Cinq principes simples et universels de saine gouvernance | En rappel


Quels sont les principes fondamentaux de la bonne gouvernance ? Voilà un sujet bien d’actualité, une question fréquemment posée, laquelle appelle, trop souvent, des réponses complexes et peu utiles pour ceux qui siègent sur des conseils d’administration.

L’article de Jo Iwasaki, paru sur le site du NewStateman, a l’avantage de résumer très succinctement les cinq (5) grands principes qui doivent animer et inspirer les administrateurs de sociétés.

Les principes évoqués dans l’article sont simples et directs; ils peuvent même paraître simplistes mais, à mon avis, ils devraient servir de puissants guides de référence à tous les administrateurs de sociétés.

Les cinq principes retenus dans l’article sont les suivants :

Un solide engagement du conseil (leadership);

Une grande capacité d’action liée au mix de compétences, expertises et savoir être;

Une reddition de compte efficace envers les parties prenantes;

Un objectif de création de valeur et une distribution équitable entre les principaux artisans de la réussite;

De solides valeurs d’intégrité et de transparence susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen minutieux de la part des parties prenantes.

« What board members need to remind themselves is that they are collectively responsible for the long-term success of their company. This may sound obvious but it is not always recognised ».

What are the fundamental principles of corporate governance ?

 

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Our suggestion is to get back to the fundamental principles of good governance which board members should bear in mind in carrying out their responsibilities. If there are just a few, simple and short principles, board members can easily refer to them when making decisions without losing focus. Such a process should be open and dynamic.

In ICAEW’s  recent paper (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales) What are the overarching principles of corporate governance?, we proposed five such principles of corporate governance.

Leadership

An effective board should head each company. The Board should steer the company to meet its business purpose in both the short and long term.

Capability

The Board should have an appropriate mix of skills, experience and independence to enable its members to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively.

Accountability

The Board should communicate to the company’s shareholders and other stakeholders, at regular intervals, a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of how the company is achieving its business purpose and meeting its other responsibilities.

Sustainability

The Board should guide the business to create value and allocate it fairly and sustainably to reinvestment and distributions to stakeholders, including shareholders, directors, employees and customers.

Integrity

The Board should lead the company to conduct its business in a fair and transparent manner that can withstand scrutiny by stakeholders.

We kept them short, with purpose, but we also kept them aspirational. None of them should be a surprise – they might be just like you have on your board. Well, why not share and exchange our ideas – the more we debate, the better we remember the principles which guide our owbehaviour.

De son côté, l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (OAAQ) a retenu six (6) valeurs fondamentales qui devraient guider les membres dans l’accomplissement de leurs tâches de professionnels. Il est utile de les rappeler dans ce billet :

Transparence 

La transparence laisse paraître la réalité tout entière, sans qu’elle ne soit altérée ou biaisée. Il n’existe d’autre principe plus vertueux que la transparence de l’acte administratif par l’administrateur qui exerce un pouvoir au nom de son détenteur; celui qui est investi d’un pouvoir doit rendre compte de ses actes à son auteur.

Essentiellement, l’administrateur doit rendre compte de sa gestion au mandant ou autre personne ou groupe désigné, par exemple, à un conseil d’administration, à un comité de surveillance ou à un vérificateur. L’administrateur doit également agir de façon transparente envers les tiers ou les préposés pouvant être affectés par ses actes dans la mesure où le mandant le permet et qu’il n’en subit aucun préjudice.

Continuité

La continuité est ce qui permet à l’administration de poursuivre ses activités sans interruption. Elle implique l’obligation du mandataire de passer les pouvoirs aux personnes et aux intervenants désignés pour qu’ils puissent remplir leurs obligations adéquatement.

La continuité englobe aussi une perspective temporelle. L’administrateur doit choisir des avenues et des solutions qui favorisent la survie ou la croissance à long terme de la société qu’il gère. En lien avec la saine gestion, l’atteinte des objectifs à court terme ne doit pas menacer la viabilité d’une organisation à plus long terme.

Efficience

L’efficience allie efficacité, c’est-à-dire, l’atteinte de résultats et l’optimisation des ressources dans la pose d’actes administratifs. L’administrateur efficient vise le rendement optimal de la société à sa charge et maximise l’utilisation des ressources à sa disposition, dans le respect de l’environnement et de la qualité de vie.

Conscient de l’accès limité aux ressources, l’administrateur met tout en œuvre pour les utiliser avec diligence, parcimonie et doigté dans le but d’atteindre les résultats anticipés. L’absence d’une utilisation judicieuse des ressources constitue une négligence, une faute qui porte préjudice aux commettants.

Équilibre

L’équilibre découle de la juste proportion entre force et idées opposées, d’où résulte l’harmonie contributrice de la saine gestion des sociétés. L’équilibre se traduit chez l’administrateur par l’utilisation dynamique de moyens, de contraintes et de limites imposées par l’environnement en constante évolution.

Pour atteindre l’équilibre, l’administrateur dirigeant doit mettre en place des mécanismes permettant de répartir et balancer l’exercice du pouvoir. Cette pratique ne vise pas la dilution du pouvoir, mais bien une répartition adéquate entre des fonctions nécessitant des compétences et des habiletés différentes.

Équité

L’équité réfère à ce qui est foncièrement juste. Plusieurs applications en lien avec l’équité sont enchâssées dans la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés de la Loi canadienne sur les droits de la personne et dans la Charte québécoise des droits et libertés de la personne. L’administrateur doit faire en sorte de gérer en respect des lois afin de prévenir l’exercice abusif ou arbitraire du pouvoir.

Abnégation

L’abnégation fait référence à une personne qui renonce à tout avantage ou intérêt personnel autre que ceux qui lui sont accordés par contrat ou établis dans le cadre de ses fonctions d’administrateur.

Effective Governance | Top Ten Steps to Improving Corporate Governance | Effective Governance (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Vous vous préparez à occuper un poste d’administrateur d’une entreprise ? (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Corporate governance in multicultural organization (leadershipbyvirtue.blogspot.com)

Corporate Governance Quick Read – The role of the board is to govern (togovern.wordpress.com)

Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance (blogs.law.harvard.edu)

Carol Hansell: Corporate governance is a part of every major decision (jacquesgrisegouvernance.com)

Are Women Decision Makers More Risk Averse Than Their Male Counterparts? (togovern.wordpress.com)

Le choix entre le couple expérience-réputation et le couple fougue-expertise | Ça dépend !


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un cas fascinant qui illustre les difficultés de choisir un nouvel administrateur d’une jeune entreprise technologique.

Ce cas de gouvernance, publié en novembre 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan*, décrit la situation d’une entreprise qui est sur le point de s’inscrire en bourse ; choisit-elle, comme nouvel administrateur, une jeune personne fougueuse avec une solide expertise technique, ou choisit-elle une personne d’expérience possédant une grande réputation de bonne gouvernance ?

Le courtier qui conseille l’entreprise sur les conditions de son entrée en bourse lui suggère impérativement le choix d’une personne de grande réputation dans le domaine des affaires.

Le cas soumis est réel et il incite trois experts à présenter des points de vue assez différents sur les avantages et les inconvénients liés à chacun des choix.

Afin de vous former une idée mieux étayée du dilemme qui met en contraste les experts en gouvernance dans ce cas, je vous invite à lire leurs opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Et vous, qu’en pensez-vous ? Faites-vous une idée claire avant de consulter les réponses des experts.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

Le choix entre le couple expérience-réputation et le couple fougue-expertise | Ça dépend !

 

 

 

This month our case study considers the dilemma of choosing between experience and potential when building a board for an IPO. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Umberto founded his company ten years ago and built a successful technology company with a product that is tested in the market and capable of further development. Potential exists to take the product global; Umberto needs to move fast to retain the advantage of IP and know-how that can’t be easily replicated. An IPO is planned within twelve months and Umberto is confident his business will make a smooth transition from private to public company status.

Umberto has an advisory board with a range of skilled directors, each of whom adds considerable expertise in a relevant topic. He has benefitted greatly from their insights, and plans to convert this group of people into a governing board as he goes through the listing process. He is keen to add a new person to his board and has spoken with an ambitious bright young executive who has recently returned after five years in Asia selling a technology similar to Umberto’s product.

The broker advising on the IPO told Umberto that his board are a -bunch of unknowns” and unlikely to inspire the confidence of private equity investors and small funds that are the target market for his equity raising. The broker suggests appointing a ‘household name’ director from a large listed company. He admits that this person would not add much to the strategic competence of the board but claims they would help to bring in investors.

Umberto is in a quandary; he feels it would be disloyal to back out after his discussions with the young potential director, can’t justify bringing in two new directors, and doesn’t want to lose any of his existing team. He understands the merit of the broker’s suggestion. Should he choose experience and reputation or energy and ability?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Sommaire de l’enquête de PwC sur la gouvernance des entreprises auprès des administrateurs


La gouvernance des entreprises a beaucoup évolué au cours des vingt dernières années. Aujourd’hui, les investisseurs institutionnels détiennent 70 % des actions des corporations publiques.

L’auteure indique que l’un des seuls moyens pour les actionnaires investisseurs d’améliorer la performance des entreprises est d’agir sur la gouvernance des entreprises, en exerçant différentes pressions auprès du management et des administrateurs (« direct engagement ») et en faisant connaître leur avis via le vote par procuration.

Un sommaire de l’étude publié par Paula Loop*, directrice du Centre de la gouvernance de PricewaterhouseCoopers, nous donne un bon aperçu des principaux changements observés lors de l’enquête auprès de 886 administrateurs de grandes corporations américaines.

Voici les points saillants de l’étude :

  1. Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark
  2. Boards are taking more action on performance assessments
  3. Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations
  4. Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms
  5. Male and female directors see strategy very differently
  6. Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not
  7. Seeing returns on shareholder engagement
  8. The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity
  9. Challenging management is a challenge

 

Voir le résumé de l’enquête ci-dessous.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Insights from PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey

 

 

« Against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington and growing social divisiveness, US public company directors are faced with great expectations from investors and the public. Perhaps now more than ever, public companies are being asked to take the lead in addressing some of society’s most difficult problems. From seeking action on climate change to advancing diversity, stakeholder expectations are increasing and many companies are responding.

In part, this responsiveness is driven by changes in who owns public companies today. Institutional investors now own 70% of US public company stock, much of which is held in index funds. [1] Many of these passive investors believe that seeking improvements in corporate governance is one of the only levers they have to improve company performance. And these shareholders are exerting their influence with management teams and the board through their governance policies, direct engagement and proxy voting.

But boards and shareholders don’t always agree, and the corporate governance environment itself is not immune to divisiveness. In fact, our research shows that directors are clearly out of step with investor priorities in some critical areas.

One of these areas is environmental issues. During the 2017 proxy season, a handful of shareholder proposals on environmental issues, like climate change, gained majority shareholder support. This is the first time we have seen these types of proposals pass, and they did so with the help of some of the largest institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard and Fidelity. For their part, some of the largest US companies declared their continuing commitment to take action fighting climate change, even as the US announced its withdrawal from the Paris climate accord.

About the survey

 

For over a decade, PwC’s Annual Corporate Directors Survey has gauged the views of public company directors from across the United States on a variety of corporate governance matters. In the summer of 2017, 886 directors participated in our survey. The respondents represent a cross-section of companies from over a dozen industries,

75% of which have annual revenues of more than $1 billion. Eighty-four percent of the respondents were men, and 16% were women. Their board tenure varied, but 60% have served on their board for five or more years.

 

But despite increased shareholder interest in environmental risk, there appears to be a disconnect when it comes to the views in many boardrooms. A majority of directors tell us that their boards don’t need sustainability expertise. A surprising number also say their company’s strategy isn’t being influenced by climate change or resource scarcity, and that they don’t think environmental concerns will impact their current strategy. Companies and investors may be driving the agenda, but rather than leading the way in this area, many directors are being carried along.

Gender diversity on boards has also become a clear priority for institutional investors in 2017. Shareholders like State Street Global Advisors and BlackRock recently adopted new diversity policies or guidance on board diversity. Indeed, State Street even voted against directors at hundreds of companies that it believed had not made sufficient strides in diversifying their boards. Yet despite the increased focus from institutional investors, fewer of the new board seats in 2016 went to women than in the prior year. [2] And gender parity is still a long way off, with only 25% of boards in the S&P 500 having more than two female directors. [3] Even so, about half of female directors tell us that their board is already sufficiently diverse. Which leads to the question—are female directors sufficiently championing the cause of gender diversity?

Investors are also putting the spotlight on social issues like income inequality and employee retirement security, asking companies to help develop shared economic security. But again, directors tell us that income inequality considerations should not play a part in company strategy.

PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey examines the areas where directors and investors are aligned and moving forward together, as well as the ways in which they are out of sync.

While boards have made real improvements in some areas, there is clearly more work to be done. Among our key observations:

 

Director discontent with peers hits a high-water mark

 

With greater expectations of boards, directors are upping their game and are seeking to add value. More than ever, directors—particularly those who are less tenured—are also noticing that not all of their fellow directors are doing the same. Almost half of directors (46%) believe that one or more of their fellow board members should be replaced. One-fifth of directors say that two or more directors on their board should be replaced.

 

Boards are taking more action on performance assessments

 

Investors have been pushing boards to not just conduct board performance assessments, but to do something with the results. This year, more than twothirds (68%) say that their board has taken some action in response to their last board assessment—an increase of 19 percentage points over last year.

 

Independent chairs are more likely to have the difficult conversations

 

Directors on boards with non-executive chairs are more than twice as likely to say that their board decided not to re-nominate a director, or provided counsel to a director, as a result of the board’s assessment process.

 

Key issues are not being prioritized in many boardrooms

 

While investors are talking about the impact of environmental and social issues on the bottom line, the conversations are not necessarily filtering up to the boardroom. A significant percentage of directors say that income inequality (51%), immigration (49%) and climate change (40%) should not be taken into account—at all—in company strategy.

 

Male and female directors see strategy very differently

 

Female directors are more likely to think that social issues should play a part in company strategy formation. And they are much more likely to think that issues like environmental concerns and social instability will force the company to change its strategy in the next three years.

 

Executive pay plans are effective—except where they’re not

 

Directors are confident that incentive plans promote long-term shareholder value. But 70% at least somewhat agree that executives in general are overpaid, and 66% say that executive compensation exacerbates income inequality. Meanwhile, executive pay continues to go up, not down. [4]

 

Seeing returns on shareholder engagement

 

In just the past year, directors have come around to a much more positive view of shareholder engagement. They are much more likely now to think that direct engagement impacts proxy voting (77% as compared to 59% in 2016). And the vast majority now say that the right representatives are present (85%) and investors are well prepared for meetings (84%)—12 and 21 percentage point increases over last year, respectively.

 

The gender divide is real on questions of board diversity

 

Male and female directors have a significant difference of opinion about the impact of board diversity on company performance. Nearly five out of six female directors (82%) believe that diversity enhances company performance, while only just over half of men agree (54%).

 

Challenging management is a challenge

 

Strategy oversight is one of the board’s core responsibilities. Investors want to know that directors are heavily involved in evaluating, challenging and monitoring the company’s strategy, and calling for a change of course when needed. Yet only 60% of directors say their board strongly challenges management assumptions on strategy as part of their oversight role.

As we analyzed the results of this year’s survey, we also looked behind the numbers at how demographic differences such as gender and length of tenure on the board affected directors’ views. Read on for our full analysis of the survey results and areas where those differences were notable. And for the results of every question in the survey, please refer to the Appendix of the complete publication.

The complete publication is available here.

Endnotes

1Institutional investors owned an average of 70% of the outstanding shares of US public companies as of June 30, 2017. PwC + Broadridge, ProxyPulse 2017 Proxy Season Review, September 2017. Forty-two percent of all US stock fund assets as of June 30, 2017 were held through index funds. Investment Company Institute.(go back)

2 The percentage of women in new board appointments at Fortune 500 companies declined two percentage points to 27.3% in 2016. Fortune, “The Share of Women Appointed to Fortune 500 Declined Last Year,” June 19, 2017.(go back)

3Spencer Stuart, 2016 Spencer Stuart Board Index, November 2016.(go back)

4See Willis Towers Watson Executive Pay Bulletin, May 9, 2017.(go back) »

_____________________________________

*Paula Loop is Leader of the Governance Insights Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a publication from the PwC Governance Insights Center.

La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?


Afin de donner suite à mon billet du 20 octobre, intitulé « Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées », dans lequel Marianne Hugoo, rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’avait demandé si les 12 grandes tendances que j’avais identifiées en 2014 s’étaient effectivement avérées en 2017, au regard de la situation française.

J’avais alors préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances identifiées dans l’article du Journal Les Affaires de 2014.

Aujourd’hui, je vous fais part des résultats de l’enquête, parus dans la revue l’Hebdo des AG (no 151 | 23 octobre 2017), qui présentent la situation de la gouvernance en France.

Il m’est toujours apparu important d’avoir une vue globale des facteurs qui affectent la gouvernance dans les entreprises étrangères, notamment les entreprises françaises.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ?

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « La gouvernance française suit-elle la tendance mondiale ? »

 

 

Suivant 10 axes de comparaison, l’Hebdo des AG a confronté les données factuelles sur les Conseils français après les AG 2017 avec les travaux de Jacques Grisé, Président de l’Ordre des administrateurs agréés du Québec (sic, président sortant) et Directeur des programmes de formation en gouvernance (sic, ex-directeur) au Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS). Il identifiait en 2014 les tendances de gouvernance à mettre sous surveillance et a réagi sur les observations de notre Enquête.

La gouvernance française suit la tendance mondiale sur les grands enjeux : la prise en compte de la montée de l’activisme actionnarial, l’épée de Damoclès du Say-on-Pay comme juge de paix.

Il reste des « exceptions françaises » : l’une est la féminisation des Conseils, oui la France est en avance ! Les autres relèvent de la structure des travaux du Conseil et peut-être au poids prépondérant du dirigeant en France : les Conseils sont moins indépendants et moins ouverts à l’évaluation extérieure.

Les 4 thèmes qui inscrivent la gouvernance des entreprises françaises dans la tendance mondiale :

  1. En France comme ailleurs, l’administrateur a 59 ans en moyenne : c’est une personne à la fois expérimentée et en âge d’exercer une activité professionnelle
  2. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus formés
  3. Le Say-on-Pay joue le rôle de juge de paix sur la satisfaction des actionnaires
  4. L’enjeu aujourd’hui : le rôle des investisseurs activistes

Les 6 « exceptions françaises »,

  1. La dissociation des pouvoirs n’est toujours pas d’actualité en France — mais pas non plus aux États-Unis
  2. Les Conseils d’administration se sont féminisés, en France plus qu’ailleurs due à l’effet de la loi Copé-Zimmerman
  3. Cette féminisation est souvent allée de pair avec l’internationalisation des Conseils français, sujet qui n’est pas identifié comme tendance mondiale.
  4. La taille des Conseils en France est stable à 12-13 administrateurs, elle se réduit dans les autres pays
  5. Les Conseils français sont moins indépendants — un sujet de débat sur la définition même de l’indépendance
  6. Les Conseils ont partout mis en place des procédures d’évaluation — mais il s’agit encore souvent, en France, d’auto-évaluation

 

 

L’ENQUÊTE

 

  1. En France, comme ailleurs, l’administrateur a 59 ans en moyenne : c’est une personne à la fois expérimentée et en âge d’exercer une activité professionnelle

 

Il y a 10 ans, 28 % des Conseils américains avaient une moyenne d’âge de 59 ans ou moins contre 15 % aujourd’hui. La moyenne d’âge des administrateurs américains est de 63 ans.

L’âge moyen des administrateurs français ne bouge pas : il était de 59 ans pour le SBF 120 en 2014 et l’est toujours en 2017. Le reste des Conseils européens se situent dans la même moyenne.

Ce chiffre indique que la plupart des administrateurs français ne sont pas « retraités », mais en activité. Il exclut également, de fait, la notion d’« administrateur indépendant professionnel », vivant uniquement de ses mandats.

 

  1. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus formés

 

Selon Jacques Grisé, ce sont les « compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise qui sont très recherchées ».

En France, l’IFA a mis en place en 2010, en partenariat avec l’IEP (« Sciences Po »), une formation d’administrateur certifié. Depuis 2014, le nombre de certificats délivrés a crû de 5,56 % en passant de 108 certificats délivrés en 2014 à 114 certificats en 2016.

Déjà en 2013, le Code de Gouvernance insistait sur la formation des administrateurs : « chaque administrateur bénéficie, s’il le juge nécessaire, d’une formation complémentaire sur les spécificités de l’entreprise, ses métiers et son secteur d’activité. »

Par ailleurs, toutes les sociétés pour lesquelles s’applique le Code de gouvernance doivent mentionner les domaines de compétences de leurs administrateurs dans leur communication annuelle avec les actionnaires à travers leur document de référence.

Certaines sociétés vont encore plus loin en institutionnalisant au sein des Conseils des équipes dédiées à la recherche d’expertises clés. En effet, comme le mentionne par exemple le document de référence 2016 d’ENGIE, il a été décidé de mettre en place « le recensement des expertises clés des administrateurs ».

 

  1. Le Say-on-Pay joue le rôle de juge de paix sur la satisfaction des actionnaires

 

Jacques Grisé souligne le caractère « toujours potentiellement conflictuel » de la situation entre « les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes ».

La contestation se cristallise sur le Say-on-Pay

En France depuis la loi Sapin II, les actionnaires votent sur la rémunération des dirigeants — consultatif jusqu’ici, décisif à partir de 2018.

Pour mémoire, ils ont rejeté, en 2016, la rémunération de Carlos Ghosn, PDG de Renault, et celle de Patrick Kron, PDG d’Alstom ; en 2017, celle de Jean-Pierre Rémy, PDG de Solocal Group, et celle de Philippe Salle, PDG d’Elior. Dans chacun de ces cas, les Conseils ont révisé leur proposition.

Des scores d’élection d’administrateurs toujours très hauts : les actionnaires, quand ils sont mécontents, ne mettent pas en cause les administrateurs.

De manière générale, les actionnaires votent moins facilement les nominations de nouveaux administrateurs par rapport aux taux d’approbation de 2014. Cependant, les scores restent très hauts et il n’y a donc pas de quoi penser que les actionnaires se servent de cette tribune pour faire valoir leurs droits.

 

  1. L’enjeu aujourd’hui : le rôle des investisseurs activistes

 

Dans tous les pays, l’activisme progresse. Un point commun est le fondement de leur argumentaire : il s’agit, souvent, d’une question de transparence ou de gouvernance. La question est de savoir si les interventions de ces investisseurs activistes sont, à long terme, négatives ou positives pour la gouvernance, dans la mesure où les investisseurs obtiennent souvent une accélération de la transformation de l’entreprise, mais n’y restent pas. Une préoccupation commune à toutes les entreprises cette année.

Jacques Grisé identifie l’aiguillon des investisseurs activistes comme important, car ils « minent l’autorité du Conseil d’administration en s’adressant directement aux actionnaires ». Quatre ans plus tard, « force est de constater que l’activisme est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde et que les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques ».

 

  1. La dissociation des pouvoirs n’est toujours pas d’actualité en France — mais pas non plus aux États-Unis

 

En 2014, Jacques Grisé s’attendait à une « valorisation du rôle du Président du Conseil », faisant contrepoids au DG — dans un contexte où les PDG étaient déjà très majoritaires en France.

Au Canada, le rôle du Chairman est mis en avant. Les États-Unis, souligne Jacques Grisé, sont « plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairmen et CEO ».

La France suit sur ce point la tendance des États-Unis : le CAC 40 compte 65 % de PDG et le NEXT 80 en compte 50 %.

 

  1. Les Conseils d’administration se sont féminisés, en France, plus qu’ailleurs — l’effet de la loi Copé-Zimmerman

 

En 2014, Jacques Grisé prévoyait que « la diversité au sein du Conseil deviendrait un sujet de gouvernance incontournable ».

Jacques Grisé, en 2017, souligne que la tendance américaine « de diminution (sic, de la taille) des Conseils ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices », ce qui n’est pas le cas en France. La loi Copé-Zimmerman a imposé le quota de 40 % de femmes administrateurs.

 

  1. Cette féminisation est souvent allée de pair avec l’internationalisation des Conseils français, sujet qui n’est pas identifié comme tendance mondiale

 

Les Conseils français se sont rapidement dotés de nombreux administrateurs étrangers afin de remplir les critères de diversité recommandés par le Code de Gouvernance (Afep MEDEF).

Même si certaines sociétés, comme AMUNDI, n’ont aucun administrateur étranger au sein du Conseil, elles intègrent une représentation étrangère dans d’autres instances. Amundi a par exemple mis en place un « comité consultatif composé de grands experts économiques et politiques de renommée internationale ».  Le taux moyen d’internationalisation des Conseils du SBF 120 est passé de 16 % en 2013 à 24 % 3 n 2017.

 

  1. La taille des Conseils en France est stable à 12-13 administrateurs, elle est plus faible dans d’autres pays

 

Outre-Atlantique, la réduction de la taille des Conseils prédite par Jacques Grisé s’est confirmée au Canada. Cependant, aux États-Unis, le nombre moyen de membres par Conseil a augmenté : depuis 10 ans, la moyenne se situe autour de 10 membres pour les entreprises du S&P 500.

En France, le nombre d’administrateurs moyen par Conseil est resté stable autour de 12 ou 13, ce qui reste supérieur à la moyenne américaine.

 

  1. Les Conseils français sont moins indépendants qu’ailleurs et une bonne définition de l’indépendance persiste

 

Jacques Grisé prévoyait une plus grande indépendance des Conseils.

Pour les besoins de cette Enquête, nous retiendrons comme définition de l’indépendance celle donnée par chaque société, ce qui est la méthode retenue par l’AMF : est indépendant un administrateur qualifié par la société comme indépendant, même si des associations comme l’AFG ou des proxy advisors comme ISS ou Proxinvest ont un comptage différent.

L’indépendance des Conseils, quant à elle, augmente progressivement. En effet, elle a grimpé de 3 points entre 2014 et 2016.  Le taux moyen d’internationalisation des Conseils du SBF 120 est passé de 42 % en 2014 à 47 % en 2016.

 

  1. Les Conseils ont partout mis en place des procédures d’évaluation — mais il s’agit encore souvent, en France, d’auto-évaluation

Notre spécialiste affirme que « l’évaluation de la performance des Conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle ». En France comme aux États-Unis ou au Canada, les Conseils des sociétés cotées ont mis en place des procédures d’évaluations de leurs travaux.

Cependant, si dès 2014, Jacques Grisé notait qu’aux États-Unis « les sociétés font déjà appel à des firmes extérieures pour mener cette évaluation », il n’en est pas de même en France où la forme la plus habituelle est celle de l’auto-évaluation.

__________________________________

Enquête réalisée par Marianne Hugoo

Divulgation protégée d’un lanceur d’alerte dans une société d’État | Un cas épineux pour un président de conseil


Voici un cas de gouvernance, publié en octobre 2017 sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan*, qui présente une situation dans laquelle Tiffany, la présidente du conseil d’une grande société d’État, se demande quel plan d’action elle doit adopter avant la rencontre de son ministre responsable.

Le cas soumis est très délicat, car il présente une situation où un employé divulgue l’abus de pouvoir d’un haut dirigeant qui se rapporte au CEO. Les membres du conseil sont avisés des allégations, mais les administrateurs auraient voulu en savoir davantage. Cependant, ils comprennent que l’identité de l’informateur est protégée par leur propre politique !

Le CEO est très mécontent de la situation et il exige que ses employés lui fournissent toutes les informations relatives à cette divulgation.

Quelle approche Tiffany doit-elle privilégier lors de sa rencontre avec le ministre ? Doit-elle proposer le congédiement du CEO qui, dans l’ensemble, s’acquitte très bien de ses responsabilités de direction ? Quelles sont ses options ?

Le cas présente la situation succinctement, mais clairement ; puis, trois experts en gouvernance se prononcent sur le dilemme qui se présente aux personnes qui vivent des situations similaires.

Je vous invite donc à lire ces opinions en allant sur le site de Julie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.

 

Divulgation par un lanceur d’alerte dans une société d’État

 

Our case study this month looks at how a board can establish control without losing a valuable executive. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Tiffany chairs a large government-sector company. It is subject to intense public scrutiny as it handles multi-million-dollar investments and sensitive customer information.

A few months ago, a whistle-blower made a series of protected disclosures alleging improper use of position and information by one of the CEO’s direct reports. The Senior Compliance Officer (SCO) briefed the board, and CEO, on the allegations and their investigation. The board were unhappy with the level of detail available but accepted this as an inevitable consequence of their policy which protects the identity of whistle-blowers.

Unbeknownst to Tiffany, or her board, the CEO angrily followed up with the SCO after the board meeting and said that he was embarrassed to have been unable to provide complete answers to the board’s questions. The investigation eventually exonerated the person concerned and the SCO reported to the CEO that the case was ‘closed’. The CEO responded to the news with an emailed request that he now be told who had made the allegations. The SCO refused to divulge the identity but confirmed he had reported the outcome to the whistle-blower.

The following morning the CEO asked the SCO’s secretary to forward him a copy of all documents relating to the completed inquiry and specifically requested the closure report sent to the confidential informant. The SCO found out and referred the matter to the anti-corruption authority before reporting the matter to Tiffany.

Tiffany wants to brief the Minister before the matter becomes public. She would like a plan of action before she meets the Minister. She doesn’t want to fire the CEO as he is doing well in other respects; she knows action is essential.

What are her options?


*Julie Garland McLellan is a practising non-executive director and board consultant based in Sydney, Australia. www.mclellan.com.au/newsletter.html

Quelles tendances en gouvernance, identifiées en 2014, se sont avérées


J’ai réalisé une entrevue avec le Journal des Affaires le 17 mars 2014. Une rédactrice au sein de l’Hebdo des AG, un média numérique qui se consacre au traitement des sujets touchant à la gouvernance des entreprises françaises, m’a contacté afin de connaître mon opinion sur quelles « prédictions » se sont effectivement avérées, et lesquelles restent encore à améliorer.

J’ai préparé quelques réflexions en référence aux douze tendances que j’avais identifiées le 17 mars 2014 (voir le texte ci-dessous en rouge).

J’espère que ces commentaires vous seront utiles même si mon intervention est colorée par la situation canadienne et américaine.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

Gouvernance : 12 tendances à surveiller

 

« Si la gouvernance des entreprises a fait beaucoup de chemin depuis quelques années, son évolution se poursuit. Afin d’imaginer la direction qu’elle prendra au cours des prochaines années, nous avons consulté l’expert Jacques Grisé, ancien directeur des programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés, de l’Université Laval.

Toujours affilié au Collège, M. Grisé publie depuis plusieurs années le blogue www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com, un site incontournable pour rester à l’affût des bonnes pratiques et tendances en gouvernance. Voici les 12 tendances dont il faut suivre l’évolution, selon Jacques Grisé : »

 

1. Les conseils d’administration réaffirmeront leur autorité. « Auparavant, la gouvernance était une affaire qui concernait davantage le management », explique M. Grisé. La professionnalisation de la fonction d’administrateur amène une modification et un élargissement du rôle et des responsabilités des conseils. Les CA sont de plus en plus sollicités et questionnés au sujet de leurs décisions et de l’entreprise.

Cette affirmation est de plus en plus vraie. La formation certifiée en gouvernance est de plus en plus prisée. Les CA, et notamment les présidents de CA, sont de plus en plus sollicités pour expliquer leurs décisions, leurs erreurs et les problèmes de gestion de crise.

2. La formation des administrateurs prendra de l’importance. À l’avenir, on exigera toujours plus des administrateurs. C’est pourquoi la formation est essentielle et devient même une exigence pour certains organismes. De plus, la formation continue se généralise ; elle devient plus formelle.

Il va de soi que la formation en gouvernance prendra plus d’importance, mais les compétences et les expériences reliées au secteur d’activité de l’entreprise seront toujours très recherchées.

3. L’affirmation du droit des actionnaires et celle du rôle du conseil s’imposeront. Le débat autour du droit des actionnaires par rapport à celui des conseils d’administration devra mener à une compréhension de ces droits conflictuels. Aujourd’hui, les conseils doivent tenir compte des parties prenantes en tout temps.

Il existe toujours une situation potentiellement conflictuelle entre les intérêts des actionnaires et la responsabilité des administrateurs envers toutes les parties prenantes.

4. La montée des investisseurs activistes se poursuivra. L’arrivée de l’activisme apporte une nouvelle dimension au travail des administrateurs. Les investisseurs activistes s’adressent directement aux actionnaires, ce qui mine l’autorité des conseils d’administration. Est-ce bon ou mauvais ? La vision à court terme des activistes peut être néfaste, mais toutes leurs actions ne sont pas négatives, notamment parce qu’ils s’intéressent souvent à des entreprises qui ont besoin d’un redressement sous une forme ou une autre. Pour bien des gens, les fonds activistes sont une façon d’améliorer la gouvernance. Le débat demeure ouvert.

Le débat est toujours ouvert, mais force est de constater que l’actionnariat activiste est en pleine croissance partout dans le monde. Les effets souvent décriés des activistes sont de plus en plus acceptés comme bénéfiques dans plusieurs situations de gestion déficiente.

5. La recherche de compétences clés deviendra la norme. De plus en plus, les organisations chercheront à augmenter la qualité de leur conseil en recrutant des administrateurs aux expertises précises, qui sont des atouts dans certains domaines ou secteurs névralgiques.

Cette tendance est très nette. Les CA cherchent à recruter des membres aux expertises complémentaires.

6. Les règles de bonne gouvernance vont s’étendre à plus d’entreprises. Les grands principes de la gouvernance sont les mêmes, peu importe le type d’organisation, de la PME à la société ouverte (ou cotée), en passant par les sociétés d’État, les organismes à but non lucratif et les entreprises familiales.

Ici également, l’application des grands principes de gouvernance se généralise et s’applique à tous les types d’organisation, en les adaptant au contexte.

7. Le rôle du président du conseil sera davantage valorisé. La tendance veut que deux personnes distinctes occupent les postes de président du conseil et de PDG, au lieu qu’une seule personne cumule les deux, comme c’est encore trop souvent le cas. Un bon conseil a besoin d’un solide leader, indépendant du PDG.

Le rôle du Chairman est de plus en plus mis en évidence, car c’est lui qui représente le conseil auprès des différents publics. Il est de plus en plus indépendant de la direction. Les É.-U. sont plus lents à adopter la séparation des fonctions entre Chairman et CEO.

8. La diversité deviendra incontournable. Même s’il y a un plus grand nombre de femmes au sein des conseils, le déficit est encore énorme. Pourtant, certaines études montrent que les entreprises qui font une place aux femmes au sein de leur conseil sont plus rentables. Et la diversité doit s’étendre à d’autres origines culturelles, à des gens de tous âges et d’horizons divers.

La diversité dans la composition des conseils d’administration est de plus en plus la norme. On a fait des progrès remarquables à ce chapitre, mais la tendance à la diminution de la taille des CA ralentit quelque peu l’accession des femmes aux postes d’administratrices.

9. Le rôle stratégique du conseil dans l’entreprise s’imposera. Le temps où les CA ne faisaient qu’approuver les orientations stratégiques définies par la direction est révolu. Désormais, l’élaboration du plan stratégique de l’entreprise doit se faire en collaboration avec le conseil, en profitant de son expertise.

Certes, l’un des rôles les plus importants des administrateurs est de voir à l’orientation de l’entreprise, en apportant une valeur ajoutée aux stratégies élaborées par la direction. Les CA sont toujours sollicités, sous une forme ou une autre, dans la conception de la stratégie.

10. La réglementation continuera de se raffermir. Le resserrement des règles qui encadrent la gouvernance ne fait que commencer. Selon Jacques Grisé, il faut s’attendre à ce que les autorités réglementaires exercent une surveillance accrue partout dans le monde, y compris au Québec, avec l’Autorité des marchés financiers. En conséquence, les conseils doivent se plier aux règles, notamment en ce qui concerne la rémunération et la divulgation. Les responsabilités des comités au sein du conseil prendront de l’importance. Les conseils doivent mettre en place des politiques claires en ce qui concerne la gouvernance.

Les conseils d’administration accordent une attention accrue à la gouvernance par l’intermédiaire de leur comité de Gouvernance, mais aussi par leurs comités de RH et d’Audit. Les autorités réglementaires mondiales sont de plus en plus vigilantes eu égard à l’application des principes de saine gouvernance. La SEC, qui donnait souvent le ton dans ce domaine, est en mode révision de la réglementation parce que le gouvernement de Trump la juge trop contraignante pour les entreprises. À suivre !

11. La composition des conseils d’administration s’adaptera aux nouvelles exigences et se transformera. Les CA seront plus petits, ce qui réduira le rôle prépondérant du comité exécutif, en donnant plus de pouvoir à tous les administrateurs. Ceux-ci seront mieux choisis et formés, plus indépendants, mieux rémunérés et plus redevables de leur gestion aux diverses parties prenantes. Les administrateurs auront davantage de responsabilités et seront plus engagés dans les comités aux fonctions plus stratégiques. Leur responsabilité légale s’élargira en même temps que leurs tâches gagnent en importance. Il faudra donc des membres plus engagés, un conseil plus diversifié, dirigé par un leader plus fort.

C’est la voie que les CA ont empruntée. La taille des CA est de plus en plus réduite ; les conseils exécutifs sont en voie de disparition pour faire plus de place aux trois comités statutaires : Gouvernance, RH et Audit. Les administrateurs sont de plus en plus engagés et ils doivent investir plus de temps dans leurs fonctions.

12. L’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration deviendra la norme. La tendance est déjà bien ancrée aux États-Unis, où les entreprises engagent souvent des firmes externes pour mener cette évaluation. Certaines choisissent l’auto-évaluation. Dans tous les cas, le processus est ouvert et si les résultats restent confidentiels, ils contribuent à l’amélioration de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Effectivement, l’évaluation de la performance des conseils d’administration est devenue une pratique quasi universelle dans les entreprises cotées. Celles-ci doivent d’ailleurs divulguer le processus dans le rapport aux actionnaires. On assiste à un énorme changement depuis les dix dernières années.

L’influence de l’activisme sur le renouvellement des CA


Quelle est l’influence de l’activisme actionnarial sur le renouvellement des conseils d’administration?

C’est précisément le sujet de l’excellente publication de Subodh Mishra*, directeur exécutif de Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), parue sur le forum en gouvernance de la Harvard Law School.

Les résultats de l’étude, réalisée auprès des entreprises du S&P 1500, sont présentés d’une manière illustrative vraiment très claire.

Je vous invite à lire le sommaire de l’étude ci-dessous.

Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « actionnaires activistes »

 

Few business-related topics provoke more passionate discussions than shareholder activism at specific companies. Supporters view activists as agents of change who push complacent corporate directors and entrenched managers to unlock stranded shareholder value. Detractors charge that these aggressive investors force their way into boardrooms, bully incumbent directors into adopting short-term strategies at the expense of long-term shareholders, and then exit with big profits in hand.

Lost in this heated long- versus short-term debate is the significant, real-time impact that such activism has on corporate board membership and demographics. ISS identified a recent surge in its evaluation of refreshment trends at S&P 1500 firms between 2008 and 2016 (see Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms, published by IRRCi in January 2017). This accelerated boardroom turnover coincided with an increase in activists’ success in securing board representation, particularly via negotiated settlements. A recent study of shareholder activism by Activist Insights pegged activists’ annual U.S. boardroom gains at more than 200 seats in 2015 and 2016. While a significant portion of this activism was aimed at micro-cap firms, threats of fights have become commonplace even at S&P 500 companies in recent years.

Despite activists’ recent boardroom gains, little attention has been paid to the influence of activism on broader board refreshment trends. Anecdotal media coverage, often fanned by anti-activist communications strategies, still tends to myopically focus on two long-standing dissident nominee stereotypes: the still-wet-behind-the-ears, 20- or 30-something-year-old hedge fund analyst, and the older, male, over-boarded crony of the fund manager.

These long-standing stereotypes appear to be outdated as activism has entered an era in which most dissident nominees have attenuated ties to their hedge fund patrons. The experience, qualifications, attributes, and skills of dissident nominees can appear indistinguishable from those of the incumbent directors whom they seek to supplant. Nominees’ backgrounds and experiences can become even more interchangeable with those of incumbent directors when the latter transfuse their own ranks with new blood during, or in anticipation of, an activist campaign. This heightened competition can leave shareholders with a bounty of fresh-faced, highly-qualified, independent candidates on both nominee slates. Highlighting this narrowing divide, dissidents’ “hand-picked” nominees have been known to reject their sponsors’ wishes and strategic plans (witness Elliott Management’s first tranche of candidates at Arconic, who were seated via a settlement, opposing the hedge fund’s second attempt to gain board seats). Similarly, nominees selected by incumbent directors to face off against dissident candidates sometimes end up endorsing the very shifts in strategic direction that they were recruited to fend off (witness the DuPont board’s “victory” over Nelson Peltz’s Trian Partners, followed by board-recruited director-turned CEO Ed Breen’s advocacy of a Peltzian-style breakup of the company).

To close this board refreshment information gap, IRRCi asked ISS to explore the broader impact of activism by focusing on nominees—regardless of the entity that backed them—and the impact of dissident campaigns on boards.

 

Methodology

 

The complete publication (available here) examines the impact of public shareholder activism on board refreshment at S&P 1500 companies targeted by activists from 2011 to 2015. Public shareholder activism refers to any shareholder activism that (1) occurred between Jan. 1, 2011 and Dec. 31, 2015, and (2) was publicly disclosed. The study period concludes in 2015 so that data for a full calendar year following activist campaigns could be analyzed. Data was captured as of the shareholder meeting dates.

Part I examines individual dissident nominees on ballots (whether they ultimately joined the board or not) in proxy contests, directors appointed via settlements with activist shareholders, and directors appointed unilaterally by boards in connection with shareholder activism.

Part II examines changes to board profiles made in connection with public shareholder activism.

Data was captured for all S&P 1500 directors with less than one year of tenure at meetings scheduled to be held between Jan. 1, 2011 and Dec. 31, 2015. The directors were then assigned to one of four classifications:

  1. All dissident nominees on ballots in proxy contests;
  2. Directors appointed or nominated by incumbent boards through publicly-disclosed settlements with activist shareholders;
  3. Directors appointed or nominated unilaterally by incumbent boards in connection with public shareholder activism; and
  4. Directors appointed or nominated prior to and not in connection with public shareholder activism.

If a definitive proxy contest was settled, directors added to the board as a result of the settlement were assigned to classification two.

Data for directors assigned to classification four was excluded, as it did not relate to the impact of public shareholder activism on board refreshment during the study period.

In Part II, board profile changes were assessed through a comparison of target boards in the year prior to shareholder activism and target boards in the year following shareholder activism. For example, there was shareholder activism at J. C. Penney in connection with the company’s 2011 annual meeting. The measure of change was therefore based on a comparison of the board profiles at the company’s 2010 and 2012 annual meetings. In cases where there were two or more consecutive years of shareholder activism, board profile changes were assessed through a comparison of target boards in the year prior to the first year of shareholder activism and target boards in the year following the final consecutive year of shareholder activism. For example, there was shareholder activism at Juniper Networks in both 2014 and 2015. The measure of change was therefore based on a comparison of the board profiles at the company’s 2013 and 2016 annual meetings.

Part II examines year-over-year trends. In these cases, study companies with two or more consecutive years of shareholder activism were excluded. Study companies were grouped by market-cap segments, i.e. S&P 500 (large-cap), S&P 400 (mid-cap), and S&P 600 (small-cap). Study companies that changed indexes over the course of the study were excluded from segment-level comparisons.

In Part II, references to changes in average director age and average director tenure at study companies (excluding those discussed in isolation) refer to averages of average company-level data. Company-level data provided average age and tenure for each specific company. For references to average age and tenure at study companies, these data points were calculated by averaging the company-level (rather than director-level) data points.

Key Findings

Part I: Individual Director Demographics

 

Snapshot: Public shareholder activism generally leads to younger, more independent, but less diverse, board candidates who had previous boardroom experience and relevant professional pedigrees. Typically activists favor nominees with financial experience and incumbent boards favor nominees with executive experience.  

 

FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017-8.png

 

Activism drives down director ages

Dissident nominees and directors appointed via settlements (hereinafter Dissident Directors) were younger, on average, than directors appointed unilaterally by boards (hereinafter Board Appointees) in connection with shareholder activism. Study Directors (the combination of Dissident Directors and Board Appointees), regardless of who recruited them, were generally younger than their counterparts across the broader S&P 1500 index. While Dissident Directors generally reflected a wider range of ages, insurgent investors and incumbent boards both favored individuals in their fifties when picking candidates. This preference for nominees in their fifties aligns with practices in the broader S&P 1500 index over the same period.

Activism does not promote gender diversity

Less than ten percent of Study Directors were women. While the rate at which females were selected as dissident nominees or Board Appointees in contested situations increased over the course of the study, it trailed the rising tide of female board representation in the broader S&P 1500 universe*.* There were zero female Dissident Directors in 2011, two in 2012, and three in 2013. Similarly, there were two female Board Appointees in 2011, but zero in both 2012 and 2013.

Activism does not promote racial/ethnic diversity

Less than five percent of Study Directors were ethnically or racially diverse. While minority representation across the entire S&P 1500 board universe slowly increased over the course of the study, from 9.3 percent in 2011 to 10.1 percent in 2015, the rate at which individuals with diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds were selected as Dissident Directors and Board Appointees was relatively uniform and trailed that of the broader index by more than five percentage points.

Activism boosts boardroom independence

Study Directors were generally more independent than their counterparts across the broader S&P 1500. Not surprisingly, dissident nominees and directors appointed to boards via settlements were more likely to be “independent” than directors appointed unilaterally by boards in connection with shareholder activism. It is worth pointing out that the measure of “independence” focused on a nominee’s degree of separation from management rather than from the dissident. Indeed, as the examination of prior boardroom experience suggests, there may be questions of independence from activist sponsors for a subset of Study Directors.

Prior boardroom experience is not required. Boardroom experience does not appear to be a prerequisite for contest candidates. More than half of Study Directors held outside board seats. While most of these directors sat on either one or two outside boards, a sizable minority pushed the over-boarded envelope. Six Study Directors served on four outside boards, four on five outside boards, and one on six outside boards. Many of these “busy” directors appear to be “go-to” nominees for individual activists. The serial nomination of favorite candidates raises questions about the “independence” of these individuals from their activist sponsors.

Investment professionals and sitting executives dominate the candidate pool for contested elections

Occupational data for the Study Directors demonstrates experience, qualifications, attributes, and skills (EQAS) preferences for nominees in contested situations. “Corporate executives” and “financial services professionals” were in a dead heat at the front of the pack. These favored occupations were not evenly distributed, as activists tended to select investors and incumbents tended to select executives. In fact, Dissident Directors were nearly three times more likely to be “financial services professionals” than Board Appointees, while Board Appointees were nearly twice as likely to be “executives” than Dissident Directors.

 

Part II: Board Profile

 

FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017-10.png

 

Snapshot: Public shareholder activism generally resulted in boards that are younger, shorter-tenured, slightly-larger, more independent, and more financially literate, but less diverse, than their pre-activism versions.

 

FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017-11.png

 

Activism-related turnover led to decreases in average director age and tenure at targeted boards

Dissident Directors averaged 53 years of age and Board Appointees averaged 56.3 years of age. Average director age decreased by 2.6 years to 59.6 years on Study Boards targeted by shareholder activists, while average director tenure decreased by 3.4 years to 6.1 years. For the broader S&P 1500 in 2015, average director age was 62.5 years and average tenure was 8.9 years.

Board size remained relatively steady despite membership changes

Although average board size at Study Companies increased from nine to 9.4 seats, less than half (41.9 percent) of the Study Companies experienced a post-activism boost in board size. 18.3 percent of Study Companies experienced a decline in board size following shareholder activism, while board size was unchanged at 39.8 percent of Study Companies.

Board independence levels increased in connection with activism campaigns

Average board independence at Study Companies increased from 79.5 percent to 83 percent. More than 60 percent of study companies experienced an increase in independence, 21.5 percent experienced a decrease, and 18.3 percent experienced no change. Average board independence in the S&P 1500 was 80.6 percent in 2015.

Other boardroom service was generally unchanged by activism-fueled refreshment

The average number of outside boards on which Study Company directors served remained virtually flat, increasing from 0.8 to 0.9. Of the 89 Study Companies, the number without a director who sat on more than one outside board decreased from four to two. There was a correlation between company size and outside board service, as directors at S&P 500 and S&P 400 study companies sat on a higher average number of outside boards than their counterparts at S&P 600 study companies.

Activism was accompanied by an erosion of gender and racial/ethnic diversity on targeted boards

Study Company boards were less likely to have at least one female director following an activism campaign than they were preceding one, decreasing from 87.1 percent to 82.8 percent. Similarly, Study Company boards were less likely to have at least one minority director following an activism campaign than they were preceding one, decreasing from 55.9 percent to 51.6 percent. According to Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms, the proportion of S&P 1500 companies with at least one female director increased from 72 percent in 2011 to 82.7 percent in 2015 and the portion of S&P 1500 companies with at least one minority board member increased through the course of the study period to 56.8 percent.

Activism added financial expertise to boards

The proportion of board seats at Study Companies occupied by “financial experts” increased from 22.6 percent (189 of 835) to 24.5 percent (214 of 874). The number of Study Companies with at least one, two, or three “financial experts” also increased. (At U.S. companies, ISS considers a director to be a “financial expert” if the board discloses that the individual qualifies as an “Audit Committee Financial Expert” as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission under Items 401(h)(2) and 401(h)(3) of Regulation S-K. Under the SEC’s rules, a person must have acquired their financial expertise through (1) education and experience as a principal financial officer (PFO), principal accounting officer (PAO), controller, public accountant or auditor or experience in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar functions, (2) experience actively supervising a PFO, a PAO, controller, public accountant, auditor or person performing similar functions; (3) experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or public accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial statements or (4) other relevant experience.)

Target company size impacted the effect of board refreshment

Larger Study Companies were more independent, more likely to have female and minority board members (both pre- and post- activism), and more likely to have financial experts in the boardroom than smaller-cap study companies. Relative to their larger peers, smaller Study Companies generally experienced more pronounced declines in average director age and tenure, but experienced more significant increases in average board size.

The complete publication is available here.

________________________________________________

Subodh Mishra* is Executive Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on a co-publication by ISS and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here).

L’acte de la prise de décision et les devoirs de prudence et de diligence de l’administrateur


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous les réflexions de Jean-François Thuot* parues dans deux articles récemment publiés dans LinkedIn. Jean-François a accepté d’agir en tant qu’auteur invité sur mon blogue en gouvernance.

Celui-ci a une longue expérience de la gouvernance, ayant œuvré au Conseil interprofessionnel du Québec (CIQ) pendant 18 ans, dont plus de dix ans en tant que directeur général.

Il a accepté de vous livrer ses idées sur l’acte de la prise de décision ainsi que les devoirs de prudence et de diligence de l’administrateur.

Bonne lecture. Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

par

Jean-François Thuot, consultant

 

 

Vous avez dit: « décider » ?

 

Décider, c’est déterminer une ligne de conduite qui enclenche l’action. Cette définition convient bien à ce qui est exigé des membres d’un conseil d’administration. Après tout, administrer, c’est décider.

Mais cette définition, pour opérationnelle qu’elle soit, omet la face cachée et dérangeante de la décision. Voyons laquelle.

Alors que je préparais une formation destinée aux administrateurs d’un ordre professionnel, sur la décision justement, j’ai fouillé l’étymologie du mot. Un bon dictionnaire nous apprend ainsi que le verbe « décider » vient du latin « decidare », qui veut dire « diminuer», « retrancher », « réduire »; et plus anciennement de « caedere », signifiant « couper », « abattre ».

Ainsi comprise, la décision repose sur un paradoxe. Car, pour décider, avant donc de « réduire », de « couper » –, nous devons d’abord établir, par la réflexion, une perspective d’ensemble, arpenter toutes les facettes d’une question à éclaircir, d’un problème à résoudre, d’une situation à gérer, ce qui permet d’obtenir un point de vue global issu de la prise en compte des multiples facettes d’une réalité. Ce point de vue global est indispensable pour être en mesure, dans un deuxième temps, d’étalonner les avenues possibles de l’action, puis, finalement, de choisir, de trancher en faveur de l’avenue censée être la meilleure pour s’engager.

Décider, c’est donc, nécessairement, rejeter dans l’ombre les segments de réalité qui paraissent inutiles. La réalité est réduite, diminuée, aux dimensions qui servent la décision. La décision a ainsi un prix, celui de nous conduire vers un regard moins pénétrant de la réalité.

Certes, ce processus est inévitable. Sans le travail de réduction, c’est-à-dire de sélection, pas d’action possible, sous peine d’aller dans toutes les directions, comme des poules sans têtes!

Mais cette vérité devrait inspirer au décideur une attitude : celle de l’humilité dans la prise de décision. Ayons la « décision modeste ». Le bon décideur connaît le prix de sa décision et ne s’emballe pas trop sur l’économie qu’il vient de faire.

 

 L’humilité de l’administrateur | prudence et diligence

 

Dans l’esprit de notre temps, l’administrateur est imaginé comme une personne qui carbure à la performance et à l’excellence. Un athlète de la prise de décision, quoi.

Le Code civil du Québec, heureusement à l’abri des modes, adopte un autre ton en ordonnant à l’administrateur d’agir en tout temps avec… « prudence et diligence » (art. 322). Le Code civil nous permet d’approcher avec plus d’exactitude l’attitude générale que nous devrions attendre d’un membre de conseil d’administration. Cette attitude, pour rester dans l’esprit de mon article précédent sur la décision, c’est celle de l’humilité. L’humilité est d’emblée contenue dans l’origine ecclésiastique du mot administrateur, qui réfère à « premier serviteur » (comme le prêtre).

Poursuivons cette exploration.

La diligence

À tort, la diligence est comprise comme le fait de décider sans tarder. Décider avec diligence, c’est décider à temps, ce qui veut dire au moment opportun. Certains moments commandent une décision rapide, immédiate; d’autres moments requièrent de retarder la décision, car décider maintenant serait inapproprié.

Dans tous les cas, c’est une affaire de jugement.

La prudence

Dans son sens commun, la prudence consiste à agir de manière à éviter les erreurs par anticipation des conséquences de nos actes. Le Petit Larousse l’associe à la « prévoyance», la « prévision », la « sagesse ».

Dans son sens étymologique, la prudence – du grec phronêsis – désigne l’acte même de penser, rien de moins! Pour les Anciens Grecs, c’est la pensée de celui qui s’immerge dans l’action sans jamais oublier le fondement moral de celle-ci. La prudence est ainsi une « vertu pratique » nourrit de la quête du « juste milieu » : ce qu’il y a de mieux à faire, étant donné les circonstances.

Quant à l’article 322 du Code civil, la jurisprudence enseigne que l’administrateur prudent est celui qui administre au mieux de ses compétences, et donc qui a conscience de ses limites. Ce devoir suppose des obligations bien connues : assister régulièrement aux réunions du conseil d’administration, demeurer informé, surveiller et contrôler les personnes qui exercent les pouvoirs délégués par le conseil (les obligations des administrateurs, présentation du cabinet McCarthy-Tétrault).

Êtes-vous un administrateur prudent?


Jean-François Thuot PhD ASC AdmA*Jean-François Thuot, Ph. D., ASC, Adm.A. est facilitateur stratégique pour OBNL et ordres professionnels: management associatif, affaires publiques, rédaction stratégique, formation.

L’internationalisation des codes de gouvernance contribue à la clarification des rôles des activistes


Voici un article de sensibilisation à l’internationalisation des règles de bonne gouvernance et des rôles respectifs que les actionnaires-investisseurs et les conseils d’administration sont appelés à prendre en compte.

On assiste à une plus grande volonté des actionnaires, réunis en groupes d’investisseurs institutionnels, en société de prise de position importante (hedge funds ou actionnaires activistes), de s’engager dans la gouvernance des entreprises. En fait, on peut parler d’un actionnariat de plus en plus actif à l’échelle internationale.

Cet article, publié par Jennifer G. Hill, professeure de droit corporatif à l’université de Sydney, atteste clairement, à l’instar du UK Stewardship Code, de l’importance mondiale des guides de gouvernance qui réclament un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs entre les CA (fiduciaires des actionnaires) et les regroupements d’actionnaires.

Ces codes de gouvernance émanent de différentes sources, mais tous mettent l’accent sur la gestion à long terme des affaires des sociétés. L’auteure mentionne que les codes de conduite peuvent être introduits (1) par les organismes réglementaires des pays (2) par certains regroupements industriels ou (3) par les actionnaires-investisseurs eux-mêmes.

L’article conclut que l’adoption de ces nouveaux codes de Stewardship peut aider à définir de nouvelles règles de conduite qui permettront de départager les « bons activistes des mauvais activistes » !

Les conseils d’administration doivent donc être de plus en plus conscients que le phénomène de l’engagement et de l’activisme des actionnaires est un mouvement mondial, et qu’ils devront faire preuve d’ouverture dans leur rôle de fiduciaire.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.

 

Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes

 

Résultat de recherche d'images pour "UK Stewardship Code"

 

Conflicting attitudes toward shareholder engagement and activism have colored the ongoing debate about the effect of shareholder influence on corporate governance. In the US, a distinctly negative view of investor engagement underpins much recent discussion on this topic—from the shareholder empowerment debate to current concerns about investor activism and private ordering through shareholder-initiated bylaws.

Outside the United States, however, a powerful alternative narrative about the benefits of increased shareholder engagement in corporate governance has gained traction in many major jurisdictions. This positive narrative treats investors as having an important participatory role in corporate governance, which is integral to accountability. It supports a radically different regulatory response to its negative counterpart, suggesting that shareholders should be granted stronger rights and/or encouraged to make greater use of their existing powers to engage with the companies in which they invest.

In my recent article, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes, I examine a particularly important recent manifestation of this positive view of shareholder engagement—stewardship codes. My article, which will appear in 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. (special issue on Investor Time Horizons, forthcoming December 2017), charts the rise of international Stewardship Codes and discusses the implications of this development for the balance of power between shareholders and boards in public corporations.

International Stewardship Codes, which originated in the United Kingdom following the global financial crisis, are now proliferating throughout the world, especially in Asia. These codes indicate that in some jurisdictions, the debate today is less about controlling shareholder power than about constraining board power, by encouraging shareholders to exercise their legal rights and increase their level of engagement in corporate governance. The codes represent a generalized regulatory response to a common complaint following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis—namely, “where were the shareholders?”.

Stewardship Codes seek to ensure that shareholders, particularly institutional investors, are active players in corporate governance. Proponents of these codes have made large claims about their benefits. The UK Stewardship Code has stated, for example, that “the goal of stewardship is to promote the long term success of companies” and that “[e]ffective stewardship benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole.”

Many countries have now jumped on the Stewardship Code bandwagon. The various Stewardship Codes around the world emanate, however, from different issuing bodies, and this can influence a code’s effectiveness. There are at least three distinct categories of Stewardship Code:

  1. those issued by regulators or quasi-regulators on behalf of the government;
  2. those initiated by certain industry participants; and
  3. codes adopted by investors themselves.

The United States joined this third category in January 2017, when the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG) released its Framework for US Stewardship and Governance (discussed on the Forum here). Although the ISG framework is voluntary, it has the backing of some of the world’s largest asset managers, including founding members, such as BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors and Vanguard.

Many of the Stewardship Codes that now operate around the world are based on the UK Stewardship Code or Japanese Stewardship Code. My article examines similarities and differences in these international Stewardship Codes. As the article shows, the recent adoption of the ISG Stewardship Principles in the US has not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it is part of a sustained international push for greater investor involvement in corporate governance and exemplifies the increasing globalization of corporate governance.

These developments and competing narratives concerning the role of shareholders in corporate governance have significant regulatory implications. In particular, they pose future challenges to regulators in seeking to differentiate between “good activists” and “bad activists”.

The complete article is available here.

Quelle est la voie pour devenir un PDG (CEO) ?


Voici un article de Satu Ahlman paru sur le site de LinkedIn récemment.

L’auteur aborde les considérations les plus importantes dans l’accession à un poste de CEO.

L’article étant relativement court, je vous en livre les grandes lignes et je vous souhaite bonne lecture.

 

The journey of becoming a CEO

 

What is crucial when choosing a CEO from a company’s point of view?

Is it knowledge of the market, of business, of the product… or…having worked your way up throughout the years, and learned everything there is to learn about that business?

Or – could you become a CEO based on your people skills, your leadership skills?

Yes, these are possible scenarios. And that means, based on the scenario, all newly appointed Chief Executives require different types of guidance and support.

Lots of experience from that specific business

No experience from that specific business

We all have to start somewhere don’t we?

With new responsibilities, there come challenges

A question remains: What type of support will the newly appointed CEO require and what can’t be provided in-house?

Executive performance and retention are determined within the first 90 days

La nomination d’un « administrateur principal indépendant » | Le compromis de la gouvernance à l’américaine


Vous avez sans doute une bonne idée de la notion d’administrateur principal (Lead director) dans le cadre de la direction du conseil d’administration. Les administrateurs de sociétés canadiennes sont cependant moins au fait de cette démarche de gouvernance, laquelle se révèle propre à la majorité des entreprises américaines.

En 1990, environ 80 % des entreprises américaines avaient une structure de gouvernance, plutôt déficiente, qui reposait sur le leadership d’une seule personne cumulant les fonctions de président du conseil (chairman) et de président directeur général de l’entreprise (PDG – CEO). Depuis les scandales des années 2000, et plus particulièrement de la crise financière de 2008, les autorités réglementaires et les bourses américaines ont exigé l’instauration d’une structure duale : un président du CA et un PDG.

La solution de compromis, qui fit largement consensus, était de nommer un administrateur principal indépendant comme président du conseil en conservant le poste de Chairman et de PDG (CEO) à une seule personne (afin de préserver l’unité de direction !). Il faut cependant savoir que la plupart des CEO des grandes corporations américaines convoitent le pouvoir absolu de l’entreprise et qu’ils n’acceptent pas facilement de le partager avec un autre Chairman (contrairement à 80 % des entreprises canadiennes qui séparent les deux fonctions).

On connaît peu les tenants et aboutissants de cette forme de gouvernance qui semble défier les principes de la saine gouvernance, notamment l’importance de préserver l’indépendance des administrateurs.

L’étude de Ryan Krause et al* tente de faire la lumière sur plusieurs questions relatives à l’exercice de l’administrateur indépendant :

(1) Qu’est-ce qui a conduit à l’adoption de cette structure de gouvernance ?

(2) Quels sont les rôles et fonctions d’un administrateur indépendant ?

(3) Comment les administrateurs principaux sont-ils choisis par leurs pairs ?

(4) La nomination d’un administrateur principal indépendant a-t-elle une incidence sur la performance de l’entreprise ?

(5) Cette structure de gouvernance est-elle une mesure de transition vers l’établissement d’une véritable séparation des rôles de Chairman et de CEO ?

À la lecture de cet article, vous constaterez certainement que les auteurs adoptent une perspective de compromis eu égard à la gouvernance. Une des limites de l’étude est que le rôle de l’administrateur indépendant n’est pas clair, notamment en ce qui concerne « l’établissement du plan stratégique, de la gestion des risques et de la gestion de crises ».

Cet article paru sur le site de la Harvard Law School of Corporate Governance vous offrira tout de même une bien meilleure compréhension de cette structure de gouvernance « à l’américaine ».

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

 

 

Sharing the Lead: Examining the Causes and Consequences of Lead Independent Director Appointment

 

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « lead director »

 

 

Many companies now use lead independent directors, yet little is known about when they are elected, who is selected, what impact their selection has on performance and if their selection prevents the future separation of the CEO and chair positions. We explore these four questions using a power perspective and largely find lead independent directors represent a power-sharing compromise between the CEO/chair and the board.

* * *

A critical issue of board governance is the tradeoff of joining or separating the CEO and board chair roles. Joining the roles provides the organization the unity of command, with a single individual leading the firm. This is very important in dynamic environments where strong leadership is required and the CEO/chair must communicate clearly to multiple audiences. Also, it can provide the board greater insight into the day-to-day operations of the firm since the leader of the board is also managing the firm. But joining the roles puts at risk the oversight role of the board since its leader is one of those it is evaluating. This has been colloquially referred to as “CEOs grading [their] own homework”. [1] To prevent this, many have argued that the CEO and chair positions must be separated to prevent the conflict of interest inherent to the CEO leading the board.

 

Highlights

 

– Power balance between the CEO and the board is a key determinant to lead independent director appointment and to who is selected.

– Lead independent director (LID) selection can affect firm performance and the likelihood of CEO/chair separation

– The managerial implication is that power-sharing can allow the CEO to remain board chair while preserving effective corporate governance

– An important open issue is the duties of the lead independent director remain vague and idiosyncratic to the individual and firm

For many years these mutually exclusive options were the only ones available, requiring boards to accept the tradeoffs inherent to each option. In 1992, Lipton and Lorsch [2] proposed a third option: retaining the CEO as board chair and the appointment of a lead independent director. This compromise solution joined together the advantages of having a single leader with the advantages of having more independent board leadership. In the early 1990s, nearly 80 percent of large, U.S.-based firms had board chairs who were also the firm’s CEO, but the scandals of the early 2000s led to greater scrutiny of joining the CEO and board chair positions, leading many firms to consider appointing a lead independent director. This was furthered by a 2008 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) policy change requiring that listed firms with CEO/chairs appoint a presiding director to lead executive sessions. [3]

The belief that a lead independent director appointment presents a compromise solution is supported by the 2013 Director Compensation and Board Practices report from The Conference Board in collaboration with Nasdaq OMX and NYSE Euronext. For companies selecting the lead independent director structure, almost 70 percent felt that board independence is achieved through a lead independent director, with financial services firms reaching almost 80 percent. In fact, this rationale was the most highly cited reason for having a lead independent director. The study also found that as the size of the firm increases (as measured in annual revenue), the belief that lead independent director appointment provides the necessary level of independence also increases.

But what is the role of the lead independent director? In 2012, Wall Street Journal reporter Joann Lublin wrote,

Lead directors could be defined by what they aren’tindependent board chairmen who share the helm with powerful CEOs. Increasingly, however, the corporate governance community is seeing them as an effective counterweight anyway. The role is a compromise that developed in the wake of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Lawmakers…didn’t want to force companies to split the chairman and CEO jobs. What evolved was the appointment of a director to represent fellow board members, someone who didn’t have ties to the company.“ [4]

This perspective was echoed by a member of the Lead Director Network (LDN),

Once you’re in the role, the conditions may change and therefore the definition of your job may change. The role will have to change on a dime if the conditions change, so we shouldn’t define the role too narrowly. The definition must be fluid enough to adapt to the situation.“ [5]

The LDN [6] identified three major ways in which lead independent directors add value to board operations:

  1. They can help develop a high-performing board by keeping it focused, coordinating across committees, and ensuring board members have the information they need.
  2. They can build a productive relationship between the board and the CEO/chair by ensuring effective communication and providing feedback to the CEO/chair from the board.
  3. They can support effective shareholder communication by being the contact person for shareholders.

While many anecdotal insights into the use and responsibilities of LID exist, there is almost no empirical investigation of them. To address this, we build on the notion that the appointment of a LID is a compromise between the two attractive, but mutually exclusive options of combining or separating the CEO and board chair roles. Since much of the concern around CEOs holding the chair role centers on the CEO’s power relative to the board, we adopt the perspective that the CEO’s power relative to the board will be a determining factor in the selection of board leadership. Using this perspective, our research sought to answer four questions:

  1. What leads to LID appointment?
  2. When a LID structure is selected, who is selected as LID?
  3. What effect on performance does appointing a LID have on various performance outcomes (specifically, holding period returns, ROI, and analyst recommendations)?
  4. What effect does LID appointment have on the likelihood of CEO/Chair separation?

When is a LID selected?

 

Our first question is under what power conditions is a LID selected. Power is generally conceptualized in relative rather than absolute terms. For example, a sports team may be the most powerful in its conference but when compared with all teams it is in the middle of the pack. Accordingly, power in corporate governance is most often conceptualized as the CEO’s power relative to the power of the board. To date most theory and research has focused on powerful CEOs or powerful boards (i.e., when one is able to control the other). This research has suggested that when the CEO is powerful relative to the board, he or she will retain the chair role. Conversely, when the board is powerful relative to the CEO the positions are most often separated. But what happens when the power is balanced? To answer this, we used a composite measure of CEO power relative to the board power. Confirming prior studies, we found that when CEO power relative to board power was high that the CEO retained the board chair role, and that when the board’s power was high relative to the CEO that the positions were separated. But consistent with the notion that LID appointment is a compromise, we found that a LID was most likely to be appointed when CEO power relative to the board was balanced. In other words, when neither the CEO nor the board was powerful relative to the other, a LID was appointed to reflect this sharing of power.

This finding presents strong evidence that as CEOs or boards move away from dominance and towards more balanced power, they will gravitate toward compromise solutions such as the lead independent director. In addition, the results revealed that while lead independent director appointment is most likely to occur when CEO power is moderate, the drop-off in CEO power between lead independent director appointment and CEO-board chair separation is larger than the drop-off between no change and lead independent director appointment. This suggests that CEOs who see their power as somewhat tenuous may opt for the compromise solution as a way to placate advocates of more structural change and stave off any further reduction in power.

 

Our Methodologya

 

To analyze LID appointment, we used a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 2002 to 2012 who had a combined CEO/Chair structure, resulting in 966 firms. We collected board and director level data from BoardEx database, from the Institutional Shareholder Services (formerly RiskMetrics) database, and from company proxy statements. Firm-level financial and market data were collected from Compustat and from CRSP. Analyst recommendations were collected from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (IBES). Finally, ownership data were collected from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database. Due to missing data, our final sample was 522 firms.

We used several dependent variables in our analysis. Our first dependent variable assessed if the firm appointed a LID, separated the CEO and chair positions, or made no change (i.e., retained the CEO/chair structure). Our second dependent variable is binary set to 1 if a LID appointment occurs and 0 otherwise. Our next set of dependent variables centered on performance. First, to measure market performance we selected stock returns to buying and holding the stock for a calendar year. Second, to measure accounting performance, we selected return on investment (ROI), which is net income divided by total invested capital. Finally, for a stakeholder performance we measured median analyst rating, which can take on five ordinal values, from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (strong sell).b Our final dependent variable is binary, set to 1 if the firm separates the CEO/chair positions after appointing a LID and 0 if they do not.

Our analysis used several independent variables as well. First, we used a composite measure for CEO power that consists of CEO tenure relative to average board tenure, the number of outside boards on which the CEO serves relative to the average number of outside boards on which each director serves, the number of outside directors who are also current CEOs, board independence, and firm performance. We standardized each of these measures and summed them to produce a standardized index of CEO power. Second, to measure individual director power we use five indicators: director tenure, number of current board seats, whether the director is a business expert, elite educational background, and financial expertise. Similar to our measure of CEO power, each of these individual variables was standardized and summed for each director-year observation to produce an index of director power. Finally, we use LID appointment as a binary variable measured as 1 if the CEO and board chair positions remained combined but an independent board member was appointed to the lead director position in a given year, and 0 otherwise.

Our analysis also contained numerous control variables such as firm size, CEO turnover, firm ownership, litigation, board interlocks, CEO equity pay, and environmental dynamism, complexity and munificence.

To analyze the data we used several forms of multiple variable regression (generalized linear latent and mixed models, fixed-effects logit, fixed-effects regression, and Cox proportional hazard) depending on the analysis being conducted.

Please see the article in Academy of Management Journal for a comprehensive explanation of data, measures, and empirical analyses.

We reverse coded this variable to aid in interpretation.

Who is selected as LID?

 

Intrigued by this finding, we examined who is selected as the LID when the firm chooses to appoint one. If power is indeed being shared between the CEO and the board, then the individual selected should embody this power-sharing. This implies that the person selected as the LID will be neither the most powerful independent board member nor the weakest. This is because if the most powerful independent director were selected, the individual might be seen as a challenger to the CEO, but if the weakest independent director were selected, he or she may be perceived as a leader in name only with no real power to control or influence the CEO/chair. To measure this, we examined the power levels of each of the independent board members relative to the other independent board members. We found that the most likely independent director selected is one with a moderate level of power. This supports the notion that the person selected as LID is as important as the decision to appoint a LID.

Taken together, these findings provide compelling evidence that CEOs and boards are compromising in both the decision to appoint a lead independent director and in who is designated as the lead independent director. This is significant as it demonstrates that the designation o

f a lead independent director is more than a symbolic gesture to appease the arbiters of good corporate governance; rather it indicates that the board is conscientious about who it selects for the role.

What effect does LID appointment have on performance?

 

Appointment of a LID impacts corporate governance outcomes, but we wanted to know if it influenced performance. In other words, if the firm has adopted a power-sharing arrangement between the CEO/chair and the board, does that affect firm outcomes? Because firm performance can be measured in many different ways, we selected market, accounting, and stakeholder performance measures, specifically:

Annual stock returns

Return on Investment (ROI)

Median analyst recommendation

Our results further support the importance of the power perspective to LID appointment. For the market and accounting measures we found no main effect of LID appointment on performance. [7] In other words, simply appointing a LID director does not affect either market or accounting performance. To explore the influence of power on this, we then examined the effect of LID appointment when the CEO/chair holds a moderate to low level of power. We reasoned that, in keeping with the power-sharing inherent to LID appointment, having a strong CEO/chair would limit the impact of the LID appointment. We found that when a LID is appointed and the CEO has a low to moderate level of power, there is a positive effect on market and accounting performance, underscoring the importance of relative power to the usefulness of having a LID. Turning to our stake-holder performance measure, we found a positive main effect of LID appointment on median analyst recommendation, and this performance effect is stronger when the CEO holds a moderate to low level of power. This suggests that analysts view LID appointment favorably and that this favorable view is stronger when the power is balanced between the board and the CEO/chair.

 

Chart 1: Performance Effect Difference between No LID & LID

Source: “Compromise on the Board: Investigating the Antecedents and Consequences of Lead Independent Director,” the Academy of Management Journal (forthcoming)

 

In addition, the positive main effect for analyst ratings but not for the other performance measures suggests that analysts respond to the symbolism of the appointment in a manner that objective metrics such as stock and accounting performance do not.

Given its outward appearance of conformity to firm oversight, it is not surprising that lead independent director appointment garners a positive overall reaction from analysts. Prior research has shown that analysts’ view increases in a board’s structural independence as positive, even when such structural changes do not produce meaningful improvements in firm governance. [8]

In contrast to the main effect, which only manifested for analyst ratings, the interaction of CEO power and lead independent director appointment was significant across all three performance measures. This suggests that appointing a lead independent director amounts to little more than window dressing when CEO power is high, but can have positive performance effects when CEO power is low. (We look at the relationship one standard deviation below and above the mean CEO power level using the CEO power measure described earlier.) Together, these results provide evidence that when the CEO is not totally dominant, the lead independent director can strike a balance between having a single leader and having proper oversight. In addition, when the CEO is dominant, the lead independent director still serves a symbolic role in placating external observers like securities analysts.

 

What effect does LID appointment have on separation?

 

Finally, we were curious about how the appointment of a LID affected the likelihood that the firm would decide to separate the CEO and chair roles in the future. If the power-sharing compromise is functioning well, then the firm may feel that separation is not necessary and the likelihood of separation will fall. To measure this we examined the likelihood of separation after the appointment of a LID and found that it decreases the likelihood of separation by almost 60 percent. Importantly, we controlled for the effect of CEO power on the likelihood of separation, given that past research has shown that CEO power by itself decreases the likelihood of separation. The effect of CEO power on separation was found to be around 33 percent. [9] We then statistically compared these two effects and found that LID appointment had a statistically higher negative effect on the likelihood of separation than CEO power. Finally, we felt that perhaps the lowest likelihood of separation would occur when a LID is appointed and the CEO has high power, but testing this we found that there was no interactive effect. This means that increasing CEO power does nothing to decrease the likelihood of separation beyond the decreased likelihood from LID appointment. In other words, appointing a LID has a stronger negative effect on separating the CEO and chair positions than CEO power, and increasing CEO power doesn’t further enhance that negative effect. The implication is that lead independent director appointment provides significant protection to the CEO/chair, independent of the CEO’s power.

 

Chart 2: Sample Governance Structure (by year)

Source: “Compromise on the Board: Investigating the Antecedents and Consequences of Lead Independent Director,” the Academy of Management Journal (forthcoming)

Managerial Implications

 

The findings of our research have several implications for corporate governance practitioners. First, balancing power between the board and the CEO does not necessarily lead to a governance impasse. We find that at parity, both the board and the CEO are willing to make important concessions to the other to fashion a functioning governance arrangement for the firm. This leads to a second implication, which is that the sharing of governance between the board and CEO is legitimate in nature. In other words, the agreement of the CEO to permit the appointment of a lead independent director of moderate power coupled with the willingness of the board to accept a lead independent director rather than calling for the separation of the CEO and board chair positions suggests a meaningful compromise. If, for example, the CEO would only accept a lead independent director with weak power, or if the board required that the lead independent director be very powerful, governance would be much more problematic and the benefits of the lead independent director would be tenuous. We see this outcome emerge in our analyses of performance outcomes; lead independent director appointment can improve firm performance, but only if the CEO is not very powerful. Finally, despite the calls from corporate governance regulators and consultants for all CEOs to relinquish the chair role, [10] our research suggests that boards and CEOs can reach a compromise that preserves the unity of command provided by CEO duality while not sacrificing robust corporate governance, as evidenced by both the performance consequences and the staying power of the lead independent director position.

 

Open Questions

 

While we provide insight into the effect of power on LID appointment, several important open questions remain.

First and foremost, while the position of LID has become more legitimate, the role the LID plays on the board remains very fluid with many unknowns. For example, it is clear that the LID is a conduit between the board and the CEO/ chair. Reflecting this, a LDN member stated, “It’s my job to make sure that every director’s perspective is aired and addressed during board meetings, especially if there are differences of opinion.” [11] But what is the LID’s role in setting corporate strategy, in risk management and in crisis management, such as when the firm’s management is under investigation?

Second, how does either CEO/chair or LID succession change the corporate governance? If the LID appointment reflects a power sharing between the CEO/ chair and the board, changing either the CEO/chair or the LID could shift the balance of power and make the structure untenable.

Finally, as LIDs are increasingly used by boards, will experience as a LID emerge as a characteristic that makes a director more attractive?

Until recently, corporate governance has conceptualized board leadership as a tradeoff between unity of command and independent monitoring. The lead independent director position directly challenges this conceptualization, however, as it constitutes a compromise between the competing theoretical prescriptions. In our research, we examined this compromise board leadership structure and explore its antecedents and consequences. We find that it reflects balanced power on the board, and that it can be beneficial when the circumstances are right. It is our hope that these insights will help to guide corporate governance, particularly in the area of board leadership.

 

* * *

 

The complete article is available for download here.

____________________________________________

Endnotes:

1 James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, and Gregg A. Jarrell, “Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 1997 pp. 189-220.(go back)

2 The NYSE requires that non-management directors meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions, that there are mechanisms for selecting a non-management director to preside at such sessions, and that companies provide a way to communicate with the presiding director (or the non-management directors as a group). See NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual, section 303A.03, “Executive Sessions”.(go back)

3 Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, “A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance,” Business Lawyer, 1992 48 (1): 59-77.(go back)

4 Joann S. Lublin, “Lead Directors Gain Clout as Counterweight to CEO,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2012.(go back)

5 Lead Director Network ViewPoints, Tapestry Network, Issue 1, July 30, 2008, page 3.(go back)

6 Ibid.(go back)

7 By main effect, we mean the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.(go back)

8 See Westphal, James D. & Graebner, Michelle E. 2010. “A matter of appearances: How corporate leaders manage the impressions of financial analysts about the conduct of their boards.” Academy of Management Journal, 53(1): 15-44.(go back)

9 In other words, for every standard deviation increase in CEO power, the likelihood of separation decreased by around 33 percent.(go back)

10 For examples of this, see MacAvoy, P. W. & Millstein, I. M. 2004. “The recurrent crisis in corporate governance,” Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Business Books. and Monks, R. A. G. & Minow, N. 2008. Corporate governance (4th ed.) Chichester, England ; Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.(go back)

11 Lead Director Network ViewPoints, Tapestry Network, Issue 10, March 24, 2011, page 6.


*Ryan Krause is Associate Professor of Strategy in the Neeley School of Business at Texas Christian University; Mike Withers is Assistant Professor of Management in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University; and Matthew Semadeni is Professor of Strategy at Arizona State University W.P. Carey School of Business. This post is based on a recent article, forthcoming in the Academy of Management Journal, and originally published in The Conference Board’s Director Notes series.

Lettre ouverte du président des Fonds Vanguard à l’ensemble des administrateurs de compagnies publiques


F. William McNabb III is Chairman and CEO of Vanguard; Glenn Booraem is the head of Investment Stewardship and a principal at Vanguard. This post is based on an excerpt from a recent Vanguard publication by Mr. Booraem, and an open letter to directors of public companies worldwide by Mr. McNabb.

 

Cinq questions destinées au nouveau président de Vanguard

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

 

An open letter to directors of public companies worldwide

Thank you for your role in overseeing the Vanguard funds’ sizable investment in your company. We depend on you to represent our funds’ ownership interests on behalf of our more than 20 million investors worldwide. Our investors depend on Vanguard to be a responsible steward of their assets, and we promote principles of corporate governance that we believe will enhance the long-term value of their investments.

At Vanguard, a long-term perspective informs every aspect of our investment approach, from the way we manage our funds to the advice we give our investors. Our index funds are structurally long-term, holding their investments almost indefinitely. And our active equity managers—who invest nearly $500 billion on our clients’ behalf—are behaviorally long-term, with most holding their positions longer than peer averages. The typical dollar invested with Vanguard stays for more than ten years.

A long-term perspective also underpins our Investment Stewardship program. We believe that well-governed companies are more likely to perform well over the long run. To this end, we consider four pillars when we evaluate corporate governance practices:

  1. The board: A high-functioning, well-composed, independent, diverse, and experienced board with effective ongoing evaluation practices.
  2. Governance structures: Provisions and structures that empower shareholders and protect their rights.
  3. Appropriate compensation: Pay that incentivizes relative outperformance over the long term.
  4. Risk oversight: Effective, integrated, and ongoing oversight of relevant industry- and company-specific risks.

These pillars guide our proxy voting and engagement activity, and we hope that by sharing this framework with you, you’ll have a better perspective on our approach to stewardship.

I’d like to highlight a few key themes that are increasingly important in our stewardship efforts:

Good governance starts with a great board.

We believe that when a company has a great board of directors, good results are more likely to follow.

We view the board as one of a company’s most critical strategic assets. When the board contributes the right mix of skill, expertise, thought, tenure, and personal characteristics, sustainable economic value becomes much easier to achieve. A thoughtfully composed, diverse board more objectively oversees how management navigates challenges and opportunities critical to shareholders’ interests. And a company’s strategic needs for the future inform effectively planned evolution of the board.

Gender diversity is one element of board composition that we will continue to focus on over the coming years. We expect boards to focus on it as well, and their demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward. There is compelling evidence that boards with a critical mass of women have outperformed those that are less diverse. Diverse boards also more effectively demonstrate governance best practices that we believe lead to long-term shareholder value. Our stance on this issue is therefore an economic imperative, not an ideological choice. This is among the reasons why we recently joined the 30% Club, a global organization that advocates for greater representation of women in boardrooms and leadership roles. The club’s mission to enhance opportunities for women from “schoolroom to boardroom” is one that we think bodes well for broadening the pipeline of great directors.

Directors are shareholders’ eyes and ears on risk.

Risk and opportunity shape every business. Shareholders rely on a strong board to oversee the strategy for realizing opportunities and mitigating risks. Thorough disclosure of relevant and material risks—a key board responsibility—enables share prices to fully reflect all significant known (and reasonably foreseeable) risks and opportunities. Given our extensive indexed investments, which rely on the price-setting mechanism of the market, that market efficiency is critical to Vanguard and our clients.

Climate risk is an example of a slowly developing and highly uncertain risk—the kind that tests the strength of a board’s oversight and risk governance. Our evolving position on climate risk (much like our stance on gender diversity) is based on the economic bottom line for Vanguard investors. As significant long-term owners of many companies in industries vulnerable to climate risk, Vanguard investors have substantial value at stake.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all approach, market solutions to climate risk and other evolving disclosure practices can be valuable when they reflect the shared priorities of issuers and investors. Our participation in the Investor Advisory Group to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reflects our belief that materiality-driven, sector-specific disclosures will better illuminate risks in a way that aids market efficiency and price discovery. We believe it is incumbent on all market participants—investors, boards, and management alike—to embrace the disclosure of sustainability risks that bear on a company’s long-term value creation prospects.

Engagement builds mutual understanding and a basis for progress.

Timely and substantive dialogue with companies is core to our investment stewardship approach. We see engagement as mutually beneficial: We convey Vanguard’s views and we hear companies’ perspectives, which adds context to our analysis.

Our funds’ votes on ballot measures—171,000 discrete items in the past year alone—are an outcome of this process, not the starting point. As we analyze ballot items, particularly controversial ones, we often invite direct and open-ended dialogue with the company. We seek management’s and the board’s perspectives on the issues at hand, and we evaluate them against our principles and leading practices. To understand the full picture, we often also engage with other investors, including activists and shareholder proponents. Our goal is that a fund’s ultimate voting decision does not come as a surprise. Our ability to make informed decisions depends on maintaining an ongoing exchange of ideas in a setting in which we can cover the intention and strategy behind the issues.

Yet our engagement activities are not solely focused on the ballot. Because our funds will hold most of their portfolio companies practically permanently, it’s important for us to build relationships with boards and management teams that transcend a transactional focus on any specific issue or vote. Engagement is a process, not an event, whose value only grows over time. A CEO we engaged with once said, “You can’t wait to build a relationship until you need it,” and that couldn’t be more true.

The opportunity to articulate our perspectives and understand a board’s thinking on a range of topics—anchored at the intersection of the firm’s strategy and its enabling governance practices—is a crucial part of our stewardship obligations. Although ballot items are reduced to a series of binary choices—yes or no, for or against—engagement beyond the ballot enables us to deal in nuance and in dialogue that drives meaningful progress over time.

There is a growing role for independent directors in engagement, both on issues over which they hold exclusive purview (such as CEO compensation and board composition/succession) and on deepening investors’ understanding of the alignment between a company’s strategy and governance practices. Our interest in engaging with directors is by no means intended to interfere with management’s ownership of the message on corporate strategy and performance. Rather, we believe it’s appropriate for directors to periodically hear directly from and be heard by the shareowners on whose behalf they serve.

* * *

Our focus on corporate governance and investment stewardship has been and will continue to be a deliberate manifestation of Vanguard’s core purpose: “To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.” Our four pillars and our increased focus on climate risk and gender diversity are not fleeting priorities for Vanguard. As essentially permanent owners of the companies you lead, we have a special obligation to be engaged stewards actively focused on the long term. Our Investment Stewardship team—available at InvestmentStewardship@vanguard.com—stands ready to engage with you and your leadership teams on matters of mutual importance to our respective stakeholders. Thank you for valuing our perspective and being our partner in stewardship.

Sincerely,

William McNabb III
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Vanguard Group, Inc.

* * *

Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report

Our values and beliefs

“To take a stand for all investors, to treat them fairly, and to give them the best chance for investment success.”

—Vanguard’s core purpose

Vanguard’s core values of focus, integrity, and stewardship are reflected every day in the way that we engage with our clients, our crew (what we call our employees), and our community. We view our Investment Stewardship program as a natural extension of these values and of Vanguard’s core purpose. Our clients depend on us to be good stewards of their assets, and we depend on corporate boards to prudently oversee the companies in which our funds invest. That is why we believe we have a unique mission to advocate for a world in which the actions and values of public companies and of investors are aligned to create value for Vanguard fund shareholders over the long term.

We believe well-governed companies will perform better over the long term.

Effective corporate governance is more than the collection of a company’s formal provisions and bylaws. A board of directors serves on behalf of all shareholders and is critical in establishing trust and transparency and ensuring the health of a company—and of the capital markets—over time. This board-centric view is the foundation of Vanguard’s approach to investment stewardship. It guides our discussions with company directors and management, as well as our voting of proxies on the funds’ behalf at shareholder meetings around the globe. Great governance starts with a board of directors that is capable of selecting the right management team, holding that team accountable through appropriate incentives, and overseeing relevant risks that are material to the business. We believe that effective corporate governance is an important ingredient for the long-term success of companies and their investors. And when portfolio companies perform well, so do our clients’ investments.

We value long-term progress over short-term gain.

Because our funds typically own the stock of companies for long periods (and, in the case of index funds, are structurally permanent holders of companies), our emphasis on investment outcomes over the long term is unwavering. That’s why we deliberately focus on enduring themes and topics that drive long-term value, rather than solely short-term results. We believe that companies and boards should similarly be focused on long-term shareholder value—both through the sustainability of their strategy and operations, and by managing the risks most material to their long-term success.

Our approach

Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team comprises an experienced group of senior leaders and analysts who are responsible for representing Vanguard shareholders’ interests through industry advocacy, company engagement, and proxy voting on behalf of the Vanguard funds. The team also houses an internal research and communications function that is active in developing Vanguard’s views, policies, and ongoing approach to investment stewardship. Our data and technology group supports every aspect of our Investment Stewardship program.

We take a thoughtful and deliberate approach to investment stewardship.

Our team supports effective corporate governance practices in three ways:

Advocating for policies that we believe will enhance the sustainable, long-term value of our clients’ investments. We promote good corporate governance and responsible investment through thoughtful participation in industry events and discussions where we can expand our advocacy and enhance our understanding of investment issues.

Engaging with portfolio company executives and directors to share our corporate governance principles and learn about portfolio companies’ corporate governance practices. We characterize our approach as “quiet diplomacy focused on results”—providing constructive input that will, in our view, better position companies to deliver sustainable value over the long term for all investors.

Voting proxies at company shareholder meetings across each of our portfolios and around the globe. Because of our ongoing advocacy and engagement efforts, companies should be aware of our governance principles and positions by the time we cast our funds’ votes.

Our process is iterative and ongoing

Our four pillars

Board

Good governance begins with a great board of directors. Our primary interest is to ensure that the individuals who represent the interests of all shareholders are independent (both in mindset and freedom from conflicts), capable (across the range of relevant skills for the company and industry), and appropriately experienced (so as to bring valuable perspective to their roles). We also believe that diversity of thought, background, and experience, as well as of personal characteristics (such as gender, race, and age), meaningfully contributes to the board’s ability to serve as effective, engaged stewards of shareholders’ interests. If a company has a well-composed, high-functioning board, good results are more likely to follow.

Structure

We believe in the importance of governance structures that empower shareholders and ensure accountability of the board and management. We believe that shareholders should be able to hold directors accountable as needed through certain governance and bylaw provisions. Among these preferred provisions are that directors must stand for election by shareholders annually and must secure a majority of the votes in order to join or remain on the board. In instances where the board appears resistant to shareholder input, we also support the right of shareholders to call special meetings and to place director nominees on the company’s ballot.

Compensation

We believe that performance-linked compensation policies and practices are fundamental drivers of the sustainable, long-term value for a company’s investors. The board plays a central role in determining appropriate executive pay that incentivizes performance relative to peers and competitors. Providing effective disclosure of these practices, their alignment with company performance, and their outcomes is crucial to giving shareholders confidence in the link between incentives and rewards and the creation of value over the long term.

Risk

Boards are responsible for effective oversight and governance of the risks most relevant and material to each company in the context of its industry and region. We believe that boards should take a thorough, integrated, and thoughtful approach to identifying, understanding, quantifying, overseeing, and—where appropriate—disclosing risks that have the potential to affect shareholder value over the long term. Importantly, boards should communicate their approach to risk oversight to shareholders through their normal course of business.

By the numbers: Voting and engagement

Engagement and voting trends

2015 proxy season 2016 proxy season  2017 proxy season
Company engagements 685 817 954
Companies voted 10,560 11,564 12,974
Meetings voted 12,785 16,740 18,905
Proposals voted 124,230 157,506 171,385
Countries voted in* 70 70 68

* The number of countries can vary each year. In certain markets, some companies do not hold shareholder meetings annually.
Note: The annual proxy season is from July 1 to June 30.

Our voting

Proxy voting reflects our governance pillars worldwide.

Meetings voted by region

Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017

Global voting activity

* Includes more than 26,000 proposals related to capitalization; 8,000 proposals related to mergers and acquisitions; 16,000 routine business proposals; and 1,000 other shareholder proposals.
Note: Data pertains to voting activity from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017.

Our engagement

We engage with companies of all sizes.

Market Capitalization % of 2017 proxy season engagements
Under $1 billion 19%
$1 billion–under $10 billion 44%
$10 billion–under $50 billion 24%
$50 billion and over 13%

Our engagement with portfolio companies has grown significantly over time.

Number of engagements and assets represented

Note: Dollar figures represent the market value of Vanguard fund investments in companies with which we engaged as of June 30, 2017.

We engage on a range of topics aligned with our four pillars

Frequency of topics discussed during Vanguard engagements (%)

Note: Figures do not total 100%, as individual engagements often span multiple topics.

Boards in focus: Vanguard’s view on gender diversity

One of our most fundamental governance beliefs is that good governance begins with a great board of directors. We believe that diversity among directors—along dimensions such as gender, experience, race, background, age, and tenure—can strengthen a board’s range of perspectives and its capacity to make complex, fully considered decisions.

While we have long discussed board composition and diversity with portfolio companies, gender diversity has emerged as one dimension on which there is compelling support for positive effects on shareholder value. In recent years, a growing body of research has demonstrated that greater gender diversity on boards can lead to better company performance and governance.

Companies should be prepared to discuss—in both their public disclosures and their engagement with investors—their plans to incorporate appropriate diversity over time in their board composition. While we believe that board evolution is a process, not an event, the demonstration of meaningful progress over time will inform our engagement and voting going forward.

Boards in focus: Gender diversity

Engagement case studies

Gender diversity on boards was an important topic of engagement for us during the 12 months ended June 30, 2017. Below are summary examples of discussions we had on the subject.

High-impact engagement on gender diversity

Over several interactions with a U.S. industrial company, our team shared Vanguard’s perspective on board composition and evaluation. The company had undergone recent leadership transitions and was open to amending elements of its governance structure to align with best practices. We expressed particular support for meaningful gender diversity and expressed concern that the board previously had only one female director in its recent history.

Right after this year’s annual general meeting, the company announced it was adding four new directors with diverse experience, including two women. This outcome is the best-case scenario: The board welcomed shareholder input, we shared our view on best corporate governance practices, and the board ultimately incorporated our perspective into its board evolution process.

A denial of diversity’s value

A Canadian materials company that had consistently underperformed was governed by an entrenched, all-male board with seemingly nominal independence from the CEO. A 2017 shareholder resolution asked the company to adopt and publish a policy governing gender diversity on the board. Before voting, Vanguard engaged with the company to learn about its board evolution process, including its perspective on gender diversity. The engagement revealed that the company understood neither the value of gender diversity nor the importance of being responsive to shareholders’ concerns. Despite verbally endorsing gender diversity, the company resisted specifying a strategy or making a commitment to achieve it. The board, when seeking new members, relied solely on recommendations from current directors, a practice that can entrench the current board’s perspective and limit diversity. Our funds voted in support of the shareholder resolution, and we will continue to engage and hold the board accountable for meaningful progress over time.

Mixed results from an ongoing engagement

A U.S. consumer discretionary company had no women on its board, a problem magnified by its medium-term underperformance relative to peers, a classified board structure, and a lengthy average director tenure. We engaged with management twice between the 2016 and 2017 annual meetings to share our perspective on the importance of gender diversity and recommend that they make it a priority for future board evolution and director searches.

In its 2017 proxy, the company described board diversity as critical to the firm’s sustainable value and named gender as an element of diversity to be considered during the director search and nomination process. The company has since added a non-independent woman to the board. Although this move is directionally correct, it does not fully address our concerns; we will continue to encourage the company to add gender diversity to its ranks of independent directors.

Risk in focus: Vanguard’s view on climate risk

As the steward of long-term shareholder value for more than 20 million investors, Vanguard closely monitors how our portfolio companies identify, manage, and mitigate risks—including climate risk. Our approach to climate risk is evolving as the world’s and business community’s understanding of the topic matures.

This year, for the first time, our funds supported a number of climate-related shareholder resolutions opposed by company management. We are also discussing climate risk with company management and boards more than ever before. Our Investment Stewardship team is committed to engaging with a range of stakeholders to inform our perspective on these issues, and to share our thinking with the market, our portfolio companies, and our investors.

Risk in focus: Climate risk

A Q&A with Glenn Booraem, Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship Officer

Vanguard is an investment management company. Why should Vanguard fund investors be concerned about climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Climate risk has the potential to be a significant long-term risk for companies in many industries. As stewards of our clients’ long-term investments, we must be finely attuned to this risk. We acknowledge that our clients’ views on climate risk span the ideological spectrum. But our position on climate risk is anchored in long-term economic value—not ideology. Regardless of one’s perspective on climate, there’s no doubt that changes in global regulation, energy consumption, and consumer preferences will have a significant economic impact on companies, particularly in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors.

Why the shift in Vanguard’s assessment of climate risk, and why now?

Mr. Booraem: We’ve been discussing climate risk with portfolio companies for several years. It has been, and will remain, one of our engagement priorities for the foreseeable future. This past year, we engaged with more companies on this issue than ever before, and for the first time our funds supported two climate-related shareholder resolutions in cases where we believed that companies’ disclosure practices weren’t on par with emerging expectations in the market. As with other issues, our point of view has evolved as the topic has matured and, importantly, as its link to shareholder value has become more clear.

What is your top concern when you learn that a company in which a Vanguard portfolio invests does not have a rigorous strategy to evaluate and mitigate climate risk?

Mr. Booraem: Our concern is fundamentally that in the absence of clear disclosure and informed board oversight, the market lacks insight into the material risks of investing in that firm. It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to select the stocks they own. When we’re not confident that companies have an appropriate level of board oversight or disclosure, we’re concerned that the market may not accurately reflect the value of the investment. Because we represent primarily long-term investors, this bias is particularly problematic when underweighting long-term risks inflates a company’s value.

Now that Vanguard has articulated a clear stance on climate risk, what can portfolio companies expect?

Mr. Booraem: First, companies should expect that we’re going to focus on their public disclosures, both about the risk itself and about their board’s and management’s oversight of that risk. Thorough disclosure is the foundation for the market’s understanding of the issue. Second, companies should expect that we’ll evaluate their disclosures in the context of both their leading peers and evolving market standards, such as those articulated by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). Third, they should expect that we’ll listen to their perspective on these and other matters. And finally, they should see our funds’ proxy voting as an extension of our engagement. When we consider a shareholder resolution on climate risk, we give companies a fair hearing on the merits of the proposal and consider their past commitments and the strength of their governance structure.

Engagement case studies

In the 12 months ended June 30, 2017, the topic of climate risk disclosure grew in frequency and prominence in our engagements with companies, particularly those in the energy, industrial, and utilities sectors, where climate risk was addressed in nearly every conversation we had. Below are examples of our engagements on climate risk.

Two companies’ commitments to enhanced disclosure

Our team led similar engagements with two U.S. energy companies facing shareholder resolutions on climate risk. One resolution requested that the first company publish an annual report on climate risk impacts and strategy. At the second company, a resolution requested disclosure of the company’s strategy and targets for transitioning to a low- carbon economy. In both cases, when we engaged with the companies, their management teams committed to improving their climate risk disclosure. Given the companies’ demonstrated responsiveness to shareholder feedback and commitment to improving, our funds did not support either shareholder proposal. Our team will continue to track and evaluate the companies’ progress toward their commitments as we consider our votes in future years.

A vote against a risk and governance outlier For years we engaged with a U.S. energy company that lagged its peers on climate risk disclosure and board accessibility. This year, a shareholder proposal requesting that the company produce a climate risk assessment report demonstrated a compelling link between the requested disclosures and long-term shareholder value. Because the board serves on behalf of shareholders and plays a critical role in risk oversight, we believed it was appropriate to seek a direct dialogue with independent directors about climate risk. Management resisted connecting the independent directors with shareholders, making the company a significant industry outlier in good governance practice. Without the confidence that the board understood or represented our view that climate risk poses a material risk in the energy sector, our team viewed the climate risk and governance issues as intertwined. Ultimately, our funds voted for the shareholder proposal and withheld votes on relevant independent directors for failing to engage with shareholders.

A vote for greater climate risk disclosure

A shareholder proposal at a U.S. energy company asked for an annual report with climate risk disclosure, including scenario planning. Through extensive research and engagements with the company’s management, its independent directors, and other industry stakeholders, our team identified governance shortfalls and a clear connection to long-term shareholder value. The company lagged its peers in disclosure, risk planning, and board oversight and responsiveness to shareholder concerns. Crucially, although the company’s public filings identified climate risk as a material issue, it failed to articulate plans for mitigation or adaptation. A similar proposal last year garnered significant support, but the company made no meaningful changes in response. Engagement had limited effect, so our funds voted for the shareholder proposal.

* * *

This post was excerpted from a Vanguard report; the complete publication is available here.

Révision de la réglementation eu égard à la divulgation de l’indépendance des administrateurs


L’importance du principe d’indépendance des administrateurs ne fait plus de doute, autant pour les grandes entreprises publiques (cotées), que pour les spécialistes de la gouvernance. La coalition des 13 plus grands premiers dirigeants des grandes sociétés publiques américaines énonce clairement que l’indépendance des administrateurs est un principe incontournable de bonne gouvernance.

Truly independent corporate boards are vital to effective governance, so no board should be beholden to the CEO or management” and directors should be strong and steadfast, independent of mind and willing to challenge [management] constructively.”

Mais si le principe est largement reconnu, il ne reflète malheureusement pas la réalité de plusieurs conseils d’administration. L’article de Yaron Nili, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université du Wisconsin, présente la réalité à ce sujet en donnant des exemples de situation de complaisance sur les CA.

Ainsi, ce sont les administrateurs eux-mêmes qui déterminent la qualité d’indépendance de leurs pairs en déclarant, dans le rapport aux actionnaires, que les administrateurs répondent aux critères très flous des standards existants. L’article montre que l’absence d’une réglementation plus explicite à cet égard laisse les actionnaires et les investisseurs dans l’ignorance au sujet de la véritable indépendance des administrateurs.

L’auteur tire trois conclusions relatives à l’indépendance des administrateurs :

(1) La réglementation est lacunaire eu égard à la divulgation d’informations aux actionnaires et aux investisseurs. Ceux-ci sont mal informés sur le niveau d’indépendance des administrateurs ainsi que sur les biais comportementaux dont souffrent les collègues administrateurs pour évaluer ce facteur ;

(2) L’étude empirique de Yaron Nili a clairement démontré que les informations transmises aux actionnaires manquent de transparence et que les actionnaires n’ont pas accès à la « boîte noire » ;

(3) Les lacunes en matière de définition de l’indépendance des administrateurs sont issues du raisonnement qui veut que, peu importe la définition choisie, celle-ci soit toujours susceptible de souffrir d’ambiguïté et elle est de nature interprétative.

C’est donc à une réflexion en profondeur sur la gouvernance en général, et sur la qualité de l’information divulguée aux actionnaires que l’auteur nous convie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sur ce sujet sont les bienvenus.

 

 

Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure

 

 

In July 2016, a coalition of 13 CEOs and heads of major investment firms—which included names like JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett, General Motors CEO Mary Barra and BlackRock CEO Larry Fink—released the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance (discussed on the Forum here). These Principles emphasize the critical role of director independence in corporate America, stating that: “[t]ruly independent corporate boards are vital to effective governance, so no board should be beholden to the CEO or management” and that “[d]irectors should be strong and steadfast, independent of mind and willing to challenge [management] constructively.” Indeed, this recent statement echoes the importance and emphasis that academics, investors, regulators and companies alike, have placed on director independence.

Two months later, on September 7, 2016 Apple and Nike announced a new collaboration with one another on the Apple Watch. In their announcement, the companies declared their new Apple Watch Nike+ to be “the latest result of a long-standing partnership” between the world-renowned brands. Significantly, the announced initiative came on the heels of Nike appointing Mr. Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, as Nike’s lead independent director. Despite the new collaboration, the companies did not refer to any potential conflicts of interest or to Mr. Cook’s status as lead independent director in their press release. Apple itself has similarly straddled the line regarding the independence of its “independent” directors. Bob Iger, Disney’s CEO, is one of Apple’s five independent directors. The two companies have a close and frequent business collaboration with one another, but Apple does nothing more than disclose that “in the ordinary course of its business, Apple enters into commercial dealings with Disney that it considers arms-length.” In regards to Mr. Iger’s independence, Apple has stated that it “does not believe that Mr. Iger has a material direct or indirect interest in any of such commercial dealings.”

Apple’s short statement concerning Mr. Iger’s independence is indicative of a larger practice taken by public firms. Many public companies can, and do, satisfy their stock exchange’s disclosure requirements by simply declaring that “the Board of Directors has determined that all non-employee Directors who served during [the fiscal year] are ‘independent’ under the listing standards of the [NYSE/NASDAQ].” Investors receive very little value from these unsubstantiated statements.

Indeed, in the current regulatory regime, public companies’ boards self-designate their peer directors as “independent directors” and boards are only required to disclose very specific, and very limited, information regarding their designation of a director as an “independent director”—leaving shareholders with minimal knowledge regarding the true level of independence that their elected directors actually have.

In my article, Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, which is forthcoming in the Journal of Corporation Law, I address this issue of director independence disclosures, in light of the rise of the independent board. The article makes three important contributions to the current discourse regarding director independence:

First, the article exposes a fundamental concern regarding the functional independence of “independent” directors, and highlights what it terms as the “empty” nature of the current regulatory framework. As the article details in length, the current framework can be summed up as being too much, too little, too late and too soft. It provides companies with too much discretion, as boards retain too much power to assert the independence of their peer directors and they may suffer from behavioral bias in doing so. It provides investors with too little information regarding the factual context against which a director is considered to be independent. Further, even when a director’s independence designation is scrutinized through state law, it is often too late, as these assessments are done post-hoc when it is too late to address many of the issues that director independence is meant to protect against. Finally, it is too soft, as companies’ self-designations of director independence are left uncontested and without proper vetting by the stock exchanges or the SEC, as they have shown no effort to proactively enforce their own requirements.

Second, the article is the first to provide hand-collected empirical evidence corroborating the lack of proper disclosure by companies in the context of their director independence designations. To do so, using a hand collected data set, the article analyzed the disclosure statements of one hundred public companies. To account for both large, high profile, companies as well as smaller, less visible public companies, fifty of the companies make up the Fortune 50 and the remaining 50 are Fortune 2000 small-cap companies. For each company, the company’s independence disclosure in its proxy statements in the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, were analyzed and coded. Indeed, as further analyzed in greater detail in the article, the majority of companies provide very little information about their director independence designations, potentially violating the already lax rules governing independence disclosure. Furthermore, several companies have in fact regressed over time in regards to the level of transparency they are providing to investors. In essence, much of the information that boards are expected to consider when determining whether a director is independent is contained in a “black box,” to which shareholders have no access.

Finally, the article argues that at its core, the failure of current regulatory standards to ensure an effective director independence regime stems from the fact that any independence definition is destined to suffer from ambiguity and interpretive freedom. Instead, we should recognize that the true value of director independence requirements is not only in that they strive to ensure actual independence, but rather also in that they empower investors. Each investor may have a distinctive, subjective comfort level with the myriad independence questions that may arise, balanced against the benefits that the various business and personal connections of each director may provide to the company. Information about directors’ ties and dealings gives investors a means of making informed decisions, both regarding the election of a director as well as their actual level of independence on any specific issue. As a result, effective director independence standards should facilitate an environment where companies are accountable to their investors for their choice of directors.

Therefore, responding to the SEC’s call for input on possible ways to improve the discourse regime under Regulation S-K, this article calls for a re-conceptualizing of the current approach to regulating company disclosures. This new approach will shift some of the focus from the definition and designation of a director as independent to a disclosure-based regime. Alongside the current designation regime, companies would have to disclose, for each “independent” director, the entirety of the information they considered when declaring a director as independent, including some mandatory information that is currently hard or costly to independently obtain or verify. This in turn will allow investors and regulators not only to confirm the judgment of the board on each director but also to possess a more nuanced view regarding the functional independence of each director in regards to each matter at hand.

The complete article is available for download here.

La gouvernance à l’anglaise | Commentaires d’Yvan Allaire


Yvan Allaire*, président exécutif du conseil de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) vient de me faire parvenir un nouvel article intitulé « La gouvernance à l’anglaise ».

Cet article intéressera certainement tous les administrateurs siégeant à des conseils d’administration qui sont à l’affût des nouveautés dans le domaine de la gouvernance.

Le document discute de deux mesures particulièrement novatrices et audacieuses, même si le principe « Conformité ou explication » prévaut toujours : (1) la rémunération des dirigeants et (2) la prise en compte de toutes les parties prenantes de l’entreprise par le conseil d’administration

Je vous invite à lire le compte rendu sur le site de l’IGOPP.

Bonne lecture !

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « UK governance code »

 

La gouvernance à l’anglaise | Yvan Allaire

 

Avec la publication récente de ses intentions en suite à une vaste consultation, le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni propose une réforme de la gouvernance des sociétés à la fois prudente et audacieuse, comportant un certain nombre de mesures (controversées) sur deux enjeux précis :

  1. La rémunération des dirigeants;
  2. La prise en compte de toutes les parties prenantes de l’entreprise par le conseil d’administration

 

1. La rémunération des dirigeants

 

Le programme annoncé contient des propositions sur des questions longuement débattues.

– Ainsi, le gouvernement, par voie d’amendements législatifs, veut exiger la publication du rapport entre la rémunération du PDG et la rémunération médiane des employés de la société au Royaume-Uni; la société devra expliquer les variations de ce ratio d’une année à l’autre.

– Le gouvernement veut susciter des changements au code de gouvernance des entreprises pour que celles-ci doivent tenir compte d’une expression significative d’insatisfaction exprimée lors d’un vote consultatif sur la rémunération. Une expression significative reste à définir, mais le seuil pourrait s’établir à 20% ou plus de votes négatifs; le gouvernement promet d’agir par voie législative si l’approche incitative ne donne pas les résultats souhaités.

– Le gouvernement s’engage à présenter des amendements juridiques pour exiger que les sociétés inscrites en Bourse fournissent des explications plus claires de leurs politiques de rémunération ainsi que l’éventail de rémunérations pouvant résulter d’incitatifs complexes en actions et options sur le titre. Le gouvernement tiendra également des consultations sur la proposition d’augmenter de trois à cinq ans la période minimale requise avant qu’un dirigeant puisse encaisser les options ou les actions reçues comme rémunération incitative.

– Le gouvernement s’engage également à commanditer un examen d’un sujet d’une grande actualité : comment s’assurer que les rachats d’actions ne servent pas comme artifice pour atteindre des cibles de performance financière et ainsi gonfler la rémunération des dirigeants. Cet examen évaluera également si de tels rachats d’actions peuvent mener à un sous-investissement en actifs productifs.

 

2. La prise en compte de toutes les parties prenantes de l’entreprise par le conseil d’administration

 

La loi anglaise sur les sociétés par actions, tout comme la loi canadienne, enjoint que la responsabilité du conseil est envers la société et ses parties prenantes. L’article 172 de la loi anglaise de 2006 est plus explicite que la loi canadienne :

Text of Section 172 of the Companies Act 20069 | Duty to promote the success of the company

(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to —

(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,

(b) the interests of the company’s employees,

(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,

(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,

(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and

(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.

Toutefois, deux jugements de la Cour suprême du Canada donnent une interprétation assez similaire de la responsabilité du conseil d’administration envers les parties prenantes de la société (voir à cet effet le texte d’Allaire et Rousseau, Gouvernance et parties prenantes, IGOPP, juillet 2014).

– Au Royaume-Uni (comme au Canada), les conseils d’administration sont rarement explicites sur leur façon de se conformer à cette responsabilité envers les parties prenantes autres que les actionnaires. Le gouvernement compte donc présenter des amendements législatifs pour obliger toutes les sociétés (privées et publiques) à expliquer comment le conseil se conforme aux exigences de la loi en ce qui concerne les intérêts des employés ainsi que ses relations avec les fournisseurs, les clients et autres parties.

– Le gouvernement entend susciter des avis sur des changements au Code de gouvernance pour exiger que les sociétés inscrites en Bourse adoptent, sur une base Se conformer ou Expliquer, l’un ou l’autre des trois mécanismes suivants pour représenter au conseil les intérêts des employés :

(1) Désigner un administrateur indépendant pour que la voix des employés soit entendue au conseil d’administration;

(2) Créer un conseil consultatif des employés;

(3) Nommer un membre du conseil choisi parmi les employés.

– Le gouvernement a choisi à ce stade de ne pas élargir cette représentation aux autres parties prenantes. Il entend inviter le groupe GC100 (les cent plus grandes sociétés ouvertes) à fournir avis et lignes directrices pour une interprétation pratique des devoirs des administrateurs en vertu de l’article 172 de la loi sur les sociétés.

 

Autres sujets

 

Le gouvernement déposera des amendements législatifs pour que route les entreprises privées comptant plus de 2000 employés doivent rendre compte publiquement de leurs arrangements de gouvernance.

Bien que la diversité au conseil ne faisant pas l’objet de cette consultation, le gouvernement rappelle son engagement envers les objectifs établis par le Davies Review, soit qu’en 2020, 33% des membres des conseils des entreprises du FTSE ainsi que 33% des membres de leurs comités de direction soient des femmes; cet objectif ne pourra être atteint que si 40% des nominations jusqu’à terme seront des femmes.

Ce projet de réforme de la gouvernance ne va pas aussi loin que l’auraient souhaité bon nombre d’observateurs, mais aussi loin que le pragmatisme britannique et la puissante contre-réforme ne le permettaient. Mélange de consultations, de déférence envers des intermédiaires et d’activisme législatif mesuré, cette réforme a le mérite de mettre la table pour une discussion d’enjeux importants, mais souvent occultés.


*Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, Président exécutif du conseil, yallaire@igopp.org

Dilemme de gouvernance d’OBNL | Respect des rôles et responsabilités du DG


Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui expose un problème bien connu dans plusieurs organisations, notamment dans les OBNL qui ont souvent une gouvernance plus « décontractée ». Comment le CA peut-il obtenir la bonne dose de contrôle/surveillance afin de bien s’acquitter de ses obligations fiduciaires ?

La situation décrite dans ce cas se déroule dans une organisation à but non lucratif (OBNL) qui vient de recruter une excellente directrice générale qui provient d’une OBNL comparable, mais avec une faible gouvernance. La DG avait pris l’habitude de prendre toutes les décisions et d’en aviser le CA après coup !

La gouvernance des OBNL révèle des lacunes qui les rendent souvent plus fragiles et, contrairement au cas présenté ici, ce sont les administrateurs qui ont trop souvent tendance à empiéter sur les tâches de direction.

Dans notre cas, c’est la nouvelle DG qui a outrepassé ses responsabilités en octroyant d’importants contrats sans en discuter avec le conseil. Le président du conseil est outré de la situation, d’autant plus qu’il avait déjà soulevé ces questions avec elle deux fois auparavant.

Même si les décisions prises semblent avantageuses pour l’OBNL, le président doit remettre les pendules à l’heure !

Comment Scott, le président du conseil, doit-il agir afin de rétablir l’équilibre des responsabilités entre le CA et le management et prévenir les activités de cover-up ?

Le cas présente la situation de manière assez simple et explicite ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit Scott.

Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part vos commentaires.

Bonne lecture !

 

Un dilemme de gouvernance

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « Dilemme gouvernance OBNL »

Our case study this month looks at how a board can establish control without losing a valuable executive. I hope you will enjoy thinking through the key governance issues and developing your own judgement from this dilemma.

Scott is the Chair of a not-for-profit board that has recently recruited a new CEO from a rival organisation.

The CEO is very well qualified and the board are delighted to have her on their executive team. She came from another NFP in the same industry sector. That NFP had a very weak board with directors who were committed to the organisation and its mission but who did not put any effort into establishing good governance. The CEO has become accustomed to making her own decisions and telling the board about them afterwards.

Scott’s board are equally committed to their organisation and mission; they are also diligent and effective directors who have established formal controls that are appropriate for an organisation receiving government and donor funding.

The new CEO has now overstepped her financial and legal delegations for the fourth time. The head of the Audit, Risk and Governance Committee is almost incandescent with rage after hearing about it from the CFO.

Scott is disappointed; last time this happened the board and CEO had a very difficult conversation and she promised not to overstep her delegations again. Less than two months after that event Scott has discovered that she has signed a contract that exceeds her delegated authority in both its length and the quantum of the contract sum.

It is a great contract to have entered into. It will position the organisation for continued growth. The board would have approved had they been asked for permission; but they haven’t been. Even worse, Scott knows that the tender process would have been underway at the time of their last discussion and yet the CEO didn’t disclose the existence of the tender even when they were talking about the need for her to comply with the delegations.

How can Scott re-establish appropriate board control and prevent any more ‘covert operations’?

 

Deux événements récents qui auront un effet important sur la gouvernance


Corporate Governance—the New Paradigm

Cadre de référence pour évaluer la gouvernance des sociétés | Questionnaire de 100 items


Le Bureau de la vérification interne (BVI) de l’Université de Montréal (UdeM) a récemment développé un cadre de référence novateur pour l’évaluation de la gouvernance. La méthodologie, ainsi que le questionnaire qui en résulte, contribue, à mon avis, à l’avancement des connaissances dans le domaine de l’évaluation des caractéristiques et des pratiques de la gouvernance par les auditeurs internes.

Ayant eu l’occasion de collaborer à la conception de cet instrument de mesure de la gouvernance des sociétés, j’ai obtenu du BVI la permission de publier le résultat de cet exercice.

Cette version du cadre se veut « générique » et peut être utilisée pour l’évaluation de la gouvernance d’un projet, d’une activité, d’une unité ou d’une entité.

De ce fait, les termes, les intervenants ainsi que les structures attendues doivent être adaptés au contexte de l’évaluation. Il est à noter que ce cadre de référence correspond à une application optimale recherchée en matière de gouvernance. Certaines pratiques pourraient ne pas s’appliquer ou ne pas être retenues de façon consciente et transparente par l’organisation.

Le questionnaire se décline en dix thèmes, chacun comportant dix items :

 


 

Thème 1 — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

Thème 2 — Travail du président du Conseil

Thème 3 — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

Thème 4 — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

Thème 5 — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités

Thème 6 — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du directeur général

Thème 7 — Planification stratégique

Thème 8 — Performance et reddition de comptes

Thème 9 — Gestion des risques

Thème 10 — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 


 

On retrouvera en Annexe une représentation graphique du cadre conceptuel qui permet d’illustrer les liens entre les thèmes à évaluer dans le présent référentiel.

L’évaluation s’effectue à l’aide d’un questionnaire de type Likert (document distinct du cadre de référence). L’échelle de Likert est une échelle de jugement par laquelle la personne interrogée exprime son degré d’accord ou de désaccord eu égard à une affirmation ou une question.

 

  1. Tout à fait d’accord
  2. D’accord
  3. Ni en désaccord ni d’accord
  4. Pas d’accord
  5. Pas du tout d’accord
  6. Ne s’applique pas (S.O.)

 

Une section commentaire est également incluse dans le questionnaire afin que les participants puissent exprimer des informations spécifiques à la question. L’audit interne doit réaliser son évaluation à l’aide de questionnaires ainsi que sur la base de la documentation qui lui sera fournie.

 

Résultats de recherche d'images pour « gouvernance d'entreprise conseil d'administration »

 

Thème 1 — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

(Questions destinées au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG] et/ou au président du Conseil [PC])

 

1.       Le Conseil compte-t-il une proportion suffisante de membres indépendants pour lui permettre d’interagir de manière constructive avec la direction ?
2.       La taille du Conseil vous semble-t-elle raisonnable compte tenu des objectifs et de la charge de travail actuel ? (dans une fourchette idéale de 9 à 13 membres, avec une moyenne d’environ 10 membres)
3.       La composition du Conseil est-elle guidée par une politique sur la diversité des membres ?
4.       Le Conseil a-t-il conçu un processus rigoureux de recrutement de ses membres, basé sur une matrice des compétences complémentaires ?
5.       Le président et les membres du comité responsable du recrutement (comité de gouvernance) ont-ils clairement exprimé aux candidats potentiels les attentes de l’organisation en matière de temps, d’engagement et de contributions reliés avec leurs compétences ?
6.       Les réunions sont-elles bien organisées et structurées ? (durée, PV, taux de présence, documentation pertinente et à temps, etc.)
7.       Les échanges portent-ils sur surtout sur des questions stratégiques, sans porter sur les activités courantes (qui sont davantage du ressort de l’équipe de direction) ?
8.       Les membres sont-ils à l’aise d’émettre des propos qui vont à contre-courant des idées dominantes ?
9.       Une séance à huis clos est-elle systématiquement prévue à la fin de chacune des réunions afin de permettre aux membres indépendants de discuter des sujets sensibles ?
10.    Les membres ont-ils accès à la planification des rencontres sur une période idéale de 18 mois en y incluant certains items ou sujets récurrents qui seront abordés lors des réunions du Conseil (plan de travail) ?

 

 

Thème 2 — Travail du président du Conseil 

(Questions destinées à un administrateur indépendant, au PC [auto-évaluation] et au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG])

 

1.       Le président s’assure-t-il de former un solide tandem avec le directeur général et de partager avec lui une vision commune de l’organisation ?
2.       Le président promeut-il de hauts standards d’efficacité et d’intégrité afin de donner le ton à l’ensemble de l’organisation ?
3.       Le président, de concert avec le directeur général, prépare-t-il adéquatement les réunions du Conseil ?
4.       Le président préside-t-il avec compétence et doigté les réunions du Conseil ?
5.       Le président s’assure-t-il que les échanges portent surtout sur des questions stratégiques et que les réunions du Conseil ne versent pas dans la micro gestion ?
6.       Le président s’investit-il pleinement dans la sélection des présidents et des membres des comités du Conseil ?
7.       Le président s’assure-t-il de l’existence d’une formation et d’une trousse d’accueil destinées aux nouveaux membres afin qu’ils soient opérationnels dans les plus brefs délais ?
8.       Le président s’assure-t-il de l’existence d’un processus d’évaluation du rendement du Conseil et de ses membres ?
9.       Le président prend-il la peine d’aborder les membres non performants pour les aider à trouver des solutions ?
10.    Le président s’assure-t-il que les membres comprennent bien leurs devoirs de fiduciaire, c’est-à-dire qu’ils doivent veiller aux meilleurs intérêts de l’organisation et non aux intérêts de la base dont ils sont issus ?

 

 

Thème 3 — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

(Questions destinées au PC et au Directeur général [DG])

 

1.       Le président du Conseil et le directeur général ont-ils des rencontres régulières et statutaires pour faire le point entre les réunions du Conseil ?
2.       Le président du Conseil et le directeur général maintiennent-ils une communication franche et ouverte ? (équilibre entre une saine tension et des relations harmonieuses et efficaces)
3.       Le Conseil résiste-t-il à la tentation de faire de la micro gestion lors de ses réunions et s’en tient-il à assumer les responsabilités qui lui incombent ?
4.       Le Conseil agit-il de façon respectueuse à l’endroit du directeur général lors des réunions du Conseil et cherche-t-il à l’aider à réussir ?
5.       Le Conseil procède-t-il à une évaluation annuelle du rendement du directeur général (par le comité de GRH) basée sur des critères objectifs et mutuellement acceptés ?
6.       Les membres du Conseil s’abstiennent-ils de donner des ordres ou des directives aux employés qui relèvent de l’autorité du directeur général ?
7.       Le président comprend-il que le directeur général ne relève pas de lui, mais plutôt du Conseil, et agit-il en conséquence ?
8.       Le directeur général aide-t-il adéquatement le président dans la préparation des réunions du Conseil, fournit-il aux membres l’information dont ils ont besoin et répond-il à leurs questions de manière satisfaisante ?
9.       Le directeur général s’assure-t-il de ne pas embourber les réunions du Conseil de sujets qui relèvent de sa propre compétence ?
10.    Le directeur général accepte-t-il de se rallier aux décisions prises par le Conseil, même dans les cas où il a exprimé des réserves ?

 

 

Thème 4 — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

 (Questions destinées au PC et au président d’un des comités)

 

1.       Existe-t-il, au sein de votre organisation, les comités du Conseil suivants :

·         Audit ?

·         Gouvernance ?

·         Ressources humaines ?

·         Gestion des risques ?

·         Sinon, a-t-on inclus les responsabilités de ces comités dans le mandat du Conseil ou d’une autre instance indépendante ?

·         Autres comités reliés à la recherche (ex. éthique, scientifique) ?

 

2.       Les recommandations des comités du Conseil aident-elles le Conseil à bien s’acquitter de son rôle ?
3.       Les comités du Conseil sont-ils actifs et présentent-ils régulièrement des rapports au Conseil ?
4.       Estimez-vous que les comités créent de la valeur pour votre organisation ?
5.       Les comités du Conseil s’abstiennent-ils de s’immiscer dans la sphère de responsabilité du directeur général ?
6.       À l’heure actuelle, la séparation des rôles et responsabilités respectifs du Conseil, des comités et de la direction est-elle officiellement documentée, généralement comprise et mise en pratique ?
7.       Les membres qui siègent à un comité opérationnel comprennent-ils qu’ils travaillent sous l’autorité du directeur général ?
8.       Le directeur général est-il invité à assister aux réunions des comités du Conseil ?
9.       Chacun des comités et des groupes de travail du Conseil dispose-t-il d’un mandat clair et formulé par écrit ?
10.    S’il existe un comité exécutif dans votre organisation, son existence est-elle prévue dans le règlement de régie interne et, si oui, son rôle est-il clairement défini ?

 

 

Thème 5 — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités 

(Questions destinées au PC et au président du comité de gouvernance [PCG])

 

1.       Est-ce que la rémunération des membres du Conseil a été déterminée par le comité de gouvernance ou avec l’aide d’un processus indépendant ? (Jetons de présence ?)
2.       Par quels processus s’assure-t-on que le Conseil consacre suffisamment de temps et d’attention aux tendances émergentes et à la prévision des besoins futurs de la collectivité qu’il sert ?
3.       Est-ce que l’on procède à l’évaluation de la performance du Conseil, des comités et de ses membres au moins annuellement ?
4.       Est-ce que la logique et la démarche d’évaluation ont été expliquées aux membres du Conseil, et ceux-ci ont-ils pu donner leur point de vue avant de procéder à l’évaluation ?
5.       A-t-on convenu préalablement de la façon dont les données seront gérées de manière à fournir une garantie sur la confidentialité de l’information recueillie ?
6.       Est-ce que le président de Conseil croit que le directeur général et la haute direction font une évaluation positive de l’apport des membres du Conseil ?
7.       L’évaluation du Conseil et de ses comités mène-t-elle à un plan d’action réaliste pour prendre les mesures nécessaires selon leur priorité ?
8.       L’évaluation du Conseil permet-elle de relever les lacunes en matière de compétences et d’expérience qui pourraient être comblées par l’ajout de nouveaux membres ?
9.       Est-ce que les membres sont évalués en fonction des compétences et connaissances qu’ils sont censés apporter au Conseil ?
10.    Les membres sont-ils informés par le président du Conseil de leurs résultats d’évaluation dans le but d’aboutir à des mesures de perfectionnement ?

 

 

Thème 6 — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du DG

(Questions destinées au PC, au DG [auto-évaluation] et au président du comité des RH)

 

1.       Existe-t-il une description du poste de directeur général ? Cette description a-t-elle servi au moment de l’embauche du titulaire du poste ?
2.       Un comité du Conseil (comité de GRH) ou un groupe de membres indépendants est-il responsable de l’évaluation du rendement du directeur général (basé sur des critères objectifs) ?
3.       Le président du Conseil s’est-il vu confier un rôle prépondérant au sein du comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement du directeur général afin qu’il exerce le leadership que l’on attend de lui ?
4.       Le comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement et le directeur général ont-ils convenu d’objectifs de performance sur lesquels ce dernier sera évalué ?
5.       Le rendement du directeur général est-il évalué au moins une fois l’an en fonction de ces objectifs ?
6.       Les objectifs de rendement du directeur général sont-ils liés au plan stratégique ?
7.       Le comité responsable de l’évaluation du rendement s’est-il entretenu avec le directeur général en cours d’année pour lui donner une rétroaction préliminaire ?
8.       La rémunération du directeur général est-elle équitable par rapport à l’ensemble des employés et a-t-elle fait l’objet d’une analyse comparative avec le marché des organisations afin d’assurer un certain degré de compétitivité ?
9.       Les hausses salariales du directeur général sont-elles uniquement accordées en fonction de l’évaluation de son rendement ?
10.    Est-ce que le Conseil consacre l’attention nécessaire à la succession du directeur général et dispose-t-il d’un processus robuste d’identification d’un nouveau premier dirigeant, tant pour les transitions planifiées que non planifiées ?

 

 

Thème 7 — Planification stratégique 

(Questions destinées au PC et au DG)

 

1.       Votre organisation possède-t-elle un plan stratégique incluant notamment :

·         le contexte dans lequel évoluent la société et les principaux enjeux auxquels elle fait face ?

·         les objectifs et les orientations stratégiques de la société ?

·         les résultats visés au terme de la période couverte par le plan ?

·         les indicateurs de performance utilisés pour mesurer l’atteinte des résultats ?

2.       Le plan stratégique porte-t-il sur une période cohérente avec la mission et l’environnement dans lequel il œuvre ?
3.       La mission, les valeurs et l’énoncé de vision de l’organisation ont-ils été déterminés et réévalués périodiquement ?
4.       Est-ce qu’il y a eu une analyse Forces/faiblesses et opportunités/menaces ?
5.       L’ensemble des parties prenantes de l’organisation a-t-il été consulté notamment au moyen de sondages et d’entrevues, et lors d’un atelier de planification stratégique ?
6.       Les membres ont-ils été engagés dans le processus, notamment par la création d’un comité ad hoc chargé de piloter l’exercice et par des rapports périodiques aux réunions du Conseil ?
7.       Le Conseil évalue-t-il la stratégie proposée, notamment les hypothèses clés, les principaux risques, les ressources nécessaires et les résultats cibles, et s’assure-t-il qu’il traite les questions primordiales telles que l’émergence de la concurrence et l’évolution des préférences des clients ?
8.       Le président du Conseil s’assure-t-il que le plan stratégique soit débattu lors de réunions spéciales et que le Conseil dispose de suffisamment de temps pour être efficace ?
9.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait des plans de la direction pour la mise en œuvre de la stratégie approuvée ?
10.    Le Conseil surveille-t-il la viabilité permanente de la stratégie, et est-elle ajustée, si nécessaire, pour répondre aux évolutions de l’environnement ?

 

 

Thème 8 — Performance et reddition de comptes

 (Questions destinées au Président du comité d’audit ou au PC, au DG et au secrétaire corporatif)

 

1.       S’assure-t-on que les indicateurs de performance utilisés par la direction et présentés au Conseil sont reliés à la stratégie de l’organisation et aux objectifs à atteindre ?
2.       S’assure-t-on que les indicateurs de la performance sont équilibrés entre indicateurs financiers et non financiers, qu’ils comprennent des indicateurs prévisionnels et permettent une comparaison des activités similaires ?
3.       A-t-on une assurance raisonnable de la fiabilité des indicateurs de performance qui sont soumis au Conseil ?
4.       Utilise-t-on des informations de sources externes afin de mieux évaluer la performance de l’organisation ?
5.       Le Conseil et les comités réexaminent-ils régulièrement la pertinence de l’information qu’il reçoit ?
6.       Le Conseil examine-t-il d’un œil critique les informations à fournir aux parties prenantes ?
7.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait du processus de communication de crise de la société et est-il à même de surveiller de près son efficacité si une crise survient ?
8.       Le Conseil est-il satisfait de son implication actuelle dans la communication avec les parties prenantes externes et comprend-il les évolutions susceptibles de l’inciter à modifier son degré de participation ?
9.       Est-ce que la direction transmet suffisamment d’information opérationnelle au Conseil afin que celui-ci puisse bien s’acquitter de ses responsabilités de surveillance ?
10.    Est-ce que le Conseil s’assure que les informations sont fournies aux parties prenantes telles que les organismes réglementaires, les organismes subventionnaires et les partenaires d’affaires ?

 

 

Thème 9 — Gestion des risques

 (Questions destinées au PC et au Président du comité de Gestion des risques ou au Président du comité d’audit)

 

1.       L’organisation a-t-elle une politique de gestion des risques et obtient-elle l’adhésion de l’ensemble des dirigeants et des employés ?
2.       L’organisation a-t-elle identifié et évalué les principaux risques susceptibles de menacer sa réputation, son intégrité, ses programmes et sa pérennité ainsi que les principaux mécanismes d’atténuation ?
3.       L’organisation a-t-elle un plan de gestion de la continuité advenant un sinistre ?
4.       Est-ce que les risques les plus élevés font l’objet de mandats d’audit interne afin de donner un niveau d’assurance suffisant aux membres du Conseil ?
5.       L’organisation se penche-t-elle occasionnellement sur les processus de contrôle des transactions, par exemple l’autorisation des dépenses, l’achat de biens et services, la vérification et l’approbation des factures et des frais de déplacement, l’émission des paiements, etc. ?
6.       Existe-t-il une délégation d’autorité documentée et comprise par tous les intervenants ?
7.       Le Conseil a-t-il convenu avec la direction de l’appétit pour le risque ? (le niveau de risque que l’organisation est prête à assumer)
8.       Le Conseil est-il informé en temps utile lors de la matérialisation d’un risque critique et s’assure-t-il que la direction les gère convenablement ?
9.       S’assure-t-on que la direction entretient une culture qui encourage l’identification et la gestion des risques ?
10.   Le Conseil s’est-il assuré que la direction a pris les mesures nécessaires pour se prémunir des risques émergents, notamment ceux reliés à la cybersécurité et aux cyberattaques ?

 

Thème 10 — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 (Questions destinées au DG et au PC)

 

1.       Les politiques de votre organisation visant à favoriser l’éthique sont-elles bien connues et appliquées par ses employés, partenaires et bénévoles ?
2.       Le Conseil de votre organisation aborde-t-il régulièrement la question de l’éthique, notamment en recevant des rapports sur les plaintes, les dénonciations ?
3.       Le Conseil et l’équipe de direction de votre organisation participent-ils régulièrement à des activités de formation visant à parfaire leurs connaissances et leurs compétences en matière d’éthique ?
4.       S’assure-t-on que la direction générale est exemplaire et a développé une culture fondée sur des valeurs qui se déclinent dans l’ensemble de l’organisation ?
5.       S’assure-t-on que la direction prend au sérieux les manquements à l’éthique et les gère promptement et de façon cohérente ?
6.       S’assure-t-on que la direction a élaboré un code de conduite efficace auquel elle adhère, et veille à ce que tous les membres du personnel en comprennent la teneur, la pertinence et l’importance ?
7.       S’assure-t-on de l’existence de canaux de communication efficaces (ligne d’alerte téléphonique dédiée, assistance téléphonique, etc.) pour permettre aux membres du personnel et partenaires de signaler les problèmes ?
8.       Le Conseil reconnaît-il l’impact sur la réputation de l’organisation du comportement de ses principaux fournisseurs et autres partenaires ?
9.       Est-ce que le président du Conseil donne le ton au même titre que le DG au niveau des opérations sur la culture organisationnelle au nom de ses croyances, son attitude et ses valeurs ?
10.    Est-ce que l’organisation a la capacité d’intégrer des changements à même ses processus, outils ou comportements dans un délai raisonnable ?

 

 

 

Annexe

Présentation du schéma conceptuel

 

 

Thème (1) — Structure et fonctionnement du Conseil

Thème (2) — Travail du président du Conseil

Thème (3) — Relation entre le Conseil et le directeur général (direction)

Thème (4) — Structure et travail des comités du Conseil

Thème (5) — Performance du Conseil et de ses comités

Thème (6) — Recrutement, rémunération et évaluation du rendement du directeur général

Thème (7) — Planification stratégique

Thème (8) — Performance et reddition de comptes

Thème (9) — Gestion des risques

Thème (10) — Éthique et culture organisationnelle

 

 

Le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration | Deuxième partie


Plusieurs personnes me demandent de l’information sur le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration.

Souvent, les personnes intéressées souhaitent obtenir des documents pragmatiques et concrets.

Afin d’explorer plus à fond cette problématique, j’ai effectué une recherche documentaire assez exhaustive sur les bonnes pratiques eu égard aux réunions de conseils d’administration.

Cette recherche m’a amené à considérer quatre étapes incontournables dans la mise en place d’un processus efficace de gouvernance :

  1. la préparation de l’information et de la documentation pertinente ;
  2. la conduite de la réunion du conseil ;
  3. l’évaluation de la réunion ;
  4. les suivis apportés à la réunion.

Chacune de ces activités représente un niveau d’importance égal à mes yeux.

Mon premier billet, Le processus de gestion des réunions d’un conseil d’administration | Première partie, portait sur les étapes 1 et 2. J’ai rassemblé les informations les plus pertinentes sur le sujet.

Dans ce billet, j’aborderai les activités se rapportant aux deux autres thèmes : l’évaluation de la réunion et les suivis apportés à la réunion.

 

(3) L’évaluation de la réunion et de l’efficacité du conseil

 

L’évaluation de chaque réunion du conseil est à recommander. Il s’agit d’une activité menée par le président du conseil et elle peut se faire lors du huis clos. Cependant, il est essentiel que cette activité se fasse annuellement.

Tel que je l’ai publié sur mon blogue en gouvernance le 16 novembre 2016 (Comment procéder à l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs | Un sujet d’actualité!), les conseils d’administration sont de plus en plus confrontés à l’exigence d’évaluer l’efficacité de leur fonctionnement par le biais d’une évaluation annuelle du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

En fait, le NYSE exige depuis dix ans que les conseils procèdent à leur évaluation et que les résultats du processus soient divulgués aux actionnaires. Également, les investisseurs institutionnels et les activistes demandent de plus en plus d’informations au sujet du processus d’évaluation.

Les résultats de l’évaluation peuvent être divulgués de plusieurs façons, notamment dans les circulaires de procuration et sur le site de l’entreprise.

L’article publié par John Olson, associé fondateur de la firme Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, professeur invité à Georgetown Law Center, et paru sur le forum du Harvard Law School, présente certaines approches fréquemment utilisées pour l’évaluation du CA, des comités et des administrateurs.

On recommande de modifier les méthodes et les paramètres de l’évaluation à chaque trois ans afin d’éviter la routine susceptible de s’installer si les administrateurs remplissent les mêmes questionnaires, gérés par le président du conseil. De plus, l’objectif de l’évaluation est sujet à changement (par exemple, depuis une décennie, on accorde une grande place à la cybersécurité).

C’est au comité de gouvernance que revient la supervision du processus d’évaluation du conseil d’administration. L’article décrit quatre méthodes fréquemment utilisées.

(1) Les questionnaires gérés par le comité de gouvernance ou une personne externe

(2) les discussions entre administrateurs sur des sujets déterminés à l’avance

(3) les entretiens individuels avec les administrateurs sur des thèmes précis par le président du conseil, le président du comité de gouvernance ou un expert externe.

(4) L’évaluation des contributions de chaque administrateur par la méthode d’auto-évaluation et par l’évaluation des pairs.

Chaque approche a ses particularités et la clé est de varier les façons de faire périodiquement. On constate également que beaucoup de sociétés cotées utilisent les services de spécialistes pour les aider dans leurs démarches.

La quasi-totalité des entreprises du S&P 500 divulgue le processus d’évaluation utilisé pour améliorer leur efficacité. L’article présente deux manières de diffuser les résultats du processus d’évaluation.

(1) Structuré, c’est-à-dire un format qui précise — qui évalue quoi ; la fréquence de l’évaluation ; qui supervise les résultats ; comment le CA a-t-il agi eu égard aux résultats de l’opération d’évaluation ?

(2) Information axée sur les résultats — les grandes conclusions ; les facteurs positifs et les points à améliorer ; un plan d’action visant à corriger les lacunes observées.

Notons que la firme de services aux actionnaires ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) utilise la qualité du processus d’évaluation pour évaluer la robustesse de la gouvernance des sociétés. L’article présente des recommandations très utiles pour toute personne intéressée par la mise en place d’un système d’évaluation du CA et par sa gestion.

Voici trois articles parus sur mon blogue qui abordent le sujet de l’évaluation :

L’évaluation des conseils d’administration et des administrateurs | Sept étapes à considérer

Quels sont les devoirs et les responsabilités d’un CA ?  (la section qui traite des questionnaires d’évaluation du rendement et de la performance du conseil)

Évaluation des membres de Conseils

Le texte de l’IGOPP, Performance et dynamique des conseils d’administration, est assez explicite sur le sujet de l’évaluation. On indique que celle-ci comporte plusieurs volets :

Une évaluation, sous forme de questionnaire, du fonctionnement du conseil et de ses comités; cette démarche est quasi-universelle;

Une évaluation nominative des membres du conseil par les pairs; cette forme d’évaluation gagne en fréquence, mais ne fait pas lunanimité chez nos participants; elle est même carrément rejetée par plusieurs parce que, selon eux, elle est susceptible de semer la zizanie au conseil;

Une auto-évaluation par les membres du conseil, laquelle est communiquée au président du conseil (PCA) et sert de base de discussion individuelle avec le PCA;

Une évaluation d’ensemble (anonyme et non nominative) des membres du conseil suivi d’une rencontre individuelle avec le ou la président(e) du conseil; cette démarche reçoit plus dappui;

De l’avis de nos informateurs, quelle que soit la démarche adoptée, la rencontre du PCA avec chaque membre individuellement est une démarche incontournable pour relever la qualité du conseil; le PCA doit être franc et ferme durant cette rencontre à propos de la contribution et de la préparation de chacun ainsi qu’à propos des aspects à améliorer, s’il y a lieu; cest le moment privilégié pour susciter des départs et ainsi renouveler et renforcer le conseil;

Une pratique, qui a du mérite, fut mentionnée : la direction (le PDG et ses subalternes immédiats) est invitée à évaluer le conseil dans son ensemble ainsi qu’à suggérer des enjeux qui devraient être considérés par le conseil au cours de la prochaine année;

L’évaluation doit aussi porter sur la façon dont le PCA s’acquitte de ses responsabilités; cette évaluation menée par le président du comité de gouvernance s’appuie habituellement sur les réponses des membres du conseil à un questionnaire préparé à cette fin.

 

 (4) Suivis apportés à la réunion

 

La direction doit être incitée à effectuer tous les suivis requis par le conseil d’administration et le CA doit l’accompagner dans la conception et la préparation de tableaux de suivis et de tableaux de bord.

Ces instruments sont essentiels au travail de supervision des administrateurs. On y retrouve généralement la date ou la résolution, la nature du suivi à effectuer, le ou les responsables de ces activités, l’échéance, les notes pertinentes au dossier.

Également, un tableau de bord doit être produit à chaque rencontre. On y retrouve des indicateurs liés à la performance de l’organisation ainsi que les principaux risques à mitiger.

Encore ici, c’est le président du conseil qui doit s’assurer que ces outils de suivis sont mis en place et utilisés à bon escient. Sans un suivi soutenu entre les rencontres du CA ou des comités, les administrateurs sont dans le brouillard.

Je vous invite également à prendre connaissance des deux documents synthèses suivants :

Assurer une efficacité supérieure du conseil d’administration

Règles et pratiques relatives aux réunions du conseil d’administration — UdeS

En terminant, il faut insister sur l’importance pour l’organisation de protéger la confidentialité et la sécurité des données par l’utilisation d’une plateforme permettant d’avoir accès aux contenus des réunions. Les firmes les plus connues pour offrir ces services sont idside et LeadingBoards.

Je suis assuré que les informations soumises dans ce rapport vous aideront à dégager une grille d’analyse pertinente pour l’évaluation de l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.

Comment votre entreprise se prépare-t-elle pour éviter d’être la cible d’investisseurs activistes ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un article de Jack « Rusty » O’Kelley III, directeur de la firme Russell Reynolds Associates, qui explique les diverses stratégies que les conseils d’administration peuvent mettre en place pour minimiser les attaques des actionnaires « activistes », lorsqu’ils ont choisi leur société comme cible de changement. L’article a été publié sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Bien sûr, les entreprises doivent anticiper les gestes des activistes afin de se préparer à l’éventualité d’une demande de changement au CA.

L’auteur expose les approches couramment utilisées par les investisseurs activistes pour accroître le nombre d’administrateurs au conseil, ou pour demander le changement d’un ou deux administrateurs.

Quelles situations sont les plus favorables pour exiger des changements dans la composition du conseil d’administration ?

Les clients de la firme Russell Reynolds se posent deux questions à ce sujet :

– How do you know if an activist is going to seek to expand the board or target specific directors for replacement (and potentially escalate the situation to a proxy contest)?

– If an activist chooses a board member replacement strategy, how can you predict which directors an activist may target?

C’est certainement un article très utile pour les grandes entreprises cotées en bourse.

Mais, le jour viendra peut-être où votre entreprise sera la cible d’activistes !

Bonne lecture !

 

Activist Investors’ Approaches to Targeting Boards

 

Image associée
Les actionnaires activistes à l’assaut de l’Europe | L’Echo

 

Clients who are anticipating or early in the process of an activist situation, and a potential proxy contest, often ask us two questions:

  1. How do you know if an activist is going to seek to expand the board or target specific directors for replacement (and potentially escalate the situation to a proxy contest)?
  2. If an activist chooses a board member replacement strategy, how can you predict which directors an activist may target?

Based on our experience working with corporate boards defending against activists (as well as our broader board search and effectiveness expertise), we have gathered insights regarding how activists analyze and target boards of directors. In response to client requests, we have developed this guide to help our clients proactively think through defensive measures regarding board composition and governance issues.

Activists generally will utilize against individual directors all current and historical negative press, statistics, and data that is publicly available, whether or not it is accurate, comprehensive, or fair. Boards should be ready for this tactic and be ready to take back control of the narrative about the board.

Russell Reynolds only works on behalf of corporations and their existing board and management teams. We urge our clients to take a proactive, “clear-eyed” activist view of their board to understand how an activist may attack their board. We have prepared this overview based on our experience and on the insights of several activist defense lawyers, investment bankers, and proxy advisors with whom we have worked. Additionally, we have talked with activist investors who were willing to share their approaches.

Expansion vs. Replacement

Anticipating an activist’s approach to targeting board seats

Activists target a board to influence decision-making and increase value creation. While activists may take different approaches and specific tactics vary by activist and situation, key indicators can help identify their potential path.

Two of the most common activist approaches to maximizing influence on a board are either pressuring the company’s board to expand the number of board members or targeting specific incumbent directors to be replaced. Both may be done by way of a proxy contest or by using the threat of such a contest to pressure the target board into a settlement that places activist-backed directors on the board. There is no strict methodology for predicting which tactic an activist will pursue, and activists’ decisions are frequently determined by how companies react to the activists’ ideas.

We have identified some key indicators that determine if activists are likely to look to expand a board or target specific board members.

Expansion

Activists often seek to expand a board in less contentious activist situations

We have observed that the earlier a company is in the process of engaging with an activist, the more likely it is that the activist will encourage the board to expand its size by adding activist-backed directors. The longer and more public the process, the more likely it is that the activist will target specific incumbent directors and consider conducting a proxy fight.

Board expansion usually occurs in several situations based on several factors, which include:

The board has accepted the activist’s investment thesis and acknowledges the validity of its recommendations

The activist wants to monitor a situation or progress

There is specific insight or expertise the activist and board feel is missing based on business strategy

The board has classified terms (to get around limitations of a replacement strategy with staggered terms)

The first procedural step is for the board to look at its size in relation to its bylaws and peer benchmarks. As a general rule, relatively large boards make expansion less desirable. If the board is already at the maximum membership allowed by its bylaws, expansion is less attractive as the board may not want to change the bylaws to increase the number of directors. Board expansion will dilute the magnitude of activist influence (compared to replacement), but may face less resistance from the target board in a settlement.

For example, if an activist seeks to add 2 directors to a 10-member board, a board agreeing to expand the membership will net the activist 16% representation (2 of 12), as opposed to the 20% representation by replacing 2 sitting directors (2 of 10).

Board Expansion May Not Be the End of Activist Opposition

An activist and the board may agree to expand the board, but the activist may subsequently use their influence from their new board seats to later call for certain incumbent directors to step down in the following board election. Often, activists will look to break up groups of power on a board. They prefer to have at least two directors on a board to increase the number of voices and leadership for change. It is easier to dismiss one voice rather than two voices on an issue. Should the activist-backed directors seek to replace other directors likely targets could include:

Directors with the poorest history of value creation

The longest-tenured directors who approved the strategy to which the activist objected

The chairman or the director(s) who led the campaign against the activist

Activists usually do not target the CEO unless they create a “CEO referendum” evidenced by strong, public complaints about value creation (e.g., Arconic). Once an activist joins the board, the average CEO tenure is 15 months

Replacement

Activists often seek to replace board members in more contentious and drawn-out situations

Activists will spend the time and effort needed to win these contests to drive adoption of their perspective around major strategic/value creation issues when the financial returns will reward it. The director replacement strategy has the benefit (for the activist) of increasing the magnitude of the activist’s influence on a board (compared to expanding the board).

Under U.S. securities law, activists may and usually identify, by name, the incumbent directors that they are targeting for replacement when submitting a proxy filing. Replacing directors sends the clearest message of an activist’s desire to drive change in strategic direction to enhance value creation.

Activists usually go down this path the greater the disagreement between a company and an activist on strategies for value creation, and the less willing management is to implement the activist’s ideas. We see a greater chance that an activist will seek to replace directors to demonstrate the need for dramatic change when:

There are visible public disagreements about strategic or operational issues and value creation

Increasingly public and “tougher” the language

Situations where the board is too large and cannot be expanded

Activists often are looking for directors who can provide specific insight or expertise about an industry and can act as change agents.

Identifying Incumbent Directors Activists May Target

Anticipating an activist’s approach to targeting board seats

Activists have become very sophisticated in how they determine which directors to target in connection with a proxy contest. Activists will try to create the narrative around the full board and/or each director to advance the story that suits their goals. Activists will use time frames and benchmarks around total shareholder return and share price appreciation that paints management and board members in the worst possible light. While boards and directors may claim this is unfair or misleading (not taking into account the full facts or context), activists have the advantage of being on the offensive and using “facts” in a manner that benefits them. Activists look at a series of “filters” for each director. The record of value creation and relevance of each director’s skill set are critical. Unfortunately, a director with a great track record of value creation and with highly relevant skills can be targeted if there are publicly available stories that raise questions about that director’s judgment or integrity.

Russell Reynolds recommends that boards conduct a proactive board and director activism defense review. To help prepare and defend against an activist targeting a board and individual directors, RRA uses five filters to analyze each incumbent director and identify those most likely to be targeted by an activist investor.

Our proactive board composition and performance audit review includes:

 

Summary

Scrutiny of public company boards from activists, institutional investors, and the media shows no signs of abating. Publically and, what was once privately available information, continues to increase. New databases from ISS, Glass Lewis, Bloomberg, S&P and other information service providers increase the ability of activists and others to analyze multiple aspects of a board and individual directors’ performance, background, and governance standards. Boards need to prepare and be “clear-eyed” and objective in foreseeing the risks they may face should an activist or institutional investor initiate a review of the board.

Combien rémunérer les administrateurs de sociétés privées ?


Cet article présente les comparaisons des programmes de rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés en fonctions des types d’organisations suivants :

 

  1. Grandes sociétés cotées
  2. Entreprises à propriété privée
  3. Entreprises sous contrôle familial
  4. Fonds privés de placement (Private equity)

 

L’article a été publié par James F. Reda directeur de la firme Arthur J. Gallagher & Co et est paru sur le forum du HLS.

Les conseils d’administration de sociétés privées se posent souvent des questions eu égard à la rémunération de leurs administrateurs. Il y a beaucoup d’information sur les rémunérations des administrateurs des sociétés publiques, mais, en ce qui concerne les entreprises privées, il y a assez peu de divulgation, donc peu de possibilités de comparaison.

À ma connaissance, l’étude de Reda est la plus complète sur le sujet.

Vous pouvez également consulter un de mes récents billets : Guide pratique à la détermination de la rémunération des administrateurs de sociétés | ICGN

Bonne lecture !

 

 

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Board Pay—Not Just a Public Company Concern

 

 

The pay levels and mechanisms for directors at public companies are well studied and benchmarked. Private and family-owned companies? Not so much. Indeed, board compensation norms for these non-public firms (which make up a huge segment of our economy) have long been very obscure. New research sheds light on the topic.

Private companies continue to struggle with how much to pay their outside board members given the shortage of available benchmarks and data. Unlike publicly traded companies, where detailed information about director compensation can be collected from an annual proxy statement and multiple survey sources, understanding pay at private boards requires further research and analysis.

Even among private companies, the variety of company ownership structures must be considered. For example, how does director compensation at a family-owned company compare to a company that is private equity-owned?

After significant growth in the early 2000s, increases in public company board pay levels have now stabilized. Heightened scrutiny from shareholders and a series of high-profile lawsuits have resulted in a standardization of pay levels between companies of similar size and industry. Companies are reviewing their plans more frequently than ever before and, subsequently, are making smaller changes.

This post compares and contrasts director pay programs at public firms that are owned by large institutional and private investors with programs at various types of private companies, as follows:

1. General

Owned by one person or a small group with a goal of increasing long-term shareholder value.

2. Family-owned

Owned by family members who have an interest in building long-term shareholder value to pass onto the next generation.

3. Private equity-owned

Owned or sponsored by private equity (PE) firms.

Private companies tend to organize their boards along the lines of public corporations. Many private companies are contemplating public status, and are working to attract investors who are more comfortable with a well-developed corporate governance structure. To staff the board with its numerous committees and leadership roles, competitive pay is required to attract and retain qualified directors.

Public and private companies compete for the same outside board talent. Private companies assume most of the leading practices of public firms with regard to board pay.

For organizations of all kinds, good governance starts with the board of directors. Despite the differences in director pay practices, boards have similar overall objectives. While the role of a board will evolve as a company grows and matures, the underlying principles remain consistent. The oversight duty, the decision-making authority, and the fiduciary responsibilities of a board are comparable, regardless of ownership, industry, size, complexity, or location within the U.S.

Public and private companies compete for the same outside board talent. The confluence of director service has made pay practices of private companies more competitive with public ones. Private companies continue to assume most of the leading practices of public firms with regard to board pay.

Despite the implementation of cash-based outside director pay plans that mirror public companies, private companies do not generally award equity, but sometimes partially make up this value in higher cash compensation. Since equity makes up a large portion of total pay for public company directors (generally over 50 percent), total director pay at private companies is significantly lower than at public companies.

Cash compensation paid to outside directors of public and private companies is fairly similar in terms of both value and structure. Cash retainer values are consistent among both public and private companies, and increase with company size.

Like public companies, many private ones pay additional cash retainers to committee chairs and members, and provide some type of incremental cash award to the lead director or non-executive chair. Private companies are also following the public company trend of eliminating board and committee meeting fees, and making up for this with a corresponding increase in board and/or committee member retainers.

Additional compensation is almost always paid for serving as a committee chair, lead director, or non-executive chair.

Public companies

For publicly held companies, many of the board’s responsibilities are defined by regulatory bodies. These are more rigorous and complex than for privately held firms where there is a substantial amount of discretion as to the role a board will play.

It has always been desirable to have a healthy complement of outside directors on the board. Corporate governance rules adopted by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) in 2003 require that a majority of a listed company’s board consist of independent directors, and with limited exceptions, that the board appoints independent compensation, audit and nominating/corporate governance committees. With the need for independent directors comes a price.

Among the 1,813 companies in our firm’s study of director pay programs among Russell 3000 companies, median 2015 total director compensation was $191,043. The median revenue of these companies was $1.2 billion. Total compensation increased with company size.

Most public company directors receive a combination of cash and equity compensation, with equity making up at least half of total pay regardless of company size or industry. The median pay mix of companies studied was 58 percent equity and 42 percent cash.

The median annual board cash retainer was $55,000. Cash retainers are correlated with company size, increasing from a median of $40,000 to $100,000 by ascending revenue size.

Additional compensation is almost always paid for serving as a committee chair, lead director, or non-executive chair. Increasingly, these leadership premiums are the only additional amounts beyond the board and committee retainers and equity awards paid in these more streamlined director pay programs.

Almost all companies (94 percent) provided committee chair retainers, consistent with the general industry practice of providing premium pay to the directors with the most responsibility. Just under half of all companies (47 percent) pay committee member retainers.

Of all companies in our study, 41 percent reported a non-executive chair (NEC). Most of these (91 percent) provided additional pay, with the median added fee for this leadership position being $65,000. Fifty-three percent of all companies reported a lead director. Of these, 79 percent provided additional compensation, a median of $25,000 (almost entirely paid in cash). Unlike the NEC role, the added pay for this role did not vary significantly by company size or industry.

For annual equity awards, which typically make up at least half of total pay, the market trend over the last decade has been away from stock options and toward full value shares (restricted stock, deferred stock or outright stock). The prevalence of options continues to decline, and when companies do grant them, they often grant options along with full value shares.

The median total equity award for the entire study sample was $112,000. Nearly all companies studied provided equity (97 percent). Seventy-seven percent granted full value shares only, compared to just eight percent granting stock options only. Twelve percent of companies granted a mix of full value shares and stock options, and the remaining three percent of companies granted no equity awards at all.

 

 

Private companies

No longer able to afford the informal corporate governance practices of the past, private companies are under increasing pressure to implement or improve board oversight. These companies are embracing public-company governance, including formation of boards that include outside directors and standard committees. This movement has also affected family businesses, particularly as shareholders of family-run companies have become less concentrated with each passing generation.

The bar has thus been rising for private company governance, despite the fact that requirements imposed by various governing bodies apply only to public companies. In today’s business environment, the talent pool is becoming more homogeneous as executives and directors move freely between organizations that are small and large, and public and private.

We have estimated total director pay levels for private companies of various sizes, based on our consulting experience as well as our Russell 3000 study of director pay programs at public companies. Among all revenue categories, more than 50 percent of total pay was made up of equity. Using this data as a guide, we have estimated the total pay range for similarly sized private companies, as follows:

The low end of private company total pay range represents the cash portion of public company total pay for the applicable revenue category.

The high end of private company pay range represents the cash portion of public company total pay, plus 30 percent of the equity portion for the applicable revenue category.

For example, the enclosed table shows that, among all Russell 3000 companies, total pay is $191,043, made up of 42 percent cash and 58 percent equity. Among similarly sized private companies, total compensation will range from $80,708 (the 42 percent cash portion of $191,043) to $113,809 (the 42 percent cash portion of $191,043 plus 30 percent of the remaining equity).

Thus, the resulting private company pay range equals 42 percent to 60 percent of public company pay for similarly sized companies. We have followed the same methodology to estimate total pay levels among private companies within each revenue category.

Private companies pay directors cash to the same extent as public companies of similar size, and in some cases more to make up for the lack of equity.

Based on our experience working with private companies, we believe that these ranges are a sound benchmark for how private companies of various sizes pay directors. In general, these companies pay cash to the same extent as public companies of similar size, and in some cases pay more cash to make up for the lack of equity awards (though still at a reduced rate, resulting in lower total pay).

Most public companies have some kind of executive equity program in place, and equity typically represents 50 percent to 75 percent of total pay for their senior executives. While more private companies are adopting long-term cash incentive plans, real equity awards (stock options or restricted stock) are used by a minority of private companies.

Overall, we estimate that less than 10 percent of private companies provide director equity awards, compared to 97 percent of public companies as mentioned previously. An exception to this is PE-owned companies.

Family-owned companies

Most family businesses benefit from a board that includes not only family members but also well-informed, seasoned, outside directors. These independents bring outside knowledge, leadership development skills and accountability. Leadership development is particularly important as there must be a management succession plan that includes family and non-family members, if necessary.

In 2016, Gallagher’s research team set out to understand exactly how much outside directors of family-owned companies are paid by conducting phone and electronic mail inquiries to a number of large family-held business. The outreach was successful, with nineteen companies responding. These companies spanned various industries, including retail, food processing, consumer products and general manufacturing. The median revenue of these nineteen companies was $6.9 billion.

Outside directors of family-owned companies are paid similarly to directors of other private companies, with a focus on cash and little to no equity

Twelve of the nineteen companies (63 percent) had family members that were also senior members of the management team serving on the board. In line with common practices for all types of companies, these family members received no compensation for board service.

We found that outside directors of family-owned companies are paid similarly to directors of other private companies, with a focus on cash and little to no equity awards. Some major findings:

1. The median annual cash retainer was $75,000. Median annual total compensation was $100,250. Only 11 percent of companies used equity as part of their director pay package.

2. Forty-two percent of companies paid a lead director premium.

3. Forty-seven percent paid their committee chairs a leadership premium.

4. Forty-two percent paid board meeting fees, with a range of $1,958 to $2,650 per meeting.

5. Thirty-two percent paid committee meeting fees with a range of $1,531 to $2,294 per committee meeting.

Like non-family-owned private companies, cash levels are similar to what we would expect to see among public companies. In fact, our Russell 3000 study found that public companies with revenues ranging from $3 to $9.9 billion also had a median cash retainer of $75,000.

Consistent with expectations, the lack of equity awards (present at only 11 percent of our family-owned company sample) creates a large disparity in total pay compared to the same group of Russell 3000 companies ($3 to $9.9 billion in revenue). The median compensation among public companies was $227,005 (consisting of 57 percent equity and 43 percent cash). This is 126 percent higher than the $100,250 seen among the family-owned sample.

This difference is due to the equity award. If we were to extricate only the 43 percent cash portion of $227,005, the resulting $98,000 (inclusive of cash retainer and committee member fees) is right in line with the total of $100,250 at family-owned companies. As discussed previously, this is one way that private companies, family-owned or not, set director pay—by stripping out the equity portion of comparable public company pay.

Private equity owned or sponsored companies

PE-owned companies invest in strong board governance early on in pursuit of significant growth. A top-down agenda set by the private equity fund generally drives the board’s focus, with an overall goal of progress toward a liquidity event, such as an initial public offering or M&A event.

The directors of PE-owned companies are mainly focused on strategies to increase investor value, with a much shorter time horizon than directors of private or public companies. Accordingly, these PE-owned boards are more deeply entrenched with company management, and in most cases meet more frequently than other company boards.

Beyond employee directors, there are two types of directors that will typically serve on these boards: outside directors, and employees of the private equity firm, which we refer to as “PE principals.”

Outside directors

Outsiders are often introduced to the board by the private equity firm that owns the portfolio company. Bringing in a director with no affiliation to the company or PE firm is most often made with the goal of gaining the benefit of that person’s specific qualifications and expertise.

These outside directors are generally paid by the PE fund owner, and pay is similar to publicly traded company directors. Unlike other private companies, where the focus is on cash, these outside directors generally receive a mix of both cash and equity compensation. In many cases, the focus is on equity.

PE principals.

Private equity firms exercise control over portfolio companies through their representation on the companies’ boards. These PE principal directors have a strong sense of personal ownership that is ensured by the compensation arrangements (particularly in the form of “carried interest”) of their firms.

PE principals are either paid nothing, or the same as the outside directors. In the latter arrangement, they are getting paid by both the portfolio company to be a director and by the private equity firm as an employee, which can result in excessive payment levels. For this reason, these “double pay” arrangements have sometimes caused controversy.

In summary, there are real differences in director pay between public and private companies, with the exception of private-equity controlled companies that tend to pay the same as public company counterparts.

Similar to executive pay, director pay trends continue to “trickle down” from public companies to private companies. With evolving standards and further integration of the director talent pool, we expect that private companies will continue adopting the cash-based pay practices of public companies. For all companies, governance improvements are focused on strengthening the role and responsibilities of the board of directors, and an appropriate director pay plan is a key factor to consider.