D’accord avec les pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance | Mais pour les autres …

Vous aurez sûrement beaucoup de plaisir (et aussi de dépit…) à lire cet article publié par Steven Davidoff Solomon* paru dans la section Business du New York Times du 26 mai 2015.

Il s’agit d’une situation vraiment cocasse où la firme d’un investisseur connu (Gamco Investors) prêche la bonne parole de la saine gouvernance à qui veut l’entendre mais n’en a rien à foutre lorsqu’il s’agit de ses propres affaires. « Faites ce que je vous dis et non ce que je fais ».

M. Gabelli est un investisseur bien connu du monde des actionnaires activistes; il prône l’accroissement de la valeur des actions par l’amélioration de la gouvernance des entreprises ciblées.

Loin de moi l’idée de condamner l’ensemble de ses agissements, mais l’auteur de l’article conclue fermement qu’il ne pratique pas ce qu’il prêche.

Il travaille plutôt à son enrichissement personnel et à celui de sa famille. À mon humble avis, il y a encore trop de situations similaires, partout dans le monde.

La bonne gouvernance eu égard à l’entité, en tenant compte de l’ensemble des parties prenantes, n’est pas encore au rendez-vous !

L’actionnaire principal, et souvent majoritaire, ne doit-il pas se préoccuper des préceptes de la saine gouvernance ? Ou doit-il gérer exclusivement en fonction de ses intérêts personnels ?

J’aimerais vous entendre à ce propos, après avoir lu l’article de M. Steven Davidoff Solomon ci-dessous.

A Shareholder Advocate in Word, but Not in Practice

Mario J. Gabelli’s investment firm, Gamco Investors, is another shareholder warrior telling companies to create value through good corporate governance. Yet, what about Gamco’s own governance?

Mr. Gabelli, who is 72, is a well-known investor, and Gamco has $47.5 billion in assets under management, mostly a hodgepodge of mutual funds for the average investor. Mr. Gabelli is also an aggressive advocate for shareholder rights, the rare mutual fund manager who is willing to engage in a proxy contest.

That would be acceptable, and perhaps even laudable, except that Gamco’s own corporate governance is on par with that of a Roman emperor, giving all the power to Mr. Gabelli, who wields it with impunity for his personal benefit.

Mr. Gabelli owns 72 percent of Gamco, but he has also arranged for Gamco to have a dual-class stock structure to ensure his control. The stock with higher voting rights is owned almost exclusively by GGCP, a private company that Mr. Gabelli controls, giving him 94 percent of the voting power.

It is power that Mr. Gabelli converts into personal profit.

In 2014, Gamco paid Mr. Gabelli $88.5 million in cash, a raise from 2013, when he made $85 million. That sum made Mr. Gabelli one of the highest paid chief executives in the country and eclipsed the compensation of the leader of any other publicly traded asset-management company. For example, Laurence D. Fink, the chief executive of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, was paid $23.8 million.

Mr. Gabelli’s pay comes from a deal he reached with Gamco at the time of its initial public offering that pays him 10 percent of its pretax profits. Shareholders recently approved an amended agreement to provide some tax benefits to Mr. Gabelli who, of course, was kind enough to vote in favor, assuring its passage. Other shareholders also approved it, but because it was better than the old arrangement, who can blame them?

Mr. Gabelli has used his control to seemingly handpick Gamco’s board.

Directors include Mr. Gabelli’s daughter and one of his sons. Other independent directors have financial benefits they get from their Gamco affiliation. For instance, Robert S. Prather Jr. is the lead independent director and chairman of the compensation committee. He is considered independent despite the fact that Gamco has been nominating him for other boards in connection with their investments, earning him hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees.

A daughter of another independent director, Raymond C. Avansino Jr., is employed by Gamco, which paid her more than $600,000 last year. Mr. Avansino, who sits on the governance committee, is chief executive of a company that leases property to Gamco.

Family plays a big role at Gamco.

In addition to sitting on the board, Mr. Gabelli’s daughter runs his charitable foundation. The company employs his three sons, two of whom earned more than a million dollars when incentive compensation was included. Mr. Gabelli’s daughter-in-law and brother make six-figure salaries. Mr. Gabelli’s wife, who works in marketing, made more than $5 million last year.

There is more. Mr. Gabelli seems to have no compunction about other conflicted dealings with Gamco. The company’s disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission for related-party transaction goes on for five pages. Mr. Gabelli’s family owns Gamco’s headquarters and his private company owns the aircraft it uses to fly him around.

Mr. Gabelli has also had sharp elbows in dealing with his business partners. After the other founding partners of Gamco accused Mr. Gabelli of squeezing them out, he settled the litigation for about $100 million after a bitter battle.

Gamco declined to respond to requests for comment.

This would all be just another story of an entrenched chief executive who treats the company as his own playground were Gamco not an asset manager, which is a fiduciary to the ordinary people who give Gamco money to invest. Not only is it an asset manager, it is an active one, pressing companies to improve their corporate governance. In other words, Gamco appears to be a shareholder advocate for everyone but itself.

And so it may have been hypocritical when Mr. Gabelli recently posted on Twitter: “French corporate governance … takes turn to ‘ugly’ …. As companies given option to implement ‘loyalty share’ rule …. will Vivendi opt out.” Mr. Gabelli was noting a recent turn in France to give some shares more voting rights if they are held for a longer period. Mr. Gabelli may have a fair point in his criticism, but it is difficult to take from a man who freely uses his own elevated voting rights to control Gamco.

In a similar vein, in a recent proxy contest to put three directors on the board of Myers Industries, Gamco argued it was concerned about the company’s corporate governance practices because it had plurality voting to elect directors. At least Myers allowed its shareholders a real vote and the ability to appoint directors. Similarly, Mr. Gabelli wrote several years ago in urging Diebold to drop a poison pill that Gamco’s governance philosophy was “not for management” or “against management” but that the company was “committed to shareholder value creation.” Later, Gamco nominated Mr. Prather as a director at Diebold, where he made $209,000 last year. Did I mention before that Mr. Prather is Gamco’s lead independent director?

Perhaps most brazen are the “Gandhian” corporate governance principles that Gamco contends it lives by. On May 16, 1988, Mr. Gabelli issued a “Magna Carta of Shareholder Rights,” which says the company favors “one-share, one-vote; golden parachutes; and cash incentives” while it opposes “poison pills, supermajority voting and super-dilutive stock options.” Mr. Gabelli could very well be a Gamco target if he did not control the company.

Gamco’s stock price over the last five years has not only trailed BlackRock’s by 45 percent, it has also trailed the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index by about 19 percent.

While Mr. Gabelli says he is for “shareholder value creation,” but he has done little of it at Gamco. During his time at the company, Mr. Gabelli has enriched himself and his family.

The next time Mr. Gabelli writes to a company about its corporate governance practices or appears on CNBC, the response should be something different than worship of an old-hand asset manager. Instead, it would be fair to hold Mr. Gabelli to a higher standard, namely the one he likes to preach to other companies, the same principles he espouses for others.

______________________________________

Quels facteurs contribuent aux rémunérations élevées des CEO ?

Voici un article intéressant publié par Gretchen Gavett dans le dernier numéro de Harvard Business Review (HBR) qui présente les grandes lignes d’une étude du professeur Greckhamer qui a tenté de déterminer les facteurs contribuant aux rémunérations élevées des PCD (CEO).

Les conclusions sont assez difficiles à apprécier car la disparité des rémunérations observées peut être attribuable à plusieurs facteurs, souvent interdépendants. Même si les résultats ne sont pas évidents, il ressort qu’une culture admirative des positions de pouvoir ainsi qu’une faible présence du mouvement syndical sont des facteurs favorables aux rémunérations élevées des dirigeants, et conduisent souvent à de fortes inégalités de revenus.

L’auteure de cet article a cru utile d’explorer les huit facteurs susceptibles d’influencer, dans un sens ou dans l’autre, la rémunération globale des dirigeants, surtout des CEO. Puis, elle a défini certaines combinaisons de ces facteurs qui sont propices à l’augmentation des salaires des dirigeants. Enfin, elle s’est penchée sur les combinaisons susceptibles de réduire les inégalités.

Même si les conclusions sont sujettes à beaucoup d’interprétations, il me semble important de bien distinguer les facteurs en causes.

Voici un extrait de cet article. Bonne lecture !

The Factors That Lead to High CEO Pay

No matter where you live, the difference between how much CEOs are paid and how much the average worker takes home is, well, big. Probably even bigger than most people think.

To better understand how he got these findings, it’s worth laying out the eight compensation-influencing factors used by Greckhamer in his analysis:

1) A country’s level of development. This is important for a variety of reasons he describes in-depth, though the basic point is that high development should result in less income inequality, with both CEOs and workers making more.

2) The development of equity markets. The more developed markets increase ownership “dispersion,” or the number of people who own shares in a company. Greater dispersion, writes Greckhamer, “implies reduced owner-control, which should increase CEOs’ power to allocate more compensation for themselves.”

3) The development of the banking sector. The more concentrated the sector is, the more that should “monitor and control firms and thus constrain CEO power and pay.”

4) Its dependence on foreign capital. When foreign investors have influence over a company’s stock, it can boost income inequality.

5) Its collective rights empowering labor. This is basically collective bargaining rights, which are “a vital determinant of worker compensation” according to Greckhamer, and can also potentially limit CEO pay.

6) The strength of its welfare institutions. Their job, of course, is to “intervene in social arrangements to partially equalize the distribution of economic welfare,” which generally means lowering CEO pay and increasing that of regular workers.

7) Employment market forces. In other words, the supply and demand for executives’ and workers’ skills.

8) Social order and authority relations. Greckhamer describes this as “power distance,” which basically means “the extent to which society accepts inequality and hierarchical authority.” A high power distance tends to lead to high CEO pay and low worker pay.

After running his analysis, he identified how all of these factors work together to shape how much CEOs and regular workers get paid.

The Combinations that Increase CEO Pay

In one scenario, for example, highly developed equity markets, a strong welfare state, and a high power distance – combined with a lack of foreign capital penetration and supported by a few complementary conditions – were key indicators.

Generally speaking, though, a lack of collective labor rights and a high power distance are two of the core and complementary factors most often present in countries with high CEO pay. “This suggests that a combination of high cultural acceptance of hierarchical power structures and a lack of institutions empowering labor are vital institutional conditions for highly compensated CEOs,” Greckhamer writes.

This is pretty obvious, but there’s also a surprise in the data, too. While a few predictors indicate that a shortage of candidates results in higher CEO pay (which would make sense when you think about how market conditions work), there are situations that contradict this. In some locations that are lucrative for top brass, there are plenty of available senior managers to choose from. Greckhamer posits that places with a competitive labor market that also accepts hierarchy and doesn’t have strong labor rights basically operates as “tournaments among an abundant cadre of senior managers and with relatively high prizes for the winners.”

The Combinations that Reduce Inequality

One factor that doesn’t play much of a role on its own, surprisingly, is a country’s level of development, a finding that contradicts previous research. But that changes when you look more closely. A high level of development combined with a lack of hierarchies seems to increase worker pay. “High development was necessary, but not sufficient, for workers to achieve high compensation,” he told me. This may also be one of those cases where the absence of something is more felt than its presence: “A lack of development was also important for several paths to the absence of high worker pay,” such as the presence of foreign capital and less-developed equity markets.

Unsurprisingly (but importantly), locations with low CEO pay tend to have strong collective labor rights, a strong welfare state, and less power distance across the board.

There’s evidence, Greckhamer explained over email, that countries that both empower workers and culturally reject inequality constrain CEO pay. This, he says, showcases the vital importance of “political forces” – government policies or strong unions, for example – when it comes to executive pay.

Almost across the board, a strong welfare state and/or strong collective labor rights are a core condition for higher worker pay. And low worker pay is almost entirely moderated by a lack of a welfare state and/or a lack of collective labor rights.

“I believe that pay dispersion between CEOs and rank and file employees is a vital questions of our time, both from the point of organization theory and from the point of view of the general public,” Greckhamer says. And because organizations don’t exist in a vacuum outside a nation or culture, studying them within those contexts is essential.

At the same time, because so many different factors are intertwined, the relative lack of action to limit CEO pay makes a certain reluctant sense: Because it’s so seemingly complex, where do you even start?

In light of this, I asked whether his findings were “actionable.” He replied that it “depends to a large extent on whether organizations (or societies) consider a certain issue a ‘problem’ and wish to take ‘actions’ to ‘resolve’ them.” So, for example, these actions could include “a combination of achieving high development, strengthening institutions empowering labor, and cultural interventions aiming to counter any ingrained cultural values accepting inequality between those and the top and those at the bottom of organizations’ hierarchies.” But only if inequality is considered a problem worth acting on.

Les principes directeurs de la bonne gouvernance des sociétés | GNDI

Les questions qui me sont le plus souvent adressées dans le cadre de mes échanges avec les administrateurs de sociétés sont les suivantes :

(1) Qui fait quoi en gouvernance de sociétés au Canada et dans le monde francophone ?

(2) Avez-vous un guide simple et universel des bonnes pratiques de gouvernance, à l’échelle mondiale ?

Il existe plusieurs sources d’informations concernant les pratiques exemplaires en gouvernance. Au Québec et au plan national, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) s’est imposé comme la référence en matière de formation en gouvernance.

L’on peut retrouver sur le site du CAS une mine de renseignements au sujet de la gouvernance : des textes sur la gouvernance, des documents sur les meilleures pratiques, des références aux documents de l’ICCA sur les questions que les administrateurs devraient poser, un programme de certification universitaire complet et détaillé, des cours adaptés aux particularités de la gouvernance des OBNL, des PME, des services financiers, des présidents de CA, des capsules d’experts (vidéos) sur les principaux thèmes de la gouvernance, une boîte à outils, etc.

On peut également consulter le site de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) qui publie régulièrement des prises de positions sur les grands enjeux de la gouvernance.

On peut aussi trouver beaucoup d’informations pertinentes sur la gouvernance en consultant le centre de ressource de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés (IAS- ICD).

Notons enfin que les formations en gouvernance du Directors College et de l’Institut français des administrateurs (IFA), deux organisations qui travaillent en partenariat avec le CAS pour les questions de formation, sont particulièrement bien adaptées aux réalités nord-américaines et européennes.

Quant à la suggestion d’un guide universel des bonnes pratiques de gouvernance, je vous réfère à une récente publication du Global Network of Directors Institutes (GNDI), qui propose 13 principes qui devraient être universellement appliqués. Malheureusement, les principes sont publiés en anglais.

Je vous invite à prendre connaissances de cette liste en consultant le document ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture !

The guiding principles of good governance | GNDI

The Global Network of Director Institutes (GNDI), the international network of director institutes, has issued a new perspectives paper to guide boards in looking at governance beyond legislative mandates.

The Guiding Principles of Good Governance were developed by GNDI as part of its commitment to provide leadership on governance issues for directors of all organisations to achieve a positive impact.

Aimed at providing a framework of rules and recommendations, the 13 principles laid out in the guideline cover a broad range of governance-related topics including disclosure of practices, independent leadership and relationship with management, among others.

(more…)

Rémunérations excessives des hauts dirigeants | Extraction ou création de valeur

WOW ! Voici un article choc de Steve Denning , contributeur au magazine Forbes qui montre que les hauts dirigeants des grandes entreprises américaines (et probablement de la plupart des autres sociétés internationales), encouragées par leurs conseils d’administration, sont plus intéressés par l’extraction de la valeur de leurs entreprises (à leur profit) que par la création de valeur.

L’auteur fait le procès du système de financiarisation américain et montre que le modèle de gouvernance en place a échoué lamentablement. Les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants se sont accrues à un rythme effréné dans une période où le salaire moyen des ménages a diminué en terme réel.

Selon lui, le système doit changer radicalement, dans le sens des idées de Drucker, et mettre le focus sur la satisfaction des besoins des clients et non sur la valeur des actions à court terme.

Pour Denning, la société américaine doit opérer un vaste virage et se questionner sérieusement sur ses valeurs. L’article, bien que radical, est fascinant à lire et procure beaucoup de matière à réflexion. Selon lui une révolution de la gouvernance s’impose afin de faire cesser tous les abus des représentants des actionnaires !

Je me permets de citer les propos d’une de mes connaissances, experte en finance (formation et expérience), qui après avoir lu le billet sur mon blogue m’a fait parvenir les commentaires suivants :

« Je lis, de façon sélective, les billets de ton blogue sur la gouvernance. Le dernier billet qui propose la lecture d’un article de Steve Denning vient renforcer mes propres conclusions sur le sujet de la fonction et de la rémunération des CEO.

J’argumente qu’un changement de paradigme s’impose non pas parce que le capitalisme tel qu’imaginé par Adam Smith est fautif, mais précisément parce qu’on l’a dénaturé. Comme tu sais, aujourd’hui il est sacrilège de critiquer le modèle « free enterprise and open market system ». C’est un peu comme proposer des caricatures de Mahomet !

Bref, je suis encouragé de savoir qu’une vague de fond s’élève contre l’usurpation du pouvoir et la spoliation de capital de cette nouvelle classe de mercenaires bureaucrates dont le seul intérêt est de s’enrichir de façon éhontée au dépend de toutes les parties prenante de la corporation dans la société. Inutile d’ajouter que je souscrits à la thèse de Denning et de tous ceux qu’il cite ».

Voici un bref extrait de l’article. Je vous invite à en prendre connaissance et à exprimer votre point de vue sur les grands changements à apporter aux institutions, à la société, au système de formation des étudiants en administration, aux règles de gouvernance, etc.

Bonne lecture !

Vampire CEOs Continue To Suck Blood

As the economy continues to struggle in the seventh year of its supposed recovery after the Great Recession–despite unprecedented amounts of free government money from the Fed–CEO compensation continues to soar.

“The party goes on,” writes David Gelles in the New York Times, with a horrifying list of examples of corporate greed and value extraction. At the top of the list is a coven of four CEOs associated with John Malone at Discovery Communications who received some $350 million in 2014. Not bad for a year’s work, at a time when median compensation for workers has not increased significantly in decades.

Bloomberg calls it “gluttony.”

Harvard Business Review calls it “the biggest financial bubble of them all.”

The New Yorker says, that the effect of reforms such as say-on-pay, aimed at containing excesses in C.E.O. salaries, has been “approximately zero. Executive compensation…is now higher than it’s ever been.”

Shareholder votes “have done little to curb lavish executive pay,” writes David Gelles. Greater public disclosure based on the view that somehow the companies would be ashamed and change their ways ”hasn’t worked.” He quotes Regina Olshan, head of the executive compensation practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom: “I don’t think those folks are particularly ashamed. If they are getting paid, they feel they deserve those amounts. And if they are on the board, they feel like they are paying competitively to attract talent.”

“At root, the unstoppable rise of CEO pay,” says James Surowiecki in the New Yorker, “involves an ideological shift. Just about everyone involved now assumes that talent is rarer than ever, and that only outsize rewards can lure suitable candidates and insure stellar performance…CEO pay is likely to keep going in only one direction: up.”

Vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance ?

Aujourd’hui, je cède la parole à Me Donald Riendeau*, Directeur général et co-fondateur de l’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations, qui agit à titre de blogueur invité.

Celui-ci nous entretiendra de l’importance de solidifier la confiance à l’échelle de toutes les entreprises et d’insuffler une gouvernance créatrice de confiance eu égard aux relations entre le conseil d’administration et la direction.

L’auteur nous présentera également un avant-goût du premier sommet international de la confiance.

Vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance ?

par

Me Daniel Riendeau

Vous avez tous entendu l’expression ‘’ vers une gouvernance créatrice de valeurs ‘’, pour différencier celle-ci de la gouvernance plus traditionnelle mais néanmoins importante qu’est ‘’ la gouvernance fiduciaire ‘’ ? Le Dr Yvan Allaire, avec lequel j’ai eu le privilège de collaborer est un visionnaire qui dès 2003 fût le premier à parler de ces deux types de gouvernance.

Au cours des douze dernières années, plusieurs consultants et experts en gouvernance ont poussé ces notions pour en permettre un maximum de valeur ajoutée. Malgré tous ses efforts et les nombreux progrès en matière de gouvernance, il semble encore manquer une pièce au puzzle. Cette pièce pourrait bien être celle de la confiance.

LE PRISME DE LA CONFIANCE

Le mot confiance est le mot de neuf lettres à la fois le plus fort et le plus essentiel. Que ce soit dans nos vies personnelle, sociale et professionnelle. Pourtant cette notion si importante est encore difficile à saisir. La confiance n’est ni une valeur, ni un comportement, ni une attitude. La confiance est ‘’ la ‘’ méta-valeur, en fait tous nos comportements, décisions et actions contribueront à la solidifier ou à l’effriter. Comme l’énonce si bien l’un de mes mentors, monsieur Jean-Claude Deschênes, la confiance est comme l’huile d’un moteur. Imaginez ce qui arrive à un moteur lorsqu’il n’y a pas d’huile… celui-ci fige, ou pire brûle. La confiance est comme cette huile. On ne l’a voit pas, mais elle est essentielle.

La mission de l’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations est de solidifier la confiance dans nos organisations. Bien entendu, l’intégrité et de bonnes instances de gouvernance sont des ingrédients clés. Mais la confiance est bien davantage. Par exemple, une organisation peut être parfaitement intègre et avoir les meilleures règles de gouvernance mais si les résultats ne sont pas au rendez-vous, la confiance sera déficiente. Un autre exemple est celui d’une organisation dans le domaine de la construction que nous avons accompagné. Rarement il nous a été donné de voir une confiance interne aussi forte (climat de travail exceptionnel, valeurs partagées, travail d’équipe synergique, activation des accomplissements personnels, respect des délais, niveau des compétences élevé, etc.). Cependant, malgré tous ses efforts, la confiance des autorités réglementaires, des créanciers et de la caution était vacillante en raison du passé de certains de ses actionnaires.

Je pourrais vous donner un grand nombre d’exemples qui vous démontreront que la confiance est une notion large qui repose sur de nombreuses composantes. Or, qui est mieux positionné qu’un conseil d’administration pour veiller à la mise en place et l’évolution d’ingrédients qui contribueront à solidifier la confiance interne et celle des parties prenantes externes ?

UNE ÉVOLUTION NATURELLE

Doucement, nos conseils d’administration évolueront d’une gouvernance créatrice de valeurs, vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance. Les conseils d’administration se poseront d’importantes questions telles que : Quel est le niveau de la confiance entre les employés et notre direction ? Quel est le niveau de confiance des autorités réglementaires envers notre organisation ? Quel est le niveau de confiance entre nos clients privés et notre organisation ? Mais plus important, qu’avons-nous fait et que pouvons-nous faire comme organisation pour solidifier la confiance des différentes parties prenantes.

L’Institut de la confiance dans les organisations accompagne des organisations afin de procéder à leur diagnostic de confiance interne et externe mais surtout pour mettre en place des parcours qui solidifieront cette confiance si importante. Certes, l’intégrité et la gouvernance sont des disciplines très importantes, mais n’oublions jamais qu’elles servent une cause encore plus importante, soit celle de bâtir la confiance.

MONTRÉAL ACCUEILLE LE PREMIER SOMMET INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONFIANCE

Je profite de l’occasion pour vous inviter à un Sommet dont l’objectif est de permettre aux administrateurs, dirigeants, gens d’affaires et professionnels d’être mieux outillés pour mettre de l’avant des stratégies, pratiques et outils contribuant à la confiance dans leur environnement de travail. Aider les participants à devenir des leaders d’organisations créatrices de confiance.

Qui sont les conférenciers? Nous aurons la chance de compter sur des conférenciers internationaux tels que l’Australienne Vanessa Hall (« The Trust Lady »), l’expert international en conformité, l’Allemand Andreas Polhmann, le gourou du management français Hervé Sérieyx, et les spécialistes américains Rob Peters, Dennis Reina et Michelle Reina. Nous compterons également sur plusieurs conférenciers de chez nous tels que : Robert Poëti (ministre du Transport), Caroline Néron (femme d’affaires et PDG de Bijoux Caroline Néron), Suzanne Blanchet (VP Cascades), Pascale Pageau (PDG Delegatus), René Rouleau (PDG La Capitale), Me Denis Gallant (Inspecteur en Chef de la Ville de Montréal), Alex Brisson (PDG Roche), Michel Nadeau (DG IGOPP), Christian Latreille (Journaliste Radio-Canada), Benoit Robert (PDG Communauto), Luc Durand (DG IPSOS Québec), François Casgrain (Commissaire au Lobbyisme), Ève Laurier (DG Edelman Québec), Diane Gareau (syndic de la Chambre des notaires du Québec) et Jean-Claude Deschênes (Administrateur de sociétés). Sans compter que ce Sommet sera animé par monsieur Jean-François Lépine.

Quand ce Sommet se tiendra-t-il ? Les 21 et 22 mai 20015 à Montréal. La première journée en sera une de conférences sous forme de tables rondes. Nous aborderons quatre grands thèmes :

(1) l’importance et le portrait de la confiance de par le monde;

(2) Stratégies, pratiques et expériences de dirigeants de confiance;

(3) Reconstruire la confiance en temps de crise;

(4) Devenez des leaders de confiance en participant au « mouvement » de la confiance.

Nous tiendrons également un cocktail lors duquel nous saluerons des leaders de confiance s’étant illustrés dans leurs secteurs d’activité. La deuxième journée regroupera des formations plus en profondeur et nous compterons sur deux invités spéciaux soient Diane Lemieux, PDG de la CCQ (petit déjeuner) et le ministre Robert Poëti (dîner). Il est à noter que ces deux journées sont reconnues par plusieurs ordres professionnels dont l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés (Adm.A.), le Barreau et l’Ordre des conseillers en ressources humaines (CRHA).

Les administrateurs qui participeront à ce sommet comprendront encore mieux l’important rôle qu’ils ont à jouer pour donner le ‘’ ton ‘’ à la confiance comme prisme d’intervention au sein de leurs organisations.

Pour en savoir plus :

www.institutdelaconfiance-sommet.org

Me Donald Riendeau*, Directeur général et co-fondateur, Institut de la confiance dans les organisations, donaldriendeau@institutdelaconfiance.org

Synergies recherchées dans la reconstitution des CA lors des opérations de fusion et acquisition (M&A)

Aujourd’hui, j’aborde un sujet assez peu étudié par les experts en gouvernance, mais néanmoins crucial pour assurer le succès de la croissance des entreprises : Il s’agit de l’attention qu’il faut apporter à la reconstitution du nouveau conseil d’administration résultant de la fusion ou de l’acquisition de deux entités privées ou publiques.

La période de transition post-acquisition se traduit souvent par des gestes et des attitudes des CA qui les rendent moins efficaces, à une période nécessitant une surveillance accrue.

L’article publié par Johanne Bouchard* et Ken Smith** dans la revue NACD Directorship décrit quatre principales situations de M&A, en illustrant les difficultés de fonctionnement susceptibles d’être vécues à la suite de la recomposition des conseils d’administration.

C’est un article phare qui montre clairement la nécessité pour les nouvelles entités de se faire accompagner dans les périodes critiques du choix des membres, de l’induction des nouveaux membres et de la dynamique de la nouvelle équipe d’administrateurs.

Je vous invite à lire le document ci-dessous. En voici, quelques extraits :

Advice for Effective Board Mergers | NACD

The board may be least effective post-deal, at the very time when its oversight may be most important.

The proposed board composition would ideally be part of the merger proposal put to shareholders for approval.

Many boards surprise themselves with what they didn’t know about each other… until they put these things on the table in the context of a big challenge such as an acquisition.

The organization structure and culture should be aligned with the overall strategy and facilitate the deal logic.

*Johanne Bouchard is an advisor to boards, CEOs, and executives. She is an expert in board composition and dynamics, and provides support in strategic alignment, board effectiveness, and post-deal board integration. Bouchard has been a serial entrepreneur and held C-level management positions at leading high-tech companies in Silicon Valley.

**Ken Smith has been a strategy consultant for more than 25 years, having served leading Canadian and U.S. corporations. He is an expert in M&A strategy and implementation, and co-wrote The Art of M&A Strategy (McGraw-Hill, 2012) with NACD Chief Knowledge Officer, Alexandra R. Lajoux.

Qu’est-ce qu’une fondation-actionnaires ? | Dix points-clé

Notre pays méconnaît largement un mode de gouvernance répandu dans le reste de l’Europe. Au Danemark, en Suisse, en Allemagne, de grandes entreprises industrielles et commerciales sont couramment détenues par des fondations.

Et le modèle s’avère durable et vertueux. Pourquoi ?

Quelles sont les spécificités des fondations actionnaires ?

Les voici résumées autour de 10 mots clés.

Qu’en est-il au Québec ? Ce sera le sujet d’un autre billet.

Bonne lecture !

Découvrez les « fondations-actionnaires » (et leurs atouts) en 10 points-clé

Les fondations actionnaires (éd.Prophil) Prophil

INDUSTRIE

Ikea, Lego, Rolex, Bosch, Carlsberg : ces marques sont mondialement connues. Mais parmi leurs millions de clients, combien connaissent leur autre particularité ? Les groupes industriels à l’origine de ces « success stories » sont, depuis longtemps, tous la propriété de… fondations ! Pourtant, faire rimer économie et philanthropie ne va pas de soi, et le terme même de « fondation actionnaire » peut paraître un oxymore. Car la philanthropie s’accorde a priori avec le « don », et l’actionnariat avec l’investissement.

Le terme n’est d’ailleurs pas stabilisé, et ne correspond à aucun statut juridique propre dans les pays étudiés : les Suisses parlent de « fondation entrepreneuriale » ou de « fondation économique», les Danois évoquent les « fondations commerciales », et les anglosaxons les « industrial fondations ». Chez nos voisins, industrie et philanthropie vont assurément de pair.

MAJORITAIRE

La fondation actionnaire, telle que nous la traitons dans cette étude, désigne une fondation à but non lucratif, propriétaire d’une entreprise industrielle ou commerciale. Elle possède tout ou partie des actions, et la majorité des droits de vote et/ou la minorité de blocage.

Ce qui n’empêche donc pas les entreprises concernées d’être en partie cotées en bourse (les fondations actionnaires représentent 54% de la capitalisation boursière de Copenhague).

Dès lors, plusieurs fondations, qui certes détiennent des actions d’entreprises, sortent du champ de cette étude, notamment celles qui ont décidé de filialiser des activités connexes à leur objet, en créant des sociétés (une fondation culturelle qui, par exemple, crée une maison d’édition).

FAMILLES

Les fondations actionnaires sont essentiellement des histoires de familles, d’engagement personnel, comme les nombreux cas de cette étude en témoignent.

Dans un esprit de résistance (La Montagne), avec la volonté de protéger et développer un patrimoine industriel (Bosch), ou avec le souhait d’articuler des engagements humanistes avec une transmission sereine de l’entreprise en absence d’ayant droits (Pierre Fabre), chaque histoire est celle d’un homme, d’une famille qui se projette dans le long terme, avec la volonté de perpétuer une culture d’entreprise singulière, dans une double approche économique et sociétale.

PHILANTHROPIE

Cette transmission est, en soi, un acte de philanthropie majeur. Car les propriétaires font don de leurs titres à une structure créée à cet effet, et renoncent donc aux gains, le cas échéant substantiels, d’une vente avec plus-value. Ils sont philanthropes.

Mais la philanthropie s’exprime aussi, et surtout, dans les dons des fondations, rendus possibles par les dividendes perçus et/ou les intérêts des dotations.

Par exemple, les fondations actionnaires donnent plus de 800 millions d’euros par an au Danemark (seul pays où des études aussi précises existent) et la fondation Novo Nordisk représente, à elle seule, 120 millions d’euros. Sa dotation est telle qu’elle pourrait continuer à vivre sans même percevoir de dividendes !

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

Au Danemark, la première mission des fondations actionnaires est majoritairement de protéger et de développer l’entreprise ; la seconde, de soutenir une cause culturelle et/ou sociale.

La double mission économique et philanthropique est parfaitement assumée et le rôle de gestion de l’entreprise, prioritaire. Maintenir le patrimoine industriel dans ce petit pays, conserver des fleurons industriels, protéger l’emploi sont considérés comme des sujets d’intérêt général.

Ce n’est pas le cas en France, où intérêt général et activité commerciale ne vont pas facilement de pair. Le principe de spécialité impose en effet aux fondations françaises d’avoir une mission exclusivement d’intérêt général, qui, dans une vision encore assez restrictive, ne peut être économique.

Quant à l’Allemagne, il n’est pas obligatoire d’avoir une mission d’intérêt général pour créer une fondation, a fortiori une fondation actionnaire. Comme le dit le célèbre banquier privé Thierry Lombard, les fondations actionnaires soulèvent des questions non seulement « de loi, mais d’idéologie ».

GOUVERNANCE

C’est le sujet clé. Dans les pays étudiés, et selon le droit national, deux modes de gouvernance prédominent :

1. soit une gestion directe de l’entreprise par la fondation, qui suppose une double finalité pleinement assumée et un conseil d’administration capable de prendre des décisions économiques et philanthropiques à la fois ;

2. soit une gestion indirecte, avec une distinction nette des instances de gouvernance de l’entreprise et de la fondation, via la création d’une société holding intermédiaire. Le droit et la fiscalité sont souvent complexes et variables d’un pays à l’autre : nous avons fait appel à d’éminents spécialistes nationaux pour nous décrire leur « état du droit ».

Notons que dans les fondations actionnaires, la succession des dirigeants n’est pas un sujet aussi sensible qu’ailleurs. La question se règle en général longtemps à l’avance, au niveau de la fondation.

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

Cette performance globale n’est pas une série de bonnes actions, mais un engagement stratégique d’une entreprise, qui se préoccupe de sa contribution économique, sociale et sociétale à son environnement.

Les entreprises les plus avancées ont compris que leur intérêt particulier rencontrait ici l’intérêt général, pour peu qu’elles ne restent pas les yeux rivés sur une gestion à court terme.

Alors que la pratique de la RSE est devenu de plus en plus un exercice imposé, et trop souvent l’instrument de directions de la communication, la fondation actionnaire place, par nature, la responsabilité sociale et l’approche de long terme au coeur de sa stratégie : dans une forme de fertilisation croisée, fondation et entreprise intrinsèquement liées, s’influencent.

LONG TERME

À un monde économique de plus en plus instable et à court terme, la fondation actionnaire oppose un modèle d’actionnariat stable et durable. La menace de prédateurs est évacuée, puisque toute tentative d’OPA hostile est impossible, et une vision de long terme, dont la redistribution de dividendes n’est pas l’unique préoccupation, oriente la stratégie.

TROISIÈME VOIE

Cette aventure, les tenants de l’économie positive et les philosophes de l’économie altruiste seraient prêts à la tenter. Car intrinsèquement les fondations actionnaires devraient faire consensus : elles allient la création de valeur économique à la force du don, au service d’une économie durable et d’une cohésion sociale renforcée.

C’est pourquoi il est si important de défricher cette troisième voie qui, en France, n’est encore qu’un sentier. La fondation actionnaire peut contribuer à faire émerger un nouveau capitalisme, plus altruiste et durable. Ce paysage pour les générations à venir, beaucoup l’appellent de leurs voeux.

EFFICACITÉ

Mais peut-on conjuguer gouvernance philanthropique et efficacité économique ? Les quelques études scientifiques (voir le panorama danois) existantes tendraient à le prouver : les performances des entreprises propriétés de fondations sont meilleures que celles où l’actionnariat est dispersé*. Le phénomène est comparable dans les sociétés familiales.

D’un point de vue social, ce type d’entreprises semble mieux traverser les crises conjoncturelles. Les dirigeants peuvent en effet s’appuyer sur une meilleure implication de leurs collaborateurs, rassurés par la stabilité de l’actionnariat.

Enfin, à l’heure où les cadres sont à la recherche de sens dans leur vie professionnelle, les valeurs promues par les fondations leur donnent une bonne raison de s’investir dans l’entreprise.

___________________________________

*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

On constate que les fondations-actionnaires ne sous-performent jamais les autres types d’entreprises. Selon Steen Thomsen, auteur de l’étude dont est tirée le tableau (« Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations« ), « les fondations-actionnaires présentent un taux de rentabilité et de croissance comparable aux entreprises classiques, mais avec un niveau de sécurité financière bien plus élevé » (comme le montre le ratio « equity/assets » de 47 au lieu de 36 pour les entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé, et 38 pour les entreprises familiales).

Un document complet sur les principes d’éthique et de saine gouvernance dans les organismes à buts charitables

Plusieurs OBNL sont à la recherche d’un document présentant les principes les plus importants s’appliquant aux organismes à buts charitables.

Le site ci-dessous vous mènera à une description sommaire des principes de gouvernance qui vous servirons de guide dans la gestion et la surveillance des OBNL de ce type. J’espère que ces informations vous seront utiles.

Vous pouvez également vous procurer le livre The Complete Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice.

What are the principles ?

The Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice outlines 33 principles of sound practice for charitable organizations and foundations related to legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The Principles should be considered by every charitable organization as a guide for strengthening its effectiveness and accountability. The Principles were developed by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2007 and updated in 2015 to reflect new circumstances in which the charitable sector functions, and new relationships within and between the sectors.

The Principles Organizational Assessment Tool allows organizations to determine their strengths and weaknesses in the application of the Principles, based on its four key content areas (Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight, and Responsible Fundraising). This probing tool asks not just whether an organization has the requisite policies and practices in place, but also enables an organization to determine the efficacy of those practices. After completing the survey (by content area or in full), organizations will receive a score report for each content area and a link to suggested resources for areas of improvement.

Voici une liste des 33 principes énoncés. Bonne lecture !

Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

Laws and Regulations

Code of Ethics

Conflicts of Interest

« Whistleblower » Policy

Document Retention and Destruction

Protection of Assets

Availability of Information to the Public

Effective Governance

Board Responsibilities

Board Meetings

Board Size and Structure

Board Diversity

Board Independence

CEO Evaluation and Compensation

Separation of CEO, Board Chair and Board Treasurer Roles

Board Education and Communication

Evaluation of Board Performance

Board Member Term Limits

Review of Governing Documents

Review of Mission and Goals

Board Compensation

Strong Financial Oversight

Financial Records

Annual Budget, Financial
Performance and Investments

Loans to Directors, Officers,
or Trustees

Resource Allocation for Programs
and Administration

Travel and Other Expense Policies

Expense Reimbursement for
Nonbusiness Travel Companions

Accuracy and Truthfulness of Fundraising Materials

Responsible Fundraising

Compliance with Donor’s Intent

Acknowledgment of Tax-Deductible Contributions

Gift Acceptance Policies

Oversight of Fundraisers

Fundraiser Compensation

Donor Privacy

« Vous êtes devenus l’un d’entre eux » | 15 règles qu’un administrateur doit appliquer !

Voici un article qui rappelle les règles à suivre pour un administrateur siégeant sur le conseil d’une entreprise familiale, d’une entreprise privée de capital de risque, d’une entreprise gérée par les fondateurs ou toute autre combinaison de celles-ci. L’article a initialement été publié par Jim McHugh en mars 2015 dans Private Company Director Magazine.

Pour plusieurs administrateurs, le fait de prendre position en faveur de la direction, des propriétaires dirigeants ou du management en général peut constituer un manquement aux obligations de fiduciaire, surtout si la position adoptée est contraire à celle de certains autres administrateurs qui ont des intérêts à protéger !

L’incident relaté dans l’extrait suivant est assez révélateur …

You’ve become one of them.” That’s what a fellow Director (“MoneyGuy”) said to me after one of XYZ Company’s regular board meetings. MoneyGuy was from XYZ’s lead investor group and the majority shareholder. The ’them’ MoneyGuy was speaking about was XYZ’s management team. From his tone, I knew MoneyGuy wasn’t giving me a compliment; I was being admonished because I ‘sided with management’ about a particular matter that was pivotal to the future of the company.

What had I done wrong? To find the answer, you’ll need to read the following fifteen “rules” on how to work with owners.

Ce commentaire d’un collègue administrateur a incité Jim McHugh* à proposer quinze (15) règles de conduite dans des cas similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces règles et à ajouter votre grain de sel.

Bonne lecture !

« You’ve Become One of Them » | Fifteen Rules for Directors

Here are my fifteen rules :

1. Remember your role as a fiduciary. MoneyGuy knew I had a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, not just to him and his private equity firm. They put me on the Board to be ‘an outside, independent voice.’ Somehow that slipped his mind! This brings me to Rule #2…

2. Don’t be a rubber stamp. You can get rubber stamps at Staples. MoneyGuy or any other majority shareholder should realize that you are not on the Board just to be another automatic vote for them. Another Director friend told me: “There is a fine line to walk as an independent director when those sitting around the table own the company and you are effectively their invited guest.” If management knows you are truly independent and not there to throw them under the bus, this will help build trust with all.

3. Understand the owner’s expectations and their personal and financial goals. One owner told me: “I believe the most important consideration for an outside Director is to ensure the shareholders’ goals and desires are fully understood. Private company owners are likely to have a complex mix of primary and secondary goals that often change based on circumstances impacting their lives. Multiple shareholders might present further complications which need to be blended into the stew.”

4. Understand the owners’ personalities. This is different than #3. The particular personality style of the individual majority shareholder exerts a significant influence on the board and management.

5. Get to know the management team. Is the CEO and senior team strong-willed, weak or balanced? How well does the CEO work with the company’s owners? Being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the C-Suite will help you be a better coach to the owners.

6. Understand the culture of the company. Why? Because you and your other directors do have a role in shaping it and maintaining it by your actions.

7. Be consequential. Joe White used this term in his book Boards That Excel. One CEO/owner told me: “I want Directors that challenge me and bring perspective and skills I lack. I also want them to be well-grounded. The one thing my board has lacked is someone who is very knowledgeable about the specifics of my industry, but I think that has been outweighed by Directors with broad experience who see the big picture.”

8. Understand the business model and the industry. I had recently joined the Board of a company and we were discussing changes to the distribution channels. One Director said: “That’s not how we go to market now, is it?” He had been on the Board for over ten years and did not know one of the basic aspects of the business model!

9. Be a colleague, not an adversary. You are on the Board to give your opinion and offer advice, suggestions and ideas, not to advance your own career or agenda. I disagreed with MoneyGuy, but I wasn’t being disagreeable. No grandstanding, no pontificating allowed.

10. Don’t be timid about personally coaching or mentoring the owners. Even though they own the company, they may need advice on areas they are unfamiliar with. See #7.

11. Trust your gut. It’s ok to be a nudge (…and be Columbo-like). For those of you who are too young to know who Columbo was, Google him. Don’t allow the CEO and the team to stiff arm you or ignore your questions. Hopefully you have proved to the owners that your probing is done with good intentions.

12. Prepare for and attend the meetings. How obvious is this? Don’t be a no show or empty seat.

13. Participate. Be available to the owners not only at the Board meetings but also between the meetings. Encourage honest two-way communication and feedback.

14. Embrace and use technology. Just a pet peeve of mine…I’m tired of hearing about people being ‘too old’ to learn today’s communication technologies. The cloud is something more than moisture in the air.

15. Stay fresh. Owners don’t want ‘stale’, they deserve ‘fresh’.

None of this is complicated and these rules may seem pretty basic and just common sense to you. But if that’s the case, then why have I witnessed so many Directors who don’t follow these, who behave irrationally and/or who are ineffective with ownership?

___________________________________

Jim McHugh* is an Entrepreneur, Director, CEO Coach, Optimist, Instigator of Positive Change…and Fixer of Stuck Companies. CEOs, family owners, investors and Boards enlist Jim to be their ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and confidant.

Un guide des pratiques de gouvernance dans l’Union Européenne (EU)

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un guide complet des pratiques de gouvernance relatives aux entreprises de l’Union Européenne.

Il n’y a pas de version française de ce document à ce stade-ci. J’ai cependant demandé à ecoDa (European Confederation of Directors’ Associations) si un guide en français était en préparation. Toute personne intéressée par la gouvernance européenne trouvera ici un excellent outil d’information.

Bonne lecture !

This publication has been produced in collaboration with the European Confederation of Directors’ Associations (ecoDa) primarily aimed at ecoDa’s membership and for supporting IFC’s work in surrounding regions with countries aspiring to understand and follow rules, standards and practices applied in the EU countries but which may be of wider relevance and interest to practitioners, policy makers, development finance institutions, investors, board directors, business reporters, and others.

A Guide to Corporate Governance Practices in the European Union

The purpose of this publication is twofold: to describe the corporate governance framework within the European Union and to highlight good European governance practices. It focuses on the particular aspects of European governance practices that distinguish this region from other parts of the world.

In addition to providing a useful source of reference, this guide is designed to be relevant to anyone interested in the evolving debate about European corporate governance. It should be of particular interest to the following parties:

Policymakers and corporate governance specialists, to assist in the identification of good practices among the member states. Improvements in corporate governance practices in a country may attract foreign direct investment.

Directors of listed and unlisted companies, to inspire them to look again at their ways of working.

Directors of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to assist in improving corporate governance practices prior to selling off state assets.

Bankers, to assist in the identification of good corporate governance practices to inform their lending and investing practices.

Staff within development financial institutions, to assist in the identification of good corporate

Proxy advisors and legal advisors, to assist in the identification of corporate governance compliance issues.

Investors, shareholders, stock brokers, and investment advisors, to assist in the identification of good practices in investor engagement and activism.

Senior company management, to assist in the identification of good relationship-management practices with boards of directors.

Journalists and academics within business schools, who are interested in good corporate governance practices.

Private sector and public sector stakeholders from the EU candidate and potential candidate countries in their preparation for eventual accession. Geographical areas of potential readership may include the following in particular:

The 18 Eurozone countries (listed in Appendix A);

The 28 EU member states (Appendix B);

The five EU candidate countries (Appendix C);

The three potential candidate countries

The 47 European Council Countries (Appendix E); and

Emerging markets and others seeking to increase trade or attract investment with European countries.

Les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler sur la stratégie ou sur la culture ?

Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.

À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?

L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, … avant la stratégie !

Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :

(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?

(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?

If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with. We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.

Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Which To Work on First, Strategy or Culture ?

Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?

Consider the following; you are driving a boat. You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south. In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture. They are not in synch. No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win. That is what Drucker meant.

Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not. This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.

Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.

Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures. We all know the ones in these listings. They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers. All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services. No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.

We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first. What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy. It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture. What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.

…..

____________________________________

* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris. He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management. He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.

Cinq questions qu’un administrateur devrait considérer lors d’une décision d’octroi de contrat | Pascale Lapointe

Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un billet soumis par Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A,, gestionnaire de projet et membre de CA d’OBNL.

Son article rappelle les questions qu’un administrateur de sociétés doit se poser lorsqu’il est confronté à une décision d’octroi de contrat.

Bonne lecture !

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Quelles sont les cinq (5) questions usitées qu’un dirigeant ou un administrateur (selon les cas) devrait se poser avant de prendre une décision d’affaires. J’avais d’abord préparé ces questions pour moi, puis j’ai décidé d’en faire un billet pour publication sur le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Je sais, la littérature d’affaires regorge de détails et d’analyses encore plus complets sur la prise de décision en situation de conflits d’intérêts potentiels. Cependant, ici, je n’ai voulu aborder le sujet qu’en en faisant un sommaire et un court aide-mémoire.

Pascale Lapointe, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A.

Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces cinq questions classiques sont encore le meilleur moyen pour s’assurer d’agir avec la plus grande intégrité et la plus grande transparence possible.

Chaque membre d’un conseil d’administration doit se poser les questions suivantes avant de prendre une décision relative à l’octroi d’un contrat majeur :

Les règles d’attribution des contrats sont-elles claires et bien comprises au sein de l’organisation ? C’est le rôle du conseil de s’en assurer auprès de la direction ;
Les règles ont-elles été respectées ? Y-a-t-il apparence de conflits d’intérêts ? En d’autres termes, peut-on déceler une quelconque apparence de favoritisme, d’amis impliqués, de relations d’affaires douteuses ou autres ;
Y-a-t-il eu assez de transparence dans les règles d’attribution des contrats ? En d’autres termes, les soumissionnaires ont-ils reçus les mêmes informations et les règles ont-elles été suivies de façon juste et équitable ? Dans ce contexte, il est souhaitable d’exiger un minimum de soumissionnaires ;
Les entreprises soumissionnaires et les partenaires possèdent-ils et appliquent-ils un code d’éthique à l’interne et dans leurs relations d’affaires ? Leur réputation en matière d’intégrité est-elle irréprochable ?
Toutes les déclarations pertinentes à la prise de décision ont-elles été faites par la direction ? Ainsi, on s’assure que le gestionnaire qui fait la présentation au CA fait preuve d’abnégation et demeure le plus impartial possible en ce qui regarde l’intérêt et la mission de l’organisation.

En résumé, si, comme administratrice, je devais défendre publiquement une décision d’octroi de contrat, aurais-je accès à l’ensemble des éléments vérifiables pour justifier ma décision ?

Malgré toutes ces précautions, la prise de décision se fait toujours avec une information incomplète et, en ce sens, elle comporte un risque. L’important pour l’administrateur est de démontrer qu’il a été vigilant et qu’il s’est assuré d’obtenir toute l’information pertinente.

_______________________________________

Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A, contribue au Conseil du Développement du Loisir Scientifique (Réseau CDLS-CLS – organisme responsable des Expo-Sciences Québec), ainsi qu’à la Maison des familles de Ville Saint-Laurent.

On peut consulter son profil sur LinkedIn ca.linkedin.com/pub/pascale-lapointe-mba-pmp/18/b66/b35

Comment composer avec un membre de CA « toxique » ? | En rappel

Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Richard Leblanc* publié dans The Globe and Mail.

Dans cet article, Richard montre que la dynamique comportementale de l’équipe des administrateurs est souvent la clé du succès des entreprises. Souvent la composition de l’équipe est remarquable, mais si un seul membre est dysfonctionnel, « toxique » ou incompétent, il arrive que toute l’efficacité du conseil en souffre.

Dans ces cas, il faut s’assurer que le processus d’évaluation des administrateurs soit capable de déceler les maillons faibles du conseil et, surtout, d’agir résolument pour régler le problème.

Il revient au président du conseil, sur recommandation du comité de gouvernance, de prendre les décisions menant à la non-reconduction du mandat de l’administrateur qui nuit à la dynamique de groupe.

Il faut donc revoir la démarche d’évaluation des membres du CA, souvent avec une firme externe, afin de déceler les problèmes de dynamique d’équipe. À ce stade-ci, il faut noter que les processus de recrutement de nouveaux administrateurs ne font pas suffisamment de place aux critères de nature comportementale.

Également, lorsqu’il devient évident qu’un administrateur est « toxique » pour le travail d’équipe du conseil, le président doit prendre les devants et engager une démarche de correction. Mais plusieurs présidents de CA n’osent pas se compromettre !

Souvent le problème est connu, et reconnu, mais le président laisse porter, au détriment de l’efficacité du travail de groupe. Dans ce cas, c’est le poste de président qui devient en jeu puisque son rôle est de s’assurer que le CA fonctionne harmonieusement et avec respect, tout en favorisant la liberté d’expression.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article en question. Si vous avez des suggestions pour mettre un terme à ces comportements déviants, ou si vous avez des exemples à partager avec nos lecteurs, n’hésitez pas à commenter ce billet.

Bonne lecture !

Don’t let your board fail your company

An effective board is the last line of defense for shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. This small but mighty peer group is responsible for overseeing the management of an organization, so if one thing is flawed – if just one director’s behaviour is disruptive or toxic – it can be the difference between performance and non-performance throughout the entire organization. Poor dynamics have that kind of ripple effect, unfortunately.

A bad board member can derail your board of directors. (iStockphoto)

As an external adviser and specialist in corporate governance and accountability, my work has allowed me to study and evaluate boards, investors and directors across all sectors, including health care.

I’ve never investigated a board failure where flawed dynamics was not a major contributor, which is why I know for a fact that great boards don’t just “happen.” They are carefully and critically designed to be functionally sound. They have to be. A board is just too important an entity to rely on crossed fingers and wishful thinking.

When it comes to toxic behaviours that can bring down a board, I’ve pretty much seen it all. Excessive power, over-reliance on one person, dominant managers, lack of integrity and trustworthiness, confidentiality breaches, lack of transparency and accountability, lack of meeting preparation, undermining board decisions, poor information flow management – these are all warning signs that need to be addressed immediately. But perhaps the biggest red flag is the dysfunctional director and the underperforming director.

I’ve seen dissention amongst the ranks on some of the most iconic boards in Canada. In one instance, there was a director who was so toxic that the board had been consumed by theatrics for nearly a year. When I spoke to the other directors, almost all of them wanted the bullying to stop, but no one had the courage to pull the trigger. Even the chair of the board was too weak to take action. Ultimately, my recommendation was to replace both of them in order to settle things down and get the board back on track.

People are often surprised to hear that the best thing you can do to begin to heal divisions and repair a broken board is to let someone go. But in many cases that’s the only way to start the mending process. It’s not easy to unwind chronic dysfunction on a board – it takes a strong chair or third-party supervision – but getting rid of the root cause is the best way to start. The key is handling the dismissal respectfully and diplomatically.

I once conducted a peer review for the board of an important and highly regulated company. If the board of this particular company makes a mistake, people can die, so it was critical for them to get it right. Every time.

During the review process, I noticed that one director rated another last on almost every single performance dimension. When questioned, the director proceeded to tell me, category by category, why he had rated his peer so poorly – even though others had given that same director exemplary ratings. It eventually became clear that he despised the director he had critiqued so harshly. There was simply no way to repair this enmity, and it had no place on this – or any – board. My recommendation was to remove the hostile director. And that’s exactly what happened.

Board members need to be proactive when they sense there is trouble brewing. The one regret directors repeatedly express is not speaking up and calling out toxic behaviours until it was too late. Letting it fester only makes the situation worse for everyone involved, especially the company.

But of course the best way to create a functional, healthy board is to avoid dysfunction from the start. Nominating committees need to spend more time at the front end recruiting directors, and on the back end retiring them. And they need to do it on the basis of expected and actual performance.

Unfortunately, most competency matrices don’t include behaviour, and all directors have “warts.” Nominating committees must do their due diligence, and that includes a proper competency matrix, the creation of long lists and short lists, interviews, background checks, and making sure to bring on directors who are not friends or known to current directors. A strong and experienced chair at the helm who can appreciate the value of a diverse board and make difficult decisions when necessary is another must-have.

An effective board doesn’t happen by accident. Spend time and effort designing yours by recruiting independent thinkers who can leave their egos at the door, ask the tough questions, give the right advice – and do it all with a smile. Let the notion of, “iron hand in a velvet glove,” be your yardstick as you create your dream team.

*Dr. Richard Leblanc (@DrRLeblanc) is an associate professor of law, governance and ethics at York University (@yorkuniversity) and principal of Boardexpert.com Inc

Le délicat problème de la rétribution des dirigeants d’OBNL ! | En rappel

L’expérience de la gestion des OBNL nous apprend que les entrepreneurs-propriétaires-fondateurs de ces organisations vivent souvent des aventures d’affaires formidables parce qu’ils sont animés par un feu sacré et une passion hors du commun. C’est souvent ce qui fait que certaines entreprises de l’économie sociale sortent de l’ombre !

Ainsi, suite à la mise sur pied de l’organisme à but non lucratif, les premiers dirigeants doivent s’impliquer activement dans la gestion quotidienne de l’entreprise; ils investissent beaucoup de temps – bénévolement – tout en occupant aussi un autre emploi.

Après plusieurs années de dévouement, de développement d’affaires tangible, de notoriété accrue et de succès répétés, souvent après des décennies d’efforts…, les gestionnaires bénévoles deviennent surchargés. L’entreprise doit se professionnaliser…

Toutes les organisations vivent ces grandes mutations, souvent déchirantes mais indispensables pour assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise.

Les leaders bénévoles doivent alors s’entourer de ressources additionnelles : administration générale, opérations, ventes, finances et comptabilité, recherche de commandites et de subventions, communications publiques, etc.

Ces nouvelles ressources, bien qu’ayant l’entreprise à cœur, ne sont pas animés de la même passion; en conséquence, l’organisation doit les rémunérer. Cela crée souvent deux classes : les responsables bénévoles (lesquels se retrouvent généralement au CA) et le personnel rémunéré.

Selon moi, le CA doit prévoir des mécanismes de transition clairs afin que les fondateurs-gestionnaires soient traités avec équité et reconnaissance.

When it comes to attracting and retaining talented leaders, the setting of executive compensation packages has posed continuing challenges to nonprofits since the 1980s. These challenges relate to the professionalization of the sector, the increasing desire to measure and reward success, and the need to retain and promote the most talented managers.

Voici un cas qui illustre pourquoi un CA doit se montrer très clairvoyant dans l’expression de sa gratitude envers les fondateurs bénévoles. Il ne doit pas attendre que les premiers dirigeants s’essoufflent, puis se retirent, pour leur exprimer sa satisfaction sous la forme d’une rétribution financière. On notera qu’il s’agit ici d’une OBNL d’envergure et que le PDG recevait déjà une rémunération significative.

Ce cas, rédigé par Ruth McCambridge et publié dans Nonprofit Quaterly, montre que le conseil d’administration d’une l’OBNL doit éviter de s’embourber dans des questions de rémunération du PDG, surtout lorsque l’organisme est tributaire de fonds publics pour son financement.

Nonprofit Boards Can and Should Avoid this Problem with CEO Compensation

This story is not new. A CEO spends decades providing measurably great leadership for a nonprofit, but no one ever considers ensuring that she is able to retire at the end of all that. So the board plays a little catch-up and makes a lump sum payment, causing a media storm in which scrutiny is focused unkindly on the organization.

So it was with the now-retired CEO of Health Care and Rehabilitation Services. Judith Hayward had been at the organization for 19 years and had built its budget from $8 million to $50 million annually. She was given a $650,000 compensation package when she retired around a year ago. Approximately 85 percent of the organization’s budget comes from taxpayer money.

Even though these kinds of payments may not be illegal and may even be ethical, when they come to light, they almost invariably cause problems for nonprofits—especially those that receive public contracts.

In this case, the board crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s. The executive and finance committees made recommendations and the board approved the payment in 2010. But when the payment was highlighted during a recent audit, the current CEO, George Karabakakis, felt compelled to travel to Montpelier to meet with local legislators to explain.

“It felt to myself, to the board, and to the senior leadership team that it was really important to come out and share the information,” Karabakakis said. “I don’t want legislators, or our staff, or anyone to get half truths or hear about this through the grapevine or the rumor mill. It’s important to put it out clearly and say ‘This is what happened.’”

Hayward’s annual salary when she retired was about $163,000. “Everyone on the board thought she did a tremendous job,” said J. Allen Dougherty, who served as chair of the HCRS board when the retirement package was approved. “She brought the organization out of bankruptcy, developed new programs and everyone who had contact with her, including people from the state, thought she did a magnificent job. She never had a retirement package and the board thought this was a way we could make it up to her.”

The package was originally approved at $450,000, but that was increased to $650,000 in 2013 when it was discovered that Hayward would be immediately taxed for $200,000 once she started to receive the payments.

Unfortunately, this year, for the first time in at least 10 years, HCRS employees did not get a raise, and Karabakakis said staff have been “disappointed, angry and outraged.”

“Some people may see it as excessive,” he said. “If we’re going to provide a deferred compensation package, it’s important that we look at the industry standard, and make sure that we do have a culture of openness and transparency.”

But the staff were unlikely to have been solely concerned about transparency. The other thing a board needs to ensure is that fair retirement benefits extend to all workers. The notion of caring only about the old age comfort of top employees is, naturally, abhorrent and insulting to many others. It’s no surprise, and in times where income inequality begs for our attention, our organizations should try not to mimic the bad policies of the larger economy.

Karabakakis said the whole incident has caused a review of employment policies, the establishment of a personnel committee, and a “commitment to open and transparent communication with all concerned.”

But all of that after-the-fact work is being done after the horse has left the barn. As reported here, Rep. Michael Mrowicki, who serves on the Human Services Committee, says he will bring up the possible oversight of executive compensation in the legislature. “These payments seem to have been structured in a way that they are legal, but they don’t really pass the smell test,” he said. “We are trying to figure out our next step.”

“Mainly we want to make sure this doesn’t happen again,” he said. “We wouldn’t want to set a precedent for other people to think they deserve more than they have been paid. The staff at these agencies work incredibly hard, and you don’t have to go very far to find people who are being denied services because they are told there is not enough money. These state agencies are entrusted with public money and the taxpayers deserve to be protected. It is frustrating and disappointing on a very basic level.”

The fact is that many nonprofits do not attend to retirement packages adequately until doing what feels fair on one level may look unreasonable to others. With as many baby boomers as there are in leadership at nonprofits, it is well past time to consider these issues.

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur | En rappel

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

C’est certainement le document le plus exhaustif que je connaisse eu égard au futur de la gouvernance corporative. Cet article rédigé par Holly J. Gregory* associée et responsable de la gouvernance corporative et de la rémunération des dirigeants de la firme Sidley Austin LLP, a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School (HLS).

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Le délicat problème de la rétribution des dirigeants d’OBNL !

Toutes les organisations vivent ces grandes mutations, souvent déchirantes mais indispensables pour assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise.

Selon moi, le CA doit prévoir des mécanismes de transition clairs afin que les fondateurs-gestionnaires soient traités avec équité et reconnaissance.

When it comes to attracting and retaining talented leaders, the setting of executive compensation packages has posed continuing challenges to nonprofits since the 1980s. These challenges relate to the professionalization of the sector, the increasing desire to measure and reward success, and the need to retain and promote the most talented managers.

Nonprofit Boards Can and Should Avoid this Problem with CEO Compensation

This story is not new. A CEO spends decades providing measurably great leadership for a nonprofit, but no one ever considers ensuring that she is able to retire at the end of all that. So the board plays a little catch-up and makes a lump sum payment, causing a media storm in which scrutiny is focused unkindly on the organization.

So it was with the now-retired CEO of Health Care and Rehabilitation Services. Judith Hayward had been at the organization for 19 years and had built its budget from $8 million to $50 million annually. She was given a $650,000 compensation package when she retired around a year ago. Approximately 85 percent of the organization’s budget comes from taxpayer money.

Even though these kinds of payments may not be illegal and may even be ethical, when they come to light, they almost invariably cause problems for nonprofits—especially those that receive public contracts.

In this case, the board crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s. The executive and finance committees made recommendations and the board approved the payment in 2010. But when the payment was highlighted during a recent audit, the current CEO, George Karabakakis, felt compelled to travel to Montpelier to meet with local legislators to explain.

“It felt to myself, to the board, and to the senior leadership team that it was really important to come out and share the information,” Karabakakis said. “I don’t want legislators, or our staff, or anyone to get half truths or hear about this through the grapevine or the rumor mill. It’s important to put it out clearly and say ‘This is what happened.’”

Hayward’s annual salary when she retired was about $163,000. “Everyone on the board thought she did a tremendous job,” said J. Allen Dougherty, who served as chair of the HCRS board when the retirement package was approved. “She brought the organization out of bankruptcy, developed new programs and everyone who had contact with her, including people from the state, thought she did a magnificent job. She never had a retirement package and the board thought this was a way we could make it up to her.”

The package was originally approved at $450,000, but that was increased to $650,000 in 2013 when it was discovered that Hayward would be immediately taxed for $200,000 once she started to receive the payments.

Unfortunately, this year, for the first time in at least 10 years, HCRS employees did not get a raise, and Karabakakis said staff have been “disappointed, angry and outraged.”

“Some people may see it as excessive,” he said. “If we’re going to provide a deferred compensation package, it’s important that we look at the industry standard, and make sure that we do have a culture of openness and transparency.”

But the staff were unlikely to have been solely concerned about transparency. The other thing a board needs to ensure is that fair retirement benefits extend to all workers. The notion of caring only about the old age comfort of top employees is, naturally, abhorrent and insulting to many others. It’s no surprise, and in times where income inequality begs for our attention, our organizations should try not to mimic the bad policies of the larger economy.

Karabakakis said the whole incident has caused a review of employment policies, the establishment of a personnel committee, and a “commitment to open and transparent communication with all concerned.”

But all of that after-the-fact work is being done after the horse has left the barn. As reported here, Rep. Michael Mrowicki, who serves on the Human Services Committee, says he will bring up the possible oversight of executive compensation in the legislature. “These payments seem to have been structured in a way that they are legal, but they don’t really pass the smell test,” he said. “We are trying to figure out our next step.”

“Mainly we want to make sure this doesn’t happen again,” he said. “We wouldn’t want to set a precedent for other people to think they deserve more than they have been paid. The staff at these agencies work incredibly hard, and you don’t have to go very far to find people who are being denied services because they are told there is not enough money. These state agencies are entrusted with public money and the taxpayers deserve to be protected. It is frustrating and disappointing on a very basic level.”

The fact is that many nonprofits do not attend to retirement packages adequately until doing what feels fair on one level may look unreasonable to others. With as many baby boomers as there are in leadership at nonprofits, it is well past time to consider these issues.

Paula doit prendre une décision très délicate et déterminante au conseil | Cas en gouvernance

Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie McLelland qui aborde un problème relatif à la conduite d’un conseil d’administration de petite entreprise, dans un contexte de conflit d’intérêt et de malversations potentielles. Paula, la nouvelle administratrice doit prendre une décision très délicate !

Le cas présente la situation de manière très claire, puis trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit la nouvelle membre du C.A.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Une décision difficile au conseil : Le cas de Paula

En rappel : Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) propose une formation spécialisée en gouvernance des PME

Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) offre un cours haut de gamme en gouvernance des PME destiné aux chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou sur les comités consultatifs de PME. Cette formation, offerte les 24 et 25 février prochains à Montréal, a pour objectifs de :

Réfléchir et échanger entre chefs d’entreprise, haut-dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs de PME sur les pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour ce type d’entreprise.

Poser un regard réaliste sur la gouvernance actuelle et future des PME.

Outiller les participants afin de faciliter les transformations nécessaires à la pérennité et/ou la croissance des PME les concernant.

Gouvernance des PME

Voici un aperçu des thèmes abordés :

La gouvernance dans les PME : une mise en contexte
La question du partage des responsabilités
Les intérêts et les défis personnels du chef d’entreprise lors de l’arrivée de tiers
Le comité consultatif ou le conseil d’administration : vers les meilleures pratiques
Les avantages et inconvénients perçus par les différentes parties prenantes des mécanismes de gouvernance
La famille et l’entreprise
Le rôle du capital de risque dans les PME
L’évaluation financière d’une PME, un défi pour le partenariat
La planification stratégique au sein des PME
Une gouvernance créatrice de valeur chez Marquis Imprimeur
Et maintenant, je fais quoi demain?

Plus d’information sur le site du CAS : Formations spécialisées du CAS.

Bonne lecture !

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Cinq questions qu’un administrateur devrait considérer lors d’une décision d’octroi de contrat

Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un billet soumis par Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A,, gestionnaire de projet et membre de CA d’OBNL.

Son article rappelle les questions qu’un administrateur de sociétés doit se poser lorsqu’il est confronté à une décision d’octroi de contrat.

Bonne lecture !

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces cinq questions classiques sont encore le meilleur moyen pour s’assurer d’agir avec la plus grande intégrité et la plus grande transparence possible.

Chaque membre d’un conseil d’administration doit se poser les questions suivantes avant de prendre une décision relative à l’octroi d’un contrat majeur :

Les règles d’attribution des contrats sont-elles claires et bien comprises au sein de l’organisation ? C’est le rôle du conseil de s’en assurer auprès de la direction ;
Les règles ont-elles été respectées ? Y-a-t-il apparence de conflits d’intérêts ? En d’autres termes, peut-on déceler une quelconque apparence de favoritisme, d’amis impliqués, de relations d’affaires douteuses ou autres ;
Y-a-t-il eu assez de transparence dans les règles d’attribution des contrats ? En d’autres termes, les soumissionnaires ont-ils reçus les mêmes informations et les règles ont-elles été suivies de façon juste et équitable ? Dans ce contexte, il est souhaitable d’exiger un minimum de soumissionnaires ;
Les entreprises soumissionnaires et les partenaires possèdent-ils et appliquent-ils un code d’éthique à l’interne et dans leurs relations d’affaires ? Leur réputation en matière d’intégrité est-elle irréprochable ?
Toutes les déclarations pertinentes à la prise de décision ont-elles été faites par la direction ? Ainsi, on s’assure que le gestionnaire qui fait la présentation au CA fait preuve d’abnégation et demeure le plus impartial possible en ce qui regarde l’intérêt et la mission de l’organisation.

_______________________________________

On peut consulter son profil sur LinkedIn ca.linkedin.com/pub/pascale-lapointe-mba-pmp/18/b66/b35

Partagez (share) ce post

The Combinations that Increase CEO Pay

The Combinations that Reduce Inequality

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Vers une gouvernance créatrice de confiance ?

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

INDUSTRIE

MAJORITAIRE

FAMILLES

PHILANTHROPIE

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

GOUVERNANCE

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

LONG TERME

TROISIÈME VOIE

EFFICACITÉ

*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

Partagez (share) ce post

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

Effective Governance

Strong Financial Oversight

Responsible Fundraising

Partagez (share) ce post

Here are my fifteen rules :

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Partagez (share) ce post

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

Partagez (share) ce post