée et contrôlée. Elle régule les relations entre les parties prenantes, de manière à rechercher un équilibre entre les rôles, responsabilités et pouvoirs de chacune d’entre elles. À cette fin, des principes et mécanismes sont proposés pour assurer une saine gouvernance d’entreprise.

Parmi ceux-ci, la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs est l’un des leviers mis à la disposition du législateur. Depuis quelques années, ce levier fait l’objet d’une attention croissante par l’État^[i], particulièrement en droit de l’environnement^[ii]. Par ce levier, différents objectifs sont poursuivis, soit la prévention, la pédagogie et l’indemnisation^[iii]. En effet, comme les entreprises ne peuvent pas être condamnés à l’emprisonnement à la suite d’une infraction criminelle et que les amendes pénales sont souvent insuffisantes pour responsabiliser les entreprises puisqu’elles risquent d’être incluses dans les coûts de production et imposées de fait à la clientèle, la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs donne un message clair que nul n’est au-dessus des lois. Il s’agit là d’une reconnaissance que le rôle des administrateurs va bien au-delà d’une gestion pour le seul bénéfice des actionnaires^[iv].

Récemment, c’est par le biais de cette responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs que l’État cherche à responsabiliser les entreprises qui souhaitent conclure des contrats publics ou qui en ont conclu par le passé. Le 3 décembre 2014, le gouvernement présentait à l’Assemblée nationale le projet de loi 26 – Loi visant principalement la récupération de sommes obtenues à la suite de fraudes ou de manœuvres dolosives dans le cadre de contrats publics^{^[v]}. Celui-ci fait écho aux révélations de collusion et de corruption faites à la Commission Charbonneau^{^[vi]} et à l’opinion publique pressant le gouvernement de récupérer les fonds publics versés en trop.

S’inspirant du modèle hollandais^{^[vii]}, ce projet de loi propose d’instituer un programme de remboursement volontaire qui permettra aux entreprises fautives de rembourser les fonds reçus injustement, peu importe le secteur d’activités. À défaut d’entente, les entreprises s’exposent à des poursuites judiciaires. Son article 10 rend même personnellement et solidairement responsables les administrateurs de tout préjudice causé. Plus précisément, le deuxième alinéa de l’article 10, tel qu’amendé en commission parlementaire^{^[viii]}, s’énonce comme suit :

« […] La responsabilité des administrateurs de l’entreprise en fonction au moment de la fraude ou de la manœuvre dolosive est également engagée s’il est établi qu’ils savaient ou auraient dû savoir qu’une fraude ou une manœuvre dolosive a été commise relativement au contrat visé, à moins qu’ils ne démontrent d’avoir agit avec le soin, la diligence et la compétence dont ferait preuve, en pareilles circonstances, une personne prudente. ».

Cette responsabilité s’étend sur une période de 20 ans précédant l’entrée en vigueur du projet de loi, et ce, jusqu’à 5 ans suivant son entrée en vigueur (art 16 et 37). Le projet de loi prévoit même que les recours rejetés par le passé au motif de prescription pourront être repris.

Ce projet de loi aura sans conteste des impacts significatifs sur la gouvernance des entreprises :

(1) Une surveillance accrue des administrateurs.

En principe, les administrateurs ne font pas de micro-gestion : c’est la règle du Nose in, Fingers out qui s’applique. Sauf exceptions, ils ne sont pas responsables des actes de leurs dirigeants. Or, le projet de loi leur impose un nouveau devoir de prudence et diligence en matière de contrats publics. Un tel devoir suppose que l’administrateur ne pourra ni prêcher par son inaction, ni faire preuve d’aveuglement volontaire^{^[ix]}. Au sujet de cette doctrine, la Cour suprême du Canada, dans l’arrêt Briscoe^{^[x]}, rappelle que « l’ignorance volontaire impute une connaissance à l’accusé qui a des doutes au point de vouloir se renseigner davantage, mais qui choisit délibérément de ne pas le faire ». Suivant le projet de loi, la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs est engagée dès qu’il est établi qu’ils savaient ou auraient dû savoir que des manœuvres frauduleuses ou dolosives ont été commises, que ce soit préalablement à la conclusion d’un contrat public ou en cours d’exécution. Un tel devoir opère un changement au niveau de la gouvernance d’entreprise. Des activités autrefois déléguées aux dirigeants relèveront dorénavant du conseil d’administration. Celui-ci a le devoir de se renseigner, surveiller et contrôler adéquatement les actes de l’entreprise et ses dirigeants. Un tel devoir impose l’institution d’un processus adéquat pour supporter les décisions du conseil d’administration. Face aux risques de poursuites judiciaires, les administrateurs devront être en mesure de démontrer que, préalablement à la prise d’une décision, ils détenaient des informations pertinentes leur permettant de prendre une décision éclairée, que le processus pour analyser ces informations est adéquat et que le jugement d’affaires appliqué à la lumière des informations et à l’issu du processus est raisonnable. Un tel devoir impose des obligations élevées. Il est donc à prévoir que le conseil d’administration mettra davantage l’accent sur le processus et le contrôle de l’information, que celui de la création de valeur qui est l’essence même de son rôle.

(2) Une plus grande méfiance envers les dirigeants.

Le projet de loi ébranle aussi le principe traditionnel de confiance entre le conseil d’administration et la haute direction. En mettant l’accent sur le processus et le contrôle, cela pourrait engendrer une plus grande méfiance des administrateurs envers leurs dirigeants. En effet, devant les risques de poursuites, les administrateurs seraient justifiés de s’impliquer davantage dans la gestion et la direction de l’entreprise et, au besoin, de demander l’avis d’une tierce personne, tels un professionnel ou un comité d’éthique, ou même prendre les mesures nécessaires visant à prévenir et contrer les fraudes. Non seulement de telles actions engendrent des délais et des coûts, mais pourraient aussi créer un climat de méfiance envers les dirigeants, ce qui est insoutenable à terme et pourrait mettre en péril la pérennité de l’entreprise.

(3) Une application rétroactive de la nouvelle norme de conduite.

Enfin, soulignons que le projet de loi impose ce nouveau devoir de diligence et prudence à tout contrat public conclu au cours des 20 dernières années. Une question s’impose : comment valoir une défense de diligence raisonnable alors que cette norme de conduite ne constituait ni une obligation, ni une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance à l’époque des actes fautifs? D’ailleurs, mentionnons que ce n’est qu’en 2004 que la Cour suprême du Canada^{^[xi]} a indiqué que la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs envers les tiers pouvait être engagée en cas de manquement au devoir de diligence et prudence. Cet enseignement n’est cependant exact que pour les entreprises régies par la Loi canadienne sur les sociétés par actions puisque le gouvernement du Québec, lors de la réforme de la Loi sur les sociétés par actions, a clairement indiqué que le bénéficiaire de ce devoir est l’entreprise, à l’exclusion des tiers^{^[xii]}. En appliquant rétroactivement un devoir aussi exigeant, le projet de loi porte vraisemblablement atteinte aux normes qui étaient autrefois admises par le législateur et les tribunaux. Une telle préoccupation est aussi partagée par l’Institut des administrateurs de société^{^[xiii]}.Au fil des années pour ne pas dire des scandales, le législateur et les tribunaux ont, de plus en plus, recherché à engager la responsabilité personnelle des administrateurs. De nos jours, il est demandé aux administrateurs d’exercer leurs devoirs en toute connaissance de cause et de guider la gestion de l’entreprise sans se fier aveuglément à la haute direction. Il est donc dans l’intérêt de tout administrateur de bien comprendre la nature et la portée de ses obligations, en plus de faire preuve d’une conduite démontrant un sens élevé d’éthique.

^{^[i]} Stéphane Rousseau, La responsabilité civile et pénale des administrateurs : tableau synoptique (Législation à jour au 31 décembre 2011), Chaire en gouvernance et droit des affaires, Université de Montréal (https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/6320/Tableau.pdf;jsessionid=2601674894C5BE75CD250D2F7B61BDCA?sequence=1); Marie-Andrée Latreille, « Responsabilité des administrateurs: un membership risqué pour les avocats! », Congrès annuel du Barreau 2002 (http://www.barreau.qc.ca/pdf/congres/2002/07-latreille.pdf); Nathalie Vallerand,, « Être administrateur, une lourde responsabilité », Journal Les affaires, 14 mai 2014 (https://www.cas.ulaval.ca/files/content/sites/college/files/documents/bulletin/juin2014/serie-gouvernance-lesaffaires-cercleasc-article2-responsabilite.pdf).

^{^[ii]} Christine Duchaine, et Nicolas Dubé, « Sanctions pénales, administratives ou ordonnances : en environnement, la diligence a bien meilleur goût! », Développements récents en droit de l’environnement, Volume 370, 2013, (http://edoctrine.caij.qc.ca/developpements-recents/370/368152798/#Toc370821836); Yvan Allaire et André Laurin, La Loi 89 sur la qualité de l’environnement : Comment convaincre les personnes compétentes de siéger aux conseils d’administration, Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques, janvier 2013 (http://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/article_loi_89-qualite-environnement-v2.pdf).

^{^[iii]} En ce sens, voir Blair c. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 R.C.S. 5 (par. 74).

^{^[iv]} Ivan Tchotourian, Devoir de prudence et de diligence des administrateurs et RSE : Approche comparative et prospective, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2014.

^{^[v]} http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-26-41-1.html.

^{^[vi]} https://www.ceic.gouv.qc.ca/la-commission.html.

^{^[vii]} Assemblée nationale, Commission des institutions, Journal des débats du 24 février 2015, ministre de la Justice : http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/ci-41-1/journal-debats/CI-150224.html; Voir aussi : LaPresse du 4 décembre 2014 (http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/politique/politique-quebecoise/201412/04/01-4825088-contrats-publics-quebec-veut-recuperer-largent-vole-par-des-entreprises.php).

^{^[viii]} http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-26-41-1.html.

^{^[ix]} Au sujet de l’aveuglement volontaire et les administrateurs, voir Blair c. Consolidated Enfield Corp., note 3.

^{^[x]} R. c. Briscoe, 2010 CSC 13 (par. 21).

^{^[xi]} Magasins à rayons Peoples inc. (Syndic de) c. Wise, [2004] 3 R.C.S. 461, 2004 CSC 68.

^{^[xii]} http://elois.caij.qc.ca/References/AUTFR_docreference_2009-12-01_vol-1.pdf#Page=289.

^{^[xiii]} https://www.cas.ulaval.ca/files/content/sites/college/files/documents/references/memoire-ias-nouv-jan2015.pdf.

*Ivan Tchotourian, professeur en droit des affaires, codirecteur du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ), membre du Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (www.grdsf.ulaval.ca), Faculté de droit, Université Laval.

**Le séminaire s’interroge sur le contenu des normes de gouvernance et leur pertinence dans un contexte de profonds questionnements des modèles économique et financier. Dans le cadre de ce séminaire, il est proposé aux étudiants depuis l’hiver 2014 d’avoir une expérience originale de publication de leurs travaux de recherche qui ont porté sur des sujets d’actualité de gouvernance d’entreprise.

En rappel | Un document complet sur les principes d’éthique et de saine gouvernance dans les organismes à buts charitables

Plusieurs OBNL sont à la recherche d’un document présentant les principes les plus importants s’appliquant aux organismes à buts charitables.

Le site ci-dessous vous mènera à une description sommaire des principes de gouvernance qui vous servirons de guide dans la gestion et la surveillance des OBNL de ce type. J’espère que ces informations vous seront utiles.

Vous pouvez également vous procurer le livre The Complete Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice.

What are the principles ?

The Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice outlines 33 principles of sound practice for charitable organizations and foundations related to legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The Principles should be considered by every charitable organization as a guide for strengthening its effectiveness and accountability. The Principles were developed by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2007 and updated in 2015 to reflect new circumstances in which the charitable sector functions, and new relationships within and between the sectors.

The Principles Organizational Assessment Tool allows organizations to determine their strengths and weaknesses in the application of the Principles, based on its four key content areas (Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight, and Responsible Fundraising). This probing tool asks not just whether an organization has the requisite policies and practices in place, but also enables an organization to determine the efficacy of those practices. After completing the survey (by content area or in full), organizations will receive a score report for each content area and a link to suggested resources for areas of improvement.

Voici une liste des 33 principes énoncés. Bonne lecture !

Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

Laws and Regulations

Code of Ethics

Conflicts of Interest

« Whistleblower » Policy

Document Retention and Destruction

Protection of Assets

Availability of Information to the Public

Effective Governance

Board Responsibilities

Board Meetings

Board Size and Structure

Board Diversity

Board Independence

CEO Evaluation and Compensation

Separation of CEO, Board Chair and Board Treasurer Roles

Board Education and Communication

Evaluation of Board Performance

Board Member Term Limits

Review of Governing Documents

Review of Mission and Goals

Board Compensation

Strong Financial Oversight

Financial Records

Annual Budget, Financial
Performance and Investments

Loans to Directors, Officers,
or Trustees

Resource Allocation for Programs
and Administration

Travel and Other Expense Policies

Expense Reimbursement for
Nonbusiness Travel Companions

Accuracy and Truthfulness of Fundraising Materials

Responsible Fundraising

Compliance with Donor’s Intent

Acknowledgment of Tax-Deductible Contributions

Gift Acceptance Policies

Oversight of Fundraisers

Fundraiser Compensation

Donor Privacy

Le rôle des conseils d’administration lors des fusions et acquisitions

S’il y a un sujet qui est très négligé dans la littérature en gouvernance, c’est bien le rôle que doit jouer un conseil d’administration lors des opérations de fusions et acquisitions (F&A) ainsi que dans la mise en œuvre d’un CA efficace, résultant des deux entités.

J’aurai l’occasion de revenir sur ce thème lorsque je publierai la version française de l’article intitulé Advice for Effective Board Mergers, édité par Johanne Bouchard et Ken Smith.

Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous un article d’Alexandra R. Lajoux, responsable du secteur de la gestion des connaissances à la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).

Les enjeux évoqués dans cet article sont les suivants :

Quel ont les tendances en matière de fusions et acquisitions dans le monde, particulièrement aux É.U. ?
Quel est le rôle du conseil dans les activités de F&A ?
Le CA doit-il être proactif dans les situations de F&A; quelles questions les administrateurs doivent-ils poser eu égard aux occasions et aux risques envisagés ?
Quel sera l’impact des F&A sur la composition et la combinaison des membres de CA des deux entités ?
Lorsque le CA est approché pour l’acquisition d’une autre entreprise (cible), quelles questions les administrateurs devraient-ils poser ?
Si le CA est approché pour vendre la compagnie, ou certaines de ses composantes, quelles préoccupations les administrateurs devraient-ils avoir ?

Cet article vous sensibilisera certainement à la problématique de gouvernance dans des situations de fusions et acquisitions, lesquelles sont de plus en plus importantes dans le monde des entreprises publiques ou privées.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Role of the Board in M&A

What is the current trend in M&A?

Right now, M&A deal value is at its highest since the global financial crisis began, according to Dealogic. In the first half of 2015, deal value rose to $2.28 trillion—approaching the record-setting first half of 2007, when $2.59 trillion changed hands just before the onset of the financial crisis. Global healthcare deal value reached a record $346.7 billion in early 2015, which includes the highest-ever U.S. health M&A activity. And total global deal value for July 2015 alone was $549.7 billion worldwide, entering record books as the second highest monthly total for value since April 2007. The United States played an important part in this developing story: M&A deal value in the first half of 2015 exceeded the $1 trillion mark for announced U.S. targets, with a total of $1.2 trillion.

What is the board’s role in M&A?

This question can be answered in two words: readiness and oversight. At any given time, directors may need to consider either the sale of their own company or the purchase of another company. The key word here is may: nothing obliges a board to buy or sell if a transaction is not in the best interests of the company and its owners. After all, internal growth and independence usually remain options for a company under ordinary circumstances. Nonetheless, the board must still carefully weigh all opportunities to buy or sell as part of its routine corporate oversight.

Director responsibilities will vary by industry and company, but in general, corporate directors have duties of care and loyalty under state law that also apply in the M&A context.

Duty of care. The duty of care requires that directors be informed and exercise appropriate diligence and good faith as they make business decisions and otherwise fulfill their general oversight responsibilities. When reviewing plans to sell a company unit or to buy or merge with another company, the board must exercise proper oversight of management, especially with respect to issues of strategy and compliance with legal obligations such as mandatory disclosures. Pricing is another important consideration, and boards should be wary of claims of synergy. Academic studies offer mixed opinions on the track record for merger returns. Some find positive returns compared to non-acquiring peers (Petrova and Shafer, 2010), especially for frequent acquirers (Cass Business School and Intralinks, 2014). Other studies, for example a recent Fiduciary Group study citing McKinsey, claim a 70% failure rate.

Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires that a director act in the best interests of the corporation, including in the M&A context. Boards can maintain independence from an M&A transaction by appointing a standing committee of the board composed entirely of independent, non-conflicted directors to review the terms of a particular deal with the help of an independent third party, who can render a fairness opinion. (The National Association of Corporate Directors submitted an amicus curiae letter on this issue in May 2015.) For a substantive legal discussion of the board’s role in M&A transactions, see this article by Holly J. Gregory of Sidley Austin, which appeared in Practical Law (May 2014).

Should the board be proactive in M&A, and if so, what are the most important questions directors should ask management about the opportunities and risks that M&A entails?

Even if your board is not currently considering an M&A transaction, it is important to remain aware of M&A as a strategic potential for the company, whether as buyer or seller. Here are some questions to ask, as noted in a recent article by Protiviti:

What potential opportunities and risks are involved in growing through acquisition?

Does M&A activity align with our current strategy and in what ways?

Looking at our portfolio of products and company units, are there any we might consider selling at this time? Why or why not?

Do we know the current market value of our company and its various units (if these are separable)?

What impact will a merger have on the boards of the combining companies, and how can boards weather the change?

M&A typically leads to a change in board composition, with the board of the acquired company (often referred to as the target board) usually being absorbed into the acquiring board. According to a study by Kevin W. McLaughlin and Chinmoy Ghosh of the University of Connecticut, among the mergers of Fortune 500 companies, most directors on the acquiring board (83%) stay on, while only about one-third of directors from the target board (34% of the inside directors and 29% of the outside directors) continue to serve after the merger. The study also shows that for acquiring company boards, outside directors who sit on more than one other outside board have a higher chance of remaining members. For both acquirers and targets, outside directors with CEO experience are more likely to keep their seats.

In the September–October 2014 issue of NACD Directorship, Johanne Bouchard and Ken Smith consider these findings and offer Advice for Effective Board Mergers. Their article outlines what boards can do to prepare for their own mergers. “Whether the board composition changes as a result of the merger or acquisition,” they note, “the board will benefit from holding a special session (or sometimes multiple sessions) to regroup and align before going into the first official board meeting.” At that first meeting they can get to know each other and the leadership team, check strategy, transfer knowledge, establish the role of the board chair, and “begin to function as an effective board.”

If the board is approached by management or a third party with a proposal to buy another company, what issues and questions should directors raise?

The extent of the board’s involvement in a proposed transaction will vary depending on the size of the acquisition and the risks it may pose. If a very large company regularly buys smaller companies in its industry and has already developed a process for finding, acquiring, and integrating these firms, boards need not focus on the details of any particular transaction. They can and should, however, periodically review the entire merger process, from strategy to integration, in the context of strategic opportunities, attendant risks, and operational implications, to make sure that the process is sound and functional.

The board’s primary role is to perform a reality check on management’s plans. A common claim in proposed mergers is that the whole will be greater than the sum of its parts—what Mark Sirower of Deloitte calls “the synergy trap” in his classic book of that name. But the challenges of integration can often result in a loss of value, an issue that is explored in noteworthy articles from McKinsey and Protiviti. Drawing on these articles as well as the thoughtful questions raised in the Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Strategy Development, we have compiled a few queries the board may wish to put to managers and advisors.

Strategic considerations: Why are we considering this deal? If there are synergies, what hard evidence indicates that they will materialize?

Tactical considerations: What processes are now in place to create a pipeline of potential acquisitions, close deals, and execute the post-M&A integration?

Risk: What is the company’s current risk profile, and how does it correspond to the company’s risk appetite?

Capital and cost implications: Does our company have the cash on hand, projected cash flow, and/or available credit to commit to this transaction?

Operations: What changes will need to be made to the current operating structure and logistics following the merger? Will the supply chain be affected?

Talent: As we blend the human resources from the two companies, will we have the right talent to make this merger a success?

Technology: Is the company’s technology infrastructure capable of supporting the planned merger? How will the acquired company’s technology be treated post-merger?

Culture: Will the merger involve a blending of two different cultures? Do we foresee conflicts? If so, what are our plans for resolving them? Will there be a new post-merger culture? How can we ensure that all retained employees thrive in the new environment?

Monitoring Progress: What are the dashboard components for this deal? What elements will management monitor and how frequently? What dashboard metrics will the board use to measure the transaction’s overall success?

If the board is approached by management or a third party to sell the company or a company unit, what issues and questions should directors raise?

While many constituencies will have a stake in any proposed company sale (including notably employees), shareholders’ main focus will be price. The two critical legal considerations in this regard are the Revlon doctrine (for public companies) and fraudulent conveyance (for asset-based transactions, usually relating to private companies).

Revlon doctrine. In the landmark case of Revlon Inc. vs. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings (1986), the court described the role of the board of directors as that of a price-oriented “neutral auctioneer” once a decision has been made to sell the company. This Revlon “doctrine” or “standard” is alive and well even today. It was cited in the In re: Family Dollar Stores decision of December 2014, in which the court denied a stockholder action claiming that the Family Dollar Stores board had violated its Revlon duty by merging with Dollar Tree Inc. and by failing to consider a bid from Dollar General Corp. According to recent commentary by Francis G.X. Pileggi, a regular columnist for NACD Directorship, this case showed an “enhanced scrutiny standard of review for breach of fiduciary duty claims under the Revlon standard.”

Fraudulent conveyance. All company directors, whether of public or private companies, have a duty to make sure that the company being sold is represented accurately to the buyer. Otherwise they can be sued for approving a “fraudulent conveyance,” especially in an asset sale. Fraudulent conveyance lawsuits became very common during the leveraged buyout era of the 1980s, when acquirers that overpaid for assets using borrowed funds failed to generate returns and tried to recoup losses. This longstanding legal concept, like the Revlon doctrine, is still in current use and was recently cited in relation to the LyondellBasell merger, according to the law firm of Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC.

***

In light of these concerns, questions to ask before approving the sale of a company or a division might include the following:

Are we certain that the sale is our best option? Have we assessed alternatives?

Under state law and/or our bylaws, do shareholders need to approve this sale?

Have we received a valid fairness opinion on the price?

Does this sale conform with the Revlon doctrine?

If this is an asset sale, are we sure that the assets have been properly appraised?

By asking the kinds of questions discussed in this brief commentary, boards can improve the chances that any M&A transaction, if pursued, will create optimal value for all participants.

Caractéristiques des bons administrateurs pour le réseau collégial | Danielle Malboeuf

Nous publions ici un quatrième billet de Danielle Malboeuf* laquelle nous a soumis ses réflexions sur les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux les 23 et 27 novembre 2013 et le 24 novembre 2014 à titre d’auteure invitée.

Dans un premier article, publié le 23 novembre 2013 sur ce blogue, on insistait sur l’importance, pour les C.A. des Cégep, de se donner des moyens pour assurer la présence d’administrateurs compétents dont le profil correspond à celui recherché. D’où les propositions adressées à la Fédération des cégeps et aux C.A. pour élaborer un profil de compétences et pour faire appel à la Banque d’administrateurs certifiés du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS), le cas échéant. Un autre enjeu identifié dans ce billet concernait la remise en question de l’indépendance des administrateurs internes.

Le troisième article portait sur l’efficacité du rôle du président du conseil d’administration (PCA).

Dans ce quatrième billet, l’auteure insiste sur les qualités et les caractéristiques des bons administrateurs dans le contexte du réseau collégial québécois (CÉGEP)

________________________________________

De bons administrateurs pour le réseau collégial

par

Danielle Malboeuf*

Le réseau collégial vit une période difficile. Chaque institution d’enseignement est présentement confrontée aux nombreuses coupures budgétaires. Cela leur demande de faire des choix difficiles tout en préservant la qualité de leurs services et en tentant de ne pas limiter leur développement. Dans ce contexte, la présence d’un conseil d’administration (CA) qui exerce ses responsabilités avec diligence et prudence, est essentielle. Chaque administrateur doit se sentir interpellé. Il est donc appelé à participer activement aux réunions, à poser des questions et à alimenter les réflexions pour identifier les meilleures pistes de solutions tout en soutenant les directions des collèges dans leur mise en œuvre. Les compétences et expertises de ces personnes doivent être mises à contribution.

D’ailleurs, monsieur Guy Demers dans son rapport d’étape (janvier 2014) sur le chantier portant sur l’offre de formation collégiale, encourageait les CA à exercer leurs responsabilités. « Les CA des établissements ont un rôle important à jouer à l’égard de la gestion rigoureuse des derniers publics…ont le devoir de provoquer la réflexion sur la pérennité de leurs services dans un contexte de ressources limitées. » (P.79). Les directions des Cégeps doivent donc encourager les membres de leur CA à jouer un rôle qui va au-delà du modèle de fiduciaire et leur permettre d’être des créateurs de valeurs (modèle préconisé par l’Institut sur la gouvernance des organismes publics et privés (IGOPP).

Pour atteindre de haut standard d’excellence, les collèges doivent compter sur un CA performant. Ils doivent donc s’attarder, entre autres, à la composition du CA, aux compétences des administrateurs, leur niveau de participation, la qualité des informations transmises et le déroulement des réunions.

Voici à mon avis les caractéristiques que l’on devrait retrouver chez ces administrateurs:

CRÉDIBLES

Considérant l’importance des décisions prises par ces administrateurs, ils doivent posséder des compétences et une expertise pertinente. D’ailleurs, cette expertise et les responsabilités qui leur sont conviées doivent être connues et reconnues par le milieu. Il ne faut pas hésiter à utiliser les outils de communications institutionnels pour les faire connaître.

De plus, pour identifier les meilleurs éléments, le CA doit élaborer un profil de compétences recherchées pour ses membres et l’utiliser au moment de la sélection des administrateurs. Ainsi, au moment de solliciter la nomination d’un administrateur externe auprès du gouvernement, ce profil devrait être utilisé.

COMPÉTENTS

Il est essentiel que ces personnes soient bien au fait de leurs rôles et responsabilités. Des formations devraient donc leur être offertes en ce sens. Toutefois, cette formation ne doit pas se limiter à leur faire connaître les obligations légales et financières qui s’appliquent au milieu collégial mais les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance doivent leur être également enseignées. Par ailleurs, rappelons que pour tirer profit de ces compétences, la direction doit y faire appel lors des rencontres du CA.

Signalons que tous les administrateurs doivent être exempts de toute situation de conflits d’intérêts. Si, sur une base ponctuelle, un administrateur se retrouve dans une telle situation, il doit quitter la réunion. De plus, il faut s’assurer que les administrateurs internes ne subissent pas de pressions de leurs groupes respectifs. Ainsi, il faut s’attarder à leur processus de sélection et leur rappeler que quels que soit leur provenance, ils doivent toujours agir dans l’intérêt du collège et de sa clientèle.

INFORMÉS

Considérant les pouvoirs du CA qui agit tant sur les aspects financiers et légaux que sur les orientations du collège, il est essentiel que la direction fasse preuve de transparence et transmette aux membres toutes les informations pertinentes. Par ailleurs, les administrateurs ne doivent pas hésiter à poser des questions et à demander des informations additionnelles, s’il y a lieu. Le président du CA peut dans ce sens, jouer un rôle essentiel. Il doit porter un regard critique sur les documents qui seront transmis avant les rencontres. Lors des réunions du CA, il encourage tous les administrateurs à poser des questions et s’assure de la qualité des interventions.

Lors des périodes de huis clos (en l’absence des membres de la direction), il profite de ce moment pour s’assurer que les administrateurs ont bien compris l’information transmise et qu’il n’existe aucune ambiguïté. Dans le cas contraire, il doit partager avec la direction les questionnements soulevés et s’assurer de la mise en place d’actions appropriées. Ainsi, il peut s’agir de revenir lors d’une prochaine réunion sur un sujet pour pousser plus à fond les réflexions et formuler des recommandations. Et, si nécessaire, ne pas hésiter à demander le dépôt d’une analyse de marché pour la mise en œuvre de nouveaux projets.

OUTILLÉS

Pour permettre aux administrateurs de porter des jugements adéquats et de juger de la pertinence et de l’efficacité de sa gestion, le collège doit fournir aux administrateurs des indicateurs. Les administrateurs devraient, d’abord, porter une attention toute particulière aux indicateurs présents dans le plan stratégique et en assurer le suivi sur une base régulière.

Il existe également, des indicateurs portant sur la réussite scolaire et la diplomation qui permettent à l’institution de se comparer à d’autres collèges et aux différents programmes institutionnels afin de juger de leur performance. Mais, il existe assurément d’autres indicateurs qui peuvent s’avérer intéressants. Il faut les demander ou proposer, s’il y a lieu, la mise en place de telles données.

Toutefois, lors de l’analyse de ces informations, j’invite les administrateurs à la prudence. Plusieurs facteurs peuvent influencer un indicateur. Il faut s’en préoccuper et en tenir compte.

Pour terminer, je me permets de rappeler que la principale qualité recherchée chez un administrateur d’un collège, c’est son engagement. Ces personnes qui agissent sur une base bénévole, investissent beaucoup de temps par leur présence aux réunions du CA et des sous-comités tout en prenant le temps de lire l’ensemble des documents qui leurs sont transmis. Il s’agit d’une implication sociale à souligner et à encourager.

_______________________

___________________________

Articles sur la gouvernance des CEGEP publié sur mon blogue par l’auteure :

(1) LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEP

(2) Les grands enjeux de la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux

(3) L’exercice de la démocratie dans la gouvernance des institutions d’enseignement collégiaux

Synergie entre le chef de la direction et le président du CA : seize (16) conseils essentiels

Aujourd’hui, Johanne Bouchard* agit à titre d’auteure invitée sur mon blogue en gouvernance. On retrouve son dixième billet sur son premier e-Book 1 publié sur son site. Sous l’entête « What I write about », blogs in French, l’on retrouve tous ses articles en français.

L’auteure a une solide expérience d’interventions de consultation auprès de conseils d’administration de sociétés américaines et d’accompagnements auprès de hauts dirigeants de sociétés publiques.

Dans ce billet, elle revient sur l’importance de créer une synergie entre le président du CA et le premier dirigeant. Dans un billet précédent, elle décrit les quatre piliers essentiels à de bonnes relations entre les deux parties : la confiance, le respect, la communication et la collaboration.

Dans ce deuxième article portant sur le même thème, l’auteure présente plusieurs conseils qui devraient guider les relations entre le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) et le président et chef de la direction (PCD)

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

La synergie entre le président du CA et le chef de la direction : seize (16) conseils essentiels

par

Johanne Bouchard

La synergie entre le président du CA et le chef de la direction : seize (16) conseils essentiels

Tel que je l’ai déjà mentionné lors du billet intitulé « La synergie entre le président du conseil d’administration et le chef de la direction – Les quatre piliers de fondations solides », lorsque la relation entre le président du conseil d’administration et le chef de la direction est solide, elle contribue à créer un climat et une dynamique au sein du conseil d’administration qui favorise une plus grande réussite.

Voici mes seize (16) conseils pour guider ces deux dirigeants importants de l’entreprise en soutenant leur synergie :

Pour le président du conseil (PCA) :

Soutenez, agissez comme mentor et conseillez votre chef de la direction. Maintenez une politique de porte ouverte, une fois que tous les deux aurez convenu des tenants et aboutissants de la communication entre vous ;
Appréciez ouvertement le travail et les efforts de l’équipe de direction ;
Posez les bonnes questions à votre chef de la direction afin de comprendre la logique derrière les décisions stratégiques qu’il a prises, la performance générale de l’entreprise et l’efficacité de l’équipe de direction ;
Participez aux conférences téléphoniques ou aux diffusions vidéo par Internet (vidéo Web) où l’on dévoile les résultats trimestriels prévisibles de l’entreprise. Examinez les états financiers et les résultats trimestriels prévisibles avec le chef de la direction et le directeur financier. Agréez si cela est justifié, mais abstenez-vous de faire des commentaires inutiles. Apportez vos commentaires constructifs, si ceux-ci peuvent ajouter de la valeur aux échanges. En cas de doute, recherchez les conseils d’un tiers ou d’un autre membre du conseil d’administration qui pourrait conseiller adéquatement le chef de la direction ;
Tenez-vous au courant de toute stratégie adoptée par le chef de la direction, puis discutez ouvertement avec ce dernier, et même questionnez ces stratégies sans toutefois interférer avec ses décisions ;
Abordez ouvertement la planification d’une éventuelle relève au poste de chef de la direction, en vous souvenant que ceci peut être un sujet épineux ;
Joignez-vous au conseil d’administration d’une autre entreprise qui est dirigée par un président du conseil d’administration et un chef de la direction que vous respectez. Continuez d’évoluer et d’apprendre en tant qu’administrateur indépendant, qui peut observer une autre relation dynamique entre un président du conseil d’administration et un chef de la direction ;
Toutefois, ne vous joignez pas à tellement d’autres conseils d’administration que vous ne puissiez pas allouer le temps requis pour alimenter la synergie de votre relation avec votre propre chef de la direction.

Pour le chef de la direction (PCD) :

Tirez parti de votre président chaque fois que possible, à titre de mentor et de conseiller ;
Assurez l’accès à l’équipe de direction de sorte que le président puisse s’associer à ses efforts et contribuer à faciliter la planification de la relève ;
Accueillez les demandes de renseignements de votre président, en supposant qu’elles sont faites correctement. Ne vous sentez pas scruté, mais à juste titre, plutôt pris en charge ;
Invitez le président, au nom du conseil d’administration, à écouter les conférences dévoilant les résultats trimestriels prévisibles de l’entreprise. Passez en revue les états financiers et les résultats trimestriels prévisibles avec le président et le directeur financier ;
Suscitez les observations des administrateurs du conseil d’administration, du vice-président des ressources humaines, le conseiller juridique et le directeur financier concernant votre relation avec le président. Ne comptez pas sur votre propre vision de cette relation ;
Lorsque vous vous sentez frustrés ou que vous détectez une friction potentielle avec le président, n’arrivez pas à une conclusion hâtive et ne blâmez personne. Tendez la main au président et partagez candidement votre opinion sur ce qui vous inquiète ;
Anticipez déjà le moment où il faudra passer la direction à la relève. Ne créez pas un éléphant qui n’a plus sa place aux réunions du conseil d’administration ;
Joignez-vous au conseil d’administration d’une autre entreprise qui est dirigée par un président du conseil d’administration et un chef de la direction que vous respectez. Continuez d’évoluer et d’apprendre en tant qu’administrateur indépendant, qui peut observer une autre relation dynamique entre un président du conseil d’administration et un chef de la direction.

À la fois pour le président du conseil et le chef de la direction :

Vous devez définir clairement et accepter la meilleure façon de communiquer avec l’autre. Soyez diplomate dans la façon dont vous vous exprimez. Soyez sensibles et à l’écoute de la communication de l’autre.

Voici trois (3) moyens de communiquer ensemble et un exemple des sujets traités :

(a) Courriels (Intranet) : les affaires courantes, le statut d’un délai et une confirmation de réunion ;

(b) Appels téléphoniques ou réunions en ligne à distance : nouvelles questions stratégiques, préoccupations d’intérêt potentiel pour le conseil d’administration ;

(c) Réunions en personne : les points urgents qui soulèvent des drapeaux rouges, les questions du ressort du conseil d’administration, les violations dans le respect des piliers relationnels entre les cadres.

Convenez de toutes les questions qui sont du ressort possible du conseil d’administration afin que vous soyez à la même page avant de vous rassembler dans la salle de réunion. N’attendez pas à la réunion du conseil d’administration pour définir un processus fonctionnel pour les questions que vous pouvez commencer à résoudre ensemble afin de maximiser le déroulement de la réunion.

Si le président du conseil d’administration et le chef de la direction font preuve d’ouverture, s’adaptent facilement et sont désireux de cultiver une relation saine, la synergie et le succès suivront. Si vous croyez réellement que vous pouvez apprendre l’un de l’autre, il en sera ainsi.

_____________________________________________

*Johanne Bouchard est consultante auprès de conseils d’administration, de chefs de la direction et de comités de direction. Johanne a développé une expertise au niveau de la dynamique et la de composition d’un conseil d’administration. Après l’obtention de son diplôme d’ingénieure en informatique, sa carrière l’a menée à œuvrer dans tous les domaines du secteur de la technologie, du marketing et de la stratégie à l’échelle mondiale.

Pour en connaître plus sur le site de Johanne Bouchard

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