Catégorie : Stratégie

Qu’est-ce qu’une fondation-actionnaires ? | Dix points-clé


Notre pays méconnaît largement un mode de gouvernance répandu dans le reste de l’Europe. Au Danemark, en Suisse, en Allemagne, de grandes entreprises industrielles et commerciales sont couramment détenues par des fondations.

Et le modèle s’avère durable et vertueux. Pourquoi ?

Quelles sont les spécificités des fondations actionnaires ?

Les voici résumées autour de 10 mots clés.

Qu’en est-il au Québec ? Ce sera le sujet d’un autre billet.

Bonne lecture !

Découvrez les « fondations-actionnaires » (et leurs atouts) en 10 points-clé

Les fondations actionnaires (éd.Prophil) Prophil
Les fondations actionnaires (éd.Prophil) Prophil

INDUSTRIE

Ikea, Lego, Rolex, Bosch, Carlsberg : ces marques sont mondialement connues. Mais parmi leurs millions de clients, combien connaissent leur autre particularité ? Les groupes industriels à l’origine de ces « success stories » sont, depuis longtemps, tous la propriété de… fondations ! Pourtant, faire rimer économie et philanthropie ne va pas de soi, et le terme même de « fondation actionnaire » peut paraître un oxymore. Car la philanthropie s’accorde a priori avec le « don », et l’actionnariat avec l’investissement.

Le terme n’est d’ailleurs pas stabilisé, et ne correspond à aucun statut juridique propre dans les pays étudiés : les Suisses parlent de « fondation entrepreneuriale » ou de « fondation économique», les Danois évoquent les « fondations commerciales », et les anglosaxons les « industrial fondations ». Chez nos voisins, industrie et philanthropie vont assurément de pair.

MAJORITAIRE

La fondation actionnaire, telle que nous la traitons dans cette étude, désigne une fondation à but non lucratif, propriétaire d’une entreprise industrielle ou commerciale. Elle possède tout ou partie des actions, et la majorité des droits de vote et/ou la minorité de blocage.

Ce qui n’empêche donc pas les entreprises concernées d’être en partie cotées en bourse (les fondations actionnaires représentent 54% de la capitalisation boursière de Copenhague).

Dès lors, plusieurs fondations, qui certes détiennent des actions d’entreprises, sortent du champ de cette étude, notamment celles qui ont décidé de filialiser des activités connexes à leur objet, en créant des sociétés (une fondation culturelle qui, par exemple, crée une maison d’édition).

FAMILLES

Les fondations actionnaires sont essentiellement des histoires de familles, d’engagement personnel, comme les nombreux cas de cette étude en témoignent.

Dans un esprit de résistance (La Montagne), avec la volonté de protéger et développer un patrimoine industriel (Bosch), ou avec le souhait d’articuler des engagements humanistes avec une transmission sereine de l’entreprise en absence d’ayant droits (Pierre Fabre), chaque histoire est celle d’un homme, d’une famille qui se projette dans le long terme, avec la volonté de perpétuer une culture d’entreprise singulière, dans une double approche économique et sociétale.

PHILANTHROPIE

Cette transmission est, en soi, un acte de philanthropie majeur. Car les propriétaires font don de leurs titres à une structure créée à cet effet, et renoncent donc aux gains, le cas échéant substantiels, d’une vente avec plus-value. Ils sont philanthropes.

Mais la philanthropie s’exprime aussi, et surtout, dans les dons des fondations, rendus possibles par les dividendes perçus et/ou les intérêts des dotations.

Par exemple, les fondations actionnaires donnent plus de 800 millions d’euros par an au Danemark (seul pays où des études aussi précises existent) et la fondation Novo Nordisk représente, à elle seule, 120 millions d’euros. Sa dotation est telle qu’elle pourrait continuer à vivre sans même percevoir de dividendes !

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

Au Danemark, la première mission des fondations actionnaires est majoritairement de protéger et de développer l’entreprise ; la seconde, de soutenir une cause culturelle et/ou sociale.

La double mission économique et philanthropique est parfaitement assumée et le rôle de gestion de l’entreprise, prioritaire. Maintenir le patrimoine industriel dans ce petit pays, conserver des fleurons industriels, protéger l’emploi sont considérés comme des sujets d’intérêt général.

Ce n’est pas le cas en France, où intérêt général et activité commerciale ne vont pas facilement de pair. Le principe de spécialité impose en effet aux fondations françaises d’avoir une mission exclusivement d’intérêt général, qui, dans une vision encore assez restrictive, ne peut être économique.

Quant à l’Allemagne, il n’est pas obligatoire d’avoir une mission d’intérêt général pour créer une fondation, a fortiori une fondation actionnaire. Comme le dit le célèbre banquier privé Thierry Lombard, les fondations actionnaires soulèvent des questions non seulement « de loi, mais d’idéologie ».

GOUVERNANCE

C’est le sujet clé. Dans les pays étudiés, et selon le droit national, deux modes de gouvernance prédominent :

1. soit une gestion directe de l’entreprise par la fondation, qui suppose une double finalité pleinement assumée et un conseil d’administration capable de prendre des décisions économiques et philanthropiques à la fois ;

2. soit une gestion indirecte, avec une distinction nette des instances de gouvernance de l’entreprise et de la fondation, via la création d’une société holding intermédiaire. Le droit et la fiscalité sont souvent complexes et variables d’un pays à l’autre : nous avons fait appel à d’éminents spécialistes nationaux pour nous décrire leur « état du droit ».

Notons que dans les fondations actionnaires, la succession des dirigeants n’est pas un sujet aussi sensible qu’ailleurs. La question se règle en général longtemps à l’avance, au niveau de la fondation.

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

Cette performance globale n’est pas une série de bonnes actions, mais un engagement stratégique d’une entreprise, qui se préoccupe de sa contribution économique, sociale et sociétale à son environnement.

Les entreprises les plus avancées ont compris que leur intérêt particulier rencontrait ici l’intérêt général, pour peu qu’elles ne restent pas les yeux rivés sur une gestion à court terme.

Alors que la pratique de la RSE est devenu de plus en plus un exercice imposé, et trop souvent l’instrument de directions de la communication, la fondation actionnaire place, par nature, la responsabilité sociale et l’approche de long terme au coeur de sa stratégie : dans une forme de fertilisation croisée, fondation et entreprise intrinsèquement liées, s’influencent.

LONG TERME

À un monde économique de plus en plus instable et à court terme, la fondation actionnaire oppose un modèle d’actionnariat stable et durable. La menace de prédateurs est évacuée, puisque toute tentative d’OPA hostile est impossible, et une vision de long terme, dont la redistribution de dividendes n’est pas l’unique préoccupation, oriente la stratégie.

TROISIÈME VOIE

Cette aventure, les tenants de l’économie positive et les philosophes de l’économie altruiste seraient prêts à la tenter. Car intrinsèquement les fondations actionnaires devraient faire consensus : elles allient la création de valeur économique à la force du don, au service d’une économie durable et d’une cohésion sociale renforcée.

C’est pourquoi il est si important de défricher cette troisième voie qui, en France, n’est encore qu’un sentier. La fondation actionnaire peut contribuer à faire émerger un nouveau capitalisme, plus altruiste et durable. Ce paysage pour les générations à venir, beaucoup l’appellent de leurs voeux.

EFFICACITÉ

Mais peut-on conjuguer gouvernance philanthropique et efficacité économique ? Les quelques études scientifiques (voir le panorama danois) existantes tendraient à le prouver : les performances des entreprises propriétés de fondations sont meilleures que celles où l’actionnariat est dispersé*. Le phénomène est comparable dans les sociétés familiales.

D’un point de vue social, ce type d’entreprises semble mieux traverser les crises conjoncturelles. Les dirigeants peuvent en effet s’appuyer sur une meilleure implication de leurs collaborateurs, rassurés par la stabilité de l’actionnariat.

Enfin, à l’heure où les cadres sont à la recherche de sens dans leur vie professionnelle, les valeurs promues par les fondations leur donnent une bonne raison de s’investir dans l’entreprise.

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*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre)  (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)
On constate que les fondations-actionnaires ne sous-performent jamais les autres types d’entreprises. Selon Steen Thomsen, auteur de l’étude dont est tirée le tableau (« Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations« ), « les fondations-actionnaires présentent un taux de rentabilité et de croissance comparable aux entreprises classiques, mais avec un niveau de sécurité financière bien plus élevé » (comme le montre le ratio « equity/assets » de 47 au lieu de 36 pour les entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé, et 38 pour les entreprises familiales).

 

Trois étapes pour aider le CA à s’acquitter de ses obligations à l’égard de la surveillance de la gestion des risques


Quel doit être le rôle du conseil d’administration eu égard à la surveillance de la gestion des risques ? L’article publié par Scott Hodgkins, Steven B. Stokdyk, et Joel H. Trotter dans le forum du site du Harvard Law School présente, d’une manière très concise, les trois étapes qu’un conseil doit entreprendre en matière de gestion des risques d’une société.

Les auteurs rappellent l’utilisation d’un modèle développé par le COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations de la Commission Treadway), bien connu en gouvernance, qui invite les CA à :

  1. S’entendre avec la direction sur un niveau de risque acceptable (l’appétit pour le risque);
  2. Comprendre les efforts de la direction dans l’exécution des pratiques de gestion des risques;
  3. Revoir le portefeuille des risques en considérant l’appétit pour le risque;
  4. Connaître les risques les plus importants de l’entreprise, ainsi que les stratégies de la direction pour les contrôler.

L’article discute des trois étapes que le CA doit accomplir afin de s’acquitter de son rôle en matière de gestion des risques :

  1. Déterminer le modèle de supervision privilégié par le CA;
  2. Convenir avec le management d’une approche appropriée à la gestion des risques et revoir l’approche retenue;
  3. Évaluer les ressources du CA en matière de gestion de risques et éviter les biais et la pensée de groupe.

Voici donc un extrait de l’article qui précise chacune des trois étapes.

Bonne lecture !

Three Practical Steps to Oversee Enterprise Risk Management

1. Determine the board’s preferred oversight model

Typically, boards either retain primary responsibility for risk oversight or delegate initial oversight duties to a committee, such as the audit committee or a risk committee. Where the board retains primary responsibility, individual committees may provide input on specific types of risk, such as compensation risk, audit and financial risk, and regulatory and compliance risk.

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In selecting between the active board model and the committee model, the board should consider those directors with the necessary expertise to oversee unique market, liquidity, regulatory, innovation, cybersecurity and other risks that may require special attention. The board should also consider whether adding duties to an existing committee, such as the audit committee, may be too burdensome in light of existing workload.

These issues are unique to each company, and the key is to ensure that the model you choose is effective for your situation.

2. Develop a stated approach to risk management

Some companies may adopt a risk management statement or policy. As with other policy statements, a risk management statement can create a tone-at-the-top benchmark for assessing value-creation opportunities as they arise and provide guideposts for management’s operational decisions.
A risk management statement should separately identify:

  1. Acceptable strategic risks
  2. Undesirable risks
  3. Risk tolerances or thresholds in stated categories, such as strategic, financial, operational and compliance

In developing the company’s approach, the board should consider:

  1. Investor expectations of the company’s risk appetite
  2. Competitors’ apparent risk appetite
  3. Stress-tests for risk scenarios, using historical experience and sensitivity analysis
  4. Long-term strategy versus existing core competencies
  5. Possible long-term market developments
  6. Risk concentrations (e.g., customer, supplier, investment, geographic)
  7. Effects of new business generation on desired risk profile
  8. Strategic planning and operations compared to articulated risk appetite

Developing a stated approach to risk management requires good working relationships among the board members, the CEO and management, as well as active participation by all involved.

3. Assess board capabilities and effectiveness, reviewing for bias and groupthink

The board must evaluate its own capabilities and effectiveness, paying particular attention to the possible emergence of cognitive bias or groupthink.

In assessing board capabilities and effectiveness, the board should consider:

  1. Directors’ skills and expertise compared to the company’s current and future operations
  2. Possible director education initiatives or new directors with additional skills
  3. Delegation of risk oversight in highly technical areas, such as cybersecurity
  4. Retention of independent experts to evaluate specific risk management practices
  5. Clear allocation of responsibility among the board committees and members
  6. The balance between board-level risk oversight and management-level day-to-day ERM Boards must also guard against two types of bias:
  7. Resistance to new ideas from outsiders, thus overlooking new opportunities or risks
  8. Confirmation bias, incorrectly filtering information and confirming preconceptions

Maintaining contact with business realities also requires collegiality and open communication among management and directors.

Boards should consider their risk oversight in light of these three steps to assist in framing an effective approach to enterprise-level risk exposures.

Nouvelle formation du CAS en Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence


Le Collège des administrateurs de sociétés présentera son nouveau cours Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence, les 19 et 20 mai prochains à Montréal, afin de répondre à la demande grandissante des administrateurs exerçant une fonction à la présidence d’un conseil d’administration, d’un comité du conseil ou d’un comité consultatif d’une PME.

Précédée d’un test en ligne sur le leadership, cette formation est axée sur la prise de conscience et le développement des habilités relationnelles et politiques qu’exigent les fonctions de présidence. Outre les résultats du test en ligne, des études de cas, une simulation et des témoignages seront aussi au rendez-vous.

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

Si vous assumez les fonctions de présidence, c’est un cours à ne pas manquer avec notre équipe de sept formateurs de haut calibre! Pour plus d’informations sur les critères d’admission, les objectifs et le contenu : consultez la page Web du cours ou le programme détaillé.

Au plaisir de vous compter parmi nous et nous vous invitons à relayer l’information aux présidents de vos conseils d’administration.

Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de sociétés


Les personnes  intéressées par les nouvelles recherches en gouvernance des entreprises sont invitées à assister au Colloque étudiant en gouvernance de société mardi 14 avril 2015

En partenariat avec la FSA et la Chaire en gouvernance des sociétés, le CÉDÉ organise un colloque étudiant. Les étudiants du cours de Gouvernance de l’entreprise DRT-6056 du professeur Ivan Tchotourian et du cours de Gouvernance des sociétés CTB-7000 du professeur Jean Bédard présenteront lors de cet événement le bilan de travaux de recherche réalisés durant la session d’hiver 2015.

Heure : 8 h 30 à 11 h 30
Lieu : Salon Hermès de la Faculté des sciences de l’administration

L’entrée est libre.

 

Un document complet sur les principes d’éthique et de saine gouvernance dans les organismes à buts charitables


Plusieurs OBNL sont à la recherche d’un document présentant les principes les plus importants s’appliquant aux organismes à buts charitables.

Le site ci-dessous vous mènera à une description sommaire des principes de gouvernance qui vous servirons de guide dans la gestion et la surveillance des OBNL de ce type. J’espère que ces informations vous seront utiles.

Vous pouvez également vous procurer le livre The Complete Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice.

What are the principles ?

The Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice outlines 33 principles of sound practice for charitable organizations and foundations related to legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The Principles should be considered by every charitable organization as a guide for strengthening its effectiveness and accountability. The Principles were developed by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector in 2007 and updated in 2015 to reflect new circumstances in which the charitable sector functions, and new relationships within and between the sectors.

The Principles Organizational Assessment Tool allows organizations to determine their strengths and weaknesses in the application of the Principles, based on its four key content areas (Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure, Effective Governance, Strong Financial Oversight, and Responsible Fundraising). This probing tool asks not just whether an organization has the requisite policies and practices in place, but also enables an organization to determine the efficacy of those practices. After completing the survey (by content area or in full), organizations will receive a score report for each content area and a link to suggested resources for areas of improvement.

Voici une liste des 33 principes énoncés. Bonne lecture !

 

Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice 

 

Legal Compliance and Public Disclosure

  1. Laws and Regulations
  2. Code of Ethics
  3. Conflicts of Interest
  4. « Whistleblower » Policy
  5. Document Retention and Destruction
  6. Protection of Assets
  7. Availability of Information to the Public

Effective Governance

  1. Board Responsibilities
  2. Board Meetings
  3. Board Size and Structure
  4. Board Diversity
  5. Board Independence
  6. CEO Evaluation and Compensation
  7. Separation of CEO, Board Chair and Board Treasurer Roles
  8. Board Education and Communication
  9. Evaluation of Board Performance
  10. Board Member Term Limits
  11. Review of Governing Documents
  12. Review of Mission and Goals
  13. Board Compensation

Strong Financial Oversight

  1. Financial Records
  2. Annual Budget, Financial
    Performance and Investments
  3. Loans to Directors, Officers,
    or Trustees
  4. Resource Allocation for Programs
    and Administration
  5. Travel and Other Expense Policies
  6. Expense Reimbursement for
    Nonbusiness Travel Companions
  7. Accuracy and Truthfulness of Fundraising Materials

Responsible Fundraising

  1. Compliance with Donor’s Intent
  2. Acknowledgment of Tax-Deductible Contributions
  3. Gift Acceptance Policies
  4. Oversight of Fundraisers
  5. Fundraiser Compensation
  6. Donor Privacy

Explications du phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires | PwC


Mary Ann Cloyd, responsable du Center for Board Governance de PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), vient de publier dans le forum du HLS un important document de référence sur le phénomène de l’activisme des actionnaires.

Son texte présente une excellente vulgarisation des activités conduites par les parties intéressées : Qui, Quoi, Quand et Comment ?

Je vous suggère de lire l’article au complet car il est très bien illustré par l’infographie. Vous trouverez ici un extrait de celui-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Shareholder Activism: Who, What, When, and How?

Who are today’s activists and what do they want?

Shareholder activism Spectrum

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“Activism” represents a range of activities by one or more of a publicly traded corporation’s shareholders that are intended to result in some change in the corporation. The activities fall along a spectrum based on the significance of the desired change and the assertiveness of the investors’ activities. On the more aggressive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism that seeks a significant change to the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board. On the other end of the spectrum are one-on-one engagements between shareholders and companies triggered by Dodd-Frank’s “say on pay” advisory vote.

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The purpose of this post is to provide an overview of activism along this spectrum: who the activists are, what they want, when they are likely to approach a company, the tactics most likely to be used, how different types of activism along the spectrum cumulate, and ways that companies can both prepare for and respond to each type of activism.

Hedge fund activism

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At the most assertive end of the spectrum is hedge fund activism, when an investor, usually a hedge fund or other investor aligned with a hedge fund, seeks to effect a significant change in the company’s strategy.

Background

Some of these activists have been engaged in this type of activity for decades (e.g., Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz). In the 1980s, these activists frequently sought the breakup of the company—hence their frequent characterization as “corporate raiders.” These activists generally used their own money to obtain a large block of the company’s shares and engage in a proxy contest for control of the board.

In the 1990s, new funds entered this market niche (e.g., Ralph Whitworth’s Relational Investors, Robert Monks’ LENS Fund, John Paulson’s Paulson & Co., and Andrew Shapiro’s Lawndale Capital). These new funds raised money from other investors and used minority board representation (i.e., one or two board seats, rather than a board majority) to influence corporate strategy. While a company breakup was still one of the potential changes sought by these activists, many also sought new executive management, operational efficiencies, or financial restructuring.

Today

During the past decade, the number of activist hedge funds across the globe has dramatically increased, with total assets under management now exceeding $100 billion. Since 2003 (and through May 2014), 275 new activist hedge funds were launched.

Forty-one percent of today’s activist hedge funds focus their activities on North America, and 32% have a focus that spans across global regions. The others focus on specific regions: Asia (15%), Europe (8%), and other regions of the world (4%).

Why?

The goals of today’s activist hedge funds are broad, including all of those historically sought, as well as changes that fall within the category of “capital allocation strategy” (e.g., return of large amounts of reserved cash to investors through stock buybacks or dividends, revisions to the company’s acquisition strategy).

How?

The tactics of these newest activists are also evolving. Many are spending time talking to the company in an effort to negotiate consensus around specific changes intended to unlock value, before pursuing a proxy contest or other more “public” (e.g., media campaign) activities. They may also spend pre-announcement time talking to some of the company’s other shareholders to gauge receptivity to their contemplated changes. Lastly, these activists (along with the companies responding to them) are grappling with the potential impact of high-frequency traders on the identity of the shareholder base that is eligible to vote on proxy matters.

Some contend that hedge fund activism improves a company’s stock price (at least in the short term), operational performance, and other measures of share value (including more disciplined capital investments). Others contend that, over the long term, hedge fund activism increases the company’s share price volatility as well as its leverage, without measurable improvements around cash management or R&D spending.
…

When is a company likely to be the target of activism?

Although each hedge fund activist’s process for identifying targets is proprietary, most share certain broad similarities:

  1. The company has a low market value relative to book value, but is profitable, generally has a well-regarded brand, and has sound operating cash flows and return on assets. Alternatively, the company’s cash reserves exceed both its own historic norms and those of its peers. This is a risk particularly when the market is unclear about the company’s rationale for the large reserve. For multi- business companies, activists are also alert for one or more of the company’s business lines or sectors that are significantly underperforming in its market.
  2. Institutional investors own the vast majority of the company’s outstanding voting stock.
  3. The company’s board composition does not meet all of today’s “best practice” expectations. For example, activists know that other investors may be more likely to support their efforts when the board is perceived as being “stale”—that is, the board has had few new directors over the past three to five years, and most of the existing directors have served for very long periods. Companies that have been repeatedly targeted by non-hedge fund activists are also attractive to some hedge funds who are alert to the cumulative impact of shareholder dissatisfaction.

A company is most likely to be a target of non-hedge fund activism based on a combination of the following factors:

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How can a company effectively prepare for—and respond to—an activist campaign?

Prepare

We believe that companies that put themselves in the shoes of an activist will be most able to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to an activist campaign. In our view, there are four key steps that a company and its board should consider before an activist knocks on the door:

Critically evaluate all business lines and market regions. Some activists have reported that when they succeed in getting on a target’s board, one of the first things they notice is that the information the board has been receiving from management is often extremely voluminous and granular, and does not aggregate data in a way that highlights underperforming assets.

Companies (and boards) may want to reassess how the data they review is aggregated and presented. Are revenues and costs of each line of business (including R&D costs) and each market region clearly depicted, so that the P&L of each component of the business strategy can be critically assessed? This assessment should be undertaken in consideration of the possible impact on the company’s segment reporting, and in consultation with the company’s management and likely its independent auditor.

Monitor the company’s ownership and understand the activists. Companies routinely monitor their ownership base for significant shifts, but they may also want to ensure that they know whether activists (of any type) are current shareholders.

Understanding what these shareholders may seek (i.e., understanding their “playbook”) will help the company assess its risk of becoming a target.

Evaluate the “risk factors.” Knowing in advance how an activist might criticize a company allows a company and its board to consider whether to proactively address one or more of the risk factors, which in turn can strengthen its credibility with the company’s overall shareholder base. If multiple risk factors exist, the company can also reduce its risk by addressing just one or two of the higher risk factors.

Even if the company decides not to make any changes based on such an evaluation, going through the deliberative process will help enable company executives and directors to articulate why they believe staying the course is in the best long-term interests of the company and its investors.

Develop an engagement plan that is tailored to the company’s shareholders and the issues that the company faces. If a company identifies areas that may attract the attention of an activist, developing a plan to engage with its other shareholders around these topics can help prepare for—and in some cases may help to avoid—an activist campaign. This is true even if the company decides not to make any changes.

Activists typically expect to engage with both members of management and the board. Accordingly, the engagement plan should prepare for either circumstance.

Whether the company decides to make changes or not, explaining to the company’s most significant shareholders why decisions have been made will help these shareholders better understand how directors are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities, strengthening their confidence that directors are acting in investors’ best long-term interests.

These communications are often most effective when the company has a history of ongoing engagement with its shareholders. Sometimes, depending on the company’s shareholder profile, the company may opt to defer actual execution of this plan until some future event occurs (e.g., an activist in fact approaches the company, or files a Schedule 13d with the SEC, which effectively announces its intent to seek one or more board seats). Preparing the plan, however, enables the company to act quickly when circumstances warrant.

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Respond

In responding to an activist’s approach, consider the advice that large institutional investors have shared with us: good ideas can come from anyone. While there may be circumstances that call for more defensive responses to an activist’s campaign (e.g., litigation), in general, we believe the most effective response plans have three components:

Objectively consider the activist’s ideas. By the time an activist first approaches a company, the activist has usually already (a) developed specific proposals for unlocking value at the company, at least in the short term, and (b) discussed (and sometimes consequently revised) these ideas with a select few of the company’s shareholders. Even if these conversations have not occurred by the time the activist first approaches the company, they are likely to occur soon thereafter. The company’s institutional investors generally spend considerable time objectively evaluating the activist’s suggestion—and most investors expect that the company’s executive management and board will be similarly open- minded and deliberate.

Look for areas around which to build consensus. In 2013, 72 of the 90 US board seats won by activists were based on voluntary agreements with the company, rather than via a shareholder vote. This demonstrates that most targeted companies are finding ways to work with activists, avoiding the potentially high costs of proxy contests. Activists are also motivated to reach agreement if possible. If given the option, most activists would prefer to spend as little time as possible to achieve the changes they believe will enhance the value of their investment in the company. While they may continue to own company shares for extensive periods of time, being able to move their attention and energy to their next target helps to boost the returns to their own investors.

Actively engage with the company’s key shareholders to tell the company’s story. An activist will likely be engaging with fellow investors, so it’s important that key shareholders also hear from the company’s management and often the board. In the best case, the company already has established a level of credibility with those shareholders upon which new communications can build. If the company does not believe the activist’s proposed changes are in the best long-term interests of the company and its owners, investors will want to know why—and just as importantly, the process the company used to reach this conclusion. If the activist and company are able to reach an agreement, investors will want to hear that the executives and directors embrace the changes as good for the company. Company leaders that are able to demonstrate to investors that they were part of positive changes, rather than simply had changes thrust upon them, enhance investor confidence in their stewardship.

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Epilogue—life after activism

When the activism has concluded—the annual meeting is over, changes have been implemented, or the hedge fund has moved its attention to another target—the risk of additional activism doesn’t go away. Depending on how the company has responded to the activism, the significance of any changes, and the perception of the board’s independence and open-mindedness, the company may again be targeted. Incorporating the “Prepare” analysis into the company’s ongoing processes, conducting periodic self-assessments for risk factors, and engaging in a tailored and focused shareholder engagement program can enhance the company’s resiliency, strengthening its long-term relationship with investors.

Modèle d’affaires nord-américains | La priorité aux actionnaires ou aux parties prenantes ?


Voici un excellent article publié par Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart et David Wessels dans le magazine Insights & Publications de McKinsey & Company, qui avance qu’il est préférable d’opter pour l’appréciation de la valeur aux actionnaires plutôt que pour la satisfaction de toutes les parties prenantes, en autant que l’entreprise met l’accent sur la gestion à long terme.

Cet article explique les principes fondamentaux du modèle d’affaires nord-américain en précisant ce qu’implique (1) la création de valeur pour les actionnaires et (2) la réconciliation des intérêts des parties prenantes (stakeholders).

Les auteurs montrent que la recherche, même inconsciente, de résultats à court terme est vraiment ce qui pose problème. Ce n’est pas la recherche d’accroissement de la valeur des actions qui est questionnable dans le modèle, c’est le court-termisme qui domine les actions.

 Shareholder-oriented capitalism is still the best path to broad economic prosperity, as long as companies focus on the long term.

L’article réfute les argumentations des approches qui évoquent la primauté de la réconciliation des intérêts des parties prenantes sur la recherche des intérêts des actionnaires.

Bonne lecture !

The real business of business

The guiding principle of business value creation is a refreshingly simple construct: companies that grow and earn a return on capital that exceeds their cost of capital create value. The financial crisis of 2007–08 and the Great Recession that followed are only the most recent reminders that when managers, boards of directors, and investors forget this guiding principle, the consequences are disastrous—so much so, in fact, that some economists now call into question the very foundations of shareholder-oriented capitalism. Confidence in business has tumbled.1 1.An annual Gallup poll in the United States showed that the percent of respondents with little or no confidence in big business increased from 27 percent in the 1983–86 period to 38 percent in the 2011–14 period. For more, see “Confidence in institutions,” gallup.com. Politicians and commentators are pushing for more regulation and fundamental changes in corporate governance. Academics and even some business leaders have called for companies to change their focus from increasing shareholder value to a broader focus on all stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers, and local communities.

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No question, the complexity of managing the interests of myriad owners and stakeholders in a modern corporation demands that any reform discussion begin with a large dose of humility and tolerance for ambiguity in defining the purpose of business. But we believe the current debate has muddied a fundamental truth: creating shareholder value is not the same as maximizing short-term profits—and companies that confuse the two often put both shareholder value and stakeholder interests at risk. Indeed, a system focused on creating shareholder value from business isn’t the problem; short-termism is. Great managers don’t skimp on safety, don’t make value-destroying investments just because their peers are doing it, and don’t use accounting or financial gimmicks to boost short-term profits, because ultimately such moves undermine intrinsic value.

What’s needed at this time of reflection on the virtues and vices of capitalism is a clearer definition of shareholder value creation that can guide managers and board directors, rather than blurring their focus with a vague stakeholder agenda. We do believe that companies are better able to deliver long-term value to shareholders when they consider stakeholder concerns; the key is for managers to examine those concerns systematically for opportunities to do both.

What does it mean to create shareholder value?

If investors knew as much about a company as its managers, maximizing its current share price might be equivalent to maximizing value over time. In the real world, investors have only a company’s published financial results and their own assessment of the quality and integrity of its management team. For large companies, it’s difficult even for insiders to know how the financial results are generated. Investors in most companies don’t know what’s really going on inside a company or what decisions managers are making. They can’t know, for example, whether the company is improving its margins by finding more efficient ways to work or by simply skimping on product development, maintenance, or marketing.

Since investors don’t have complete information, it’s not difficult for companies to pump up their share price in the short term. For example, from 1997 to 2003, a global consumer-products company consistently generated annual growth in earnings per share (EPS) between 11 and 16 percent. Managers attributed the company’s success to improved efficiency. Impressed, investors pushed the company’s share price above that of its peers—unaware that the company was shortchanging its investment in product development and brand building to inflate short-term profits, even as revenue growth declined. In 2003, managers were compelled to admit what they’d done. Not surprisingly, the company went through a painful period of rebuilding, and its stock price took years to recover.

In contrast, the evidence makes it clear that companies with a long strategic horizon create more value. The banks that had the insight and courage to forgo short-term profits during the real-estate bubble earned much better returns for shareholders over the longer term.2 2.Bin Jiang and Tim Koller, “How to choose between growth and ROIC,” McKinsey on Finance, September 2007. Oil and gas companies known for investing in safety outperform those that haven’t. We’ve found, empirically, that long-term revenue growth—particularly organic revenue growth—is the most important driver of shareholder returns for companies with high returns on capital (though not for companies with low returns on capital).3 3.Bin Jiang and Tim Koller, “How to choose between growth and ROIC,” McKinsey on Finance, September 2007. We’ve also found a strong positive correlation between long-term shareholder returns and investments in R&D—evidence of a commitment to creating value in the longer term.4 4.Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, fifth edition, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

The weight of such evidence and our experience supports a clear definition of what it means to create shareholder value, which is to create value for the collective of all shareholders, present and future. This means managers should not take actions to increase today’s share price if they will reduce it down the road. It’s the task of management and the board to have the courage to make long-term value-creating decisions despite the short-term consequences.

Can stakeholder interests be reconciled?

Much recent criticism of shareholder-oriented capitalism has called on companies to focus on a broader set of stakeholders, not just shareholders. It’s a view that has long been influential in continental Europe, where it is frequently embedded in the governance structures of the corporate form of organization. And we agree that for most companies anywhere in the world, pursuing the creation of long-term shareholder value requires satisfying other stakeholders as well.

…

Short-termism runs deep

What’s most relevant about Stout’s argument, and that of others, is its implicit criticism of short-termism—and that is a fair critique of today’s capitalism. Despite overwhelming evidence linking intrinsic investor preferences to long-term value creation,10 10.Robert N. Palter, Werner Rehm, and Jonathan Shih, “Communicating with the right investors,” McKinsey Quarterly, April 2008. too many managers continue to plan and execute strategy, and then report their performance against shorter-term measures, EPS in particular.

As a result of their focus on short-term EPS, major companies often pass up value-creating opportunities. In a survey of 400 CFOs, two Duke University professors found that fully 80 percent of the CFOs said they would reduce discretionary spending on potentially value-creating activities such as marketing and R&D in order to meet their short-term earnings targets.11 11.John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal, “Value destruction and financial reporting decisions,” Financial Analysts Journal, 2006, Volume 62, Number 6, pp. 27–39. In addition, 39 percent said they would give discounts to customers to make purchases this quarter, rather than next, in order to hit quarterly EPS targets. Such biases shortchange all stakeholders.

…

Shareholder capitalism won’t solve all social issues

There are some trade-offs that company managers can’t make—and neither a shareholder nor a stakeholder approach to governance can help. This is especially true when it comes to issues that affect people who aren’t immediately involved with the company as investors, customers, or suppliers. These so-called externalities—parties affected by a company who did not choose to be so—are often beyond the ken of corporate decision making because there is no objective basis for making trade-offs among parties.

If, for example, climate change is one of the largest social issues facing the world, then one natural place to look for a solution is coal-fired power plants, among the largest man-made sources of carbon emissions. But how are the managers of a coal-mining company to make all the trade-offs needed to begin solving our environmental problems? If a long-term shareholder focus led them to anticipate potential regulatory changes, they should modify their investment strategies accordingly; they may not want to open new mines, for example. But if the company abruptly stopped operating existing ones, not only would its shareholders be wiped out but so would its bondholders (since bonds are often held by pension funds). All of its employees would be out of work, with magnifying effects on the entire local community. Second-order effects would be unpredictable. Without concerted action among all coal producers, another supplier could step up to meet demand. Even with concerted action, power plants might be unable to produce electricity, idling their workers and causing electricity shortages that undermine the economy. What objective criteria would any individual company use to weigh the economic and environmental trade-offs of such decisions—whether they’re privileging shareholders or stakeholders?

In some cases, individual companies won’t be able to satisfy all stakeholders. For any individual company, the complexity of addressing universal social issues such as climate change leaves us with an unresolved question: If not them, then who? Some might argue that it would be better for the government to develop incentives, regulations, and taxes, for example, to encourage a migration away from polluting sources of energy. Others may espouse a free-market approach, allowing creative destruction to replace aging technologies and systems with cleaner, more efficient sources of power.

Shareholder capitalism has taken its lumps in recent years, no question. And given the complexity of the issues, it’s unlikely that either the shareholder or stakeholder model of governance can be analytically proved superior. Yet we see in our work that the shareholder model, thoughtfully embraced as a collective approach to present and future value creation, is the best at bridging the broad and varied interests of shareholders and stakeholders alike.

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*Marc Goedhard is a senior expert in McKinsey’s Amsterdam office, and Tim Koller* is a principal in the New York office; David Wessels* is an adjunct professor of finance and director of executive education at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School.

« Vous êtes devenus l’un d’entre eux » | 15 règles qu’un administrateur doit appliquer !


Voici un article qui rappelle les règles à suivre pour un administrateur siégeant sur le conseil d’une entreprise familiale, d’une entreprise privée de capital de risque, d’une entreprise gérée par les fondateurs ou toute autre combinaison de celles-ci. L’article a initialement été publié par  en mars 2015 dans Private Company Director Magazine.

Pour plusieurs administrateurs, le fait de prendre position en faveur de la direction, des propriétaires dirigeants ou du management en général peut constituer un manquement aux obligations de fiduciaire, surtout si la position adoptée est contraire à celle de certains autres administrateurs qui ont des intérêts à protéger ! 

L’incident relaté dans l’extrait suivant est assez révélateur …

You’ve become one of them.” That’s what a fellow Director (“MoneyGuy”) said to me after one of XYZ Company’s regular board meetings. MoneyGuy was from XYZ’s lead investor group and the majority shareholder. The ’them’ MoneyGuy was speaking about was XYZ’s management team. From his tone, I knew MoneyGuy wasn’t giving me a compliment; I was being admonished because I ‘sided with management’ about a particular matter that was pivotal to the future of the company.

What had I done wrong? To find the answer, you’ll need to read the following fifteen “rules” on how to work with owners.

Ce commentaire d’un collègue administrateur a incité * à proposer quinze (15) règles de conduite dans des cas similaires. Je vous invite donc à lire ces règles et à ajouter votre grain de sel.

Bonne lecture !

« You’ve Become One of Them »  | Fifteen Rules for Directors

Here are my fifteen rules :

1. Remember your role as a fiduciary. MoneyGuy knew I had a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation, not just to him and his private equity firm. They put me on the Board to be ‘an outside, independent voice.’ Somehow that slipped his mind! This brings me to Rule #2…P1010169

2. Don’t be a rubber stamp. You can get rubber stamps at Staples. MoneyGuy or any other majority shareholder should realize that you are not on the Board just to be another automatic vote for them. Another Director friend told me: “There is a fine line to walk as an independent director when those sitting around the table own the company and you are effectively their invited guest.” If management knows you are truly independent and not there to throw them under the bus, this will help build trust with all.

3. Understand the owner’s expectations and their personal and financial goals. One owner told me: “I believe the most important consideration for an outside Director is to ensure the shareholders’ goals and desires are fully understood. Private company owners are likely to have a complex mix of primary and secondary goals that often change based on circumstances impacting their lives. Multiple shareholders might present further complications which need to be blended into the stew.”

4. Understand the owners’ personalities. This is different than #3. The particular personality style of the individual majority shareholder exerts a significant influence on the board and management.

5. Get to know the management team. Is the CEO and senior team strong-willed, weak or balanced? How well does the CEO work with the company’s owners? Being aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the C-Suite will help you be a better coach to the owners.

6. Understand the culture of the company. Why? Because you and your other directors do have a role in shaping it and maintaining it by your actions.

7. Be consequential. Joe White used this term in his book Boards That Excel. One CEO/owner told me: “I want Directors that challenge me and bring perspective and skills I lack. I also want them to be well-grounded. The one thing my board has lacked is someone who is very knowledgeable about the specifics of my industry, but I think that has been outweighed by Directors with broad experience who see the big picture.”

8. Understand the business model and the industry. I had recently joined the Board of a company and we were discussing changes to the distribution channels. One Director said: “That’s not how we go to market now, is it?” He had been on the Board for over ten years and did not know one of the basic aspects of the business model!

9. Be a colleague, not an adversary. You are on the Board to give your opinion and offer advice, suggestions and ideas, not to advance your own career or agenda. I disagreed with MoneyGuy, but I wasn’t being disagreeable. No grandstanding, no pontificating allowed.

10. Don’t be timid about personally coaching or mentoring the owners. Even though they own the company, they may need advice on areas they are unfamiliar with. See #7.

11. Trust your gut. It’s ok to be a nudge (…and be Columbo-like). For those of you who are too young to know who Columbo was, Google him. Don’t allow the CEO and the team to stiff arm you or ignore your questions. Hopefully you have proved to the owners that your probing is done with good intentions.

12. Prepare for and attend the meetings. How obvious is this? Don’t be a no show or empty seat.

13. Participate. Be available to the owners not only at the Board meetings but also between the meetings. Encourage honest two-way communication and feedback.

14. Embrace and use technology. Just a pet peeve of mine…I’m tired of hearing about people being ‘too old’ to learn today’s communication technologies. The cloud is something more than moisture in the air.

15. Stay fresh. Owners don’t want ‘stale’, they deserve ‘fresh’.

None of this is complicated and these rules may seem pretty basic and just common sense to you. But if that’s the case, then why have I witnessed so many Directors who don’t follow these, who behave irrationally and/or who are ineffective with ownership?

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* is an Entrepreneur, Director, CEO Coach, Optimist, Instigator of Positive Change…and Fixer of Stuck Companies. CEOs, family owners, investors and Boards enlist Jim to be their ‘fresh pair of eyes’ and confidant.

Les interventions des actionnaires activistes | Comportements de meutes de loups !


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une référence à un article publié par Alon Brav, professeur de finance à l’Université Duke, Amil Dasgupta du département de finance de la London School of Economics et Richmond Mathews du département de finance de l’Université du Maryland, et paru dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Dans cet article, qui intéressera certainement les administrateurs préoccupés par les interventions croissantes des actionnaires activistes, les auteurs mettent en évidence les tactiques des Hedge Funds dans la « coopération » de divers groupes d’activistes, menée par un leader de la coalition (« la meute »).

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L’étude montre comment plusieurs activistes peuvent s’allier « informellement » pour coordonner leur attaque d’une entreprise cible.

Ce phénomène est relativement récent mais on peut imaginer un développement accru de l’utilisation de ces manœuvres dans le contexte règlementaire actuel.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Wolf Pack Activism

In our paper Wolf Pack Activism, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide a model analyzing a prominent and controversial governance tactic used by activist hedge funds. The tactic involves multiple hedge funds or other activist investors congregating around a target, with one acting as a “lead” activist and others as peripheral activists. This has been colorfully dubbed the “wolf pack” tactic by market observers. The use of wolf packs has intensified in recent years and has attracted a great deal of attention. Indeed, a recent post on this forum described 2014 as “the year of the wolf pack”.

The formation of a wolf pack may enable activist hedge funds to gain the significant influence that they appear to wield in target firms with relatively small holdings: According to recent research, the median stake of activist hedge funds at the initiation of an activist campaign is only 6.3%. Yet, the process by which a wolf pack form appears to be subtle, for at least two reasons. First, wolf pack activity appears to be ostensibly uncoordinated—i.e., no formal coalition is formed—a fact that is usually attributed to an attempt by the funds to circumvent the requirement for group filing under Regulation 13D when governance activities are coalitional (e.g., Briggs 2006). Second, wolf packs appear to form dynamically: Writing in this forum in 2009, Nathan describes the process of wolf pack formation as follows: “The market’s knowledge of the formation of a wolf pack (either through word of mouth or public announcement of a destabilization campaign by the lead wolf pack member) often leads to additional activist funds entering the fray against the target corporation, resulting in a rapid (and often outcome determinative) change in composition of the target’s shareholder base seemingly overnight.”

The subtle nature of wolf pack formation, combined with the prominence of this tactic, raises some questions of key importance to corporate governance: How can formally uncoordinated dynamic wolf pack activity work? What role does the lead activist play? What is the role of the peripheral wolf pack members? How do leaders and followers influence each other?

Our model addresses these questions. We consider multiple activists of different sizes: One large and many small. There is one lead activist who is as large as several small activists taken together and is better informed than the small activists. Our model involves two key components. The first component is a static model of “engagement” by activist investors, which may be interpreted to include talking with target management, making public statements, sponsoring and voting on proxy proposals etc. Successful engagement naturally involves a collective action problem: Engagement can only succeed if there is enough pressure on management, given the underlying fundamentals of the firm. To capture this collective action problem, we build on methodology for analyzing asymmetric coordination problems in Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004). The second component is a dynamic model of block-building which anticipates the subsequent engagement process. A key aspect of our analysis is that the ownership structure of the target firm (the total activist stake and the size-distribution of activists) is endogenous and determines the success of activism, given firm fundamentals.

We first show that the concentration of skill and capital matters: holding constant total activist ownership, the presence of a lead activist improves the coordination of wolf pack members in the engagement game, leading to a higher probability of successful activism. This occurs solely because the lead activist’s presence implicitly helps the smaller activists to coordinate their efforts and become more aggressive at engaging the target, since in our model there is no overt communication among the activists and they all act simultaneously. An implication of this result is that, even when a significant number of shares are held by potential activists, the arrival of a “lead” activist who holds a larger block may be a necessary catalyst for a successful campaign, which is consistent with the activist strategies that are well documented in the empirical literature.

We next show the beneficial effect of the presence of small activists on a lead activist’s decision to buy shares in the target. In particular, the larger is the wolf pack of small activists the lead activist can expect to exist at the time of the campaign, the more likely it is that buying a stake will be profitable given the activist’s opportunity cost of tying up capital. Importantly, the expected wolf pack size consists of both small activists that already own stakes, and those that can be expected to purchase a stake after observing the lead activist’s purchase decision.

We also examine the dynamics of optimal purchase decisions by small activists. We find that the acquisition of a position by the large activist (in effect, a 13D filing) precipitates the immediate entry of a significant additional number of small activists. While these activists know about the potential for activism at the firm before the lead activist buys in, other attractive uses of funds keep them from committing capital to the firm before they are sure that a lead activist will emerge. Others with lower opportunity costs may be willing to buy in earlier, as the real (but smaller) chance of successful engagement in the absence of a lead activist provides sufficient potential returns. Thus, our model predicts that late entrants to activism will be those who have relatively higher opportunity costs of tying up capital. One potential way to interpret this is that more concentrated, smaller, and more “specialized” vehicles (such as other activist funds) may be more inclined to acquire a stake only after the filing of a 13D by a lead activist.

The full paper is available for download here.

Les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler sur la stratégie ou sur la culture ?


Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.

À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?

L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, …  avant la stratégie !

Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :

(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?

(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?

If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with.   We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.

Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Which To Work on First, Strategy or Culture ?

 

Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”.   A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?

Consider the following; you are driving a boat.  You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south.  In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture.  They are not in synch.  No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win.  That is what Drucker meant.

Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not.  This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.

Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.

Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures.  We all know the ones in these listings.  They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers.  All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services.  No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.

We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first.  What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy.  It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture.   What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.

…..

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* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris.  He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management.  He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.

Quelles sont les dix plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. pour l’année 2015 ?


Voici un article de Kerry E. Berchem*, paru récemment dans le Harvard Law School Forum, qui présente une liste détaillée des 10 plus importantes préoccupations des conseils d’administration en 2015.

Cet excellent article devrait intéresser tous les membres de C.A., notamment le président du conseil et les présidents des comités du conseil. Même si l’article peut vous paraître assez dense, je crois qu’il fait vraiment le tour de la question.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les sujets chauds à considérer par les C.A. en 2015.

Bonne lecture !

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015

1. Oversee strategic planning in the face of uneven economic growth and rising geopolitical tensions

2. Oversee cybersecurity as hackers seek to infiltrate even the most sophisticated information security systemsIMG_20141210_193400

3. Assess the impact of advances in technology and big data on the company’s business plans

4. Cultivate shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities as activist investors target more companies

5. Consider the impact of M&A opportunities

6. Oversee risk management as newer and more complex risks emerge

7. Ensure appropriate board composition in light of increasing focus on diversity, director tenure and board size

8. Explore new trends in reducing corporate health care costs

9. Set appropriate executive compensation

10. Ensure the company has a robust compliance program as the SEC steps up its enforcement efforts and whistleblowers earn huge bounties.

…….

In light of these developments, it is critical for companies to have comprehensive and effective compliance programs in place, including a transparent process for internal investigations. Companies should also review and update as necessary their anti-retaliation policies and procedures and make sure employees and executives at every level are sufficiently trained in this area.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

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* Kerry E. Berchem, associé et co-responsable des pratiques de gouvernance de la firme Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Les dix (10) billets vedettes en gouvernance sur mon blogue en 2014


Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en 2014.

Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.

Les dix (10) articles les plus lus du Blogue en gouvernance ont fait l’objet de plus de 1 0 000 visites.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

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Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 125 000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 31 décembre 2014, il était fréquenté par plus de 5 000 visiteurs par mois. Depuis le début, j’ai œuvré à la publication de 1 097 billets.

En 2015, on estime qu’environ 5 500 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser qu’environ 70 000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2015. 

On  note que 44 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn et 44 % par différents engins de recherche. Les autres réseaux sociaux (Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr) se partagent 13 % des références.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

  1. Canada (64 %)
  2. France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
  3. Magreb (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie) (5 %)
  4. Autres pays de l’Union Européenne (2 %)
  5. États-Unis (2 %)
  6. Autres pays de provenance (7 %)

En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog (MiB Awards) : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix (10) finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance.

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Top 10 de l’année 2014 du blogue en gouvernance de www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

1.       Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
2.       Sur quoi les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler ? | Sur la stratégie ou sur la culture*
3.       Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !
4.       Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
5.       Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains PCD (CEO)
6.       LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7.       On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A. | Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter ! **
8.       Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise
9.       Pourquoi les entreprises choisissent le Delaware pour s’incorporer ?
10.     Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board | The Directors Toolkit

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de PCA et de PCD ? Réflexions d’Yvan Allaire


Très bonnes réflexions d’Yvan Allaire sur le dogme de la séparation des rôles entre le président du conseil d’administration (PCA) et le président et chef de la direction (PCD).

Rien à rajouter à ce billet de l’expert en gouvernance qui , comme moi, cherche des réponses à plusieurs théories sur la gouvernance. Plus de recherches dans le domaine de la gouvernance serait grandement indiquées…

Le CAS et la FSA de l’Université Laval ont mis sur pied une chaire de recherche en gouvernance des sociétés dont le but est de répondre à ce type de questionnement.

 À lire sur le blogue Les Affaires .com

Pourquoi séparer les fonctions de président du conseil (PCA) et de président et chef de la direction (PDG) ?

 

image
Gouvernance, stratégie…et al. Yvan Allaire

« Parmi les dogmes de la bonne gouvernance, la séparation des rôles du PCA et du PDG vient au deuxième rang immédiatement derrière « l’indépendance absolue et inviolable » de la majorité des administrateurs. … Bien que les études empiriques aient grande difficulté à démontrer de façon irréfutable la valeur de ces deux dogmes, ceux-ci sont, semble-t-il, incontournables.

Dans le cas de la séparation des rôles, le sujet a pris une certaine importance récemment chez Research in Motion ainsi que chez Air Transat. Le compromis d’un administrateur en chef (lead director) pour compenser pour le fait que le PCA et le PDG soit la même personne ne satisfait plus; le dogme demande que le président du conseil soit indépendant de la direction ».

Le constat de l’incompétence de plusieurs administrateurs | Harvard Business Review


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un récent article, paru dans Harvard Business Review, sous la plume de Dominic Barton* et Mark Wiseman*, qui traite d’un sujet assez brûlant : l’incompétence de plusieurs conseils d’administration.

Les auteurs font le constat que, malgré les nombreuses réformes règlementaires effectuées depuis Enron, plusieurs « Boards » sont dysfonctionnels, sinon carrément incompétents !

En effet, une étude de McKinsey montre que seulement 22 % des administrateurs comprennent comment leur firme crée de la valeur; uniquement 16 % des administrateurs comprennent vraiment la dynamique de l’industrie dans laquelle leur société œuvre.

L’article avance même que l’industrie de l’activisme existe parce que les « Boards » sont inadéquatement équipés pour répondre aux intérêts des actionnaires !

Je vous invite à lire cet article provocateur. Voici un extrait de l’introduction. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

Where Boards Fall Short

Boards aren’t working. It’s been more than a decade since the first wave of post-Enron regulatory reforms, and despite a host of guidelines from independent watchdogs such as the International Corporate Governance Network, most boards aren’t delivering on their core mission: providing strong oversight and strategic support for management’s efforts to create long-term value. This isn’t just our opinion. Directors also believe boards are falling short, our research suggests.

435A mere 34% of the 772 directors surveyed by McKinsey in 2013 agreed that the boards on which they served fully comprehended their companies’ strategies. Only 22% said their boards were completely aware of how their firms created value, and just 16% claimed that their boards had a strong understanding of the dynamics of their firms’ industries.

More recently, in March 2014, McKinsey and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) asked 604 C-suite executives and directors around the world which source of pressure was most responsible for their organizations’ overemphasis on short-term financial results and underemphasis on long-term value creation. The most frequent response, cited by 47% of those surveyed, was the company’s board. An even higher percentage (74%) of the 47 respondents who identified themselves as sitting directors on public company boards pointed the finger at themselves.

_________________________________

*Dominic Barton is the global managing director of McKinsey & Company and the author of “Capitalism for the Long Term.”

*Mark Wiseman is the president and CEO of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board.

Ce que chaque administrateur de sociétés devrait savoir à propos de la sécurité infonuagique |En rappel


Cet article est basé sur un rapport de recherche de Paul A. Ferrillo, avocat conseil chez Weil, Gotshal & Manges, et de Dave Burg et Aaron Philipp de PricewaterhouseCoopers. Les auteurs présentent une conceptualisation des facteurs infonuagiques (cloud computing) qui influencent les entreprises, en particulier les comportements de leurs administrateurs.

L’article donne une définition du phénomène infonuagique et montre comment les conseils d’administration sont interpellés par les risques que peuvent constituer les cyber-attaques. En fait, la partie la plus intéressante de l’article consiste à mieux comprendre, ce que les auteurs appellent, la « Gouvernance infonuagique » (Cloud Cyber Governance).

L’article propose plusieurs questions critiques que les administrateurs doivent adresser à la direction de l’entreprise.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les points saillants de cet article lequel devrait intéresser les administrateurs préoccupés par les aspects de sécurité des opérations infonuagiques.

Bonne lecture !

 

Cloud Cyber Security: What Every Director Needs to Know

« There are four competing business propositions affecting most American businesses today. Think of them as four freight trains on different tracks headed for a four-way stop signal at fiber optic speed.

First, with a significant potential for cost savings, American business has adopted cloud computing as an efficient and effective way to manage countless bytes of data from remote locations at costs that would be unheard of if they were forced to store their data on hard servers. According to one report, “In September 2013, International Data Corporation predicted that, between 2013 and 2017, spending on pubic IT cloud computing will experience a compound annual growth of 23.5%.” Another report noted, “By 2014, cloud computing is expected to become a $150 billion industry. And for good reason—whether users are on a desktop computer or mobile device, the cloud provides instant access to data anytime, anywhere there is an Internet connection.”

IMG_20140219_205959

The second freight train is data security. Making your enterprise’s information easier for you to access and analyze also potentially makes it easier for others to do, too. 2013 and 2014 have been the years of “the big data breach,” with millions of personal data and information records stolen by hackers. Respondents to the 2014 Global State of Information Security® Survey reported a 25% increase in detected security incidents over 2012 and a 45% increase compared to 2011. Though larger breaches at global retailers are extremely well known, what is less known is that cloud providers are not immune from attack. Witness the cyber breach against a file sharing cloud provider that was perpetrated by lax password security and which caused a spam attack on its customers. “The message is that cyber criminals, just like legitimate companies, are seeing the ‘business benefits’ of cloud services. Thus, they’re signing up for accounts and reaching sensitive files through these accounts. For the cyber criminals this only takes a run-of-the-mill knowledge level … This is the next step in a new trend … and it will only continue.”

The third freight train is the plaintiff’s litigation bar. Following cyber breach after cyber breach, they are viewing the corporate horizon as rich with opportunities to sue previously unsuspecting companies caught in the middle of a cyber disaster, with no clear way out. They see companies scrambling to contend with major breaches, investor relation delays, and loss of brand and reputation.

The last freight train running towards the intersection of cloud computing and data security is the topic of cyber governance—i.e., what directors should be doing or thinking about to protect their firm’s most critical and valuable IP assets. In our previous article, we noted that though directors are not supposed to be able to predict all potential issues when it comes to cyber security issues, they do have a basic fiduciary duty to oversee the risk management of the enterprise, which includes securing its intellectual property and trade secrets. The purpose of this article is to help directors and officers potentially avoid a freight train collision by helping the “cyber governance train” control the path and destiny of the company. We will discuss basic cloud security principles, and basic questions directors should ask when considering whether or not the data their management desires to run on a cloud-based architecture will be as safe from attack as possible. As usual when dealing with cyber security issues, there are no 100% foolproof answers. Even cloud experts disagree on cloud-based data security practices and their effectiveness] There are only good questions a board can ask to make sure it is fulfilling its duties to shareholders to protect the company’s valuable IP assets.

What is Cloud Computing/What Are Its Basic Platforms

“Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services). Cloud computing is a disruptive technology that has the potential to enhance collaboration, agility, scaling, and availability, and provides the opportunities for cost reduction through optimized and efficient computing. The cloud model envisages a world where components can be rapidly orchestrated, provisioned, implemented and decommissioned, and scaled up or down to provide an on-demand utility-like model of allocation and consumption.”

Cloud computing is generally based upon three separate and distinct architectures that matter when considering the security of the data sitting in the particular cloud environment.

……

Cloud Cyber Governance

As shown above, what is commonly referred to as the cloud actually can mean many different things depending on the context and use. Using SaaS to manage a customer base has a vastly different set of governance criteria to using IaaS as a development environment. As such, there are very few accepted standards for properly monitoring/administering a cloud-based environment. There are many IT consultants in the cloud-based computing environment that can be consulted in that regard. Our view, however, is that directors are ultimately responsible for enterprise risk management, and that includes cyber security, a subset of which is cloud-based cyber-security. Thus it is important for directors to have a basic understanding of the risks involved in cloud-based data storage systems, and with cloud-based storage providers. Below are a few basic questions that come to mind that a director could pose to management, and the company’s CISO and CIO:

1. Where will your data be stored geographically (which may determine which laws apply to the protection of the company’s data), and in what data centers?

2. Is there any type of customer data co-mingling that could potentially expose the company data to competitors or other parties?

3. What sort of encryption does the cloud-based provider use?

4. What is the vendor’s backup and disaster recovery plan?

5. What is the vendor’s incident response and notification plan?

6. What kind of access will you have to security information on your data stored in the cloud in the event the company needs to respond to a regulatory request or internal investigation?

7. How transparent is the cloud provider’s own security posture? What sort of access can your company get to the cloud provider’s data center and personnel to make sure it is receiving what it is paying for?

8. What is the cloud servicer’s responsibility to update its security systems as technology and sophistication evolves?

9. What is the cloud provider’s ability to timely detect (i.e., continuously monitor) and respond to a security incident, and what sort of logging information is kept in order to potentially detect anomalous activity?

10. Are there any third party requirements (such as HITECH/HIPAA) that the provider needs to conform to for your industry?

11. Is the cloud service provider that is being considered already approved under the government’s FedRamp authorization process, which pre-approves cloud service providers and their security controls?

12. Finally, does the company’s cyber insurance liability policy cover cloud-based Losses assuming there is a breach and customer records are stolen or otherwise compromised?  This is a very important question to ask, especially if the company involved is going to use a cyber-insurance policy as a risk transfer mechanism. When in doubt, a knowledgeable cyber-insurance broker should be consulted to make sure cloud-based Losses are covered.

High-profile breaches have proven conclusively that cybersecurity is a board issue first and foremost. Being a board member is tough work. Board members have a lot on their plate, including, first and foremost, financial reporting issues. But as high-profile breaches have shown, major cyber breaches have almost the same effect as a high profile accounting problem or restatement. They cause havoc with investors, stock prices, vendors, branding, corporate reputation and consumers. Directors should be ready to ask tough questions regarding cyber security and cloud-based security issues so they do not find themselves on the wrong end of a major data breach, either on the ground or in the cloud. »

Les relations entre les devoirs des administrateurs et la RSE | Ivan Tchotourian


Ivan Tchotourian*, professeur en droit des affaires à l’Université Laval, vient de publier un ouvrage dans la collection du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ). Cet ouvrage aborde la gouvernance d’entreprise et les devoirs des administrateurs.

Intitulé « Devoir de prudence et de diligence des administrateurs et RSE : Approche comparative et prospective », ce livre analyse les liens entre les devoirs des administrateurs et la responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE).

L’interrogation centrale qu’aborde cette publication est de savoir ce qu’on attend aujourd’hui d’un administrateur de société prudent et diligent. De nos jours, une réflexion s’impose sur la prudence et la diligence dont doit faire preuve chaque administrateur. Après avoir exposé le devoir de prudence et de diligence des administrateurs dans ce qui fait son histoire et son actualité, les auteurs offrent une vision prospective sur le devenir de cette norme de conduite au tournant du XXe siècle faisant place à une responsabilisation croissante des sociétés par actions.

IMG00286-20100629-2027_2

Dans cet ouvrage, les auteurs s’interrogent de manière innovante sur le contenu du devoir de prudence et de diligence au regard de l’émergence des préoccupations liées à la RSE. Sous l’influence de facteurs macro juridiques et micro juridiques, la norme de conduite prudente et diligente des administrateurs évolue. La norme d’aujourd’hui ne sera sans doute plus celle de demain, encore faut-il pleinement en saisir les implications juridiques.

A priori, cet ouvrage devrait intéresser un certain nombre de lecteurs en gouvernance. En voici un bref aperçu :

La responsabilité sociale des entreprises et le développement durable sont devenus des objectifs tant politiques qu’économiques conférant de nouvelles attentes vis-à-vis du comportement des entreprises. Ces dernières détenant un pouvoir considérable, chacune de leurs décisions a des implications sur l’économie, l’emploi, l’environnement et la communauté locale. Au vu de ces observations, la norme de prudence et de diligence doit faire l’objet d’une attention renouvelée par les juristes non seulement dans ce qu’elle est aujourd’hui au Québec, au Canada et ailleurs, mais encore dans ce qu’elle se prépare à être dans un proche avenir.

Cet ouvrage s’intéresse à cette question en deux temps. La première partie de l’ouvrage détaille le devoir de gestion intelligente des administrateurs de sociétés dans une approche de droit comparé. La deuxième partie de l’ouvrage trace les grandes lignes de la norme de prudence et de diligence du XXI e siècle. En conclusion, l’auteur présente quelques réflexions prospectives.

Aperçu de la table des matières

Chapitre 1 – Introduction

Chapitre 2 – La norme de prudence et de diligence d’aujourd’hui

Prolégomènes sur le statut juridique des administrateurs

La norme de prudence et de diligence : des premières esquisses à l’ère des codifications

Contenu et régime du devoir de prudence et de diligence

Discussion autour de l’existence d’un recours judiciaire au profit du tiers

Chapitre 3 – La norme de prudence et de diligence de demain

Facteurs macro juridiques d’évolution Facteurs micro juridiques

Chapitre 4 – Conclusion

Postface

Bibliographie

Table de la législation

Table de la jurisprudence

Index analytique

Pour en savoir davantage.

 

*Ivan Tchotourian, professeur en droit des affaires, codirecteur du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ), membre du Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (www.grdsf.ulaval.ca), Faculté de droit, Université Laval.

 

Un rappel des guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses


Voici le billet qui a attiré l’attention du plus grand nombre de lecteurs sur mon blogue depuis le début. Celui-ci a été publié le 30 octobre 2011. Je l’ai mis à jour afin que les nombreuses personnes intéressés par la gouvernance des OBNL puissent être mieux informées. L’Institut canadien des comptables agréés (ICCA) a produit des documents pratiques, pertinents, synthétiques et accessibles sur presque toutes les questions de gouvernance. Il est également important de noter que l’ICCA accorde une attention toute particulière aux pratiques de gouvernance des organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL = OBNL).

Ainsi, l’ICCA met à la disposition de ces organisations la collection 20 Questions pour les OSBL qui comprend des questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif (OSBL=OBNL) devraient se poser concernant des enjeux importants pour la gouvernance de ce type d’organismes. Ces documents sont révisés régulièrement afin qu’ils demeurent actuels et pertinents. Si vous avez des questions dans le domaine de la gouvernance des OBNL, vous y trouverez certainement des réponses satisfaisantes.Si vous souhaitez avoir une idée du type de document à votre disposition, vous pouvez télécharger le PDF suivant:

20 questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la gouvernance

Vous pouvez choisir le document pertinent (voir la liste ci-dessous) et le commander à la boutique CA.

Boutique CA de ICCA – SÉRIE ORGANISMES SANS BUT LUCRATIF OSBL/OBNL

SÉRIE ORGANISMES SANS BUT LUCRATIF
20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les ressources humaines
20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les ressources humaines
(also available in English)
Le présent cahier d’information aidera les administrateurs d’OSBL à assumer leurs principales responsabilités à cet égard, soit : le recrutement, l’évaluation et la planification de la relève du directeur général ou du principal responsable au sein du personnel, l’établissement de la rémunération du directeur général et l’approbation de la philosophie de rémunération de l’organisme, ainsi que la surveillance des politiques et pratiques en matière de ressources humaines de l’organisme pris dans son ensemble.
20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les risques
20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les risques
(also available in English)
20 Questions que les administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur les risques a été rédigé pour aider les membres des conseils d’administration des OSBL à comprendre leur responsabilité à l’égard de la surveillance des risques.
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur l’obligation fiduciaire
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur l’obligation fiduciaire
(also available in English)
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur l’obligation fiduciaire vise à aider les membres des conseils d’administration d’OSBL à comprendre leurs obligations fiduciaires et à s’en acquitter en leur fournissant un résumé des principes juridiques et des pratiques de pointe en matière de gouvernance pour ces organismes.
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la gouvernance
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la gouvernance
(also available in English)
Ce cahier d’information décrit brièvement les principaux éléments de gouvernance des organismes sans but lucratif et des responsabilités des administrateurs. Il sera utile non seulement aux administrateurs éventuels, nouveaux et expérimentés, mais aussi aux comités des candidatures et aux organisateurs des séances d’orientation et de formation des administrateurs. Il est le premier d’une série de cahiers d’information destinés aux administrateurs d’organismes sans but lucratif et portant sur des aspects particuliers de la gouvernance de ces organisations.
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la stratégie et la planification
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur la stratégie et la planification
(also available in English)
La viabilité d’un organisme sans but lucratif, soit sa capacité de poursuivre et de financer ses activités année après année, est l’une des principales responsabilités du conseil. Les administrateurs doivent comprendre la raison d’être de l’organisme, les intérêts de ses parties prenantes et la façon dont il gère les risques auxquels il est exposé. Ils doivent également participer activement à l’élaboration de la stratégie de l’organisme et à son approbation.
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur le recrutement, la formation et l’évaluation des membres du conseil
20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur le recrutement, la formation et l’évaluation des membres du conseil
(also available in English)
Le document 20 Questions que les administrateurs des organismes sans but lucratif devraient poser sur le recrutement, la formation et l’évaluation des membres du conseil explore les défis que doivent relever les OSBL pour recruter les personnes aptes à siéger à leur conseil d’administration. Il souligne aussi l’importance qu’il convient d’accorder à la formation et au perfectionnement des administrateurs ainsi qu’à l’évaluation régulière du conseil et de ses membres.
20 Questions que les administrateurs devraient poser sur l'indemnisation et l'assurance responsabilité des administrateurs et des dirigeants (Comprend un supplément à l’intention des organismes sans but lucratif)
20 Questions que les administrateurs devraient poser sur l’indemnisation et l’assurance responsabilité des administrateurs et des dirigeants
(Comprend un supplément à l’intention des organismes sans but lucratif)
(also available in English)
Les administrateurs sont exposés à divers risques juridiques du fait de leur association avec une société et de leur obligation fiduciaire à son égard. De plus en plus, ils s’intéressent aux conditions de leur indemnisation et de leur assurance et se tournent vers leurs conseillers professionnels pour vérifier qu’ils disposent d’un niveau de protection adéquat. Il est recommandé aux conseils de s’intéresser activement aux dispositions prises par la société en ce qui concerne l’indemnisation et l’assurance relatives à la responsabilité civile des administrateurs et des dirigeants.

Comment devenir administrateur de société de nos jours ! | En rappel


Plusieurs personnes très qualifiées me demandent comment procéder pour décrocher un poste d’administrateur de sociétés … rapidement.

Dans une période où les conseils d’administration ont des tailles de plus en plus restreintes ainsi que des exigences de plus en plus élevées, comment faire pour obtenir un poste, surtout si on n’a peu ou pas d’expérience comme CEO d’une entreprise ?

Je leur réponds qu’il doivent d’abord se concentrer sur un secteur d’activité dans lequel ils ont une solide expertise, bien saisir en quoi ils se démarquent (en revoyant leur CV) et comment leurs atouts peuvent contribuer à la valeur à l’organisation, comment faire appel à leurs réseaux de contacts, s’assurer de bien comprendre l’industrie et le modèle d’affaires de l’entreprise, faire connaître ses intérêts et ses compétence en gouvernance, notamment en communiquant avec le président du comité de gouvernance de l’entreprise convoitée, et, surtout … d’être patients !

Si vous n’avez pas suivi une formation en gouvernance, je vous encourage fortement à consulter les programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

L’article qui suit présente une démarche de recherche d’un mandat d’administrateur en six étapes. L’article a été rédigé par Alexandra Reed Lajoux, directrice de la veille en gouvernance à la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une brève introduction de l’article paru sur le blogue de Executive Career Insider, ainsi qu’une énumération des 6 éléments à considérer.

Je vous conseille de lire ce court article en vous rappelant qu’il est surtout destiné à un auditoire américain. Vous serez étonné de constater les similitudes avec la situation canadienne.

6 Steps to Becoming a Corporate Director This Year

 

Of all the career paths winding through the business world, few can match the prestige and fascination of corporate board service. The honor of being selected to guide the future of an enterprise, combined with the intellectual challenge of helping that enterprise succeed despite the odds, make directorship a strong magnet for ambition and a worthy goal for accomplishment.

Furthermore, the pay can be decent, judging from the NACD and Pearl Meyer & Partners director compensation studies. While directors do risk getting underpaid for the accordion-like hours they can be called upon to devote (typical pay is a flat retainer plus stock, but hours are as needed with no upper limit), it’s typically equivalent to CEO pay, if considered hour for hour. For example, a director can expect to work a good 250 hours for the CEO’s 2,500 and to receive nearly 10 percent of the CEO’s pay. In a public company that can provide marketable equity (typically half of pay), the sums can be significant—low six figures for the largest global companies.

Granted, directorship cannot be a first career. As explained in my previous post, boards offer only part time engagements and they typically seek candidates with track records. Yet directorship can be a fulfilling mid-career sideline, and a culminating vocation later in life—for those who retire from day to day work, but still have much to offer.

So, at any age or stage, how can you get on a board? Here are 6 steps, representing common wisdom and some of my own insights based on what I have heard from directors who have searched for – or who are seeking – that first board seat.

1. Recast your resume – and retune your mindset – for board service

2. Integrate the right keywords

3. Suit up and show up

4. Cast a wide net

5. Join NACD

6. Pace yourself

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur | En rappel


Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

C’est certainement le document le plus exhaustif que je connaisse eu égard au futur de la gouvernance corporative. Cet article rédigé par Holly J. Gregory* associée et responsable de la gouvernance corporative et de la rémunération des dirigeants de la firme Sidley Austin LLP, a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School (HLS).

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in 249the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

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Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

  1. Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.
  2. A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.
  3. Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.
  4. Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

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*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Les interventions des activistes vues sous l’angle d’une meute de loups


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une référence à un article publié par Alon Brav, professeur de finance à l’Université Duke, Amil Dasgupta du département de finance de la London School of Economics et Richmond Mathews du département de finance de l’Université du Maryland, et paru dans le Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Dans cet article, qui intéressera certainement les administrateurs préoccupés par les interventions croissantes des actionnaires activistes, les auteurs mettent en évidence les tactiques des Hedge Funds dans la « coopération » de divers groupes d’activistes, menée par un leader de la coalition (« la meute »).

IMG_20141211_183948

L’étude montre comment plusieurs activistes peuvent s’allier « informellement » pour coordonner leur attaque d’une entreprise cible.

Ce phénomène est relativement récent mais on peut imaginer un développement accru de l’utilisation de ces manœuvres dans le contexte règlementaire actuel.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Wolf Pack Activism

In our paper Wolf Pack Activism, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide a model analyzing a prominent and controversial governance tactic used by activist hedge funds. The tactic involves multiple hedge funds or other activist investors congregating around a target, with one acting as a “lead” activist and others as peripheral activists. This has been colorfully dubbed the “wolf pack” tactic by market observers. The use of wolf packs has intensified in recent years and has attracted a great deal of attention. Indeed, a recent post on this forum described 2014 as “the year of the wolf pack”.

The formation of a wolf pack may enable activist hedge funds to gain the significant influence that they appear to wield in target firms with relatively small holdings: According to recent research, the median stake of activist hedge funds at the initiation of an activist campaign is only 6.3%. Yet, the process by which a wolf pack form appears to be subtle, for at least two reasons. First, wolf pack activity appears to be ostensibly uncoordinated—i.e., no formal coalition is formed—a fact that is usually attributed to an attempt by the funds to circumvent the requirement for group filing under Regulation 13D when governance activities are coalitional (e.g., Briggs 2006). Second, wolf packs appear to form dynamically: Writing in this forum in 2009, Nathan describes the process of wolf pack formation as follows: “The market’s knowledge of the formation of a wolf pack (either through word of mouth or public announcement of a destabilization campaign by the lead wolf pack member) often leads to additional activist funds entering the fray against the target corporation, resulting in a rapid (and often outcome determinative) change in composition of the target’s shareholder base seemingly overnight.”

The subtle nature of wolf pack formation, combined with the prominence of this tactic, raises some questions of key importance to corporate governance: How can formally uncoordinated dynamic wolf pack activity work? What role does the lead activist play? What is the role of the peripheral wolf pack members? How do leaders and followers influence each other?

Our model addresses these questions. We consider multiple activists of different sizes: One large and many small. There is one lead activist who is as large as several small activists taken together and is better informed than the small activists. Our model involves two key components. The first component is a static model of “engagement” by activist investors, which may be interpreted to include talking with target management, making public statements, sponsoring and voting on proxy proposals etc. Successful engagement naturally involves a collective action problem: Engagement can only succeed if there is enough pressure on management, given the underlying fundamentals of the firm. To capture this collective action problem, we build on methodology for analyzing asymmetric coordination problems in Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004). The second component is a dynamic model of block-building which anticipates the subsequent engagement process. A key aspect of our analysis is that the ownership structure of the target firm (the total activist stake and the size-distribution of activists) is endogenous and determines the success of activism, given firm fundamentals.

We first show that the concentration of skill and capital matters: holding constant total activist ownership, the presence of a lead activist improves the coordination of wolf pack members in the engagement game, leading to a higher probability of successful activism. This occurs solely because the lead activist’s presence implicitly helps the smaller activists to coordinate their efforts and become more aggressive at engaging the target, since in our model there is no overt communication among the activists and they all act simultaneously. An implication of this result is that, even when a significant number of shares are held by potential activists, the arrival of a “lead” activist who holds a larger block may be a necessary catalyst for a successful campaign, which is consistent with the activist strategies that are well documented in the empirical literature.

We next show the beneficial effect of the presence of small activists on a lead activist’s decision to buy shares in the target. In particular, the larger is the wolf pack of small activists the lead activist can expect to exist at the time of the campaign, the more likely it is that buying a stake will be profitable given the activist’s opportunity cost of tying up capital. Importantly, the expected wolf pack size consists of both small activists that already own stakes, and those that can be expected to purchase a stake after observing the lead activist’s purchase decision.

We also examine the dynamics of optimal purchase decisions by small activists. We find that the acquisition of a position by the large activist (in effect, a 13D filing) precipitates the immediate entry of a significant additional number of small activists. While these activists know about the potential for activism at the firm before the lead activist buys in, other attractive uses of funds keep them from committing capital to the firm before they are sure that a lead activist will emerge. Others with lower opportunity costs may be willing to buy in earlier, as the real (but smaller) chance of successful engagement in the absence of a lead activist provides sufficient potential returns. Thus, our model predicts that late entrants to activism will be those who have relatively higher opportunity costs of tying up capital. One potential way to interpret this is that more concentrated, smaller, and more “specialized” vehicles (such as other activist funds) may be more inclined to acquire a stake only after the filing of a 13D by a lead activist.

The full paper is available for download here.