Dix leçons tirées d’une multitude d’entrevues avec des PCD de PME **


Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des entrevues avec les PCD (CEO) d’entreprises de petites capitalisations. C’est ce que nous présente Adam J. Epstein*, un spécialiste de « hedge fund » qui investit des centaines de millions de dollars dans les petites entreprises. L’article a été publié dans mc2MicroCap par Ian Cassel.

J’ai trouvé les conseils très pertinents pour les personnes intéressées à connaître la réalité des évaluations d’entreprises par des investisseurs privés. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

10 Lessons Learned from Interviewing Hundreds of MicroCap CEOs

1)    Preparation – there is no reason to waste your time and someone else’s by sitting down with a CEO to discuss their company without preparing – really preparing.  To me, “really preparing” doesn’t mean looking at Yahoo Finance for a few minutes in the taxi on the way to the meeting, or flipping through the company’s PowerPoint on your phone.  That kind of preparation is akin to walking up a few flights of stairs with some grocery bags to get ready for climbing Mt. Rainier.  To be really prepared for a first meeting means reading/skimming the most recent 10K, the most recent 10Q, the most recent proxy filing, the management presentation, any previous management presentations (more on this later), a recent sell-side company or industry report, and an Internet search of the management team’s backgrounds (with particular emphasis on any prior SEC, NASD, or other state/federal legal problems).  It’s hard to overemphasize how many would-be micro-cap investing disasters can be headed off at the pass by reading what’s said, and not said, and then having the opportunity to ask the CEO directly about what you’ve found.

Stream Near Mt Rainier

2)    Non-Starters – for better or worse, the micro-cap world is home to some “colorful” management teams.  After all of the time served in this regard, absolutely nothing surprises me anymore.  I have found CEOs who were simultaneously running 3 companies, CEOs who were banned from running a public company by the SEC, management presentations that were largely plagiarized, CEOs who shouted profanities in response to basic questions about their “skin in the game,” and CEOs who not only didn’t understand Reg. FD, but clearly didn’t even know it existed.  When in doubt, it’s much better not to invest at all than to make a bad investment; fortunately there are always thousands of other companies to consider.

3)    Company .PPT – these presentations speak volumes about what kind of company you are dealing with if you’re paying attention: a) my colleagues and I came up with a golden rule during my institutional investing tenure, namely that the length of a .ppt presentation is, more often than not, inversely proportional to the quality of the micro-cap company being presented (i.e., any micro-cap company that can’t be adequately presented in less than 20 slides is a problem, and 15 is even better); b) if the slides are too complex to understand on a standalone basis then either the company has a problem or you’re about to invest in something you don’t sufficiently understand – neither is good; c) NEO bios, market information, service/product/IP, strategy, financials, and use of proceeds should all receive equal billing (when buying a house, would you go and visit a house with an online profile that only features pictures of the front yard and the garage?); d) .ppt formatting and spelling/syntax problems are akin to showing up at an important job interview with giant pieces of spinach in your teeth; e) when reviewing use of proceeds (for a prospective financing) or milestones, look up prior investor presentations to see how well they did with prior promises – history often repeats itself; f) treat forward looking projections for what they typically are – fanciful at best, and violations of Reg. FD at worst; and g) micro-cap companies that flaunt celebrities as directors, partners, or investors should be approached cautiously.

4)    NEO Bios – as Ian Cassel often points out quite rightly in my opinion, micro-cap investing is an exercise in wagering on jockeys more than horses.  One of the principal ways prospective investors have to assess jockeys is the manner in which professional backgrounds are set forth; i.e., management bios.  Like a company .ppt, bios of named executive officers speak volumes about the people being described. Here are some things to look out for: a) bios that don’t contain specific company names (at least for a 10 year historic period) typically don’t for a reason, and it’s unlikely to be positive (e.g., “Mr. Smith has held senior management roles with several large technology companies”); b) it’s a good idea to compare SEC bios with bios you might find for the same people on other websites (remember the “three company CEO” referred to earlier?); c) bios that don’t contain any educational references or only highlight executive programs at Harvard, Wharton, Stanford, etc.; d) company websites that don’t have any management/director bios (surprising how many there are); and e) CEOs and CFOs who have never held those jobs before in a public company (to be clear, lots of micro-cap NEOs are “first-timers,” but it’s something you should at least factor into the risk profile of the investment).

5)    Management Conduct – just as management bios speak volumes, so does their conduct at in person one-on-one meetings.  More specifically: a) organized, professional corporate leaders rarely look disheveled or have bad hygiene; b) service providers chosen by companies also represent the company, so the previous observation applies to bankers/lawyers as well; c) CEOs who are overly chatty about non-business issues might not be keen to talk about their companies; d) if a CEO seems glued to their .ppt presentation (i.e., essentially just reading you the slides), tell them to close their laptops and just talk about the company with no visual aids – you will learn an awful lot about them in the ensuing 5 minutes; e) be on the lookout for NEOs or service providers cutting each other off, disagreeing with each other, or talking over one another;  f) when asking questions of the CEO or CFO watch their body language – moving around in their seats, running hands through their hair, perspiration, and less eye contact are nonverbal signs of duress (it’s one of the reasons why in-person meetings with management are always preferable to phone calls); g) if there are more than one NEOs in attendance, are they listening to each other (it’s rarely a great sign when other execs are looking at their phones during meetings); h) is the CEO providing careful, thoughtful answers or are they shooting from the hip – loose lips virtually always sink ships; i) did the CEO answer any questions with “I don’t know” – even great CEOs can’t possibly know the answer to every question about their companies; and j) something partially tongue-in-cheek just to think about – we know from everyday life that when someone starts a sentence with “with all due respect” what inevitably  follows is, well, something disrespectful, and when a CEO repeatedly says “to be honest” what inevitably follows is….

6)    Service Providers – micro-cap service providers (bankers, lawyers, auditors, IR firms, etc.) can run the gamut from highly professional to so bad that they can actually jeopardize companies with their advice.  While it certainly can take a while to learn “the good, the bad, and the ugly” in the micro-cap ecosystem, you can learn a lot about the CEO by asking him/her to take a few minutes to explain why the company’s service providers are the best choices for the shareholders.  It perhaps goes without saying that if a CEO can’t speak artfully, and convincingly in this regard, then buyer beware.

7)    Corporate Governance – spans the full continuum in micro-cap companies from top-notch to nothing more than a mirage.  One way to quickly ferret out which flavor of governance you’re dealing with is to ask a CEO to succinctly set forth the company’s strategy (i.e., goals, risks, opportunities, customers, etc.), and subsequently ask the CEO to describe how each seated director assists with the fundamental elements of achieving that strategy.  Though oversimplified, material disconnects in this regard are very likely to illustrate some governance challenges.  Also, ask the CEO how each of the directors came to the company; if all of the directors were brought to the company by the CEO, it’s fair to ask the CEO how confident an investor should be that the board is suitably independent to monitor the CEOs performance (one of the principal roles of all boards).

8)    Public Company IQ – easily one of the biggest problems with investing in the micro-cap arena is the conspicuous lack of (relevant, successful) capital markets and corporate finance experience in boardrooms and C-suites.  As alluded to earlier, it’s a fact of life that a large percentage of micro-cap officers and directors lack appreciable tenures in shepherding small public companies (to be clear, this doesn’t mean they aren’t smart, successful, and sophisticated, it just means they haven’t had lots of experience in small public companies).  Unlike larger public companies, small public companies can execute relatively well, and still toil in obscurity creating little or no value for shareholders.   It’s a good idea to evaluate the same when meeting with management, because companies with low “public company IQs” are more likely to underperform all else being equal.  Be on the lookout for CEOs who: a) can’t articulate a sensible strategy for maintaining or increasing trading volume; b) seem to regularly undertake financings that are more dilutive than similarly situated peer companies; c) frequently authorize the issuance of press releases that don’t appear to contain material information; d) blame some or all of their capital markets challenges on short-seller/market-making conspiracy theories; and e) can’t name the company’s largest 5 shareholders, their approximate holdings, and the last time he/she spoke to each.

9)    Follow-Up – CEOs who promise to follow-up after meetings with clarified answers, customer references, or more information but don’t are tacitly underscoring for you that they are either disorganized, disingenuous, don’t care about investors or all three.  The opposite is also not good; for example, if the company’s internal or external IR professionals subsequently convey information that seems inappropriate (from a Reg. FD standpoint) – it probably is.

10) Cautionary Note – Bernard Madoff undoubtedly would have passed these tests and a lot more with flying colors.  Sometimes the “bad guys” are really smart and charming and you’re going to either lose most of your money or get defrauded, or both. It’s happened to me, and it’s maddening and humbling at the same time.  Hence, the apt phrase: high risk, high return.

It’s easy, in my experience anyway, to get so skeptical about micro-cap companies that it can be paralyzing.  But, just when you’re about to throw in the towel, along comes a compelling growth prospect run by management with as much integrity and skill as the day is long, and it serves as a poignant reminder of everything that’s great about investing in small public companies.

Like most “best-of” lists, this isn’t intended to be exhaustive by any stretch of the imagination.  In addition to making money and promoting US jobs/innovation, one of the best parts of investing in small public companies in my opinion is continuing to hone the craft, and learn from other investors and their experiences.  Accordingly, add/subtract per your own experiences, and happy hunting.

_________________________________________

*Adam J. Epstein advises small-cap boards through his firm, Third Creek Advisors, LLC, is a National Association of Corporate Directors Board Leadership Fellow, and the author of The Perfect Corporate Board: A Handbook for Mastering the Unique Challenges of Small-Cap Companies, (McGraw Hill, 2012).  He was co-founder and principal of Enable Capital Management, LLC.

** En reprise

Enhanced by Zemanta

Les dirigeants d’entreprises privées font-ils de bons administrateurs d’OBNL ?


Est-ce que les hauts dirigeants, reconnus pour leurs habiletés de gestionnaires, font de bons administrateurs d’organisations à buts non lucratifs (OBNL) ?

La thèse de William G. Bowen* (1994) est à l’effet que beaucoup de représentants du monde des affaires, siégeant sur des conseils d’administration d’OBNL, le font pour une multitude de raisons n’ayant pas toujours de relations avec les intérêts de l’organisation, mais servent plutôt à faire avancer leurs intérêts personnels !

Eugene H. Fram**, expert en gouvernance des OBNL et auteur du billet publié sur le blogue Nonprofit Management, croit qu’il faut peindre un portrait plus nuancé en 2014. Selon lui, les comités de gouvernance et de mise en nomination ne devraient cependant jamais prendre pour acquis que l’efficacité d’un gestionnaire dans une entreprise privée sera garante d’une valeur ajoutée pour l’OBNL.

Les perceptions de ceux-ci sont trop souvent à l’effet que les OBNL sont plus permissives, moins exigeantes, moins sérieuses …  La réalité est tout autre et les dirigeants devraient y penser à deux fois avant de s’engager sur un C.A. d’OBNL ! Plusieurs témoigneront que les réunions de ces conseils sont très souvent complexes, sensitives, moins structurées et, souvent, éprouvantes pour des « gestionnaires chevronnés »…

On a ici un beau sujet d’étude (de recherche) car le modèle d’affaires des OBNL suppose toujours une contribution remarquable des gens d’affaires !

Pensez-vous que la situation a beaucoup évoluée depuis l’affirmation de Bowen, il y a 20 ans ? La gouvernance des OBNL a-t-elle changée au point de modifier les perceptions des gens d’affaires ?

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

 

Do Today’s Business Leaders Make Effective Nonprofit Directors?

The names of the new board nominees have been announced. They include several outstanding recruits from the business community. Will these new formidable directors perform well in the nonprofit environment? William G. Bowen, a veteran director in both the for-profit and nonprofit environments, raised the following questions about such beginnings in a 1994 article:* Is it true that well-regarded representatives of the business world are often surprisingly ineffective as members of nonprofit boards? Do they seem to have checked their analytical skills and their “toughness” at the door? If this is true in some considerable number of cases, what is the explanation?

An example of the U.S. Nonprofit Organization ...
An example of the U.S. Nonprofit Organization postage meter marking made with a Pitney Bowes mailstream system. Letter. 2007. Русский: Пример штампа франкировальной машины системы Pitney Bowes, имеющего тариф « Nonprofit Organization » (США, 2007). Письмо. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Are Bowen’s observations about directors’ questionable motivations for accepting director positions still applicable in the 21st century? He noted that some nonprofit directors accept board positions because they are dedicated to the organization’s mission, vision and values. But he also hypothesized that business leaders are sometimes motivated to join nonprofit boards for a variety of other reasons. They may regard board membership as a “vacation from the bottom line … or the enjoyment of a membership in a new ‘club’.” Also they perhaps join nonprofit boards to “soften” community perceptions that, as tough bottom-line executives, they also may care as much about human issues as they care about shareholder returns. (It would probably be costly or impossible to obtain objective data of this observation.) Press reports through the years, since 1994, have indicated that such attitudes still hold leadership sway in nonprofit organizations. (See: Nonprofit Board Crisis.com)

In today’s nonprofit environment, there may remain senior business leaders or groups who are less serious about the responsibilities incumbent upon board members, as noted by Bowen. If this is the situation, a high level of board permissiveness, allowed by business-oriented directors and others, is still causing a level of board dysfunction business leaders would never allow on their own boards.

____________________________________

21st Century Reflections on Bowen’s Observations

Since Bowen’s 1994 observations, there have been some improvements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has driven some of the changes in audit committee’s procedures, overviews of internal controls, whistle-blower requirement, CEO’s & CFOs signatures attesting to financial statement accuracy, etc. Although not required by law, some larger nonprofits have adhered to all the provisions of the Act. I also feel business leaders now think more deeply about joining a nonprofit board, especially after the Penn State scandal and the reputation embarrassment the board encountered.

But do these changes indicate substantial change reducing the permissiveness in the nonprofit environment Bowen described? Anecdotally, here is a typical comment that I continue to hear, this one from the board chair large nonprofit with 300 employees. “We don’t expect the same standards of management performance that the business organization has.”

However, I am optimistic about the future. As nonprofit boards select more professional type CEO’s to lead their organizations, whether they are hired internally or externally, more change will take place. Hopefully, if boards want to retain these people, this movement should place some subtle pressures on board nomination committees to seek more candidates whose motivation is to focus on mission, vision and values, along with balanced budgets. A new breed should readily understand that this focus has the same meaning to nonprofit stakeholders, as a profit focus does to business stakeholders.

_____________________________________________

* William G. Bowen (1994), “When a Business Leader Joins a Nonprofit Board,” Harvard Business Review, September-October. Bowen currently is president emeritus of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and former president of Princeton University in Princeton. He has served as an outside director for a wide variety of for-profit and nonprofit organizations.

**Eugene H. Fram PRACTITIONER AND PROFESSOR OF MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT, AUTHOR & CONSULTANT. ALSO SIGNIFICANT EXPERTISE WITH BUSINESS & NONPROFIT BOARDS OF DIRECTORS.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !


IMG_00001194

Voici le condensé d’un article publié par Deloitte en 2011 et que j’ai relayé à mes premiers abonnés au début de la création de mon blogue.

En revisitant mes billets, j’ai été en mesure de constater que plusieurs parutions étaient encore d’une grande pertinence. Ainsi, afin de revenir sur mes débuts comme blogueur, je vous présente un document de la firme Deloitte qui énumère dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration doivent éviter de faire.

Les suggestions sont toujours aussi d’actualité. Bonne relecture !

Avoid presentation overload

Presentations should not dominate board meetings. If your board meetings consist of a scripted agenda packed with one presentation after another, there may not be sufficient time for substantive discussions. The majority of board meetings should be focused on candid dialogue about the critical strategic issues facing the company. The advance meeting materials should comprise information that provides the basis for the discussions held during the meeting. Management should feel confident that the board will read these pre-meeting materials, and the board must commit an adequate amount of time in advance of the meeting to do so.

Avoid understating the importance of compliance

There is no room for a culture of complacency when it comes to compliance with laws and regulations. As noted in the Deloitte publication

Avoid postponing the CEO succession discussion

CEO succession planning is one of the primary roles of the board. With the changing governance landscape and new and proposed regulations, the board has a full agenda these days. However, it is important to occasionally take a step back to ensure the board is addressing this important responsibility. During this time of rebuilding and prior to the implementation of new regulations, boards should assess where time is being spent and perhaps redirect focus on succession.

It is important to note that the succession planning process is continual and doesn’t end when a new CEO is selected. As the company evolves, its needs change, as do the skills required of the leadership team. The board needs to ensure that a leadership pipeline is developed and that its members have ample opportunity to connect with the next generation of leaders.

Avoid the trap of homogeneity

The topic of board composition and having the « right » people on the board continues to receive much attention. The SEC has proposed rules that would require more disclosure about director qualifications, including what makes each director qualified to participate on certain board committees. The shift to independent board members facilitated a move away from a « friends on the board » approach to a new mix. However, the board needs to assess whether this new mix translates into a positive and productive board dynamic. Boards should take a closer look at the expertise, experience and other qualities of each member to ensure the board that can provide the right expertise. Diversity of thought provides the perspectives needed to effectively address critical topics, which can contribute to greater productivity and ultimately a stronger board.

Avoid excessive short-term focus

Perpetual existence is one of the principal reasons for the initial development of a corporation. However, recent history offers many examples of modern corporate entities managing to reach short-term results at the expense of long-term prosperity. The board can demonstrate its leadership by being the voice of reason and openly discussing the sustainability of strategic initiatives. This can result in a well-governed company with a greater chance of achieving long-term, sustainable success.

Avoid approvals if you don’t understand the issue

Complex issues can have significant implications for the survival of an organization. It is up to directors to make sure that they understand issues that can alter the future of an enterprise before a vote is taken. This doesn’t require dissecting every detail, but it should consist of a thorough investigation and assessment of the risks and rewards of proposed transactions. If you don’t adequately understand the issue, ask for more education from management or external experts. It comes down to being able to ask the tough questions of management and probing further if things do not make sense. Consensus doesn’t mean going along with the crowd. True consensus results from a thorough debate and airing of the issues before the board, resulting in a more informed vote by directors.

Avoid discounting the value of experience

As a director, it is important to recognize the value that your experience can bring to the issues at hand. Good governance doesn’t mean checking all the right boxes. Rather, it is bringing together the diverse skills and experiences of each director to lead the company through challenges. Directors can provide greater insight by being ‘situationally aware’ when evaluating events and courses of action to take. Just as the captain of a ship needs to understand the various environmental factors that influence navigation, boards need to understand the external risks that may have an impact on the navigation of the company. Consider the context of the current issue, how it is similar to, or different from, previous experiences, what alternatives could be considered, and how outside forces may impede a successful outcome. Don’t discount the value of experience just because it was gained outside the boardroom.

Avoid stepping over the line into management’s role

A board that makes management decisions will find it difficult to hold the CEO accountable for the outcome. A director’s role is to oversee the efforts of management rather than stepping into management’s shoes. Directors must make a concentrated effort to ensure that they have clarity on management’s role, which is to operate the company. The distinction between the board and management is often blurred by directors who forget that they are not charged with running the day-to-day operations of an enterprise. This doesn’t prevent a director from getting into the details of an issue facing the company, but it does mean that directors should avoid stepping over the line.

Avoid ignoring shareholders

A company’s shareholders are among the most important and potentially vocal constituents of the enterprise. Concerns can sometimes be addressed by providing shareholders an audience with the board to air their concerns. Historically, compliance with the SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) rules has been perceived as a hindrance to directors engaging in shareholder dialogue and meetings. As outlined in the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance policy briefing.

Avoid a bias to risk aversion

With the recent focus on excessive risk-taking and its impact on the credit crisis, there is concern that companies and boards may become risk-averse.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Comment se préparer aux agissements plus audacieux des actionnaires activistes ?


Joseph Cyriac, Ruth De Backer, et Justin Sanders de la firme McKinsey Insights ont produit un formidable document de recherche sur la contribution et sur l’impact des activités des actionnaires activistes. Ceux-ci ciblent de plus en plus d’entreprises … et des entreprises de plus en plus grandes.

Une recherche empirique conduite par les auteurs indique :

(1) les types de facteurs susceptibles de les attirer

(2) comment les directions et les conseils d’administration doivent réagir à l’annonce de l’intérêt.

Voici trois constats qui découlent de l’étude :

1. Les campagnes menées par les activistes génèrent, en moyenne, un accroissement de la valeur des actions

2. L’issue d’un arrangement négocié tend à produire un rendement aux actionnaires plus élevé sur une période de trois ans

3. La plupart des campagnes débutent de manière collaborative mais tournent à « l’hostilité ».

Voici un court extrait d’un article que je vous invite à lire au complet pour une meilleure compréhension de ce qu’il faut faire lorsqu’une entreprise est approchée par un investisseur activiste.

Bonne lecture !

Preparing for bigger, bolder shareholder activists !

Activist investors1 are getting ever more adventurous. Last year, according to our analysis, the US-listed companies that activists targeted had an average market capitalization of $10 billion—up from $8 billion just a year earlier and less than $2 billion at the end of the last decade. They’ve also been busier, launching an average of 240 campaigns in each of the past three years—more than double the number a decade ago. And even though activists are a relatively small group, with only $75 billion in combined assets under management compared with the $2.5 trillion hedge-fund industry overall, they’ve enjoyed a higher rate of asset growth than hedge funds and attracted new partnerships with traditional investors. As a result, they have both the capital and the leverage to continue engaging largecap companies.P1060442

Shareholders generally benefit. Our analysis of 400 activist campaigns (out of 1,400 launched against US companies over the past decade) finds that, among large companies for which data are available, the median activist campaign reverses a downward trajectory in target-company performance and generates excess shareholder returns that persist for at least 36 months (Exhibit 1).2

Exhibit 1 : Activist campaigns, on average, generate a sustained increase in shareholder returns
Enhanced by Zemanta

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller


Vous trouverez ci-dessous un article publié dans Lesaffaires.com le 31 mars 2014. Dans cet entrevue, le journaliste me demande de faire une synthèse des tendances les plus significatives en gouvernance de sociétés. Bonne lecture !

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance.

Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé :

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité.

« Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance.

À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront.

Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra.

L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme.

De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises.

Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé.

La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable.

Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera.

Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir.

Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera.

Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme.

La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’autoévaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Vous désirez en savoir plus sur les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ? Visitez le site du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés et suivez le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Formations spécialisées en gouvernance | Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) de l’Université Laval offrira, en mai prochain, trois formations spécialisées de haut niveau :

(1) Gouvernance des services financiers

(2) Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

(3) Gouvernance des PME

Sur une formule de deux jours intensifs, chaque formation est animée par des experts chevronnés et est adaptée aux besoins des administrateurs, cadres et dirigeants. Les trois formations se tiendront à Montréal, au Centre de conférences Le 1000.

Montréal - la tour IBM et le 1000 de La Gauche...

Gouvernance des services financiers

La formation Gouvernance des services financiers aura lieu les 6 et 7 mai 2014. Elle est destinée aux administrateurs, cadres et hauts dirigeants du secteur des services financiers qui œuvrent dans le domaine bancaire, les assurances, les valeurs mobilières et les organismes d’encadrement légal et corporatif. Cette formation vise à favoriser la mise en place de saines pratiques de gouvernance afin de préserver la confiance du grand public, des consommateurs et des investisseurs. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des services financiers

Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

La formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite aura lieu les 13 et 14 mai 2014. Elle s’adresse aux membres de comités de retraite, aux administrateurs et gestionnaires de fonds de régime de retraite. Cette formation vise à améliorer les connaissances et compétences en gouvernance, à préciser les rôles et responsabilités qui incombent aux administrateurs et gestionnaires d’un régime de retraite, puis à développer un sens critique pour un meilleur processus décisionnel. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des régimes de retraite

Gouvernance des PME

La formation Gouvernance des PME aura lieu les 27 et 28 mai 2014. Elle est destinée aux chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou comités consultatifs de PME. Cette formation propose de réfléchir aux pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour l’entreprise de type PME et permet de revoir les grandes orientations et identifier des moyens concrets pour en optimiser la gouvernance. Pour connaître les détails de la formation Gouvernance des PME

______________________________________________

Ces formations comptent pour un crédit de 15 heures de formation continue requise pour les détenteurs du titre IAS.A. de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés ainsi que les ASC du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés. De plus, elles sont reconnues par les ordres et organismes professionnels suivants : Association des MBA du Québec, Barreau du Québec, Chambre de la sécurité financière, Institut québécois des planificateurs financiers, Ordre des ADMA du Québec, Ordre des CPA du Québec, Ordre des CRHA.

__________________________

* À propos du CAS

Créé en 2005 grâce à un partenariat entre l’Autorité des marchés financiers, la Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, le ministère du Conseil exécutif du Québec et la Faculté des sciences de l’administration de l’Université Laval, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés se positionne comme leader de la formation des administrateurs et représente le seul programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés au Québec. Il contribue au développement et à la promotion de la bonne gouvernance de sociétés en offrant des formations reconnues et à la fine pointe des meilleures pratiques. À ce jour, le CAS a diplômé 624 ASC. Il est possible de consulter leur profil en visitant le www.BanqueAdministrateurs.com.

Enhanced by Zemanta

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com


Voici une série de huit articles, publiés le 31 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques. Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Huit articles parus dans Lesaffaires.com

 

image

Une bonne gouvernance, c’est aussi pour les PME

Une entrevue avec M. Réjean Dancause, président et directeur général du Groupe Dancause et Associés inc.

image

Les défis de la gouvernance à l’ère du numérique

Une entrevue avec M. Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

image

La montée de l’activisme des actionnaires en six questions

Une entrevue avec M. Jean Bédard, titulaire de la Chaire de recherche en gouvernance de sociétés, Université Laval

image

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

Une entrevue avec M. Jacques Grisé, auteur du blogue jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

image

Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Drouin, avocat-conseil, McCarthy Tétrault

image

Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi

Une entrevue avec Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés

image

Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?

Une entrevue avec Mme Louise Champoux-Paillé, administratrice de sociétés et présidente du …

image

Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?

Une entrevue avec M. Richard Joly, président de Leaders et Cie

La culture organisationnelle contribue-t-elle à la valeur des organisations ?


Qu’est-ce que la culture organisationnelle et comment celle-ci est-elle associée à la performance ? L’étude conduite par Luigi Guiso, professeur de finance à Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance; Paola Sapienza, professeur de finance à Northwestern University; and Luigi Zingales, professeur de finance à University of Chicago, tente de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle la valeur de l’intégrité serait plus élevée dans les entreprises privées que dans les entreprises publiques (cotées).

L’étude tend à démontrer que l’accent mis sur la maximisation de la valeur aux actionnaires peut nuire à l’atteinte d’un haut niveau d’intégrité.

Voici un extrait de cette étude. Quel est votre point de vue sur l’importance d’une culture d’intégrité dans la performance des entreprises ?

The value of Corporate Culture

In our recent NBER working paper, The Value of Corporate Culture, we study which dimensions of corporate culture are related to a firm’s performance and why. Resigning from Goldman Sachs, vice president Greg Smith wrote in a very controversial New York Times op-ed: “Culture was always a vital part of Goldman Sachs’s success. It revolved around teamwork, integrity, a spirit of humility, and always doing right by our clients. The culture was the secret sauce that made this place great and allowed us to earn our clients’ trust for 143 years.” He then adds “I am sad to say that I look around today and see virtually no trace of the culture that made me love working for this firm for many years.” In his follow-up book, Greg Smith seems to blame the demise of Goldman Sachs’s culture to its transformation from a partnership to a publicly traded company.

English: Goldman Sachs Tower, Jersey City, New...
English: Goldman Sachs Tower, Jersey City, New Jersey (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

While highly disputed by the company, Greg Smith’s remarks raise several important questions. What constitutes a firm’s culture? How can we measure it? Does this culture—however defined and measured—impact a firm’s success? If so, why? And how can different governance structures enable or curtail the formation and preservation of a value-enhancing culture? In this paper we try to answer these questions.

Whether culture was Goldman’s secret sauce or not, Goldman certainly went out of the way to advertise it. The first page of its IPO prospectus was enumerating the “Business Principles,” including “Integrity and honesty are at the heart of our business.” Yet, in this regard Goldman is not unique. When we look at companies’ web pages, we find that 85% of the S&P 500 companies have a section (sometimes even two) dedicated to—what they call—“corporate culture,” i.e. principles and values that should inform the behavior of all firms’ employees.

If this is true, it might be value maximizing (at least in the short term) for publicly traded firms to underinvest in integrity capital. To test this hypothesis, we analyze whether ceteris paribus publicly traded firms in the GPTW dataset have a lower value of integrity (as measured by the survey responses) than privately held ones. We find this to be the case, even after controlling for industry, geography, size, and labor force composition. Public firms have an integrity value that is 0.21 standard deviations below similar firms that are private.

Not all firms see their integrity drop when they go public. Venture capital-backed firms do not seem to experience any drop. This different outcome might be the result of a longer horizon generated by the presence of a large shareholder or by a better organizational design made by professional founders.

To disentangle these hypotheses, we test whether the presence of a large shareholder or other corporate governance characteristics affect the level of integrity capital. We find that the only corporate governance characteristic that is statistically significant is the presence of large shareholder (at least 5% ownership share), yet it has a negative correlation with the level of integrity. Thus, it looks like a focus towards shareholders value maximization undermines the ability of a company to sustain a high level of integrity capital.

Vous pouvez télécharger le document complet ici.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Quelle est la valeur ajoutée d’un « conseil aviseur » efficace ?


Ce texte publié par Barry Reiter, et paru dans Ivey Business Journal, explique très bien en quoi consiste un « conseil aviseur » pour une PME en développement. En quoi les entreprises trouvent-elles avantage à se doter d’une telle structure ?

Et, surtout, quelles sont les étapes concrètes de sa création ainsi que les conditions d’un bon fonctionnement.

Cet article couvre vraiment tous les angles de l’établissement d’un « comité aviseur » et il répond aux questions que les entrepreneurs et les dirigeants d’entreprises en développement se posent eu égard à la valeur ajoutée d’un tel comité.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

THE ROLE AND VALUE OF AN EFFECTIVE ADVISORY BOARD

An effective advisory board, properly composed and structured, can provide non-binding but informed guidance and serve as a tremendous ally in the quest for superior corporate governance. This author, a lawyer with significant experience on boards of directors, offers a helpful blueprint for establishing an effective advisory board.

MA

Nobody can build a great business alone, and whether it’s a start up or an established industry leader, having access to high-quality advice can enhance an organization’s odds of success. Entities seeking advice can obtain it from a board of directors, consultants or networks of one sort or another. Increasingly, attention is being given to advisory boards. This article discusses the role of these boards, how they should be structured and organized, and their value to an enterprise.

Why have an advisory board ?

Enterprises considering setting up an advisory board must answer a key question: “Why are we establishing an advisory board and what do we want out of it?” The enterprise may be seeking assistance with anything from marketing to managing human resources to influencing the direction of regulators. Thinking carefully about an advisory board’s purpose will ensure that it will be structured to maximize its contribution to an organization’s success.

Commitment of Management/Leadership

An enterprise that wants to have an effective advisory board must spend time determining the mandate of that board, recruiting members, addressing compensation issues, organizing for and orchestrating effective meetings, paying for the services of advisory board members and dealing with the other matters noted above. The commitment must come from an appropriate point in the enterprise. If the advisory board is set up primarily to advise the CEO, the CEO’s involvement must be obvious and constant. If an advisory board is set up to assist in science or marketing, an appropriate individual, one who is willing to lend his or her name to the recruiting effort and to spend the time required to address the other issues, must be identified from that group. An advisory board that senses that there is an absence of commitment (whether by virtue of poorly organized meetings, frequently cancelled meetings, a leader who cancels his or her own attendance at the last minute, advice that is not transmitted or is ignored) will quickly become ineffective, as members will not prepare for meetings, not attend meetings or will not apply the degree of rigour required to provide their best advice.


Un autre document très intéressant est le suivant : 9 Tips for Creating an Advisory Board

Enhanced by Zemanta

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Première série d’articles


Voici les quatre premiers articles, d’une série de huit, publiés le 17 mars 2014 par les experts du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) dans le volet Dossier de l’édition Les Affaires.com

Découvrez comment les entreprises et les administrateurs doivent s’adapter afin de tirer profit des meilleures pratiques

La gouvernance dans tous ses états | Première série d’articles

Présenté par

CAS

Dossier à suivre

                   

image
Gouvernance : huit principes à respecter
image
Conseils d’administration : la diversité, mode d’emploi
image
Les administrateurs doivent-ils développer leurs compétences?
image
Vous souhaitez occuper un poste sur un conseil d’administration ?
Enhanced by Zemanta

Une vision constructive des interventions des actionnaires activistes


Cet article, publié par Gerry Hansell, associé de la firme The Boston Consulting Group, est paru sur le site du HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation le 13 mars 2014.

L’auteur montre clairement que les comportements des grands investisseurs activistes peuvent avoir des effets positifs, à long terme, sur plusieurs organisations qui ne semblent pas profiter de la pleine valeur de leur positionnement stratégique.

Il y a bien sûr des comportements activistes qui détruisent de la valeur : ces interventions de « hit-and-run »  doivent être contrées fermement par une direction avisée.

Mais il faut bien reconnaître qu’il existe de plus en plus « d’activisme constructif » qui produit des résultats prodigieux et qui attire la participation des investisseurs institutionnels. L’article donne beaucoup d’exemples d’interventions réussies.

L’auteur met aussi l’accent sur cinq (5) moyens à envisager par la direction pour mieux se préparer à des telles actions. Essentiellement, une veille stratégique plus poussée et une meilleure communication avec les actionnaires devraient permettre l’identification de lacunes organisationnelles et révéler de nouvelles opportunités d’affaires.

Voici un extrait de cet article que je vous invite à lire pour vous faire une idée plus juste de ce nouveau paramètre de la gouvernance.

Many corporate executives and board members view activist investors as little more than bullies with calculators: they seem to hunt in packs, force disruptive and risky changes, and use simplistic benchmarks as their call to action.

English:

Yet their ranks have grown rapidly, and activist investors now attack even the largest and most successful companies. Worldwide, the assets managed by activist investors have increased sevenfold over the past decade, from $12 billion to $85 billion. Since 2005, the number of activist campaigns in the U.S. has increased 15 percent per year, reaching a total of 144 in 2012. These investors have pushed for the return of excess cash to shareholders at Apple; urged restructuring through spinoffs and divestitures at PepsiCo, Sony, Timken, and McGraw-Hill; and called for the replacement of senior management or board members at Abercrombie & Fitch, Yahoo, and Sotheby’s.

Although some campaigns have backfired, resulting in significant corporate damage (JCPenney is one dramatic example), activists are creating value often enough to continue to attract institutional funds and expand their influence. Indeed, collaboration between activists and traditionally more passive investors is blurring the definition of investor activism. Leading pension funds, such as CalPERS and the Ontario Municipal Employee Retirement System (OMERS), are not only allocating capital to activist hedge funds, they are publicly teaming with activists to campaign for change.

In light of these trends, most large companies can expect to face an activist campaign in the normal course of business. How should they prepare? One common approach is to put an “activist response” team in place, often in collaboration with legal counsel and investment bankers, and to periodically run fire drills with the board in anticipation of future activist interventions. But such reactive procedural moves are like the old “duck and cover” civil-defense drills: They give the illusion of safety without providing it.

There is a more effective response: Senior managers and the board can borrow directly from the activist’s playbook by critically examining their company’s portfolio, balance sheet, and governance in much the same way that an activist investor would, and then preemptively making necessary changes. By engaging in what we call do-it-yourself activism, senior management can make a company less attractive to activists by making it more attractive to long-term shareholders.

Enhanced by Zemanta

La bonne gouvernance selon Munger, vice-président du C.A. de Berkshire


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose une très intéressante lecture publiée par David F. Larcker et Brian Tayan, de la  Stanford Graduate School of Business qui porte sur la conception que se fait Charles Munger de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés.

Les auteurs nous proposent de répondre à trois questions relatives à la position de Munger, vice-président du conseil de Berkshire :

1. Le système de gouvernance basé sur la confiance avancé par Munger pourrait-il s’appliquer à différents types d’organisations ?

2. Quelles pratiques de gouvernance sont-elles nécessaires et quelles pratiques sont-elles superflues ?

3. Comment s’assurer que la culture organisationnelle survivra à un processus de succession du PCD ?

À la suite de la lecture de l’article ci-dessous, quelles seraient vos réponses à ces questions.

Voici un résumé de la pensée de Munger, suivi d’un court extrait. Bonne lecture !

Charlie Munger

Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking” — the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance.
 
Munger advocates that corporate governance systems become more simple, rather than more complex, and rely on trust rather than compliance to instill ethical behavior in employees and executives. He advocates giving more power to a highly capable and ethical CEO, and taking several steps to improve the culture of the organization to reduce the risk of self-interested behavior.

Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger

How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior.

Trust-Based Governance

The need for a governance system is based on the premise that individuals working in a firm are selfinterested and therefore willing to take actions to further their own interest at the expense of the organization’s interests. To discourage this tendency, companies implement a series of carrots (incentives) and sticks (controls). The incentives might be monetary, such as performance-based compensation that aligns the financial interest of executives with shareholders. Or they might be or cultural, such as organizational norms that encourage certain behaviors. The controls include policies and procédures to limit malfeasance and oversight mechanisms to review executive decisions.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Comment éviter qu’un C.A. composé de membres indépendants soit à la merci du management ?


L’article ci-dessous publié par Ann C. Mulé et Charles M. Elson, respectivement associée et directeur du Center for Corporate Governance à l’Université du Delaware, mérite toute l’attention des comités de gouvernance des sociétés.

En effet, il existe plusieurs cas d’entreprises très vulnérables parce qu’elles sont, en quelque sorte, totalement dépendantes du PCD et de la haute direction. C’est ce que les auteurs appellent « Management knowledge-captured board« . Comment éviter qu’un C.A., composé de membres indépendants, soit totalement à la merci du management ?

Je vous invite à lire l’article. Bonne lecture !

A new kind of captured board

 

It may seem overly obvious, but we will say it anyway. Boards of directors need people who know what they are doing. They also need people who have the objectivity to then follow through and make the best décisions for shareholders. What boards need are industryexpert  independent directors.

RDECOM Board of Directors Site Visit
RDECOM Board of Directors Site Visit (Photo credit: RDECOM)

We believe, as longtime governance advisors, that this issue is critically important. It is essential that most publicly traded U.S. companies have one or more independent directors with industry expertise represented on the board. Recent academic studies, Delaware litigation, and activist shareholder campaigns — and reason — support this view.

Good-governance advocates have long sought to dismantle the “management-captured board,” in part, by stressing the importance of board independence. Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and the stock exchange corporate governance listing standards have largely codified an intensified board independence regime for public companies. The underlying belief was that board independence would strengthen a board’s ability to challenge management as appropriate from both a board monitoring and advising perspective. As a result, when seeking to fill a board seat many U. S. boards have searched for director candidates who are current or former CEOs or other C-suite executives who were “independent” without regard as to whether or not that individual was knowledgeable about the company’s business or industry.

Enhanced by Zemanta

L’utilisation des huis clos lors des sessions de C.A.


Voici un article intéressant de Matthew Scott sur le site de Corporate Secretary qui aborde un sujet qui préoccupe beaucoup de hauts dirigeants : le huis clos lors des sessions du conseil d’administration ou de certains comités. L’auteur explique très bien la nature et la nécessité de cette activité à inscrire à l’ordre du jour du conseil.

Compte tenu de la « réticence » de plusieurs hauts dirigeants à la tenue de cette activité, il est généralement reconnu que cet item devrait toujours être présent à l’ordre du jour afin d’éliminer certaines susceptibilités.

Le huis clos est un temps privilégié que les administrateurs indépendants se donnent pour se questionner sur l’efficacité du conseil et la possibilité d’améliorer la dynamique interne; mais c’est surtout une occasion pour les membres de discuter librement, sans la présence des gestionnaires, de sujets délicats tels que la planification de la relève, la performance des dirigeants, la rémunération globale de la direction, les poursuites légales, les situations de conflits d’intérêts, les arrangements confidentiels, etc. On ne rédige généralement pas de procès-verbal à la suite de cette activité, sauf lorsque les membres croient qu’une résolution doit absolument apparaître au P.V.

van_bandeau3

La mise en place d’une période de huis clos est une pratique relativement récente, depuis que les conseils d’administration ont réaffirmé leur souveraineté sur la gouvernance des entreprises. Cette activité est maintenant considérée comme une pratique exemplaire de gouvernance et presque toutes les sociétés l’ont adoptée.

Notons que le rôle du président du conseil, en tant que premier responsable de l’établissement de l’agenda, est primordial à cet égard. C’est lui qui doit informer le PCD de la position des membres indépendants à la suite du huis clos, un exercice qui demande du tact !

Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Are you using in-camera meetings ?

More companies are encouraging candid exchange among independent directors without management present

As corporate boards face more complex and difficult decisions, they may want to consider increasing the use of in-camera meetings to get more ‘realistic’ opinions from directors before moving forward with corporate strategy.

In-camera meetings, as they are called in Canada – or executive sessions, as they are referred to in the US – are special meetings where independent directors or committees of the board convene separately from management to have candid, off-the-record discussions about matters that are important to the company.

The term ‘In camera’ derives from Latin and refers to ‘in a chamber’ which is a legal term meaning ‘in private.’ During these meetings, independent board members are free to challenge each other and speak their mind freely because minutes are generally not taken. Such meetings could be held to discuss and clarify the board’s position on issues that may produce opposing views between management and the board or to deal with issues that could involve conflicts of interest with management, such as CEO compensation.

‘In-camera meetings allow directors to talk about their view of matters without management present,’ says Jo-Anne Archibald, president of DSA Corporate Services. ‘They can talk about anything related to the company and they don’t have to worry about it being written down anywhere.’

Enhanced by Zemanta

Un code de conduite pour une évaluation indépendante des C.A.


L’évaluation de l’efficacité d’un conseil d’administration par des consultants externes n’est pas encore une norme dans les pratiques de gouvernance. Incidemment, il n’existe pas de code de conduite présentant une démarche d’évaluation professionnelle menée par des conseillers externes et indépendants.

Je vous soumets donc la lecture d’un code de pratique de l’évaluation conçu par Helen Pitcher, Chairman de Advanced Boardroom Excellence et Seamus Gillen,CEO, Board Evaluation and Governance Advanced Boardroom Excellence.

Je crois que si l’activité d’évaluation des C.A. vous intéresse, vous trouverez dans ce document plusieurs idées maîtresses qui vous inspireront et qui vous inciteront, comme consultant,  à mettre en place un tel code de conduite. Les membres de conseils y trouveront également de bons arguments en faveur de l’implantation d’un processus d’évaluation externe.

Voici la préface du document PDF. Vos commentaires concernant la problématique de l’évaluation des conseils d’administration sont bienvenus.

Bonne lecture !

INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL BOARD EVALUATIONS CODE OF PRACTICE

An effective board creates value. It is more likely to make the high-quality decisions which will help the company achieve its objectives, manage its risks, and safeguard its reputation. Effective boards – and successful companies – build trust and confidence among investors, employees, customers and all those who have a stake in the company’s on-going success.

Company outing

Board evaluations – as set out in the UK Corporate Governance Code – are one of the principal methods for building board effectiveness. The activity must be owned by the company, and tailored to suit the needs of the business, and its board. The evaluation should be professionally delivered, and its outcomes implemented. There is a perception, however, that the scope and service quality of evaluations is variable, and a there is a concern about standards. It is an appropriate time to reflect on what can be done to increase the effectiveness of board evaluations, particularly those conducted by independent, external consultants.

This draft Code of Practice on Board Evaluation seeks to begin a discussion to address and resolve this perceived lack of market confidence, and install a more coherent framework to allow companies and consultants to work more effectively together. We would like to acknowledge the valuable contribution of a number of market participants, whose views and comments we have used to inform the document. Evaluations provide a unique opportunity to improve board performance and shape corporate success.

Enhanced by Zemanta

La montée de l’activisme corporatif | Défis à la gouvernance des sociétés ?


Voici un autre excellent article sur l’évolution de la situation de l’activisme. L’article de Laurie Havelock publié dans IR Magazine montre comment les cibles des activistes ont changées au cours des trois dernières années. Par exemple, le secteur financier qui représentait 36 % des cibles des activistes en 2010 ne représente maintenant que 15 %.

Les stratégies d’investissement des activistes se sont raffinées; elles ont muries. Elles mettent davantage l’accent sur la recherche, sur la volonté de collaborer avec les entreprises cibles, ainsi que sur des vues à plus long terme.

La tendance est de cibler des firmes qui ont accumulé de grandes liquidités et de viser des entreprises très diversifiées, dans le but d’explorer la vente de certaines unités d’affaires.

Lorsqu’on évalue quelles réactions produisent les meilleurs résultats financiers, on note que les situations de compromis entre les activistes et les entreprises donnent lieu à des retours de l’ordre de 60 %. Les entreprises sont de plus en plus à l’écoute des points de vue des actionnaires activistes…

Les activistes sont également de plus en plus perçus comme étant ceux qui amènent des idées nouvelles. Les activistes vedettes tel que Icahn n’hésitent pas à faire la promouvoir de leur cause pour les droits des actionnaires et à faire connaître leur position via les médias sociaux.

Les responsables des communications et des relations publiques des entreprises doivent sérieusement prendre note des doléances des actionnaires activistes, lesquels sont de plus en plus de mèches avec les investisseurs institutionnels.

En termes de stratégies utilisées par les activistes pour améliorer le rendement des entreprises, une étude de Linklaters a démontré que la fréquence des activités est la suivante :

Number of times different strategies employed by activists

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

The changing face of activism

What is the best way to engage with the growing and diversifying ranks of activist investors?

Listed firms are now expected to be prepared to deal with activist investors and the challenges they might bring to a firm and its boardroom. According to a recent study produced by Linklaters, the international law firm, the number of shareholder actions carried out across the globe swelled by 88 percent between January 1, 2010 and September 30, 2013, with the majority of that growth taking place in Europe and the US.
SEC chairman Mary Jo White described the influx as ‘a good thing’ for companies at the 10th annual Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue organized by the European Corporate Governance Institute in December 2013.
‘I think most would agree the advice on how to respond to shareholder engagement today is quite different from the advice companies were getting 30 years ago, or even 10 years ago,’ she said. ‘The process has become less defensive and more proactive. We are seeing a concerted effort to persuade shareholders of the wisdom of management’s choices and practices.’ Reaching out to activists, then, could form an increasingly important part of an IR professional’s role.

Diverse interests

The Linklaters study reveals that the number of shareholders with a stated activist strategy has more than doubled within the last decade, while activism is now spread across a more diversified range of sectors than ever before, including services and technology (see How activist targets have changed below).

How activist targets have changed
David Drake, president of proxy solicitation firm Georgeson, says shareholder activists are most often to be found in business sectors or industries that have recently underperformed.
‘There tends to be a rotation of industries based on relative valuation of companies in that industry,’ he explains. ‘If you find an industry where there are a significant number of underperforming companies or companies that are trading at lower multiples than the market as a whole, and investors see opportunities to close that gap, those industries could represent the next haven for activist input.
Drake, a frequent speaker and writer on proxy fights and investor activism, has spent more than 20 years working in shareholder-facing roles. Prior to joining Georgeson in 1997, he served as a senior analyst and director of US research at ISS, and remains a member of several trade bodies. Targets for activism are not determined by industry alone, he notes.
‘I do tend to look at things a little differently,’ he points out. ‘I usually look at prime targets for activism around different themes that make companies attractive to activist funds or investors.’
In most cases, Drake says, these will be companies with an excess of cash, though firms that are – or appear to be – conglomerates with multiple lines of business are also prime targets. ‘The platform for the dissident investor would perhaps be for the spin-off of a particular part of the business that might add value, or restructuring that may produce at least a short-term benefit, if not a long-term one,’ he explains.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Les priorités en gouvernance en 2014 selon Harvard Law School


Je vous propose une lecture parue dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, publiée par Holly J. Gregory du « Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group » de la firme Sidley Austin LLP.

On y décrit les priorités que les conseils d’administration doivent considérer en 2014 :

Les investisseurs institutionnels

Le conseil d’administration

Les priorités

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism...La performance de l’entreprise et l’orientation stratégique

La sélection du PCD, la rémunération, la relève

Les contrôles internes, la gestion du risque et la conformité

La préparation pour la gestion de crises

L’activisme et les relations avec le C.A.

La composition du C.A. et le leadership

Bonne lecture !

Governance Priorities for 2014

As the fallout from the financial crisis recedes and both institutional investors and corporate boards gain experience with expanded corporate governance regulation, the coming year holds some promise of decreased tensions in board-shareholder relations. With governance settling in to a “new normal,” influential shareholders and boards should refocus their attention on the fundamental aspects of their roles as they relate to the creation of long-term value.

Institutional investors and their beneficiaries, and society at large, have a decided interest in the long-term health of the corporation and in the effectiveness of its governing body. Corporate governance is likely to work best in supporting the creation of value when the decision rights and responsibilities of shareholders and boards set out in state corporate law are effectuated.

This article identifies and examines the key areas of focus that institutional investors and boards should prioritize in 2014.

Institutional Investors

  1. Apply a long-term value approach.
  2. Vote on a company-specific basis where possible.
  3. Focus on core issues.

The Board

Despite increased shareholder decision rights and influence, the board’s fundamental mandate remains to direct the affairs of the company. Key areas for boards to focus on include:

  1. Defining board priorities.
  2. Monitoring company performance and setting strategic direction.
  3. Selecting and compensating the CEO and planning for succession.
  4. Attending to internal controls, risk management and compliance.
  5. Preparing for a crisis.
  6. Engaging with shareholders and responding to shareholder activism.
  7. Determining board composition needs and leadership structure.

Board Priorities

Boards determine how to apportion their very limited time based on board responsibilities and the unique needs of the company. Each board must define the priorities that will shape its agenda and determine the information it needs to govern, driven by the needs of the business. Boards add value when they help management cope with the complex context in which the company operates, and when they support management in focusing on the long-term interests of the company and its shareholders.

Active board engagement in overseeing company performance, strategy and the culture of ethics should help to align the company’s approach to compensation, financial disclosure, internal controls, risk management and compliance. Therefore, in most circumstances the majority of board time should be reserved for matters related to company performance and strategy, and the ethical tone within the company.

Outside directors require considerable amounts of information as they get to know the business and the environment in which the company operates. Active involvement in prioritizing the agenda and defining information needs positions outside directors to provide objective guidance and judgment. The board should not leave decisions about the board agenda and information needs to management alone.

Company Performance and Strategic Direction

Challenges for boards include:

  1. Reserving appropriate time for review and discussion of company performance.
  2. Taking an active role in strategic planning while maintaining objectivity. (This is especially critical in enabling the board to assess the positions of activist shareholders versus management’s plans.)
  3. Supporting appropriate long-term investment and prudent risk-taking in the face of significant short-term pressures for immediate returns or other conflicts.
  4. Balancing guidance and support of management with objective assessment and constructive criticism.
  5. Holding management accountable for results in light of the agreed strategy by determining and applying performance benchmarks.
  6. Helping management anticipate and understand the potential for abrupt and long-term changes in the company’s economic, political and social environment.
  7. Testing key assumptions that underpin management’s proposed strategic plans and major transactions, including assumptions about risks.
  8. Maintaining appropriate deference to management on day-to- day operations without becoming unduly passive.

CEO Selection, Compensation and Succession

Challenges for boards include:

  1. Setting goals for the CEO (and other key executives) in line with corporate strategy, objectives and plans.
  2. Providing appropriate support, guidance and deference to the CEO while maintaining objectivity about performance.
  3. Designing compensation to attract and retain talent while aligning it with performance.
  4. Considering the CEO’s contributions in the context of the contributions of the broader team, an issue that will be highlighted with the new pay ratio disclosures.
  5. Discussing management development and succession planning on a regular basis, even regarding a new, young or high-performing CEO.
  6. Understanding and considering shareholder views about CEO compensation and succession without substituting those views for the board’s own objective judgment.
  7. Ensuring that company disclosures adequately communicate the board’s views and activities regarding compensation and succession planning.

Internal Controls, Risk Management and Compliance

Challenges for boards include:

  1. Ensuring that appropriate time is devoted to these key issues without becoming overly focused on controls and compliance.
  2. Using board committees efficiently to address these issues while keeping the entire board appropriately informed and involved.
  3. Remaining vigilant for red flags, which are often a series of yellow flags.
  4. Creating incentives for management to establish and maintain an appropriate control, risk management and compliance environment.
  5. Ensuring that the company has adopted appropriate standards of corporate social responsibility consistent with evolving societal expectations.
  6. Monitoring compliance with legal and ethical standards.

Preparing For Crisis

Shareholder Engagement and Activism

Board Composition and Leadership

Enhanced by Zemanta

Gouverner et gérer sont-ils deux systèmes de pensée différents ?


Peter Tunjic* avance que les actes de gouvernance, de la part d’un conseil d’administration, et les actes de direction, au sens de management, correspondent à deux systèmes de pensée fondamentalement différents.

Dans son article, l’auteur présente une matrice que vous trouverez peut-être utile de considérer. Je vous invite à lire l’article pour plus de détails.

Governing and Directing : Are They Different ?

A recent survey of CEO attitudes to their boards by respected commentator Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and his colleagues, shouldn’t surprise anyone: ‘CEOs complain that boards often lack the intestinal fortitude for the level of risk taking that healthy growth requires.

“Board members are supposed to bring long-term prudence to a company”, as one CEO says, but this often translates to protecting the status quo and suppressing the bold thinking about reinvention that enterprises need when strategic contexts shift.’ Consensus is emerging that public company boards are too focused on compliance and are ignoring their role as creators of enduring value for the firms they direct. But it’s not for lack of will on their part.

The board’s role in strategy is considered the biggest issue for 67 per cent of respondents to the 2012 Spencer Stuart US Board Index want to spend more time on strategy. Despite this, according to Heidrick & Struggles, 84 per cent of directors of the top 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the US thought ‘they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy. Consequently, only one-third of respondents to a 2013 McKinsey & Company report say they have a complete understanding of current strategy. If directors have their eyes on value creation why is it that their feet are still pointing in a different direction? It’s because the system is not designed to create value. Best practice in corporate governance produces too many ‘governors’ focused on protecting value and not enough directors focused on creating it.

Public companies have become over governed and under directed because corporate governance regulation and education is designed to ensure the ‘correct’ board structure, process and composition rather than ensure ‘imagination, creativity, or ethical behavior in guiding the destinies of corporate enterprises’

This paper argues that in order to create enduring value, public company directors must go beyond governing and governance and must also embrace ‘directing’ and ‘directorship’. I propose that governance and directorship are two distinct systems of thought and action in the boardroom.

The difference between the two lies primarily in their attitude to value. Governance concerns right structure and process. The focus is on protecting and preserving value through maintaining control and managing risk. In contrast, directorship involves bold choices that necessarily create risk.

Directing involves designing the ways in which value is created, making decision of consequence and inspiring CEO’s to lead their organisations into strength, resilience and endurance. The boundaries between the two might blur in the heat of a board meeting, but the differences in attitude, competencies and outcome are clear. Here are four tests to help you decide whether you stand on the question of value.

  1. Governing for shareholder value versus directing for firm value
  2. Measuring value versus creating value
  3. Governing for transparency versus directing with discretion
  4. Managing risk versus creating risk

…. The DLMA Matrix  graphically represents the similarities and differences of each perspective as well as the inherent dilemma required to balance them all.

THE DLMA MATRIX ™

DLMA Matrix (v1.2(0310913).jpg

_______________________________

*Peter Tunjic is an independent corporate advocate and commercial lawyer based in Melbourne, Australia. He is the author of ondirectorship.com and has co-authored several learning programmes for the Australian Institute of Company Directors. He consults on creating value in the boardroom and improving board/manager relations.

Articles d’intérêt :

Enhanced by Zemanta

Les conseils d’administration affirment leur leadership et assument leur souveraineté


Dans cette entrevue, Robert Borghese, avocat en pratique privée, discute avec Michael Useem, directeur du Wharton’s Center for Leadership and Change Management, et co-auteur (avec Ram Charan et Dennis C. Carey), du nouveau livre : Boards That Lead.

Le livre explique que les « Boards » ne sont pas uniquement des organismes de contrôle, de surveillance et de conformité, mais ils sont également des agents de changement et de création de valeur en exerçant un rôle essentiel de leadership, en collaboration avec la haute direction.

Les fonctions d’administrateurs de sociétés sont de plus en plus exigeantes, ceux-ci étant de plus en plus sollicités pour représenter les intérêts des actionnaires, tout en préservant les droits des parties prenantes.

P1060038

Les administrateurs ne sont plus des pions à la solde des CEO comme autrefois nous dit Useem; ils sont choisis parmi les meilleurs leaders du monde des affaires, ils sont indépendants, rigoureux, visionnaires; les actionnaires investisseurs, qui occupent une place toujours plus grande, s’attendent à des conseils d’administrations de la plus haute qualité, capables de questionner les actions des dirigeants et de les aider à accroître la valeur de l’organisation.

L’auteur discute également de la fine ligne à préserver entre le leadership actif du « Board » et le management de l’entreprise et la gestion des opérations. Il est important que les responsabilités entre ces deux groupes soient bien délimitées. Useem constate que dans les grandes entreprises cotées contemporaines, les rôles sont assez clairement identifiés.

Voici un extrait de cette entrevue. J’espère que vous apprécierez le langage clair et simple de la conversation.  Bonne lecture !

Corporate Boards Taking the Lead

In this interview, Useem explains why monitoring is no longer the only responsibility of the board, where board directors should draw the line in their leadership of organizations and where some companies and boards are getting it right, including Lenovo.

_______________________

Robert Borghese: Mike, thanks for being with us today. What led you to write a book on board leadership?

Michael Useem: Corporate governance has been a topic of great interest for many people, including myself, for a number of years. My colleagues Ram Charan, who is a very high-end consultant, and Dennis Carey, who is the vice-chair of Korn/Ferry, which is a very large executive search firm, and I got into a dialogue on what exactly is happening in boardrooms these days….

English: Integrated boardroom designed and ins...
English: Integrated boardroom designed and installed by EDG in 2003. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Boards have to monitor, and they do that much better after Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, these two legislative acts that strengthen the hands of boards of directors. But increasingly, directors are also exercising a leadership function in the boardroom and with top management.

As we drew upon our experience – and all three of us have been in boardrooms – we did inductively conclude that it is good for all of us to rethink what boards do [beyond] just monitoring, which is what they are required to do, but to also see boards as helping the company to be going where it has to go, [which we will] call leadership.

Borghese: Mike, give us a little historical perspective on the role that boards have played over time and how that role has evolved beyond the monitoring function to more of a leadership function.

Useem: If we go way back, boards were aptly described by the title of a very well known book, which was Pawns or Potentates, by a professional colleague, Jay Lorsch, who is on the faculty of the HarvardBusinessSchool. He had a bit of a question mark there, but his conclusion was that historically – 30, 40 years ago – boards tended to be pawns. They had become passive. They were really under the thumb of the chief executive. They met, had a great lunch together and all went home.

“If you are a director, it is good to think of what you are doing both as a defender of shareholder value and as a leader of the company.”

With the rise of big institutional investors – the California pension fund, Fidelity, BlackRock, hedge funds – the pressure came from investors for directors to not be pawns, but to get in there and to keep management’s feet to the fire to avoid malfeasance. Think Enron. On the affirmative side, [in order] to get great growth at a reasonable degree of risk, boards [needed to] move from that pawn role to a much more active monitoring role. We can see that [in the research] on the background of directors and how boards are organized. Virtually all the major Standard & Poor’s 500 boards, for example, now have an independent audit committee, an independent governance committee and an independent compensation committee. “Independent” meaning that they are not under the thumb of the chief executive. They actually have that relationship turned around.

With a more vigilant monitoring function pushed by the big stockholders out there and reinforced by legislation coming out of the early part of the last decade after the Enron failure, boards began to exercise more leadership – in an unanticipated way and in an almost unplanned way. What we mean by that is that directors now often come from top management positions themselves. Many former CEOs, for example, occupy board rooms now. When they come into a board meeting, they are helping the top executive think through a spin-off, an acquisition. They are helping top executives think about how they develop top talent here so they have a great replacement once their day is up.

We ended up titling this book,Boards That Lead. Implicit in that is that boards also monitor on behalf of stockholders. That is the deal set forward by the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange. We all want that to happen, but in addition, because of this historical and quite profound transformation, boards now increasingly are at the plate, helping the company to go where it ought to get to, substantively.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Précisions sur le code de gouvernance français


Afin de vous mettre à jour sur les développements de la gouvernance en France, je vous réfère à l’article publié par Samuel Schmidt dans LesÉchos.fr le 4 février 2014.

English: Bill Gates at Medef Français : Bill G...
English: Bill Gates at Medef Français : Bill Gates au Medef (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

L’auteur présente les interprétations apportées par le haut comité de gouvernance eu égard au code Afep-Medef (Association française des entreprises privéesMouvement des entreprises de France) des sociétés françaises cotées en bourse dont les sept éléments identifiés.

Je vous invite à lire l’article afin d’avoir le portrait global.

Code Afep-Medef sur la gouvernance des sociétés cotées : sept lignes de force à retenir  

1) Rémunération : le « Say on pay »

L’innovation la plus marquante, tant il s’agit d’un sujet hautement sensible, réside dans l’introduction du principe dit du « say on pay », à l’article 24.3 du code Afep-Medef révisé, qui à trait à l’information et à la consultation des actionnaires sur la rémunération individuelle des « dirigeants mandataires sociaux ».

2) Les indemnités de prise de fonction (« golden hello ») sont reconnues, mais encadrées

Le code Afep-Medef révisé s’est enrichi de recommandations relatives aux golden hellos ou « indemnités de prise de fonction » pour préciser, à l’article 23.2.5, qu’elles ne peuvent être accordées « qu’à un nouveau dirigeant mandataire social venant d’une société extérieure du groupe » et que « son montant doit être rendu public au moment de sa fixation ».

3) Les indemnités de non-concurrence sont plus strictement encadrées

Il en va de même concernant les indemnités dites de « non-concurrence », pour lesquelles il est désormais prévu « une réflexion approfondie au sein du comité des rémunérations » et une autorisation préalable, ainsi qu’au moment du départ du dirigeant, du conseil d’administration sur l’accord de non-concurrence.

4) Toilettage pour les indemnités de départ

Concernant les « indemnités de départ » ou golden parachute, la nouvelle version du code indique que les conditions de performance doivent s’apprécier sur au moins deux exercices. Il est confirmé que l’indemnité de départ ne doit pas excéder, le cas échéant, deux ans de rémunération (fixe et variable). De plus, lorsqu’une clause de non-concurrence est en outre mise en œuvre, le cumul de ces deux indemnités ne peut excéder ce plafond.

 5) Cumuls des mandats : un code plus restrictif

Le code Afep-Medef  révisé met davantage l’accent que son prédécesseur sur la limitation du cumul des mandats. Ainsi, le nouvel article 19 du code indique que l’ »administrateur ne doit pas exercer plus de quatre autres mandats dans des sociétés cotées extérieures au groupe, y compris étrangères » et que le « dirigeant mandataire social ne doit pas exercer plus de deux autres mandats d’administrateur dans des sociétés cotées extérieures à son groupe, y compris étrangères »

6) Comités : des précisions sur l’organisation et la gouvernance

Ainsi il est recommandé, pour ces comités, de se doter d’un « règlement précisant ses attributions et ses modalités de fonctionnement », de ne pas avoir d’administrateurs dits « croisés », et de veiller à l’objectivité des conseils externes auxquels ils recourent. Il est désormais précisé de manière claire que le président, s’il est directeur général, ne peut présider le comité des nominations et que le comité des rémunérations doit être présidé par un administrateur indépendant.

7) Une force accrue conférée à la règle dite du « Comply or Explain »

Une force accrue est conférée à la règle dite du comply or explain en ce sens que la nouvelle version du code impose aux sociétés de fournir une explication claire, détaillée et pertinente, si elles souhaitent s’écarter des règles prescrites, et d’indiquer les mesures alternatives adoptées.

 Articles reliés :

Enhanced by Zemanta