Étiquette : Réglementation

Mesures à prendre en matière de contrôle interne afin d’éviter les fraudes de cybersécurité


Voici un article qui met l’accent sur les mesures à prendre en matière de contrôle interne afin d’éviter les fraudes de cybersécurité.

Les auteurs, Keith Higgins*et Marvin Tagabanis exposent les résultats de leurs recherches dans un billet publié sur le site de  Havard Law School Forum.

Les fraudes dont il est question concernent neuf entreprises qui ont été la cible des arnaques par l’utilisation de courriels.

The nine defrauded companies lost a total of nearly $100 million as a result of the email scams. The companies operated in different business sectors including technology, machinery, real estate, energy, financial, and consumer goods, which the Report suggests “reflect[s] the reality that every type of business is a potential target of cyber-related fraud.” The Report also highlighted the significant economic harm posed by “business email compromises” more broadly, which, based on FBI estimates, has caused over $5 billion in losses since 2013, with an additional $675 million in adjusted losses in 2017—the highest estimated out-of-pocket losses from any class of cyber-facilitated crime during this period.

Les auteurs notent que les escroqueries par le biais des courriels étaient principalement de deux types :

(1) Courriels envoyés par de faux dirigeants ;

(2) Courriels envoyés par de faux vendeurs.

Les auteurs présentent les implications du contrôle interne pour minimiser ces fraudes.

Bonne lecture !

 

Implementing Internal Controls in Cyberspace—Old Wine, New Skins

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « contrôle interne et cybersécurité »

 

On October 16, 2018, the SEC issued a Section 21(a) investigative report (the “Report”), [1]cautioning public companies to consider cyber threats when designing and implementing internal accounting controls. The Report arose out of an investigation focused on the internal accounting controls of nine public companies that were victims of “business email compromises” in which perpetrators posed as company executives or vendors and used emails to dupe company personnel into sending large sums to bank accounts controlled by the perpetrators. In the investigation, the SEC considered whether the companies had complied with the internal accounting controls provisions of the federal securities laws. Although the Report is in lieu of an enforcement action against any of the issuers, the SEC issued the Report to draw attention to the prevalence of these cyber-related scams and as a reminder that all public companies should consider cyber-related threats when devising and maintaining a system of internal accounting controls.

The nine defrauded companies lost a total of nearly $100 million as a result of the email scams. The companies operated in different business sectors including technology, machinery, real estate, energy, financial, and consumer goods, which the Report suggests “reflect[s] the reality that every type of business is a potential target of cyber-related fraud.” The Report also highlighted the significant economic harm posed by “business email compromises” more broadly, which, based on FBI estimates, has caused over $5 billion in losses since 2013, with an additional $675 million in adjusted losses in 2017—the highest estimated out-of-pocket losses from any class of cyber-facilitated crime during this period.

Two types of email scams were employed against the nine companies: (i) emails from fake executives, and (ii) emails from fake vendors.

Emails from Fake Executives. In the first type of scam, perpetrators emailed company finance personnel using spoofed email domains and addresses of an executive (typically the CEO) so that it appeared as if the email were legitimate. The spoofed email directed the employees to work with a purported outside attorney identified in the email, who then directed them to wire large payments to foreign bank accounts controlled by the perpetrators. Common elements among each of these schemes included: (1) the transactions or “deals” were time-sensitive and confidential; (2) the requested funds needed to be sent to foreign banks and beneficiaries in connection with foreign deals or acquisitions; and (3) the spoofed emails typically were sent to midlevel personnel, who were not generally responsible or involved in the deals and rarely communicated with the executives being spoofed.

Emails from Fake Vendors. The second type of scam was more technologically sophisticated than the spoofed executive emails because the schemes typically involved the perpetrators hacking into the email accounts of the companies’ foreign vendors. The perpetrators then requested that the vendors’ banking information be changed so that a company’s payments on outstanding invoices for legitimate transactions were sent to foreign accounts controlled by the perpetrators rather than the real vendors. The Report noted that some spoofed vendor email scams went undetected for an extended period of time because vendors often afforded companies months before considering a payment delinquent.

Considerations for Public Companies

In the Report, the SEC advises public companies to “pay particular attention to the obligations imposed by Section 13(b)(2)(B) to devise and maintain internal accounting controls that reasonably safeguard company and, ultimately, investor assets from cyber-related frauds.” Finance and accounting personnel at public companies should be aware that the above-described cyber-related scams exist, and these types of scams should be considered when implementing internal accounting controls.

Although the “cyber” aspect of these scams helps to make them a topic du jour, fake invoices are certainly no recent invention, nor are vendor requests to direct payments to a new address something that is unique to the email era. If the result of the Report is to cause companies to liberally insert “cyber” references into their internal controls, and little more, it will not have accomplished its objective. SEC Enforcement staff observed that the cyber-related frauds succeeded, at least in part, because the responsible personnel at the companies did not sufficiently understand the company’s existing controls or did not recognize indications in the emailed instructions that those communications lacked reliability. For example, in one matter, the accounting employee who received the spoofed email did not follow the company’s dual-authorization requirement for wire payments, directing unqualified subordinates to sign-off on the wires. In another case, the accounting employee misinterpreted the company’s authorization matrix as giving him approval authority at a level reserved for the CFO.

Scams will always be with us, and the Report recognizes that the effectiveness of internal accounting control systems largely depends on having trained personnel to implement, maintain, and follow such controls. Public companies should also consider the following points raised by the actions taken by the defrauded companies following the cyber-related scams:

Review and enhance payment authorization procedures, verification requirements for vendor information changes, account reconciliation procedures and outgoing payment notification processes, particularly to foreign jurisdictions.

Evaluate whether finance and accounting personnel are adequately trained on relevant cyber-related threats and provide additional training on any new policies and procedures implemented as a result of the above step.

The Report confirms that the SEC remains focused on cybersecurity matters and companies should continue to be vigilant against cyber threats. While the SEC stated that it was “not suggesting that every issuer that is the victim of a cyber-related scam is . . . in violation of the internal accounting controls requirements of the federal securities laws,” the Report also noted that “[h]aving internal accounting control systems that factor in such cyber-related threats, and related human vulnerabilities, may be vital to maintaining a sufficient accounting control environment and safeguarding assets.”

_________________________________________________

Endnotes

1Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding Certain Cyber-Related Frauds Perpetrated Against Public Companies and Related Internal Accounting Controls Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 84429 (Oct. 16, 2018) (available here).(go back)

*Keith Higgins is chair of the securities and governance practice and Marvin Tagaban is an associate at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on their Ropes & Gray memorandum.

Cinq questionnements qui préoccupent les nouveaux administrateurs de sociétés | SpencerStuart


Aujourd’hui, je reviens sur un texte vraiment très important de SpencerStuart qui propose des conseils aux nouveaux administrateurs qui acceptent de siéger à des conseils d’administration, peu importe le type d’organisation.

Les conseils prodigués par les auteurs George Anderson, Tessa Bamford, Jason Baumgarten, Kevin A. Jurd, afin d’accélérer l’efficacité des nouveaux administrateurs peuvent se résumer essentiellement à cinq grandes préoccupations :

  1. Comment puis-je savoir si je choisis le bon CA ? Quels devoirs dois-je accomplir avant d’accepter une offre ?
  2. Comment dois-je me préparer pour ma première réunion du conseil ?
  3. Quels comportements en matière de prises de parole dois-je adopter lors de cette première rencontre ?
  4. Quelles sont les stratégies à adopter pour avoir un impact et une plus-value sur le CA et sur l’entreprise ?
  5. Si j’expérimente une grande préoccupation, comment montrer mon désaccord ou soulever une question délicate ?

 

À l’heure où environ le tiers des postes d’administrateurs sont occupés par de nouvelles recrues, il est crucial de bien explorer les occasions qui se présentent, car un engagement comme administrateur peut nous occuper plus de 20 jours par année, pour une période de neuf ans !

Je vous invite donc à lire attentivement ce document si vous êtes dans votre première année d’un mandat qui pourrait être assez long.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Five Most Common New Director Questions

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « spencer stuart »

 

 

No matter how experienced they are as leaders or how much previous boardroom exposure they have had, most first-time directors will admit to having some trepidation before their first board meeting: What will the first board meeting be like? Should I say anything at all in my first meeting? Am I prepared?

Helping these directors quickly acclimate matters because, depending on the country, first-timers can represent a sizable share of the new director population in a given year. One-third of newly appointed S&P 500 directors in the U.S., for example, are serving on their first corporate board, as are about 30 percent of new U.K. non-executive directors. Given the escalating demands on boards, new directors must be prepared to quickly contribute.

In working with first-time board directors around the world and the chairmen and lead independent directors of the boards they join, we have found that their questions and concerns about board experience typically fall into the five following areas:

  1. How do I know what’s the right board to join? Should I say yes to the first board invitation?
  2. What do I need to do to prepare for my first board?
  3. How much should I speak up during the early board meetings?
  4. How can I have an impact for the board and company?
  5. What if I have concerns? How do I disagree or raise questions when I’m new?

To explore these first-time director questions in more detail, we spoke with directors around the world who shared what they learned from their first board experience and offered observations that boards can use to enhance their new director onboarding programs.

 

(1) Selecting the right opportunity

 

Most directors would describe their first non-executive board role as a major professional milestone, a terrific growth opportunity and something they are very glad they did, even though it represented a significant commitment. Given the demands of board service — 20-30 days a year up to nine or more years — it pays to carefully weigh the pros and cons of a given opportunity. The key question, say directors, is whether it is mutually beneficial — one that the prospective director finds engaging and useful as a growth opportunity and that adds a valuable perspective to the board. As one director put it, “You need something that will bind you to the job, because it is a lot of time.” Ask yourself, “Is this a business that I will still be interested in, say, in six to nine years’ time?”

Other considerations may be who else is on the board — especially the opportunity to work with a good chair and gain exposure to experienced executives from other industries — the strength and diversity of the management team, and how well the board and management team work together, which in part reflects how much the CEO values the board’s contribution. “I asked the CEO, ‘Do you like having a board?’ And he very honestly said, ‘Mostly.’ If he’d said to me, ‘I think they’re marvelous all the time,’ I’d know he was lying because that’s just not how executives think,” recalls one director.

When considering whether you can balance board service with other commitments, particularly if you have a full-time executive role, understand that you will likely underestimate how much time it will take, especially early on. “It took much more time than I thought would be required initially to get up to speed — to understand the business, strategies, key issues and opportunities,” one director told us. If you have to travel to meetings, plan on that adding a day or two to the board meeting commitment. You also should allow time for work related to committee assignments and, depending on your expertise, you may be tapped to mentor someone on the executive team, work on issues outside of board meetings or respond to unexpected demands related to a crisis or deal. “It can be hard to budget for that, and it can happen at the worst time. But you can’t shake off your responsibilities at the time when you’re needed most, when there’s an activist or stakeholder issue, a significant transition or a succession planning issue that you have to work through.”

Conversely, don’t immediately take yourself out of the running for a very valuable opportunity. “If I thought too much about the time commitment, there is a chance I would have turned it down, which would have been a terrible thing,” one director told us. Equally do your research; it’s amazing the sorts of businesses that initially might seem not right for you but on further research are really interesting and worth pursuing.

 

(2) Preparing for the first board meeting

 

As part of your due diligence, you will already have read published information about the company, and it goes without saying that new directors will have received a wealth of material as part of the onboarding process and in advance of the first meeting. What many don’t appreciate before they’ve done it is just how much pre-reading material there can be, and the amount of time it can take to thoroughly digest it.

Many first-time directors have presented to their own company’s board of directors, but these encounters provide just a narrow glimpse of the board’s responsibilities. For this reason, some first-time directors find it helpful to attend a formal director education program providing a deep dive into corporate governance, including the board’s fiduciary responsibilities and areas such as NED liability, reporting to shareholders and reporting on sustainability. “They expect you to have an understanding of governance when you come in. They’re happy to answer questions, but they’re not going to know what you don’t know. If you don’t even know what you don’t know, then you don’t know to ask,” said one director.

Most formal onboarding programs encourage new directors to meet with key members of management, and many will schedule site visits to key operations. “It was really helpful to spend quality time with each of the CEO’s main direct reports so that I could get a sense of their top priorities and how they think about running their businesses. Without that little additional context from some of these executives in the organization, you’re really operating in a bubble.”

One-on-one meetings with as many of other directors as possible before the first board meeting can provide a sense of the priorities of the board, and the dynamics among directors and between management and the board. When these meetings are not an explicit part of the onboarding process, it can feel awkward to reach out to other board members, but directors say arranging a breakfast or dinner meeting or even a coffee with other directors, starting with committee chairs, is well worth it. “Everybody is busy, but the time you take to meet people upfront definitely pays dividends in the long run because you get context you wouldn’t have gotten any other way. You can’t replace seeing someone’s facial expression or their gestures while they’re talking about a certain topic. You’ll see how much something worries them. How emphatic they’re being. You’ll see their brow wrinkle when you dig deeper into certain issues.”

What else did new directors find most helpful in preparing for their first board meetings?

The key performance indicators (KPIs) and lead indicators for the company. “What do I have to keep my eye on? Every other question ends up stemming from those KPIs.”

A glossary of company and industry-specific jargon and acronyms. “Many companies overlook this, but it’s a real impediment to being productive in your first couple of meetings.”

Meeting with as many members of the executive committee or senior management team as possible.

Understand how the board views sector and company risk. How does management assess, present and articulate risk? Are assumptions discussed and challenged clearly and freely?

A detailed overview of the operations, operational challenges and underlying infrastructure. “You can think you know how an airline runs, but when you walk through the operation center and see hundreds of people managing thousands of flights in the air at the same time around the world, you begin to understand the complexity of the business.”

A holistic view of the board calendar and activities — not just what the next board meeting is about, but the key processes of the board over the course of 12 months of board meetings. “When you’re new, you might wonder why the board isn’t talking about the compensation implication of a decision, as an example, but everyone else knows that’s because the next meeting is the one when the board does the comp review.”

A detailed explanation of how the finances are organized, including a complete listing of accounts in an accounting system. “Everybody’s chart of accounts is different. Depending on how it’s drawn, you can get a very different look at P&L.”

 

Spotlight: Director induction best practices

 

Most boards have a formal induction program, which typically includes the following:

Presentations from management on the business model, profitability and performance

A review of the previous 12 months’ board papers and minutes to provide context on the current issues

Meetings with key business executives and functional leaders, including finance, marketing, IT, HR, etc.

Site visits providing new directors a better sense of how the business works and an opportunity to meet people on the ground

Meetings with external advisers such as accountants, bankers, brokers and others

Explanation of regulatory and governance issues

Attendance at an investor day

Mentoring: First-time directors, especially, tell us they appreciate having a mentor during the first six to 12 months on the board. An informal mentor program pairs a new director with a more experienced director who can provide perspective on boardroom activities and dynamics or help with meeting preparation, explain aspects of board papers, and debrief and act as a sounding board between meetings.

What new directors can do: Don’t be afraid to ask for the process to be tailored to your needs if you want to explore certain areas of the business in greater depth.

(3) Participating in early meetings

 

First-time directors tend to assume that they should say little during their first few meetings, while they observe and get to know the board and its dynamics. The directors we spoke with recommend a more balanced approach: listen more than talk, but be willing to participate in the discussion, especially in your area of expertise. “You’re there for a reason. You’re there because they thought you could add value.” New directors appreciate getting feedback from the board chair or lead director about their contribution level — so, if it’s not given, directors should ask for it. “After the first meeting, the lead director said, ‘I’m glad you spoke up a couple times. Do that more. We brought you here to get your point of view so feel free to speak up.’ It was great to hear that. You never want to hear it the other way, where you spoke up too much or took up too much air time.”

Nothing is more valuable for getting a sense of the board dynamics and directors’ expectations for how you should behave in those early meetings than one-on-one discussions with individual board members. “I wanted to get to know them a little bit personally before meetings where more-involved or controversial topics would be discussed so that we at least have met and have a little bit of an understanding of one another.”

New directors also appreciate when the board chair or lead independent director is proactive in making sure that the multiple voices are heard in board discussions. “Even when the board composition is diverse along many dimensions, your work isn’t done. You still have to actively work to avoid conforming your behaviors and opinions and to hear diverse viewpoints. That’s a constant work in progress.”

 

(4) Having an impact

 

“How do I have impact?” It’s a question that is top of mind for most new directors, especially those who were brought on the board because of their expertise in areas such as digital technology, product development, risk management or go-to-market experience. Depending on the size of the company and experience of the management team, a new director’s involvement outside the boardroom could include interviewing candidates for key roles, mentoring senior leaders, advising on specific topics or making useful introductions. “Engagement has to be on the terms that work for the executive team,” advised one of the directors we interviewed.

New directors with specialized expertise also play a role in educating other directors. “You don’t want a situation where the rest of the board sits back while all the questions flow to one person. Over time, all directors want to learn how to ask challenging questions in these areas. I find that other directors ask me questions like: ‘Why did you ask that? Why did you put the question in this way? What were you looking for? There seems to be something in the response to that question that troubles you, so let’s peel that apart a little bit.’”

First-time directors can find it challenging to know if they are having a positive impact on the board — and that the board is positively contributing to the business — because of the lack of regular feedback. “I would like a little more focus on making performance feedback a continuous process, particularly for the first six to 12 months. Following every meeting, there should be opportunities to point to out what’s working well and what could work differently, even if it’s just a 10- or 15-minute conversation to reinforce and correct the issues that didn’t go well in context.” So it is important to ask the chairman for feedback.

 

(5) Raising questions

 

By definition, a new director lacks perspective on the board’s history — the sacred cows, the topics that have been debated ad nauseam already and other important context. This makes knowing when to raise questions or to push for more information all the more difficult. “Fresh eyes are good, but one of the worst things you can do is walk into the board and hone in on topics that aren’t going to be productive, that the board has already hashed to death.” That is why it is important to have read the board minutes, if not papers, for the previous year or so, so you can understand some of the key issues and debates.

Getting a read from other directors about the board’s priorities can provide important context, as can using meeting breaks to follow up on your questions. “You’re not going to know everything going in. Expect that you’ve got a lot of holes. When I have big questions, I’ll grab a board member who I know will have the context and say, ‘Hey, I noticed this,’ or ‘I had a question on this,’ or ‘I’m sure there’s context here that I don’t know about,’ and just let them talk.”

When a director does have questions or concerns that go deeper, the delivery is important. “Asking questions, even when you know what the answer is, rather than making declarative statements is a good general approach. Other directors will be receptive to your questions if you communicate that you’re trying to get to the heart of important issues and facilitate discussion that needs to happen to gain consensus on direction.” How you frame questions also is important: Ask, “How are you thinking about …?” rather than trying to be too prescriptive and asking, “Have you considered …?”

 

Conclusion

 

Most new directors truly value their first board assignment, despite the time demands and steep learning curve. First-time directors are most likely to enjoy the experience when they conduct careful research and due diligence before accepting a board invitation, prepare thoroughly for board meetings and have the confidence to be themselves in the boardroom.

______________________________________________________________

Participating Directors :

Stewart Butel, former managing director of Wesfarmers Resources and independent director for DUET Company Limited
Amy L. Chang, CEO and founder of Accompany and non-executive director of Cisco, The Procter & Gamble Company and Splunk
Sue Clark, managing director of SABMiller Europe and non-executive director of Britvic
Greg Couttas, former Deloitte audit partner and non-executive director of Virtus Health
Tom Killalea, former Amazon vice president and independent director of Capital One, Carbon Black and MongoDB
George Mattson, former managing director of the Global Industrials Group for Goldman Sachs and independent director of Delta Air Lines
Admiral (Ret.) Gary Roughead, former chief of Naval Operations and independent director of Northrop Grumman Corporation
Michelle Somerville, former KPMG audit partner and independent director of The GPT Group and Challenger
Sybella Stanley, director of corporate finance at RELX and non-executive director at Tate & Lyle and Merchants Trust
Jane Thompson, former senior vice president of Match.com and independent director of Michael Kors
Gene Tilbrook, chair of The GPT Group Nomination and Remuneration Committee
Trae Vassallo, co-founder and managing director of Defy Partners and non-executive director of Telstra Corporation

Quelles sont les tendances eu égard à l’évaluation des conseils d’administration à l’échelle internationale ?


Voici un article très intéressant sur les tendances en évaluation des CA à l’échelle internationale.

Les auteurs, Mark Fenwick* et Erik P. M. Vermeulen, ont étudié l’état de la situation de l’évaluation des conseils dans 20 juridictions différentes qu’ils ont classifiées en 5 groupes, allant d’absence de législation, à des réglementations détaillées et explicites.

Dans l’ensemble, l’étude montre que les juridictions qui sont explicites eu égard aux meilleures pratiques en matière d’évaluation des conseils sont plus susceptibles d’adopter des processus d’évaluation efficaces. La législation et la réglementation ont un grand pouvoir d’influence sur les pratiques exemplaires.

Les auteurs retiennent un certain nombre de constats sur les meilleures pratiques en évaluation des CA :

 

(1) Although there is “no one-size-fits-all” solution, and the design of the evaluation should be tailored to meet the needs of the individual company and the particular circumstances of that company, board evaluation needs to be a continuous and on-going process rather than a periodic event.

(2) Evaluation should include not only compliance and risk-management competencies, but also skills and experience in business-related and organization-related areas, such as strategy, innovation, marketing, globalization, and growth.

(3) Regulator-issued “best practice” principles and guidelines should provide enough detail to offer genuine help to companies in implementing and evaluation processes, but also leave enough flexibility for companies to tailor the process to their specific needs. Additional guidelines need to provide more information about the criteria, methods, and form of the evaluation process (without compelling companies to make use of them).

(4) The board member or committee responsible for driving the evaluation process should actively involve external experts if, and when, necessary. In addition, “Legal Tech”, specifically board evaluation software and application, can help facilitate the assessment process.

(5) Boards should engage in a more open and detailed form of communication and disclosure about the evaluation process and its outcomes.

 

Bonne lecture !

 

Board Evaluation: International Practice

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Board Evaluation: International Practice »
Corporate Governance Practice Framework

 

 

Although there is a broad consensus that we need “better corporate governance,” there is often less agreement as to what this actually means or how we might achieve it. Such uncertainties are hardly surprising. Contemporary corporate governance frameworks were significantly re-worked in the 2000s in response to a series of high-profile scandals. But these reforms appear to have had little effect on the performance of listed companies during the 2008 Financial Crisis. Moreover, the number, scale, and damage of corporate scandals and economic failures do not appear to be diminishing.

One possible reason for the poor performance of corporate governance measures has been an over-emphasis on the regulatory design of “checks-and-balances” in listed companies, rather than on the equally important question of how governance structures can add value to a firm. Our new paper, Evaluating the Board of Directors: International Practice, explores this latter issue, with particular reference to the role of boards and board evaluation.

In the conventional “checks and balances” model of corporate governance, authority and empowerment flow “downwards” from the shareholders (the legal and moral owners of a company) through the board of directors/supervisory board to the management and, eventually, employees. Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to curtail agency problems, notably those that arise between (potentially) self-interested management and investor-owners.

Since management is responsible to the board of directors or supervisory board that, in turn, owes a responsibility to the shareholders or owners of the firm, board members have also been heavily affected by the regulations that have been implemented over the last two decades. In particular, policymakers have emphasized the monitoring and oversight role of “independent” or “outside” directors as crucial in protecting shareholder interests and preventing self-interested transactions. In countries with controlling shareholders, which is common in Europe and Asia, board members are also expected to protect the interests of “minority investors” and other stakeholders in the company. This is deemed necessary because controlling block shareholders may engage in activities that are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders or other stakeholders in the company.

As such, the dominant view of policymakers has been to treat the board as supervisor/monitors of the senior managers. In consequence, the board of directors has tended to focus on the control of management behavior and the monitoring of company past-performance and sustainability.

An alternative way of framing the issue, however, would be to move beyond a control perspective and recognize that a well-balanced board can be a competitive advantage for a company looking to create value and build its capacity for delivering innovation. Such a broader view can be found in the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, for instance, or, more recently, The New Paradigm, A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, issued on 2 September 2016 by the World Economic Forum.

Moreover, companies themselves, as well as their investors, now recognize that the “monitoring” role is no longer sufficient and that the model of board supervision and independence constitutes a missed opportunity. Instead, more innovative firms have integrated a diverse range of individuals onto their boards in the expectation that they will work in collaboration with the firm’s CEO and other senior managers in developing new business strategies. These directors can help a firm stay relevant via the inclusion of diverse perspectives that are directly relevant to a company’s core business operation. A more collaborative model of the relationship between the board and senior management (and the companies’ investors) ensures that these different perspectives are properly integrated into the decision-making processes in a way that can add genuine value to a firm’s business performance.

It is in this context that policymakers, regulators and companies seek to understand better the factors that impact the effectiveness of board performance. As a consequence, board evaluation and evaluation processes have become a key point of interest. In particular, many boards have recognized that it is vital for them to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of their performance on a regular basis. This has resulted in more attention to board evaluations in many jurisdictions. Again, this trend can be seen in the G20/OECD Corporate Governance Principles which recommend including regular board evaluations in a country’s corporate governance framework

As is often the case, however, the risk of regulatory initiatives aimed at forcing or “nudging” changes in corporate behavior is that it merely encourages “box-ticking” in which managing the appearance of compliance becomes the overriding objective. Resources devoted to managing an image of compliance and not substantive compliance are wasted, and the potential gains from meaningful compliance—in this case, effective board evaluation—are never realized.

Our paper, therefore, aims to evaluate regulatory measures aimed at promoting meaningful board evaluation. An empirical study of twenty different jurisdictions was conducted employing multiple criteria. The jurisdictions were classified into five groups ranging from no legal provision for board evaluation to jurisdictions with detailed rules and procedures.

The evidence presented in our paper seems to indicate that companies that are listed in countries with more specific principles and rules, as well as substantive guidance on “best practice” do tend to adopt more meaningful and open forms of board evaluation practice than their counterparts in jurisdictions with no or less detailed requirements, i.e., there seems to be evidence that “law matters” in this context.

As to what constitutes “best practice” in board evaluation the paper makes a number of findings and suggestions. Crucial amongst them are the suggestions that (1) Although there is “no one-size-fits-all” solution, and the design of the evaluation should be tailored to meet the needs of the individual company and the particular circumstances of that company, board evaluation needs to be a continuous and on-going process rather than a periodic event. (2) Evaluation should include not only compliance and risk-management competencies, but also skills and experience in business-related and organization-related areas, such as strategy, innovation, marketing, globalization, and growth. (3) Regulator-issued “best practice” principles and guidelines should provide enough detail to offer genuine help to companies in implementing and evaluation processes, but also leave enough flexibility for companies to tailor the process to their specific needs. Additional guidelines need to provide more information about the criteria, methods, and form of the evaluation process (without compelling companies to make use of them). (4) The board member or committee responsible for driving the evaluation process should actively involve external experts if—and when—necessary. In addition, “Legal Tech”—specifically board evaluation software and applications—can help facilitate the assessment process. (5) Boards should engage in a more open and detailed form of communication and disclosure about the evaluation process and its outcomes.

“Done right”, board evaluation has the potential to enhance a board’s supervisory functions but—just as importantly—it can allow a firm to identify (and fill) expertise gaps on the board and leverage the expertise of board members to improve firm performance by building strategic partnerships with executives and senior management.

The complete paper is available for download here.

*Mark Fenwick is a Professor at Kyushu University Graduate School of Law and Erik P. M. Vermeulen is Professor of Business & Financial Law at Tilburg University. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Fenwick and Professor Vermeulen.

L’activisme actionnarial sans frontières et sans limites


L’activisme actionnarial est de plus en plus en vogue dans les grandes entreprises publiques, partout à l’échelle de la planète.

Selon François Dauphin, ce phénomène mondial est dommageable à plusieurs titres. Son article soulève plusieurs exemples d’organisations qui ont été la cible d’attaques de la part de fonds de couverture (hedge funds).

Les effets négatifs de ce mouvement sont encore trop méconnus des Québécois et plusieurs grandes entreprises ne sont pas suffisamment vigilantes à cet égard. L’auteur mentionne les cas d’entreprises de chez nous qui ont été ciblées.

Les recherches qu’il a menées avec Yvan Allaire de l’IGOPP ont démontré « que les rendements obtenus par les activistes n’étaient pas supérieurs à ceux d’un groupe d’entreprises comparables, sauf lorsque les entreprises ciblées étaient vendues. Lorsque des améliorations opérationnelles étaient constatées, celles-ci provenaient essentiellement de la vente d’actifs, d’une réduction des investissements en capital ou en recherche et développement, de rachat d’actions ou d’une réduction du nombre d’employés. Bref, les avantages sur le plan du rendement financier s’expliquaient par des manœuvres à courte vue ».

François a accepté d’agir en tant qu’auteur invité dans mon blogue en gouvernance. Voici donc son article ; vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « activisme actionnarial »
Qu’est-ce que l’activisme actionnarial ? Définition d’une pratique aux multiples visages

 

L’activisme actionnarial sans frontières et sans limites

par François Dauphin*

Chargé de cours ESG-UQAM

 

 

Dans le cadre d’une conférence donnée à New York le 9 octobre dernier, Bill Ackman a dévoilé, dans son style habituel, que le fonds de couverture qu’il dirige, Pershing Square, a fait l’acquisition de 15,2 millions d’actions de Starbucks (une valeur de près de 900 millions de dollars). Après l’annonce, l’action a grimpé de 5 %, avant de clôturer la séance en hausse de 1,5 %, et le prix est demeuré relativement stable depuis, malgré la correction subie par les marchés durant la même période.

Les coups d’éclat se multiplient chaque année. Aux États-Unis, l’emblématique Campbell Soup est actuellement aux prises avec l’activiste Dan Loeb, de Third Point, qui menace de renverser le conseil d’administration au complet afin de prendre le contrôle de la compagnie. Le conseil en place se défend, accusant l’activiste de souhaiter faire vendre la compagnie en totalité ou en pièces détachées. L’ultime jury, composé des actionnaires de la compagnie, tranchera le 29 novembre prochain au moment de l’élection des 12 membres du conseil lors de l’assemblée annuelle.

Le phénomène de l’activisme actionnarial demeure relativement méconnu au Québec. Pourtant, des sociétés canadiennes ont fait l’objet d’attaques, parfois répétées, de ces actionnaires aux objectifs résolument à court terme. Seulement au cours de la dernière année, des sociétés comme HBC, Power Corp, Open Text et Aimia ont été ciblées. Elles s’ajoutent aux Canadien Pacifique, Tim Hortons et autres sociétés qui ont été profondément transformées par le passage d’un investisseur activiste au sein de leur actionnariat.

Le phénomène ne s’essouffle pas, bien au contraire. Selon les données compilées par la firme américaine Lazard, 62 milliards de dollars ont été déployés par 108 activistes dans le cadre de 193 campagnes activistes en 2017 (dans des entreprises ciblées ayant des capitalisations boursières de 500 millions de dollars ou plus [1]). Après 6 mois en 2018, 145 campagnes ciblant 136 entreprises ont déjà été enregistrées, un nouveau record.

Et ces campagnes portent fruit… Au cours de l’année 2017, les activistes ont ainsi gagné 100 sièges aux conseils d’administration d’entreprises ciblées, et un total de 551 administrateurs auront été déboulonnés au cours des cinq dernières années en conséquence d’attaques activistes. Voilà une statistique qui devrait faire réfléchir tout administrateur qui se croit en position immuable, incluant nos administrateurs québécois qui pourraient se croire à l’abri de telles agitations.

L’activisme actionnarial n’est plus limité à l’Amérique du Nord. Après diverses incursions au Japon au cours des dernières années, on voit maintenant de plus en plus de sociétés européennes ciblées par ces campagnes, incluant des entreprises que l’on croyait à l’épreuve de telles manœuvres. En effet, Nestlé (vives critiques sur la stratégie, avec une demande de recentrer les activités) et Crédit Suisse (demande de scission de la banque en trois entités), par exemple, ont été au cœur de campagnes virulentes. 33 campagnes activistes européennes ont déjà été entamées au cours du premier semestre de 2018.

Les rendements justifient-ils cette recrudescence de cas ?

Dans une étude menée par l’IGOPP [2], il avait été démontré que les rendements obtenus par les activistes n’étaient pas supérieurs à ceux d’un groupe d’entreprises comparables, sauf lorsque les entreprises ciblées étaient vendues. Lorsque des améliorations opérationnelles étaient constatées, celles-ci provenaient essentiellement de la vente d’actifs, d’une réduction des investissements en capital ou en recherche et développement, de rachat d’actions ou d’une réduction du nombre d’employés. Bref, les avantages sur le plan du rendement financier s’expliquaient par des manœuvres à courte vue. Ces constats ont été maintes fois observés dans des études subséquentes, mais une divergence idéologique demeure profondément ancrée dans certains milieux académiques (et financiers) soutenant sans réserve les bienfaits de l’activisme actionnarial.

Les rendements réels des fonds activistes font également réfléchir sur le bien-fondé de cette excitation qui perturbe grandement les activités des entreprises ciblées. Pershing Square, le fonds dirigé par Ackman, est une société inscrite à la bourse et publie donc des résultats annuellement. Les rendements nets du fonds : -20,5 %, -13,5 % et -4,0 % en 2015, 2016 et 2017 respectivement. Ces rendements sont comparés à ceux du S&P 500 qui ont été de 1,4 %, 11,9 % et 21,8 % pour les trois mêmes années. Peu impressionnant.

Les 16 hauts dirigeants du fonds Pershing Square se sont néanmoins partagé la modique somme de 81,6 millions de dollars en rémunération en 2017, soit une moyenne de 5,1 millions par individu. Il est vrai qu’il s’agissait là d’une importante réduction comparativement aux dernières années, dont 2015, alors que les 18 membres de la haute direction s’étaient partagé 515,4 millions de dollars (une moyenne de 28,6 millions par individu).

Si les bienfaits pour les entreprises ciblées demeurent à prouver, le bénéfice pour les activistes eux-mêmes n’est assurément plus à démontrer. Pourtant, de nombreux administrateurs de régimes de retraite se laissent tenter à investir dans ces fonds de couverture activistes sous le mirage de rendements alléchants, alors que, ironiquement, les conséquences des campagnes activistes affectent généralement en premier lieu les travailleurs pour lesquels ils administrent cet argent, un fait souvent décrié par Leo E. Strine Jr., juge en chef de la Cour Suprême du Delaware. Ces travailleurs, paradoxalement, fourbissent donc eux-mêmes l’arme de leur bourreau en épargnant dans des régimes collectifs. Les administrateurs de tels régimes qui appuient les activistes devraient réviser leur stratégie de placement à la lumière d’un nécessaire examen de conscience.

[1] Selon Activist Insight, l’année 2017 a été marquée par 805 campagnes activistes en faisant abstraction du critère de la taille des entreprises ciblées.

[2] Allaire Y, et F. Dauphin, « The game of activist hedge funds: Cui bono ? », International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Vol. 13, no 4, novembre 2016, pp.279-308.

 

*François Dauphin, MBA, CPA, CMA

François est actuellement vice-président directeur pour Ellix Gestion Condo, une firme spécialisée dans la gestion de syndicats de copropriété de grande envergure au centre-ville de Montréal. Auparavant, François était Directeur de la recherche de l’Institut sur la gouvernance d’organisations privées et publiques (IGOPP) où il était notamment responsable des activités de recherche et de publication sur des sujets reliés la gouvernance corporative et à la réglementation financière. Avant de se joindre à l’IGOPP, François a travaillé pour l’Ordre des comptables professionnels agréés du Québec (CPA) dans le cadre du programme de formation continue en management et en comptabilité de management; il demeure impliqué auprès de l’Ordre à titre de membre du Groupe de travail en gouvernance et planification stratégique. François cumule une expérience professionnelle de plus d’une vingtaine d’années en entreprise, dont plusieurs à des fonctions de haute direction. Il a toujours maintenu un lien avec l’enseignement en parallèle à ses activités professionnelles; il est chargé de cours à l’UQAM où il enseigne la stratégie des affaires depuis 2008. Membre de l’Ordre des comptables professionnels agréés du Québec, François détient un MBA de l’Université du Québec à Montréal.

Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées au 20 octobre 2018


Dans un premier temps, j’ai tenté de répondre à cette question en renvoyant le lecteur à deux publications que j’ai faites sur le sujet. C’est du genre check-list !

Puis, dans un deuxième temps, je vous invite à consulter les documents suivants qui me semblent très pertinents pour répondre à la question. Il s’agit en quelque sorte d’une revue de la littérature sur le sujet.

  1. La gouvernance relative aux sociétés en 2017 | Un « Survey » des entreprises du SV 150 et de la S&P 100
  2. Principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale en 2017
  3. Séparation des fonctions de PDG et de président du conseil d’administration | Signe de saine gouvernance !
  4. Six mesures pour améliorer la gouvernance des organismes publics au Québec | Yvan Allaire
  5. Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items
  6. La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?
  7. Enquête mondiale sur les conseils d’administration et la gouvernance

 

J’espère que ces commentaires vous seront utiles, même si mon intervention est colorée par la situation canadienne et américaine !

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « tendances en gouvernance »

 

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

 

J’ai réalisé une entrevue avec le Journal des Affaires le 17 mars 2014. Une rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’a contacté afin de connaître mon opinion sur quelles « prédictions » se sont effectivement avérées, et lesquelles restent encore à améliorer.

J’ai préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances que j’avais identifiées le 17 mars 2014. J’ai donc revisité les tendances afin de vérifier comment la situation avait évolué en quatre ans. J’ai indiqué en rouge mon point de vue eu égard à ces tendances.

 « Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert en gouvernance Jacques Grisé, ex- directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval. Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance. Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé »

 

  1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité. « Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise. Cette affirmation est de plus en plus vraie. La formation certifiée en gouvernance est de plus en plus prisée. Les CA, et notamment les présidents de CA, sont de plus en plus sollicités pour expliquer leurs décisions, leurs erreurs et les problèmes de gestion de crise.
  2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance. À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle. Il va de soi que la formation en gouvernance prendra plus d’importance, mais les compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise seront toujours très recherchées.
  3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront. Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps. Il existe toujours une situation potentiellement conflictuelle entre les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes.
  4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra. L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert. Le débat est toujours ouvert, mais force est de constater que l’actionnariat activiste est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde. Les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques dans plusieurs situations de gestion déficiente.
  5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme. De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques. Cette tendance est très nette. Les CA cherchent à recruter des membres aux expertises complémentaires.
  6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises. Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales. Ici également, l’application des grands principes de gouvernance se généralise et s’applique à tous les types d’organisation, en les adaptant au contexte.
  7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé. La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG. Le rôle du Chairman est de plus en plus mis en évidence, car c’est lui qui représente le conseil auprès des différents publics. Il est de plus en plus indépendant de la direction. Les É.U. sont plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairman et CEO.
  8. La diversité deviendra incontournable. Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers. La diversité dans la composition des conseils d’administration est de plus en plus la norme. On a fait des progrès remarquables à ce chapitre, mais la tendance à la diminution de la taille des CA ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices.
  9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera. Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise. Certes, l’un des rôles les plus importants des administrateurs est de voir à l’orientation de l’entreprise, en apportant une valeur ajoutée aux stratégies élaborées par la direction. Les CA sont toujours sollicités, sous une forme ou une autre, dans la conception de la stratégie.
  10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir. Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance. Les conseils d’administration accordent une attention accrue à la gouvernance par l’intermédiaire de leur comité de gouvernance, mais aussi par leurs comités de RH et d’Audit. Les autorités réglementaires mondiales sont de plus en plus vigilantes eu égard à l’application des principes de saine gouvernance. La SEC, qui donnait souvent le ton dans ce domaine, est en mode révision de la réglementation parce que le gouvernement de Trump la juge trop contraignante pour les entreprises. À suivre !
  11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera. Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort. C’est la voie que les CA ont empruntée. La taille des CA est de plus en plus réduite ; les conseils exécutifs sont en voie de disparition pour faire plus de place aux trois comités statutaires : Gouvernance, Ressources Humaines et Audit. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus engagés et ils doivent investir plus de temps dans leurs fonctions.
  12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme. La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’auto-évaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration. Effectivement, l’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle dans les entreprises cotées. Celles-ci doivent d’ailleurs divulguer le processus dans le rapport aux actionnaires. On assiste à un énorme changement depuis les dix dernières années.

 

À ces 12 tendances, il faudrait en ajouter deux autres qui se sont révélées cruciales pour les conseils d’administration depuis quelques années :

(1) la mise en œuvre d’une politique de gestion des risques, l’identification des risques, l’évaluation des facteurs de risque eu égard à leur probabilité d’occurrence et d’impact sur l’organisation, le suivi effectué par le comité d’audit et par l’auditeur interne.

(2) le renforcement des ressources du conseil par l’ajout de compétences liées à la cybersécurité. La sécurité des données est l’un des plus grands risques des entreprises.

 

Aspects fondamentaux à considérer par les administrateurs dans la gouvernance des organisations

 

 

Récemment, je suis intervenu auprès du conseil d’administration d’une OBNL et j’ai animé une discussion tournant autour des thèmes suivants en affirmant certains principes de gouvernance que je pense être incontournables.

Vous serez certainement intéressé par les propositions suivantes :

(1) Le conseil d’administration est souverain — il est l’ultime organe décisionnel.

(2) Le rôle des administrateurs est d’assurer la saine gestion de l’organisation en fonction d’objectifs établis. L’administrateur a un rôle de fiduciaire, non seulement envers les membres qui les ont élus, mais aussi envers les parties prenantes de toute l’organisation. Son rôle comporte des devoirs et des responsabilités envers celle-ci.

(3) Les administrateurs ont un devoir de surveillance et de diligence ; ils doivent cependant s’assurer de ne pas s’immiscer dans la gestion de l’organisation (« nose in, fingers out »).

(4) Les administrateurs élus par l’assemblée générale ne sont pas porteurs des intérêts propres à leur groupe ; ce sont les intérêts supérieurs de l’organisation qui priment.

(5) Le président du conseil est le chef d’orchestre du groupe d’administrateurs ; il doit être en étroite relation avec le premier dirigeant et bien comprendre les coulisses du pouvoir.

(6) Les membres du conseil doivent entretenir des relations de collaboration et de respect entre eux ; ils doivent viser les consensus et exprimer leur solidarité, notamment par la confidentialité des échanges.

(7) Les administrateurs doivent être bien préparés pour les réunions du conseil et ils doivent poser les bonnes questions afin de bien comprendre les enjeux et de décider en toute indépendance d’esprit. Pour ce faire, ils peuvent tirer profit de l’avis d’experts indépendants.

(8) La composition du conseil devrait refléter la diversité de l’organisation. On doit privilégier l’expertise, la connaissance de l’industrie et la complémentarité.

(9) Le conseil d’administration doit accorder toute son attention aux orientations stratégiques de l’organisation et passer le plus clair de son temps dans un rôle de conseil stratégique.

(10) Chaque réunion devrait se conclure par un huis clos, systématiquement inscrit à l’ordre du jour de toutes les rencontres.

(11) Le président du CA doit procéder à l’évaluation du fonctionnement et de la dynamique du conseil.

(12) Les administrateurs doivent prévoir des activités de formation en gouvernance et en éthique.

 

Voici enfin une documentation utile pour bien appréhender les grandes tendances qui se dégagent dans le monde de la gouvernance aux É.U., au Canada et en France.

 

  1. La gouvernance relative aux sociétés en 2017 | Un « Survey » des entreprises du SV 150 et de la S&P 100
  2. Principales tendances en gouvernance à l’échelle internationale en 2017
  3. Séparation des fonctions de PDG et de président du conseil d’administration | Signe de saine gouvernance !
  4. Six mesures pour améliorer la gouvernance des organismes publics au Québec | Yvan Allaire
  5. Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items
  6. La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?
  7. Enquête mondiale sur les conseils d’administration et la gouvernance

 

Pour une gouvernance efficace des coopératives


Récemment, un ami qui prépare une conférence sur la gouvernance des coopératives me demanda si je pouvais lui procurer des références sur les spécificités de ce type d’organisation pour les administrateurs d’un CA en relation avec d’autres catégories d’entreprises.

J’ai réalisé que je n’avais pas beaucoup publié sur les coopératives comme mode d’organisation du travail. Le portail du gouvernement du Québec sur les coopératives est une mine d’informations très pertinentes pour toutes les questions concernant les coopératives. Les articles suivants sont importants pour bien définir le contexte :

Définition d’une coopérative

Gouvernance des coopératives

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance des coopératives »

 

On y note que celles-ci constituent une grande part de l’économie québécoise et qu’elles sont présentes dans de nombreux secteurs d’activité économique.

Environ 3 300 coopératives et mutuelles sont actives au Québec. Elles regroupent 8,8 millions de producteurs, de consommateurs et de travailleurs. On les trouve notamment dans les secteurs :

– des services financiers et des assurances;

– de l’industrie agroalimentaire;

– de l’alimentation;

– de l’habitation;

– de l’industrie forestière;

– des services funéraires;

– des soins de santé et en milieu scolaire.

Les coopératives régies par la Loi sur les coopératives

Les quelque 2 800 coopératives non financières regroupent environ 1,3 million de membres. Ces entreprises procurent un emploi à plus de 46 000 personnes et font un chiffre d’affaires annuel global de plus de 14,5 milliards de dollars. Ces coopératives sont constituées juridiquement en vertu de la Loi sur les coopératives (RLRQ, c. C-67.2). Ce lien mène à un site qui n'est peut-être pas soumis au standard gouvernemental sur l'accessibilité..

Également, je crois que les deux références suivantes sont très utiles pour mieux comprendre la gouvernance :

 

Gouvernance et coopératives

LA GOUVERNANCE EFFICACE DES COOPÉRATIVES

Enfin, je vous soumets un Tableau comparatif entre une coopérative, une société par actions et un organisme à but non lucratif.

Bonne lecture !

 

Tableau comparatif entre une coopérative, une société par actions et un organisme à but non lucratif

COOPÉRATIVE SOCIÉTÉ PAR ACTIONS ORGANISME À BUT NON LUCRATIF (OBNL)
RLRQ, chapitre C-67.2
Loi sur les coopérativesLa loi est appliquée par la Direction du développement des coopératives du ministère de l’Économie, de la Science et de l’Innovation.		 RLRQ, chapitre S-31.1
Loi sur les sociétés par actionsLa loi est appliquée par le Registraire des entreprises.		 RLRQ, chapitre C-38
Loi sur les compagnies
Partie IIILa loi est appliquée par le Registraire des entreprises.
PARTICIPATION À LA PROPRIÉTÉ
Part sociale Action au porteur Capital social ou capital-actions
La part sociale est nominative.
Article 39		 Un certificat d’actions fait preuve que l’actionnaire a droit aux actions qui y sont représentées.
Article 63		 Inexistant
Article 224
La part sociale a une valeur nominale de 10 $, sauf dans une coopérative en milieu scolaire.
Articles 41 et 221.5		 Le capital-actions est sans valeur nominale, sauf disposition contraire des statuts.
Article 43
La part sociale est rachetable L’action est rachetable
Un membre peut obtenir, à certaines conditions, le remboursement de ses parts sociales à leur valeur nominale.
Articles 38, 38.1, 44 et 202		 La loi contient certaines dispositions spécifiques régissant l’achat et le rachat des actions.
Articles 93 et suiv.		 Ne s’applique pas.
Responsabilité des membres Responsabilité des actionnaires Responsabilité des membres
La responsabilité des membres est limitée au montant de leur souscription en capital social. Les membres ne sont pas personnellement responsables des dettes de la coopérative.
Articles 309 et 315 du Code civil du Québec (C.c.Q.)
 La responsabilité des actionnaires est limitée au montant non payé sur les actions qu’ils détiennent. Les actionnaires ne sont pas personnellement responsables des dettes de la société par actions.
Article 224		 La responsabilité des membres est limitée à l’obligation de verser une contribution fixée par règlement. Les membres ne sont pas personnellement responsables des dettes de l’organisme.
Articles 222 et 226
PARTICIPATION AU POUVOIR
Un membre, un vote Une action, un vote Un membre, un vote
Un membre n’a droit qu’à une seule voix, quel que soit le nombre de parts qu’il détient.
Articles 4 et 68		 L’actionnaire dispose habituellement d’une voix par action.
Article 179		 Un membre n’a droit qu’à une seule voix. Toutefois, les règlements peuvent limiter le droit de vote à certaines catégories de membres.
Article 225
Le vote par procuration est interdit Le vote par procuration est permis Le vote par procuration est interdit
Un membre ne peut voter par procuration.
Article 4		 Chaque actionnaire peut se faire représenter par son fondé de pouvoir.
Article 170		 Un membre ne peut voter par procuration.
Article 224
Il a le droit de se faire représenter par son conjoint ou son enfant majeur non membre, sous réserve des règlements.
Article 69
Responsabilités des administrateurs Responsabilités des administrateurs Responsabilités des administrateurs
Les administrateurs ont le rôle et les devoirs de mandataires de la coopérative.
Article 91
Articles 2138 et suiv. du C.c.Q.		 Les dirigeants ont le rôle et les devoirs de mandataires de la société par actions.
Article 116
Articles 2138 et suiv. du C.c.Q.		 Les administrateurs ont le rôle et les devoirs de mandataires de l’organisme.
Article 321 C.c.Q.
Articles 2138 et suiv. du C.c.Q.
Devoirs et responsabilités d’administrateurs d’une personne morale.
Articles 321 à 330 du C.c.Q.		 Devoirs et responsabilités d’administrateurs de la société par actions.
Articles 119 à 133		 Devoirs et responsabilités d’administrateurs d’une personne morale.
Articles 321 à 330 du C.c.Q.
Devoirs particuliers découlant de la Loi sur les coopératives.
Article 90		 Responsabilités découlant de la Loi sur les sociétés par actions.
Articles 154 à 158		 Responsabilités découlant de la Loi sur les compagnies.
Article 95
Responsabilités en vertu d’autres lois. Responsabilités en vertu d’autres lois. Responsabilités en vertu d’autres lois.
PARTICIPATION AUX RÉSULTATS
Intérêt sur le capital social Dividende
La loi décrète qu’aucun intérêt ne sera payable sur la part sociale. Par ailleurs, elle prévoit qu’un intérêt peut être payé sur la part privilégiée et que cet intérêt doit être limité par résolution du conseil d’administration. Enfin, un intérêt peut également être payé sur la part privilégiée participante, mais celui-ci doit être limité par règlement de la coopérative.
Articles 4, paragraphe 3
Articles 42, 46, 49.1 et 49.4		 La société par actions peut déclarer et payer tout dividende, sauf si elle ne peut de ce fait acquitter son passif à échéance.
Articles 103 à 105		 Ne s’applique pas.
La part sociale ne peut avoir de plus-value La valeur de l’action ordinaire est variable
L’article 38.1 stipule que seules les sommes payées sur les parts sociales des membres démissionnaires ou exclus leur sont remboursées. Comme l’article 147 décrète que la réserve ne peut être partagée entre les membres ou les membres auxiliaires, elle ne peut servir à conférer une plus-value sur ces parts. Un actionnaire peut vendre ses actions à une autre personne, à un prix convenu avec elle. La rentabilité de la société par actions et la valeur des bénéfices non répartis influent sur la valeur des actions. Ne s’applique pas.
Affectation des trop-perçus ou des excédents Affectation des profits Affectation des excédents
Les trop-perçus annuels sont affectés à la réserve ou attribués aux membres ou aux membres auxiliaires, sous forme de ristournes, au prorata des opérations de chacun avec la coopérative.
Articles 4, 143 et 149		 Les profits peuvent être distribués sous forme de dividendes, si les administrateurs en déclarent selon les droits prévus pour les différentes catégories d’actions. Ils peuvent être également réinvestis dans la société par actions.
 Les membres d’un organisme à but non lucratif n’ont aucun droit sur les biens ou les revenus de cet organisme. De plus, un organisme n’attribue pas de ristourne à ses membres.
Liquidation Liquidation Liquidation
Le titulaire de parts, dans le cas d’une liquidation, n’a droit qu’aux sommes versées sur ses parts. Le détenteur d’actions ordinaires, dans le cas d’une liquidation, participe au partage du reliquat des biens de la société.
Articles 47 et 48		 Le membre, dans le cas d’une liquidation, ne participe généralement pas à la distribution des biens de l’organisme.
Le liquidateur paie d’abord les dettes de la coopérative ainsi que les frais de liquidation et rembourse ensuite aux membres les sommes versées sur leurs parts, suivant la priorité établie par règlement ou résolution du conseil. Après ces versements, le solde de l’actif est dévolu à une coopérative, à une fédération, à une confédération ou au Conseil québécois de la coopération et de la mutualité, par une résolution adoptée à la majorité des voix exprimées.
Article 185
Cette disposition ne concerne pas certaines coopératives agricoles.
Article 208		 Le liquidateur recouvre les créances et exécute les obligations de la société par actions. Il effectue ensuite le partage du reliquat des biens conformément à une proposition de partage approuvée par les actionnaires.
Articles 337 à 346		 Les lettres patentes de la plupart des organismes à but non lucratif ordonnent que le résidu des biens soit remis à un autre organisme poursuivant des fins similaires. Dans ce cas, les membres n’ont aucun droit sur les biens de l’organisme.
Articles 28(2), 31(Q) et 224Toutefois, si les lettres patentes sont muettes sur cette question, les membres ont droit à ces biens au prorata entre eux.

Les enjeux de la diffusion des informations stratégiques sur les réseaux sociaux


Ce matin un article de Alissa Amico*, paru sur le forum de Harvard Law School, a attiré mon attention parce que c’est sur un sujet qui fait couler beaucoup d’encre dans le domaine la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (cotées en bourse).

En effet, quels sont les moyens appropriés de diffusion et de divulgation des informations à l’ère des médias sociaux ? L’auteure fait le tour de la question en rappelant qu’il existe encore beaucoup d’ambiguïté dans l’acceptation des nouveaux outils de communication.

On le sait, la SEC a réagi promptement aux annonces de Elon Musk, PDG et Chairman de Telsa, faites par le biais de Twitter qui ont été jugées trompeuses et qui ne respectaient pas le principe d’une diffusion de l’information à la portée de tous les actionnaires.

L’auteure rappelle que l’Autorité des Marchés Financiers français a pris une position ferme à ce propos en exigeant que les entreprises divulguent leurs réseaux sociaux privilégiés de communication sur leur site Internet.

La conclusion de l’article est révélatrice de grands changements à l’égard de la diffusion d’information stratégique.

The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

 

On Elon Musk, Donald Trump, and Corporate Governance

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Elon Musk SEC »
SEC sues Tesla CEO Elon Musk for ‘misleading’ tweet »- ABC News

 

There was something Trumpian in Elon Musk’s tweet about taking Tesla private. “Am considering taking Tesla private at $420. Funding secured”, he boldly and succinctly announced on August 7, claiming that the necessary capital has been confirmed from the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the Saudi sovereign fund that is seeking to become the region’s largest according to the ambitions of its government, including through the much-debated public offering of Saudi Aramco.

Like in a Mexican soap opera, news about the PIF raising fresh capital through the transfer of its 70% stake in SABIC, the Saudi $100 billion petrochemicals giant and the largest listed company in the Kingdom to Saudi Aramco, as well its talks with Tesla’s rival Lucid followed shortly, immediately highlighting the perils of instant communication. As it turns out, tweeting 280-character messages is straightforward, explaining them takes a little more character and significantly more characters.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reacted promptly, issuing a subpoena to Tesla to probe into the accuracy of its communication to investors. Elon Musk is unfortunately not the first CEO to pay for taking to Twitter. Nestle’s attempt at humor on Twitter, which likened a massacre of Mexican students to its candy bar, resulted in calls for boycott, ultimately forcing the company to erase the message and apologize. Even the CEO of Twitter itself, Jack Dorsey, has had to apologize for one of his personal tweets, which unlike Tesla and Nestle cases, had nothing to do with his company.

Indeed, the emergence of new communication channels has occurred at a faster pace than regulation on how these should be employed by companies has emerged, whilst over-excited executives have taken to social media in attempt to build hype around their companies. In the world where the number of Instagram, Twitter and Facebook followers counts more than the number of public investors, social media has the potential of becoming the main channel for communication in the corporate world.

Although this phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed, its implications need to be considered in a wider context that is beyond this immediate Bermuda Triangle involving Mr. Musk, the PIF and Tesla. In fact, this episode raises two important and distinct questions: first, who should be able to speak on behalf of public shareholding companies in order to ensure the accuracy of communication, and second, how should this communication be made such that it reaches its ultimate target, the investor community.

In developed markets such as the United States, where Tesla is incorporated, disclosure by public companies is subject to a myriad of regulations including Rule 10b-5—first issued 70 years ago—which prohibits the release or omission of material information, resulting in fraud or deceit. It is also subject to a more recent Fair Disclosure Regulation which essentially forbids companies from releasing non-public material information to third parties, effectively stamping out the practice of selective disclosure by companies to specific investors.

These regulations provide the colorful context behind the SEC’s investigation into Mr. Musk’s unfortunate tweet, allowing the regulator to question whether he had misled investors: that is, whether funding for taking Tesla private has indeed been “secured”. Another issue—and one not raised in the media—is whether Twitter can effectively be considered as an appropriate means of communication to the investor community. In the United States, where 70% of public share ownership today is in the hands of institutional investors, this is a moot point.

Indeed, the SEC has officially allowed listed companies to use social media in 2013, prompted by an investigation into a Facebook post by the Netflix CEO Reed Hastings about the company passing a billion hours watched for the first time. The SEC did not penalize him and decided that henceforth social media could be used for communicating corporate announcements as long as investors are warned that this would be the case.

In the context of emerging markets however, this position would be potentially quite dangerous. In Saudi Arabia for example, home to the PIF—Tesla’s alleged buyer—trading in the stock market is 90% retail, whereas its underlying ownership is largely institutional. Communicating company news via social media presupposes that all investors have equal access to it, which may not necessarily be the case in retail marketplaces. Regulators in emerging markets, where guidelines on the use of social media for corporate announcements are generally lacking, would do well to address this before executives take to Twitter and Facebook.

They would need to keep in mind however, that habits of emerging market investors may not have shifted fast enough to be comfortable in the world of Twitter. In Egypt for example, the officially recognised channel for publishing financial results remains the country’s newspapers. Expecting investors to run from conventional—not to say outdated—means of communication, to judiciously tracking social media announcements appears overly ambitious.

Using social media as a means of communicating material corporate news raises another non-semantic point which is equally important to address in both emerging and developed markets. It is not only tweets of CEOs like Elon Musk that have the potential to affect share prices and investor perceptions. If CFOs, CROs, CIOs, COOs and other C-suite members take to Twitter, Facebook, Instagram or other platforms to offer their interpretation of company developments, the potential impact on investors could be quite disheartening.

Just like the CEO’s or the CFO’s ability to write a cheque is circumscribed by internal controls and board oversight of material transactions related to mergers and acquisitions for instance, their ability to speak on behalf of their companies should be addressed by policies including specific approval processes. This would effectively limit the possibility of senior executives or board members using their iPhone as a Megaphone, instead requiring rigorous processes to be introduced such that social media announcements are coherent with other disclosure channels and indeed with corporate strategy.

From a governance perspective, further thought should be given to centralizing the communication function within companies in the hands of the Head of Investor Relations or equivalent. Indeed, given the value of information in our era of fast-paced communication powered by social media and fast-paced stock exchanges powered by algorithmic and high-frequency trading, the role of a Chief Communication Officer may be justified in large publicly listed companies, just as the role of a Chief Risk Officer reporting to the board has been introduced in many large organisations following the financial crisis.

While forcing companies in a straightjacket of yet more corporate governance rules on how they should handle their corporate communications may be unwise, some thought about legal distinctions and limits between what is considered personal and corporate announcements appears warranted. Investors may need to be told that unless corporate announcements come from official company channels—which personal Twitter accounts are not—their interpretation of tweets by excited executives are to be made at their own peril, not subject to usual investor protections.

Likewise, publicly-traded companies need to inform the investor community of what constitutes their official communication channels and ensure that financial and non-financial information announced through these is pre-approved, synchronized and not in conflict with existing regulations. Some regulators such as the French securities regulator, Authorité des Marches Financiers, has done so almost 5 years ago, recommending that companies specify their social media accounts on their website as well as establish a charter addressing how executives and staff are to use their personal social media accounts.

The ultimate twist of irony is of course that the SEC, investigating Tesla and its CEO, is part of the same government whose President’s tweeting activity has been far from uncontroversial. Both Mr. Musk’s and Mr. Trump’s use of Twitter highlight that—whether we like it or not—social media may soon be the most consulted sort of media. Its impact, in both corporate or political circles, needs hence to be considered by policymakers seriously. It is clear that every boat—whether corporate or political—needs a captain responsible for setting the course and communicating it to the lighthouse to avoid collisions and confusion at sea. Yet, captains are not pirates, and in the era of social media, regulators need to devise new rules of the game to avoid investor collusion and collision.

 

*Alissa Amico is the Managing Director of GOVERN. This post is based on a GOVERN memorandum by Ms. Amico.

Le comportement d’Elon Musk est-il un signe de faible gouvernance chez Tesla ?


Depuis quelques années, on ne cesse de relater les faits d’armes de Elon Musk lequel gère ses entreprises de manières plutôt controversées, ou à tout le moins contraires aux principes de saine gouvernance.Dans cet article de Kevin Reed, publié sur le site de Board Agenda le 17 septembre 2018, on porte un jugement assez sévère sur le comportement autoritaire de Musk qui continue de bafouer les règles les plus élémentaires de gouvernance.

Les investisseurs qui croient dans le génie de cet entrepreneur sont en droit de s’attendre à ce que le fondateur mette en place des systèmes de gouvernance qui respectent les parties prenantes, dont les investisseurs.

Ces comportements de dominance sont tributaires du conseil d’administration où le fondateur joue le rôle de « Chairman, Product architect and CEO », comme s’il était le propriétaire de tout le capital de l’entreprise.

On peut comprendre la confiance que les investisseurs mettent en Musk, mais jusqu’à quel point doivent-ils ignorer certaines règles fondamentales de gouvernance d’entreprise ?

On connaît plusieurs entreprises qui sont dominées complètement par leur fondateur-entrepreneur. Ces comportements « dysfonctionnels » ne sont pas toujours signe de mauvaise performance à court terme. Mais, à long terme, sans de solides principes de gouvernance, ces entreprises rencontrent généralement des problèmes de croissance.

Selon l’auteur Kevin Reed,

Elon Musk, Tesla’s “chairman, product architect and CEO”, has recently the displayed classic traits of a dominant, idiosyncratic and controversial boss which, according to one commentator, is a sure sign of weak governance.

Voici un aperçu de l’argumentaire présenté dans l’article.

Bonne lecture !

 

Tale of Tesla’s Elon Musk is a ‘sadly familiar story’ of weak governance

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « elon musk »

There has been a long history of dominant, sometimes idiosyncratic and often irascible CEOs.

They will court controversy—which can be directly related to the business’s strategy and operations, or linked to “non-corporate” behaviour or actions.

Names such as Mike Ashley, Lord Sugar and even “shareholder-return-friendly” Sir Martin Sorrell have shown how outspoken and autocratic leaders will find their approach strongly questioned or criticised.

Names such as Mike Ashley, Lord Sugar and even “shareholder-return-friendly” Sir Martin Sorrell have shown how outspoken and autocratic leaders will find their approach strongly questioned or criticised—usually during tough times, despite previous spells of success.

However, recent proclamations on social and traditional media by Tesla’s Elon Musk could well be viewed as beyond the pale.

Whether offering a mini-submarine to rescue children stuck in a Thai cave, to making lewd accusations about another rescuer, through to proclaiming on Twitter that he is considering taking Tesla private, it puts into question whether such behaviour damages shareholder value.

“The tale of Elon Musk is a sadly familiar story of a founder who through vision, drive, ambition and talent grows a company to fantastic levels, but who then seems unable to accept challenge and healthy criticism and feels unable to operate in an appropriate governance environment,” explains Iain Wright, director of corporate and regional engagement at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW).

Crashing companies onto rocks

Wright believes that we have seen “time and time again” dominant founders and chiefs “crash those companies onto the rocks” through “weak corporate governance”.

An important part of reining in such dominance is through the board and, namely, the chairman. They need to be able to support someone  with the vision and entrepreneurial spirit of someone like Musk, but also challenge them on behalf of the company and its stakeholders to “curb some of his erratic behaviour”.

“The board is subservient to the founder and chief executive rather than the other way round.”

He adds: “Good corporate governance would put in place a board who would challenge this, led by a chair who has the authority, experience and gravitas to stand up to Musk and tell him to have a holiday and get some sleep.”

And so, what of Tesla’s chairman? Well, that’s Elon Musk, whose full title is “chairman, product architect and CEO”. Attempts to separate the roles and appoint a chairman have been rebuffed by the board in the past, stating that it has a lead independent director in place.

This director is Antonio Gracias, a private equity investor who has reportedly shared many years associated with Musk.

“The board is subservient to the founder and chief executive rather than the other way round,” suggests Wright. “Musk is both chairman and CEO of Tesla, a situation relatively common in the States but quite properly frowned upon as inappropriate corporate governance in the UK.”

Separating the role is for the “long-term benefit of the company”, adds Wright. “This proposal should come back on the table soon.”

Le point sur la future loi californienne eu égard aux quotas de femmes sur les CA


Voici un article de Tomas Pereira, analyste de recherche à Equilar Inc, publié sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum qui fait le point sur la future loi californienne eu égard aux quotas de femmes sur les CA.

L’étude présente des statistiques intéressantes sur la situation des femmes sur les CA en Californie et fait état de projections concernant l’effet des mesures. Rappelons que l’état de la Californie est le premier état qui s’aventure dans l’établissement de quotas pour favoriser la diversité sur les conseils d’administration.

La législation propose qu’une entreprise ait au moins une femme sur le CA au 31 décembre 2019,

That minimum will be raised to at least two female board members for companies with five directors or at least three female board members for companies with six or more directors by December 31, 2021.

Ainsi en 2021, les conseils d’administration devront compter au moins trois femmes sur les CA, si le nombre d’administrateurs est de six ou plus.

Bonne lecture !

 

Gender Quotas in California Boardrooms

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Gender Quotas in California Boardrooms »

 

By August 31, 2018, California could become the first state in the nation to mandate publicly held companies that base their operations in the state to have women on their boards. The legislation—SB 826—will require public companies headquartered in California to have a minimum of one female on its board of directors by December 31, 2019. That minimum will be raised to at least two female board members for companies with five directors or at least three female board members for companies with six or more directors by December 31, 2021.

If SB 826 is passed in the Assembly and signed by Governor Jerry Brown, corporations not compliant with the new rules will be subjected to financial consequences. Strike one will be accompanied with a fine equal to the average annual cash compensation of directors. Any subsequent violation would amount to a fine equal to three times the average annual cash compensation for directors. Hence, the consequences are very real for companies that choose not to comply with the new rules.

A new study by Equilar looks at where public companies headquartered in California currently lie in relation to the proposed legislation. The study includes public companies in California that have annual revenues of $5 million or more—amounting to a total of 211 companies with an aggregate of 349 female and 1,466 male board members.

 

Looking broadly, California is slightly below other states and the national average in terms of average women on a board. California, on average, has 1.65 female members per board, whereas other states and the United States as a whole average 1.76 and 1.75 female members, respectively. This type of statistic is a likely factor in spurring state legislators in Sacramento to make significant changes to the status quo and place California in a leading role for board diversity in the United States.

 

By 2019, most companies in California would be safe from any financial penalties for having an insufficient number of female board members. As it stands now, 82% of public companies in California who have annual revenues of over $5 million will meet the initial criteria, whereas 18% will not. Consequently, 37 public companies would be faced with a fine equal to the average annual director compensation for failing to comply.

In the following table, Equilar examined the 82% success rate a bit further and broke it down by sector in order to examine which industries are driving the rates of success and failure. By 2019, the basic materials and utilities sectors in California would both have a 100% success rate. Thus, every company within these two sectors has at least one female director present on their board. The next sector with the highest rate of success is services, with 92% having at least one female member. Both the healthcare and technology sectors are tied for lowest compliance at 83% pass.

 

When looking at the companies that would meet the secondary December 31, 2021 criteria, the picture is much bleaker at present for public companies in California. According to the proposed legislation, the required minimum would increase to two female board members for companies with five total directors or to three female board members for companies with at least six total directors.

 

Taking that future criteria and applying it to today, 79% of public companies would fail, while only 21% would pass. The following table sees basic materials—one of the sectors with 100% company success rate with the previous 2019 criteria—fall down to a 50-50 ratio of pass to fail. The sector with the highest success rate is utilities, while the industrial goods sector has the lowest success rate at 75% and 14%, respectively.

 

While the path for the proposed legislation is still a bit rocky, the broader trend towards diversifying boardrooms across the country is growing. Companies should anticipate new legislation—not just SB 826—sprouting throughout more state legislatures and get ahead of this rolling tide. States like Maine, Illinois and Ohio have already begun promoting resolutions to encourage companies to diversify their boards. In addition, BlackRock and other institutional investors have publicly stated that they will expect at least two female members per board. The push towards gender diversification is well warranted. Studies by management consulting firms, such as Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Co., have shown that diverse boards perform better financially. Signs do point to a gradual progression towards gender parity in the boardroom, as noted by the Q1 2018 Equilar Gender Diversity Index. However, without proactive encouragement or legislation, it would take decades before a true gender balance is realized.

L’émergence de la Chine dans le monde de la gouvernance moderne


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article sur l’évolution de la gouvernance chinoise.

Les auteurs, Jamie Allen*et Li Rui, de la Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), ont produit un excellent rapport sur les changements que vivent les entreprises chinoises eu égard à la gouvernance.

L’étude se base sur une enquête auprès d’entreprises chinoises et auprès d’investisseurs étrangers. Également, les auteurs présentent une mine d’information sur la situation de la gouvernance.J’ai reproduit, ci-après, un résumé de l’enquête.

Bonne lecture !

 

With its securities market continuing to internationalise and grow in complexity, China appears at a turning point in its application of CG and ESG principles.

The time is right to strengthen communication and understanding between domestic and foreign market participants.

 

 

Awakening Governance: ACGA China Corporate Governance Report 2018

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance chinoise »

Introduction: Bridging the gap

 

The story of modern corporate governance in China is closely connected to the rapid evolution of its capital markets following the opening to the outside world in 1978. The 1980s brought the first issuance of shares by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a lively over-the-counter market. National stock markets were relaunched in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 to 1991, while new guidance on the corporatisation and listing of SOEs was issued in 1992. The first overseas listing of a state enterprise came in October 1992 in New York, followed by the first SOE listing in Hong Kong in 1993. Corporate governance reform gained momentum in the late 1990s, but it was less a byproduct of the Asian Financial Crisis than a need to strengthen the governance of SOEs listing abroad. The early 2000s then brought a series of major reforms on independent directors, quarterly reporting and board governance aimed squarely at domestically listed firms.

A great deal has changed in China since then, with periods of intense policy focus on corporate governance followed by consolidation. In recent years, China’s equity market has undergone a renewed burst of internationalisation through Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Connect, relaxed rules for Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, and the landmark inclusion of 234 leading A shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index in June 2018. While capital controls and other restrictions on foreign investment remain, there seems little reason to doubt that foreign portfolio investment will play an increasing role in China’s public and private securities markets in the foreseeable future.

Running parallel to market internationalisation, and facilitated by it, is a broadening of the scope of corporate governance to include a focus on environmental and social factors (“ESG”), and a deepening concern about climate change and environmental sustainability. Pension funds and investment managers in China are now encouraged by the government to look closely at ESG risks and opportunities in their investment process. And green finance has become big business in China, with green bond issuance growing steadily. Indeed, these themes are also part of the newly revised Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (2018) from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC); this is the first revision of the Code since 2002.

 

Turning point

 

China thus appears at a new turning point in its market development and application of corporate governance principles. While it is difficult to predict how this process will unfurl, we believe three broad developments would be beneficial:

-That unlisted and listed companies in China see corporate governance and ESG not merely as a compliance requirement, but as tools for enhancing organisational effectiveness and corporate performance over the longer term. This applies as much to entrepreneurial privately owned enterprises (POEs) as established SOEs. The view that good governance is not relevant or possible in young, innovative firms is misguided.

-That domestic institutional investors in China see corporate governance and ESG not only as tools for mitigating investment risk, but as a platform for enhancing the value of existing investments through active dialogue with investee companies. The process of engagement can also help investors differentiate between companies that take governance seriously and those which do not.

-That foreign institutional investors view corporate governance in China as something more nuanced than a division between “shareholder unfriendly” SOEs and “exciting but risky” POEs. We recommend foreign asset owners and managers spend more time on the ground in China and invest in studying China’s corporate governance system, if they are not already doing so.

Of course, there are many exceptions to these broad characterisations. It is possible to find companies which view governance as a learning journey—and they are not necessarily listed. Certain mainland asset managers have begun investigating how to integrate governance and ESG factors into their investment process. And there are a growing number of foreign investors, both boutique and mainstream, that have developed a deep understanding of the diversity among SOEs and POEs and which have achieved excellent investment returns from SOEs as well.

Not surprisingly, however, our research has found that significant gaps in communication and understanding do exist between foreign institutional investors and China listed companies. According to an original survey undertaken by ACGA for this report, a majority of foreign investor respondents (59%) admitted that they did not understand corporate governance in China. Only 10% answered in the affirmative, while another 31% felt they “somewhat” understood the system. Conversely, it appears that most China listed companies do not appreciate the challenges that foreign institutional investors face in navigating “corporate governance with Chinese characteristics”.

This report is written for both a domestic and international audience. Our aim is to describe in as fair and factual a manner as possible the system of corporate governance in China, highlighting what is unique, what looks the same but is different, and areas of genuine similarity with other major securities markets. The main part of the report focuses on “Chinese characteristics” and looks at the role of Party organisations/committees, the board of directors, supervisory boards, independent directors, SOEs vs POEs, and audit committees/auditing. Each chapter explains the current legal and regulatory basis for the governance institution described, the particular challenges that companies and investors face, and concludes with suggestions for next steps. Our intention has been to craft recommendations that are practical and anchored firmly in the current CG system in China—in other words, that are implementable by companies and institutional investors. We hope the suggestions, and indeed this report, will be viewed as a constructive contribution to the development of China’s capital market.

The remainder of this Introduction provides an overview of key macro results from our two surveys. We start with the good news—that a large proportion of foreign institutional investors and local companies are optimistic about China—then highlight the challenges both sides face in addressing governance issues. The following chapters draw upon additional material from the two surveys.

ACGA survey—The big picture

Are you optimistic?

 

The good news from our survey is that a sizeable proportion of both foreign investors (38% of respondents) and China listed companies (52%) are optimistic about the investment potential of the A share market over the next five to 10 years, as Figure 1.1 below shows. Only 21% of foreign investors are negative, while the remainder are neutral. Not surprisingly, only 15% of China respondents were negative, while almost one-third were neutral.

 

Do you agree with MSCI?

 

The picture diverges on the issue of whether MSCI was right to include A shares in its Emerging Markets Index in 2018: only 27% of foreign respondents agreed compared to 65% of Chinese respondents, as Figure 1.2, below, shows. Almost half the foreign respondents did not agree compared to a mere 12% for Chinese respondents. A similar proportion was neutral in both surveys.

 

Challenges—Foreign institutional investors

The investment process

 

Foreign investors face a range of challenges investing in China, the first of which is understanding the companies in which they invest. As Figure 1.3 below indicates, foreign investors do not rely solely on information provided by companies when making investment decisions, but utilise a range of additional sources. It appears that listed companies are not aware of this issue.

 

Company engagement

 

Globally, institutional investors seek to enter into dialogue with their investee companies. It is no different in China, as shown in Figure 1.4.

 

 

But the process is not easy.

 

 

And successful outcomes are fairly thin on the ground to date.

 

Common threads

 

Respondents gave a range of answers as to why the process of engagement was difficult and successful outcomes limited, but some common threads were discernible:

Language and communication: In addition to straightforward linguistic difficulties (ie, companies not speaking English, investors not speaking Chinese), the communication problem is sometimes cultural. As one person said, “Even though I am from China, it is hard to interpret hidden messages.”

Access: Getting access to companies can be difficult. Getting to meet the right senior-level person, such as a director or executive, can be even more challenging.

Investor relations (IR): While some IR teams are professional, many are not. As one respondent commented: “IR (managers) are not very well trained and some of them lack basic understanding or knowledge of corporate governance or even financial information.”

CG as compliance: A common complaint is that companies view CG as merely a compliance exercise. Some refuse to give “detailed answers beyond the party line”.

Non-alignment: There is a recurring feeling that the interests of controlling shareholders in SOEs are not aligned with minority shareholders. One investor commented on the “lack of responsiveness” to outside shareholder suggestions, adding that SOEs “wait for government to give the direction, not investors”.

Lack of understanding: There can be a significant gap in the awareness of CG and ESG principles.

 

Empathy for companies

 

Conversely, a few respondents expressed empathy for the position of companies. As one wrote: “There also appears to be an under appreciation by international investors of the differences in culture, political context, and the path and stage of economic development between China and the rest of the world. Any attempt at influencing changes without a reasonable understanding of these differences is likely to be ineffective and (may) at times lead to unintended consequences.”

Another explained some of the regulatory challenges facing listed companies: “With a few exceptions, both SOEs and POEs have to deal with stringent and ever-changing industry regulations and government policies.”

A third said that some engagement had been positive: “Generally, where I have had access to the right people, engagement has been constructive. I suspect this is a result of the companies already appreciating the value of good governance in attracting non-domestic investors.”

And perhaps the most positive comment of all: “A number of the Chinese companies we speak to, especially the industry leaders, already address ESG risks in their businesses. Most of them publish ESG reports annually, which help to set the benchmark for their industry and also to garner positive feedback from society and hence, end-customers. Some of such companies end up enjoying a pricing premium on their products once this positive brand equity has been established. This creates a virtuous cycle, where ESG becomes part of their corporate culture. They understand that for the long-term sustainability of their business, and for the benefits of all their stakeholders, such investment can only enhance their competitiveness.”

 

Brave new world of stewardship

 

Yet most investors still find engaging with companies a challenge. A further reason may be that China is one of only three major markets in Asia-Pacific that has not yet issued an “investor stewardship code”. Such codes push institutional investors to take CG and ESG more seriously, incorporate these concepts into their investment process, and help to encourage greater dialogue between listed companies and their shareholders (see Table 1.1, below). In recent years, the bar has been quickly raised on this issue in Asia and expectations have risen commensurately.

Without an explicit policy driving investor stewardship, it is unlikely that the average listed company will give proper weight to a dialogue with shareholders. As one foreign investor said: “Generally speaking, it is relatively easier to engage with bigger listed companies. SOEs and larger companies tend to be more responsive. SOEs have more incentive to do so following government guidelines and trends.”

A key question to ask is who within a company should be responsible for engaging with shareholders? The short answer is the board, as a group representing and accountable to shareholders. Indeed, on a positive note, our survey found that most Chinese listed companies do admit that the responsibility for talking to shareholders should not be placed solely on the investor relations (IR) team (see Figure 1.7 below). But given that delegating this task to IR remains a common practice, it would appear that there is an inconsistency between words and actions here.

 

 

 

Challenges—China listed companies

 

Some additional factors clearly play on the willingness of companies to take CG and ESG seriously, as Figures 1.8 and 1.9 below show.

Does the market reward good CG?

 

Only 27% of the respondents to our China listed company survey believe there is a close correlation between good corporate governance and company performance. Another 46% think they are “somewhat related”, while a quarter see no relationship. These results broadly align with the view common in most markets, including China, that only a minority of companies (usually the large caps) feel incentivised to improve their governance practices and that they will be rewarded by investors if they do so.

 

Even more concerning is the largely negative view on whether better governance helps a company to list.

 

 

As an aside, this might also help to explain why listed POEs in China are generally not seen as being a better investment proposition or as having better governance than SOEs—an issue we explore in Chapter 3.5.

Only 23% of foreign respondents said they preferred investing in POEs over SOEs, while two-thirds said they did not. Meanwhile, only 10% of China listed companies thought POEs were better governed than SOEs. Around one-third thought they were about the same, while 54% thought POEs were worse.

Even so, in a fast-growing market such as China, there is a risk in taking a static or one-dimensional view.

‘Companies will have to become more ESG aware’

 

We conclude this section with a wide-ranging comment from a China-based institutional investor on the need to see governance and ESG as a process:

Chinese companies are generally financial weaker than their more established peers in developed markets. This is a symptom of markets being at different stages of development. For Chinese companies, survival is the top priority. Once they have gained enough market share and accumulated a certain level of capital reserves, they will start to consider ESG issues. This will help them cement their market position and grow more healthily in the long term.

At the moment, we recognise that the cost of not practicing ESG is not high in China. But things are changing, especially on the environmental front. We can see that the government is very serious about closing down small players who are not compliant with emission standards. The quality of air, earth and water concerns the livelihood of every citizen, and we believe that there will be heightened enforcement of pollution laws.

Corporate governance is also improving as public shareholders get more actively involved in major corporate actions. Having said that, shareholder structures remain highly concentrated, especially for SOEs in China, and external forces may not be strong enough to ensure a proper division of power.

We see increasing numbers of entrepreneurs and companies more willing to give back to society and the challenge here is simply that philanthropy is quite new in China.

As society becomes more civilised and consumers become more aware of issues such as child labour and environmental pollution, Chinese companies will have to become more ESG aware and responsible.

 

Interview: ‘Character and quality of management is critical’

 

David Smith CFA, Head of Corporate Governance, Aberdeen Standard Investments Asia, Singapore

 

What is your view on investing in A shares?

 

We have an A share fund, so naturally, we have spent substantial time and effort getting comfortable with both the market and the companies. There are well-documented risks surrounding investing in China, but the market has obvious attractions China is leading the world in some of the sectors, like e-commerce, for example. As investors, we always have to balance return with macroeconomic risk, political risk, regulatory risk, and so on, and this is certainly the case for China.

 

What is your view on stock suspensions in China?

 

The situation is getting better but companies too often still choose to suspend given a pending “restructuring”, which protects potential investors at the expense of existing investors, something that can be incredibly frustrating given how long we can be locked up for. There is a general misunderstanding in China as to what suspension means: companies should only suspend when there is information asymmetry, not when there is uncertainty. We are paid to analyse and deal with uncertainty, and the market will find a price for it. If companies have to suspend whenever there is uncertainty, we won’t have a stock market in place.

In general, there are too many suspensions in China. If a company has a restructuring plan or a regulatory investigation is going on, it should just disclose this through an announcement; as long as everyone in the market knows the same information, the stock should keep trading.

The issue of price-sensitive information has already been taken care of by regulations around continuous disclosure, so a suspension is often not protecting anyone, it just removes liquidity for existing investors. This issue is exacerbated by the bizarre and unusual situation of dual-listed A/H share companies suspending on one exchange and not the other.

In developed markets, in contrast, suspensions of issuers lasting more than a month for whatever reason are very rare. Part of the issue is also that promoter shares might sometimes have been pledged, so promoters want to avoid a share price fall triggering a margin call.

 

What are the top CG issues you have observed in Chinese companies?

 

Entrepreneur risk (people risk) is the most obvious one, including related-party transaction risks, along with operational and execution risks. For Aberdeen, we never invest if we feel uncomfortable with the founder or management. Both the character and quality of the people inside the company is something we value a lot in our investment decision-making process.

Regulatory risk is another issue. Changes in regulations can affect not just SOEs but also POEs to different extents. For example, the recent regulatory change on the reinforcement of Party committees inside Chinese companies is not what foreign investors expected to see as the direction of corporate governance development in China.

Another issue is that given more and more onus put on independent directors, maybe we need to think about another way to elect them. The current situation involves voting for independent directors on their independence, rather than competence. However, “independence” can be easily gamed in Asia. Many independent directors are structurally independent but rely on the company for their living (pension), so investors are increasingly asking if/how they add value to board discussions.

 

What is your view on voting trends among China listed firms? Does voting lead to engagement

 

Not much has changed. Any voting against has tended to focus on resolutions like related-party transactions, or other corporate actions, rather than issues across the board.

Engagement is getting a little bit better in China. We have seen more and more companies listening to us, and dialogue is getting much better. Companies increasingly understand that we are not in China for the short-term and that our interests are aligned. That certainly helps.

 

Methodology

A tale of two surveys

 

The two surveys in this report, the “ACGA Foreign Institutional Investor Perceptions Survey 2017” and the “ACGA China Listed Company Perceptions Survey 2017”, were developed internally in the first half of 2017 and carried out over 21 July to 1 September of that year. They were distributed through ACGA’s global network of members and contacts, and by a number of supporting organisations both inside and outside China (see the Acknowledgements page for details).

Purpose

We decided to conduct a survey at the preliminary stage of this project for two main reasons. The first was to add a broader range of perspectives to the report and to complement the extensive research carried out by ACGA and our contributing authors.

The second was to develop new data on corporate governance in China. When we began researching this report, we found that much of the information on board structures and governance practices in China was out of date, incomplete or non-existent. We developed the survey to partially fill this gap. To complement this information, we turned to data providers such as Wind and Valueonline to provide raw data on which we could do original analysis—and we carried out our own reviews of specific governance practices among large listed companies.

Foreign Institutional Investor Perceptions Survey

The Foreign Institutional Investor Perceptions Survey contained 22 questions and focused on areas that we believe are relevant to China’s investment potential and governance. They can be divided into the following categories:

Macro questions, such as capital market development, MSCI inclusion, SOEs vs POEs, and mainland-listed vs overseas-listed firms.

Shareholder rights, including investor protection in China vs overseas.

Company governance, including corporate reporting, role of chairman, independent directors, supervisory boards.

Role of government, including appointment of chairmen, intervention in SOEs and POEs, the role of the Party organisation/committee.

Investor engagement with companies.

Several of the questions provided options for respondents to give detailed answers and, where relevant, these comments are incorporated into our text.

The survey was developed by ACGA in Q2 2017 and first tested with a select group of ACGA global investor members in June of that year. It was refined based on feedback received before being sent out electronically in July. The recipients were primarily drawn from among ACGA’s list of institutional investor members based in Asia and around the world. This was complemented by recipients from our supporting organisation membership networks.

In total, we received 155 complete and comparable responses. Partial responses were not counted. Based on information gathered about respondents’ titles, they fell into three broad groups: CEOs, directors, managing directors or partners; portfolio managers and analysts; and managers or specialists in CG, ESG or stewardship. A large proportion held senior roles in their organisations.

The total assets under management (AUM) of all respondents amounted to around US$40 trillion, with the range from US$20m to US$6 trillion. In other words, a mix of both boutique investment managers and large mainstream institutions.

China Listed Company Perceptions Survey

The China Listed Company Perceptions Survey contained 12 questions and likewise focused on areas that we believe are relevant to such companies, their directors and managers. While there were fewer questions in this survey, they covered similar categories as in our foreign survey, namely macro issues, company governance, role of government, and investor engagement.

We designed some questions to be identical to the Foreign Institutional Investor Survey, in order to allow direct comparisons between corporate and investor perspectives on the same issue.

We also asked some unique questions of companies, such as whether or not they see a close correlation between corporate governance and performance, and whether better governance helps a firm list its shares.

The survey recipients were drawn from among ACGA’s corporate membership base, as well as clients and contacts of supporting organisations.

In total, we received 182 complete responses from which we extracted the survey results. Most respondents held senior positions in their companies such as directors, executives, board secretaries and senior managers. Most of the companies represented have been listed in China for more than five years and have a market cap of more than Rmb5 billion (US$800m approx). Further demographic data on the two groups of respondents follows:

 

Foreign respondents

The foreign institutional investors who responded are mostly from the US, UK, Asia and the European Union, as shown in Figure 1.10 below. The response is consistent with the distribution of ACGA members by region. Investors from Australia, New Zealand, the Middle East and Canada also responded to the survey.

 

 

In terms of their global AUM, the vast majority of respondents have less than 1% invested in China A shares, while a significant minority have between 1% and 10%. Very few have more than 10% of their funds invested in China domestic listings, although interestingly a few have more than 50%. The latter would be smaller investment managers with a dedicated China focus, as shown in Figure 1.11.

The picture changes markedly when overseas-listed Chinese firms are taken into account: the majority of foreign respondents allocate between 1% to 10% of their global AUM to such companies and a sizeable proportion, about one-fifth, invest more than 10%.

 

 

How do foreign investors invest in China? As Figure 1.12 below shows, around a quarter go only through the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme, 15% only through Stock Connect, and almost half through both channels. Interestingly, a significant minority invest directly through wholly owned foreign enterprises (WFOEs) or other foreign direct investment (FDI) channels.

 

China respondents

Most respondents to our China Listed Company Perceptions Survey work for a company that has been listed for more than five years. Around 40% of the companies have been listed for more than 10 years, which is a relatively long period given that the Chinese stock market is still less than 30 years old (see Figure 1.13).

The market cap of 54% of respondents’ companies was more than Rmb5 billion, as highlighted in Figure 1.14, and 19% have a market cap of more than Rmb10 billion. Generally, the larger firms are likely to be SOEs.

 

In terms of ownership, the distribution of respondents falls evenly between SOEs and POEs, with 13% being of a “mixed-ownership” type (see Figure 1.15, above). This gives us confidence that the survey results incorporate a range of views from different participants in the Chinese market.

As for where respondents’ companies are listed, Figures 1.16 and 1.17, below, highlight that almost 60% are listed in a single jurisdiction. Mainland China comes first, not surprisingly, followed by a reasonable number in Hong Kong. Only a few respondents work for Chinese companies listed in Singapore, the US and the UK. Regarding the remaining companies listed in more than one jurisdiction, again the most popular venue is a dual-listing in China and Hong Kong, followed by a listing in China and the US. Some companies have a listing in China, Hong Kong and the US.

 

 

 

The complete report, in both English and Chinese, is available here.

___________________________________________________________

*Jamie Allen is Secretary General and Li Rui (Nana Li) is Senior Research Analyst at the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA). This post is based on the introduction to their ACGA report.

L’objectif visé par les fonds d’investissement activistes afin de profiter au maximum de leurs interventions : la vente de l’entreprise au plus offrant !


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article de Roger L. Martin, ex-doyen de la Rotman School of Management de l’Université de Toronto, paru dans Harvard Business Review le 20 août 2018, qui remet en question la valeur des interventions des fonds activistes au cours des dernières années.

L’auteur pourfend les prétendus bénéfices des campagnes orchestrées par les fonds activistes en s’appuyant notamment sur une étude d’Allaire qui procure des données statistiques probantes sur les rendements des fonds activistes.

Ainsi, l’étude publiée par Allaire montre que les fonds d’investissement activistes réalisent des rendements moyens de 12,4 %, comparés à 13,5 % pour le S&P 500. Le rendement était de 13,9 % pour des firmes de tailles similaires dans les mêmes secteurs industriels.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance d’une présentation PPT du professeur Allaire qui présente des résultats empiriques très convaincants : Hedge Fund Activism : Some empirical evidence.

Le résultat qui importe, et qui est très payant, pour les investisseurs activistes est la réalisation de la vente de l’entreprise ciblée afin de toucher la prime de contrôle qui est de l’ordre de 30 %.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12,4 % to a stupendous 94,3 %.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t Good for Companies or Investors, So Why Do They Exist?

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Activist Hedge Funds Aren’t Good for Companies or Investors, So Why Do They Exist? »

 

Activist hedge funds have become capital market and financial media darlings. The Economist famously called them“capitalism’s unlikely heroes” in a cover story, and the FT published an article saying we “should welcome” them.

But they are utterly reviled by CEOs. And at best, their performance is ambiguous.

The most comprehensive study of activist hedge fund performance that I have read is by Yvan Allaire at the Institute for Governance of Private and Public Organizations in Montreal, which studies hedge fund campaigns against U.S. companies for an eight-year period (2005–2013).

Total shareholder return is what the activist hedge funds claim to enhance. But for the universe of U.S. activist hedge fund investments Allaire studied, the mean compound annual TSR for the activists was 12.4% while for the S&P500 it was 13.5% and for a random sample of firms of similar size in like industries, it was 13.9%. That is to say, if you decided to invest money in a random sample of activist hedge funds, you would have earned 12.4% before paying the hedge fund 2% per year plus 20% of that 12.4% upside. If instead you would have invested in a Vanguard S&P500 index fund, you would have kept all but a tiny fraction of 13.5%.

Since the returns that they produce underwhelm, why do activist hedge funds exist? Why do investors keep giving them money? It is an important question because the Allaire data shows the truly sad and unfortunate outcomes for the companies after the hedge funds ride off into the sunset, after a median holding period of only 423 unpleasant days. Over this span, employee headcount gets reduced by an average of 12%, while R&D gets cut by more than half, and returns don’t change.

The reason investors keep giving their money to these hedge funds is simple. There is gold for activist hedge funds if they can accomplish one thing. If they can get their target sold, the compound annual TSR jumps from a lackluster 12.4% to a stupendous 94.3%.  That is why they so frequently agitate for the sale of their victim.

But why is this such a lucrative avenue? It is because of the control premium. When a S&P500-sized company gets sold, the average premium over the prevailing stock price that is paid for the right to take over that company is in excess of 30%. This is ironic, of course, because studies show the majority of acquisitions don’t earn the cost of capital for the buyer. It is a case of the triumph of hope over reality – which is not unusual. It is not dissimilar to what happens in the National Football League where the trade price for a future draft pick is typically higher than the trade price for an accomplished successful player. That is because the acquiring team dreams that the player it will pick in the draft will be more awesome than that player is likely to turn out to be. But hope springs eternal!

The activist hedge funds have their eyes focused laser-like on the control premium — which for the S&P 500, which has a market capitalization of $23 trillion, is conservatively a $7 trillion pie assuming a 30% control premium. To get a piece of that scrumptious pie, all they need to do is pressure their victim to put itself up for sale and they will have “created shareholder value.” Of course, on average, they will have destroyed shareholder value for the acquiring firm, but they couldn’t care less. They are long gone by that time; off to the next victim.

And they have lots of friends to help them access the control premium pie. Investment bankers want to help them do the deal whether it is a good deal or not and that $7 trillion pie for hedge funds translates into a multibillion dollar annual slice for investment bankers. And for the M&A lawyers that need to opine on the deal. And the accounting firms that need to audit the deal. And for the proxy voting firms that collect the votes for and against the deal. And the consultants who get hired to do post-merger integration. And the financial press that gets to write stories about an exciting deal.

It is an entire ecosystem that sees the $7 trillion pie and wants a piece of it. It doesn’t matter a whit whether a hedge-fund inspired change of control is a good thing for customers, employees or the combined shareholders involved (selling plus acquiring). It is too lucrative a pie to pass up.

What will stop this lunacy? When shareholders come to their senses and realize that when an activist hedge fund has pressured a company intensively enough to put it up for sale, they are simply feeding the hedge fund beast and the vast majority of the time it will be at their own expense. When activist hedge funds’ access to the $7 trillion pie is shut off, they will have to rely on their ability to actually make their victims perform better. And their track record on that front is mediocre at best.

______________________________________________________________

Roger L. Martin is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute and a former . He is a coauthor of Creating Great Choices: A Leader’s Guide to Integrative Thinking.

La place des femmes sur les CA et dans la haute direction des entreprises


Voici un rapport qui fait le point sur la place des femmes dans les CA et dans des postes de haute direction des entreprises publiques (cotées) américaines et internationales.

Cet article, publié par Subodh Mishra* directeur de Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), est paru sur le forum du Harvad Law School on Corporate Governance, le 13 août 2018.

On note des progrès dans tous les domaines, mais l’évolution est encore trop lente. Eu égard à la présence des femmes sur les CA des grandes entreprises cotées, c’est la France qui remporte la palme avec 43 % de femmes sur les CA.

Les entreprises se dotent de plus en plus de politique de divulgation de la diversité sur les postes de haute direction. Le Danemark (96 %), l’Australie (91 %) et le R.U. (84 %) sont en tête de liste en ce qui concerne la présence de politique à cet égard. Les É.U. (32 %) et la Russie (22 %) ferment la marche. Le Canada est en milieu de peloton avec 63 %.

L’infographie présentée ici montre clairement les tendances dans ce domaine.

L’auteur identifie les cinq pratiques émergentes les plus significatives pour mettre en œuvre une politique de diversité exemplaire.

(1) Address subtle or unconscious bias.

Cultivating a strong culture free of subtle or unconscious bias is a fundamental step towards an inclusive work environment. A meta-analysis by the Harvard Business Review finds that subtle discrimination has as negative effects, if not more negative, than overt discrimination, as it can drain emotional and cognitive resources, it can accumulate quickly, and is difficult to address through legal recourse. The researchers suggest that structured processes and procedures around hiring, assignments, and business decisions limit the opportunity for unconscious bias to creep in. In addition, they suggest training programs and practicing techniques, such as mindfulness, to reduce bias.

(2) Establish clear diversity targets and measure progress towards goals.

Most companies with gender diversity strategies set clear, measurable targets. BP has set a goal of women representing at least 25 percent of its group leaders by 2020, while Symantecaims at having 30 percent of leadership roles occupied by women by the same year. This approach allows firms to focus on concrete performance results, while also creating a framework of accountability in the company’s gender diversity and inclusion program.

(3) Focus on key roles and redefine the path to leadership.

True meritocracy should determine the criteria for leadership roles. However, companies should recognize that there may be multiple paths to the CEO position, and should focus on their efforts on roles that lead to those paths. Women CEOs Speak, A Korn Ferry Institute study supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, identifies four different career approaches for women to prepare for the CEO role. However, the study identifies early assumption of profit-and-loss responsibilities in all four paths as a crucial experience leading to top positions.

(4) Establish mentorship and sponsorship programs.

Training and development programs within the organization can help facilitate mentorships and sponsorships, which are crucial in career development. GM’s Diversity and Inclusion Report explains how its Executive Leadership Program aims at creating a support network of female leaders, as well as training and development sessions hosted by female executives. Mentors can support employees earlier in their career with coaching and advice, while sponsors take a more active role later in one’s career to promote the individual. Gender should obviously not constitute a barrier for such mentorships and sponsorships, and organizations should take active steps to encourage such relationships across genders and remove any hesitations or biases.

(5) Provide flexibility and support towards work-life balance.

Top executive assignments often involve significant time commitments and travel that can impact an executive’s family life. In a New York Times news analysis, former McDonald’s executive Janice Fields, identified her choice not to work overseas as a handicap to becoming the CEO. Making accommodations in relation family, including both children and spouses, can remove some significant hurdles for women.

 

 

Women in the C-Suite: The Next Frontier in Gender Diversity

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Women in the C-Suite: The Next Frontier in Gender Diversity »

 

Despite recent advances in female board participation globally, gender diversity among top executives remains disappointingly low across all markets, with some improvement discerned in the past few years. Moreover, there does not appear a correlation between board gender diversity and gender diversity in the C-Suite at the market level. Some of the markets that have implemented gender quotas on boards and have achieved the highest rates of female board participation, such as France, Sweden, and Germany, appear to have embarrassingly low rates of female top executives. In fact, many of the markets with progressive board diversity policies have lower gender diversity levels in executive positions compared to several emerging markets like South Africa, Singapore, and Thailand. Thus, achieving higher rates of gender diversity in the C-Suite will require deeper cultural shifts within organizations in order to overcome potential biases and hurdles to gender equality.

The number of female top executives remains low

 

In the past decade, gender quotas, policy initiatives, and—more recently—investor pressure have led to boards improving female board participation in Europe and North America significantly. The percentage of female directors in the Russell 3000 increased from 10 percent in 2008 to 18 percent in 2018, with most of the increase taking place since 2013. Similarly, the percentage of female directors in ISS’s core universe of widely-held European firms more than tripled from 8 percent in 2008 to 27 percent in 2018. While the recent push by policymakers, investors, and advocacy groups for greater gender diversity has primarily focused on board positions, the discussion is beginning to evolve to encompass diversity in all leadership roles, including top management. In the United States, we have observed small but significant changes in the gender composition of the C-Suite over the past five years. Since 2012, the Russell 3000 has seen a 70-percent increase in the number of female CEOs. Despite the relative increase, the number of top female executives remains disappointingly low, with only 5 percent of Russell 3000 companies having a female CEO in 2018.

 

Companies need to develop the pipeline of female executive leaders

 

The scarcity of female CEOs does not appear surprising, especially after taking a closer look at the rest of the members of the C-Suite, who often comprise the primary candidates in line for succession for the top job. These roles include the Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Head of Sales, among others. Only 9 percent of top executive positions in the Russell 3000 are filled by women, which means that companies have a long way to go towards building gender equity within the top ranks where the next generation of CEOs are cultivated. Certain sectors lag considerably more than others, with Real Estate, Telecommunications and Energy exhibiting the lowest rates of female named executive officers.

 

Within the C-Suite, gender differentiation persists in terms of executive roles

 

The picture seems even bleaker for the future of gender parity at the CEO level when examining the types of roles that female top executives currently occupy within their organizations. Female executives appear scarcer at roles with profit-and-loss responsibilities that often serve as stepping stones to the CEO role, such as COO, Head of Sales, or CEOs of business units and subsidiary groups. Meanwhile, women are more highly concentrated in positions that rarely see a promotion to the top job, such as Human Resources Officer, General Counsel, and Chief Administrative Officer.

 

 

Not surprisingly, and in conjunction with the disparity in functions described above, women who belong to the group of the five highest paid executive officers in their organization, are far more likely to rank fourth or fifth in pay rank compared to their male counterparts. Approximately 46 percent of women in the top five positions rank either fourth or fifth in pay, compared to 33 percent of male top five executives in these pay rankings.

 

Breaking down barriers to gender diversity in the C-Suite

 

Companies can take a number steps to foster gender diversity in their executive leadership, and to remove biases or potential obstacles to an inclusive management environment. Many companies have identified gender diversity in leadership positions as a key priority, and have established gender diversity strategies to achieve specific goals. While workforce diversity policies appear to become the standard across most markets, gender diversity policies at the senior management level are common only in some markets. According to ISS Environmental & Social QualityScore data, the majority of companies in developed European markets and Canada disclose gender diversity policies for senior managers. The practice has not been widely established United States, where 32 percent of the S&P 500 and only 4 percent of the remaining Russell 3000 disclose such policies.

 

 

Several companies and advocacy groups identify gender diversity and inclusion as a major driver for talent acquisition and performance. The recognition of the absence of women in top executive roles has sparked several initiatives that seek to promote inclusivity in the workplace. The Rockefeller Foundation’s 100×25 advocacy initiative aims at bringing more women to the C-Suite, with the explicit goal of having 100 Fortune 500 female CEOs by 2025. Meanwhile, Paradigm for Parity was formed by a coalition of business leaders (CEOs, founders, and board members), and set the goal of achieving full gender parity by 2030. The group has created a 5-point action plan to help companies accelerate their progress.

Based on the work of these initiatives and actual programs disclosed by companies, we identify five of the emerging best practices that companies adopt to address gender diversity in leadership roles.

Address subtle or unconscious bias. Cultivating a strong culture free of subtle or unconscious bias is a fundamental step towards an inclusive work environment. A meta-analysis by the Harvard Business Review finds that subtle discrimination has as negative effects, if not more negative, than overt discrimination, as it can drain emotional and cognitive resources, it can accumulate quickly, and is difficult to address through legal recourse. The researchers suggest that structured processes and procedures around hiring, assignments, and business decisions limit the opportunity for unconscious bias to creep in. In addition, they suggest training programs and practicing techniques, such as mindfulness, to reduce bias.

Establish clear diversity targets and measure progress towards goals. Most companies with gender diversity strategies set clear, measurable targets. BP has set a goal of women representing at least 25 percent of its group leaders by 2020, while Symantecaims at having 30 percent of leadership roles occupied by women by the same year. This approach allows firms to focus on concrete performance results, while also creating a framework of accountability in the company’s gender diversity and inclusion program.

Focus on key roles and redefine the path to leadership. True meritocracy should determine the criteria for leadership roles. However, companies should recognize that there may be multiple paths to the CEO position, and should focus on their efforts on roles that lead to those paths. Women CEOs Speak, A Korn Ferry Institute study supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, identifies four different career approaches for women to prepare for the CEO role. However, the study identifies early assumption of profit-and-loss responsibilities in all four paths as a crucial experience leading to top positions.

Establish mentorship and sponsorship programs. Training and development programs within the organization can help facilitate mentorships and sponsorships, which are crucial in career development. GM’s Diversity and Inclusion Report explains how its Executive Leadership Program aims at creating a support network of female leaders, as well as training and development sessions hosted by female executives. Mentors can support employees earlier in their career with coaching and advice, while sponsors take a more active role later in one’s career to promote the individual. Gender should obviously not constitute a barrier for such mentorships and sponsorships, and organizations should take active steps to encourage such relationships across genders and remove any hesitations or biases.

Provide flexibility and support towards work-life balance. Top executive assignments often involve significant time commitments and travel that can impact an executive’s family life. In a New York Times news analysis, former McDonald’s executive Janice Fields, identified her choice not to work overseas as a handicap to becoming the CEO. Making accommodations in relation family, including both children and spouses, can remove some significant hurdles for women.

_________________________________________________________________

*Subodh Mishra is Executive Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS Analytics publication by Kosmas Papadopoulos, Managing Editor at ISS Analytics.

La nouvelle loi californienne | Instauration de quotas pour accélérer la diversité sur les CA


Aujourd’hui, je souhaite vous familiariser avec la réalité de la nouvelle loi californienne eu égard à la mise en place de quotas pour accélérer la diversité sur les conseils d’administration.

Cet article paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, par David A. Katz et Laura A. McIntosh, associés à la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, explique le contexte menant à la nouvelle législation californienne.

La Californie se distingue par l’originalité et par le caractère affirmatif de sa loi sur la composition des conseils d’administration. Bien entendu, cette loi a ses détracteurs, notamment les chambres de commerce qui redoutent les impacts négatifs de la loi pour les plus petites entreprises qui ont des CA composés essentiellement d’hommes !

Mais, il faut noter que l’état de la Californie est le seul état américain à avoir légiféré sur la diversité des membres de conseils d’administration en proposant des mesures qui s’apparentent aux quotas imposés par plusieurs pays européens.

Voici un extrait de l’article qui résume assez bien le contenu de cette loi.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The bill that passed the California State Senate at the end of May 2018 would, if enacted, require any public company with shares listed on a major U.S. stock exchange that has its principal executive offices in California to have at least one woman on its board by December 31, 2019. By year-end 2021, such companies with five directors would be required to have two women on the board, and companies with six or more directors would be required to have three women on the board.

 

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « California Bill gender diversity and Quotas »

 

 

California has made headlines this summer with legislative action toward instituting gender quotas for boards of directors of public companies headquartered in the state. The legislation has passed the state senate; to be enacted, it must be passed by the California state assembly and signed by the governor. In 2013, California became the first state to pass a precatory resolution promoting gender diversity on public company boards, and five other states have since followed suit. The current legislative effort has come under criticism for a variety of reasons, and, while it is not certain to become law, it could be a harbinger of a broader push for public company board gender quotas in the United States. It is worth considering whether quotas in this area would be beneficial or harmful to the larger goals of gender parity and board diversity.

 

The California Bill

 

The bill that passed the California State Senate at the end of May 2018 would, if enacted, require any public company with shares listed on a major U.S. stock exchange that has its principal executive offices in California to have at least one woman on its board by December 31, 2019. By year-end 2021, such companies with five directors would be required to have two women on the board, and companies with six or more directors would be required to have three women on the board.

Section 1 of the California bill (SB 826) presents an argument in favor of establishing gender quotas: More women directors would be beneficial to California’s economy in various ways, yet progress toward gender parity is too slow. The bill cites studies indicating that companies perform better with women on their boards and observes that other countries have used quotas to achieve 30 percent to 40 percent representation. The bill notes that, of California public companies in the Russell 3000 as of June 2017, 26 percent had no women on their boards, while women composed 15.5 percent of directors on boards that have at least one woman. The bill cites further studies showing that, at current rates, it could take approximately four decades to achieve gender parity on boards. And finally, Section 1 of the bill concludes by citing studies suggesting that having at least three women directors increases board effectiveness.

The Opposing View

 

The California bill has been controversial. The California Chamber of Commerce filed an opposition letter on behalf of numerous organizations arguing that the bill would violate state and federal constitutions and conflict with existing California civil rights law, on the basis that it requires a person to be promoted—and another person disqualified—simply on the basis of gender. California legislators dispute that the bill requires men to be displaced by women, noting that boards can simply increase their size. This may be easier said than done, however: Because the required quota increases with board size, a company with a four-man board that did not wish to force out a current director would need to add three women to accommodate the requirements of the law by 2021. Suddenly expanding from four to seven would entail a very significant change to board dynamics. For a previously well-functioning board, the negative effects of a change that dramatic could outweigh the benefits of gender diversity.

Further, the bill’s opponents argue that prioritizing only one element of diversity would be suboptimal, especially at time when many California companies are engaged in addressing and increasing diversity by focusing on all classifications of diversity. Advocates for greater representation of ethnic minority groups on boards have expressed concerns that prioritizing gender will be detrimental to progress toward greater ethnic diversity. For purposes of increasing overall diversity, quotas are not a solution that can be applied broadly; if quotas such as those in the California bill were established not only for gender but for ethnic and other categories of diversity, the project of board composition would soon become a near-impossible logic and recruitment puzzle, as nominating committees struggled to meet mandated quotas, expertise needs, and director independence requirements, all within the board size parameters set forth in the company’s organizing documents. Board functioning and effectiveness would be severely compromised by the legislative micromanaging of board composition.

Thanks to the establishment of quotas in various European countries over the past 15 years, there is evidence as to the effect of gender quotas for boards. A 2018 Economist study found that, despite high expectations, the effects of quotas were, in some ways, disappointing. According to the Economist, greater numbers of women on boards did not necessarily produce better performance or decision-making, nor was there a trickle-down effect of boosting women’s progress to senior management jobs.

On the other hand, fears about unqualified women being put on boards, or a few qualified women being overboarded, also did not materialize. While there is a great deal of evidence showing that having women directors does produce more effective boards—and there are even indications in Europe that diverse boards are less likely to be targeted by shareholder activists—the Economist study shows that diversity achieved through government-imposed quotas may not be as beneficial as diversity achieved through private-ordering efforts.

The Big Picture

 

Progress toward gender diversity in the board room is accelerating. In the first fiscal quarter of 2018, nearly one-third of new directorships in the Russell 3000 went to women, and for the first time, fewer than 20 percent of companies in that index had all-male boards. Institutional investors, corporate governance activists, and many large companies have been at the forefront of this progress. State Street and BlackRock have been leaders on this issue in the United States. Similarly, in the UK—a country that has made significant efforts to improve gender diversity on boards while also resisting the imposition of quotas—the large investment funds Legal & General Investment Management and Standard Life Aberdeen Plc have said that they will vote against boards that are composed of less than 25 percent or 20 percent women, respectively. British institutional investor Hermes has said that it expects boards to include at minimum 30 percent women, and it led a failed opposition to the reelection of the chairman of mining group Rio Tinto Plc due to lack of diversity on the board. Given the effectiveness of recent efforts by the private sector, and in light of the intense resistance to quotas in the business community, government intervention to establish quotas may be unnecessary as well as undesirable.

Recent research shows that simply adding women to boards does not necessarily improve board performance. As common sense would suggest, it turns out that to be a positive factor, the gender composition of the board must be considered along with the skills and knowledge of the board as a whole in the context of the organization and its stakeholders. A 2017 academic study indicated that the “right” level of gender diversity may be proportionate to the number of female stakeholders—employees, clients, and suppliers, for example—and may vary across countries and cultures. In certain circumstances, the appropriate gender diversity ratio might well be over 50 percent women. The authors of the study caution against selecting directors based on quotas if, in so doing, gender diversity is prioritized over the expertise needs of the board.

Overall board diversity, including gender and ethnic minorities, has never been higher. According to a comprehensive 2018 study by James Drury Partners, overall board diversity is now at 34 percent for America’s 651 largest corporations, as measured by revenue and market capitalization. The level of board diversity is increasing, as 49 percent of the 449 newly elected directors at these companies represent diverse groups. Of particular note, the study revealed that the diversity distribution of the 6,225 directors currently serving on the boards of these companies corresponds very closely to the diversity of the population in the executive ranks of 222 companies studied by McKinsey & Co. and LeanIn.org. While there clearly is more room for progress toward greater diversity at both the executive and board levels, this data point shows that boardrooms are indeed mirroring the increasingly diverse leadership of U.S. business.

The benefit of mandatory quotas, as the business community has seen through European examples, is that they compel companies and shareholders to focus on board composition and to establish more formal recruitment processes in order to find the necessary directors. Such developments are certainly beneficial. That said, boards can and should focus on composition and recruitment in the absence of quotas, and indeed they are doing so to a greater extent than ever before. Proponents of gender diversity can be heartened by recent developments in the United States, as organic and market-driven efforts have produced results that increase the business community’s enthusiasm for diverse boards. A real danger of legislation like the California bill is that context-free quotas may have the effect of destabilizing boards and undermining the business case for increased gender diversity. Were that to occur, then not only boards themselves, but stakeholders, the business community, and the larger societal goals of gender parity and board diversity would suffer as well.

_______________________________________________________________

*David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz and Ms. McIntosh that originally appeared in the New York Law Journal.

Les fonds activistes accusés d’hypocrisie !


Il y a une pléthore d’arguments qui circulent dans la littérature sur la gouvernance et qui concernent les pour et contre des fonds activistes eu égard aux avantages pour les actionnaires.
Voici un article publié par Kai Haakon E. Liekefett*, président de Shareholder Activism Defense Team, paru dans récemment dans ethicalboardroom.
L’auteur tente de montrer l’hypocrisie des fonds activistes de type « edge fund » eu égard aux points suivants :

1. Undermining the shareholder franchise

2. Weakening board independence and diversity

– Overboarding

– Director tenure

– Mandatory retirement age

3. Inconsistency on takeover defences

 

 

The hypocrisy of hedge fund activists

 

 

 

In virtually every activism campaign, hedge fund activists don the mantle of the shareholders’ champion and accuse the target company’s board and management of subpar corporate governance.

This claim to having ‘best practices of corporate governance’ at heart is hollow – even hypocritical – as evidenced by at least three examples: hedge fund activists actually undermine the shareholder franchise, they weaken the independence and diversity of the board, and they waffle on their anti-takeover protection stance.

 

1. Undermining the shareholder franchise

 

Shareholders have a significant interest in maintaining their franchise: the right to elect directors, approve significant transactions such as a merger or the sale of all or a substantial part of the assets, or amend the charter of a corporation. Hedge fund activists promote themselves as ferocious proponents of this franchise and of ‘shareholder democracy’. In their campaigns, they demand shareholder votes on any matter that allegedly touches on shareholder rights, including areas where corporate law and the bylaws bestow authority on the board.

Yet, in most activism situations, activists seek to influence board decisions and obtain board seats through private settlement negotiations. The price of peace for the corporation is often accepting the addition of one or more activist representatives to the board to avoid the cost and disruption of a proxy contest. Notably, hedge fund activists will accuse directors of  ‘entrenchment’ if a board does not settle and instead opts to let the shareholders decide at the ballot box. This practice of entering into private settlements to appoint directors without a shareholder vote is, of course, directly contrary to the shareholder franchise. For this reason, major institutional investors have called publicly on companies to engage with a broader base of shareholders prior to settling with an activist.

In the same vein, activists habitually accuse directors of ‘disenfranchising shareholders’ when they refresh the board in the face of an activist campaign, arguing that a board must not appoint new directors without shareholder approval. Remarkably, all these concerns for the shareholder franchise quickly disappear once a company engages in settlement discussions with an activist. In private negotiations, activists commonly insist on an immediate appointment to the board. A board’s request to delay the appointment and allow shareholders to vote on an activist’s director designees at the annual meeting is usually met with fierce resistance.

“THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ‘BEST PRACTICES’ THAT ACTIVISTS TEND TO IGNORE IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CAMPAIGNS”

Note also that in these private settlement negotiations, activists almost always seek recovery of their campaign expenses and companies typically agree to some level of payment. These demands for expense reimbursement are almost never submitted to shareholders for approval. While the proxy rules expressly require dissidents to disclose ‘whether the question of such reimbursement will be submitted to a vote of security holders’, an activist hedge fund’s interest in the shareholder franchise evaporates once the fund’s own wallet is concerned. All too often, it appears that the activists’ concern for the shareholder franchise is merely for public consumption.

 

2. Weakening board independence and diversity

 

The main target of most activist campaigns is the composition of a company’s board of directors. The business model of hedge fund activism is to identify undervalued public companies whose intrinsic value is substantially higher than the share price on the stock exchange. And if the stock market undervalues a company, then it is only fair to look to those in charge of the company: the board of directors. Consequently, activists often argue that a board needs a refresh, typically calling for ‘shareholder representatives’ and ‘industry experts’ to be appointed as directors.

Of course, activists are not interested in just any type of ‘shareholder representative’ in the boardroom. The preferred director candidate is a principal or employee of the activist hedge fund itself. The reason is that activists intend to use the influence in the boardroom to push aggressively for their own agenda. And, in most cases, that agenda is to push the company to take some strategic action that will return financial value to the hedge fund in the near-term – such as a quick sale at a premium – irrespective of the company’s long-term potential.

Often, an activist will also identify the need for more ‘industry experts’ to join the board and propose experts affiliated with the activist to be added. Activists may give lip service to the need for independent director candidates but when they have to choose between placing an independent candidate or themselves on the board, their preferred candidate is an activist principal or employee. Frequently, even if they passionately argued for ‘much-needed industry expertise’ beforehand, activists are quick to drop their independent board nominee in favour of a 30-something activist employee who lacks any significant relevant experience. This is particularly true for smaller activist hedge funds but is also evident at larger companies. Last year, ISS and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC) published a study of the impact of activism on board refreshment at S&P 1500 companies targeted by activists.  The study found that activist nominees and directors appointed to boards by activists via settlements were nearly three times more likely to be ‘financial services professionals’ compared to directors appointed unilaterally by boards.

Moreover, while proxy advisory firms and key institutional investors increasingly demand more gender and ethnic diversity in boardrooms, most activist slates exclusively feature white, male director candidates. According to last year’s ISS/IRRC study, women comprised only 8.4 per cent of dissident nominees on proxy contest ballots and directors appointed via settlements with activists, and only 4.2 per cent of those candidates and directors were ethnically or racially diverse.

There are numerous other examples of corporate governance ‘best practices’ that activists tend to ignore in connection with their campaigns:

(a) Overboarding ISS, Glass Lewis and most institutional investors agree that a director should not sit on too many boards (in particular if the director is also an executive in his ‘daytime’ job). For activists, this seems to be a non-issue when it comes to themselves or their fund-nominated candidates. In addition, the practice of funds nominating the same people for various campaigns raises independence concerns. As noted in the aforementioned ISS/IRRC study: “Many of these ‘busy’ directors appear to be ‘go-to’ nominees for individual activists. The serial nomination of favourite candidates raises questions about the ‘independence’ of these individuals from their activist sponsors”.

(b) Director tenure Directors who sit on the same board for 10 years and more typically end up in the crosshairs of activist hedge funds, which argue that such directors are entrenched and cannot provide objective oversight. However, it is not uncommon for activist directors to remain on the board for many years if they cannot push the company into a sale.

(c) Mandatory retirement age Young activists frequently decry the high average age of boards and may target older directors as part of a campaign. By contrast, one rarely hears a call for age limits on the board from the more seasoned activists of the 1980s, who are pushing 70 years and beyond. In some campaigns, activists nominated director candidates who were 75 years old, 80 years old or even older.

 

3. Inconsistency on takeover defences

 

Activists love to attack companies for their takeover defences and perceived lack of ‘shareholder rights’. They crucify boards who dare to adopt a poison pill in response to a hostile bid or activist stake accumulation. They condemn bylaw amendments for ‘changing the rules of the game after the game has started’. And they deride classified boards as an outrageous entrenchment device whose sole purpose is to shield incumbent directors from the ballot box.

UNLOCKING VALUE Activist hedge funds want to deliver outsize returns within two years

Against this backdrop, it is fascinating and educational to observe what sometimes happens once activists join a board. Activists claim to hate poison pills unless, of course, they were able to acquire a large stake of 15 to 25 per cent before the pill was adopted. In these cases, an activist is sometimes perfectly fine with capping other shareholders at 10 per cent or less because it ensures that the activist remains the largest shareholder with the most influence.

It is also not usual for an activist-controlled board to maintain the very same bylaws the activist previously voraciously attacked in the campaign. Sometimes, activists will limit shareholder rights even further. The rights to act by written consent and call special meetings tend to be among the victims. If shareholders can act by written consent or call special meetings to remove the board, insurgents do not have to wait for an annual shareholder meeting to wage a proxy fight. However, once activists are in charge of a boardroom, these shareholder rights primarily constitute a threat to their own control.

The last example is the classified board (aka ‘staggered board’). In a company with a classified board, only a fraction (usually, one third) of the board members are up for re-election every year. Activists are fierce opponents of classified boards. Classification makes it harder for them to win a proxy fight. For example, it is more difficult to win an election contest for three board seats on a nine-member board if only three board seats are up for election and not all nine directorships. Activists also like the intimidation factor of threatening a proxy fight for control of a board. It makes it easier to settle for two or three seats if the activist starts by demanding seven or more seats. Everything changes, of course, once an activist is on the board. Then, many activists are perfectly comfortable with with it being a classified board. In settlement negotiations, activists often fight hard to be in the director classes that are not up for re-election in the near term. Occasionally, they even suggest a ‘reshuffling’ of the director classes to achieve this. Activists also often refuse to leave a classified board after a standstill expires, arguing that they need to be allowed to serve out their three-year term – even if they previously campaigned for annual director elections.

“ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLOAK THEMSELVES IN THE MANTLE OF SHAREHOLDER CHAMPION WHILE PRIVATELY PUSHING TO INCREASE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE”

In other words, when it comes to takeover defences, activists’ perspectives depend on whether they have control of the boardroom or not. When activists are successful in ‘conquering the castle’, there is sometimes little reluctance on their part to pull up the drawbridge.

The true reason why activists love corporate governance

 

These examples make clear that most activists really do not care about corporate governance all that much. So why are activists so focussed on corporate governance in their campaigns? For the same reason why politicians kiss babies during political campaigns: it plays well with the voters. Most institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis care deeply about governance issues. That is because they believe, with some justification, that good corporate governance will create shareholder value in the long-term. The long term, of course, is rarely the game of activist hedge funds. Most of these funds have capital with relatively short lock-ups, which means that their own investors will be breathing down their neck if they do not deliver outsize returns within a year or two.

Many activists will admit after a few drinks that their professed passion for governance is only a means to an end. Activists preach so-called ‘best practices of corporate governance’ in every proxy fight because it is an effective way to smear an incumbent board and rile up the voters who do care about governance issues.

Conclusion

 

Hedge fund activists have been able to cloak themselves in the mantle of a shareholder champion while privately pushing to increase their own influence. Institutional investors and proxy advisory firms should not look to activist hedge funds as promoters of good corporate practices. Activists are no Robin Hoods. They care about good corporate governance just as much as they care about taking from the rich and giving to the poor.

 

_____________________________________________________

Kai Haakon Liekefett* is a partner of Sidley Austin LLP in New York and the chair of the firm’s Shareholder Activism Defense Team. He has over 18 years of experience in corporate law in New York, London, Germany, Hong Kong and Tokyo. He dedicates 100% of his time to defending companies against shareholder activism campaigns and proxy contests. Kai holds a Ph.D. from Freiburg University; an Executive MBA from Muenster Business School; and an LL.M., James Kent Scholar, from Columbia Law School. He is admitted to practice in New York and Germany. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of Sidley Austin LLP or its clients.

Le futur code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni


Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du futur code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni (R.-U.).

À cet effet, voici un billet de Martin Lipton*, paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui présente un aperçu des points saillants.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Financial Reporting Council today [July 16, 2018] issued a revised corporate governance code and announced that a revised investor stewardship code will be issued before year-end. The code and related materials are available at www.frc.org.uk.

The revised code contains two provisions that will be of great interest. They will undoubtedly be relied upon in efforts to update the various U.S. corporate governance codes. They will also be used to further the efforts to expand the sustainability and stakeholder concerns of U.S. boards.

First, the introduction to the code makes note that shareholder primacy needs to be moderated and that the concept of the “purpose” of the corporation, as long put forth in the U.K. by Colin Mayer and recently popularized in the U.S. by Larry Fink in his 2018 letter to CEO’s, is the guiding principle for the revised code:

Companies do not exist in isolation. Successful and sustainable businesses underpin our economy and society by providing employment and creating prosperity. To succeed in the long-term, directors and the companies they lead need to build and maintain successful relationships with a wide range of stakeholders. These relationships will be successful and enduring if they are based on respect, trust and mutual benefit. Accordingly, a company’s culture should promote integrity and openness, value diversity and be responsive to the views of shareholders and wider stakeholders.

Second, the code provides that the board is responsible for policies and practices which reinforce a healthy culture and that the board should engage:

with the workforce through one, or a combination, of a director appointed from the workforce, a formal workforce advisory panel and a designated non-executive director, or other arrangements which meet the circumstances of the company and the workforce.

It will be interesting to see how this provision will be implemented and whether it gains any traction in the U.S.

 

 

The UK Corporate Governance Code

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « UK Corporate Governance Code 2018 »

Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton.

La gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008


Voici un article publié par Lisa Andersson*, directrice de la recherche à Aktis et Stilpon Nestor, paru sur le site du Forum de Harvard Law School, qui brosse un portrait de l’évolution de la gouvernance des grandes institutions bancaires européennes au cours des dix années qui ont suivi la crise financière des 2008.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de ce document illustré d’infographies très éclairantes. J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, l’introduction à l’article.

Si vous avez un intérêt pour la gouvernance dans le milieu bancaire, cet article est pour vous.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

Governance of the 25 Largest European Banks a Decade After the Crisis

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance bancaire européenne »

 

 

This summer marked the 10-year anniversary of the start of the global financial crisis. Over the 18 months following August 2007, several bank collapses in the United States, Germany and Britain, culminating with the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 shook the financial system to its core. The interconnectivity of the world’s financial system meant that the repercussions would be felt globally, and on a monumental scale. The US Department of the Treasury has estimated that total household wealth would lose some $19.2 trillion following a publicly-funded government bailout program. Over the last decade governments, regulators, banks and their investors have revamped the financial system and its supervision in order to recover the public subsidy and prevent a similar crash from happening again.

In Europe, politicians and regulators at both the national and European level abandoned the path of deregulation and dramatically increased regulatory requirements and the scope of prudential supervision with an unparalleled focus on governance. The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the ensuing European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Central Bank (ECB) guidance implied stricter suitability reviews for board members and senior management, along with individual responsibility and in some cases criminal liability of non-executive directors (“NEDs”), as well as strict limits on variable remuneration. Higher regulatory requirements were compounded by the creation of a single supervisor for all systemic Eurozone banks. In many countries, especially the smaller ones, familiarity with supervisors usually allow a larger margin of forbearance and greater tolerance in assuming local sovereign risk. This has since disappeared. New rules and stricter oversight practices in the financial industry have translated into higher governance requirements and expectations for European banks’ boards of directors and senior management. So how do the boards and management committees of the top European banks measure up to their former selves? Data from the 25 largest listed banks [1] in Europe shows that boards today are smaller, work harder, and have a higher level of expertise than a decade ago.

While board sizes are getting smaller, the number of committees supporting the board has consistently grown over the years. This is in part driven by the mandatory separation of the audit and risk committee into two separate committees, but also by a general trend towards establishing more and more committees focusing on regulatory and compliance issues, as well as bank culture, conduct and reputation.

On average, 86% of board membership has been refreshed post-crisis. New board members brought with them greater independence, banking experience and general financial expertise among NEDs, as well as an improved gender balance on the board. In fact, women now comprise on average 34% of top European banks’ board membership, a development largely driven by national initiatives. Another significant change since 2007 is the fact that all the bank boards in the group now conduct regular assessments of the effectiveness of the board, a Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) requirement. The disclosure of this process has also improved significantly, with 48% of banks now disclosing specific challenges identified and actions taken to address these.

The role of a bank NED has evolved post-crisis. With increased scrutiny, boards of financial institutions are now required to adopt a more hands-on approach, requiring a greater time-commitment by their non-executive directors. On average, the workload per director has increased by over 30% compared to pre-crisis levels.

In contrast to the board, the size of management committees has grown in recent years. The top management committee now tend to include more heads of functions, reflected by the increased presence of the Chief Risk Officer, Head of Compliance and Head of Legal. Despite the positive development of a better gender balance on the board of directors, the number of women on the highest management committee has not increased significantly over the last ten years. This may suggest that the “top-down” approach of board quotas adopted in many European countries might be less than effective in promoting gender equality.

*Lisa Andersson is Head of Research of Aktis and Stilpon Nestor is Managing Director and Senior Advisor at Nestor Advisors. This post is based on their recent Nestor Advisors/Aktis publication.

 

Quel client les firmes d’audit servent-elles ?


Voici un article-choc publié par Chris Hughes dans la revue Bloomberg qui porte sur l’indépendance (ou le manque d’indépendance) des quatre grandes firmes d’audit dans le monde.

Il y a une sérieuse polémique eu égard à l’indépendance réelle des grandes firmes d’audit.

Cet article donne les grandes lignes de la problématique et il esquisse des avenues de solution.

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

 

 

Just Whom Does an Auditor Really Serve?

 

Shareholders need to be the client, not company executives.

L’une des quatre grandes firmes

 

British lawmakers are pushing for a full-blown antitrust probe into the country’s four big accountancy firms following the demise of U.K. construction group Carillion Plc.

The current domination of KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, EY and Deloitte isn’t working for shareholders. But creating more competition among the bean counters won’t be enough on its own. The fundamental problem is who the client is. The thrust of reform should be on making auditors see that their client is the investor and not the company executive. Randgold Resources is the only FTSE 100 company not to be audited by one of the Big Four !

Carillion’s accounts weren’t completely useless. Recent annual reports contained red flags of the company’s deteriorating financial health that were apparent to the smart money. Some long funds cut their holdings and hedge funds took large short positions, as my colleague Chris Bryant points out.

If the evidence was there to those who looked hard, it’s odd that the company was given a clean bill of health from accountancy firm KPMG months before it went bust. The impression is that auditors are on the side of the company rather than the shareholder. (KPMG says it believes it conducted its audit appropriately.)

Would more competition have made a difference? Companies may have only one accountant available if the few competing firms are already working for a rival. A lack of choice in any market usually leads to lower quality.

One response would be to force the Big Four to shed clients to mid-tier firms, creating a Big Five or Big Six. The risk is this greater competition just leads to a race to the bottom on fees with no improvement in quality. Other remedies are needed first.

The combination of audit and more lucrative consultancy work has long been chided – with good reason. Consultancy creates a client-pleasing culture. That’s at odds with the auditor’s role in challenging the assumptions behind company statements.

Opponents of a separation say combining the two services helps attract talent. This is a weak argument. Further lowering the current cap on consultancy fees, or completely separating audit and consultancy, is hard to argue with.

The accountancy firm should clearly serve the non-executive directors on the company’s audit committee which, in turn, is charged with looking out for shareholders. The risk is that the auditor’s main point of contact is the executive in the form of the chief financial officer.

Shareholders already have a vote on the appointment of the auditor. But annual reports could provide more useful disclosure on the frequency and depth of the last year’s contact between the firm and the audit committee, and between the latter and shareholders.

Now consider the nature of the job itself. Companies present the accounts, auditors check them. Out pops a financial statement that gives the false impression of extreme precision. Numbers that are the based on assumptions might be better presented as a range, accompanied by a critique of the judgments applied by the company.

Creating more big audit firms may create upward pressure on quality. But so long as they aren’t incentivized to have shareholders front of mind, it won’t be a long wait for the next Carillion.

__________________________________________________________

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Le cycle de vie des sociétés régies par des classes d’actions diverses


Les études montrent que ces types d’arrangements ne sont pas immanquablement dommageables pour les actionnaires, comme nous laissent croire plusieurs groupes d’intérêt tels que le Conseil des investisseurs institutionnels et la firme de conseil Institutional Shareholder Services (« ISS »). Plusieurs militent en faveur d’une durée limitée pour de telles émissions d’actions.

Les récentes émissions d’actions à classes multiples des entreprises de haute technologie ne nous permettent pas, à ce stade-ci, de statuer sur les avantages à long terme pour les actionnaires.

Les auteurs, Martijn Cremers et coll., concluent qu’il est trop tôt pour se prononcer définitivement sur la question, et pour réglementer cette structure de capital. Voir à cet égard l’article suivant : Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence.

Bonne lecture !

 

The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Dual Class Firms »

 

 

In our paper, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms, we consider the market valuation of dual class firms over their life cycle. Dual class financing is on the rise in recent years, particularly among high-tech firms, following Google’s seminal 2004 dual-class IPO structure. This financing choice leaves control of the firms in the hands of entrepreneurs, giving outside investors with inferior-vote shares no direct mechanism to influence the board or management. Rather, public investors buying inferior vote shares at the IPO are betting that granting the entrepreneurs such control allows them to better implement their unique vision.

However, as dual class firms mature and their vision is largely accomplished, entrepreneurs’ leadership may no longer be needed, and entrepreneurs may start self-serving behavior. Public investors’ resentment may then develop, accusing dual class firms’ controlling shareholders for wanting their money without any accountability. Such public pressure arguably recently led MSCI to issue a proposal to reduce the weight of inferior-vote shares in MSCI indices by multiplying the regular weight by the shares fractional voting power. Notably, the same MSCI also issued a report a few months ago stating that “[o]ur research shows that unequal voting stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period from November 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market indexes would have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 basis points per year over our sample period.” Obviously, confusion reigns over the merits of dual class financing.

Bebchuk and Kastiel (2017) (The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, Virginia Law Review) argue that any initial benefits of dual class structures decay with firm age, while the potential agency costs associated with dual class structures increase with time. Thus, Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel advocate sunset clauses to dual class financing. The sunset clauses would require the “non-interested” public shareholders of the firm to vote on whether or not to extend the dual class structure, some pre-determined number of years after the IPO. If the extension proposal is declined, firms would unify the low- and high-vote shares, i.e., convert all shares into a single class of shares with “one share one vote”.

In our paper, we empirically investigate the desirability of sunset provisions by examining the life-cycle of dual class firms. Using an extensive sample of all single-and dual-class firm IPOs in the U.S. during 1980-2015, and relying on comparing dual class firms to similar single class firms, we document several novel phenomena in the life cycle of dual class firms.

First, the difference in firm valuation between dual and single class firms strongly varies over the corporate life cycle. At the IPO, dual class firms tend to have higher valuations, as at the IPO year-end the market valuation of dual class firms is, on average, 11% higher than that of matched single class firms. This initial valuation premium of dual class firms dissipates in the years after the IPO, and on average it becomes insignificantly negative about six to nine years after the IPO. We also find that the difference between the voting and equity stakes of the controlling shareholders of dual class firms (the “wedge”) tends to increase as the firm ages. According to one of our estimates, the mean wedge increases from 16% one year after the IPO to 22% five years after the IPO, and to 26% nine years after the IPO. The widening of the wedge is typically associated with more severe valuation reducing agency problems—see Masulis et al. (2009) (Agency Costs and Dual-Class Companies, Journal of Finance). Bebchuk and Kastiel (2018) (The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, forthcoming Georgetown Law Review) analyze the perils of the widening wedges and advocate informing the public and capping it.

Second, we document interesting differences between dual class firms with a valuation premium (relative to their matched single class firms) at the IPO and dual class firms with a valuation discount at the IPO. Dual class firms with a valuation premium at the end of their IPO year gradually tend to lose this premium, until their valuations become very similar to those of their single class counterparts about six to nine years after the IPO. In contrast, we find no evidence for a life cycle in the relative valuation of initially discounted dual class firms, as their valuation discount persists from the time of their IPO to when they are mature dual class firms as well. The behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with a valuation premium at the IPO suggests that for some firms the dual class structure does not harm valuations, at least in the first decade after the IPO. On the other hand, the behavior of the subsample of dual class firms with an initial valuation discount, which we find is highly persistent, suggests that a mandatory sunset provision may be useful for these firms.

Third, a natural solution to possible dual class inefficiency is a voluntary firm-initiated dual class share unification, in which all share classes are transformed into “one share one vote”. We find that only about 20% of dual class firms unify their shares within 9 years after the IPO. Furthermore, voluntary unifications become rare after six years following the IPO. Most of the mature dual class firms elect to retain a dual class structure, perhaps because unification is against the interests of their controlling shareholders. This implies that some inefficient dual class structures may persist.

Our findings suggest that some sort of a sunset provision might be useful, especially for firms that trade at a valuation discount. Further, regarding the set-in time of any sunset provision, our study suggests to wait at least six years after the IPO. Regulators should also be worried about some potential negative consequences of any sunset regulation. First, some founders may be more reluctant to issue publicly traded shares if their reign over the firm is likely to be more limited in time. Public may lose the opportunity to invest in some breakthrough firms. Second, controlling shareholders may intensify their private benefits extraction in the period before their extra power expires. Third, it is possible that shareholders may elect to abolish dual class structures even when they are (still) beneficial.

Finally, our paper also documents several other interesting life cycle phenomena of dual class firms such as their higher survival rates, similar stock returns and lower likelihoods of being taken over, compared to matched single class firms. We conclude that unequal vote structures are viable financing tools.

The complete paper is available for download here.

________________________________________

*Martijn Cremers* is Bernard J. Hank Professor of Finance at University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, and an ECGI research member; Beni Lauterbach is a Professor of Finance and the Raymond Ackerman Family Chair in Corporate Governance at Bar Ilan University Graduate School of Business Administration, and an ECGI research member; Anete Pajuste is an Associate Professor of Finance and Head of Accounting and Finance Department at the Stockholm School of Economics, and an ECGI research member. This post is based on their recent paper.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here) and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

Les six principes qui gouvernent la conduite des investisseurs — ISG


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente le point de vue de l’association Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles, eu égard aux principes de gouvernance que celle-ci entend promouvoir.

Je reproduis ici les principaux éléments de l’article publié par Anne Meyer* et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, notamment les six principes qui gouvernent leur conduite.

1 — Les CA sont redevables envers les actionnaires ;

2 — Les actionnaires doivent avoir des droits de vote qui sont proportionnels à leurs intérêts économiques ;

3 — Les CA doivent être à l’écoute des actionnaires et être proactifs dans la compréhension de leurs perspectives ;

4 — Les CA doivent avoir une solide structure de leadership indépendante ;

5 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de gouvernance qui mènent à des pratiques efficaces ;

6 — Les CA doivent adopter des structures de rémunération des dirigeants qui sont alignées sur la stratégie à long terme de l’entreprise.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The Investor Stewardship Group’s Governance Principles

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Investor Stewardship Group Governance Principles »

 

In this post, we provide an overview of the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”) Governance Principles and steps for public companies to consider when evaluating how the principles may be incorporated into their own disclosure and engagement priorities. The ISG’s website, including a link to the ISG Governance Principles, is available here. In January 2017, the Investor Stewardship Group (the “ISG”), a collective of large U.S.-based and international institutional investors and asset managers, announced the launch of its Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance (the “Framework”). The measure is an unprecedented attempt to establish a set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed companies (the “ISG Governance Principles”) as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors. The Framework’s effective date was January 1, 2018, in order to provide U.S. listed companies with time to adjust to the corporate governance principles prior to the 2018 proxy season.

As the 2018 proxy season gets into full swing, there is evidence that ISG members will be utilizing the Framework as a tool for evaluating the governance regimes at their portfolio companies, informing their engagement priorities, and potentially factoring compliance with the ISG Governance Principles into selected voting policies and decisions. In December, the ISG issued a press release “encouraging companies to articulate how their governance structures and practices align with the ISG’s Corporate Governance Principles and where and why they differ in approach”, leaving it to companies to determine how and where to disclose such alignment. And at least one large investor, State Street Global Advisors, has specifically highlighted that it will screen portfolio companies for compliance with the principles.

As a result, companies and their boards should continue to benchmark and understand how their specific governance practices relate to ISG Governance Principles and remain cognizant of this new regime as they prepare for engagement with investors and draft public disclosures.

 

Background

 

The ISG’s global reach and financial influence is significant; currently consisting of 50 investors representing over $22 trillion invested in the U.S. equity markets. The ISG’s signatories includes some of the largest and most influential institutional investors, including BlackRock, CalSTRS, State Street Global Advisors, TIAA Investments, T. Rowe Price, ValueAct Capital and Vanguard, among others. The Framework’s stewardship principles emphasize that these institutional investors have a vested interest and responsibility for the long-term economic success of their portfolio companies.

The ISG’s roll-out of the Framework characterized it as a “sustained initiative” and emphasized an evolutionary view of the ability of U.S. companies and investors to work together under the Framework.

Corporate governance practices at U.S. listed companies have historically been informed by multiple regulatory and rules-based regimes. Rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stock exchange listing requirements, state corporate codes, case law and federal legislation adopted in the wake of past financial market crises, have been the primary dictating standards. More recently, shareholders and other stakeholders have played a larger role in influencing corporate governance norms at U.S. listed companies through engagement and various forms of shareholder activism. In contrast, the ISG Governance Principles are based substantially on U.K., Continental European and other non-U.S. frameworks that establish principles-based corporate governance standards and tend to rely on “comply-or-explain” accountability. [1] Advocates for this type of principles-based approach stress the flexibility that it gives for companies to adopt a tailored response to important tenets such as boardroom transparency, as opposed to responding more narrowly to prescriptive rules. As institutional investors continue to focus more attention on environmental and social matters, including related governance concerns, the Framework’s principles-based approach will be a tool, for both institutions and companies, to promote mutually agreeable objectives, particularly given the lack of rulemaking or legislation mandating more specific disclosure on trending topics such as board diversity and environmental concerns.

 

The ISG Governance Principles

 

The six ISG Governance Principles are broad principles that will not look new to those who have been following key issues in corporate governance over the past several years. Indeed, they were designed to reflect the common corporate governance principles that are already embedded in member institutions’ proxy voting and engagement guidelines. The principles emphasize the importance of boardroom effectiveness and oversight, alignment of executive compensation with long-term financial results, and board accountability demonstrated in part through the adoption of governance best practices, including a one-share one-vote capital structure and independent board leadership.

Principle 1: Boards are accountable to shareholders

This principle encompasses the annual election of directors, majority voting, proxy access and more robust disclosure surrounding board practices and corporate governance. Companies are also asked to explain how any anti-takeover measures are in the best long-term interest of the company.

Interestingly, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink recently published a letter to the CEOs at the world’s largest public companies in which he argued explicitly that boards are accountable to other stakeholders, such as employees and customers, in addition to shareholders.

Principle 2: Shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest

This principle sets a base line of one-share one-vote and encourages companies with existing multi-class share structures to review and consider phasing out control shares.

In 2017, this issue became national news when Snap Inc. filed for an IPO of non-voting shares. Many large investors were vehemently opposed and at the urging of the Council for Institutional Investors and other investor advocates, the stock index provider FTSE Russell refused to include these shares in its indices.

Principle 3: Boards should be responsive to shareholders and be proactive in order to understand their perspectives

Under this principle, companies are expected to implement shareholder proposals that receive “significant” support or explain why they have not done so. Independent directors are encouraged to participate in engagement on matters that are meaningful to investors, and directors may be held accountable with “against” votes in instances where investors do not feel that their concerns have been adequately addressed.

Principle 4: Boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure

There are two common independent leadership structures at U.S. companies—an independent chairperson and an independent lead director (where the role of Chairman and CEO are combined)—and the principles acknowledge that signatory investors have differing opinions on whether they provide adequate independent oversight.

The overarching position under the principles is that the role of the independent board leader should be “clearly defined and sufficiently robust to ensure effective and constructive leadership.”

Principle 5: Boards should adopt structures and practices that enhance their effectiveness

This principle encompasses an array of board structure and effectiveness issues, including: strong board composition and board diversity; board and committee responsibilities; director attentiveness, preparedness and time commitments; and board refreshment.

Board diversity, in particular gender diversity, has emerged as a high priority for most of the largest institutional investors. There has also been a focus on screening for long-tenured directors and directors that are over-boarded or have poor attendance records as a proxy for identifying directors that may not be adequately engaged or independent.

Principle 6: Boards should develop management incentive structures that are aligned with the long-term strategy of the company

This principle emphasizes that the board, in particular the compensation committee, is responsible for ensuring that drivers and performance goals that underpin the company’s long-term strategy are adequately reflected in a company’s management incentive structure.

Steps to Consider

As noted, the ISG Governance Principles are intended to provide a framework of broad, high-level principles. The individual investors that comprise the ISG have their own voting guidelines and engagement priorities that are tailored to their own investment philosophy and strategy. Even on current hot button issues, such as board diversity, investors have differing views and companies should consider the practices they adopt depending upon their specific facts and circumstances. There are, however, general steps that we recommend companies take to address the growing influence of the Framework.

These include:

Understand how the company’s corporate governance structure and practices relate to the six ISG Governance Principles.

Review the company’s public disclosure regarding corporate governance structure and practices; consider enhancements to be responsive to the ISG’s request that companies disclose how their governance aligns or differs from the ISG Governance Principles.

As with other corporate governance benchmarking exercises, companies should be particularly cognizant of how and why their practices may differ from the ISG Governance Principles and whether these differences are adequately explained in public disclosures. As investors screen their portfolio companies’ governance practices, they will often consider valid explanations, but in the absence of effective disclosure the company may be unnecessarily penalized.

Management and the board should be informed and prepared to respond to questions about the company’s alignment with the ISG Governance Principles during shareholder engagements. Companies can also consider proactively addressing the issue in written materials or prepared remarks during investor presentations.

In preparing for shareholder engagements with ISG signatories, understand how and if they are explicitly incorporating the ISG Governance Principles into engagement and voting priorities and continue to screen their individual voting and engagement policies.

Companies should determine whether, and how, they wish to address and incorporate the ISG Governance Principles based upon their own specific governance profile, disclosure regime and approach to shareholder engagement.

Endnotes

1 See in particular the UK Investor Stewardship Code, on which the US ISG Principles are largely based. The UK Code “sets out a number of areas of good practice to which … institutional investors should aspire.” Available here.

*Anne Meyer is Senior Managing Director, Don Cassidy is Executive Vice President, and Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based their recent Georgeson publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst.

La bonne gouvernance est associée au rendement selon une étude | Le Temps.ch


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous un article publié dans le magazine suisse Le Temps.ch qui présente les résultats d’une recherche sur la bonne gouvernance des caisses de retraite en lien avec les recommandations des fonds de placement tels que BlackRock.

L’auteur, Emmanuel Garessus, montre que même si le lien entre la performance des sociétés et la bonne gouvernance semble bien établi, les caisses de retraite faisant l’objet de la recherche ont des indices de gouvernance assez dissemblables. L’étude montre que les caisses ayant des indices de gouvernance faibles ont des rendements plus modestes en comparaison avec les indices de référence retenus.

Également, il ressort de cette étude que c’était surtout la prédominance de la gestion des risques qui était associée à la performance des caisses de retraite.

Comme le dit Christian Ehmann, spécialisé dans la sélection de fonds de placement auprès de Safra Sarasin, « la gouvernance n’est pas une cause de surperformance, mais il existe un lien direct entre les deux ».

Encore une fois, il appert que BlackRock défend les petits épargnants-investisseurs en proposant des normes de gouvernance uniformisées s’appliquant au monde des entreprises cotées en bourses.

J’ai reproduit l’article en français ci-dessous afin que vous puissiez bien saisir l’objet de l’étude et ses conclusions.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

BlackRock contre Facebook, un combat de géants

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « le temps »

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance »

 

 

Le principe de gouvernance selon lequel une action donne droit à une voix en assemblée générale est bafoué par de très nombreuses sociétés, surtout technologiques, au premier rang desquelles on trouve Facebook, Snap, Dropbox et Google. BlackRock, le plus grand groupe de fonds de placement du monde, demande aux autorités d’intervenir et de présenter des standards minimaux, indique le Financial Times.

Le groupe dont Philipp Hildebrand est vice-président préfère un appel à l’Etat plutôt que de laisser les fournisseurs d’indices (MSCI, Dow Jones, etc.) modifier la composition des indices en y intégrant divers critères d’exclusion. Barbara Novick, vice-présidente de BlackRock, a envoyé une lettre à Baer Pettit, président de MSCI, afin de l’informer de son désir de mettre de l’ordre dans les structures de capital des sociétés cotées.

 

Mark Zuckerberg détient 60% des droits de vote

 

De nombreuses sociétés ont deux catégories d’actions donnant droit à un nombre distinct de droits de vote. Les titres Facebook de la classe B ont par exemple dix fois plus de droits de vote que ceux de la classe A. Mark Zuckerberg, grâce à ses actions de classe B (dont il détient 75% du total), est assuré d’avoir 60% des droits de vote du groupe. A la suite du dernier scandale lié à Cambridge Analytica, le fondateur du réseau social ne court donc aucun risque d’être mis à la porte, explique Business Insider. L’intervention de BlackRock n’empêche pas l’un de ses fonds (Global Allocation Fund) d’avoir probablement accumulé des titres Facebook après sa correction de mars, selon Reuters, pour l’intégrer dans ses dix principales positions.

Cette structure du capital répartie en plusieurs catégories d’actions permet à un groupe d’actionnaires, généralement les fondateurs, de contrôler la société avec un minimum d’actions. Les titres ayant moins ou pas de droit de vote augmentent de valeur si la société se développe bien, mais leurs détenteurs ont moins de poids en assemblée générale. Les sociétés qui disposent d’une double catégorie de titres la justifient par le besoin de se soustraire aux réactions à court terme du marché boursier et de rester ainsi concentrés sur les objectifs à long terme. Ce sont souvent des sociétés technologiques.

Facebook respecte très imparfaitement les principes de bonne conduite en matière de gouvernance. Mark Zuckerberg, 33 ans, est en effet à la fois président du conseil d’administration et président de la direction générale. Ce n’est pas optimal puisque, en tant que président, il se contrôle lui-même. Sa rémunération est également inhabituelle. Sur les 8,9 millions de dollars de rémunération, 83% sont liés à ses frais de sécurité et le reste presque entièrement à l’utilisation d’un avion privé (son salaire est de 1 dollar et son bonus nul).

 

Quand BlackRock défend le petit épargnant

 

Le site de prévoyance IPE indique que le fonds de pension suédois AP7, l’un des plus grands actionnaires du réseau social, est parvenu l’an dernier à empêcher l’émission d’une troisième catégorie de titres Facebook. Cette dernière classe d’actions n’aurait offert aucun droit de vote. Une telle décision, si elle avait été menée à bien, aurait coûté 10 milliards de dollars à AP7. Finalement Facebook a renoncé.

BlackRock prend la défense du petit investisseur. Il est leader de la gestion indicielle et des ETF et ses produits restent investis à long terme dans tous les titres composant un indice. Il préfère influer sur la gouvernance par ses prises de position que de vendre le titre. Le plus grand groupe de fonds de placement du monde demande aux autorités de réglementation d’établir des standards de gouvernance en collaboration avec les sociétés de bourse plutôt que de s’en remettre aux fournisseurs d’indices comme MSCI.

La création de plusieurs classes d’actions peut être justifiée par des start-up en forte croissance dont les fondateurs ne veulent pas diluer leur pouvoir. BlackRock reconnaît ce besoin spécifique aux start-up en forte croissance, mais le gérant estime que «ce n’est acceptable que durant une phase transitoire. Ce n’est pas une situation durable.»

Le géant des fonds de placement aimerait que les producteurs d’indices soutiennent sa démarche et créent des «indices alternatifs» afin d’accroître la transparence et de réduire l’exposition aux sociétés avec plusieurs catégories de titres. L’initiative de BlackRock est également appuyée par George Dallas, responsable auprès du puissant International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN).

La gouvernance des «bonnes caisses de pension»

 

La recherche économique a largement démontré l’impact positif d’une bonne gouvernance sur la performance d’une entreprise. Mais presque tout reste à faire en matière de fonds de placement et de caisses de pension.

«La gouvernance n’est pas une cause de surperformance, mais il existe un lien direct entre les deux. Les caisses de pension qui appartiennent au meilleur quart en termes de bonne gouvernance présentent une surperformance de 1% par année par rapport au moins bon quart», explique Christian Ehmann, spécialisé dans la sélection de fonds de placement auprès de Safra Sarasin, lors d’une présentation organisée par la CFA Society Switzerland, à Zurich.

Ce dernier est avec le professeur Manuel Ammann coauteur d’une étude sur la gouvernance et la performance au sein des caisses de pension suisses (Is Governance Related to Investment Performance and Asset Allocation?, Université de Saint-Gall, 2016). «Le travail sur cette étude m’a amené à porter une attention particulière à la gouvernance des fonds de placement dans mon travail quotidien», déclare Christian Ehmann. Son regard porte notamment sur la structure de l’équipe de gestion, son organisation et son système de gestion des risques. «Je m’intéresse par exemple à la politique de l’équipe de gérants en cas de catastrophe», indique-t-il.

Claire surperformance

 

L’étude réalisée sur 139 caisses de pension suisses, représentant 43% des actifs gérés, consiste à noter objectivement la qualité de la gouvernance et à définir le lien avec la performance de gestion. L’analyse détaille les questions de gouvernance en fonction de six catégories, de la gestion du risque à la transparence des informations en passant par le système d’incitations, l’objectif et la stratégie d’investissement ainsi que les processus de placement. Sur un maximum de 60 points, la moyenne a été de 21 (plus bas de 10 et plus haut de 50). La dispersion est donc très forte entre les caisses de pension. Certaines institutions de prévoyance ne disposent par exemple d’aucun système de gestion du risque.

Les auteurs ont mesuré la performance sur trois ans (2010 à 2012), le rendement relatif par rapport à l’indice de référence et l’écart de rendement par rapport au rendement sans risque (ratio de Sharpe). Toutes ces mesures confirment le lien positif entre la gouvernance et la performance (gain de 2,7 points de base par point de gouvernance). Les moteurs de surperformance proviennent clairement de la gestion du risque et du critère portant sur les objectifs et la stratégie d’investissement. Les auteurs constatent aussi que même les meilleurs, en termes de gouvernance, sous-performent leur indice de référence.

La deuxième étape de la recherche portait sur l’existence ou non d’une relation entre le degré de gouvernance et l’allocation des actifs. Ce lien n’a pas pu être établi.