Il y a une pléthore d’arguments qui circulent dans la littérature sur la gouvernance et qui concernent les pour et contre des fonds activistes eu égard aux avantages pour les actionnaires.Voici un article publié par Kai Haakon E. Liekefett*, président de Shareholder Activism Defense Team, paru dans récemment dans ethicalboardroom.L’auteur tente de montrer l’hypocrisie des fonds activistes de type « edge fund » eu égard aux points suivants :
In virtually every activism campaign, hedge fund activists don the mantle of the shareholders’ champion and accuse the target company’s board and management of subpar corporate governance.
This claim to having ‘best practices of corporate governance’ at heart is hollow – even hypocritical – as evidenced by at least three examples: hedge fund activists actually undermine the shareholder franchise, they weaken the independence and diversity of the board, and they waffle on their anti-takeover protection stance.
1. Undermining the shareholder franchise
Shareholders have a significant interest in maintaining their franchise: the right to elect directors, approve significant transactions such as a merger or the sale of all or a substantial part of the assets, or amend the charter of a corporation. Hedge fund activists promote themselves as ferocious proponents of this franchise and of ‘shareholder democracy’. In their campaigns, they demand shareholder votes on any matter that allegedly touches on shareholder rights, including areas where corporate law and the bylaws bestow authority on the board.
Yet, in most activism situations, activists seek to influence board decisions and obtain board seats through private settlement negotiations. The price of peace for the corporation is often accepting the addition of one or more activist representatives to the board to avoid the cost and disruption of a proxy contest. Notably, hedge fund activists will accuse directors of ‘entrenchment’ if a board does not settle and instead opts to let the shareholders decide at the ballot box. This practice of entering into private settlements to appoint directors without a shareholder vote is, of course, directly contrary to the shareholder franchise. For this reason, major institutional investors have called publicly on companies to engage with a broader base of shareholders prior to settling with an activist.
In the same vein, activists habitually accuse directors of ‘disenfranchising shareholders’ when they refresh the board in the face of an activist campaign, arguing that a board must not appoint new directors without shareholder approval. Remarkably, all these concerns for the shareholder franchise quickly disappear once a company engages in settlement discussions with an activist. In private negotiations, activists commonly insist on an immediate appointment to the board. A board’s request to delay the appointment and allow shareholders to vote on an activist’s director designees at the annual meeting is usually met with fierce resistance.
“THERE ARE NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ‘BEST PRACTICES’ THAT ACTIVISTS TEND TO IGNORE IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CAMPAIGNS”
Note also that in these private settlement negotiations, activists almost always seek recovery of their campaign expenses and companies typically agree to some level of payment. These demands for expense reimbursement are almost never submitted to shareholders for approval. While the proxy rules expressly require dissidents to disclose ‘whether the question of such reimbursement will be submitted to a vote of security holders’, an activist hedge fund’s interest in the shareholder franchise evaporates once the fund’s own wallet is concerned. All too often, it appears that the activists’ concern for the shareholder franchise is merely for public consumption.
2. Weakening board independence and diversity
The main target of most activist campaigns is the composition of a company’s board of directors. The business model of hedge fund activism is to identify undervalued public companies whose intrinsic value is substantially higher than the share price on the stock exchange. And if the stock market undervalues a company, then it is only fair to look to those in charge of the company: the board of directors. Consequently, activists often argue that a board needs a refresh, typically calling for ‘shareholder representatives’ and ‘industry experts’ to be appointed as directors.
Of course, activists are not interested in just any type of ‘shareholder representative’ in the boardroom. The preferred director candidate is a principal or employee of the activist hedge fund itself. The reason is that activists intend to use the influence in the boardroom to push aggressively for their own agenda. And, in most cases, that agenda is to push the company to take some strategic action that will return financial value to the hedge fund in the near-term – such as a quick sale at a premium – irrespective of the company’s long-term potential.
Often, an activist will also identify the need for more ‘industry experts’ to join the board and propose experts affiliated with the activist to be added. Activists may give lip service to the need for independent director candidates but when they have to choose between placing an independent candidate or themselves on the board, their preferred candidate is an activist principal or employee. Frequently, even if they passionately argued for ‘much-needed industry expertise’ beforehand, activists are quick to drop their independent board nominee in favour of a 30-something activist employee who lacks any significant relevant experience. This is particularly true for smaller activist hedge funds but is also evident at larger companies. Last year, ISS and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC) published a study of the impact of activism on board refreshment at S&P 1500 companies targeted by activists. The study found that activist nominees and directors appointed to boards by activists via settlements were nearly three times more likely to be ‘financial services professionals’ compared to directors appointed unilaterally by boards.
Moreover, while proxy advisory firms and key institutional investors increasingly demand more gender and ethnic diversity in boardrooms, most activist slates exclusively feature white, male director candidates. According to last year’s ISS/IRRC study, women comprised only 8.4 per cent of dissident nominees on proxy contest ballots and directors appointed via settlements with activists, and only 4.2 per cent of those candidates and directors were ethnically or racially diverse.
There are numerous other examples of corporate governance ‘best practices’ that activists tend to ignore in connection with their campaigns:
(a) Overboarding ISS, Glass Lewis and most institutional investors agree that a director should not sit on too many boards (in particular if the director is also an executive in his ‘daytime’ job). For activists, this seems to be a non-issue when it comes to themselves or their fund-nominated candidates. In addition, the practice of funds nominating the same people for various campaigns raises independence concerns. As noted in the aforementioned ISS/IRRC study: “Many of these ‘busy’ directors appear to be ‘go-to’ nominees for individual activists. The serial nomination of favourite candidates raises questions about the ‘independence’ of these individuals from their activist sponsors”.
(b) Director tenure Directors who sit on the same board for 10 years and more typically end up in the crosshairs of activist hedge funds, which argue that such directors are entrenched and cannot provide objective oversight. However, it is not uncommon for activist directors to remain on the board for many years if they cannot push the company into a sale.
(c) Mandatory retirement age Young activists frequently decry the high average age of boards and may target older directors as part of a campaign. By contrast, one rarely hears a call for age limits on the board from the more seasoned activists of the 1980s, who are pushing 70 years and beyond. In some campaigns, activists nominated director candidates who were 75 years old, 80 years old or even older.
3. Inconsistency on takeover defences
Activists love to attack companies for their takeover defences and perceived lack of ‘shareholder rights’. They crucify boards who dare to adopt a poison pill in response to a hostile bid or activist stake accumulation. They condemn bylaw amendments for ‘changing the rules of the game after the game has started’. And they deride classified boards as an outrageous entrenchment device whose sole purpose is to shield incumbent directors from the ballot box.
UNLOCKING VALUE Activist hedge funds want to deliver outsize returns within two years
Against this backdrop, it is fascinating and educational to observe what sometimes happens once activists join a board. Activists claim to hate poison pills unless, of course, they were able to acquire a large stake of 15 to 25 per cent before the pill was adopted. In these cases, an activist is sometimes perfectly fine with capping other shareholders at 10 per cent or less because it ensures that the activist remains the largest shareholder with the most influence.
It is also not usual for an activist-controlled board to maintain the very same bylaws the activist previously voraciously attacked in the campaign. Sometimes, activists will limit shareholder rights even further. The rights to act by written consent and call special meetings tend to be among the victims. If shareholders can act by written consent or call special meetings to remove the board, insurgents do not have to wait for an annual shareholder meeting to wage a proxy fight. However, once activists are in charge of a boardroom, these shareholder rights primarily constitute a threat to their own control.
The last example is the classified board (aka ‘staggered board’). In a company with a classified board, only a fraction (usually, one third) of the board members are up for re-election every year. Activists are fierce opponents of classified boards. Classification makes it harder for them to win a proxy fight. For example, it is more difficult to win an election contest for three board seats on a nine-member board if only three board seats are up for election and not all nine directorships. Activists also like the intimidation factor of threatening a proxy fight for control of a board. It makes it easier to settle for two or three seats if the activist starts by demanding seven or more seats. Everything changes, of course, once an activist is on the board. Then, many activists are perfectly comfortable with with it being a classified board. In settlement negotiations, activists often fight hard to be in the director classes that are not up for re-election in the near term. Occasionally, they even suggest a ‘reshuffling’ of the director classes to achieve this. Activists also often refuse to leave a classified board after a standstill expires, arguing that they need to be allowed to serve out their three-year term – even if they previously campaigned for annual director elections.
“ACTIVISTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLOAK THEMSELVES IN THE MANTLE OF SHAREHOLDER CHAMPION WHILE PRIVATELY PUSHING TO INCREASE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE”
In other words, when it comes to takeover defences, activists’ perspectives depend on whether they have control of the boardroom or not. When activists are successful in ‘conquering the castle’, there is sometimes little reluctance on their part to pull up the drawbridge.
The true reason why activists love corporate governance
These examples make clear that most activists really do not care about corporate governance all that much. So why are activists so focussed on corporate governance in their campaigns? For the same reason why politicians kiss babies during political campaigns: it plays well with the voters. Most institutional investors and the proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis care deeply about governance issues. That is because they believe, with some justification, that good corporate governance will create shareholder value in the long-term. The long term, of course, is rarely the game of activist hedge funds. Most of these funds have capital with relatively short lock-ups, which means that their own investors will be breathing down their neck if they do not deliver outsize returns within a year or two.
Many activists will admit after a few drinks that their professed passion for governance is only a means to an end. Activists preach so-called ‘best practices of corporate governance’ in every proxy fight because it is an effective way to smear an incumbent board and rile up the voters who do care about governance issues.
Conclusion
Hedge fund activists have been able to cloak themselves in the mantle of a shareholder champion while privately pushing to increase their own influence. Institutional investors and proxy advisory firms should not look to activist hedge funds as promoters of good corporate practices. Activists are no Robin Hoods. They care about good corporate governance just as much as they care about taking from the rich and giving to the poor.
Kai Haakon Liekefett* is a partner of Sidley Austin LLP in New York and the chair of the firm’s Shareholder Activism Defense Team. He has over 18 years of experience in corporate law in New York, London, Germany, Hong Kong and Tokyo. He dedicates 100% of his time to defending companies against shareholder activism campaigns and proxy contests. Kai holds a Ph.D. from Freiburg University; an Executive MBA from Muenster Business School; and an LL.M., James Kent Scholar, from Columbia Law School. He is admitted to practice in New York and Germany. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of Sidley Austin LLP or its clients.
Dans le contexte du nouveau code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni, les administrateurs doivent exercer une vigilance accrue de la culture des organisations.
Cet article de GUENDALINA DONDE*, publié dans Board Agenda, nous rappelle certains enseignements concernant la nature des comportements éthiques dans les organisations.
Perhaps the first important lesson from behavioural ethics is to forget the idea that human beings are perfectly rational. In reality, people do not always make consistent decisions, based on strict logic or narrow self-interest. Human behaviour is complex and emotions and intuition have a significant role to play in individual decision-making.
Voici donc plusieurs facteurs qui peuvent avoir une incidence significative sur les comportements éthiques et sur la culture organisationnelle.
J’ai pensé que tous les administrateurs devraient se familiariser avec ces notions.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
The UK’s revised governance code will require boards to keep a watchful eye on their corporate cultures. To this end, understanding behavioural ethics can help instil the right values in employees.
There is no escaping the current increasing pressure for boards to have this question on their agenda, as the draft new UK Corporate Governance Code contains a provision requiring directors to monitor and assess their corporate culture to satisfy themselves that behaviour throughout the business is in line with the company’s values.
Perhaps the first important lesson from behavioural ethics is to forget the idea that human beings are perfectly rational.
What can be done to ensure that employee behaviour is in line with ethical values? Ethics programmes, which include the development of a code of ethics, training and communication campaigns can go some way, but even the best-intentioned ethics programmes will fail if they don’t take into account behavioural ethics—the biases that can blind us to unethical behaviour, whether ours or that of others.
People are likely to put aside their personal moral standards at work if they think this is what is expected of their role
“I was only following orders” is a classic indicator of this kind of ethical blindness. Expectations of a role can translate into pressure to compromise one’s ethical standards.
Many organisations make explicit in their code of ethics that all employees, and managers in particular, have the responsibility to be a role model for ethics in the organisation. It is important that this message is also reinforced through the communications strategy and through training for managers.
Ethics needs to become part of the reward, recognition and promotion system
Availability bias means that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of something happening because a similar event has either happened recently or because they feel emotional about a previous similar event. If employees remember that someone was promoted or rewarded for commercial results, which were achieved by unethical means, they will think that this is the norm—even if it was just a one-off event.
On the other hand, recognising and rewarding those who live up to the organisation’s ethical values, or communicating positive stories internally, can be a quick and effective way to send employees the message that ethics is important in the organisation.
Time pressure can negatively impact organisational culture and the ability to consider ethical implications of decisions
A group of seminary students were asked to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan at two adjacent buildings. In between talks, the researchers told participants that they should hurry, varying the amount of urgency between students. An actor was situated in an alleyway between the two buildings, posing as a sick man.
The results showed that time pressure had a significant impact on the students’ willingness to stop and help the sick man: in low-hurry situations, 63% helped; medium hurry, 45%; and high hurry only 10%. This was even when, ironically, they were on their way to prepare a talk on the Good Samaritan.
Internal communications and the language used within an organisation can have a significant impact on ethical culture
The framing effect is a cognitive bias where individuals respond differently to the same problem depending on how it is presented. Communications manipulate perception and how a situation is interpreted or framed, making it easier for employees to rationalise their behaviour. The use of aggressive language—such as “at war with competitors”—promotes rigid framing which can, in turn, drive ethical blindness.
On the other hand, using positive language can be a driver of change—changing a whistleblowing line to a “Speak Up” line can have a significant effect on call volume.
In some circumstances, “nudging” ethics can be more effective than enforcing compliance
Nudge Theory (developed by the 2017 Nobel laureate Richard Thaler) suggests that positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions can be more effective in encouraging desired behaviour than direct instructions, legislation and enforcement.
This concept has seen many applications, especially in marketing, and it can also be used to promote an ethical culture. An approach that focuses on ethics—by communicating ethical values, explaining how and why an organisation does its business, encouraging individual judgement based on ethical values—is at least as important as having clear rules of conduct which employees must follow, and the related sanctions.
Individual responsibility for values and associated behaviours needs to be encouraged
Following the atrocities of World War II, one of the most researched behaviour patterns has been the willingness of people to put aside their own moral standards and give up responsibility for their actions if they are following the instructions of a person in a position of authority.
To prevent this kind of blind obedience, it is important that companies encourage employees to apply critical thinking and learn how to take initiative, rather than just follow orders.
Perhaps the most well known of these studies was by Stanley Milgram, whose electric-shock experiment showed that people are likely to follow orders given by authority figures (e.g. managers, teachers, police officers) even if it means inflicting harm on another human being.
To prevent this kind of blind obedience, it is important that companies encourage employees to apply critical thinking and learn how to take initiative, rather than just follow orders. Promoting an open culture where employees feel empowered to challenge decisions, even when they have been instructed by a superior, is paramount.
People determine the appropriate behaviour by looking at what others are doing
The phrase “everybody’s doing it” is a red flag which signifies that there may be an ethical problem. Social pressure from a majority group can cause a person to conform to a certain behaviour, and there is plenty of research to back this up, most recently from behavioural economists like Francesca Gino and Dan Ariely.
To avoid this ethical risk, training staff on ethical matters is important to create a shared systems of beliefs and to keep these issues prominent in people’s minds when they face a difficult decision.
Leadership engagement and the right “tone at the top” are also crucial. We naturally follow our leaders, and employees will be more likely to behave unethically if they perceive that their senior leaders and managers fail to “walk the talk”.
Doing the right thing needs to become our instinctive reaction
Daniel Kahneman, professor of psychology at Princeton University, proposes that most human decision-making is done intuitively and subconsciously (“System 1”) before the cognitive part of the brain engages (“System 2”).
In many circumstances, even when people feel they are making a rational decision, their cognitive System 2 is simply rationalising a decision that their intuitive System 1 has already made. Sometimes this results in a seemingly irrational decision that might increase ethical risk.
Embedding ethical values into everything the organisation does can help them become an automatic part of an employee’s System 1. Corporate culture—“the way things are done around here”—is a powerful influence upon our corporate subconscious.
Sometimes a company’s culture can actually be working against its ethical values. Looking at which behaviours are rewarded, considering how messages are framed, and setting an example at the top are all examples of how ethics can achieve saliency in an organisation.
So perhaps the question should be: Why do good people do good things? And how can we support and empower them to consider the ethical implications of their decisions?
Je vous invite à prendre connaissance du futur code de gouvernance du Royaume-Uni (R.-U.).
À cet effet, voici un billet de Martin Lipton*, paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, qui présente un aperçu des points saillants.
Bonne lecture !
The Financial Reporting Council today [July 16, 2018] issued a revised corporate governance code and announced that a revised investor stewardship code will be issued before year-end. The code and related materials are available at www.frc.org.uk.
The revised code contains two provisions that will be of great interest. They will undoubtedly be relied upon in efforts to update the various U.S. corporate governance codes. They will also be used to further the efforts to expand the sustainability and stakeholder concerns of U.S. boards.
First, the introduction to the code makes note that shareholder primacy needs to be moderated and that the concept of the “purpose” of the corporation, as long put forth in the U.K. by Colin Mayer and recently popularized in the U.S. by Larry Fink in his 2018 letter to CEO’s, is the guiding principle for the revised code:
Companies do not exist in isolation. Successful and sustainable businesses underpin our economy and society by providing employment and creating prosperity. To succeed in the long-term, directors and the companies they lead need to build and maintain successful relationships with a wide range of stakeholders. These relationships will be successful and enduring if they are based on respect, trust and mutual benefit. Accordingly, a company’s culture should promote integrity and openness, value diversity and be responsive to the views of shareholders and wider stakeholders.
Second, the code provides that the board is responsible for policies and practices which reinforce a healthy culture and that the board should engage:
with the workforce through one, or a combination, of a director appointed from the workforce, a formal workforce advisory panel and a designated non-executive director, or other arrangements which meet the circumstances of the company and the workforce.
It will be interesting to see how this provision will be implemented and whether it gains any traction in the U.S.
Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton.
C’est avec enthousiasme que je vous recommande la lecture de cette dixième prise de position d’Yvan Allaire* au nom de l’IGOPP.
L’indépendance des administrateurs est une condition importante, mais d’autres considérations doivent nécessairement être prises en compte, notamment la légitimité et la crédibilité du conseil d’administration.
Comme l’auteur le mentionne, il faut parfois faire des arbitrages afin de se doter d’un conseil d’administration efficace.
J’ai reproduit, ci-dessous, le sommaire exécutif du document. Pour plus de détails sur ce document de 40 pages, je vous invite à lire le texte au complet.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus. Ils orienteront les nouvelles exigences en matière de gouvernance.
L’indépendance de la plupart des membres de conseils d’administration est maintenant un fait accompli. Bien qu’ayant contribué à un certain assainissement de la gouvernance des sociétés, force est de constater que cette sacro-sainte indépendance, dont certains ont fait la pierre angulaire, voire, la pierre philosophale de la «bonne» gouvernance, n’a pas donné tous les résultats escomptés.
Déjà en 2008, au moment de publier une première prise de position sur le thème de l’indépendance, l’IGOPP argumentait que ce qui faisait défaut à trop de conseils, ce n’était pas leur indépendance mais la légitimité et la crédibilité de leurs membres. Le fait qu’un administrateur n’ait pas d’intérêts personnels contraires aux intérêts de la société, son indépendance, devait être vu comme une condition nécessaire mais non suffisante au statut d’administrateur légitime.
Les évènements depuis lors, en particulier la crise financière de 2008, ont donné raison à cette prise de position et ont suscité de nouveaux enjeux de légitimité, comme la diversité des conseils, la représentation au conseil de parties prenantes autres que les actionnaires, le droit, contingent à la durée de détention des actions, de mettre en nomination des candidats pour le conseil, les limites d’âge et de durée des mandats comme administrateur.
Quant à la crédibilité d’un conseil, l’IGOPP proposait en 2008 que celle-ci devait s’appuyer sur «une expérience et une expertise pertinentes aux enjeux et aux défis avec lesquels l’organisation doit composer» ainsi que sur une connaissance fine «du modèle d’affaires de l’entreprise, de ses moteurs de création de valeurs économique et sociale» (Allaire, 2008). Pour l’IGOPP, la crédibilité du conseil suppose également l’intégrité et la confiance réciproque entre les membres du conseil et la direction. Donc, celle-ci devenait si importante qu’il serait acceptable, voire nécessaire, de suspendre l’exigence d’indépendance pour certains membres si c’était le prix à payer pour relever la crédibilité du conseil.
Depuis 2008
Profondément perturbés par la crise financière, les sociétés, les agences de règlementation et tous les observateurs de la gouvernance durent admettre que l’indépendance des membres du conseil et leur expérience de gestion dans des secteurs d’activités sans similarité avec l’entreprise à gouverner étaient nettement insuffisants. Ceux-ci devaient également posséder des compétences et une expérience à la mesure des enjeux et défis précis de la société qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner.
Graduellement, pour la sélection des membres de conseil, on s’est préoccupé de leur expérience et connaissance spécifiques au type d’organisation qu’ils sont appelés à gouverner ainsi que de leur intégrité et leur fiabilité. Ainsi, l’évolution du monde de la gouvernance depuis 2008 a conforté la position de l’IGOPP et lui a donné un caractère prescient.
Toutefois, certains ont constaté que cette crédibilité pouvait être parfois difficile à concilier avec l’indépendance. En effet, si la crédibilité d’un candidat provient d’une longue expérience à œuvrer dans l’industrie à laquelle appartient la société-cible, il est bien possible que pour cette raison cette personne ne satisfasse pas à tous les desiderata d’une indépendance immaculée.
La prise de position de 2018 de l’IGOPP offre des précisions et des solutions aux nouveaux enjeux apparus depuis 2008.
Ainsi, l’IGOPP propose un net changement dans les démarches d’évaluation des conseils, dans les critères de sélection des nouveaux membres ainsi que pour l’établissement du profil de compétences recherchées.
La démarche d’évaluation du conseil
L’évaluation du conseil constitue le premier pilier d’une nécessaire réforme de la gouvernance. Cette évaluation doit répondre aux questions suivantes : le conseil est-il légitime par la façon dont les membres ont été mis en nomination? Par qui furent-ils élus ou nommés?
L‘IGOPP estime qu’une recherche de légitimité relevée et élargie pour un conseil deviendra un enjeu à plus ou moins brève échéance. Même dans le contexte juridique actuel, il est possible de s’interroger sur la qualité des démarches de mise en nomination et d’élection ainsi que du sens à donner aux variations dans le support électif reçu par les différents membres d’un conseil.
Puis, le conseil est-il crédible? L’IGOPP propose une évaluation des connaissances et de l’expérience spécifiques au type d’industries dans lequel œuvre la société que le conseil est appelé à gouverner. Il est important que la plupart des membres du conseil (tous?) possèdent des connaissances économique et financière pertinentes à ce secteur d’activités.
Un conseil d’administration n’est crédible que dans la mesure où une grande partie de ses membres peuvent soutenir un échange avec la direction sur ces aspects de performance et sur les multiples facteurs qui exercent une influence dynamique sur cette performance. Ce type de questionnement suppose, de la part du conseil, une fine et systémique compréhension du modèle d’affaires de la société.
Les critères de sélection de nouveaux membres:
Le président du conseil et le comité de gouvernance doivent s’équiper d’une grille de sélection à la mesure des enjeux actuels. Ainsi, plus de la moitié des membres doivent être indépendants et le conseil doit se préoccuper de la diversité de sa composition. Idéalement, le conseil devrait rechercher des nouveaux membres qui sont indépendants, ajoutent à la diversité du conseil et sont crédibles selon le sens donné à ce terme dans ce texte.
Toutefois, il pourra arriver qu’un conseil doive faire des arbitrages, des compromis entre ces trois qualités souhaitables pour un nouveau membre du conseil.
Si une personne par ailleurs dotée de qualités attrayantes pour le conseil ne possédait pas une expérience qui en fasse un membre crédible dès son arrivée, il faut s’assurer préalablement que celle-ci dispose du temps nécessaire, possède la formation et la rigueur intellectuelle essentielles pour acquérir en un temps raisonnable, un bon niveau de crédibilité; il est essentiel qu’un programme fait sur mesure soit mis en place pour relever rapidement la crédibilité de ce nouveau membre du conseil
Le profil d’expertise recherché:
Cette prise de position propose que le profil établi pour la recherche de nouveaux candidats pour le conseil débute par l’identification de secteurs d’activités proches de celui dans lequel œuvre la société en termes de cycle d’investissement, d’horizon temporel de gestion, de technologie, de marchés desservis (industriels, consommateurs, international), de facteurs de succès et de stratégie (leadership de coûts, différenciation/segmentation, envergure de produits).
Des dirigeants ayant une expérience de tels secteurs apprivoiseront plus rapidement les aspects essentiels d’une société œuvrant dans un secteur s’en rapprochant. Cette façon de procéder permet de concilier «indépendance» et «crédibilité».
Puis, si l’éventail des expertises au conseil indique une carence, disons, en termes de «finance», la recherche ne doit pas se limiter à identifier une personne qui fut une chef de la direction financière, mais bien une personne dont l’expérience en finance fut acquise dans le type de secteurs d’activités identifiés plus tôt. La gestion financière, des ressources humaines, des risques ou de la technologie d’information sont sans commune mesure selon que l’entreprise en est une de commerce au détail ou une minière ou une banque ou une entreprise du secteur aéronautique.
Conclusion
Notre prise de position de 2008 conserve toute sa pertinence. En fait les évènements survenus depuis 2008 appuient et confortent nos propositions d’alors. Si, à l’époque, nous étions une voix dans le désert, notre propos est maintenant sur la place publique, appuyé par des études empiriques et repris par tous ceux qui ont un peu réfléchi aux dilemmes de la gouvernance contemporaine.
Cette révision de notre prise de position de 2008 y ajoute des clarifications, aborde des enjeux devenus inévitables et veut rappeler à tous les conseils d’administration que:
«Si c’est par sa légitimité qu’un conseil acquiert le droit et l’autorité d’imposer ses volontés à la direction, c’est par sa crédibilité qu’un conseil devient créateur de valeur pour toutes les parties prenantes d’une organisation.» (Allaire, 2008).
*Ce document a été préparé et rédigé par Yvan Allaire, Ph. D. (MIT), MSRC, président exécutif, IGOPP
Quelle est la raison d’être d’une entreprise sur le plan juridique ? À qui doit-elle rendre des comptes ?
Une entreprise est-elle au service exclusif de ses actionnaires ou doit-elle obligatoirement considérer les intérêts de ses parties prenantes (stakeholders) avant de prendre des décisions de nature stratégiques ?
On conviendra que ces questions ont fréquemment été abordées dans ces pages. Cependant, la réalité de la conduite des organisations semble toujours refléter le modèle de la primauté des actionnaires, mieux connu maintenant sous l’appellation « démocratie de l’actionnariat ».
L’article de Martin Lipton* fait le point sur l’évolution de la reconnaissance des parties prenantes au cours des quelque dix dernières années.
Je crois que les personnes intéressées par les questions de gouvernance (notamment les administrateurs de sociétés) doivent être informées des enjeux qui concernent leurs responsabilités fiduciaires.
Bonne lecture. ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Whether the purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders or to operate in the interests of all of its stakeholders has been actively debated since 1932, when it was the subject of dueling law review articles by Columbia law professor Adolf Berle (shareholders) and Harvard law professor Merrick Dodd (stakeholders).
Following “Chicago School” economics professor Milton Friedman’s famous (some might say infamous) 1970 New York Times article announcing ex cathedra that the social responsibility of a corporation is to increase its profits, shareholder primacy was widely viewed as the purpose and basis for the governance of a corporation. My 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, arguing that the board of directors of a corporation that was the target of a takeover bid had the right, if not the duty, to consider the interests of all stakeholders in deciding whether to accept or reject the bid, was widely derided and rejected by the Chicago School economists and law professors who embraced Chicago School economics. Despite the 1985 decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware citing my article in holding that a board of directors could take into account stakeholder interests, and over 30 states enacting constituency (stakeholder) statutes, shareholder primacy continued to dominate academic, economic, financial and legal thinking—often disguised as “shareholder democracy.”
While the debate continued and stakeholder governance gained adherents in the new millennium, shareholder primacy continued to dominate. Only since the 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession has there been significant recognition that shareholder primacy has been a major driver of short-termism, encourages activist attacks on corporations, reduces R&D expenditures, depresses wages and reduces long-term sustainable investments—indeed, it promotes inequality and strikes at the very heart of our society. In the past five years, the necessity for changes has been recognized by significant academic, business, financial and investor reports and opinions. An example is the 2017 paper I and a Wachtell Lipton team prepared for the World Economic Forum, The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, whichquotes or cites many of the others.
This year we are seeing important new support for counterbalancing shareholder primacy and promoting long-term sustainable investment. Among the many prominent examples is the January 2018 annual letter from Larry Fink, Chairman of BlackRock, to CEOs:
Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will succumb to short-term pressures to distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth. It will remain exposed to activist campaigns that articulate a clearer goal, even if that goal serves only the shortest and narrowest of objectives. And ultimately, that company will provide subpar returns to the investors who depend on it to finance their retirement, home purchases, or higher education.
This was followed in March by the report of a commission appointed by the French Government recommending amendment to the French Civil Code to add, “The company shall be managed in its own interest, considering the social and environmental consequences of its activity,” following the existing, “All companies shall have a lawful purpose and be incorporated in the common interest of the shareholders.” The draft amendment is intended to establish the principle that each company should pursue its own interest—namely, the continuity of its operation, sustainability through investment, collective creation and innovation. The report notes that this amendment integrates corporate and social responsibility considerations into corporate governance and goes on to state that each company has a purpose not reducible to profit and needs to be aware of its purpose. The report recommends an amendment to the French Commercial Code for the purpose of entrusting the boards of directors to define a company’s purpose in order to guide the company’s strategy, taking into account its social and environmental consequences.
Subject to the outcome of its impact assessment, the Commission will table a legislative proposal to clarify institutional investors’ and asset managers’ duties in relation to sustainability considerations by Q2 2018. The proposal will aim to (i) explicitly require institutional investors and asset managers to integrate sustainability considerations in the investment decision-making process and (ii) increase transparency, towards end-investors on how they integrate such sustainability factors in their investment decisions in particular as concerns their exposure to sustainability risks.
Further, the Commission proposes a number of other laws or regulations designed to promote ESG, CSR and sustainable long-term investment.
In addition to these examples, there are similar policy statements by major investors and similar efforts at legislation to modulate or eliminate shareholder primacy in Great Britain and the United States. While it is not certain that any legislation will soon be enacted, it is clear that the problems have been identified, support is growing to find a way to address them and if implicit stakeholder governance does not take hold, legislation will ensue to assure it.
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*Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton.
Les administrateurs de sociétés doivent apporter une attention spéciale à la gestion des risques telle qu’elle est mise en œuvre par les dirigeants des entreprises.
Les préoccupations des fiduciaires pour la gestion des risques, quoique fondamentales, sont relativement récentes, et les administrateurs ne savent souvent pas comment aborder cette question.
L’article présenté, ci-dessous, est le fruit d’une recherche de Martin Lipton, fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les fusions et acquisitions ainsi que dans les affaires de gouvernance.
L’auteur et ses collaborateurs ont produit un guide des pratiques exemplaires en matière de gestion des risques. Cet article de fond s’adresse aux administrateurs et touche aux éléments-clés de la gestion des risques :
(1) la distinction entre la supervision des risques et la gestion des risques ;
(2) les leçons que l’on doit tirer de la supervision des risques à Wells Fargo ;
(3) l’importance accordée par les investisseurs institutionnels aux questions des risques ;
(4) « tone at the top » et culture organisationnelle ;
(5) les devoirs fiduciaires, les contraintes réglementaires et les meilleures pratiques ;
(6) quelques recommandations spécifiques pour améliorer la supervision des risques ;
(7) les programmes de conformité juridiques ;
(8) les considérations touchant les questions de cybersécurité ;
(9) quelques facettes se rapportant aux risques environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance ;
(10) l’anticipation des risques futurs.
Voici donc l’introduction de l’article. Je vous invite à prendre connaissance de l’article au complet.
The past year has seen continued evolution in the political, legal and economic arenas as technological change accelerates. Innovation, new business models, dealmaking and rapidly evolving technologies are transforming competitive and industry landscapes and impacting companies’ strategic plans and prospects for sustainable, long-term value creation. Tax reform has created new opportunities and challenges for companies too. Meanwhile, the severe consequences that can flow from misconduct within an organization serve as a reminder that corporate operations are fraught with risk. Social and environmental issues, including heightened focus on income inequality and economic disparities, scrutiny of sexual misconduct issues and evolving views on climate change and natural disasters, have taken on a new salience in the public sphere, requiring companies to exercise utmost care to address legitimate issues and avoid public relations crises and liability.
Corporate risk taking and the monitoring of corporate risk remain prominently top of mind for boards of directors, investors, legislators and the media. Major institutional shareholders and proxy advisory firms increasingly evaluate risk oversight matters when considering withhold votes in uncontested director elections and routinely engage companies on risk-related topics. This focus on risk management has also led to increased scrutiny of compensation arrangements throughout the organization that have the potential for incentivizing excessive risk taking. Risk management is no longer simply a business and operational responsibility of management. It has also become a governance issue that is squarely within the oversight responsibility of the board. This post highlights a number of issues that have remained critical over the years and provides an update to reflect emerging and recent developments. Key topics addressed in this post include:
the distinction between risk oversight and risk management;
a lesson from Wells Fargo on risk oversight;
the strong institutional investor focus on risk matters;
tone at the top and corporate culture;
fiduciary duties, legal and regulatory frameworks and third-party guidance on best practices;
specific recommendations for improving risk oversight;
legal compliance programs;
special considerations regarding cybersecurity matters;
special considerations pertaining to environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks; and
Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui demande beaucoup d’analyse, de stratégie et de jugement.
Dans ce cas, Xandra, la présidente du comité d’audit d’une petite association professionnelle, propose une solution courageuse afin de mettre un terme au déclin du membership de l’organisation : une diminution des frais de cotisation en échange d’une hausse des frais de service et des frais associés à la formation.
La proposition a été jugée inéquitable par les membres, qui ont soulevé leur grande désapprobation, en la condamnant sur les réseaux sociaux.
Plusieurs membres insistent pour que cette décision soit mise au vote lors de l’AGA, et que le PDG soit démis de ses fonctions.
Étant donné que les règlements internes de l’organisation ne permettent pas aux membres de voter sur ces questions en assemblée générale (puisque c’est une prérogative du CA), le président du conseil demande à Xandra de préparer une défense pour le rejet de la requête.
Xandra est cependant consciente que la stratégie de communication arrêtée devra faire l’objet d’une analyse judicieuse afin de ne pas mettre la survie de l’organisation en danger.
Comment la responsable doit-elle procéder pour présenter une argumentation convaincante ?
La situation est exposée de manière assez synthétique ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit Xandra.
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part vos commentaires.
This month our case study investigates the options for a board to respond to shareholders who know that they want something but don’t quite know how to get it. I hope you enjoy thinking about the governance and strategic implications of this dilemma:
Xandra chairs the audit committee of a small professional association. She has a strong working relationship with the chair and CEO who are implementing a strategic reform based on ‘user pays services’ to redress a fall in membership numbers and hence revenue. The strategy bravely introduced a reduced membership fee compensated by charges for advisory services and an increase in the cost of member events and education.
Some members felt that this was unfair as they used more services than others and would now pay a higher total amount each year. They have voiced their concerns through the company’s Facebook page and in an ‘open’ letter addressed to the board. In the letter they have said that they want to put a motion to the next AGM asking for a vote on the new pricing strategy and for the CEO to be dismissed. They copied the letter to a journalist in a national paper. The journalist has not contacted the company for comment or published the letter.
The CEO has checked the bylaws and the open letter does not meet the technical requirements for requisitioning a motion (indeed the authors seem to have confused their right to requisition an EGM with the right of members to speak at the AGM and ask questions of the board and auditor).
As the only person qualified in directorship on the association board, the Chair has asked Xandra « how can we push back against this request? »
Xandra is not sure that it is wise to rebuff a clear request for engagement with the members on an issue that is important for the survival of their association. She agrees that putting a motion to a members’ meeting could be dangerous. She also agrees that the matter needs to be handled sensitively and away from emotive online fora where passions are running unexpectedly high
Voici un article qui met en garde les structures de gouvernance telles que Facebook.
L’article publié sur le site de Directors&Boards par Eve Tahmincioglu soulève plusieurs questions fondamentales :
(1) L’actionnariat à vote multiple conduit-il à une structure de gouvernance convenable et acceptable ?
(2) Pourquoi le principe de gouvernance stipulant une action, un vote, est-il bafoué dans le cas de plusieurs entreprises de la Silicone Valley ?
(3) Quel est le véritable pouvoir d’un conseil d’administration où les fondateurs sont majoritaires par le jeu des actions à classe multiple ?
(4) Doit-on réglementer pour rétablir la position de suprématie du conseil d’administration dirigé par des administrateurs indépendants ?
(5) Dans une situation de gestion de crise comme celle qui confronte Facebook, quel est le rôle d’un administrateur indépendant, président de conseil ?
(6) Les médias cherchent à connaître la position du PDG sans se questionner sur les responsabilités des administrateurs. Est-ce normal en gestion de crise ?
Je vous invite à lire l’article ci-dessous et à exprimer vos idées sur les principes de bonne gouvernance appliqués aux entreprises publiques contrôlées par les fondateurs.
Facebook is arguably facing one of the toughest challenges the company has ever faced. But the slow and tepid response from leadership, including the boards of directors, concerns governance experts.
The scandal involving data-mining firm Cambridge Analytica allegedly led to 50 million Facebook users’ private information being compromised but a public accounting from Facebook’s CEO and chairman Mark Zuckerberg has been slow coming.
Could this be a governance breakdown?
“This high-powered board needs to engage more strongly,” says Steve Odland, CEO of the Committee for Economic Development and a board member for General Mills, Inc. and Analogic Corporation. Facebook’s board includes Netflix’s CEO Reed Hastings; Susan D. Desmond-Hellmann, CEO of The Gates Foundation; the former chairman of American Express Kenneth I. Chenault; and PayPal cofounder Peter A. Thiel, among others.
Odland points out that Facebook has two powerful and well-known executives, Zuckerberg and Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg, who have been publicly out there on every subject, but largely absent on this one.
“They need to get out and publicly talk about this quickly,” Odland maintains. “They didn’t have to have all the answers. But this vacuum of communications gets filled by others, and that’s not good for the company.”
Indeed, politicians, the Federal Trade Commission and European politicians are stepping in, he says, “and that could threaten the whole platform.”
Typically, he adds, it comes back to management to engage and use the board, but “I don’t think Zuckerberg is all that experienced in that regard. This is where the board needs to help him.”
But how much power does the board have?
Charles Elson, director of the University of Delaware’s Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, sees the dual-class ownership structure of Facebook that gives the majority of voting power to Zuckerberg and thus undermines shareholders and the board’s power.
“It’s his board because of the dual-class stock. There is nothing [directors] can do; neither can the shareholders and a lawsuit would yield really nothing,” he explains.
Increasingly, company founders have been opting to shore up control by creating stock ownership structures that undercut shareholder voting power, where only a decade ago almost all chose the standard and accepted one-share, one-vote model.
Now the Snap Inc. initial public offering (IPO) takes it even further with the first-ever solely non-voting stock model. It’s a stock ownership structure that further undercuts shareholder influence, undermines corporate governance and will likely shift the burden of investment grievances to the courts.
By offering stock in the company with no shareholder vote at all, Snap — the company behind the popular mobile-messaging app Snapchat that’s all about giving a voice to the many — has acknowledged that public voting power at companies with a hierarchy of stock ownership classes is only a fiction. And it begs the question: Why does Snap even need a board?
Alas, Facebook’s shares have tanked as a result of the Cambridge Analytica revelations, and it’s unclear what’s happening among the leaders at Facebook to deal with the crisis.
Facebook’s board, advises Odland, needs to get involved and help create privacy policies and if those are violated, they need to follow up.
“This is a relatively young company in a relatively young industry that has grown to be a powerhouse and incredibly important,” he explains. Given that, he says, there are “new forms of risk management this board needs to tackle.”
J’ai trouvé très intéressantes les questions qu’un nouvel administrateur pourrait se poser afin de mieux cerner les principaux facteurs liés à la bonne gouvernance d’un conseil d’administration.
Bien sûr, ce petit questionnaire peut également être utilisé par un membre de CA qui veut évaluer la qualité de la gouvernance de son propre conseil d’administration.
Les administrateurs peuvent interroger le président du conseil, les autres membres du conseil et le secrétaire corporatif.
Les douze questions énumérées ci-dessous ont fait l’objet d’une discussion lors d’une table ronde organisée par INSEAD Directors Forum du campus asiatique de Singapore.
Cet article a été publié par Noelle Ahlberg Kleiterp* sur le site de la Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.
Chaque question est accompagnée de quelques réflexions utiles pour permettre le passage à l’acte.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
In many countries, boards of directors (particularly those of large organisations) have functioned too long as black boxes. Directors’ focus has often—and understandably so—been monopolised by a laundry list of issues to be discussed and typically approved at quarterly meetings.
The board’s own performance, effectiveness, processes and habits receive scant reflection. Many directors are happy to leave the corporate secretary with the task of keeping sight of governance best practices; certainly they do not regard it as their own responsibility.
It occurred to me later that these questions could be of broader use to directors as a framework for beginning a reassessment of their board role.
However, increased regulatory pressures are now pushing boards toward greater responsibility, transparency and self-awareness. In some countries, annual board reviews have become compulsory. In addition, mounting concerns about board diversity provide greater scope for questioning the status quo.
Achieving a more heterogeneous mix of specialisations, cultures and professional experiences entails a willingness to revise some unwritten rules that, in many instances, have governed board functions. And that is not without risk.
At the same time, the “diversity recruits” wooed for board positions may not know the explicit, let alone the implicit, rules. Some doubtless never anticipated they would be asked to join a board. Such invitations often come out of the blue, with little motivation or clarity about what is expected from the new recruit. No universal guidelines are available to aid candidates as they decide whether to accept their invitation.
Long-standing directors and outliers alike could benefit from a crash course in the fundamentals of well-run boards. This was the subject of a roundtable discussion held in February 2017 as part of the INSEAD Directors Forum on the Asia campus.
As discussion leader, I gave the participants, most of whom were recent recipients of INSEAD’s Certificate in Corporate Governance, a basic quiz designed to prompt reflection about how their board applies basic governance principles. It occurred to me later that these questions could be of broader use to directors as a framework for beginning a reassessment of their board role.
Questions and reflections
Q1) True/False: My board maintains a proper ratio of governing vs. executing.
Reflection: Recall basic principles of governance. If you are executing, who is maintaining oversight over you? Why aren’t the executive team executing and the board governing?
Q2) True/False: My board possesses the required competencies to fulfil its duties.
Reflection: Competencies can be industry-specific or universal (such as being an effective director). Many boards are reluctant to replace members, yet the needs of the organisation shift and demand new competencies, particularly in the digital age. Does your board have a director trained in corporate governance who could take the lead? Or does it adopt the outdated view of governance as a matter for the corporate secretary, perhaps in consultation with owners?
Q3) True/False: The frequency and duration of my board meetings are sufficient.
Reflection: Do you cover what you must cover and have ample time for strategy discussions? Are discussions taking place at the table that should be conducted prior to meetings?
Q4) How frequently does your chairperson meet with management: weekly, fortnightly, monthly, or otherwise?
Reflection: Meetings can be face-to-face or virtual. An alternative question is: Consider email traffic between the chair/board and management—is correspondence at set times (e.g. prior to scheduled meetings/calls) or random in terms of topic and frequency?
Q5) Is this frequency excessive, adequate or insufficient?
Reflection: Consider what is driving the frequency of the meetings (or email traffic). Is there a pressing topic that justifies more frequent interactions? Is there a lack of trust or lack of interest driving the frequency?
Q6) True/False: My board possesses the ideal mix of competencies to handle the most pressing issue on the agenda.
Reflection: If one issue continually appears on the agenda (e.g. marketing-related), there could be reason to review the board’s effectiveness with regards to this issue, and probably the mix of skills within the current board. If the necessary expertise were present at the table, could the board have resolved the issue?
Q7) True/False: The executive team is competent/capable. If “false”, is your board acting on this?
Reflection: At this point in the quiz, you should be considering whether incompetency is the issue. If so, is it being addressed? How comfortable are you, for example, that your executive team is capable of addressing digitisation?
Q8) True/False: My chairperson is effective.
Reflection: Perhaps incompetency rests with the chairperson or with a few board members. Are elements within control of the chairperson well managed? Does your board function professionally? If not, does the chair intervene and improve matters? Are you alone in your views regarding board effectiveness? A “false” answer here should lead you to take an activist role at the table to guide the chair and the board to effectiveness.
Q9) Yes/No: Does your board effectively make use of committees? If “yes”, how many and for which topics? If “no”, why not?
Reflection: Well-defined committees (e.g. audit, nomination, risk) improve the efficiency of board meetings and are a vital component of governance. In the non-profit arena, use of board committees is less common. However, non-profit boards can equally benefit from this basic guiding principle of good governance.
Q10) True/False: Recruitment/nomination of new board members adheres to a robust process.
Reflection: When are openings posted? Who reviews/targets potential candidates? How are candidate criteria determined? And is there a clear “on-boarding” process that is regularly revisited?
Q11) True/False: My board performs a board review annually.
Reflection: A board review will touch on many elements mentioned in previous questions. Obtaining buy-in for the first review might prove painful. Thereafter knowledge of an annual review will undoubtedly lead to more conscious governance and opportunities to introduce improvements (including replacement of board members). Procedurally, the review of the board as a whole should precede the review of individuals.
Q12) Think of a tough decision your board has made. Recall how the decision was reached and results were monitored. Was “fair process leadership” (FPL) at play?
Reflection: Put yourself in the shoes of a fellow board member, perhaps the one most dissatisfied with the outcome of a particular decision. Would that person agree that fair process was adhered to, despite his or her own feelings? Boards that apply fair process move on—as a team—from what is perceived to be a negative outcome for an individual board member. If decisions are made rashly and lack follow-up, FPL is not applied. Energies will quickly leave the room.
From reflection to action
Roundtable participants agreed that these questions should be applied in light of the longevity of the organisation concerned. Compared with most mature organisations, a start-up will need many more board meetings and more interactions between the board and the management team. The “exit” phase of an organisation (or a sub-part of the organisation) is another time in the lifecycle that requires intensified board involvement.
Particularly in the non-profit sector, where directors commonly work pro bono, passion for the organisational mission should be a prerequisite for all prospective board members. However, passion—in the form of a determination to see the organisation’s strategy succeed—should be a consideration for all board members and nominees, regardless of the sector.
Directors who apply the above framework and are dissatisfied with what they discover could seek solutions in their professional networks, corporate governance textbooks or a course such as INSEAD’s International Directors Programme.
If you are considering a board role, you could use the 12 questions, tweak them for your needs and evaluate your answers. Speak not only with the chair, but also with as many board members and relevant executive team members as you can. Understand your comfort level with how the board operates and applies governance principles before accepting a mandate.
Noelle Ahlberg Kleiterp, MBA, IDP-C, has worked for 25 years across three continents with companies including GE, KPMG, Andersen Consulting and Atradius. Noelle owns a sole proprietorship in Singapore and serves as a board member on a non-profit organisation in Singapore.
Le récent rapport de KPMG sur les grandes tendances en audit présente sept défis que les membres des CA, notamment les membres des comités d’audit, doivent considérer afin de bien s’acquitter de leurs responsabilités dans la gouvernance des sociétés.
Le rapport a été rédigé par des professionnels en audit de la firme KPMG ainsi que par le Conference Board du Canada.
Les sept défis abordés dans le rapport sont les suivants :
– talent et capital humain ;
– technologie et cybersécurité ;
– perturbation des modèles d’affaires ;
– paysage réglementaire en évolution ;
– incertitude politique et économique ;
– évolution des attentes en matière de présentation de l’information ;
– environnement et changements climatiques.
Je vous invite à consulter le rapport complet ci-dessous pour de plus amples informations sur chaque enjeu.
Alors que l’innovation technologique et la cybersécurité continuent d’avoir un impact croissant sur le monde des finances et des affaires à l’échelle mondiale, tant les comités d’audit que les chefs des finances reconnaissent le besoin de compter sur des talents de haut calibre pour contribuer à affronter ces défis et à en tirer parti.
Le rôle du comité d’audit est de s’assurer que l’organisation dispose des bonnes personnes possédant l’expérience et les connaissances requises, tant au niveau de la gestion et des opérations qu’au sein même de sa constitution. Il ne s’agit que de l’un des nombreux défis à avoir fait surface dans le cadre de ce troisième numéro du rapport Tendances en audit.
Les comités d’audit d’aujourd’hui ont la responsabilité d’aider les organisations à s’orienter parmi les nombreux enjeux et défis plus complexes que jamais auxquels ils font face, tout en remplissant leur mandat traditionnel de conformité et de présentation de l’information. Alors que les comités d’audit sont pleinement conscients de cette nécessité, notre rapport indique que les comités d’audit et les chefs des finances se demandent dans quelle mesure leur organisation est bien positionnée pour faire face à la gamme complète des tendances actuelles et émergentes.
Pour mettre en lumière cette préoccupation et d’autres enjeux clés, le rapport Tendances en audit se penche sur les sept défis qui suivent :
talent et capital humain;
technologie et cybersécurité;
perturbation des modèles d’affaires;
paysage réglementaire en évolution;
incertitude politique et économique;
évolution des attentes en matière de présentation de l’information;
environnement et changements climatiques.
Au fil de l’évolution des mandats et des responsabilités, ce rapport se révélera être une ressource précieuse pour l’ensemble des parties prenantes en audit.
L’une des questions prédominantes — et souvent controversées — dans l’évaluation des principes de saine gouvernance concerne l’indépendance des administrateurs.
L’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP) propose une approche nouvelle et originale sur la question de l’indépendance des membres des conseils d’administration.
Dans un document « L’indépendance des conseils : un enjeu de légitimité », l’IGOPP propose que toute organisation dotée d’un conseil d’administration cherche à constituer un conseil qui soit à la fois légitime et crédible.
L’enjeu n’est pas tellement l’indépendance des conseils mais bien leur légitimité et leur crédibilité. La qualité d’indépendance ne prend son sens que si elle contribue à rehausser la légitimité d’un conseil.
C’est par sa légitimité qu’un conseil acquiert le droit et l’autorité de s’imposer à la direction d’une organisation. Les conseils d’organisations publiques ou privées, sans actionnaire ou sans actionnaire actif détenant plus de 10 % du capital-actions ordinaire, devraient être composés d’une majorité nette d’administrateurs indépendants. De plus, tous leurs comités statutaires devraient être composés exclusivement de membres indépendants.
L’article ci-dessous, écrit à la suite d’une table ronde réunissant plusieurs spécialistes de la gouvernance européenne, aborde trois sujets incontournables, en tentant de tirer des enseignements pour le futur :
(1) l’indépendance des administrateurs et la pertinence du concept
(2) les divers aspects de la rémunération et les obligations fiduciaires
(3) l’identification des actionnaires et les questions de procuration des votes
Dans ce billet, nous vous proposons les questionnements reliés à l’indépendance des administrateurs.
L’indépendance est-elle une bonne idée ?
Quels sont les problèmes liés à l’indépendance ?
Quels sont les résultats de recherche qui montrent que l’indépendance améliore la qualité de la gouvernance ?
Comment composer avec l’influence des gestionnaires et des conflits d’intérêts ?
L’article publié par Christian Strenger*est paru sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Govervance.
Alors, selon vous, pourquoi l’indépendance des administrateurs est-elle un gage de bonne gouvernance ?
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
L’indépendance des administrateurs : panacée ou boîte de Pandore?
Board Independence: the Quality Question and dealing with Insider Issues
Background
A reliable formula for board effectiveness has been elusive, but the importance of effective boards warrants ongoing reflection and research by both academics and practitioners.
In spite of the diversity of governance models around the world, the concept of independence plays a prominent role in most, if not all, codes of governance globally as an intrinsic component of good board structure. For example, independence features, to varying degrees of emphasis, in the governance frameworks of the US, UK, Germany and Japan. It is also reflected in global frameworks, such as the ICGN Global Governance Principles or the OECD Corporate Governance Principles.
But what does independence mean in a corporate governance context, and does it deliver what we want it to? This session seeks to challenge how we think about independence and addresses several fundamental questions relating to boards and corporate governance:
Is board independence essential to quality in corporate governance—or is independence simply a placebo that doesn’t do anything but makes us feel better?
What do we expect board independence to achieve in practical terms?
Are independent directors really in a position to monitor and control corporate insiders?
These are questions that have relevance for company managers and directors, but also for investors, regulators and stakeholders.
Role of boards
A company’s board of directors is at the core of its corporate governance. Boards play a range of advisory and control functions. This includes strategic direction and risk/control oversight, along with the monitoring and reward of executive management.
At a more overarching level, agency theory suggests that one of the key roles of the board is to serve as an agent protecting the interests of shareholders vis-à-vis company management or controlling owners. This reflects a duty of care to support the company’s long-term success and sustainable value creation and to ensure the alignment of interests between management, controlling owners, minority investors—taking into account stakeholder interests as well.
Why is independence a good idea?
Shareholders and other stakeholders expect boards to have the ability and authority to think and act independently from company executives or controlling owners. The board may be unable to serve effectively in its agency role if its directors’ judgements are not free of conflicts or any other external influence other than promoting the long-term success of the firm.
What are the problems related to independence?
It is important to recognise that independence has to be looked at in the context of how it affects board processes, decisions and overall governance. Yet spite of the inherent virtues of independence, its realisation in practice is not an easy fix; nor does it intrinsically enhance board effectiveness. A director must be able to contribute something other than independence alone, whether that is in the form of sector knowledge, commercial experience, international experience, technical skills or other areas that support the board’s oversight of company management.
Moreover, independence is ultimately a state of mind, not a product of definitions. There are many different sets of criteria that seek to define independence for individual directors. While these sorts of criteria can be useful, they can also be crude, misleading or incomplete.
The Lehman Brothers board in 2008, the year of its demise, was an example of a nominally independent board. But was this board able to operate independently of a strong Chair/CEO? Was there enough financial sector expertise amongst this group of independent directors to provide a rigorous challenge? (See Annex 1 in the complete publication).
Does independence ensure quality? What is the evidence?
Independence may be real, but it can be hard, if not impossible, to measure in a meaningful way. It is much easier to measure structural features of boards than it is to measure the quality of board processes. But sometimes what is easily measurable is not worth measuring. So while it is possible (and very common) to calculate simple ratios, such as independent directors/total directors a common gauge of board independence, they may not tell us much. Indeed, the evidence of empirical studies using simplistic/conventional measures of independence has been inconclusive (See Annex 2).
Many board attributes, including independence, which are regarded as “best practice” lack clear empirical grounding, at least in an econometric context. So, in many features of our corporate governance codes we are dealing in effect with opinions more than facts.
How to deal with insider influence and vested interests?
Insider influences can vary depending on the nature of the company. For widely-held companies, the vested interests of executive management often take the form of high pay for limited performance. In controlled companies vested interests may be the controlling owners themselves in terms of entrenchment and self-dealing.
Are independent directors really equipped to challenge these insiders? Or is that possibly asking for a bit too much? The empirical evidence cited above suggests that independent directors may not have a meaningful impact on board governance. But the evidence does suggest in the area of audit committees that independence is important. This makes logical sense, but it also suggests that for an independent director to provide meaningful oversight, independence must be combined with other important attributes, including sectoral knowledge and financial expertise. Independence as a determinant of board effectiveness therefore may be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition.
Conclusion
We need to recognise that independence may be overrated, or at least not always live up to its billing. At least as it is conventionally defined, independence has not proven to be a panacea or silver bullet to ensure good corporate governance. At the same time, however, the concept of board independence is important and worth preserving, if nothing else as an aspirational ideal.
Discussion Results
Independent directors seem to be an intuitive solution for the agency problem stemming from the separation of ownership and control, but also for limiting the power of controlling shareholders in a corporation.
The starting point of the discussion was: Why do we need independence in the first place? As investors and other stakeholders want to see their interests served and protected by the board, the absence of potential conflicts of interest between non-executive directors and managers or undue influence from a major shareholder are the answers. Disclosure of meaningful ties of the non-executive directors to the management or controlling shareholders is important. The discussion also emphasized that reasonable diversity can be a contributing factor for board independence, and that truly independent board members can play a key role in avoiding too much convergence in decision making, as well as in focusing on the well-being of the company itself, and not any separate vested interests. While the discussion highlighted many benefits of board independence, it also pointed to potential costs: board independence may come with costs relating to problems in information flows, access to information and processing. Thus, it is important to complement board independence with proper board procedures and processes.
A key point of the discussion was the definition of independence itself. Besides the obligatory disclosure of relevant ties of a non-executive board member to management or controlling shareholders, regulators tried to formalize criteria to define independent board members. Academic literature also strives to evaluate how predefined criteria affect company decisions. However, results of these efforts are mixed and can hardly achieve “true” independence. The description of certain characteristics could introduce independence on paper, but may not reflect correctly the individual case of a board member. A predefined strict categorization would in practice suffer from a “ticking the box” approach. Independence from a controlling shareholder is equally hard to define as thresholds for shareholdings may not reflect the individual circumstances. The discussion also highlighted that strict definitions of independence might also require companies to replace experienced board members with new independent board members. That could lead to a temporary loss of experience and industry expertise.
Ways for the Future:
The realistic description of board independence needs a detailed assessment of the individual and a disclosure of ties of a non-executive board member to the management or controlling shareholders. Furthermore, disclosure of the selection process of the nomination committee should bring important insights for investors and the stakeholders.
The discussion further emphasized that formal characteristics alone could be misleading to determine the independence of a board member, focusing on “independence in mind” as an important aspect. As this factor is difficult to gauge or measure, investors may have to communicate with the chair in individual cases.
A sensible and company specific skillset of personnel management, industry knowledge and experience must be represented in the board as a priority, as formal independence alone is not a sufficient prerequisite for the selection process. The discussion emphasized that extensive information is key to allow proper evaluation of true independence. This should be complemented by sufficient access to the chair for communication with investors. The latest German code revision emphasizes that chairs make themselves available to investors for such supervisory board related issues.
Ways for the Future:
Full disclosure of important ties between individual board members with management and controlling shareholders should be obligatory. To properly evaluate the board member proposals, the disclosure of the skillsets of board members and the selection process would bring further important insights for investors. An idea proposed to support the process was the development of a “board skills matrix” for individual boards.
The discussion highlighted the key role of the nomination committee in the identificatio n and evaluation of independent directors. It was therefore suggested that the chair of the nomination committee should make himself available to investors. This point was controversially discussed due to possible loss of a “One Voice” communication strategy, so that communication should be confined to the chair of the supervisory board.
Another important point of the discussion was the regular evaluation of non-executive board members, as this may bring improvements for independent guidance and decision making of the full board. It could also identify areas of strength and weaknesses for an improved performance of both boards. A key prerequisite for a successful evaluation is the independence of the conducting leader.
The discussants raised the issue of the differences emerging from national governance environments, such as different shareholder structures and cultural differences. While the Anglo American approach to independence appears to work in the UK, this differs from continental European countries such as Germany and France.
Ways for the Future:
A solution to cross-country differences is the development of “local optima” that reflect the special circumstances in each country, rather from pursuing a “one fits all” approach.
Conclusion
The participants concluded that board independence remains a central issue in the corporate governance debate. The discussion identified definition issues as critical. It was also highlighted that full disclosure of the individual independence is important. Formal independence alone does not ensure board or director effectiveness. It must be accompanied with skills, knowledge and experience to obtain satisfactory board work results. Disclosure on the individual board members’ selection process and independence characteristics should be made available to investors and the other stakeholders.
*Christian Strengeris Academic Director at the Center for Corporate Governance at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. This post is based on a publication by Mr. Strenger and Jörg Rochell, President and Managing Director at ESMT Berlin, for a symposium held in Berlin on November 9, 2017, sponsored by ESMT Berlin and the Center for Corporate Governance at HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management.
Voici un article très intéressant qui présente une vision différente de la gouvernance à l’« Américaine ».
Les auteurs XAVIER HOLLANDTS et BERTRAND VALIORGUE sont enseignants-chercheurs en stratégie et gouvernance des entreprises. L’article vient de paraître sur le site LesEchos.fr.
Le projet français de loi « Pacte » a pour objectif de repenser les grandes notions de gouvernance, notamment la place de la participation des salariés à titre d’administrateur à part entière.
L’article examine trois idées reçues qu’il est important de bien élucider :
(1) la participation permet d’équilibrer le rapport capital/travail
(2) la participation améliore le dialogue social
(3) la participation améliore la performance
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Voilà de quelle manière les auteurs concluent leur article :
Compte tenu de ces éléments, faut-il promouvoir la participation des salariés à la gouvernance des entreprises ? Oui car l’accroissement de cette participation nous semble nécessaire pour deux raisons. L’arrivée d’administrateurs élus par les salariés au sein des conseils d’administration va permettre de recentrer les discussions sur l’entreprise, son projet stratégique, les investissements de long terme et son apport au progrès social et environnemental. Cette arrivée va redonner tout leur sens et prérogatives aux conseils d’administration.
La participation des salariés à la gouvernance va en outre apporter des éclairages et des moyens nouveaux pour gérer l’actif clé de la performance des entreprises : le capital humain. Les administrateurs salariés vont aider les dirigeants à mieux prendre en compte et développer cet actif qui est facteur majeur de compétitivité, d’innovation et de performance durable. On objectera alors que d’autres parties prenantes jouent aussi un rôle clé dans le processus de création de valeur et que leur présence au sein des conseils d’administration serait bienvenue. Ceux-là n’auraient pas tort.
Ma veille en gouvernance m’amène à vous proposer la lecture d’un article publié par Demi Derem* et Elizabeth Maiellano sur les défis posés par un ensemble de directives récemment approuvées par le Parlement européen et qui traitent du droit des actionnaires : « Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD) ».
La Commission Européenne (CE) veut que les entreprises cotées aient une meilleure connaissance de leurs investisseurs et qu’elles soient en mesure d’interagir d’une manière claire et transparente avec eux. Voici un extrait qui montre l’ampleur des nouvelles directives.
The SRD also grants shareholders the right to vote on companies’ remuneration policies, which may increase the policy analysis and assessment required by the buy-side. Similarly, the SRD requires that any material transaction (as defined by national regulators) between a listed company and a related third party must be announced and approved by the shareholders and the board.
Depending on national requirements, the announcement may also need to be accompanied by a report about the impact of the transaction from an independent third party, the board or a committee of independent directors.
La lecture de cet article montre que les entreprises ont peu de temps pour se conformer aux directives. Les auteurs explorent les impacts de l’adoption de ces règles sur les principaux intéressés, notamment sur les investisseurs institutionnels et les firmes d’intermédiation.
All parties in the shareholder communication chain need to prepare for the enhanced requirements of the new Shareholder Rights Directive—and try to influence its local implementation to encourage a harmonised approach.
The new Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD), adopted by the European Council and approved by the European Parliament this spring, is a laudable initiative intended to encourage shareholder engagement in listed companies in Europe and improve the transparency of related processes— including proxy voting. The European Commission (EC) wants to see proof that companies understand their investors and communicate with them in a clear and transparent manner.
The new SRD updates its 2007 predecessor and introduces some new requirements related to remunerating directors, identifying shareholders, facilitating the exercise of shareholder rights, transmitting information and providing transparency for institutional investors, asset managers and proxy advisors. The majority of the SRD is required to be translated into national law by European member states by June 2019 (although some elements will not come into force until September 2020).
Given the complexities introduced by the new SRD, firms across the shareholder communication chain need to begin preparing now if they are to meet its requirements by 2019. These are expected to entail significant and potentially costly changes relating to process reforms and transparency requirements, impacting issuers, asset managers, custodians, central securities depositories (CSDs), and a range of other intermediaries and service providers.
The two-year member-state transposition process will involve adaptation of the SRD’s requirements to reflect domestic market structures and local legal processes. We encourage all affected firms to engage with the EC and national regulators, and share their views on how the SRD should be implemented. This is vital for achieving outcomes that are equitable and commensurate with the corporate governance benefits of the SRD. If national regulators opt for significantly different interpretations of the SRD, this would be challenging for industry participants.
For example, one global custodian has expressed concern about the risk of national divergence requiring compliance efforts to be tailored to each regulator’s interpretation, thereby increasing the complexity and cost of SRD implementation for firms operating in more than one market.
Another securities services firm believes that discrepancies in implementation dates in different jurisdictions will be problematic for global firms.
Institutional investor impact
Institutional investors and asset managers are likely to be affected by the SRD in a number of ways. For example, both will have to be more transparent about their engagement with investee companies and how they integrate shareholder engagement into their investment strategy. Under the SRD this information must be reported annually and made available on buy-side firms’ websites. These firms must also disclose annually their voting behaviour and explain significant votes and their use of proxy advisor services. The SRD introduces these requirements on a comply-or-explain basis.
The SRD also grants shareholders the right to vote on companies’ remuneration policies, which may increase the policy analysis and assessment required by the buy-side. Similarly, the SRD requires that any material transaction (as defined by national regulators) between a listed company and a related third party must be announced and approved by the shareholders and the board. Depending on national requirements, the announcement may also need to be accompanied by a report about the impact of the transaction from an independent third party, the board or a committee of independent directors.
These new requirements will result in the production of more data and more reporting before a vote, potentially creating a significant burden on asset managers and investors as they try to manage this information flow. This burden is likely to be particularly noticeable with related party transactions.
Intermediary implications
Intermediary firms will need to keep a close watch on national requirements for the adoption of specific identification standards and data items for shareholder transparency requirements. For instance, markets could set different minimum levels of holdings that must be disclosed.
In addition, the SRD refers to providing data in a standardised format but does not specify the standards, so these may be provided by the EC. However, if the disclosure of certain data items would breach some countries’ data privacy laws, national regulators would have to alter the local requirements.
Another change introduced by the SRD is that intermediaries will have to store shareholder information for at least 12 months after they become aware that someone has ceased to be a shareholder. Data storage and retention requirements are therefore likely to increase.
A particular concern for intermediaries is that the SRD requires them to transmit general meeting agenda and voting information “without delay”. National regulators could interpret this as a requirement for real-time or near-real-time reporting. If this means that vote information has to be transmitted immediately, intermediaries will need to introduce intraday processing support. Meanwhile, the need to use a standardised format could result in amendments to current SWIFT message formats, with associated costs. It is also likely that the volume of voting instructions and amendments will increase after implementation of the SRD.
One custodian has expressed concern about the lack of regulatory clarity on whether post-meeting announcements will also have to be transmitted immediately. The EC and national regulators will need to confirm the level of information that must be passed on to shareholders. Some intermediaries may face operational headaches if their current processes can support the transmission of voting information but not of other data items in the same standardised and immediate manner.
Intermediaries could face the brunt of the costs of SRD implementation, particularly because European member states can prohibit intermediaries from charging fees for the cost of changes related to disclosure. If regulators decide to mandate this, intermediaries will have to absorb all compliance costs rather than passing a percentage on to clients.
If regulators are more lenient, intermediaries may be able to pass on certain costs, but the SRD specifies that these must be proven to be proportionate to the cost of offering the service. Intermediaries could therefore have to pay for the full cost of transparency requirements in some jurisdictions, while providing an audit trail of operational costs (and facing questions about any inefficiencies) in others.
The bundling of proxy costs into custody fees may also need re-evaluating, because intermediaries will need to disclose their fees in relation to proxy services. The SRD stresses the need for “non-discriminatory and proportionate” fees and jurisdictions will also have the power to prohibit fees for proxy services. If some do prohibit fees, firms’ business models will need to be revised.
Widespread impact
Issuers and registrars will also be affected by the SRD in relation to the standardisation of meeting announcements and the provision of vote confirmation. And proxy service providers will be impacted, although global firms that already comply with some jurisdictions’ voluntary requirements in transparency and reporting will feel less short-term impact. They could face both opportunities and challenges—with the potential to deliver new services to help intermediaries to support requirements such as vote confirmation, but needing to invest to do so.
The SRD’s transposition period presents market participants with an opportunity to review the impact on their operations, engage with regulators and assess their readiness. It is something that the industry should embrace and collaborate on to get right.
___________________________________________
*Demi Derem is general manager for Investor Communication Solutions, International, at Broadridge, and Elizabeth Maiellano is vice president for product management, Investor Communication Solutions, International, at Broadridge. This article has been prepared in collaboration with Broadridge, a supporter of Board Agenda.
Aujourd’hui, je fais une première expérience de publication d’un billet en gouvernance parue sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, le 6 février 2018.
En effet, j’édite la traduction en français d’un article publié par Abe M. Friedman*, CEO de la firme CamberView. Cette publication constitue, à mon avis, un moment décisif dans la conception de la gouvernance telle que vue par un investisseur avisé.
Comme plusieurs lecteurs sont particulièrement intéressés par les contenus en français, j’ai utilisé l’outil de traduction de Google pour faire ressortir les implications de la lettre annuelle aux PDG de Larry Fink, PDG de BlackRock.
Vous comprendrez que la traduction est perfectible, mais je crois qu’elle est compréhensible avec un minimum d’édition.
Je vous invite également à lire la dernière mise à jour des recommandations de BlackRock en vue des votes aux assemblées annuelles : Updated BlackRock Proxy Voting Guidelines
Bonne lecture !
Le mardi 16 janvier, Larry Fink, PDG de BlackRock, a publié sa lettre annuelle aux PDG décrivant une vision audacieuse liant la prospérité des entreprises à leur capacité à fournir de solides performances financières tout en contribuant positivement à la société. Intitulée « A Sense of Purpose », cette lettre souligne l’approche de plus en plus active de BlackRock en matière d’engagement actionnarial ; elle constitue son opinion selon laquelle les conseils d’administration jouent un rôle central dans la direction stratégique à long terme des sociétés ainsi que dans la prise en compte des facteurs de risque environnementaux, sociaux, de gouvernance (ESG) et de création de valeur à long terme.
La lettre est un autre signal d’un changement fondamental dans la pensée des gestionnaires d’actifs traditionnels sur des sujets que certains ont toujours considérés comme non économiques. Alors que la pression monte sur les grands gestionnaires d’actifs sur la façon dont ils « supervisent » les « portefeuilles » de leurs entreprises, ces questions sociales et environnementales sont de plus en plus considérées comme essentielles à la création de valeur et à la durabilité à long terme. La position d’avant-garde sur la responsabilité d’entreprise prise dans la lettre est un indicateur de la manière dont les attentes changeantes des propriétaires d’actifs sont intégrées dans le comportement des gestionnaires d’actifs. Pour les entreprises, ce changement a créé un nouvel ensemble d’attentes, et le potentiel d’un examen plus approfondi de la part des investisseurs qui pourraient continuer à croître dans les années à venir.
Thèmes clés — ESG, engagement des actionnaires, administrateurs et activisme
La lettre de cette année réitère un certain nombre de thèmes tirés des communications des années précédentes et explique comment BlackRock s’attend à ce que les sociétés améliorent la valeur à long terme pour les actionnaires.
ESG et importance de la diversité du conseil d’administration dans la création de valeur à long terme
La lettre de Fink souligne la conviction de BlackRock que la gestion des questions ESG est essentielle à une croissance durable. De l’avis de BlackRock, exercer la surveillance de ces défis ainsi que d’autres défis émergents à la création de valeur à long terme relève de la compétence du conseil, qui, selon M. Fink, devrait inclure une diversité de genres, d’ethnies, d’expériences et de façons de penser. Les entreprises devraient s’attendre à ce que BlackRock (et, avec le temps, d’autres grands investisseurs institutionnels) investisse plus de temps pour comprendre la gestion des risques des entreprises liée à leur impact plus large sur les communautés, la société et l’environnement. Cela signifie probablement un soutien croissant aux propositions d’actionnaires sur ces sujets et une pression accrue sur les conseils pour qu’ils démontrent qu’ils s’adressent sérieusement à ces questions.
Engagement des actionnaires
Citant le besoin d’être des « agents actifs et engagés pour le compte des clients investis avec BlackRock », la lettre appelle à un nouveau modèle d’engagement des actionnaires qui comprend des communications pendant toute l’année sur les moyens d’améliorer la valeur à long terme. Alors que M. Fink note que BlackRock a engagé des ressources importantes pour améliorer ses propres efforts d’intendance des investissements au cours des dernières années, il écrit que « la croissance de l’indexation exige que nous prenions maintenant cette fonction à un nouveau niveau. » BlackRock a l’intention de doubler la taille de ses équipes de supervision.
Le rôle du conseil dans la communication et la supervision de la stratégie d’entreprise pour la croissance à long terme
Revenant sur un thème commun des communications précédentes, la lettre de cette année souligne l’importance du conseil pour aider les entreprises à définir un cadre stratégique pour la création de valeur à long terme. Bien que le nombre moyen d’heures consacrées par les membres du conseil à leur rôle ait augmenté au cours des dernières années, M. Fink continue d’élever la barre, soulignant que les administrateurs, dont les compétences et l’expérience proviennent uniquement de réunions sporadiques, ne remplissent pas leur devoir envers les actionnaires. La lettre de cette année contient une liste de questions que les sociétés (c.-à-d. les conseils d’administration et la direction) devraient poser pour s’assurer qu’elles sont en mesure de maintenir leur rendement à long terme. Ces questions comprennent explicitement l’impact sociétal des entreprises et les importants changements structurels (tels que les conditions économiques, l’automation et les changements climatiques) qui influencent le potentiel de croissance.
S’engager sur l’activisme
Fink écrit qu’une « raison centrale de la montée de l’activisme — et des luttes intempestives par procuration — est que les entreprises n’ont pas été assez explicites sur leurs stratégies à long terme. » Il souligne, à titre d’exemple, la réforme fiscale récemment adoptée et son potentiel d’augmentation des flux de trésorerie après impôt, comme un moyen pour les activistes de cibler les entreprises qui ne communiquent pas efficacement leur stratégie à long terme. M. Fink encourage les entreprises à s’engager avec les investisseurs et autres parties prenantes au début du processus lorsque ceux-ci offrent « des idées précieuses — plus souvent que certains détracteurs ne le suggèrent », une observation cohérente avec le soutien sélectif de BlackRock aux activistes dans les luttes par procuration.
Recommandations aux émetteurs
Cette lettre représente une évolution significative de l’opinion publique de BlackRock sur la responsabilité des entreprises et des conseils d’administration de gérer activement les impacts sociétaux de leurs activités au bénéfice de toutes les parties prenantes. M. Fink affirme que l’objectif des propriétaires d’actifs est non seulement d’améliorer leurs rendements d’investissement, mais aussi de voir le secteur privé relever les défis sociaux qui assureront la « prospérité et la sécurité » de leurs concitoyens.
BlackRock n’est pas le seul à faire ce changement philosophique. Les derniers mois ont fourni des exemples de la façon dont cette nouvelle dynamique façonne les décisions de vote et d’investissement. L’été dernier, des résolutions sur la divulgation des risques climatiques ont été adoptées pour la première fois dans de grandes entreprises énergétiques. En novembre, State Street Global Advisors a révélé qu’elle avait voté contre les administrateurs de 400 entreprises qui, selon elle, n’avaient pas fait d’efforts pour accroître la diversité au sein du conseil. Plus tôt ce mois-ci, JANA Partners et CalSTRS se sont associés pour mener une campagne d’activisme sur la question de savoir si Apple permet aux parents de protéger leurs enfants en utilisant la technologie et JANA a également créé un fonds pour cibler d’autres entreprises.
Afin de répondre aux questions soulevées dans la lettre de M. Fink, les sociétés ouvertes devraient envisager :
Construire une pratique de l’engagement continu tout au long de l’année sur la gouvernance et la durabilité avec leurs meilleurs investisseurs afin de rester en contrôle de l’activisme et d’être au-devant des investisseurs face à un défi.
Expliquer le processus du conseil dans le développement de la stratégie à long terme, dans le rôle de supervision de l’entreprise ainsi que dans les discussions avec les investisseurs.
Présenter les investisseurs à une variété de membres de l’équipe de direction et, à l’occasion, à un ou plusieurs membres du conseil d’administration pour établir des relations et faire confiance, au fil du temps, à tous les dirigeants de l’entreprise.
Décrire comment les administrateurs cultivent la connaissance de l’entreprise en dehors des réunions formelles du conseil d’administration, afin de remplir leur mandat de protection des intérêts à long terme des investisseurs.
Récemment, je suis intervenu auprès du conseil d’administration d’une OBNL et j’ai animé une discussion tournant autour des thèmes suivants en affirmant certains principes de gouvernance que je pense être incontournable.
J’ai regroupé les thèmes en 15 volets :
(1) Le conseil d’administration est souverain — il est l’ultime organe décisionnel.
(2) Le rôle des administrateurs est d’assurer la saine gestion de l’organisation en fonction d’objectifs établis. L’administrateur a un rôle de fiduciaire, non seulement envers les membres qui les ont élus, mais aussi envers les parties prenantes de toute l’organisation. Son rôle comporte des devoirs et des responsabilités envers celle-ci.
(3) Les administrateurs ont un devoir de surveillance et de diligence ; ils doivent cependant s’assurer de ne pas s’immiscer dans la gestion de l’organisation (« nose in, fingers out »).
(4) La décision la plus importante du conseil d’administration est le choix du premier dirigeant, c’est-à-dire le directeur général de l’organisation.
(5) Les administrateurs élus par l’assemblée générale ne sont pas porteurs des intérêts propres à leur groupe ; ce sont les intérêts supérieurs de l’organisation qui priment.
(6) Le président du conseil est le chef d’orchestre du groupe d’administrateurs ; il doit être en étroite relation avec le premier dirigeant et bien comprendre les coulisses du pouvoir. Il doit de plus s’assurer que chaque administrateur apporte une valeur ajoutée aux décisions du CA.
(7) Les membres du conseil doivent entretenir des relations de collaboration et de respect entre eux ; ils doivent viser les consensus et exprimer leur solidarité, notamment par la confidentialité des échanges.
(8) Les administrateurs doivent être bien préparés pour les réunions du conseil et ils doivent poser les bonnes questions afin de bien comprendre les enjeux et de décider en toute indépendance d’esprit. Pour ce faire, ils peuvent tirer profit de l’avis d’experts indépendants.
(9) La composition du conseil devrait refléter la diversité de l’organisation. On doit privilégier l’expertise, la connaissance de l’industrie et la complémentarité.
(10) Le conseil d’administration doit accorder toute son attention aux orientations stratégiques de l’organisation et passer le plus clair de son temps dans un rôle de conseil stratégique.
(11) Le rôle des comités du conseil (Ressources humaines, audit, gouvernance) est crucial ; ceux-ci doivent alimenter la réflexion des membres du conseil et faire des recommandations.
(12) La nécessité de fonctionner avec un comité exécutif varie selon la configuration du conseil d’administration de l’organisation.
(13) Chaque réunion devrait se conclure par un huis clos, systématiquement inscrit à l’ordre du jour de toutes les rencontres.
(14) Le président du comité de gouvernance doit mettre en place une évaluation du fonctionnement et de la dynamique du conseil.
(15) Les administrateurs doivent prévoir des activités de formation en gouvernance et en éthique.
Nous savons que le Dodd-Frank Act aux États-Unis oblige les entreprises publiques à publier le ratio indiquant la rémunération du CEO en comparaison avec la moyenne des salaires des employés.
L’obligation de publier ces ratios dans les rapports aux actionnaires commence cette année, et les entreprises doivent se préparer aux répercussions de cette divulgation.
L’article ci-dessous, publié par Joe Mallin, associé de la firme Pay Governance, paru sur le site du HLS Forum, met l’accent sur les impacts envisagés auprès des parties prenantes.
Quelles seront les retombées de la publication de ces statistiques tant redoutées ? C’est ce dont il est question dans ce court article.
Le graphique qui suit est assez révélateur d’un problème qui concerne les sociétés américaines et canadiennes !
Comment l’AMF réagira-t-elle à cette nouvelle donne ?
CEO = 184 x average worker pay – Canada CEO Pay – BayStreetEx
Key Takeaways
The CEO Pay Ratio will be published in 2018 proxy season.
As companies begin calculating their Ratios, it is also time to begin thinking about the timeframe immediately following the proxy statement publication and the possible reactions of key interested parties.
We suggest that companies determine how they want to respond to inquiries about the published CEO Pay Ratio and evaluate whether alternative Ratios should be calculated to provide appropriate context.
Companies will need to decide whether to be proactive or reactive to potential inquiries.
Interested Parties
A. The Media
We envision several likely outcomes as the media begins reporting on the CEO Pay Ratio. These include:
The local publication of tables comparing the CEO Pay Ratios of companies in specific geographies, such as large cities
Similar tables comparing companies across industries, likely by the national media
General conclusions between companies with higher versus lower Ratios (e.g., “high” = “bad”and “low” = “not as bad”)
We believe the tables published by both local and national media will include CEO pay, median employee pay, and the Ratio itself. Such tables will illustrate the fact that the CEO Pay Ratio consists of three parts, and the relationship among these components is key to understanding how employees may perceive its publication. This cross-company media comparison will be problematic: the SEC has stated it does not expect CEO Pay Ratios to be comparable across companies because of the variety of methodologies allowed for computing median employee pay. [1] This distinction is unlikely to make its way into media reports.
B. Employees
With the publication of the CEO Pay Ratio, employees will get a first glimpse into how their colleagues are paid, specifically the median pay of their colleagues. This will be a glimpse of just one number, but it will be a number they did not have access to before. As such, employees will be interested in two aspects of the CEO Pay Ratio:
Internal Comparisons to Median Pay—Employees will compare their own pay to the median employee’s pay. The obvious issue is that, by definition, half will be paid below the median; this could create a morale issue for those employees. Likewise, employees paid above the median could feel the same way if their pay is closer to the median than they had expected. Finally, the methodology used to calculate this median could complicate personal comparisons or cause other issues if the value of benefits are combined with direct compensation.
External Comparisons to Median Pay—Cross-company comparisons of median employee pay will be made. This will be especially prevalent among employees in the same geographic area and industry. Such comparisons could give the impression that a competitor pays more than one’s own company, and this could prompt employees to seek out a higher-paying competitor. This could become a key issue for companies in similar industries and regions, such as Silicon Valley. Will there be a competition to see who has the highest median employee pay? What would the recruiting implications be?
Overall, employees will likely pay more attention to the CEO Pay Ratio’s median employee pay aspect than to the CEO pay itself: CEO pay has been published for many years and should not be a surprise to employees. In addition, company employees may perceive the Ratio as a rather abstract number and have only mild interest in cross-company comparisons.
C. Investors
Early assumptions had been that investors were relatively uninterested in CEO Pay Ratio outcomes. This is due to the assumption the Ratio does not reveal information about the operations and future investment potential of a given company. However, a recent Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) policy survey [2] indicates:
Only 16% of investors polled (primarily institutional investors) indicated they would not evaluate the CEO Pay Ratio as part of their investment evaluations.
The remaining investors indicated they would either:
Compare Ratios across companies and industries, or
Assess year-over-year changes in the Ratio for individual companies.
The key conclusion is that investors will look for Ratio differences across both companies and time, but any Ratio differences/changes in and of themselves will not likely be enough to change investment decisions. Such information will likely be considered in conjunction with other available information. At the same time, investors may inquire about what they perceive to be “high” Ratios and companies should be prepared for such inquiries.
Addressing Potential Issues
Most companies should be prepared to respond to questions related to the CEO Pay Ratio’s publication. Companies with what are perceived to be “low” ratios will get fewer inquiries, but should be prepared in any case. Responses to investor and media questions could be covered together, as we think they will be similar in nature.
Employee questions will be somewhat different, as they will be more focused on the median employee pay rather than the CEO Pay Ratio itself.
For example, companies may consider publishing multiple “supplemental” CEO Pay Ratios intended to provide context for media, investor and employee perceptions. For example, a significant number of relatively lower-paid, international, part-time, and/or seasonal employees would lower the median employee pay. Ratios will also likely vary significantly by industry: professional services firms with “high” median employee pay will generally have lower Ratios, and those with “low” median employee pay will have higher Ratios.
The supplemental calculations could take the form of Ratios based on:
Domestic employees only—for companies with significant employment in international locations
Salaried employees only—for companies with many lower-paid, non-salaried employees
Full-time employees only—for companies who employ many part-time employees
We believe these additional calculations may provide beneficial insight into the CEO Pay Ratio for employees, investors, and the media. In each case, the supplemental calculations will result in a lower Ratio along with insight into the initial Ratio’s calculation.
Investor/media relation functions should develop talking points to respond to inquiries, especially if their company’s initial CEO Pay Ratio may be perceived as “high”. The likelihood of media inquiries and the need for talking points is less likely among those companies whose CEO Pay Ratio may be perceived as “low”. This is particularly true concerning the media, whose sole focus will be on “high” CEO Pay Ratios. Prepared talking points can also form the basis for responding to employee issues; there should be a sense of cohesion across all responses to the various interested parties.
A key issue will be whether a company should be proactive or reactive to employee questions. Again, the initial CEO Pay Ratio may hold the answer: it may be appropriate to be proactive for a Ratio which may be perceived as “high” and reactive for one that may be perceived as “low”. However, individual Company facts and circumstances should influence this decision.
Conclusions
In general, the publication of CEO Pay Ratios for the first time will be prominently noted by the business media. It remains to be seen whether it will have its “fifteen minutes of fame,” or if it will face lingering scrutiny. However, the CEO Pay Ratio will likely become another aspect of the ongoing societal debate around income inequality and wealth concentration, which is not easily resolved either in this country or around the world.
In any case, we believe companies should begin developing appropriate responses to likely CEO Pay Ratio questions from their employees, investors and the media. Companies are currently in a period when the Ratios are being calculated, and now is the time to begin planning for publication and its after-effects. Be like the Boy Scouts: Be Prepared!
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Endnotes
1“Division of Corporation Finance Guidance on Calculation of Pay Ratio Disclosure.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. September 21, 2017.(go back)
2“Contextualizing CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure.” ISS Corporate Solutions Governance Insights. October 6, 2017.(go back)
Aujourd’hui, je porte à votre attention, un événement marquant dans l’application des règles de gouvernance des sociétés.
En effet, Larry Fink, le CEO de la société d’investissement BlackRock, dans une lettre adressée aux dirigeants des plus importantes entreprises, rejette le modèle de gouvernance à la Friedman, basé sur la primauté de la satisfaction des actionnaires.
Il prône de surcroît une gouvernance qui adopte le point de vue d’un développement à long terme ainsi que la prise en compte de l’ensemble des parties prenantes.
Je vous invite à lire le résumé ci-dessous, publié par Martin Lipton* sur le site de Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, afin de vous former une opinion sur le sujet.
BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink, who has been a leader in shaping corporate governance, has now firmly rejected Milton Friedman’s shareholder-primacy governance and embraced sustainability and stakeholder-focused governance. January 2018 BlackRock letter to CEOs.
The primacy of shareholder value as the exclusive objective of corporations, as articulated by Milton Friedman and then thoroughly embraced by Wall Street, has come under scrutiny by regulators, academics, politicians and even investors. While the corporate governance initiatives of the past year cannot be categorized as an abandonment of the shareholder primacy agenda, there are signs that academic commentators, legislators and some investors are looking at more nuanced and tempered approaches to creating shareholder value.
In his letter, Larry Fink says:
We also see many governments failing to prepare for the future, on issues ranging from retirement and infrastructure to automation and worker retraining. As a result, society increasingly is turning to the private sector and asking that companies respond to broader societal challenges. Indeed, the public expectations of your company have never been greater. Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.
Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential. It will ultimately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will succumb to short-term pressures to distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth. It will remain exposed to activist campaigns that articulate a clearer goal, even if that goal serves only the shortest and narrowest of objectives. And ultimately, that company will provide subpar returns to the investors who depend on it to finance their retirement, home purchases, or higher education.
Most importantly, the letter sets out the type of engagement between corporations and their shareholders that BlackRock expects in order to secure its support against activist pressure. While the whole letter needs to be carefully considered in developing investor relations engagement practices, the following is of special note,
In order to make engagement with shareholders as productive as possible, companies must be able to describe their strategy for long-term growth. I want to reiterate our request, outlined in past letters, that you publicly articulate your company’s strategic framework for long-term value creation and explicitly affirm that it has been reviewed by your board of directors. This demonstrates to investors that your board is engaged with the strategic direction of the company. When we meet with directors, we also expect them to describe the board process for overseeing your strategy.
The statement of long-term strategy is essential to understanding a company’s actions and policies, its preparation for potential challenges, and the context of its shorter-term decisions. Your company’s strategy must articulate a path to achieve financial performance. To sustain that performance, however, you must also understand the societal impact of your business as well as the ways that broad, structural trends—from slow wage growth to rising automation to climate change—affect your potential for growth.
While the BlackRock letter is a major step in rejecting activism and short-termism and is a practical guide as to investor relations, it stops short of a critical step in assuring corporations that their efforts are bearing fruit—it does not commit BlackRock to publicly state its support for a corporation under attack by an activist seeking to impose financial engineering or other short-term action before the corporation has to endure a proxy fight. This type of early concrete support would be a major factor in supporting sustainability and long-term investment.
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*Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton.
Voici un cas publié sur le site de Julie Garland McLellan qui expose un problème très réel dans la plupart des OBNL. Comment la présidente du CA doit-elle agir afin de respecter les politiques de rémunération en vigueur dans son organisme ?
La situation décrite dans ce cas se déroule dans une organisation à but non lucratif (OBNL) qui vient de recruter un nouvel administrateur, sur recommandation du Ministère de l’Éducation, qui provient d’une communauté autochtone bénéficiaire des bourses de l’organisation.
Dans ce cas, le nouvel administrateur a accepté de siéger au conseil sans rémunération et sans remboursement de dépenses. C’est la politique de l’organisme qui s’applique à tous les autres administrateurs.
À la première réunion du CA, celui-ci insiste pour se faire rembourser ses frais de voyage et il demande une rémunération de 1 000 $ par réunion. Devant un refus, il avise le ministère de son insatisfaction.
Comment Victoria, la présidente du conseil, doit-elle agir afin de dénouer cette impasse ?
Le cas présente la situation de manière assez explicite ; puis, trois experts se prononcent sur le dilemme que vit Victoria.
Je vous invite donc à prendre connaissance de ces avis, en cliquant sur le lien ci-dessous, et me faire part de vos commentaires, si vous le souhaitez.
Victoria chairs the board of a not-for-profit organisation that offers scholarships at leading boarding schools for children in secondary education from disadvantaged backgrounds and living in regional, rural and remote communities. Many of the beneficiaries are from indigenous peoples and her board was delighted when the Minister for Education offered to help them source a new director. The Minister suggested a high profile and well-connected leader from a beneficiary community. It seemed just what they needed.
The new director met Victoria for a coffee and said that he was delighted to be joining her board as his people had great need for quality education. He had some good insights about sourcing grant funds to supplement their current bequests and donations. He then met some other directors, and all agreed that he would be a perfect addition to the board. A letter of appointment was sent and a consent form was received.
At his first board meeting the new director asked for the company to pay his travel and accommodation in attending the meeting and also for a sitting fee of one thousand dollars. He said this was a legitimate expectation and that he was paid for his service on other boards. The letter of appointment clearly stated that directors were unremunerated and attended meetings at their own cost. Now he has complained to the Minister that he hasn’t been paid and a staffer has called to ask why not.
How can Victoria resolve this difference between the expectations of the board and its new director?
Yvan Allaire, président exécutif du conseil de l’Institut sur la gouvernance (IGOPP), vient de publier une 9e prise de position sur la rémunération des dirigeants des sociétés canadiennes.
Cette prise de position formule plusieurs recommandations aux conseils d’administration afin de les inciter à modifier les méthodes d’établissement des rémunérations de leurs dirigeants.
Selon l’IGOPP, « cette prise de position se veut un appel pressant à une remise en question de la démarche devenue standard et conventionnelle pour établir la rémunération des dirigeants d’entreprises publiques. Cette démarche, rassurante en raison du nombre de ses adhérents, ne prend en compte aucune particularité de l’entreprise, de son industrie, de son modèle d’affaires, de son horizon de gestion et ses propres leviers de création de valeur. Elle enferme les sociétés dans un moule fabriqué par les conseillers en rémunération, lequel produit de hautes rémunérations, satisfait aux attentes des investisseurs et aux diktats des gendarmes de la gouvernance, mais ne fait pas ce que la rémunération devrait faire.
Cette démarche s’appuie sur des hypothèses en grande partie factices et sans appui empirique : une forte mobilité des dirigeants d’une entreprise à l’autre ; la transférabilité du talent de gestion d’une entreprise à une autre, d’une industrie à une autre, la rémunération “à risque” comme facteur de motivation à de hautes performances ; une sous-estimation du rôle de la chance et du hasard dans la vie des organisations ; un groupe d’entreprises bien sélectionnées pouvant servir de quasi-marché du talent de direction, etc. Les conseils d’administration des grandes entreprises publiques doivent se doter de mécanismes pour aborder de façon collective les moyens, mesures et démarches susceptibles de changer ce système. Il y va de leur légitimité et de leur crédibilité.
Cette prise de position met de l’avant un certain nombre de propositions dont l’adoption, pensons-nous, ferait évoluer positivement l’encadrement des rémunérations. Il est probable que les changements nécessaires surviendront de façon graduelle, mais le but est clair : en arriver à des systèmes de rémunération conçus par le conseil d’administration pour leur entreprise bien spécifique, prenant en compte l’ensemble des parties prenantes de la société et suscitant une gestion à long terme de l’entreprise ».
Les douze propositions présentées par l’IGOPP m’apparaissent très judicieuses. Les conseils d’administration, ainsi que les autorités réglementaires, devraient en prendre bonne note afin d’assurer des mécanismes d’établissement des rémunérations des dirigeants plus appropriés.
La rémunération médiane des chefs de la direction des grandes entreprises publiques canadiennes a plus que doublé entre 1998 et 2007, suivie d’une baisse substantielle de 17,7 % en 2008 en raison de la crise financière. Depuis lors, leur rémunération a repris à la hausse puis s’est stabilisée autour de 8 millions $ depuis 2010.
La rémunération médiane des PDG des six grandes banques canadiennes atteignait 10,5 millions $ en 2016, une baisse notable par comparaison aux 11,8 millions $ de 2010. Le rapport entre la rémunération médiane des PDG des grandes entreprises canadiennes et le salaire moyen gagné par les travailleurs du secteur privé canadien est passé de 62 fois en 1998 à un apogée de 159 fois en 2013 pour terminer à 140 fois en 2016. Ce même rapport pour les PDG des banques a atteint 184 fois en 2016.
Au cours des 20 dernières années, la rémunération des dirigeants d’entreprises fut l’objet de critiques sévères et persistantes, celles-ci étant méritées dans beaucoup de cas.
Pour composer avec les pressions exercées sur eux, la plupart des conseils d’administration ont opté pour une démarche prudente qui consiste à adopter la forme de rémunération devenue un standard, conçue en bonne partie par des conseillers en rémunération et diffusée quasi universellement.
En conséquence, les systèmes de rémunération devinrent de véritables arcanes exigeant des explications longues et détaillées. Ainsi, le nombre moyen de pages consacrées à la description de la rémunération des dirigeants des grandes entreprises canadiennes a quintuplé en une quinzaine d’années à peine, atteignant 34 pages en 2016.
Cette approche « prudente » pour l’établissement des rémunérations se comprend dans les circonstances actuelles alors que les conseils d’administration sont ciblés isolément, doivent réagir au cas par cas, manquent de voix collective, ne jouissent d’aucun forum où discuter et adopter des positions communes et, s’il y a lieu, résister collectivement aux pressions des investisseurs et autres intervenants. En bref, les conseils d’administration n‘ont pas de forum, d’associations ou de « coalition » où se réunir et prendre position comme le fait la Coalition canadienne pour la bonne gouvernance en regroupant les grands investisseurs institutionnels.
Cette prise de position appelle les conseils d’administration à revoir cette démarche standard pour l’établissement des programmes de rémunération, laquelle nous semble déficiente. Laisser tomber les approches devenues standard pour fixer les rémunérations : Le rituel en place pour établir la rémunération est en effet rassurant en vertu du grand nombre d’entreprises qui y ont recours; mais cette approche standard ne prend pas en compte les particularités de l’entreprise et de son industrie, du caractère de son modèle d’affaires, de l’horizon temporel selon lequel sa stratégie se déploie, des leviers de création de valeur qui lui est propre.
Cette démarche enferme les sociétés et leurs conseils d’administration dans un modèle de rémunération conçu par des consultants qui produite de hautes rémunérations tout en satisfaisant aux attentes des
observateurs critiques, mais qui n’atteint pas les objectifs que la rémunération devrait cibler.
Cette démarche standard pour établir la rémunération des dirigeants s’appuie en fait sur des hypothèses empiriquement douteuses sinon carrément fausses: une forte mobilité entre firmes et industries des dirigeants, une haute transférabilité du talent de gestion d’une industrie à une autre, la rémunération «à risque» comme facteur de motivation à de hautes performances, une surévaluation de la relation entre le prix de l’action et les efforts individuels des dirigeants (minimisant le rôle de la chance dans la production de fortes rémunérations) , la notion qu’un groupe témoin d’entreprises bien choisies peut servir de quasi-marché du talent pour établir la valeur marchande du PDG et autres dirigeants, etc.
De façon urgente, les conseils d’administration doivent se doter d’un mécanisme, établir un forum, pour enclencher une démarche concertée pour changer ce système. De leur capacité à tracer une voie nouvelle dépendent leur légitimité et leur crédibilité.
Cette prise de position avance un certain nombre de propositions qui, si elles étaient adoptées, contribueraient à une nouvelle approche, une approche plus conforme aux attentes en matière de rémunération. Cette nouvelle approche pourrait bien s’installer de façon incrémentielle, mais l’objectif est clair : un système de rémunération conçu par le conseil d’administration pour le contexte très spécifique d’une entreprise précise, sensible aux attentes des parties prenantes et induisant la direction à gérer l’entreprise dans une perspective de long terme.
Principales propositions
• Les entreprises devraient abandonner le principe que la rémunération du PDG doit être établie selon les rémunérations versées aux dirigeants d’entreprises semblables par leur taille, leur chiffre d’affaires, etc. C’est le maillon faible de toute la démarche actuelle de rémunération qui a mené à une augmentation quasi automatique des rémunérations.
• Pas d’octrois d’options (sauf dans des circonstances exceptionnelles comme un redressement) et l’attribution d’unités d’actions ne devrait pas être un rite annuel ; les unités devraient être attribuées au moment où un dirigeant assume un poste ou est promu et le niveau de telles unités devrait être revu aux trois ans seulement; ces unités d’actions ne devraient être exerçables qu’au terme d’un nombre d’années établi selon le cycle d’investissement et de gestion de l’industrie à laquelle l’entreprise appartient; selon les situations, le terme pourrait être 1 an, 3 ans, 5 ans, voire 10 ans!
• Le conseil devra déclarer dans la Circulaire de sollicitation de procurations qu’il est informé du rapport entre la rémunération du PDG et la rémunération médiane dans l’entreprise ainsi que dans la société civile et qu’il juge ce rapport approprié dans le contexte de l’entreprise, de l’industrie et des valeurs de la société ambiante;
• Les arrangements en cas de changement de contrôle devraient comporter les aspects suivants : seules les options et les unités-actions exerçables au moment de l’offre pourront être encaissées, mais au prix de l’action qui prévalait 90 jours avant l’annonce publique d’une offre d’achat pour l’entreprise.
• Le conseil est responsable de s’assurer que les dirigeants ne peuvent bénéficier de la plusvalue de leurs options ou unités d’actions provoquées essentiellement par des mesures financières comme le rachat d’actions, la vente d’actifs ou autres mesures.
• Tout progrès dans l’implantation de mesures comme celles proposées ici passe par une volonté collective des présidents de conseil des entreprises du TSX 60. Il est impérieux de créer un forum où des propositions comme certaines contenues dans cette prise de position pourraient être discutées et celles faisant consensus, adoptées pour encadrer la démarche de rémunération de toutes ces grandes sociétés canadiennes. Ces positions collectives serviraient de contrepoids aux pressions exercées isolément sur les entreprises.
• Cette prise de position interpelle aussi les fonds institutionnels afin qu’ils deviennent des participants engagés dans la solution des dilemmes, paradoxes et labyrinthes que sont devenus les enjeux de rémunération. Ces fonds doivent donner une substance concrète à leur engagement envers la gestion à long terme des sociétés dans lesquelles ils investissent.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 