Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Richard Leblanc* publié dans The Globe and Mail.
Dans cet article, Richard montre que la dynamique comportementale de l’équipe des administrateurs est souvent la clé du succès des entreprises. Souvent la composition de l’équipe est remarquable, mais si un seul membre est dysfonctionnel, « toxique » ou incompétent, il arrive que toute l’efficacité du conseil en souffre.
Dans ces cas, il faut s’assurer que le processus d’évaluation des administrateurs soit capable de déceler les maillons faibles du conseil et, surtout, d’agir résolument pour régler le problème.
Il revient au président du conseil, sur recommandation du comité de gouvernance, de prendre les décisions menant à la non-reconduction du mandat de l’administrateur qui nuit à la dynamique de groupe.
Il faut donc revoir la démarche d’évaluation des membres du CA, souvent avec une firme externe, afin de déceler les problèmes de dynamique d’équipe. À ce stade-ci, il faut noter que les processus de recrutement de nouveaux administrateurs ne font pas suffisamment de place aux critères de nature comportementale.
Également, lorsqu’il devient évident qu’un administrateur est « toxique » pour le travail d’équipe du conseil, le président doit prendre les devants et engager une démarche de correction. Mais plusieurs présidents de CA n’osent pas se compromettre !
Souvent le problème est connu, et reconnu, mais le président laisse porter, au détriment de l’efficacité du travail de groupe. Dans ce cas, c’est le poste de président qui devient en jeu puisque son rôle est de s’assurer que le CA fonctionne harmonieusement et avec respect, tout en favorisant la liberté d’expression.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article en question. Si vous avez des suggestions pour mettre un terme à ces comportements déviants, ou si vous avez des exemples à partager avec nos lecteurs, n’hésitez pas à commenter ce billet.
An effective board is the last line of defense for shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. This small but mighty peer group is responsible for overseeing the management of an organization, so if one thing is flawed – if just one director’s behaviour is disruptive or toxic – it can be the difference between performance and non-performance throughout the entire organization. Poor dynamics have that kind of ripple effect, unfortunately.
A bad board member can derail your board of directors. (iStockphoto)
As an external adviser and specialist in corporate governance and accountability, my work has allowed me to study and evaluate boards, investors and directors across all sectors, including health care.
I’ve never investigated a board failure where flawed dynamics was not a major contributor, which is why I know for a fact that great boards don’t just “happen.” They are carefully and critically designed to be functionally sound. They have to be. A board is just too important an entity to rely on crossed fingers and wishful thinking.
When it comes to toxic behaviours that can bring down a board, I’ve pretty much seen it all. Excessive power, over-reliance on one person, dominant managers, lack of integrity and trustworthiness, confidentiality breaches, lack of transparency and accountability, lack of meeting preparation, undermining board decisions, poor information flow management – these are all warning signs that need to be addressed immediately. But perhaps the biggest red flag is the dysfunctional director and the underperforming director.
I’ve seen dissention amongst the ranks on some of the most iconic boards in Canada. In one instance, there was a director who was so toxic that the board had been consumed by theatrics for nearly a year. When I spoke to the other directors, almost all of them wanted the bullying to stop, but no one had the courage to pull the trigger. Even the chair of the board was too weak to take action. Ultimately, my recommendation was to replace both of them in order to settle things down and get the board back on track.
People are often surprised to hear that the best thing you can do to begin to heal divisions and repair a broken board is to let someone go. But in many cases that’s the only way to start the mending process. It’s not easy to unwind chronic dysfunction on a board – it takes a strong chair or third-party supervision – but getting rid of the root cause is the best way to start. The key is handling the dismissal respectfully and diplomatically.
I once conducted a peer review for the board of an important and highly regulated company. If the board of this particular company makes a mistake, people can die, so it was critical for them to get it right. Every time.
During the review process, I noticed that one director rated another last on almost every single performance dimension. When questioned, the director proceeded to tell me, category by category, why he had rated his peer so poorly – even though others had given that same director exemplary ratings. It eventually became clear that he despised the director he had critiqued so harshly. There was simply no way to repair this enmity, and it had no place on this – or any – board. My recommendation was to remove the hostile director. And that’s exactly what happened.
Board members need to be proactive when they sense there is trouble brewing. The one regret directors repeatedly express is not speaking up and calling out toxic behaviours until it was too late. Letting it fester only makes the situation worse for everyone involved, especially the company.
But of course the best way to create a functional, healthy board is to avoid dysfunction from the start. Nominating committees need to spend more time at the front end recruiting directors, and on the back end retiring them. And they need to do it on the basis of expected and actual performance.
Unfortunately, most competency matrices don’t include behaviour, and all directors have “warts.” Nominating committees must do their due diligence, and that includes a proper competency matrix, the creation of long lists and short lists, interviews, background checks, and making sure to bring on directors who are not friends or known to current directors. A strong and experienced chair at the helm who can appreciate the value of a diverse board and make difficult decisions when necessary is another must-have.
An effective board doesn’t happen by accident. Spend time and effort designing yours by recruiting independent thinkers who can leave their egos at the door, ask the tough questions, give the right advice – and do it all with a smile. Let the notion of, “iron hand in a velvet glove,” be your yardstick as you create your dream team.
*Dr. Richard Leblanc (@DrRLeblanc) is an associate professor of law, governance and ethics at York University (@yorkuniversity) and principal of Boardexpert.com Inc
Voici une infographie réalisée par Pixelis, directement inspirée de la publication « le cercle – LES ECHOS« . Comme vous le savez, les infographies sont d’excellents moyens pour mieux communiquer et mieux faire passer les messages.
Dans ce cas-ci, il s’agit d’illustrer douze raisons qui devraient inciter les entreprises à mettre en œuvre des actions qui favoriseront la responsabilité sociale.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) offre un cours haut de gamme en gouvernance des PME destiné aux chefs d’entreprise, hauts dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs appelés à siéger sur les conseils d’administration ou sur les comités consultatifs de PME. Cette formation, offerte les 24 et 25 février prochains à Montréal, a pour objectifs de :
Réfléchir et échanger entre chefs d’entreprise, haut-dirigeants, investisseurs et administrateurs de PME sur les pratiques de gouvernance les mieux adaptées et les plus efficaces pour ce type d’entreprise.
Poser un regard réaliste sur la gouvernance actuelle et future des PME.
Outiller les participants afin de faciliter les transformations nécessaires à la pérennité et/ou la croissance des PME les concernant.
Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous une belle histoire de succession d’une entreprise familiale mondialement connue : Heineken.
Ce cas d’entreprise m’a été proposé par Paul Michaud, un administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC), une personne expérimentée dans les situations de transferts d’entreprises familiales.
Comme Paul le mentionne : « C’est un cas intéressant ! Le bonhomme est un hybride entre un entrepreneur et un CEO, la fille entre la mère-au-foyer et CEO ».
Je vous invite donc à lire ce cas de relève d’entreprise familiale publié par Patricia Sellers dans Fortune.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques certaines conclusions tirées du cas. C’est une belle lecture du temps des Fêtes !
For anyone who oversees a family business, passing it on to the next generation is the ultimate challenge of leadership. “If we get that wrong, we’ve wasted our energy on all that we’ve built,” says Michel de Carvalho, the investment banker husband of Charlene Heineken.
The de Carvalho family (from left): Alexander, Michel, Charlene, Louisa, Charles, Sophie, and Isabel
Heineken has a stock market value of $44 billion, and Charlene aims to pass on her 25% ownership stake and control of the voting shares more prudently than her father, Freddy Heineken, did to her. So she and Michel have been diligently studying the best practices of passing on a family business. No matter the size of a dynasty, certain basic rules apply.
CHOOSE ONE.
Other billionaire owners of family businesses have advised the de Carvalhos, regardless of how they divvy up the wealth, to select one of their five children to take control of the company. “But Charlene and I are not yet convinced that we could not have an odd number, perhaps three,” admits Michel, noting that ownership may be a lonely job for one heir. “Had Charlene not been married to someone who has a strong interest in the business, it would have been a terrible burden.”
TEST THE CHILDREN.
Don’t trap them,” says Byron Trott, a former Goldman Sachs banker whose merchant bank, BDT & Co., invests in and advises closely held companies. “Allow them to find their passion.” Trott admires the way the de Carvalhos are getting their five children to define their interests, whether philanthropic, arts-related, or corporate. Meanwhile, they’re preparing eldest son Alexander, who works in private equity, to inherit control of Heineken. “He’s on the board. He’s working in the financial industry,” notes Trott. “He understands the rigor of opting in.”
PICK STRONG ADVISERS.
Freddy Heineken stocked his board with yes men, which weakened the company before -Charlene inherited control in 2002. Charlene and Michel’s advice to Alexander or whoever among their children eventually takes control: “Surround yourself with the best possible people who are not yes men and sycophants. You want people who express doubt.”
HOLD ON.
Family control of a business protects management from “the short-term whims of Wall Street,” enabling it to focus on long-term growth, says Trott. “These companies tend to outperform the market over long periods of time.” Trott advises the de Carvalhos: “Keep doing what you’re doing, because you’re doing it very well.” —P.S.
Le Dr Eugene Fram a récemment publié un article pertinent qui fait l’apologie des OBNL, lesquelles doivent accomplir leurs missions en dépit de conditions sous-optimales.
L’article expose une série de caractéristiques des OBNL qui, trop souvent, contribuent à sous-estimer leur œuvre et qui teintent les perceptions du public envers celles-ci.
Parmi les particularités inhérentes à plusieurs OBNL, on retrouve souvent des éléments qui servent à justifier des lacunes de gouvernance; ces indices de dysfonction influent sur la perception des donateurs éventuels :
La plupart des organisations sont de très petites tailles;
Le défi de la gestion des bénévoles est très grand;
Les locaux et les équipements sont souvent peu attrayants;
Les relations entre le CA et la direction sont perçues comme immatures;
Les parties prenantes, notamment les donateurs, sont souvent mal informés de la distribution aux bénéficiaires, contribuant ainsi à créer l’impression qu’ils sont à la merci de la direction;
Les relations avec le CA sont souvent inhabituelles … en ce sens que les administrateurs ont tendance à s’immiscer régulièrement dans les activités des gestionnaires.
L’article tente de décrire ce qui peut être fait pour contrer ces perceptions.
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum 1071 Fifth Avenue (at 89th Street) New York, NY
Judging from the vast literature on dysfunctional nonprofit boards and organizations (my own posts included!) one might conclude that the majority of nonprofits are struggling, incompetent and/or in crisis. I argue that this is not the case. Decades of experience lead me to believe that nonprofits have the same functional variables as profit making organizations—dysfunctional at times like Target or GM; efficient like Apple or Whole Foods; adaptable like Del Monte and Cisco. Everybody doesn’t get it right all the time.
Perceptions become reality to those who are quick to embrace popular labels such as the overused term, “dysfunctional.” Obviously, in the case of nonprofits, such perceptions are harmful. Once evaluated in this way the stigma persists and can seriously reduce the level of support that is so critical to the work of these organizations.
What characteristics color these perceptions?
• Small Organizations: About one-third of the charitable nonprofits have gross receipts under $25,000 a year. At that level the vast majority can’t employ more than one full-time person, overworking those with job responsibilities that can’t be delegated. While small organization can’t do much to improve the misperceptions about nonprofit dysfunctions, more mature ones can take deliberate steps over time.
• The Volunteer Challenge: A large cadre of board and operational volunteers take time to assist struggling charities, which give the organizations appearances of nonprofit always being on the edge or existence. Many outsiders are unaware that those on management and staff are highly competent people who accept this employment condition because they know how their work can positively impact the lives of clients.
• Facilities: Nonprofit facilities are often second rate and appear highly dysfunctional. Client needs, not facilities, are primary to the board, management and staff.
• Board Relationships: Many relationships between the board and management can be similar to that of a “parent-child” one. In the words of one nonprofit director, “We tell the executive director exactly what to do.”
• Stakeholders: They often do not appreciate the tremendous impacts that the staff can have. Example: Donors often don’t have contact with those who directly benefit.
• Board Dysfunctions: A root cause of the perception may be due to a dysfunctional board trying to resolve internal conflicts, and there is little the management and staff can do about it. Valiant managements and staffs can sometimes achieve productive impacts without board support.
What can be done?
Competency & Relationships: I have encountered many CEOs who have more management expertise than many of their board members who are professors, accountants or physician, etc. While I appreciated that dealing with volunteer directors may involve working with some persons with outsized egos, the CEO must strive to portray himself as a competent manager. The positive outcome is that the CEO is viewed as a peer working with the board, not under the board.
Many staff persons figuratively stand ten feet tall for what they accomplish on behalf of clients.. The CEO has an obligation to make sure that the stories about outstanding staff personnel are well acknowledged, so that stakeholders know about them. This takes more then simple public relations events. It involves highlighting and rewarding those who are highly productive.
Facilities: I understand the tradeoff between expenditures for facilities versus expenditures for clients. Having first class facilities may even hinder achieving a mission if donors perceive their donations are being used for plush facilities. At the least, the nonprofit needs to have an uncluttered area for board meetings and events with outside stakeholders.
Implications: Many suggest that a nonprofit organization being perceived as dysfunctional is not an important issue, as long as mission objectives and impacts are achieved. I argue that more resources for clients could be developed if the perception is not a diminished one. Some can equate dysfunction with being inefficient. In addition, a positive perception might make it easier to attract more qualified board members, management and staff.
Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.
À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?
L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, … avant la stratégie !
Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :
(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?
(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?
If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with. We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.
Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !
Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?
Consider the following; you are driving a boat. You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south. In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture. They are not in synch. No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win. That is what Drucker meant.
Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not. This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.
Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.
Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures. We all know the ones in these listings. They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers. All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services. No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.
We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first. What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy. It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture. What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.
…..
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* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris. He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management. He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un excellent article de John C. Wilcox*, président de Sodali, paru dans The Conference Board Governance Center Blog, sur la problématique de l’engagement des administrateurs avec leur actionnaires. Un sujet hautement d’actualité …
L’auteur affirme que la transparenceest la clé de voute d’une bonne relation entre la direction et les actionnaires activistes. Selon lui, l’engagement est une mesure plutôt réactive parce ce que ce processus de communication avec les actionnaires n’établit pas une base solide à long terme ayant pour effet de prévenir l’activisme.
L’auteur propose plusieurs moyens très utiles pour rendre une organisation plus transparente et plus proactive dans ses communications avec ses actionnaires et avec les parties prenantes.
Une approche misant sur la valeur de la transparence est nécessaire pour assurer une bonne gouvernance. L’article évoque plusieurs moyens concrets pour y arriver en commençant par la clarification des rôles des administrateurs et l’établissement de la nette distinction à faire entre les tâches du CA et celles du management.
Voici les tâches qui relèvent de la responsabilité du conseil d’administration :
« Long-term strategy, company values, culture and “tone at the top”;
Oversight of management and long-term performance;
Accounting principles and the audit process;
Policies relating to ESG and sustainability;
Director nomination, selection and competence;
CEO succession planning;
Board evaluation;
Executive and board compensation;
Risk oversight;
Ethics, conflicts of interest and related-party transactions;
Non-financial performance goals and metrics;
Engagement and communication with shareholders and other constituents »
En fait, le CA doit avoir une voix clairement indépendante de la direction … et se doter des moyens pour l’exprimer.
Je vous invite à lire l’extrait ci-dessous qui résume bien la problématique abordée et à prendre connaissance de l’article qui suggère des moyens concrets pour accroître la transparence.
To demonstrate their effectiveness, corporate boards should increase transparency, provide an annual report of boardroom activities and take charge of their relations with shareholders.
With shareholders continuing to press for ever-deepening levels of engagement, companies must find a way to answer the most basic question of corporate governance: “How effective is the board of directors?” It is a question that can only be answered by the board itself, but it presents directors with a challenge as well as an opportunity. The challenge is to overcome the mindset, habits and perceived risks that have long kept boardroom activities under wraps. The opportunity, on the other hand, is to define governance and strategic issues from the board’s perspective, manage shareholder expectations, take the engagement initiative away from shareholders and reduce the likelihood of activism. Directors should give careful consideration to this opportunity. Over the long term, it will be far better for companies to control the process by which board transparency is achieved rather than waiting for yet again another set of governance reforms that could further erode the board’s authority.
Despite widespread support for board primacy and the board-centric governance model, boardroom transparency and director-shareholder relations are not a priority at most companies. A recent DealBook column in the New York Times described the situation as follows:
“What if lawmakers never spoke to their constituents? Oddly enough, that’s exactly how corporate America operates. Shareholders vote for directors, but the directors rarely, if ever, communicate with them.”
The problem is not limited to corporate America. Opaque boardrooms are a global phenomenon, particularly common in markets where companies are dominated by founding families, control groups, or the state.
The column concludes:
“…[S]ome form of engagement with shareholders – rather than directors simply taking their cues from management – would go a long way toward helping boards work on behalf of all shareholders…”
[Andrew Ross Sorkin, The New York Times, July 21, 2014]
Cues from management are not the only concern. In many global markets the board’s role is broadly defined, requiring directors to balance the competing demands of insiders, resolve conflicts of interest, deal with related-party transactions and juggle competing business and public policy goals in addition to their basic oversight duties. In these markets the need for transparency is even more compelling than in highly regulated markets, such as the UK, the European Union and the USA, where comprehensive legal, disclosure and accounting standards are well established.
Boards are under pressure…
Pressure for greater board transparency and more open communication continues to come from the usual suspects: activist investment funds, hedge funds with a range of long and short-term investment strategies, governance reform professionals, NGOs, shareholder advocacy groups, trade unions, individual shareholder activists, special interest proponents and other adversaries. Proxy advisory firms compound the pressure by providing a global audience for these disputes. When issues of policy are involved, the media and politicians often step in to further amplify the pressure on companies.
Companies have fought defensive rearguard actions against activism, occasionally prevailing in specific campaigns, but ultimately they have had to concede defeat on most policy disputes relating to governance and board accountability. The decade-long evolution of the say-on-pay vote exemplifies this pattern of opposition and retreat.
Despite the chain of losses, the high-volume debate between companies and shareholders about the merits of governance reform continues today: Are corporate governance standards good or bad for companies? Does shareholder activism produce value or destroy value? Should shareholders have more power or less? Are directors sufficiently independent or not? Should corporate governance be director-centric or shareholder-centric? Is chronic short-termism the fault of greedy shareholders, or greedy CEOs, or weak boards, or does it represent the inevitable decline of free-market capitalism, or all of the above? The list of questions goes on and on. The debate has not lessened in intensity, but it has not resolved the questions either. The few answers that have been provided remain largely determined by research methodologies, policy perspectives or the merits of individual cases. The real answer to most of the big questions seems inevitably to be “It depends…”
As 2015 approaches, it remains unclear how much the debate really matters or whether answers to these questions would be helpful to businesses and investors. For individual companies, the answer would seem to be No.
…but institutional investors are under pressure, too.
Today’s governance and regulatory environment is changing rapidly for shareholders and the investment community as well as for companies. In the extended wake of the financial crisis, institutional investors remain under the regulatory microscope. They can no longer claim privileged status or remain exempt from the governance and accountability standards they impose on portfolio companies.
Stewardship codes and new laws in several major markets now require institutional investors to intensify their oversight of portfolio companies and disclose publicly their governance policies, voting practices and engagement activities. These requirements have further led to the development of new means of collective institutional engagement through organizations such as the UK Investors Forum.
Proxy advisory firms, themselves under regulatory and industry pressure to provide less standardized governance reviews as well as more information about the integrity of their research and vote recommendations, are relying much less on their traditional check lists of governance externalities. In response to client demand, they are digging for more detailed information about board effectiveness at individual companies.
The financial crisis awakened the investment community and the general public to the failures that resulted from overreliance on quantitative analysis to evaluate companies’ performance and risk. In response to new rules, institutional investors are now beginning to include intangibles and non-financial performance metrics in their analytical models. This wider lens embraces corporate governance, environmental practices, social policies, ethics, culture, reputation and other non-quantitative elements that are predictive of long-term performance. The terms “ESG” (Environmental, Social, Governance) and “sustainability” have become a form of shorthand for defining this new way of looking holistically at business enterprises. A recently issued Directive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by the EU Council puts the legal imprimatur on this broader set of data.
The enlarged analytical framework has important implications for companies — and specifically for boards of directors. Responsibility for ESG and sustainability falls squarely on the board. The directors, rather than management, are deemed by shareholders to be answerable for ESG and sustainability.
Investor focus on non-financial criteria is producing some interesting results. In the U.S., the Council of Institutional Investors and its members have taken an approach that involves a carrot rather than a stick. CII has begun publishing periodic reports, based on member surveys and feedback, identifying companies whose disclosure practices exemplify best practice. A February 2014 CII report named six U.S. companies — Coca-Cola, GE, Pfizer, Prudential Financial, Microsoft and Walt Disney — as examples of excellence in disclosure of director qualifications and skills. In September 2014 CII published an additional report on board evaluation practices, citing GE (USA), Potash, Agrium (both Canadian companies), BHP Billiton (Australia), Dunelm (UK) and Randstad Holdings (Netherlands) as examples of excellence. According to deputy director Amy Borrus, CII plans to continue publishing reports on issues deemed important for its members to evaluate board effectiveness.
……
CONCLUSION
Although global corporate governance standards continue to uphold the director-centric model, information about board effectiveness remains fragmentary and inconsistent. Both companies and shareholders would benefit from an annual board narrative and a structured program for directors to communicate and engage with shareholders.
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*John C. Wilcox is Chairman of Sodali Ltd, a global consultancy providing companies and boards with services relating to corporate governance, shareholder relations, corporate actions and the capital markets. From 2005 to 2008 he served as Senior Vice President and Head of Corporate Governance at TIAA-CREF, one of the world’s largest private pension systems. Prior to joining TIAA-CREF he was chairman of Georgeson & Company, the U.S. proxy and investor relations.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un entretien mené par Patrick Amoux auprès d’Agnès Touraine, présidente de l’Institut Français des Administrateurs (IFA), publié dans le nouvel Economiste.fr, qui fait un excellent bilan de la gouvernance en France depuis 10 ans.
Les actionnaires peuvent lui dire merci … Si leurs représentants dans les conseils d’administrations se sont vigoureusement professionnalisés pour défendre leurs intérêts, se mettant ni plus ni moins aux standards anglo-saxons et aux normes de gouvernance moderne démodant les si fameux petits arrangement entre « chers amis » c’est à l’Institut Français des administrateurs, à Daniel Lebègue qui l’a créé, à Agnès Touraine qui le préside désormais. Une autre époque pour ces instance de pilotage de la stratégie des entreprises qui justifie quelques sérieuses remises en cause compte tenu de la consanguinité chronique des vieux modèles.
Diversité, internationalisation, transparence, éthique, formation, professionnalisme….sur tous les fronts, il faut batailler, convaincre, décider afin que l’autorégulation évite le couperet de la loi. Agnès Touraine est donc aux avants postes de tous ces combats. La méthode douce n’exclut pas la détermination. « Un projet nous tient vraiment à cœur, le lien entre la qualité de la gouvernance et la compétitivité. Il faut que les organes de gouvernance soient vus comme des apports de valeurs ajoutées. » Cela suppose la qualité des compétences composant les conseils. L’un des plus vastes chantiers de la présidente de l’IFA.
En 10 ans, Daniel Lebègue a fait un travail remarquable en travaillant à cette révolution de la gouvernance des entreprises en France. Il y a 15 ans, la gouvernance était quelque chose qui n’existait pas. Avec l’évolution des lois, des règlements, et le code Afep-Medef de 2013 qui s’est mis en place, c’est probablement l’un des domaines où il se produit une vraie révolution par rapport au comportement des administrateurs d’autrefois. Elle se concrétise notamment par l’instauration des comités. Il y a 15 ans, il n’y avait ni comité d’audit, ni comité de rémunération, ni comité de nomination. Aujourd’hui, il n’y a pas de groupe coté où il n’y ait pas un comité d’audit, bien sûr, et un comité de rémunération, de nomination.
Si vous souhaitez connaître la réalité française eu égard à la gouvernance, je vous conseille de lire cet article. Voici les sujets abordés dans cet entretien :
L’apport de compétences
L’entrée des femmes aux conseils d’administration
Le déficit d’administrateurs étrangers
Gouvernance et compétitivité
La dissociation président/directeur général
Les administrateurs indépendants
Les rémunérations des patrons
Les salariés administrateurs
Le défi numérique
Les conseils des ETI et des start-up
L’évaluation des conseils d’administration
La maison des administrateurs
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Les chiffres clés des conseils d’administration
Part des femmes (2014) :
-29 % pour le CAC40 (19 % en 2012)
-26 % au sein du SBF120 (15 % en 2012)
Administrateurs étrangers (2014) :
-30 % au sein du CAC40 (23 % en 2012)
-22 % au sein du SBF120 (13 % en 2012)
Source : Étude Ernst & Young et Labrador
Dissociation des fonctions :
-14 % des sociétés du CAC40 dissocient président du conseil et direction générale
-21 % des sociétés du SBF120
-11 % des sociétés du CAC40 ont une structure conseil de surveillance/directoire
-16 % du SBF120 ont opté pour ce mode de gouvernance
Source : Rapport du Haut Comité de gouvernement d’entreprise
Le Say on Pay :
> 90% d’approbation aux AG 2014 du SBF120
Nombre d’administrateurs du marché Euronext Paris :
1/ Cote parisienne : 966 émetteurs
7 045 administrateurs, dont 795 indépendants (11,3 %) et 1 316 femmes (18,7 %).
Moyenne de 7,3 administrateurs par émetteur.
2/ CAC 40 : 587 administrateurs dont 204 indépendants (34,7 %) et 172 femmes (29,3 %).
Moyenne de 14,7 administrateurs par émetteur.
*Bio express de Agnès Touraine, l’administrateure internationale
Sciences-Po, un MBA à Columbia, puis des débuts chez McKinsey… du classique haut de gamme, version délibérément grand large, pour l’entrée dans une vie professionnelle qui va mener Agnès Touraine chez Hachette. Membre du comité exécutif puis directrice de la branche grande diffusion du groupe Livre Hachette, avant de prendre la présidence de la filiale multimédia de CEP Communication, devenue Havas Interactive, elle devient ensuite directrice générale déléguée et membre du comité exécutif de Vivendi Universal Publishing du temps de Jean-Marie Messier et des grandes acquisitions américaines. Cette passionnée de nouvelles technologies crée ensuite la société de conseil en management Act III Consultants, puis une structure dédiée aux jeux vidéo, Act III Gaming. Administratrice de nombreuses sociétés (Neopost, ITV, Coridis, Playcast Media) et de l’Institut Français des administrateurs, dont elle a pris la présidence cette année.
Voici un cas qui intéressera certainement tous les administrateurs qui siègent sur des CA d’entreprises familiales.
Comment un nouveau PDG (PCD), fils du propriétaire-fondateur, doit-il s’y prendre pour convaincre un CA formé d’administrateurs nommés par le père, lui-même maintenant président du conseil, du bien-fondé d’une décision audacieuse qui engage l’avenir de la société ?
Prenez connaissance du cas ci-dessous et consultez les avis émis par les trois experts en gouvernance retenus.
Nils is the managing director of his family business, a position he was promoted into when his father, the company founder, became chairman of the board. He was previously the marketing director. The company manufactures a wide range of food products from its base south west of Sydney. These are mostly sold under home brand packaging to large retail chains and a distribution company.
The other directors on the board are all longstanding advisors to his father and, as his father says, have kept the company from making many potentially costly mistakes, by providing prudent advice over the years.
Nils has conducted research and identified what he thinks is a great opportunity for the company to manufacture a branded product which it would initially sell through specialty stores and chemists to establish the brand before offering to the major supermarket chains. He is confident that the project can be funded from cash-flow and will not cannibalise the existing business. The bank has offered to increase the company’s line of credit to allow for working capital increases and possible cash flow timing issues.
Nils developed a proposal for the board and eagerly presented this under the title ‘new opportunity’ at the recent strategy retreat attended by the board and management. The board were horrified. They could only see risk in entering new distribution chains, possibly competing with their current customers, and investing in developing a branded product. Nils sees those risks and believes he has a strategy to counter them.
How can Nils encourage his board to be more innovative?
Ce matin, je vous propose une réflexion basée sur une discussion parue dans le groupe Board of Directors Society de LinkedIn.
Les propos sont publiés par Kimiharu (Kim) Chatani, Directeur-Conseil chez KPMG; ils mettent en lumière l’importance, pour le conseil d’administration et le management, de se doter d’un plan d’affaires qui prend en compte les activités reliées au développement durable.
Les commentaires font ressortir le caractère irréversible des activités de surveillance amorcées par les CA ainsi que la sensibilité accrue des grandes entreprises américaines à l’égard de la gouvernance à long terme, laquelle est beaucoup plus axée sur les besoins des diverses parties prenantes et sur l’analyse en profondeur des grands changements sociaux.
L’auteur souligne que 95 % des 250 plus grandes entreprises mondiales divulguent des rapports de développement durable (sustainability reports).
Bonne lecture !
Oversight of Corporate Sustainability Activities
Value creation, long-term business resiliency, strategic risk management, and stewardship represent the essence of the board’s role in overseeing corporate sustainability activities. Sustainability oversight is increasingly becoming a board-level issue for several reasons.
First and most fundamentally, boards are meant to safeguard the assets of the companies they serve, and one of the trickiest “assets” to understand, let alone protect, is the company’s social license to operate.
Second, the ways in which a company affects, and is affected by, global mega-trends such as population growth, an expanding urban middle class in emerging markets, demographic change, resource scarcity, climate change, and transformative technologies —all of which fall under the rubric of sustainability issues — are often at the core of board-management discussions about strategy, risk, and performance.
Thus, understanding how a company executes its business model within a changing operating context, and with an eye toward long-term profitability, is squarely a board issue and a director’s responsibility.
The Current State of Sustainability Governance
Many companies still see sustainability as a set of “softer” issues that can be relegated to marketing or public relations departments. The links between environmental and social issues, core business operations, and corporate reputation are becoming increasingly material, however.
On one recent survey, the number of companies reporting that their sustainability activities contributed to profits rose by 23 percent year over year, and nearly half of the respondents reported changing their business models in response to sustainability-related opportunities.
Companies are highlighting their place on global sustainability indices including the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good, and Corporate Knights’ Global 100, which saw 31 new honorees in 2014.
Ninety-five percent of the world’s 250 largest companies, and 86 percent of the largest U.S. companies, produce sustainability reports.
Shareholder interest is growing: nearly half of shareholder proposal submissions in 2014 related to environmental and social matters.
According to one report, companies that fail to connect their sustainability activities to financial and operational performance are missing out on potential opportunities to better understand how sustainability can identify and reduce risk and boost returns. As David Kiron, executive editor of MIT Sloan Management Review, put it, leading-edge companies “don’t dwell on [sustainability] as a cost issue. They focus on how their efforts can increase market share, boost energy efficiency, and build competitive advantage.”
Despite these trends, the extent of board-level oversight of sustainability issues varies considerably. Studies from organizations such as the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) and Ceres show that a notable and growing proportion of large, publicly traded companies have explicit, board-level oversight of sustainability and corporate responsibility activities: indeed, they are three times more likely than smaller companies to have board oversight of environmental and/or social issues.
But the overarching message of the IRRCi and Ceres reports, as well as similar studies, is that there is considerable room for improvement. At many companies, the level of board-level oversight of environmental and social sustainability activities is not consistent with the link between these activities and the firm’s strategic imperatives, or with the attention that key stakeholders are placing on the underlying issues.
Récemment, le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) a répondu à la demande de l’organisme « ecoDa » (The European Confederation of Directors Associations) de produire une capsule vidéo de formation sur les tendances en matière de gouvernance de sociétés au Canada et aux États-Unis. Cette vidéo sera présentée par ecoDa à chaque offre de son cours « New Governance Challenges for Board Members in Europe » présentée en classe à Bruxelles en Belgique, siège social de l’ecoDa.
Ce mandat a été réalisé avec succès grâce à la contribution de Gilles Bernier, directeur des programmes du CAS, qui a réuni Mme Alexandra Lajoux, Chief Knowledge Officer de la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) aux États-Unis et M. Chris Bart, Founder and Lead Faculty du Directors College en Ontario.
Intitulé « Where is Corporate Governance Going : The View from Canada and the USA », cette vidéo de formation vise à sensibiliser les participants à l’évolution des pratiques de gouvernance à l’extérieur de l’Europe.
D’une durée de 20 minutes, les experts invités discutent des sujets suivants :
(1) le rôle du CA à l’égard de la stratégie et du risque
(2) la réglementation et les enjeux touchant les investisseurs
(3) les nouvelles tendances en matière de gouvernance des TI et celles touchant la gouvernance des principales sociétés œuvrant dans le secteur technologique
(4) l’importance du talent et de la diversité sur les conseils, ainsi que l’importance de la formation des administrateurs de sociétés.
Le micro-management est certainement un danger qui guette beaucoup d’administrateurs siégeant sur des conseils d’administration, surtout sur des CA d’OBNL.
Le court article publié par Eugene Fram sur son blogue Nonprofit Management montre qu’il y certaines situations de Start-Up qui nécessitent une implication des administrateurs dans la gestion de leur organisation; mais, il n’est pas rare que ce comportement devienne une très mauvaise habitude à plus long terme*.
L’auteur présente les dangers reliés aux comportements des administrateurs qui investissent inconsidérément les rôles de gestionnaires.
Les administrateurs doivent toujours se rappeler qu’ils ont un devoir de fiduciaire envers les actionnaires ou les membres d’une OBNL et qu’ils peuvent difficilement exercer leurs responsabilités s’ils effectuent des tâches de nature managériale.
Cette façon de faire détruit l’initiative des gestionnaires et sape leurs sens des responsabilités.
Micromanaging is a method of management in which an individual closely observes or controls the work of an employee. In comparison to simply giving general direction, the micromanager monitors and evaluates every stage in a process, from beginning to end. This behavior negatively affects efficiency, creativity, trust, communication, problem-solving, and the company’s ability to reach its goals.
The typical micromanager spends their time directing employees rather than empowering them. They are often very insecure. They spend more time with the details of business operations instead of planning the company’s short-term and long-term growth strategies. The fact of the matter is, time DOES equal money. When the designated leader of an organization is wasting time (and therefore money) on overseeing projects instead of focusing on specific growth opportunities, it’s time to reevaluate a few things.
The Need for a Micromanaging Board
Board micromanagement is an appropriate approach when either a nonprofit or for-profit is in a start-up stage. Financial and human resources are modest, and the directors often assume some responsibilities normally executed by compensated staff. The chief executive often has managerial responsibilities as well as a list of low-level operational duties. As extreme examples, I have even seen CEOs install office furniture or install floor tiles.
Long Term Implications
Prolonging these types of activities much after they are needed can imbed micromanagement in the DNA of the organization’s decision-making. Some directors may even obtain ego gratification from continual micromanaging. It can provide more immediate gratifications not found with policy or strategy development. If their mandates fail, they can always quietly blame management for poor implementations. Eventually these failures have an impact on the organization, either by stunting development or causing it to fail. Following are some of the behavioral patterns that become part of the decision-making environment:
Less competent managers are attracted to executive positions – There is a tendency to promote people with good operational records work into key management positions. They may have even taken university courses in management or social dynamics but they fail to realistically implement what they have learned into the dynamics of the real world problems.
Delegating Decisions Upward – Knowing that even small decisions will need to have board review, if not approval, the organization takes no pride in taking initiative, being creative and employing critical thinking. There is also a tendency to shirk responsibility.
More Difficult Recruitment — When the board comes to the conclusion it needs more talented managers, the directors may have trouble understanding why talented recruits reject their offers. Sometimes a talented senior manger may take a position after negotiating an understanding that the micromanaging board will change or modify the way it operates. However changing such an imbedded culture can be difficult and sometimes impossible, if a founder has established a micromanagement environment for the board.
Founders of both nonprofit and for-profit organizations can generate micromanaging boards that last for years beyond their tenures. Succeeding boards can be composed of directors who follow the founders’ management styles and are not capable of excising the unhealthy DNA surging through the organization.
Board micromanagement in either nonprofit or business organizations, when continued beyond a start-up stage, can be can be viewed as an incipient disease. It, at any point, can cause a “heart attack” in the organization.
Vous trouverez, ci-après, un document de l’Institut de l’audit interne (IIA) du Royaume-Uni (UK) partagé par Denis Lefort, expert conseil en gouvernance, audit interne et contrôle, qui porte sur le rôle de l’audit interne sur la culture organisationnelle.
Auditer la culture organisationnelle est une activité qui peut s’avérer complexe mais qui peut apporter néanmoins une grande valeur ajoutée. Le présent guide de l’IIA UK saura vous apporter un éclairage intéressant et utile à cet égard.
Le document de l’IIA est très intéressant car il expose clairement la problématique d’intervention de l’audit interne dans ce domaine, tout en agrémentant les actions à entreprendre de plusieurs exemples concrets d’intervention.
The approach taken by IIA report on culture is reflected in the new (September 2014) FRC Corporate Governance Code, which says « One of the key roles for the board includes establishing the culture, values and ethics of the company. It is important that the board sets the correct ‘tone from the top’. »
The accompanying FRC guidance on risk management – exercising responsibilities says “The board should establish the tone for risk management and internal control and put in place appropriate systems to enable it to meet its responsibilities effectively”
“In deciding what arrangements are appropriate the board should consider, amongst other things:
The culture it wishes to embed in the company, and whether this has been achieved.
What assurance the board requires, and how this is to be obtained.”
How should internal audit support boards in giving assuarance on culture?
Foreword
Public trust in business has ebbed and flowed over recent years but a significant minority (circa 40%) of those questioned by Ipsos MORI believe companies are ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ ethical in the way they behave. Responsibility and ownership for addressing this lies with those who sit in the boardroom. This is supported by regulators in the way that they now monitor and review the culture of organisations.
Internal audit is a unique function within an organisation with its independence and access to give assurance to those in the boardroom. This can provide confidence that there is a strong commitment to good conduct and that it is actually being translated into everyday behaviours, but also, more importantly, where it is not. To have this information allows the board an opportunity to mitigate the risk of integrity failure.
Leaders need to send a message and show by example that culture and values matter, demonstrating this by putting in place all the necessary measures. I believe this report will support boards and audit committees to help rebuild public trust by making the best use of internal audit as they develop their thinking around how to improve ethical conduct for the benefit of customers, employees, all other stakeholders and for business itself.
Philippa Foster Back CBE
Director
Institute of Business Ethics
Comme vous le savez, je suis désireux d’être au fait des derniers développements eu égard aux interventions des actionnaires activistes car je pense que ce mouvement peut avoir des conséquences positives sur la gouvernance des sociétés, même si le management a tendance à se défendre âprement contre les « intrusions des actionnaires activistes et opportunistes »
L’article ci-dessous, paru sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, nous fait part d’une récente étude du Conference Board* sur l’évolution du phénomène de l’activisme aux É.U.
L’étude en question, Proxy Voting Analytics (2010-2014), montre que le mouvement, loin de s’essouffler, a continué d’avoir un impact significatif sur les relations entre les actionnaires et les dirigeants des grandes entreprises américaines.
Voici donc un résumé des faits saillants de cette étude. Bonne lecture !
Proxy Voting Analytics (2010-2014), a report recently released by The Conference Board in collaboration with FactSet, reviews the last five years of shareholder activism and proxy voting at Russell 3000 and S&P 500 companies.
Data analyzed in the report includes:
Shareholder activism, including proxy fights, exempt solicitations, and other public agitations for change.
Most frequent activist funds and their tactics.
Volume, sponsors, and subjects of shareholder proposals.
Voted, omitted, and withdrawn shareholder proposals.
Voting results of shareholder proposals.
Shareholder proposals on executive compensation.
Shareholder proposals on corporate governance.
Shareholder proposals on social and environmental policy.
Volume and subjects of management proposals.
Failed say-on-pay proposals among Russell 3000 companies.
Say-on-pay proposals that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast.
Additional insights (including volume by index, industry, and sponsor, most frequent sponsors, and support levels) are offered with respect to key issues from the last few proxy seasons, including: majority voting; board declassification; supermajority vote requirements; independent board chairmen; proxy access; sustainability reporting; political issues; election of dissident’s director nominee.
The report pays special attention to trends and developments that have emerged in the last few months. In fact, what started as an unremarkable proxy voting season has blossomed into a series of developments that may influence annual general meetings for years to come.
There is a clear indication that activist investors are turning their attention to new issues. For example, in the Russell 3000, five investor-sponsored proposals restricting golden parachutes received the support of a majority of shareholders. While the volume remains low, it is the highest ever recorded on this topic and it signals that voting on executive compensation issues other than say on pay can still find its way to general meetings of shareholders. Political spending and lobbying activities, a topic virtually absent from voting ballots until a few years ago, became the most frequently submitted shareholder proposal type of 2014, with 86 voted proposals and five receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast (compared to only one in 2013). Finally, support for resolutions on proxy access reached a tipping point in the first six months of the year, with five proposals approved and four receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast in favor.
The advisory vote on executive compensation was a game changer for corporate/investor relations and, in 2014, more than ever before, shareholders have been pursuing opportunities to engage with senior management and be heard ahead of a shareholder meeting. This trend was reflected in the rate of withdrawals of shareholder proposals, which doubled from a few years ago as companies chose to preempt a vote on certain investor requests by voluntarily implementing their own reforms. It was not all a product of engagement, however, and guidelines on board responsiveness from proxy advisory firm ISS also drove the surge of management proposals on issues previously raised by activists.
Increased dialogue with senior executives and board members as well as the progress made by many large companies in the adoption of baseline corporate governance practices prompted large institutional investors to reconsider their role as agents of corporate change. For example, while some public pension funds such as the California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS) cut back significantly on their submissions in 2014, others such as the New York City Employees’ Retirement Systems remained prolific proponents and galvanized around proxy access requests. Similarly, the popularity of social and environmental policy issues observed this year is in part explained by the larger number of proposals filed by labor-affiliated investment funds, which, before the introduction of mandatory say on pay, had always concentrated on executive compensation issues. Despite the traditional focus of this type of fund on industrial sectors, in 2014, for the first time, more than 20 percent of the 86 proposals submitted by labor unions were directed at companies in the finance industry.
Social media and other new technologies allow a broad outreach that was unimaginable only a few years ago, and activists are perfecting their use. This year, a growing number of activist investors, especially hedge funds, have agitated for change without even filing a shareholder proposal, let alone waging a proxy fight. Despite the increase in activism campaign announcements, there was a sensible decline in the number of campaigns related to shareholder meetings held in the first six months of 2014. This decline suggests that, rather than urge other shareholders to oppose a director election or vote for a certain resolution, these activism campaign announcements now serve to publicize the investor’s view of the business strategy or organizational performance. It is a first step that may lead to the future filing of a proposal or the solicitation of proxies but that may also prove sufficient to persuade the company to seek dialogue and reach a compromise.
The following are the major findings of the report:
Although activism campaign announcements in the Russell 3000 were up in 2014, the number of campaigns related to a shareholder meeting declined, as some hedge funds chose to agitate for change without even filing a shareholder proposal.
Observations made in 2013 that hedge funds were starting to set their sights on larger companies appear disputed by numbers for 2014, when a sharp decline in activism campaign volume was recorded among S&P 500 companies.
Proxy contests were the only type of activist campaign related to a shareholder vote to increase among Russell 3000 companies in 2014, with a concentration in the retail trade and finance industries, and dissidents reported their highest success rates in years.
Engagement between corporations and investors has not curbed the most hostile forms of activism, as the volume of proposals to elect a dissident’s nominee remains fairly high.
Shareholder proposal volume was slightly lower this year, with a sharper decline among larger companies as investors focus on new topics and broaden their targets.
Excess cash on US companies’ balance sheets fueled the growth of the activist hedge fund industry, and the number of resolutions sponsored by hedge funds surpassed the record levels of 2008.
The 2014 proxy season marked another sharp year-over-year decline in the number of proposals submitted by multiemployer investment funds affiliated with labor unions, as those investors showed new interests, especially in social and environmental policy issues.
Proposals on corporate governance, once a stronghold for pension funds, were sharply reduced as more companies introduced engagement policies with large investors.
Shareholder resolutions on social and environmental policy rose to unprecedented levels, while some institutional investors dropped governance issues that were a staple of their past activity but never garnered widespread support.
The rate of withdrawals of shareholder proposals doubled from a few years ago as companies preempted some of the issues by voluntarily implementing their own reforms.
As large groups of institutional investors reduced their 14a-8 filings or shifted their attention to new and less popular topics, the percentage of voted proposals winning the support of a majority of shareholders reached a new low.
Proposals on board declassification and majority voting have become a sure bet for labor unions and public pension funds, as they are widely recognized as a baseline in corporate governance.
A surge in requests from corporate gadflies made the separation of CEO and chairman roles the top shareholder proposal topic by volume, but the institutional investment community remains skeptical of a one-size-fits-all approach to board leadership.
For the first time in the same proxy season, five investor-sponsored proposals restricting golden parachutes received majority support, signaling that voting on executive compensation issues other than say on pay may still find its way to the AGM.
hareholder proposals on political spending and lobbying activities skyrocketed this year, with five receiving more than 40 percent of votes cast (compared to only one in 2013).
Support for shareholder proposals on proxy access rights reached a tipping point in 2014, with five proposals approved and four others receiving the support of more than 40 percent of votes cast, and a handful of companies submitted board-sponsored proposals.
Say-on-pay analysis confirms a significant turnover in failed votes, with several companies losing the confidence of their shareholders this year after winning the vote by a wide margin in 2013.
*Matteo Tonello is vice president at The Conference Board. This post relates to a report released jointly by The Conference Board and FactSet, authored by Dr. Tonello and Melissa Aguilar of The Conference Board. The Executive Summary is available here (the document is free but registration is required).
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéo.
Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule est dévoilée chaque semaine.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement des deux plus récentes capsules d’experts qui sont maintenant en ligne. Elles ont pour thèmes « La gouvernance des PME » par Mme Anne-Marie Croteau, ASC, vice-doyenne responsable des relations externes à l’École de gestion John-Molson et professeure titulaire, Université Concordia, et « La présidence du CA » par M. Michel Clair, ASC, président et chef de la direction, Groupe Santé Sedna.
Aujourd’hui, nous abordons le thème de l’évaluation du fonctionnement du conseil d’administration. Il n’y a pas de doute que le processus d’évaluation est un moyen très efficace pour l’amélioration de la gouvernance des sociétés.
La presque totalité des entreprises, et toutes celles du NYSE, ont mises en place des mécanismes d’évaluation sur une base annuelle; mais encore faut-il que cette activité soit conduite avec beaucoup de compétence et de doigté par le président du conseil, ce qui n’est pas nécessairement le cas puisque beaucoup d’administrateurs ne prennent pas encore cet exercice assez au sérieux.
En effet, plusieurs études montrent que l’on ne se contente trop souvent que d’une autoévaluation sommaire, produite dans le but de satisfaire aux exigences réglementaires. Le sujet est délicat … les administrateurs sont relativement réticents à se faire évaluer … et à évaluer le travail de leurs pairs !
Jordan Temple, dans un article paru sur le blogue de Securities & Corporate Governance Group, nous présente un rappel de l’importance de bien concevoir l’évaluation du conseil d’administration.
Il expose les principales étapesde l’évaluation, donne un exemple d’une plus grande divulgation du processus, et insiste sur l’exploitation des résultats et sur la nécessité de faire le suivi, tout en soulevant l’épineux problème de la conservation des données et des risques légaux associés à leur divulgation.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires relatifs à l’activité d’évaluation dans vos conseils sont les bienvenus.
Board evaluations have long been standard practice among public companies. With shareholder interest in corporate governance practices at an all-time high, the focus on board evaluations is expected to increase. Given that board evaluations can be an effective tool to improve board and company performance, now may be a good time to review your company’s current board evaluation process and the disclosure of that process.
The Evaluation Process
A recent study by PwC found that 63% of directors believe self-evaluations are mostly a “check the box” exercise. This attitude may stem from the fact that NYSE listed companies are required to conduct evaluations on an annual basis. (See NYSE Rule 303A.09; NASDAQ does not require an annual evaluation.) That means that a significant number of boards may be missing out on a valuable opportunity to identify issues with and improve on various board functions. Evaluations may provide helpful information about how the board conducts its meetings and interacts with management, what type of board education programs are needed in the upcoming year and whether the current structure of the board is appropriate in guiding and executing the company’s strategy. The evaluations may identify small changes, like changing the order of items on board meeting agendas, or more substantive areas for improvement, like a gap in expertise and the need to add a new director.
Because the process should fit the board’s culture, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to designing effective board evaluations. Furthermore, a process designed years ago may no longer fit the company’s current culture and strategic goals. Therefore, it is necessary to re-evaluate from time to time the effectiveness of the process and implement any necessary changes.
In taking on this challenge, you should consider the following:
What is the current culture? Are director interactions formal or informal? Are there clear leaders and followers? Does anyone unduly dominate the meetings? Are there factions (activist investor or private equity fund designees, long-tenured versus recently elected, etc.)? Do some directors seem passive or prefer anonymity?
What are the objectives? Has an area of concern (like lack of board alignment) been identified? Or is the board engaging in the process to determine what, if anything, might be done better?
Who will be evaluated? The board as a whole? Each committee? Will individual directors review each other? Will individual directors perform a self-evaluation? Will the board solicit the opinion of members of management that have regular contact with the board?
Who will do the evaluating?Recent trends show a slight increase in the retention of external advisors to conduct the evaluations, but the majority of public companies still employ an internally driven process lead by either the Chairman, Lead Independent Director, Chair of the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee or General Counsel.
How will they be evaluated? Typically, evaluations are conducted using written questionnaires or interviews. Written questionnaires may include any combination of a standardized survey of questions, comment sections meant to facilitate the explanation of the standard survey of questions and open-ended questions intended to solicit feedback. Interviews may be conducted on an individual basis or in a group setting. The objectives of the evaluation will dictate the content of questions being solicited. And the questions should be refreshed on an annual basis to ensure they are relevant and effective.
What will be done with the results of the evaluations? This will partially depend on the method of evaluation but may include a discussion of the results, a memo summarizing the results or an individual meeting with each director. The company should also use the results of the evaluations to resolve issues, make changes and achieve goals.
While the benefits of board evaluation are widely accepted, it is important to consider how such evaluations may impact the collegiality and trust that is vital for board room discussions, along with what, if any, impact the board evaluation process may have on director candidates. Another consideration in designing the process is how evaluation material could be used in litigation and what the board can do to mitigate that risk. On one hand, it is important for the board to develop a written record that demonstrates that the board acted deliberately in conducting evaluations. On the other hand, questionnaires and other evaluation material are discoverable and may contain damaging information regarding board performance. Accordingly, it is important to consider whether questionnaires and other evaluation material need to be retained after the evaluations have taken place. Regardless of whether the evaluation material is retained or not, it is important that the board apply this policy consistently for all evaluations – good or bad – year after year.
Enhancing Disclosure of Board Evaluation
While most U.S. public companies have a board evaluation process in place, the disclosure explaining the evaluation process (whether in the proxy statement of corporate governance guidelines) is minimal. Recently, however, the Council of Institutional Investors released a report entitled Best Disclosure: Board Evaluation, which delineates two approaches for disclosing board evaluations that the Council believes are helpful to investors. The first approach describes the board evaluation process and the mechanics of the board’s self-evaluations. The second approach provides not only a description of the process employed to evaluate the board, but also the takeaways and results of the evaluation.
One U.S company that has presented a more in-depth description of its board evaluation process is General Electric. The disclosure does not appear in the company’s proxy statement, but instead it is contained in its “Governance and Public Affairs Committee Key Practices” document. General Electric’s proxy statement provides a high-level overview of the process and directs shareholders to the “Governance and Public Affairs Committee Key Practices” document by providing a link. An excerpt from the disclosure is provided below:
Method of Evaluating Board and Committee Effectiveness. The committee will oversee the following self-evaluation process, which will be used by the board and by each committee of the board to determine their effectiveness and opportunities for improvement. All of the board and committee self-evaluations should be done annually at the November board and committee meetings. Every October, an independent expert in corporate governance will contact each director soliciting comments with respect to both the full board and any committee on which the director serves, as well as director performance and board dynamics. These comments will relate to the large question of how the board can improve its key functions of overseeing personnel development, financials, other major issues of strategy, risk, integrity, reputation and governance. In particular, for both the board and the relevant committee, the process will solicit ideas from directors about:
a. improving prioritization of issues;
b. improving quality of written, chart and oral presentations from management;
c. improving quality of board or committee discussions on these key matters;
d. identifying how specific issues in the past year could have been handled better;
e. identifying specific issues which should be discussed in the future; and
f. identifying any other matter of importance to board functioning.
The independent expert in corporate governance will then work with the committee chairs and the lead director to organize the comments received around options for changes at either board or committee level. At the November board and committee meetings, time will be allocated to a discussion of – and decisions relating to – the actionable items.
Robust disclosure of the board evaluation process is not yet common practice. However, shareholders value the board evaluation process and are eager for details about the process, what the board has learned from the process and how the board intends to address issues or objectives identified in the process. Accordingly, companies should expect to receive more interest (or pressure) to adopt a more formal evaluation process and provide more robust disclosure about the process.
Whether to address existing board effectiveness issues, to simply update outdated processes or to anticipate increased shareholder interest in board functionality, now is a good time to review your company’s board evaluation process and related public disclosures.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéo.
Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule est dévoilée chaque semaine.
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose le visionnement des deux plus récentes capsules d’experts qui sont maintenant en ligne. Elles ont pour thèmes « La diversité » par Mme Nicolle Forget, administratrice de sociétés, et « La gestion des risques » par M. Martin Leblanc, CA, CMC, Associé, Services-conseils – Management et Gestion des risques, KPMG.
Ce matin, je porte à votre attention une courte vidéo produite par la chaîne française Xerfi Canal qui aborde le sujet du « Say on Pay », une importation du système réglementaire américain.
Entendez le point de vue de l’expert français Philippe Portier, avocat-associé au cabinet JeantetAssociés, qui répond aux questions Thibault Lieurade sur l’efficacité de ce dispositif appliqué au système de gouvernance français.
Quel est votre avis sur l’application de certaines mesures de gouvernance dans un contexte culturel différent ?
Voici une brève description du contenu. Bon visionnement !
Depuis la mi-2013 en France, les actionnaires des entreprises cotées assujetties au code de gouvernance AFEP-MEDEF émettent un avis sur les rémunérations des dirigeants. C’est le principe du Say on Pay.
L’objectif théorique est double :
(1) limiter l’inflation jugée inacceptable socialement des rémunérations des dirigeants et
Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.
À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?
L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, … avant la stratégie !
Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :
(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?
(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?
If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with. We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.
Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !
Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?
Consider the following; you are driving a boat. You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south. In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture. They are not in synch. No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win. That is what Drucker meant.
Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not. This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.
Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.
Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures. We all know the ones in these listings. They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers. All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services. No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.
We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first. What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy. It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture. What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.
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* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris. He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management. He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.
Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés est heureux de vous dévoiler sa 3e série de capsules d’experts, formée de huit entrevues vidéos. Pendant 3 minutes, un expert du Collège partage une réflexion et se prononce sur un sujet d’actualité lié à la gouvernance. Une capsule sera dévoilée chaque semaine.
Deux nouvelles « capsules d’experts » sont maintenant en ligne; elles ont pour thèmes « Les médias sociaux » par M. Sylvain Lafrance, ASC, professeur au HEC Montréal et consultant en communications et « La planification stratégique » par M. Dominic Deneault, ASC , Trebora Conseil.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 