D’accord avec les pratiques exemplaires de gouvernance | Mais pour les autres …

Vous aurez sûrement beaucoup de plaisir (et aussi de dépit…) à lire cet article publié par Steven Davidoff Solomon* paru dans la section Business du New York Times du 26 mai 2015.

Il s’agit d’une situation vraiment cocasse où la firme d’un investisseur connu (Gamco Investors) prêche la bonne parole de la saine gouvernance à qui veut l’entendre mais n’en a rien à foutre lorsqu’il s’agit de ses propres affaires. « Faites ce que je vous dis et non ce que je fais ».

M. Gabelli est un investisseur bien connu du monde des actionnaires activistes; il prône l’accroissement de la valeur des actions par l’amélioration de la gouvernance des entreprises ciblées.

Loin de moi l’idée de condamner l’ensemble de ses agissements, mais l’auteur de l’article conclue fermement qu’il ne pratique pas ce qu’il prêche.

Il travaille plutôt à son enrichissement personnel et à celui de sa famille. À mon humble avis, il y a encore trop de situations similaires, partout dans le monde.

La bonne gouvernance eu égard à l’entité, en tenant compte de l’ensemble des parties prenantes, n’est pas encore au rendez-vous !

L’actionnaire principal, et souvent majoritaire, ne doit-il pas se préoccuper des préceptes de la saine gouvernance ? Ou doit-il gérer exclusivement en fonction de ses intérêts personnels ?

J’aimerais vous entendre à ce propos, après avoir lu l’article de M. Steven Davidoff Solomon ci-dessous.

A Shareholder Advocate in Word, but Not in Practice

Mario J. Gabelli’s investment firm, Gamco Investors, is another shareholder warrior telling companies to create value through good corporate governance. Yet, what about Gamco’s own governance?

Mr. Gabelli, who is 72, is a well-known investor, and Gamco has $47.5 billion in assets under management, mostly a hodgepodge of mutual funds for the average investor. Mr. Gabelli is also an aggressive advocate for shareholder rights, the rare mutual fund manager who is willing to engage in a proxy contest.

That would be acceptable, and perhaps even laudable, except that Gamco’s own corporate governance is on par with that of a Roman emperor, giving all the power to Mr. Gabelli, who wields it with impunity for his personal benefit.

Mr. Gabelli owns 72 percent of Gamco, but he has also arranged for Gamco to have a dual-class stock structure to ensure his control. The stock with higher voting rights is owned almost exclusively by GGCP, a private company that Mr. Gabelli controls, giving him 94 percent of the voting power.

It is power that Mr. Gabelli converts into personal profit.

In 2014, Gamco paid Mr. Gabelli $88.5 million in cash, a raise from 2013, when he made $85 million. That sum made Mr. Gabelli one of the highest paid chief executives in the country and eclipsed the compensation of the leader of any other publicly traded asset-management company. For example, Laurence D. Fink, the chief executive of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, was paid $23.8 million.

Mr. Gabelli’s pay comes from a deal he reached with Gamco at the time of its initial public offering that pays him 10 percent of its pretax profits. Shareholders recently approved an amended agreement to provide some tax benefits to Mr. Gabelli who, of course, was kind enough to vote in favor, assuring its passage. Other shareholders also approved it, but because it was better than the old arrangement, who can blame them?

Mr. Gabelli has used his control to seemingly handpick Gamco’s board.

Directors include Mr. Gabelli’s daughter and one of his sons. Other independent directors have financial benefits they get from their Gamco affiliation. For instance, Robert S. Prather Jr. is the lead independent director and chairman of the compensation committee. He is considered independent despite the fact that Gamco has been nominating him for other boards in connection with their investments, earning him hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees.

A daughter of another independent director, Raymond C. Avansino Jr., is employed by Gamco, which paid her more than $600,000 last year. Mr. Avansino, who sits on the governance committee, is chief executive of a company that leases property to Gamco.

Family plays a big role at Gamco.

In addition to sitting on the board, Mr. Gabelli’s daughter runs his charitable foundation. The company employs his three sons, two of whom earned more than a million dollars when incentive compensation was included. Mr. Gabelli’s daughter-in-law and brother make six-figure salaries. Mr. Gabelli’s wife, who works in marketing, made more than $5 million last year.

There is more. Mr. Gabelli seems to have no compunction about other conflicted dealings with Gamco. The company’s disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission for related-party transaction goes on for five pages. Mr. Gabelli’s family owns Gamco’s headquarters and his private company owns the aircraft it uses to fly him around.

Mr. Gabelli has also had sharp elbows in dealing with his business partners. After the other founding partners of Gamco accused Mr. Gabelli of squeezing them out, he settled the litigation for about $100 million after a bitter battle.

Gamco declined to respond to requests for comment.

This would all be just another story of an entrenched chief executive who treats the company as his own playground were Gamco not an asset manager, which is a fiduciary to the ordinary people who give Gamco money to invest. Not only is it an asset manager, it is an active one, pressing companies to improve their corporate governance. In other words, Gamco appears to be a shareholder advocate for everyone but itself.

And so it may have been hypocritical when Mr. Gabelli recently posted on Twitter: “French corporate governance … takes turn to ‘ugly’ …. As companies given option to implement ‘loyalty share’ rule …. will Vivendi opt out.” Mr. Gabelli was noting a recent turn in France to give some shares more voting rights if they are held for a longer period. Mr. Gabelli may have a fair point in his criticism, but it is difficult to take from a man who freely uses his own elevated voting rights to control Gamco.

In a similar vein, in a recent proxy contest to put three directors on the board of Myers Industries, Gamco argued it was concerned about the company’s corporate governance practices because it had plurality voting to elect directors. At least Myers allowed its shareholders a real vote and the ability to appoint directors. Similarly, Mr. Gabelli wrote several years ago in urging Diebold to drop a poison pill that Gamco’s governance philosophy was “not for management” or “against management” but that the company was “committed to shareholder value creation.” Later, Gamco nominated Mr. Prather as a director at Diebold, where he made $209,000 last year. Did I mention before that Mr. Prather is Gamco’s lead independent director?

Perhaps most brazen are the “Gandhian” corporate governance principles that Gamco contends it lives by. On May 16, 1988, Mr. Gabelli issued a “Magna Carta of Shareholder Rights,” which says the company favors “one-share, one-vote; golden parachutes; and cash incentives” while it opposes “poison pills, supermajority voting and super-dilutive stock options.” Mr. Gabelli could very well be a Gamco target if he did not control the company.

Gamco’s stock price over the last five years has not only trailed BlackRock’s by 45 percent, it has also trailed the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index by about 19 percent.

While Mr. Gabelli says he is for “shareholder value creation,” but he has done little of it at Gamco. During his time at the company, Mr. Gabelli has enriched himself and his family.

The next time Mr. Gabelli writes to a company about its corporate governance practices or appears on CNBC, the response should be something different than worship of an old-hand asset manager. Instead, it would be fair to hold Mr. Gabelli to a higher standard, namely the one he likes to preach to other companies, the same principles he espouses for others.

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Rémunérations excessives des hauts dirigeants | Extraction ou création de valeur

WOW ! Voici un article choc de Steve Denning , contributeur au magazine Forbes qui montre que les hauts dirigeants des grandes entreprises américaines (et probablement de la plupart des autres sociétés internationales), encouragées par leurs conseils d’administration, sont plus intéressés par l’extraction de la valeur de leurs entreprises (à leur profit) que par la création de valeur.

L’auteur fait le procès du système de financiarisation américain et montre que le modèle de gouvernance en place a échoué lamentablement. Les rémunérations des hauts dirigeants se sont accrues à un rythme effréné dans une période où le salaire moyen des ménages a diminué en terme réel.

Selon lui, le système doit changer radicalement, dans le sens des idées de Drucker, et mettre le focus sur la satisfaction des besoins des clients et non sur la valeur des actions à court terme.

Pour Denning, la société américaine doit opérer un vaste virage et se questionner sérieusement sur ses valeurs. L’article, bien que radical, est fascinant à lire et procure beaucoup de matière à réflexion. Selon lui une révolution de la gouvernance s’impose afin de faire cesser tous les abus des représentants des actionnaires !

Je me permets de citer les propos d’une de mes connaissances, experte en finance (formation et expérience), qui après avoir lu le billet sur mon blogue m’a fait parvenir les commentaires suivants :

« Je lis, de façon sélective, les billets de ton blogue sur la gouvernance. Le dernier billet qui propose la lecture d’un article de Steve Denning vient renforcer mes propres conclusions sur le sujet de la fonction et de la rémunération des CEO.

J’argumente qu’un changement de paradigme s’impose non pas parce que le capitalisme tel qu’imaginé par Adam Smith est fautif, mais précisément parce qu’on l’a dénaturé. Comme tu sais, aujourd’hui il est sacrilège de critiquer le modèle « free enterprise and open market system ». C’est un peu comme proposer des caricatures de Mahomet !

Bref, je suis encouragé de savoir qu’une vague de fond s’élève contre l’usurpation du pouvoir et la spoliation de capital de cette nouvelle classe de mercenaires bureaucrates dont le seul intérêt est de s’enrichir de façon éhontée au dépend de toutes les parties prenante de la corporation dans la société. Inutile d’ajouter que je souscrits à la thèse de Denning et de tous ceux qu’il cite ».

Voici un bref extrait de l’article. Je vous invite à en prendre connaissance et à exprimer votre point de vue sur les grands changements à apporter aux institutions, à la société, au système de formation des étudiants en administration, aux règles de gouvernance, etc.

Bonne lecture !

Vampire CEOs Continue To Suck Blood

As the economy continues to struggle in the seventh year of its supposed recovery after the Great Recession–despite unprecedented amounts of free government money from the Fed–CEO compensation continues to soar.

“The party goes on,” writes David Gelles in the New York Times, with a horrifying list of examples of corporate greed and value extraction. At the top of the list is a coven of four CEOs associated with John Malone at Discovery Communications who received some $350 million in 2014. Not bad for a year’s work, at a time when median compensation for workers has not increased significantly in decades.

Bloomberg calls it “gluttony.”

Harvard Business Review calls it “the biggest financial bubble of them all.”

The New Yorker says, that the effect of reforms such as say-on-pay, aimed at containing excesses in C.E.O. salaries, has been “approximately zero. Executive compensation…is now higher than it’s ever been.”

Shareholder votes “have done little to curb lavish executive pay,” writes David Gelles. Greater public disclosure based on the view that somehow the companies would be ashamed and change their ways ”hasn’t worked.” He quotes Regina Olshan, head of the executive compensation practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom: “I don’t think those folks are particularly ashamed. If they are getting paid, they feel they deserve those amounts. And if they are on the board, they feel like they are paying competitively to attract talent.”

“At root, the unstoppable rise of CEO pay,” says James Surowiecki in the New Yorker, “involves an ideological shift. Just about everyone involved now assumes that talent is rarer than ever, and that only outsize rewards can lure suitable candidates and insure stellar performance…CEO pay is likely to keep going in only one direction: up.”

Principes de gouvernance et règlementations en vigueur dans les pays membres de l’OCDE

Ce matin, je porte à votre attention un document-clé de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE) qui présente en détail toutes les informations concernant les pratiques de gouvernance dans les 34 pays de l’OCDE ainsi que dans un certain nombre d’autres pays influents : Argentine, Brésil, Hong Kong, Chine, Inde, Indonésie, Lituanie, Arabie Saoudite et Singapore.

Le document intitulé Corporate Governance Factbook est une ressource informationnelle indispensable pour mieux comprendre et comparer les codes de gouvernance et les règlementations relatives aux diverses juridictions. Il s’agit de la deuxième édition de cette publication; celle-ci alimente les révisions apportées annuellement aux Principes de Gouvernance de l’OCDE, principes de gouvernance universellement reconnus.

Le Canada a collaboré activement au partage des informations sur la gouvernance. Ainsi, le rapport présente une multitude de tableaux qui comparent la situation du Canada avec celle des autres pays retenus. C’est une mine d’information vraiment exceptionnelle.

Le document est en version anglaise pour le moment. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, la référence au document ainsi que la table des matières :

Corporate Governance Factbook

Introduction

The Corporate Landscape

– The ownership structure of listed companies

The Corporate Governance Framework

– The regulatory framework for corporate governance
– Cross-border application of corporate governance requirements
– The main public regulators of corporate governance
– Stock exchanges

The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions

– Notification of general meetings and information provided to shareholders
– Shareholder rights to request a meeting and to place items on the agenda
– Shareholder voting
– Related party transactions
– Takeover bid rules
– The roles and responsibilities of institutional investors

The Corporate Board of Directors

– Basic board structure and independence
– Board-level committees
– Board nomination and election
– Board and key executive remuneration

Le rôle malaisé du PDG dans l’évaluation de la performance de son équipe de direction

L’une des activités les plus cruciales et … décisives d’un PDG (PCD) est de constituer une équipe de hauts dirigeants d’une grande qualité. Son succès personnel et celui de l’organisation dépend ultimement de la cohésion et de l’efficacité de son équipe de direction.

Alors, lorsqu’un problème de performance chez l’un ou plusieurs de ses lieutenants est identifié, il doit nécessairement procéder au rétablissement de l’équilibre, de l’équité et de la performance de son équipe. Mais comment ?

Quels sont les facteurs déterminants dans les mesures correctives que peut apporter le PDG ? Comment doit-il agir pour faire face à la musique ?

C’est un sujet d’une grande complexité, qui exige une solide dose d’analyse de la situation, de coaching et de courage. D’autant plus que l’expérience montre que les équipes de direction sont destinées à échouer un jour ou l’autre !

Voici l’hypothèse qui sous-tend toute la discussion de l’article de Mark Nadler, récemment publié sur le blogue du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Our approach is grounded in some basic notions concerning the complexity of senior-level jobs and the profound consequences that can result from deficient performance at the top. Experience and observation lead us to this troubling but inescapable conclusion: The composition of the executive team virtually guarantees that some of its members will fail.

Each member of the executive team is required to play multiple, complex, and essential roles—and what’s more, to play them in concert with the CEO and with each other. That’s why it’s so difficult, and so crucial, to create and maintain an effective cast of senior characters. Basically, each member is expected to play these roles:

– Individual contributor, providing specialized analysis, perspectives, and technical expertise to the rest of the team

– Organizational leader, managing the performance of a major segment of the enterprise and representing that segment’s interests in the corporate setting

– Supporter of the CEO, promulgating the CEO’s agenda both publicly and privately

– Colleague and peer, demonstrating public and private support for fellow members of the executive team

– Executive team member, taking an active and appropriate role in the team’s collective work

– External representative of the team and the organization to the workforce at large and to outside constituencies

– Potential successor to the CEO or a potential member of the next generation of top-tier leadership

With each team member playing so many vital roles, just one ineffective, unqualified, or disruptive member can undermine the team and damage the organization in countless ways. The consequences can range from an impotent executive team to the breakdown of a key operating unit to the alienation of essential customers. Within the organization, the perceived tolerance of a senior executive who fails to meet objectives or openly flouts the organization’s values creates a huge credibility problem for management in general, and for the CEO in particular.

L’auteur explore les avenues qui se présentent aux PDG dans les cas de gestion de la performance de son équipe, en considérant plusieurs enjeux liés à la dynamique interpersonnelle des équipes de direction.

La lecture de cet article sera très utile aux PDG aux prises avec des problèmes de procrastination à cet égard.

Bonne lecture !

When Executives Fail: Managing Performance on the CEO’s Team

Picture, if you will, the chief executive officer of a Fortune 500 company slumped over a conference table, holding his head in his hands, anguishing over whether the time had come to pull the plug on one of his most senior executives. “Tell me,” he asks in despair, “is it this hard for everybody?”

Yes, it is.

Of all the complex, sensitive, and stressful issues that confront CEOs, none consumes as much time, generates as much angst, or extracts such a high personal toll as dealing with executive team members who are just not working out. Billion-dollar acquisitions, huge strategic shifts, even decisions to eliminate thousands of jobs—all pale in comparison with the anxiety most CEOs experience when it comes to deciding the fate of their direct reports.

To be sure, there are exceptions. Every once in a while, an executive fouls up so dramatically or is so woefully incompetent that the CEO’s course of action is clear. However, that’s rarely the case. More typically, these situations slowly escalate. Early warning signs are either dismissed or overlooked, and by the time the problem starts reaching crisis proportions, the CEO has become deeply invested in making things work. He or she procrastinates, grasping at one flawed excuse after another. Meanwhile, the cost of inaction mounts daily, exacted in poor leadership and lost opportunities.

This issue is so critical because it is so common. Embedded in the unique composition and roles of the executive team are the seeds of failure; it’s virtually guaranteed that over time, a substantial number of the CEO’s direct reports will fall by the wayside. The stark truth, as David Kearns of Xerox once remarked, is that the majority of executive careers end in disappointment. Nowhere is Kearns’s observation more poignant than at the executive team level. Of all the ambitious young managers who yearn to become CEOs, only a fraction will achieve their ultimate dream. Even among the relative handful who achieve the second tier, only a few possess the rare combination of intelligence, competence, savvy, flexibility, and luck to go out on top. The pyramid is steep and slippery; the closer you get to the top, the harder it is to hold on.

There are lots of ways for senior executives to stumble, and when they do, the shock waves can rock the enterprise. At the most senior level, each executive’s performance is magnified; one dysfunctional individual can stop the entire executive team in its tracks and wreak havoc throughout the organization. Consequently, decisions about replacing executive team members are highly leveraged, with far-reaching consequences often involving thousands of people and literally billions of dollars.

Despite those organizational consequences, the decision by any CEO to remove a direct report is, in the end, an intensely personal one. This isn’t a matter of reasoning your way through a strategic problem or even of deciding to lay off multitudes of workers halfway around the globe. Instead, it involves the face-to-face acknowledgment of failure by a powerful, successful member of the inner circle, quite possibly a long-time colleague. There is no way to take the pain out of these decisions; instead, our intent here is to suggest ways to make them somewhat more rational. There are processes and techniques that can help CEOs deal with executives who are in deep trouble, and methods to sort through the conflicting considerations that inevitably muddle the final decision. When the time comes to actually dismiss someone, however, there are no slick approaches or decision trees that can substitute for character and courage.

…..

Synergies recherchées dans la reconstitution des CA lors des opérations de fusion et acquisition (M&A)

Aujourd’hui, j’aborde un sujet assez peu étudié par les experts en gouvernance, mais néanmoins crucial pour assurer le succès de la croissance des entreprises : Il s’agit de l’attention qu’il faut apporter à la reconstitution du nouveau conseil d’administration résultant de la fusion ou de l’acquisition de deux entités privées ou publiques.

La période de transition post-acquisition se traduit souvent par des gestes et des attitudes des CA qui les rendent moins efficaces, à une période nécessitant une surveillance accrue.

L’article publié par Johanne Bouchard* et Ken Smith** dans la revue NACD Directorship décrit quatre principales situations de M&A, en illustrant les difficultés de fonctionnement susceptibles d’être vécues à la suite de la recomposition des conseils d’administration.

C’est un article phare qui montre clairement la nécessité pour les nouvelles entités de se faire accompagner dans les périodes critiques du choix des membres, de l’induction des nouveaux membres et de la dynamique de la nouvelle équipe d’administrateurs.

Je vous invite à lire le document ci-dessous. En voici, quelques extraits :

Advice for Effective Board Mergers | NACD

The board may be least effective post-deal, at the very time when its oversight may be most important.

The proposed board composition would ideally be part of the merger proposal put to shareholders for approval.

Many boards surprise themselves with what they didn’t know about each other… until they put these things on the table in the context of a big challenge such as an acquisition.

The organization structure and culture should be aligned with the overall strategy and facilitate the deal logic.

*Johanne Bouchard is an advisor to boards, CEOs, and executives. She is an expert in board composition and dynamics, and provides support in strategic alignment, board effectiveness, and post-deal board integration. Bouchard has been a serial entrepreneur and held C-level management positions at leading high-tech companies in Silicon Valley.

**Ken Smith has been a strategy consultant for more than 25 years, having served leading Canadian and U.S. corporations. He is an expert in M&A strategy and implementation, and co-wrote The Art of M&A Strategy (McGraw-Hill, 2012) with NACD Chief Knowledge Officer, Alexandra R. Lajoux.

Qu’est-ce qu’une fondation-actionnaires ? | Dix points-clé

Notre pays méconnaît largement un mode de gouvernance répandu dans le reste de l’Europe. Au Danemark, en Suisse, en Allemagne, de grandes entreprises industrielles et commerciales sont couramment détenues par des fondations.

Et le modèle s’avère durable et vertueux. Pourquoi ?

Quelles sont les spécificités des fondations actionnaires ?

Les voici résumées autour de 10 mots clés.

Qu’en est-il au Québec ? Ce sera le sujet d’un autre billet.

Bonne lecture !

Découvrez les « fondations-actionnaires » (et leurs atouts) en 10 points-clé

Les fondations actionnaires (éd.Prophil) Prophil

INDUSTRIE

Ikea, Lego, Rolex, Bosch, Carlsberg : ces marques sont mondialement connues. Mais parmi leurs millions de clients, combien connaissent leur autre particularité ? Les groupes industriels à l’origine de ces « success stories » sont, depuis longtemps, tous la propriété de… fondations ! Pourtant, faire rimer économie et philanthropie ne va pas de soi, et le terme même de « fondation actionnaire » peut paraître un oxymore. Car la philanthropie s’accorde a priori avec le « don », et l’actionnariat avec l’investissement.

Le terme n’est d’ailleurs pas stabilisé, et ne correspond à aucun statut juridique propre dans les pays étudiés : les Suisses parlent de « fondation entrepreneuriale » ou de « fondation économique», les Danois évoquent les « fondations commerciales », et les anglosaxons les « industrial fondations ». Chez nos voisins, industrie et philanthropie vont assurément de pair.

MAJORITAIRE

La fondation actionnaire, telle que nous la traitons dans cette étude, désigne une fondation à but non lucratif, propriétaire d’une entreprise industrielle ou commerciale. Elle possède tout ou partie des actions, et la majorité des droits de vote et/ou la minorité de blocage.

Ce qui n’empêche donc pas les entreprises concernées d’être en partie cotées en bourse (les fondations actionnaires représentent 54% de la capitalisation boursière de Copenhague).

Dès lors, plusieurs fondations, qui certes détiennent des actions d’entreprises, sortent du champ de cette étude, notamment celles qui ont décidé de filialiser des activités connexes à leur objet, en créant des sociétés (une fondation culturelle qui, par exemple, crée une maison d’édition).

FAMILLES

Les fondations actionnaires sont essentiellement des histoires de familles, d’engagement personnel, comme les nombreux cas de cette étude en témoignent.

Dans un esprit de résistance (La Montagne), avec la volonté de protéger et développer un patrimoine industriel (Bosch), ou avec le souhait d’articuler des engagements humanistes avec une transmission sereine de l’entreprise en absence d’ayant droits (Pierre Fabre), chaque histoire est celle d’un homme, d’une famille qui se projette dans le long terme, avec la volonté de perpétuer une culture d’entreprise singulière, dans une double approche économique et sociétale.

PHILANTHROPIE

Cette transmission est, en soi, un acte de philanthropie majeur. Car les propriétaires font don de leurs titres à une structure créée à cet effet, et renoncent donc aux gains, le cas échéant substantiels, d’une vente avec plus-value. Ils sont philanthropes.

Mais la philanthropie s’exprime aussi, et surtout, dans les dons des fondations, rendus possibles par les dividendes perçus et/ou les intérêts des dotations.

Par exemple, les fondations actionnaires donnent plus de 800 millions d’euros par an au Danemark (seul pays où des études aussi précises existent) et la fondation Novo Nordisk représente, à elle seule, 120 millions d’euros. Sa dotation est telle qu’elle pourrait continuer à vivre sans même percevoir de dividendes !

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

Au Danemark, la première mission des fondations actionnaires est majoritairement de protéger et de développer l’entreprise ; la seconde, de soutenir une cause culturelle et/ou sociale.

La double mission économique et philanthropique est parfaitement assumée et le rôle de gestion de l’entreprise, prioritaire. Maintenir le patrimoine industriel dans ce petit pays, conserver des fleurons industriels, protéger l’emploi sont considérés comme des sujets d’intérêt général.

Ce n’est pas le cas en France, où intérêt général et activité commerciale ne vont pas facilement de pair. Le principe de spécialité impose en effet aux fondations françaises d’avoir une mission exclusivement d’intérêt général, qui, dans une vision encore assez restrictive, ne peut être économique.

Quant à l’Allemagne, il n’est pas obligatoire d’avoir une mission d’intérêt général pour créer une fondation, a fortiori une fondation actionnaire. Comme le dit le célèbre banquier privé Thierry Lombard, les fondations actionnaires soulèvent des questions non seulement « de loi, mais d’idéologie ».

GOUVERNANCE

C’est le sujet clé. Dans les pays étudiés, et selon le droit national, deux modes de gouvernance prédominent :

1. soit une gestion directe de l’entreprise par la fondation, qui suppose une double finalité pleinement assumée et un conseil d’administration capable de prendre des décisions économiques et philanthropiques à la fois ;

2. soit une gestion indirecte, avec une distinction nette des instances de gouvernance de l’entreprise et de la fondation, via la création d’une société holding intermédiaire. Le droit et la fiscalité sont souvent complexes et variables d’un pays à l’autre : nous avons fait appel à d’éminents spécialistes nationaux pour nous décrire leur « état du droit ».

Notons que dans les fondations actionnaires, la succession des dirigeants n’est pas un sujet aussi sensible qu’ailleurs. La question se règle en général longtemps à l’avance, au niveau de la fondation.

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

Cette performance globale n’est pas une série de bonnes actions, mais un engagement stratégique d’une entreprise, qui se préoccupe de sa contribution économique, sociale et sociétale à son environnement.

Les entreprises les plus avancées ont compris que leur intérêt particulier rencontrait ici l’intérêt général, pour peu qu’elles ne restent pas les yeux rivés sur une gestion à court terme.

Alors que la pratique de la RSE est devenu de plus en plus un exercice imposé, et trop souvent l’instrument de directions de la communication, la fondation actionnaire place, par nature, la responsabilité sociale et l’approche de long terme au coeur de sa stratégie : dans une forme de fertilisation croisée, fondation et entreprise intrinsèquement liées, s’influencent.

LONG TERME

À un monde économique de plus en plus instable et à court terme, la fondation actionnaire oppose un modèle d’actionnariat stable et durable. La menace de prédateurs est évacuée, puisque toute tentative d’OPA hostile est impossible, et une vision de long terme, dont la redistribution de dividendes n’est pas l’unique préoccupation, oriente la stratégie.

TROISIÈME VOIE

Cette aventure, les tenants de l’économie positive et les philosophes de l’économie altruiste seraient prêts à la tenter. Car intrinsèquement les fondations actionnaires devraient faire consensus : elles allient la création de valeur économique à la force du don, au service d’une économie durable et d’une cohésion sociale renforcée.

C’est pourquoi il est si important de défricher cette troisième voie qui, en France, n’est encore qu’un sentier. La fondation actionnaire peut contribuer à faire émerger un nouveau capitalisme, plus altruiste et durable. Ce paysage pour les générations à venir, beaucoup l’appellent de leurs voeux.

EFFICACITÉ

Mais peut-on conjuguer gouvernance philanthropique et efficacité économique ? Les quelques études scientifiques (voir le panorama danois) existantes tendraient à le prouver : les performances des entreprises propriétés de fondations sont meilleures que celles où l’actionnariat est dispersé*. Le phénomène est comparable dans les sociétés familiales.

D’un point de vue social, ce type d’entreprises semble mieux traverser les crises conjoncturelles. Les dirigeants peuvent en effet s’appuyer sur une meilleure implication de leurs collaborateurs, rassurés par la stabilité de l’actionnariat.

Enfin, à l’heure où les cadres sont à la recherche de sens dans leur vie professionnelle, les valeurs promues par les fondations leur donnent une bonne raison de s’investir dans l’entreprise.

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*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

On constate que les fondations-actionnaires ne sous-performent jamais les autres types d’entreprises. Selon Steen Thomsen, auteur de l’étude dont est tirée le tableau (« Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations« ), « les fondations-actionnaires présentent un taux de rentabilité et de croissance comparable aux entreprises classiques, mais avec un niveau de sécurité financière bien plus élevé » (comme le montre le ratio « equity/assets » de 47 au lieu de 36 pour les entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé, et 38 pour les entreprises familiales).

Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains présidents et chefs de direction (PCD) | En reprise

Il est indéniable qu’un PCD (CEO) doit avoir une personnalité marquante, un caractère fort et un leadership manifeste. Ces caractéristiques tant recherchées chez les premiers dirigeants peuvent, dans certains cas, s’accompagner de traits de personnalité dysfonctionnels tels que le narcissisme.

C’est ce que Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic soutien dans son article publié sur le blogue du HuffPost du 2 janvier 2014. Il cite deux études qui confirment que le comportement narcissique de certains dirigeants (1) peut avoir des effets néfastes sur le moral des employés, (2) éloigner les employés potentiels talentueux et (3) contribuer à un déficit de valeurs d’intégrité à l’échelle de toute l’organisation.

L’auteur avance que les membres des conseils d’administration, notamment ceux qui constituent les comités de Ressources humaines, doivent être conscients des conséquences potentiellement dommageables des leaders flamboyants et « charismatiques ». En fait, les études montrent que les vertus d’humilité, plutôt que les traits d’arrogance, sont de bien meilleures prédicteurs du succès d’une organisation.

La première étude citée montre que les organisations dirigées par des PCD prétentieux et tout-puissants ont tendances à avoir de moins bons résultats, tout en étant plus sujettes à des fraudes.

La seconde étude indique que les valeurs d’humilité incarnées par un leader ont des conséquences positives sur l’engagement des employés.

Voici en quelques paragraphes les conclusions de ces deux études.

Bonne lecture !

In the first study, Antoinette Rijsenbilt and Harry Commandeur assessed the narcissism levels of 953 CEOs from a wide range of industries, as well as examining objective performance indicators of their companies during their tenure. Unsurprisingly, organizations led by arrogant, self-centered, and entitled CEOs tended to perform worse, and their CEOs were significantly more likely to be convicted for corporate fraud (e.g., fake financial reports, rigged accounts, insider trading, etc.). Interestingly, the detrimental effects of narcissism appear to be exacerbated when CEOs are charismatic, which is consistent with the idea that charisma is toxic because it increases employees’ blind trust and irrational confidence in the leader. If you hire a charismatic leader, be prepared to put up with a narcissist.

In the second study, Bradley Owens and colleagues examined the effects of leader humility on employee morale and turnover. Their results showed that « in contrast to rousing employees through charismatic, energetic, and idealistic leadership approaches (…) a ‘quieter’ leadership approach, with listening, being transparent about limitations, and appreciating follower strengths and contributions [is the most] effective way to engage employees. » This suggests that narcissistic CEOs may be good at attracting talent, but they are probably better at repelling it. Prospective job candidates, especially high potentials, should therefore think twice before being seduced by the meteoric career opportunities outlined by charismatic executives. Greed is not only contagious, but competitive and jealous, too…

The Dark Side of Executive Narcissism: How CEOs Destroy Companies’ Reputation and Employee Morale

If we can educate organizations, in particular board members, on the virtues of humility and the destructive consequences of narcissistic and charismatic leadership, we may see a smaller proportion of entitled, arrogant, and fraudulent CEOs — to everyone’s benefit. Instead of worshiping and celebrating the flamboyant habits of corporate bosses, let us revisit the wise words of Peter Drucker, who knew a thing or two about management:

The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say ‘I’. And that’s not because they have trained themselves not to say ‘I’. They don’t think ‘I’. They think ‘we’; they think ‘team’. They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don’t sidestep it, but ‘we’ gets the credit.

Les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler sur la stratégie ou sur la culture ?

Voici un article très intéressant de Elliot S. Schreiber* paru sur le blogue de Schreiber | Paris récemment. L’auteur pose une question cruciale pour mieux comprendre la nature et la priorité des interventions organisationnelles.

À quoi le management et le C.A. doivent-ils accorder le plus d’attention : À stratégie ou à la culture de l’organisation ?

L’auteur affirme que la culture, étant l’ADN de l’entreprise, devrait se situer en premier, … avant la stratégie !

Le bref article présenté ci-dessous pose deux questions fondamentales pour connaître si l’entreprise a une culture appropriée :

(1) Does it cost us the same, more or less than competitors to recruit and retain top talent ?

(2) Are customers happy with the relationship they have with our company versus our competition ?

If it costs you more to recruit and retain your best talent or if customers believe that competitors are easier to deal with, you have cultural issues that need to be dealt with. We can guarantee that if you do not, you will not execute your strategy successfully, no matter what else you do.

Ce point de vue correspond-il à votre réalité ? Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Bonne lecture !

Which To Work on First, Strategy or Culture ?

Peter Drucker famously stated “culture eats strategy for breakfast”. A great quote no doubt and quite right, but it still raises the question – one that we recently got from a board member at a client organization – “which should we work on first, strategy or culture”?

Consider the following; you are driving a boat. You want to head east, but every time you turn the wheel the boat goes south. In this analogy, the course direction is strategy; the boat’s rudder is culture. They are not in synch. No matter how hard you turn the wheel, the rudder will win. That is what Drucker meant.

Every organization has a culture, whether it was intentionally developed or not. This culture gets built over time by the personalities and principles of the leaders, as well as by rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that let people know what really is valued in the company.

Culture is defined as “the way we do things around here every day and allow them to be done”. Employees look to their leaders to determine what behaviors are truly values, as well as to the rewards, incentives, processes and procedures that channel behaviors.

Executives we work with often get confused about culture, thinking that they need to duplicate the companies that are written up in publications as having the best cultures. We all know the ones in these listings. They are the ones with skate ramps, Friday beer parties, and day care centers. All these things are nice, but there is no need to duplicate these unless you are attempting to recruit the same employees and create the same products and services. No two companies, even those in the same market segment, need to have the same culture.

We know from discussions with other consultants and business executives that there are many who strongly believe that culture comes first. What they suggest is that since culture is there—it is the DNA of the company—it comes before strategy. It may be first in historical order, but that is not what matters. You don’t need pool tables and skate ramps like Google to have a good culture. What matters with culture is whether or not it drives or undermines value creation, which comes from the successful interaction of employees and customers.

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* Elliot S. Schreiber, Ph.D., is the founding Chairman of Schreiber Paris. He has gained a reputation among both corporate executives and academics as one of the world’s most knowledgeable and insightful business and market strategists. Elliot is recognized as an expert in organizational alignment, strategy execution and risk management. He is a co-founder in 2003 of the Directors College, acknowledged as Canada’s « gold standard » for director education.

Les dix (10) billets vedettes en gouvernance sur mon blogue en 2014

Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en 2014.

Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.

Les dix (10) articles les plus lus du Blogue en gouvernance ont fait l’objet de plus de 1 0 000 visites.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 125 000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 31 décembre 2014, il était fréquenté par plus de 5 000 visiteurs par mois. Depuis le début, j’ai œuvré à la publication de 1 097 billets.

En 2015, on estime qu’environ 5 500 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser qu’environ 70 000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2015.

On note que 44 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn et 44 % par différents engins de recherche. Les autres réseaux sociaux (Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr) se partagent 13 % des références.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

Canada (64 %)
France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
Magreb (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie) (5 %)
Autres pays de l’Union Européenne (2 %)
États-Unis (2 %)
Autres pays de provenance (7 %)

En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog (MiB Awards) : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix (10) finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance.

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Top 10 de l’année 2014 du blogue en gouvernance de www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

1. Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
2. Sur quoi les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler ? \| Sur la stratégie ou sur la culture*
3. Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !
4. Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance \| Jacques Grisé
5. Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains PCD (CEO)

6. LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) \| LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7. On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A. \| Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter ! **
8. Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise
9. Pourquoi les entreprises choisissent le Delaware pour s’incorporer ?
10. Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board \| The Directors Toolkit

Mesurer et rémunérer la performance de la direction | En rappel

Voici une étude empirique qui cherche à mieux comprendre comment le choix des mesures de performance influence la rémunération de la direction.

Globalement, les résultats montrent une corrélation positive entre la rémunération du CEO et plusieurs autres mesures de création de valeur. L’étude indique qu’il y a d’autres facteurs qui viennent nuancer cette conclusion.

Je vous invite à lire cet article pour mieux saisir les relations entre les mesures de performance et la structure de rémunération de la direction. Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un court extrait de cette étude.

Bonne lecture !

MEASURING AND REWARDING PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Debate surrounding executive compensation is an enduring feature of the UK corporate landscape. While concern over compensation levels continue to exercise politicians, regulators, investors and the media, there is growing concern over the degree to which performance metrics commonly used in executive compensation contracts represent appropriate measures of long-term value creation. This debate partly reflects fears that UK executives face excessive pressure to deliver short-term results at the expense of long-term improvements in value (e.g., Kay Review 2012).

This report contributes to the debate over executive compensation generally and in particular to the question of performance measure choice in executive compensation contracts. The first part of the report summarises key insights from the academic and professional literatures regarding the structure of executive compensation arrangements and the metrics used to link pay with corporate performance.

The second part of the report presents findings from a pilot study of executive compensation arrangements and their association with corporate value creation using a subsample of FTSE-100 companies.

…

Our results provide some comfort but also create cause for concern. On the positive side, results demonstrate a material positive association between CEO pay and several measures of value creation for all capital providers. The evidence suggests that prevailing executive pay structures incentivise and reward important aspects of value creation even though contractual performance metrics are not directly linked with value creation in many cases. More troubling, however, is our evidence that (i) a large fraction of CEO pay appears unrelated to periodic value creation and (ii) key aspects of compensation consistently correlate with performance metrics such as TSR and EPS growth where the direct link with value creation is more fragile.

Ratio de la rémunération du PCD en relation avec le salaire moyen des employés ! En rappel

Le sujet de la divulgation du ratio PCD – employés fait de plus en plus les manchettes de la gouvernance aux É.U.

En général, la direction des entreprises est contre cette divulgation obligatoire mais l’organisme règlementaire américain SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) veut aller de l’avant et mettre en œuvre l’une des provisions du Dodd Frank Act qui requiert que les entreprises divulguent le ratio de la rémunération du PCD en relation avec le salaire moyen des employés.

Steve Crawford professeur de comptabilité et taxation de l’Université de Houston et Karen Nelson et Brian Rountree, tous deux du département de comptabilité de l’Université Rice, ont conçu une étude qui cherche à répondre à la question suivante : La divulgation des ratios aura-t-elle un impact sur le comportement des investisseurs ?

À partir d’une méthodologie astucieuse, les auteurs montrent qu’il y a plus de dissidences de votes pour les ratios les plus hauts, mais aussi pour les plus bas ! Les résultats de cette recherche sont publiés dans Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Je vous invite à lire les arguments des auteurs dont les conclusions se résument à ceci :

… it appears that the pay ratio provides significant information concerning shareholder voting behavior, but only limited information about actual economic outcomes.

The CEO-Employee Pay Ratio

Will knowing how much the CEO makes relative to rank and file employees provide information to investors? We may soon find out as a result of a provision in the Dodd Frank Act that requires companies to report the ratio of the CEO’s compensation to that of the median employee.

A number of different sources have developed industry-based estimates of the ratio using information about CEO pay from corporate disclosures and employee pay from the government’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. For instance, an article in Bloomberg BusinessWeek on May 2, 2013 found the ratio of CEO pay to the typical worker rose from about 20-to-1 in the 1950s to 120-to-1 in 2000, with the ratio reaching nearly 500-to-1 for the top 100 companies.

In our The CEO-Pay Ratio, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we take advantage of unique reporting rules for the banking sector, which requires disclosures concerning compensation to all employees, as well as the CEO. With this data, we calculate the ratio of CEO compensation to that of the average employee. Over the years 1995-2012, the ratio is relatively stable with an average of 16.58-to-1. In fact, it is only in the highest decile of CEO pay where we find ratios rising to the levels popularized in the financial press and policy debate. Thus, for the vast majority of corporations in the banking sector we find ratios that are well within the bounds espoused by management experts such as Peter Drucker.

A more important question is whether disclosure of the ratios will influence investor behavior. To provide some evidence on this issue, we investigate whether the ratios we calculate for the banking sector systematically relate to the way investors vote on Say on Pay (SOP) proposals. The Dodd-Frank Act also mandates that all corporations administer a non-binding shareholder vote on the compensation of executives reported in the firms’ annual proxy statements. This portion of the law is currently in effect, providing us with three years of data on the preferences of shareholders as revealed through their voting behavior. We find that voting dissent is greatest at both the lowest and highest levels of the ratio, consistent with information on pay disparity influencing voting behavior. Increased voting dissent at the highest levels of the ratio aligns with arguments that disclosure of the ratio may serve as a catalyst to reign in what investors believe to be excessive CEO compensation. However, it is interesting to note that dissent is also high for banks with the lowest levels of the pay ratio, which could be consistent with the view that some level of pay disparity is necessary to provide appropriate incentives for effort within organizations.

We further examine whether the ratios are predictive of future firm performance and risk to see if investors voting behavior is consistent with underlying firm outcomes. Our findings reveal a similar non-linear relationship where the highest and lowest pay ratios result in the lowest (highest) performance (risk). The economic magnitudes of these effects, however, are relatively small. Thus in the end, it appears that the pay ratio provides significant information concerning shareholder voting behavior, but only limited information about actual economic outcomes.

Overall, the results in our study help to inform the ongoing policy debate on the magnitude and consequences of pay disparity in public corporations. If the Securities and Exchange Commission issues its final pay ratio disclosure rule in 2015, investors may soon have this information to inform their voting decisions for a broad range of firms.

The full paper is available for download here.

Le délicat problème de la rétribution des dirigeants d’OBNL ! | En rappel

L’expérience de la gestion des OBNL nous apprend que les entrepreneurs-propriétaires-fondateurs de ces organisations vivent souvent des aventures d’affaires formidables parce qu’ils sont animés par un feu sacré et une passion hors du commun. C’est souvent ce qui fait que certaines entreprises de l’économie sociale sortent de l’ombre !

Ainsi, suite à la mise sur pied de l’organisme à but non lucratif, les premiers dirigeants doivent s’impliquer activement dans la gestion quotidienne de l’entreprise; ils investissent beaucoup de temps – bénévolement – tout en occupant aussi un autre emploi.

Après plusieurs années de dévouement, de développement d’affaires tangible, de notoriété accrue et de succès répétés, souvent après des décennies d’efforts…, les gestionnaires bénévoles deviennent surchargés. L’entreprise doit se professionnaliser…

Toutes les organisations vivent ces grandes mutations, souvent déchirantes mais indispensables pour assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise.

Les leaders bénévoles doivent alors s’entourer de ressources additionnelles : administration générale, opérations, ventes, finances et comptabilité, recherche de commandites et de subventions, communications publiques, etc.

Ces nouvelles ressources, bien qu’ayant l’entreprise à cœur, ne sont pas animés de la même passion; en conséquence, l’organisation doit les rémunérer. Cela crée souvent deux classes : les responsables bénévoles (lesquels se retrouvent généralement au CA) et le personnel rémunéré.

Selon moi, le CA doit prévoir des mécanismes de transition clairs afin que les fondateurs-gestionnaires soient traités avec équité et reconnaissance.

When it comes to attracting and retaining talented leaders, the setting of executive compensation packages has posed continuing challenges to nonprofits since the 1980s. These challenges relate to the professionalization of the sector, the increasing desire to measure and reward success, and the need to retain and promote the most talented managers.

Voici un cas qui illustre pourquoi un CA doit se montrer très clairvoyant dans l’expression de sa gratitude envers les fondateurs bénévoles. Il ne doit pas attendre que les premiers dirigeants s’essoufflent, puis se retirent, pour leur exprimer sa satisfaction sous la forme d’une rétribution financière. On notera qu’il s’agit ici d’une OBNL d’envergure et que le PDG recevait déjà une rémunération significative.

Ce cas, rédigé par Ruth McCambridge et publié dans Nonprofit Quaterly, montre que le conseil d’administration d’une l’OBNL doit éviter de s’embourber dans des questions de rémunération du PDG, surtout lorsque l’organisme est tributaire de fonds publics pour son financement.

Nonprofit Boards Can and Should Avoid this Problem with CEO Compensation

This story is not new. A CEO spends decades providing measurably great leadership for a nonprofit, but no one ever considers ensuring that she is able to retire at the end of all that. So the board plays a little catch-up and makes a lump sum payment, causing a media storm in which scrutiny is focused unkindly on the organization.

So it was with the now-retired CEO of Health Care and Rehabilitation Services. Judith Hayward had been at the organization for 19 years and had built its budget from $8 million to $50 million annually. She was given a $650,000 compensation package when she retired around a year ago. Approximately 85 percent of the organization’s budget comes from taxpayer money.

Even though these kinds of payments may not be illegal and may even be ethical, when they come to light, they almost invariably cause problems for nonprofits—especially those that receive public contracts.

In this case, the board crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s. The executive and finance committees made recommendations and the board approved the payment in 2010. But when the payment was highlighted during a recent audit, the current CEO, George Karabakakis, felt compelled to travel to Montpelier to meet with local legislators to explain.

“It felt to myself, to the board, and to the senior leadership team that it was really important to come out and share the information,” Karabakakis said. “I don’t want legislators, or our staff, or anyone to get half truths or hear about this through the grapevine or the rumor mill. It’s important to put it out clearly and say ‘This is what happened.’”

Hayward’s annual salary when she retired was about $163,000. “Everyone on the board thought she did a tremendous job,” said J. Allen Dougherty, who served as chair of the HCRS board when the retirement package was approved. “She brought the organization out of bankruptcy, developed new programs and everyone who had contact with her, including people from the state, thought she did a magnificent job. She never had a retirement package and the board thought this was a way we could make it up to her.”

The package was originally approved at $450,000, but that was increased to $650,000 in 2013 when it was discovered that Hayward would be immediately taxed for $200,000 once she started to receive the payments.

Unfortunately, this year, for the first time in at least 10 years, HCRS employees did not get a raise, and Karabakakis said staff have been “disappointed, angry and outraged.”

“Some people may see it as excessive,” he said. “If we’re going to provide a deferred compensation package, it’s important that we look at the industry standard, and make sure that we do have a culture of openness and transparency.”

But the staff were unlikely to have been solely concerned about transparency. The other thing a board needs to ensure is that fair retirement benefits extend to all workers. The notion of caring only about the old age comfort of top employees is, naturally, abhorrent and insulting to many others. It’s no surprise, and in times where income inequality begs for our attention, our organizations should try not to mimic the bad policies of the larger economy.

Karabakakis said the whole incident has caused a review of employment policies, the establishment of a personnel committee, and a “commitment to open and transparent communication with all concerned.”

But all of that after-the-fact work is being done after the horse has left the barn. As reported here, Rep. Michael Mrowicki, who serves on the Human Services Committee, says he will bring up the possible oversight of executive compensation in the legislature. “These payments seem to have been structured in a way that they are legal, but they don’t really pass the smell test,” he said. “We are trying to figure out our next step.”

“Mainly we want to make sure this doesn’t happen again,” he said. “We wouldn’t want to set a precedent for other people to think they deserve more than they have been paid. The staff at these agencies work incredibly hard, and you don’t have to go very far to find people who are being denied services because they are told there is not enough money. These state agencies are entrusted with public money and the taxpayers deserve to be protected. It is frustrating and disappointing on a very basic level.”

The fact is that many nonprofits do not attend to retirement packages adequately until doing what feels fair on one level may look unreasonable to others. With as many baby boomers as there are in leadership at nonprofits, it is well past time to consider these issues.

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur | En rappel

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

C’est certainement le document le plus exhaustif que je connaisse eu égard au futur de la gouvernance corporative. Cet article rédigé par Holly J. Gregory* associée et responsable de la gouvernance corporative et de la rémunération des dirigeants de la firme Sidley Austin LLP, a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School (HLS).

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Mesurer et reconnaître la performance de la direction | Une étude empirique

Voici une étude empirique qui cherche à mieux comprendre comment le choix des mesures de performance influence la rémunération de la direction.

Bonne lecture !

MEASURING AND REWARDING PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Debate surrounding executive compensation is an enduring feature of the UK corporate landscape. While concern over compensation levels continue to exercise politicians, regulators, investors and the media, there is growing concern over the degree to which performance metrics commonly used in executive compensation contracts represent appropriate measures of long-term value creation. This debate partly reflects fears that UK executives face excessive pressure to deliver short-term results at the expense of long-term improvements in value (e.g., Kay Review 2012).

This report contributes to the debate over executive compensation generally and in particular to the question of performance measure choice in executive compensation contracts. The first part of the report summarises key insights from the academic and professional literatures regarding the structure of executive compensation arrangements and the metrics used to link pay with corporate performance.

The second part of the report presents findings from a pilot study of executive compensation arrangements and their association with corporate value creation using a subsample of FTSE-100 companies.

…

Our results provide some comfort but also create cause for concern. On the positive side, results demonstrate a material positive association between CEO pay and several measures of value creation for all capital providers. The evidence suggests that prevailing executive pay structures incentivise and reward important aspects of value creation even though contractual performance metrics are not directly linked with value creation in many cases. More troubling, however, is our evidence that (i) a large fraction of CEO pay appears unrelated to periodic value creation and (ii) key aspects of compensation consistently correlate with performance metrics such as TSR and EPS growth where the direct link with value creation is more fragile.

Ratio de la rémunération du PCD en relation avec le salaire moyen des employés

Le sujet de la divulgation du ratio PCD – employés fait de plus en plus les manchettes de la gouvernance aux É.U.

Je vous invite à lire les arguments des auteurs dont les conclusions se résument à ceci :

… it appears that the pay ratio provides significant information concerning shareholder voting behavior, but only limited information about actual economic outcomes.

The CEO-Employee Pay Ratio

The full paper is available for download here.

L’amélioration de la participation de l’actionnariat au processus de votation par procuration

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les commentaires de Luis A. Aguilar, commissaire à la U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, sur les moyens à prendre pour inciter les actionnaires des sociétés cotées à se prévaloir de leurs droits de vote par procuration.

Le commissaire présente clairement les difficultés liées au processus de votation existant, en adoptant le point de vue de l’actionnariat individuel (retail) et en mettant en exergue les incongruités de la règlementation.

Les panels constitués pour discuter de ces questions ont essentiellement deux sujets à explorer :

L’importance d’adopter un bulletin de vote « universel » qui permettrait aux actionnaires de voter séparément dans les cas d’administrateurs contestés

L’importance d’améliorer la participation de l’actionnariat au processus de votation par procuration. Aux États-Unis, les « petits actionnaires » possèdent 30 % des actions des 1 000 plus grandes entreprises mais leur taux de participation au processus de votation n’est que de 13 %. Les investisseurs institutionnels, en comparaison, utilisent leurs droits de vote dans 90 % des cas.

Je vous invite donc à lire les arguments exposés par le commissaire et à livrer votre point de vue sur ces deux questions. Cette problématique s’adresse tout autant à la situation canadienne.

Que faire pour assurer une meilleure participation de l’actionnariat diffus au processus de votation, surtout en cas d’élection contestée ?

Bonne lecture ?

Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders

Today’s [February 19, 2015] Roundtable on Proxy Voting is certainly timely since over the course of the next several months, thousands of America’s public companies will hold annual shareholders meetings to elect directors and to vote on many important corporate governance issues. The start of the annual “proxy season” is an appropriate time to consider the annual process by which companies communicate with their shareholders and get their input on a variety of issues. Whether it’s voting on directors, executive compensation matters, or other significant matters, the annual meeting is the principal opportunity for shareholders—the true owners of public companies—to have their voices heard by the corporate managers of their investments. At these annual meetings, shareholders can express their support, or disappointment, with the direction of their companies through the exercise of their right to vote.

As today’s panelists know well, the days of shareholders coming together, sitting in a room and talking one-on-one with the directors and officers running their companies are long gone. The ownership of today’s public companies is both too widely dispersed geographically and would involve too many shareholders to reasonably attend shareholders meetings (such meetings would require football stadiums rather than typical conference rooms). Accordingly, rather than attending the annual shareholders meetings in person to cast their votes, shareholders of public companies typically submit their votes by proxy. To that end, the Commission recognizes that the proxy statement process is a vital means by which shareholders and companies’ leadership communicate with one another. Consistent with this reality, the Commission’s proxy rules operate on the principle that the proxy process should function, as close as possible, to replicate the rights of a shareholder who attends the annual meeting in person.

These rules are not static, however. The advent of the internet and other recent technological advances that have resulted in the rapid evolution in communications have raised tremendous possibilities, and a host of issues, related to how shareholders can engage in the proxy process. This is why it is so important for the Commission, the investor’s advocate, to continue to actively monitor and improve the proxy process so that it best protects the interests of shareholders.

To that end, today’s Roundtable will focus on two fundamental issues: first, a discussion of how best to empower shareholders so that they can effectively vote for the director they want; and second, a discussion of whether the existing proxy voting process is fostering or hindering the ability of shareholders to exercise their voting rights.

Importance of the Universal Proxy Ballot

To discuss the issues of empowering shareholders to vote for the directors of their choice, today’s first panel will focus on the state of contested director elections and discuss the use of universal proxy ballots. The fundamental issue to be addressed by this panel is straightforward: shareholders who could attend the annual meetings in person, particularly in contested elections, would have the ability to “split their tickets” and vote among all of the eligible candidates—whether recommended by management or by other shareholders. The same cannot be said for shareholders who participate in contested director elections by proxy. Rather, under today’s proxy regime, shareholders who vote by proxy effectively are unable to pick-and-choose among all eligible director candidates. This is because current proxy rules effectively do not provide shareholders with a single proxy ballot that would allow them to vote on candidates nominated by both shareholder proponents and management. This is one anomaly in the Commission’s proxy process rules that, when taken into account with prevailing state proxy laws, do not replicate an actual in-person meeting of shareholders. As a result, these proxy rules effectively result in diminishing shareholders’ rights by limiting voting choice during contested elections—an unwelcomed result at an important time for shareholders to have their voices heard.

To address these concerns, shareholders, commenters, and others have at various times promoted the idea of a universal proxy ballot—or a proxy card that permits shareholders to choose among all eligible director candidates. More recently, in 2013, the Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee (“IAC”) considered this issue and recommended that the Commission explore amending the proxy rules to provide any person soliciting proxies with the option of distributing a “universal ballot” in a “short slate” direction nomination—or a proxy contest in which the outside candidates would not control the board if elected. Even more recently, other commenters have suggested that the Commission facilitate the use of universal ballot proxy cards for all director elections, regardless of any resulting change in control.

The goal of these recommendations is to remove artificial barriers to shareholder nominations and thereby improve shareholder choice. The expectation is that a universal ballot proxy card would make management and boards of directors more responsive to the interests of shareholders.

I look forward to a robust discussion of the universal proxy ballot concept and a discussion of what can be done to improve the ways that shareholders can elect the directors that they want to run their companies.

Improving Informed Retail Participation in the Proxy Process

Today’s second panel will discuss possible approaches to addressing the drop in retail shareholder participation in the proxy process. This discussion is particularly important, given how Americans are increasingly relying on the capital markets for their savings and retirement. In fact, the data shows that about half of all U.S. households participate, either directly or indirectly, in the stock market.

While retail shareholders are no longer the predominant owners of America’s public companies like they were in the years before 1945, they remain significant direct owners of public companies. For example, one report found that as of the end of 2009, retail shareholders owned nearly 30% of the shares of America’s largest 1,000 public companies. This is a significant percentage of direct ownership interests and makes it clear why the Commission must promote policies that encourage retail investors to protect their interests by exercising their voting rights.

It’s no secret that retail shareholder participation in the proxy process has been falling. In fact, one of the first issues that I raised after becoming a Commissioner concerned the negative impact on retail investor voting following the Commission’s 2005 adoption of an “access equals delivery” rule. I noted in February 2009 that retail investor voting, already at low numbers, had plummeted at those companies using the notice and access model permitted by this rule. Indeed, the reports that compiled statistics on the level of participation by investors before and after the notice and access model was put in place at their companies found decreases of over 30% for large investors, and over 60% for smaller investors. Other reports find that retail response rates have declined each year since the introduction of the notice and access model, falling to less than a 13% response rate for the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.

Although the Commission has not revisited the “access equals delivery” rule to determine its continuing impact, which is something I think should be done, the SEC has taken some steps to create greater interest in the voting process. For example, in 2010, the Commission identified a need for education outreach to better inform retail investors as to the importance of exercising their voting rights—and how to exercise those rights. In connection with that effort, the Commission took a series of steps designed to educate investors—including issuing an “investor alert” on new shareholder rules in advance of the 2010 proxy season, and launching a new “Spotlight on Proxy Matters” Web page at sec.gov that provides investors with information on the mechanics of proxy voting, the e-proxy rules, corporate elections, and proxy matters generally.

Notwithstanding the Commission’s efforts—which admittedly were limited—retail shareholder participation in the proxy process remains disappointingly low. For example, one report looking at a sample of annual meetings in 2013 found that 70% of shares held by retail shareholders were not voted. Another more recent report found that by July 2014, institutional shareholders had voted 90% of their shares, but retail shareholders had voted just 29% of their shares.

These dismal retail investor participation numbers have continued, despite technological advances that should have made it easier and more efficient for widely dispersed groups of shareholders to engage with other investors and their companies. For example, so-called “virtual shareholder meetings,” which allow shareholders to use the internet—not just to listen and watch, but also to vote their shares—have grown in prevalence over the past five years. Yet, retail shareholder participation remains low.

Perhaps it’s not just the use of new technology but, rather, how that technology is used that will result in greater shareholder participation.

For instance, it has been suggested that the better use of 21st century technology in the proxy process may facilitate how shareholders can more effectively receive and understand how their companies are performing, and to better put that performance into perspective. Indeed, it’s only logical to expect that better informed investors would likely participate in greater numbers.

In its 2010 Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, the Commission stated that if issuers provided reportable items in interactive data format, “shareholders may be able to more easily obtain specific information about issuers, compare information across different issuers, and observe how issuer-specific information changes over time as the same issuer continues to file in an interactive data format.” In addition, in 2013, the IAC recommended that the Commission immediately prioritize tagging important information with respect to various corporate governance issues, including portions of the proxy statement that relate to executive compensation and matters voted upon by shareholders. The IAC added that tagging the voting data and results contained in certain forms could result in more informed voting and investment decisions, and would facilitate comparisons among public companies. For these reasons, the IAC suggested that data tagging could “facilitate participation in the governance process.”

The end goal, of course, is not simply to increase retail shareholder participation in the proxy process, but rather to increase informed participation in this process. This is one of the fundamental concerns that have been previously raised about so-called “advance voting instructions” (sometimes referred to as “client-directed voting”). In particular, most iterations of advance voting instructions inevitably would set voting instructions for shareholders before any disclosures about the matters in question are known or even available. Any serious discussion of the merits of advanced voting instructions needs to consider how these processes will comport with the basic disclosure principles of investor protection and shareholder rights that underpin the current proxy rules.

As today’s panelists discuss various ways to promote retail shareholder participation in the proxy process, the discussion should focus, not only on how to get a shareholder to technically cast their vote, but also on how best to protect the fundamental interests of shareholders in making informed voting decisions.

Conclusion

I expect that today’s Roundtable will go a long way in assisting the Commission in exploring how best to get shareholders to participate in shareholders meetings and, in particular, how best to give them a more effective way to vote for the directors of their choice.

I would like to thank all of our panelists for taking the time to be here today, and I want to thank the staff for organizing this Roundtable. I look forward to an active discussion about the universal proxy ballots and the ways to increase the participation of informed shareholders in the proxy process.

In conclusion, I want to remind everyone that there will be a public comment file associated with today’s Roundtable. I look forward to receiving additional comments and input on these issues.

Le délicat problème de la rétribution des dirigeants d’OBNL !

Toutes les organisations vivent ces grandes mutations, souvent déchirantes mais indispensables pour assurer la pérennité de l’entreprise.

Selon moi, le CA doit prévoir des mécanismes de transition clairs afin que les fondateurs-gestionnaires soient traités avec équité et reconnaissance.

When it comes to attracting and retaining talented leaders, the setting of executive compensation packages has posed continuing challenges to nonprofits since the 1980s. These challenges relate to the professionalization of the sector, the increasing desire to measure and reward success, and the need to retain and promote the most talented managers.

Nonprofit Boards Can and Should Avoid this Problem with CEO Compensation

This story is not new. A CEO spends decades providing measurably great leadership for a nonprofit, but no one ever considers ensuring that she is able to retire at the end of all that. So the board plays a little catch-up and makes a lump sum payment, causing a media storm in which scrutiny is focused unkindly on the organization.

So it was with the now-retired CEO of Health Care and Rehabilitation Services. Judith Hayward had been at the organization for 19 years and had built its budget from $8 million to $50 million annually. She was given a $650,000 compensation package when she retired around a year ago. Approximately 85 percent of the organization’s budget comes from taxpayer money.

Even though these kinds of payments may not be illegal and may even be ethical, when they come to light, they almost invariably cause problems for nonprofits—especially those that receive public contracts.

In this case, the board crossed its t’s and dotted its i’s. The executive and finance committees made recommendations and the board approved the payment in 2010. But when the payment was highlighted during a recent audit, the current CEO, George Karabakakis, felt compelled to travel to Montpelier to meet with local legislators to explain.

“It felt to myself, to the board, and to the senior leadership team that it was really important to come out and share the information,” Karabakakis said. “I don’t want legislators, or our staff, or anyone to get half truths or hear about this through the grapevine or the rumor mill. It’s important to put it out clearly and say ‘This is what happened.’”

Hayward’s annual salary when she retired was about $163,000. “Everyone on the board thought she did a tremendous job,” said J. Allen Dougherty, who served as chair of the HCRS board when the retirement package was approved. “She brought the organization out of bankruptcy, developed new programs and everyone who had contact with her, including people from the state, thought she did a magnificent job. She never had a retirement package and the board thought this was a way we could make it up to her.”

The package was originally approved at $450,000, but that was increased to $650,000 in 2013 when it was discovered that Hayward would be immediately taxed for $200,000 once she started to receive the payments.

Unfortunately, this year, for the first time in at least 10 years, HCRS employees did not get a raise, and Karabakakis said staff have been “disappointed, angry and outraged.”

“Some people may see it as excessive,” he said. “If we’re going to provide a deferred compensation package, it’s important that we look at the industry standard, and make sure that we do have a culture of openness and transparency.”

But the staff were unlikely to have been solely concerned about transparency. The other thing a board needs to ensure is that fair retirement benefits extend to all workers. The notion of caring only about the old age comfort of top employees is, naturally, abhorrent and insulting to many others. It’s no surprise, and in times where income inequality begs for our attention, our organizations should try not to mimic the bad policies of the larger economy.

Karabakakis said the whole incident has caused a review of employment policies, the establishment of a personnel committee, and a “commitment to open and transparent communication with all concerned.”

But all of that after-the-fact work is being done after the horse has left the barn. As reported here, Rep. Michael Mrowicki, who serves on the Human Services Committee, says he will bring up the possible oversight of executive compensation in the legislature. “These payments seem to have been structured in a way that they are legal, but they don’t really pass the smell test,” he said. “We are trying to figure out our next step.”

“Mainly we want to make sure this doesn’t happen again,” he said. “We wouldn’t want to set a precedent for other people to think they deserve more than they have been paid. The staff at these agencies work incredibly hard, and you don’t have to go very far to find people who are being denied services because they are told there is not enough money. These state agencies are entrusted with public money and the taxpayers deserve to be protected. It is frustrating and disappointing on a very basic level.”

The fact is that many nonprofits do not attend to retirement packages adequately until doing what feels fair on one level may look unreasonable to others. With as many baby boomers as there are in leadership at nonprofits, it is well past time to consider these issues.

Paula doit prendre une décision très délicate et déterminante au conseil | Cas en gouvernance

Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie McLelland qui aborde un problème relatif à la conduite d’un conseil d’administration de petite entreprise, dans un contexte de conflit d’intérêt et de malversations potentielles. Paula, la nouvelle administratrice doit prendre une décision très délicate !

Le cas présente la situation de manière très claire, puis trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit la nouvelle membre du C.A.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Une décision difficile au conseil : Le cas de Paula

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur

Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.

A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.

Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.

Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Top 10 des billets en gouvernance sur mon blogue | Année 2014

Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en 2014.

Les dix (10) articles les plus lus du Blogue en gouvernance ont fait l’objet de plus de 1 0 000 visites.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

Canada (64 %)
France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
Magreb (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie) (5 %)
Autres pays de l’Union Européenne (2 %)
États-Unis (2 %)
Autres pays de provenance (7 %)

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Top 10 de l’année 2014 du blogue en gouvernance de www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

1. Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
2. Sur quoi les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler ? \| Sur la stratégie ou sur la culture*
3. Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !
4. Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance \| Jacques Grisé
5. Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains PCD (CEO)

6. LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) \| LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7. On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A. \| Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter ! **
8. Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise
9. Pourquoi les entreprises choisissent le Delaware pour s’incorporer ?
10. Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board \| The Directors Toolkit

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– Individual contributor, providing specialized analysis, perspectives, and technical expertise to the rest of the team

– Organizational leader, managing the performance of a major segment of the enterprise and representing that segment’s interests in the corporate setting

– Supporter of the CEO, promulgating the CEO’s agenda both publicly and privately

– Colleague and peer, demonstrating public and private support for fellow members of the executive team

– Executive team member, taking an active and appropriate role in the team’s collective work

– External representative of the team and the organization to the workforce at large and to outside constituencies

– Potential successor to the CEO or a potential member of the next generation of top-tier leadership

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INDUSTRIE

MAJORITAIRE

FAMILLES

PHILANTHROPIE

INTÉRÊT GÉNÉRAL

GOUVERNANCE

RESPONSABILITÉ SOCIALE

LONG TERME

TROISIÈME VOIE

EFFICACITÉ

*Comparatif de l’efficacité des fondations actionnaires (colonne de droite), face aux entreprises à l’actionnariat dispersé (colonne de gauche), et aux entreprises à l’actionnariat familial (colonne du centre) (en anglais)

Source: Steen Thomsen, « Corporate ownership by industrial foundations »)

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