Étiquette : Board of directors

L’évolution de la gouvernance en 2015 et dans le futur


Aujourd’hui, je vous réfère à un formidable compte rendu de l’évolution de la gouvernance aux États-Unis en 2015.

C’est certainement le document le plus exhaustif que je connaisse eu égard au futur de la gouvernance corporative. Cet article rédigé par Holly J. Gregory* associée et responsable de la gouvernance corporative et de la rémunération des dirigeants de la firme Sidley Austin LLP, a été publié sur le forum de la Harvard Law School (HLS).

L’article est assez long mais les spécialistes de toutes les questions de gouvernance y trouveront leur compte car c’est un document phare. On y traite des sujets suivants:

1. L’impact des règlementations sur le rôle de la gouvernance;

2. Les tensions entre l’atteinte de résultats à court terme et les investissements à long terme;

3. L’impact de l’activisme sur le comportement des CA et sur la création de valeur;

4. Les réactions de protection et de défense des CA, notamment en modifiant les règlements de l’entreprise;

5. L’influence et le pouvoir des firmes spécialisées en votation;

6. La démarcation entre la supervision (oversight) de la direction et le management;

7. Les activités de règlementation, d’implantation et de suivi;

8. Le rétablissement de la confiance du public envers les entreprises.

Je vous invite donc à lire cet article dont voici un extrait de la première partie.

Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.

The State of Corporate Governance for 2015

The balance of power between shareholders and boards of directors is central to the U.S. public corporation’s success as an engine of economic growth, job creation and innovation. Yet that balance is under significant and increasing strain. In 2015, we expect to see continued growth in shareholder activism and engagement, as well as in 249the influence of shareholder initiatives, including advisory proposals and votes. Time will tell whether, over the long term, tipping the balance to greater shareholder influence will prove beneficial for corporations, their shareholders and our economy at large. In the near term, there is reason to question whether increased shareholder influence on matters that the law has traditionally apportioned to the board is at the expense of other values that are key to the sustainability of healthy corporations.

…..

Governance Roles and Responsibilities

Over the past 15 years, two distinct theories have been advanced to explain corporate governance failures: too little active and objective board involvement and too little accountability to shareholders. The former finds expression in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on improving board attention to financial reporting and compliance, and related Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and listing rules on independent audit committees and director and committee independence and function generally. The latter is expressed by the Dodd-Frank Act’s focus on providing greater influence to shareholders through advisory say on pay votes and access to the company’s proxy machinery for nomination by shareholders of director candidates.

The emerging question is whether federal law and regulation (and related influences) are altering the balance that state law provides between the role of shareholders and the role of the board, and if so, whether that alteration is beneficial or harmful. State law places the management and direction of the corporation firmly in the hands of the board of directors. This legal empowerment of the board—and implicit rejection of governance by shareholder referendum—goes hand in hand with the limited liability that shareholders enjoy. Under state law, directors may not delegate or defer to shareholders as to matters reserved by law for the board, even where a majority of shareholders express a clear preference for a specific outcome. Concern about appropriate balance in shareholder and board roles is implicated by the increasingly coercive nature—given the influence and policies of proxy advisory firms—of federally-mandated advisory say on pay proposals and advisory shareholder proposals submitted under Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 on other matters that do not fall within shareholder decision rights. The extent of proxy advisory firm influence is linked, at least in part, to the manner in which the SEC regulates registered investment advisors.

Short-Term Returns vs. Long-Term Investment

Management has long reported significant pressures to focus on short-term results at the expense of the long-term investment needed to position the corporation for the long term. Observers point to short-term financial market pressures which have increased with the rise of institutional investors whose investment managers have incentives to focus on quarterly performance in relation to benchmark and competing funds.

Short-term pressures may also be accentuated by the increasing reliance on stock-based executive compensation. It is estimated that the percentage of stock-based compensation has tripled since the early nineties: in 1993, approximately 20 percent of executive compensation was stock-based. Today, it is about 60 percent.

Boards that should be positioned to help management take the long-term view and balance competing interests are also under pressure from financial and governance focused shareholder activism. Both forms of activism are supported by proxy advisors that favor some degree of change in board composition and tend to have fairly defined—some would say rigid—views of governance practices.

Shareholder Activism and Its Value

As fiduciaries acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, directors must make independent and objective judgments. While it is prudent for boards to understand and consider the range of shareholder concerns and views represented in the shareholder constituency, shareholder engagement has its limits: The board must make its own independent judgment and may not simply defer to the wishes of shareholders. While activist shareholders often bring a valuable perspective, they may press for changes to suit particular special interests or short-term goals that may not be in the company’s long-term interests.

Governance Activism

Shareholder pressure for greater rights and influence through advisory shareholder proposals are expected to continue in the 2015 proxy season. A study of trends from the 2014 proxy season in Fortune 250 companies by James R. Copland and Margaret M. O’Keefe, Proxy Monitor 2014: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism (available at www.proxymonitor.org), suggests that the focus of most shareholder proposal activity does not relate to concerns that are broadly held by the majority of shareholders:

  1. Shareholder support for shareholder proposals is down, with only four percent garnering majority support, down from seven percent in 2013.
  2. A small group of shareholders dominates the shareholder-proposal process. One-third of all shareholder proposals are sponsored by three persons and members of their families and another 28 percent of proposals are sponsored by investors with an avowed social, religious or public-policy focus.
  3. Forty-eight percent of 2014 proposals at Fortune 250 companies related to social or political concerns. However, only one out of these 136 proposals received majority support, and that solitary passing proposal was one that the board had supported.
  4. Institutional Shareholders Services Inc. (“ISS”) is far more likely to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals than the average investor is to support them.

Nonetheless, the universe of shareholder proposals included in corporate proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 has grown significantly over the years. In addition, the coercive power of advisory shareholder proposals has expanded as a result of the policy of proxy advisors to recommend that their clients vote against the re-election of directors who fail to implement advisory shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. Directors should carefully assess the reasons underlying shareholder efforts to use advisory proposals to influence the company’s strategic direction or otherwise change the board’s approach to matters such as CEO compensation and succession, risk management, governance structures and environmental and social issues. Shareholder viewpoints provide an important data set, but must be understood in the context of the corporation’s best interest rather than the single lens of one particular constituency.

….

__________________________________

*Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP.

Comment devenir administrateur de société de nos jours !


Plusieurs personnes très qualifiées me demandent comment procéder pour décrocher un poste d’administrateur de sociétés … rapidement.

Dans une période où les conseils d’administration ont des tailles de plus en plus restreintes ainsi que des exigences de plus en plus élevées, comment faire pour obtenir un poste, surtout si on n’a peu ou pas d’expérience comme CEO d’une entreprise ?

Je leur réponds qu’il doivent d’abord se concentrer sur un secteur d’activité dans lequel ils ont une solide expertise, bien saisir en quoi ils se démarquent (en revoyant leur CV) et comment leurs atouts peuvent contribuer à la valeur à l’organisation, comment faire appel à leurs réseaux de contacts, s’assurer de bien comprendre l’industrie et le modèle d’affaires de l’entreprise, faire connaître ses intérêts et ses compétence en gouvernance, notamment en communiquant avec le président du comité de gouvernance de l’entreprise convoitée, et, surtout … d’être patients !

Si vous n’avez pas suivi une formation en gouvernance, je vous encourage fortement à consulter les programmes du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS).

L’article qui suit présente une démarche de recherche d’un mandat d’administrateur en six étapes. L’article a été rédigé par Alexandra Reed Lajoux, directrice de la veille en gouvernance à la National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une brève introduction de l’article paru sur le blogue de Executive Career Insider, ainsi qu’une énumération des 6 éléments à considérer.

Je vous conseille de lire ce court article en vous rappelant qu’il est surtout destiné à un auditoire américain. Vous serez étonné de constater les similitudes avec la situation canadienne.

6 Steps to Becoming a Corporate Director This Year

 

Of all the career paths winding through the business world, few can match the prestige and fascination of corporate board service. The honor of being selected to guide the future of an enterprise, combined with the intellectual challenge of helping that enterprise succeed despite the odds, make directorship a strong magnet for ambition and a worthy goal for accomplishment.

Furthermore, the pay can be decent, judging from the NACD and Pearl Meyer & Partners director compensation studies. While directors do risk getting underpaid for the accordion-like hours they can be called upon to devote (typical pay is a flat retainer plus stock, but hours are as needed with no upper limit), it’s typically equivalent to CEO pay, if considered hour for hour. For example, a director can expect to work a good 250 hours for the CEO’s 2,500 and to receive nearly 10 percent of the CEO’s pay. In a public company that can provide marketable equity (typically half of pay), the sums can be significant—low six figures for the largest global companies.

Granted, directorship cannot be a first career. As explained in my previous post, boards offer only part time engagements and they typically seek candidates with track records. Yet directorship can be a fulfilling mid-career sideline, and a culminating vocation later in life—for those who retire from day to day work, but still have much to offer.

So, at any age or stage, how can you get on a board? Here are 6 steps, representing common wisdom and some of my own insights based on what I have heard from directors who have searched for – or who are seeking – that first board seat.

1. Recast your resume – and retune your mindset – for board service

2. Integrate the right keywords

3. Suit up and show up

4. Cast a wide net

5. Join NACD

6. Pace yourself

Cinq questions qu’un administrateur devrait considérer lors d’une décision d’octroi de contrat


Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un billet soumis par Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A,, gestionnaire de projet et membre de CA d’OBNL.

Son article rappelle les questions qu’un administrateur de sociétés doit se poser lorsqu’il est confronté à une décision d’octroi de contrat.

Bonne lecture !

Les 5 questions classiques

par

Pascale Lapointe

 

Quelles sont les cinq (5) questions usitées qu’un dirigeant ou un administrateur (selon les cas) devrait se poser avant de prendre une décision d’affaires. J’avais d’abord préparé ces questions pour moi, puis j’ai décidé d’en faire un billet pour publication sur le blogue de Jacques Grisé.

Je sais, la littérature d’affaires regorge de détails et d’analyses encore plus complets sur la prise de décision en situation de conflits d’intérêts potentiels. Cependant, ici,  je n’ai voulu aborder le sujet qu’en en faisant un sommaire et un court aide-mémoire.

Pascale Lapointe, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A.

Il n’en demeure pas moins que ces cinq questions classiques sont encore le meilleur moyen pour s’assurer d’agir avec la plus grande intégrité et la plus grande transparence possible.

Chaque membre d’un conseil d’administration doit se poser les questions suivantes avant de  prendre une décision relative à l’octroi d’un contrat majeur :

  1. Les règles d’attribution des contrats sont-elles claires et bien comprises au sein de l’organisation ? C’est le rôle du conseil de s’en assurer auprès de la direction ;
  2. Les règles ont-elles été respectées ? Y-a-t-il apparence de conflits d’intérêts ? En d’autres termes, peut-on déceler une quelconque apparence de favoritisme, d’amis impliqués, de relations d’affaires douteuses ou autres ;
  3. Y-a-t-il eu assez de transparence dans les règles d’attribution des contrats ? En d’autres termes, les soumissionnaires ont-ils reçus les mêmes informations et les règles ont-elles été suivies de façon juste et équitable ? Dans ce contexte, il est souhaitable d’exiger un minimum de soumissionnaires ;
  4. Les entreprises soumissionnaires et les partenaires possèdent-ils et appliquent-ils un code d’éthique à l’interne et dans leurs relations d’affaires ? Leur réputation en matière d’intégrité est-elle irréprochable ?
  5. Toutes les déclarations pertinentes à la prise de décision ont-elles été faites par la direction ? Ainsi, on s’assure que le gestionnaire qui fait la présentation au CA fait preuve d’abnégation et demeure le plus impartial possible en ce qui regarde l’intérêt et la mission de l’organisation.

En résumé, si,  comme administratrice, je devais défendre publiquement une décision d’octroi de contrat, aurais-je accès à l’ensemble des éléments vérifiables pour justifier ma décision ?

Malgré toutes ces précautions, la prise de décision se fait toujours avec une information incomplète et, en ce sens, elle comporte un risque. L’important pour l’administrateur est de démontrer qu’il a été vigilant et qu’il s’est assuré d’obtenir toute l’information pertinente.

_______________________________________

Pascale Lapointe*, ing., MBA, PMP, Adm.A, contribue au Conseil du Développement du Loisir Scientifique (Réseau CDLS-CLS – organisme responsable des Expo-Sciences Québec), ainsi qu’à la Maison des familles de Ville Saint-Laurent.

On peut consulter son profil sur LinkedIn ca.linkedin.com/pub/pascale-lapointe-mba-pmp/18/b66/b35

 

Que faire avec un membre de CA « toxique » ?


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un excellent article de Richard Leblanc* publié dans The Globe and Mail.

Dans cet article, Richard montre que la dynamique comportementale de l’équipe des administrateurs est souvent la clé du succès des entreprises. Souvent la composition de l’équipe est remarquable, mais si un seul membre est dysfonctionnel, « toxique » ou incompétent, il arrive que toute l’efficacité du conseil en souffre.

Dans ces cas, il faut s’assurer que le processus d’évaluation des administrateurs soit capable de déceler les maillons faibles du conseil et, surtout, d’agir résolument pour régler le problème.

Il revient au président du conseil, sur recommandation du comité de gouvernance, de prendre les décisions menant à la non-reconduction du mandat de l’administrateur qui nuit à la dynamique de groupe.

Il faut donc revoir la démarche d’évaluation des membres du CA, souvent avec une firme externe, afin de déceler les problèmes de dynamique d’équipe. À ce stade-ci, il faut noter que les processus de recrutement de nouveaux administrateurs ne font pas suffisamment de place aux critères de nature comportementale.

Également, lorsqu’il devient évident qu’un administrateur est « toxique » pour le travail d’équipe du conseil, le président doit prendre les devants et engager une démarche de correction. Mais plusieurs présidents de CA n’osent pas se compromettre !

Souvent le problème est connu, et reconnu, mais le président laisse porter, au détriment de l’efficacité du travail de groupe. Dans ce cas, c’est le poste de président qui devient en jeu puisque son rôle est de s’assurer que le CA fonctionne harmonieusement et avec respect, tout en favorisant la liberté d’expression.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article en question. Si vous avez des suggestions pour mettre un terme à ces comportements déviants, ou si vous avez des exemples à partager avec nos lecteurs, n’hésitez pas à commenter ce billet.

Bonne lecture !

Don’t let your board fail your company

An effective board is the last line of defense for shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. This small but mighty peer group is responsible for overseeing the management of an organization, so if one thing is flawed – if just one director’s behaviour is disruptive or toxic – it can be the difference between performance and non-performance throughout the entire organization. Poor dynamics have that kind of ripple effect, unfortunately.

A bad board member can derail your board of directors. (iStockphoto)
A bad board member can derail your board of directors. (iStockphoto)

 

As an external adviser and specialist in corporate governance and accountability, my work has allowed me to study and evaluate boards, investors and directors across all sectors, including health care.

I’ve never investigated a board failure where flawed dynamics was not a major contributor, which is why I know for a fact that great boards don’t just “happen.” They are carefully and critically designed to be functionally sound. They have to be. A board is just too important an entity to rely on crossed fingers and wishful thinking.

When it comes to toxic behaviours that can bring down a board, I’ve pretty much seen it all. Excessive power, over-reliance on one person, dominant managers, lack of integrity and trustworthiness, confidentiality breaches, lack of transparency and accountability, lack of meeting preparation, undermining board decisions, poor information flow management – these are all warning signs that need to be addressed immediately. But perhaps the biggest red flag is the dysfunctional director and the underperforming director.

I’ve seen dissention amongst the ranks on some of the most iconic boards in Canada. In one instance, there was a director who was so toxic that the board had been consumed by theatrics for nearly a year. When I spoke to the other directors, almost all of them wanted the bullying to stop, but no one had the courage to pull the trigger. Even the chair of the board was too weak to take action. Ultimately, my recommendation was to replace both of them in order to settle things down and get the board back on track.

People are often surprised to hear that the best thing you can do to begin to heal divisions and repair a broken board is to let someone go. But in many cases that’s the only way to start the mending process. It’s not easy to unwind chronic dysfunction on a board – it takes a strong chair or third-party supervision – but getting rid of the root cause is the best way to start. The key is handling the dismissal respectfully and diplomatically.

I once conducted a peer review for the board of an important and highly regulated company. If the board of this particular company makes a mistake, people can die, so it was critical for them to get it right. Every time.

During the review process, I noticed that one director rated another last on almost every single performance dimension. When questioned, the director proceeded to tell me, category by category, why he had rated his peer so poorly – even though others had given that same director exemplary ratings. It eventually became clear that he despised the director he had critiqued so harshly. There was simply no way to repair this enmity, and it had no place on this – or any – board. My recommendation was to remove the hostile director. And that’s exactly what happened.

Board members need to be proactive when they sense there is trouble brewing. The one regret directors repeatedly express is not speaking up and calling out toxic behaviours until it was too late. Letting it fester only makes the situation worse for everyone involved, especially the company.

But of course the best way to create a functional, healthy board is to avoid dysfunction from the start. Nominating committees need to spend more time at the front end recruiting directors, and on the back end retiring them. And they need to do it on the basis of expected and actual performance.

Unfortunately, most competency matrices don’t include behaviour, and all directors have “warts.” Nominating committees must do their due diligence, and that includes a proper competency matrix, the creation of long lists and short lists, interviews, background checks, and making sure to bring on directors who are not friends or known to current directors. A strong and experienced chair at the helm who can appreciate the value of a diverse board and make difficult decisions when necessary is another must-have.

An effective board doesn’t happen by accident. Spend time and effort designing yours by recruiting independent thinkers who can leave their egos at the door, ask the tough questions, give the right advice – and do it all with a smile. Let the notion of, “iron hand in a velvet glove,” be your yardstick as you create your dream team.

*Dr. Richard Leblanc (@DrRLeblanc) is an associate professor of law, governance and ethics at York University (@yorkuniversity) and principal of Boardexpert.com Inc

La contribution du comité d’audit à la stratégie | KPMG


Comment le comité d’audit contribue-t-il à la stratégie de l’entreprise ?

C’est le sujet abordé par Laurent Giguère, associé Audit chez KPMG, dans cet excellent article dont je vous propose la lecture.

Voici le questionnement qui a donné naissance à cet article :

Au cours de la dernière décennie, le comité d’audit a surtout mis l’accent sur la conformité, la gouvernance et diverses questions d’approbation. Toutefois, dans la plupart des cas, les comités d’audit d’aujourd’hui ont établi des cadres de surveillance rigoureux qui permettent de consacrer moins de temps à la surveillance. Les comités d’audit ont-ils ainsi l’occasion de se pencher sur de nouveaux domaines? Voilà la question qui se pose. Compte tenu de l’évolution du rôle du comité d’audit dans la surveillance des risques, y a-t-il des domaines nouveaux dans lesquels le comité d’audit peut améliorer la qualité de la surveillance?

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait de l’article qui traite des moyens utilisés pour obtenir la bonne information.

Je vous invite à lire ce court article.

Bonne lecture !

La contribution du comité d’audit à la stratégie | KPMG

L’efficacité stratégique du comité d’audit dépend, dans une certaine mesure, de sa capacité de bien comprendre les indicateurs clés de performance de l’organisation, de même que de la question de savoir si ces indicateurs respectent et appuient les objectifs stratégiques d’ensemble. Étant donné que le comité d’audit a récemment mis l’accent sur la surveillance de l’information financière, il pourrait ne pas s’être investi autant dans ce domaine qu’il ne l’aurait fait autrement.

La contribution du comité d’audit à la stratégie

Toutefois, le comité d’audit a maintenant la chance d’améliorer le « dialogue en matière de finances » entre le conseil d’administration et la direction concernant la façon dont les systèmes de gestion évaluent la performance. Les comités d’audit favorisent également cet objectif en déployant des efforts accrus pour que des experts opérationnels les aident à mieux comprendre l’entreprise elle-même et à déterminer les indicateurs clés de performance les plus efficaces.

Compte tenu de ces défis et de l’ampleur considérable des enjeux qui entourent le risque financier, les comités d’audit semblent être les seuls à être qualifiés pour discuter de certaines questions, notamment les suivantes :

  1. Quels sont les objectifs de performance quantifiés que nous devons évaluer?
  2. De quelle façon pouvons-nous les surveiller à l’avenir?
  3. Quels sont les contrôles en place?
  4. À quel point nos systèmes et nos contrôles sont-ils solides?
  5. Nos systèmes permettent-ils de mesurer ces indicateurs clés de la performance?
  6. Procédons-nous régulièrement à un examen des indicateurs clés de la performance afin de déterminer leur pertinence?
  7. Procédons-nous à un examen rétrospectif des résultats obtenus par rapport aux objectifs établis dans les plans sur trois ou cinq ans?
  8. Pouvons-nous arriver à obtenir une combinaison optimale d’expertise financière et opérationnelle afin de répondre aux préoccupations de façon globale?
  9. Devrions-nous faire appel à des experts externes afin d’élargir la discussion?
  10. Devrions-nous avoir recours aux connaissances opérationnelles des membres du conseil d’administration qui ne font pas partie du comité d’audit?

Top 10 des billets en gouvernance sur mon blogue | Année 2014


Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue en 2014.

Cette liste constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des dizaines de milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.

Les dix (10) articles les plus lus du Blogue en gouvernance ont fait l’objet de plus de 1 0 000 visites.

Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs ?

Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.

6f49ada2-22d7-453a-b86d-31dfd1b4ca77

Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets quotidiens) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.

Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé

Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 125 000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au 31 décembre 2014, il était fréquenté par plus de 5 000 visiteurs par mois. Depuis le début, j’ai œuvré à la publication de 1 097 billets.

En 2015, on estime qu’environ 5 500 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser qu’environ 70 000 personnes visiteront le site du blogue en 2015. 

On  note que 44 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de LinkedIn et 44 % par différents engins de recherche. Les autres réseaux sociaux (Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr) se partagent 13 % des références.

Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :

  1. Canada (64 %)
  2. France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
  3. Magreb (Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie) (5 %)
  4. Autres pays de l’Union Européenne (2 %)
  5. États-Unis (2 %)
  6. Autres pays de provenance (7 %)

En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog (MiB Awards) : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix (10) finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance.

Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.

Bonne lecture !

Top 10 de l’année 2014 du blogue en gouvernance de www.jacquesgrisegouvernance.com

1.       Guides de gouvernance à l’intention des OBNL : Questions et réponses
2.       Sur quoi les organisations doivent-elles d’abord travailler ? | Sur la stratégie ou sur la culture*
3.       Dix (10) activités que les conseils d’administration devraient éviter de faire !
4.       Douze (12) tendances à surveiller en gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
5.       Comportements néfastes liés au narcissisme de certains PCD (CEO)
6.       LE RÔLE DU PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL D’ADMINISTRATION (PCA) | LE CAS DES CÉGEP
7.       On vous offre de siéger sur un C.A. | Posez les bonnes questions avant d’accepter ! **
8.       Sept leçons apprises en matière de communications de crise
9.       Pourquoi les entreprises choisissent le Delaware pour s’incorporer ?
10.     Document de KPMG sur les bonnes pratiques de constitution d’un Board | The Directors Toolkit

Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) | Janvier 2015


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, le Bulletin du Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS) du mois de Janvier 2015.

Le programme de certification universitaire en gouvernance de sociétés est le seul programme universitaire offert au Québec. Il s’adresse aux administrateurs siégeant à un conseil d’administration et disposant d’une expérience pertinente.

Les administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC) sont regroupés dans la Banque des Administrateurs de sociétés certifiés (ASC), un outil de recherche en ligne mis au point par le Collège, afin de faciliter le recrutement d’administrateurs sur les conseils d’administration.

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés

Bulletin du Collège des administraters de sociétés (CAS) | Janvier 2015

GRANDE CONFÉRENCE EN GOUVERNANCE DE SOCIÉTÉS 

La Grande conférence annuelle en gouvernance de sociétés du Collège aura lieu le mardi 27 janvier prochain, de 17 h à 21 h, au Parquet du Centre CDP Capital à Montréal. Cet événement affiche complet avec plus de 200 participants. M. Jean-René Halde

M. Jean-René Halde, président et chef de la direction de la Banque de développement du Canada, agira à titre de conférencier lors de cette soirée qui marquera le lancement des activités soulignant le 10e anniversaire du Collège. Cet événement sera aussi l’occasion de rendre hommage aux partenaires du Collège engagés depuis sa création. Surveillez le bulletin électronique du Collège de février qui reviendra sur cette soirée.

Le Collège offrira gracieusement le service d’autocar faisant l’aller-retour à partir du campus de l’Université Laval..

Détails de l’événement [+] – COMPLET

 

FORMATIONS DU CAS ET ÉVÉNEMENTS DES PARTENAIRES

Gouvernance des PME | 24 et 25 février 2015, à Montréal

Gouvernance des services financiers | 21 et 22 avril 2015, à Montréal

Gouvernance des OBNL | 24 et 25 avril 2015, à Québec

Gouvernance et leadership à la présidence | 19 et 20 mai 2015, à Montréal

Certification – Module 1 : Les rôles et responsabilités des administrateurs | 17, 18 et 19 septembre 2015, à Québec |  5. 6 et 7 novembre 2015, à Montréal

Forum montréalais sur la métropole présenté par la CRÉ de Montréal | 29 janvier 2015, à Montréal

Un C.A. à l’heure du thé pour administratrices présenté par la Chambre de commerce et d’industrie de Québec | 3 février 2015, à Québec

Forum OBNL « Les grands défis – vision et perspectives » présenté par l’IAS, section du Québec | 4 février 2015, à Montréal

Congrès de l’Ordre des ADMA sur les changements sociaux et organisationnels | 5 et 6 février 2015, à Montréal

Petits-déjeuners conférences du Cercle des ASC sur le « Comité de gouvernance : les conditions gagnantes » | 11 février 2015, à Montréal | 25 février 2015, à Québec

Colloque sur les meilleures pratiques et tendances en gestion des risques présenté par l’Ordre des comptables professionnels agréés du Québec | 12 février 2015, à Montréal

NOMINATIONS ET DISTINCTIONS ASC

Serge Riendeau, ASC, nommé personnalité du monde agricole de l’année au Gala Cérès

Éric Thibault, ASC | Comité Entraide

Annie Tremblay, ASC | Ordre des ergothérapeutes du Québec

Pierre Nelis, ASC | CM Labs

Diane Delisle, ASC | Agence du revenu du Québec

André Grondines, ASC | Roche, Groupe conseil

Sophie Bégin, ASC | Société municipale d’habitation Champlain et Office municipal d’habitation de Québec

Monique Landry, ASC | Université du Québec

Annie Tremblay, ASC | Université du Québec

Stephan Robitaille, ASC | Université du Québec

CAPSULES D’EXPERTS EN GOUVERNANCE 

Série 2 L’administrateur d’un OBNL, par Karine Chênevert [+]

L’administrateur d’un OBNL
par Karine Chenevert

Série 3 Les médias sociaux, par Sylvain Lafrance [+]

Les médias sociaux
par Sylvain Lafrance

BOÎTE À OUTILS DES ADMINISTRATEURS 

Nouvelle référence mensuelle en gouvernance : Projet de loi 26 

Mémoire de l’Institut des administrateurs de sociétés section du Québec relatif au régime de responsabilité des administrateurs du projet de loi 26 intitulé Loi visant principalement la récupération de sommes obtenues à la suite de fraudes ou de manœuvres dolosives dans le cadre de contrats publics.

Publication en gouvernance sur le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé et sur les réseaux sociaux

En ce début d’année 2015, le blogueur Jacques Grisé, collaborateur au Collège, attire votre attention sur ses 10 billets les plus populaires de l’année 2014, ayant attiré plus de 10 000 visites, et rassemblant des articles et documents incontournables du monde de la gouvernance. Consultez le top 10 de l’année 2014 du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé.

En 2014, le blogue de Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories au concours canadien Made in Blog (MiB Awards) : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le Collège tient à féliciter M. Grisé pour sa nomination parmi les 10 finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune des catégories, le seul blogue en gouvernance. Suivez le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé pour être au fait des publications les plus pertinentes dans le domaine.

Dans le même ordre d’idées, le Collège vous invite à rejoindre le groupe LinkedIn Administrateurs de sociétés – Gouvernance voué aux discussions et échanges sur le thème de la gouvernance et rassemblant une communauté de plus de 1120 administrateurs et gestionnaires.

Bonne lecture !

____________________________________________

Collège des administrateurs de sociétés (CAS)

Faculté des sciences de l’administration Pavillon Palasis-Prince

2325, rue de la Terrasse, Université Laval Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

418 656-2630; 418 656-2624

info@cas.ulaval.ca

 

Les effets dévastateurs des « Hedge Funds » | Recueil des arguments évoqués


Voici le plus récent mémo de Martin Lipton*, associé fondateur de la firme Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, spécialisée dans les affaires de fusions et acquisition, qui présente une longue liste d’événements et de publications montrant les effets dévastateurs des attaques des fonds activistes sur l’actionnariat, les autres parties prenantes et l’économie en général.

L’auteur avance que les trois dernières années ont vu un accroissement de l’intensité des actions menées par les « Hedge Funds ».

Si l’évolution de ce débat vous intéresse et que vous croyez que les activistes de tout acabit nuisent à la saine gouvernance des grandes sociétés, vous serez certainement comblés par les arguments invoqués par une multitude d’experts, de firmes spécialisées, d’universitaires, d’autorités règlementaires, etc.

Voici l’introduction à ce court article paru hier sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.

Vos commentaires sont appréciés. Bonne lecture !

The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds

Again in 2014, as in the two previous years, there has been an increase in the number and intensity of attacks by activist hedge funds. Indeed, 2014 could well be called the “year of the wolf pack.”

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With the increase in activist hedge fund attacks, particularly those aimed at achieving an immediate increase in the market value of the target by dismembering or overleveraging, there is a growing recognition of the adverse effect of these attacks on shareholders, employees, communities and the economy.

Noted below are the most significant 2014 developments holding out a promise of turning the tide against activism and its proponents, including those in academia.

___________________________________________

*Martin Lipton* is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy.

Le constat de l’incompétence de plusieurs administrateurs | HBR


Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un récent article, paru dans Harvard Business Review, sous la plume de Dominic Barton* et Mark Wiseman*, qui traite d’un sujet assez brûlant : l’incompétence de plusieurs conseils d’administration.

Les auteurs font le constat que, malgré les nombreuses réformes règlementaires effectuées depuis Enron, plusieurs « Boards » sont dysfonctionnels, sinon carrément incompétents !

En effet, une étude de McKinsey montre que seulement 22 % des administrateurs comprennent comment leur firme crée de la valeur; uniquement 16 % des administrateurs comprennent vraiment la dynamique de l’industrie dans laquelle leur société œuvre.

L’article avance même que l’industrie de l’activisme existe parce que les « Boards » sont inadéquatement équipés pour répondre aux intérêts des actionnaires !

Je vous invite à lire cet article provocateur. Voici un extrait de l’introduction. Qu’en pensez-vous ?

Bonne lecture !

Where Boards Fall Short

Boards aren’t working. It’s been more than a decade since the first wave of post-Enron regulatory reforms, and despite a host of guidelines from independent watchdogs such as the International Corporate Governance Network, most boards aren’t delivering on their core mission: providing strong oversight and strategic support for management’s efforts to create long-term value. This isn’t just our opinion. Directors also believe boards are falling short, our research suggests.

435A mere 34% of the 772 directors surveyed by McKinsey in 2013 agreed that the boards on which they served fully comprehended their companies’ strategies. Only 22% said their boards were completely aware of how their firms created value, and just 16% claimed that their boards had a strong understanding of the dynamics of their firms’ industries.

More recently, in March 2014, McKinsey and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) asked 604 C-suite executives and directors around the world which source of pressure was most responsible for their organizations’ overemphasis on short-term financial results and underemphasis on long-term value creation. The most frequent response, cited by 47% of those surveyed, was the company’s board. An even higher percentage (74%) of the 47 respondents who identified themselves as sitting directors on public company boards pointed the finger at themselves.

_________________________________

*Dominic Barton is the global managing director of McKinsey & Company and the author of “Capitalism for the Long Term.”

*Mark Wiseman is the president and CEO of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board.

Mieux travailler avec les CA dans le futur


Nous assistons à un intérêt accru des problématiques de gouvernance depuis les vingt dernières années.

En fait, au cours de ma carrière universitaire comme professeur de management, les notions de gouvernance étaient très peu abordées, sinon carrément ignorées.

Pourquoi ? Parce que l’on enseignait le management, c’est-à-dire la gestion, surtout la gestion stratégique, qui relevait de la haute direction; les effets de la gouvernance n’étaient perçues qu’à travers les activités de conformité des CA, de manière plutôt traditionnelle et figée; la direction des entreprises ne semblait imputable qu’envers les actionnaires, pas envers les parties prenantes ! Et les actionnaires étaient loin …

Le PDG (PCD) est nommé par le conseil d’administration, élu annuellement lors de l’assemblée des actionnaires. Celle-ci est très bien organisée car le PDG veille au grain ! 

Nos organisations étaient laissées au bon vouloir des hauts gestionnaires, sans pratiquement aucune intervention du CA.

Les choses ont changées dramatiquement depuis que les autorités règlementaires ont réaffirmé le rôle souverain des administrateurs et que les experts de la gouvernance ont mis en place des programmes de formation renouvelés et adaptés.

L’article ci-dessous, publié sur le blogue de David Doughty* traite des défis qui attendent les coaches, les mentors et les consultants appelés à travailler avec les conseils d’administration du futur.

Working with the board in the 21st century

 working with the board

Qu’est-ce que l’investissement socialement responsable ?


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, une référence à un article publié par Merryn Somerset Webb* dans le Financial Times qui montre qu’il n’est pas facile de saisir la notion d’investissement dans une entreprise socialement responsable. 

Comment identifier des organisations qui sont véritablement socialement responsables, qui gèrent en fonction du long terme, et qui procurent des biens et services utiles à la société ?

Quelle est votre définition d’un fond d’investissement constitué d’entreprises socialement responsables ?

Rien n’est évident dans ce domaine…

L’auteur nous présente son point de vue sur le sujet. Bonne lecture !

So what exactly is social enterprise investing ?

I went to speak at an event on social enterprise last week for a very nice organisation called LaunchMe. My brief was pretty simple. I was to speak for 10-15 minutes on the nature of social enterprise and then I was to interview TV celebrity Carol Smillie about her newish company Diary Dolls, which sells rather marvellous pants made at a manufacturing plant in Scotland that is a social enterprise.

Now what could be easier than that? Nothing – as long as you know what a social enterprise is. When I sat down to think about the matter, I realised I did not. Luckily, I have a pretty good contacts book. What, I asked them, is a social enterprise? Answers came there plenty, definitive answers came there none. Beyond the idea that it was a business – or sort of a business – that in some way did good, no one could really answer the question.

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Can a social enterprise make a profit? Even at the dinner itself, one person told me yes and one person told me no. If it makes a profit does it have to give some away? Or is it not the profit but the nature of the business that makes it a social enterprise? If you employ homeless people but pay them the minimum wage and keep the profits in their entirety, are you a social enterprise? Or do you have to overpay the staff and donate to Shelter too? You get the idea. This is very tricky ground.

Everyone wants capitalism to make more people better off than not, for companies to act in the interest of society as a whole as well as for their shareholders. You’ve read this hundreds of times. But what is good and what is bad? I don’t often write about ethical funds on the basis that the lines are all far too blurred. If you are going to invest with ethics in mind you have to choose someone’s ethics to work with.

Take defence companies. They might be bad when their products are used in wars of which you disapprove – but what if you were to need defending very badly? Would you withhold your capital then? And what of tobacco companies? I think they are bad. But what if paying my grandmother’s care home fees rested on the need for high dividends sustainable over the medium term? I wonder if I might be budged from my position then. And what about companies that aren’t explicitly out to do good, but do it along the way?

I went to meet Will Smith, manager of the City Natural Resources High Yield Trust earlier in the week. His fund holds all sorts of companies I would imagine ethical investors wouldn’t fancy much. But he also told me about a recent investment in a small UK-listed firm called Plant Impact, which develops products that help to enhance the eventual yield from seeds. Higher yields mean a greater supply of food to the market, lower prices and then, presumably, fewer hungry people. Does that make Plant Impact a social impact business? It might even make City Natural Resources HYT a partial impact fund.

Moving away from the absolutely bad or not, there are companies that you could argue should get marks for improvement. If big oil invests a lot in renewable energy does that make them bad for being involved in fossil fuels – or good for pouring capital the rest of us don’t have into a greener future? Then there is Coca-Cola. Sure, it is peddling poison to the masses. But it has also been spending huge amounts of time and effort on useful things such as cutting its water usage (vital in much of the world these days). That’s a social good. Sort of.

You can see the problem. Once you start down the path of trying to be a morally superior investor, you are always a hypocrite– Merryn Somerset Webb

If you are going to choose ethics you might want to take religious fuzziness into account. If Islamic finance forbids interest payments, but there are very few listed companies that have no debt and do not pay or receive interest, is an Islamic finance compliant equity fund an oxymoron? Or not?

You can see the problem. Once you start down the path of trying to be a morally superior investor, you are always a hypocrite. Which is why you don’t read about this stuff much in this column.

However, there is a problem with my persistent refusal to engage with this attempt to make capitalism friendlier. It leaves me with a nagging sense that I could do a little better. I am, for example, a long-term fan of passive investing. But as First State’s David Gait pointed out to me this week, if we simply throw our money into the market to be invested in the stocks of every company in any index we are obviously neglecting our duty to society. There are some genuinely awful companies out there and if we don’t discriminate between the good and the bad how can we hope to encourage the bad to be better?

Mr Gait runs a group of what First State calls sustainability funds. The approach in these is not about red lines on good and bad, but about investing in companies that have the good governance, social and environmental polices in place to keep operating and paying good dividends to shareholders for decades to come. He wouldn’t buy Coca-Cola or tobacco companies, not because they are evil but because consumer habits (and legislation) are likely to mean their businesses aren’t sustainable in their current forms over the long term.

That seems entirely reasonable. But think about it a bit and you will see that it brings us right back to our usual mantra on investing: buy long-term growth at the right price.

Mr Gait phrases it well and First State practises what it preaches with exceptional skill, but what they are peddling is simply what should be recognised by everyone as good practice, long-term investing with a happy label. Nothing wrong with that. But it does suggest that investing in a way that is right for society is probably a matter of finding a good long-term, long-only fund run by an intelligent and trustworthy manager.

If he really is investing for the long term he will be automatically investing in sustainability. Mr Gait’s Worldwise Sustainability Fund is as good a place to start as any. The only caveat? I think it might be part of my own duty to society to point out that almost all stocks and markets are overvalued at the moment, so whatever you buy comes with more risk than usual.

______________________________________________

*Merryn Somerset Webb is editor-in-chief of MoneyWeek.

Peut-on évaluer la valeur d’une organisation en se fiant uniquement au prix de ses actions ?


Voici un article très intéressant qui montre qu’on ne peut pas évaluer une entreprise uniquement en prenant en compte la valeur de ses actions, au moment présent.

Cet article publié par John Rekenthaler*, et paru sur le site de Morningstar.com, montre que l’actionnaire n’est pas le seul maître à bord et que les dirigeants doivent considérer plusieurs autres parties prenantes dans l’établissement de la valeur d’une organisation. La société civile doit aussi se rallier à cette idée.

Les arguments développés dans cet article indiquent que la contre-attaque des tenants de la bonne gouvernance est en marche … et qu’ils auront probablement gain de cause !

Je vous invite à lire l’extrait ci-dessous et à consulter l’article pour plus de détails.

Qu’en pensez-vous ? Bonne lecture !

The Attack on Shareholder Value

The Markets Say …

Another way of viewing the matter is to compare the results of the U.S. stock market with those of the major European marketplaces. As previously mentioned, shareholder-value theory has been most influential in the U.S., somewhat less so in the United Kingdom, and largely ignored in continental Europe. Can this pattern be seen in the 30-year market returns? Apparently not…

 Over the past two years, the barrage has intensified. Both The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times have published articles criticizing shareholder value, the Times on multiple occasions. The discussion has gone thoroughly mainstream.

It also is making its way into money-management circles–an audience that historically has been among the strongest supporters of shareholder value. Earlier this month, James Montier of GMO published a white paper calling shareholder value “the world’s dumbest idea. » He assembles several charts in support of his contention that the practice damages the long term by overemphasizing the short term. Montier’s recommendation is the same as Stout’s: acknowledging that companies have multiple constituencies.

Summary

Two questions: Will the backlash strengthen and, if so, what might that mean for investors?

For the first question, a tentative yes. The current orthodoxy has been in place for several decades. While it has not been proved wrong, neither has it made a convincing case for itself. Yes, many particularly slow-growing and asset-rich companies have been transformed through the notion of shareholder value–often with excellent benefits for stock owners (although not necessarily for those companies’ employees). But it’s not clear that the typical firm has fared better by having its managers constantly measured by stock-market returns. Thus, the questions will continue.

As for the second question, I suspect the answer is « not much in aggregate. » Some companies likely will perform less well, as their managements relax when not having their feet held to the fire. Others likely will meet Montier’s expectations by improving their prospects through increased investment, as managements will be willing to take more chances on long-term investments. Overall, then, I would expect that a change in the shareholder-value mind-set would not much affect U.S. stock-market averages.

It is possible, however, that it might improve the prospects of active mutual fund managers. If corporate managers are afforded more freedom to reward (and hire) employees, increase capital investment, and/or purchase more businesses, then they have more rope with which to either create something of value or hang themselves. Perhaps the astute fund manager will be able to distinguish between the bad and good corporate managements.

Perhaps. It’s only a wink of hope, but after the annus horribilis for active managers that was 2014, a wink is as good as a nod.

_____________________________________

*John Rekenthaler has been researching the fund industry since 1988. He is now a columnist for Morningstar.com and a member of Morningstar’s investment research department.

Une revue du blogue en 2014


Voici le rapport annuel du blogue préparé par The WordPress.com

Bonne lecture. Bonne année 2015 !

Voici un extrait du rapport annuel.

The concert hall at the Sydney Opera House holds 2,700 people.

This blog was viewed about 51,000 times in 2014.

If it were a concert at Sydney Opera House, it would take about 19 sold-out performances for that many people to see it.

Cliquez ici pour voir le rapport complet

Le cas du transfert de l’entreprise familiale Heineken


Aujourd’hui, je partage avec vous une belle histoire de succession d’une entreprise familiale mondialement connue : Heineken.

Ce cas d’entreprise m’a été proposé par Paul Michaud, un administrateur de sociétés certifié (ASC), une personne expérimentée dans les situations de transferts d’entreprises familiales.

Comme Paul le mentionne : « C’est un cas intéressant ! Le bonhomme est un hybride entre un entrepreneur et un CEO, la fille entre la mère-au-foyer et CEO ».

Je vous invite donc à lire ce cas de relève d’entreprise familiale publié par Patricia Sellers dans Fortune.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, quelques certaines conclusions tirées du cas. C’est une belle lecture du temps des Fêtes !

 

Heineken’s Charlene de Carvalho: A self-made heiress

 

For anyone who oversees a family business, passing it on to the next generation is the ultimate challenge of leadership. “If we get that wrong, we’ve wasted our energy on all that we’ve built,” says Michel de Carvalho, the investment banker husband of Charlene Heineken.

heineken, de Carvalho family
The de Carvalho family (from left): Alexander, Michel, Charlene, Louisa, Charles, Sophie, and Isabel

Heineken has a stock market value of $44 billion, and Charlene aims to pass on her 25% ownership stake and control of the voting shares more prudently than her father, Freddy Heineken, did to her. So she and Michel have been diligently studying the best practices of passing on a family business. No matter the size of a dynasty, certain basic rules apply.

CHOOSE ONE.

Other billionaire owners of family businesses have advised the de Carvalhos, regardless of how they divvy up the wealth, to select one of their five children to take control of the company. “But Charlene and I are not yet convinced that we could not have an odd number, perhaps three,” admits Michel, noting that ownership may be a lonely job for one heir. “Had Charlene not been married to someone who has a strong interest in the business, it would have been a terrible burden.”

TEST THE CHILDREN.

Don’t trap them,” says Byron Trott, a former Goldman Sachs banker whose merchant bank, BDT & Co., invests in and advises closely held companies. “Allow them to find their passion.” Trott admires the way the de Carvalhos are getting their five children to define their interests, whether philanthropic, arts-related, or corporate. Meanwhile, they’re preparing eldest son Alexander, who works in private equity, to inherit control of Heineken. “He’s on the board. He’s working in the financial industry,” notes Trott. “He understands the rigor of opting in.”

PICK STRONG ADVISERS.

Freddy Heineken stocked his board with yes men, which weakened the company before -Charlene inherited control in 2002. Charlene and Michel’s advice to Alexander or whoever among their children eventually takes control: “Surround yourself with the best possible people who are not yes men and sycophants. You want people who express doubt.”

HOLD ON.

Family control of a business protects management from “the short-term whims of Wall Street,” enabling it to focus on long-term growth, says Trott. “These companies tend to outperform the market over long periods of time.” Trott advises the de Carvalhos: “Keep doing what you’re doing, because you’re doing it very well.” —P.S.

Quelles sont les qualités managériales recherchées par les C.A. | Entrevue avec le PCD de Korn/Ferry


Voici un article qui met en exergue les qualités que les conseils d’administration veulent voir chez les futurs membres de la haute direction.

L’article, écrit par Lauren Weber dans les pages du The Wall Street Journal, relate un extrait de l’entrevue avec Gary Burnison, PCD de Korn/Ferry International, à propos de la recherche de talents en management à l’échelle internationale.

Le marché de la recherche des meilleurs talents de gestionnaires est en pleine expansion; il représente un marché d’environ 20 Milliards.

Toutes les grandes firmes font affaires avec des entreprises spécialisées dans la recherche des meilleurs talents, dans l’évaluation de ces derniers ainsi que dans leur rétention. De grandes firmes comme Korn/Ferry International possèdent des banques de données très à jour sur les carrières des hauts dirigeants ainsi que des outils de recherche à la fine pointe.

On est donc intéressé à connaître le point de vue du président et chef de la direction de la plus grande entreprise (1 Milliard par année) sur la croissance du marché et sur les qualités des candidatures recherchées.

On y apprend que les C.A. sont préoccupés par la plus grande diversité possible, par des candidats qui sont constamment en processus d’apprentissage, qui possèdent plusieurs réseaux d’affaires, qui savent bien s’entourer et qui ont fait leurs preuves dans des situations de gestion similaires. Le partenaire stratégique du PCD doit être le V-P Ressources humaines … et non le V-P Finance.

Je vous invite à lire l’extrait ci-dessous. Bonne lecture !

Korn/Ferry’s CEO: What Boards Want in Exécutives

 

WSJ: Your executive-search business was up in the first quarter by 9%. Are companies investing in growth, or are they mostly replacing people who leave?

Mr. Burnison: Industries like health care, technology and energy are going through massive change, and it’s going to continue for the foreseeable future. That creates a need for new positions, whether it’s about delivering health care remotely or finding new ways to tap people instantaneously through social media. Those needs didn’t exist a decade ago.

IMG_20141211_183948

WSJ: Executive search seems like an old-fashioned, Rolodex business. Are LinkedIn and other social-networking tools going to make it obsolete?

Mr. Burnison: CEOs are in this mad fight for growth and relevancy, so they’re paying us not for finding people, but for finding out who people are. You can go lots of places to find people. But you’re going to want somebody to answer, “Okay, but what is this person really like? What do others really say about them?”

WSJ: How do you answer those questions?

Mr. Burnison: For the boardroom or the C-suite, the technical competencies are a starting point. What we’ve seen through our research is that the No. 1 predictor of executive success is learning agility. So we want to get a real line of sight into a person’s thinking style and leadership style. Right now, you’re seeing me how I want you to see me. What you really want to know is “How does Gary make decisions under pressure?”

WSJ: What is learning agility?

Mr. Burnison: It comes down to people’s willingness to grow, to learn, to have insatiable curiosity. Think about the levers of growth that a CEO has. You can consolidate, or tap [new markets], or innovate. When it comes down to the last two, particularly innovation, you want a workforce that is incredibly curious.

WSJ: What are companies getting wrong today about managing their employees?

Mr. Burnison: There’s this gap between what [executives] say and how they invest in people’s careers. They spend an enormous amount on development and performance management, but it’s not well spent.

WSJ: Where are they investing poorly in talent?

Mr. Burnison: They should be asking, how do you develop people in their careers? How do you extend the life of an employee? This is not an environment where you work for an organization for 20 years. But if you can extend it from three years to six years; that has enormous impact. [Turnover] is a huge hidden cost in a profit-and-loss statement that nobody ever focuses on. If there was a line item that showed that, I guarantee you’d have the attention of a CEO.

WSJ: Why aren’t CEOs focused on turnover?

Mr. Burnison: A CEO only has an average tenure today of five years. You have 20 quarters to show that you have a winning team. There is a trade-off between knowing in your heart that you’ve got to empower people, you’ve got to develop them. But then there’s the other side, that says, “Oh, my gosh. I’ve got to win this next game.”

WSJ: How should leaders look beyond the short-term horizon?

Mr. Burnison: The strategic partner to the CEO should be the CHRO [chief human-resources officer] in almost any organization. It shouldn’t be the CFO. The person that is responsible for people should be the biggest lever that a CEO can pull. Too often, it’s not.

WSJ: You’ve been CEO for seven years. Is the clock ticking?

Mr. Burnison: We’re all by definition “on the clock.” However, that ticking clock should never impede the journey. I am having a lot of fun and there is still an enormous amount of work to be done.

WSJ: You’re pushing to create more management products for companies. Why, and what are they?

Mr. Burnison: People are hard to scale. [Products are] very easy to scale. It’s going to be based on predictors of success. By culture, by industry, by function, around the world. It could be a program for how we assess and develop people. It could be licensing a piece of content around onboarding or hiring. Candidates could take an online assessment. You would get feedback and you could license our interviewing technology to say, “With this person, you may want to probe this area and this area when you’re interviewing them.”

WSJ: What do your search clients ask for most often?

Mr. Burnison: The No. 1 request we get in the search business is diversity. Diversity in thought. Diversity in backgrounds. Diversity, yes, in gender. Diversity yes, in race. Diversity, yes in terms of cultural upbringing. That’s got serious legs.

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015


En cette veille de Noël, voici un article de Kerry E. Berchem*, paru aujourd’hui dans le Harvard Law School Forum, qui présente une liste détaillée des 10 plus importantes préoccupations des conseils d’administration en 2015.

Cet excellent article devrait intéresser tous les membres de C.A., notamment le président du conseil et les présidents des comités du conseil. Même si l’article peut vous paraître assez dense, je crois qu’il fait vraiment le tour de la question.

Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, les sujets chauds à considérer par les C.A. en 2015.

Bonne lecture !

Les 10 plus importantes préoccupations des C.A. en 2015

1. Oversee strategic planning in the face of uneven economic growth and rising geopolitical tensions

2. Oversee cybersecurity as hackers seek to infiltrate even the most sophisticated information security systemsIMG_20141210_193400

3. Assess the impact of advances in technology and big data on the company’s business plans

4. Cultivate shareholder relations and assess company vulnerabilities as activist investors target more companies

5. Consider the impact of M&A opportunities

6. Oversee risk management as newer and more complex risks emerge

7. Ensure appropriate board composition in light of increasing focus on diversity, director tenure and board size

8. Explore new trends in reducing corporate health care costs

9. Set appropriate executive compensation

10. Ensure the company has a robust compliance program as the SEC steps up its enforcement efforts and whistleblowers earn huge bounties.

…….

In light of these developments, it is critical for companies to have comprehensive and effective compliance programs in place, including a transparent process for internal investigations. Companies should also review and update as necessary their anti-retaliation policies and procedures and make sure employees and executives at every level are sufficiently trained in this area.

The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

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* Kerry E. Berchem, associé et co-responsable des pratiques de gouvernance de la firme Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP.

Facteurs qui conditionnent les relations entre un C.A. et sa direction, notamment son PCD


Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait d’un excellent article paru sur le site de Russell Reynolds Associates (www.russellreynolds.com), une firme spécialisée dans la recherche de cadres supérieurs à l’échelle internationale.

On a souvent abordé l’importance de la recherche de nouveaux administrateurs dans ces pages, mais ici nous attirons votre attention sur les facteurs qui conditionnent les relations entre le conseil et le PCD.

Les auteurs ont identifié 25 éléments essentiels sur lesquels se fondent une solide relation entre le CA et la haute direction. Ces facteurs ont été regroupés en quatre catégories de responsabilités :

1. Les responsabilités relationnelles du président du conseil d’administration (PCA);

2. Les responsabilités relationnelles du président et chef de la direction (PCD);

3. Les responsabilités relationnelles des administrateurs;

4. Les responsabilités relationnelles partagées.

Bonne lecture !

Essential Elements of an Effective CEO-Board Relationship

Essential Elements of an Effective CEO-Board Relationship builds on the ongoing work of our global CEO and Board Services practice in assessing critical board composition, governance and performance issues. This discussion is meant to help boards led by non-executive chairmen understand the defining activities and attributes of the best CEO-board relationships— relationships that consistently contribute to organizational performance and superior results.

Our goal is twofold: To provide boards and CEOs with a clear understanding of the essential elements of an effective CEO-board relationship and to enable boards and CEOs to both assess and improve their current performance in delivering against each of these relationship attributes. We have identified 25 essential elements of an effective CEO-board relationship, each with an actionable defining standard. We hope these prove useful in assessing the health and quality of the relationship dynamics in your firm.

……

Conclusion

We developed the framework for Essential Elements of an Effective CEO-Board Relationship with the input of sitting CEOs, chairmen and directors from a range of industry sectors and regions to provide guidance and structure for boards as they assess the clarity of their roles and the effectiveness of their relationships across the board as a whole. The 25 essential activities and attributes identified here can serve as a diagnostic to help those involved in the process rate the importance of each role’s responsibilities, as well as determine how effective individuals currently in these roles are delivering against those responsibilities.

Our Global CEO and Board Services practice has an ongoing commitment to investigate critical corporate governance and board performance issues and to share our findings—with the aim of promoting discussion and adoption of best practices in board oversight.

Le secteur des OBNL est-il dysfonctionnel sur le plan de la gouvernance | Mythes et réalités ?


Le Dr Eugene Fram a récemment publié un article pertinent qui fait l’apologie des OBNL, lesquelles doivent accomplir leurs missions en dépit de conditions sous-optimales.

L’article expose une série de caractéristiques des OBNL qui, trop souvent, contribuent à sous-estimer leur œuvre et qui teintent les perceptions du public envers celles-ci.

Parmi les particularités inhérentes à plusieurs OBNL, on retrouve souvent des éléments qui servent à justifier des lacunes de gouvernance; ces indices de dysfonction influent sur la perception des donateurs éventuels :

La plupart des organisations sont de très petites tailles;

Le défi de la gestion des bénévoles est très grand;

Les locaux et les équipements sont souvent peu attrayants;

Les relations entre le CA et la direction sont perçues comme immatures;

Les parties prenantes, notamment les donateurs, sont souvent mal informés de la distribution aux bénéficiaires, contribuant ainsi à créer l’impression qu’ils sont à la merci de la direction;

Les relations avec le CA sont souvent inhabituelles … en ce sens que les administrateurs ont tendance à s’immiscer régulièrement dans les activités des gestionnaires.

L’article tente de décrire ce qui peut être fait pour contrer ces perceptions.

Voici un extrait de l’article. Bonne lecture !

Dysfunction in the Nonprofit Sector—Reality or Myth ?

IMG_20141210_153507
Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum 1071 Fifth Avenue (at 89th Street) New York, NY

Judging from the vast literature on dysfunctional nonprofit boards and organizations (my own posts included!) one might conclude that the majority of nonprofits are struggling, incompetent and/or in crisis. I argue that this is not the case. Decades of experience lead me to believe that nonprofits have the same functional variables as profit making organizations—dysfunctional at times like Target or GM; efficient like Apple or Whole Foods; adaptable like Del Monte and Cisco. Everybody doesn’t get it right all the time.

Perceptions become reality to those who are quick to embrace popular labels such as the overused term, “dysfunctional.” Obviously, in the case of nonprofits, such perceptions are harmful. Once evaluated in this way the stigma persists and can seriously reduce the level of support that is so critical to the work of these organizations.

What characteristics color these perceptions?

• Small Organizations: About one-third of the charitable nonprofits have gross receipts under $25,000 a year. At that level the vast majority can’t employ more than one full-time person, overworking those with job responsibilities that can’t be delegated. While small organization can’t do much to improve the misperceptions about nonprofit dysfunctions, more mature ones can take deliberate steps over time.

• The Volunteer Challenge: A large cadre of board and operational volunteers take time to assist struggling charities, which give the organizations appearances of nonprofit always being on the edge or existence. Many outsiders are unaware that those on management and staff are highly competent people who accept this employment condition because they know how their work can positively impact the lives of clients.

• Facilities: Nonprofit facilities are often second rate and appear highly dysfunctional. Client needs, not facilities, are primary to the board, management and staff.

• Board Relationships: Many relationships between the board and management can be similar to that of a “parent-child” one. In the words of one nonprofit director, “We tell the executive director exactly what to do.”

• Stakeholders: They often do not appreciate the tremendous impacts that the staff can have. Example: Donors often don’t have contact with those who directly benefit.

• Board Dysfunctions: A root cause of the perception may be due to a dysfunctional board trying to resolve internal conflicts, and there is little the management and staff can do about it. Valiant managements and staffs can sometimes achieve productive impacts without board support.

What can be done?

Competency & Relationships: I have encountered many CEOs who have more management expertise than many of their board members who are professors, accountants or physician, etc. While I appreciated that dealing with volunteer directors may involve working with some persons with outsized egos, the CEO must strive to portray himself as a competent manager. The positive outcome is that the CEO is viewed as a peer working with the board, not under the board.

Many staff persons figuratively stand ten feet tall for what they accomplish on behalf of clients.. The CEO has an obligation to make sure that the stories about outstanding staff personnel are well acknowledged, so that stakeholders know about them. This takes more then simple public relations events. It involves highlighting and rewarding those who are highly productive.

Facilities: I understand the tradeoff between expenditures for facilities versus expenditures for clients. Having first class facilities may even hinder achieving a mission if donors perceive their donations are being used for plush facilities. At the least, the nonprofit needs to have an uncluttered area for board meetings and events with outside stakeholders.

Implications: Many suggest that a nonprofit organization being perceived as dysfunctional is not an important issue, as long as mission objectives and impacts are achieved. I argue that more resources for clients could be developed if the perception is not a diminished one. Some can equate dysfunction with being inefficient. In addition, a positive perception might make it easier to attract more qualified board members, management and staff.

 

Rémunérations élevées dans les entreprises qui ont un actionnaire de contrôle !


Voici une étude très intéressante conduite par  Kobi Kastiel, fellow à la Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. La publication aura lieu en janvier 2015, mais le sommaire présenté ici résume bien le sens de celle-ci.

L’auteur montre que les compagnies qui ont un actionnaire de contrôle ont plus tendance à offrir des rémunérations « excessives » au premier dirigeant (PCD), qui lui, en retour, a tendance à s’entourer de dirigeants très bien payés.

L’étude explique que les actionnaires de contrôle paient plus pour s’assurer de la loyauté de la direction et maximiser les bénéfices qui leurs reviennent. L’auteur avance plusieurs autres raisons qui expliquent cette situation. 

Le phénomène est tellement répandu dans ce type de compagnie que les recommandations des firmes de conseil en votation (telles que ISS), eu égard au « Say on Pay », devraient être suivies afin de neutraliser l’effet des actionnaires dominants qui ont l’habitude d’accepter des « packages » de rétribution beaucoup trop généreux, lesquels ne sont pas dans l’intérêt de tous les actionnaires …

L’article qui paraîtra dans Indiana Law Journal aura sûrement un impact sur les motivations derrières les rémunérations jugées excessives par beaucoup d’experts en gouvernance.

Bonne lecture !

 Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies

More than a decade ago, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried published the seminal work on the role and significance of managerial power theory in executive compensation. Their work cultivated a vivid debate on executive compensation in companies with dispersed ownership. The discourse on the optimality of executive pay in controlled companies, however, has been more monolithic. Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists has long suggested that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay.IMG_20141210_201151

My Article, Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies, forthcoming in the Indiana Law Journal, challenges that common understanding by proposing a different view that is based on an agency problem paradigm, and by presenting a comprehensive framework for understanding the relationship between concentrated ownership and executive pay. On the theoretical level, the Article shows that controlling shareholders often have incentives to overpay professional managers instead of having an arm’s-length contract with them, and therefore it suggests that compensation practices in a large number of controlled companies may have their own pathologies.

To begin with, controllers may wish to overpay managers in order to maximize their consumption of private benefits, while providing professional managers with a premium for their “loyalty” and for colluding with tunneling activities. This tendency is further aggravated by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, such as dual-class share structures, which distort controllers’ monitoring incentives due to the wedge it creates between controllers’ cash flow rights and control rights. In addition, certain controllers, such as second generation controllers, could be “weak” due to their lack of experience, motivation or talent, and thus are more easily captured by professional CEOs. Controllers could also be biased due to their longstanding professional and social relationship with professional managers, and cannot be expected to exercise an impartial influence over the formulation of compensation contracts. This alternative view presented in the Article could also help explain recent puzzling phenomena such as the overly generous pay patterns in Viacom or other controlled companies, as well as the rise in say-on-pay rules in countries with concentrated ownership (as observed in a recent study by Thomas & Van der Elst).

On the empirical level, the Article questions conventional beliefs on executive pay by reviewing the recommendations on say-on-pay votes of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (ISS), the leading and most influential proxy advisory firm in the United States. In determining whether to recommend shareholders to vote against a management say-on-pay proposal, ISS examines the company’s pay-for-performance alignment compared to peer group alignment over a sustained period, as well as the use of problematic pay practices. This, in turn, makes the ISS recommendation a useful tool for determining whether a pay package is accurately calibrated to maximize shareholder value.

The data presented in the Article, which is based on the review of ISS recommendations for say-on-pay votes at companies included in the Russell 3000 Index during the 2011 and the 2012 proxy seasons, provides an indication that the compensation packages of professional managers in controlled companies appears to be a bigger problem than initially predicted. In particular, it shows that a controlled company managed by a professional CEO has a slightly higher likelihood to receive a negative recommendation than a widely held company. This result remains substantially similar and statistically significant even when controlling for firms’ market value and industry, or when neutralizing the effect of controllers who are also the CEOs of their firms.

Finally, on the normative level, the Article shows that a U.S. style say-on-pay rule, which requires a non-binding vote by the shareholders as a whole, is unlikely to mitigate the agency problem in determining executive compensation in controlled companies. Since controlling shareholders exercise significant control over the directors’ election process, receiving a failed say-on-pay vote and facing a risk of a withhold vote recommendation for the election of certain directors is unlikely to have any effect on controllers’ ability to elect their directors. And when controllers face no sanctions for failing their say-on-pay votes, they are more likely to ignore shareholders’ concerns, and to use their voting power to approve compensation packages that are suboptimal for other shareholders. The Article, therefore, calls for a new regulatory approach: re-conceptualize the pay of professional managers in controlled companies as an indirect self-dealing transaction and subject it to the applicable rules that regulate conflicted transactions.

The full paper is available for download here.

Rôles du comité exécutif versus rôles du conseil d’administration*


Voici une discussion très intéressante paru sur le groupe de discussion LinkedIn Board of Directors Society, et initiée par Jean-François Denault, concernant la nécessité de faire appel à un comité exécutif.

Je vous invite à lire les commentaires présentés sur le fil de discussion du groupe afin de vous former une opinion.

Personnellement, je crois que le comité exécutif est beaucoup trop souvent impliqué dans des activités de nature managériale.

Dans plusieurs cas, le CA pourrait s’en passer et reprendre l’initiative !

Qu’en pensez-vous ?

____________________________________________________

 

La situation exposée par  est la suivante (en anglais) :

I’m looking for feedback for a situation I encountered.
I am a board member for a non-profit. Some of us learned of an issue, and we brought it up at the last meeting for an update.IMG_20141013_145537
We were told that it was being handled by the Executive Committee, and would not be brought up in board meetings.
It is my understanding that the executive committee’s role is not to take issues upon themselves, but to act in interim of board meetings. It should not be discussing issues independently from the board.
Am I correct in thinking this? Should all issues be brought up to the board, or can the executive committee handle situations that it qualifies as « sensitive »?

 

The Role of the Executive Committee versus the main board of directors

Alan Kershaw

Chair of Regulatory Board

Depends whether it’s an operational matter I guess – e.g. a staffing issue below CEO/Director level. If it’s a matter of policy or strategy, or impacts on them, then the Board is entitled to be kept informed, surely, and to consider the matter itself. 

 

John Dinner

John T,  Dinner Board Governance Services

Helping boards improve their performance and contributionI’ll respond a bit more broadly, Jean-François. While I am not opposed to the use of executive committees, a red flag often goes up when I conduct a governance review for clients and review their EC mandate and practices. There is a slippery slope where such committees find themselves assuming more accountability for the board’s work over time. Two classes of directors often form unintentionally as a result. Your situation is an example where the executive committee has usurped the board’s final authority. While I don’t recommend one approach, my inclination is to suggest that boards try to function without an executive committee because of the frequency that situations similar to the one you describe arise at boards where such committees play an active role. There are pros and cons, of course, for having these committees, but I believe the associated risk often warrants reconsideration of their real value and need.

 

Chuck Molina

Chief Technology Officer at DHI

I currently sit on the EC and have been in that role with other boards. Although I can see the EC working on projects as a subset of the board we Always go back to the full board and disclose those projects and will take items to the full board for approval. The board as a whole is accountable for decisions! There has to be transparency on the board! I found this article for you. http://www.help4nonprofits.com/BrainTeaser/BrainTeaser-Role_of_Executive_Committee.htm , which concurs to John’s comment. If used correctly the EC or a subset of the board can work on board issues more efficiently then venting through the full board, but they should always go back to the Full board for consideration or approval.  

 

Dave Chapman

CHM and CEO of NorthPoint ERM

I have experienced couple of EB’s and unless the company is in deep financial or legal trouble for the most part the took away from the main board and in the whole worked ok but not great. If the board has over 10 to 15 board members it is almost a requirement but the board them is there for optics more than or effective and efficient decision making

James Clouser

Experienced CEO & Board member of Domestic and European companies.

I think Mr. Dinner, Mr. Molina, and Mr. Chapman summed it up beautifully:
– You cannot have two classes of Directors
– You have to have transparency and every Board member is entitled to the same information
– A Board of 10-15 members is inefficient and may need committees, but that does not change the fact that all Board members are entitled to have input into anything that the Board decides as a body.
– An Executive Committee is a sub-committee of the entire Board, not an independent body with extraordinary powers.

 

Al Errington

Entrepreneur & Governance Advocate

I agree with John, executive committees tend to be a slippery slope to bad governance. The board of directors has the responsibility of direction and oversight of the business or organization. If anything goes substantially wrong, the board of directors will also be accountable, legally. The rules of thumb for any and all committees is
– Committees must always be accountable to the board of directors, not the other way around.
– Committees must always have limits defined by the board of directors on authority and responsibility, and should have limits on duration.
– Committees should always have a specific reason to exist and that reason should be to support the board of directors in addressing it’s responsibilities. 

 

Emerson Galfo

Consulting CFO/COO / Board Member/Advisor

Judging from the responses, we need to clearly define the context of what an Executive Committee is. Every organization can have it’s own function/view of what an Executive Committee is.

From my experience, an Executive Committee is under the CEO and reflects a group of trusted C-level executives that influence his decisions. I have had NO experience with Executive Boards other than the usual specific Board Committees dealing with specific realms of the organization.

So coming from this perspective, the Executive Committee is two steps down from the organizational pecking order and should be treated or viewed in that context.. 

 

Terry Tormey

President & CEO at Prevention Pharmaceuticals Inc.

I concur with Mr. James Clouser (above).
They should be avoided except in matters involving a performance question regarding C-Level Executive Board member, where a replacement may be sought.

 

John Baily

Board of Directors at RLI Corp

James hit the nail on the head. Executive committees are a throwback to times when we didn’t have the communication tools we do now. They no longer have a reason for their existence. All directors, weather on a not for profit or a corporate board have equal responsibilities and legal exposures. There is no room or reason for a board within a board in today’s world.

 

Chinyere Nze

Chief Executive Officer

My experience is; Board members have the last say in all policy issues- especially when it concerns operational matter. But in this case, where there is Executive Committee, what it sounds like is that, the organization in question has not clearly identified, nor delineated the roles of each body- which seem to have brought up the issue of ‘conflict’ in final decision- making. Often Executive Committees are created to act as a buffer or interim to the Board, this may sometime cause some over-lapping in executive decision-making.

My suggestion is for the organization to assess and evaluate its current hierarchy- clearly identify & define roles-benefits for creating and having both bodies, and how specific policies/ protocol would benefit the organization. In other words, the CEO needs to define the goals or benefits of having just a Board or having both bodies, and to avoid role conflict or over-lap, which may lead to confusion, as it seems to have been the case here. 

 

STEPHEN KOSMALSKI

CEO / PRESIDENT/BOARD OF DIRECTORS /PRIVATE EQUITY OPERATING PARTNER known for returning growth to stagnant businesses

The critical consideration for all board members is ‘ fiduciary accountability’ of all bod members. With that exposure , all bod members should be aware of key issues . 

 

Thomas Brattle « Toby » Gannett

President and CEO at BCR Managment

I think for large organizations, that executive committees still have an important role as many board members have a great deal going on and operational matters may come up from time to time that need to be handled in a judicial manner. While I think that the Executive committee has an important, at times critical role for a BOD, it is also critical that trust is built between the executive Committee and the BOD. This is only done when the executive committee is transparent, and pushes as many decisions that it can to the full board. If the committee does not have time to bring a matter to the full BOD, then they must convey to the BOD the circumstances why and reasoning for their decision. It is the executive committees responsibility to build that trust with the BOD and work hard to maintain it. All strategic decisions must be made by the full BOD. It sounds like you either have a communication failure, governance issue, or need work with your policies and procedures or a combination of issues.

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*En reprise