Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au deuxième trimestre de 2016.
Cette liste de 15 billets constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.
Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs?
Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et les plus récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et des sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.
Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 192000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au30 juin 2016, il était fréquenté pardes milliers devisiteurs par mois. Depuis le début,j’aiœuvré à la publication de 1373billets.
En 2016, j’estime qu’environ 5000 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser qu’environ 60000 personnesvisiteront le site du blogue en 2016.
On note que 80 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de différents moteurs de recherche et 20 % par LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr.
Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :
Canada (64 %)
France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
Maghreb [Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie] (5 %)
Autres pays de l’Union européenne (3 %)
États-Unis [3 %]
Autres pays de provenance (5 %)
En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog [MiB Awards] : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix [10] finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance. Il n’y avait pas de concours en 2015.
Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.
N.B. Vous pouvez vous inscrire ou faire des recherches en allant au bas de cette page.
Bonne lecture !
Voici les Tops 15 du second trimestre de 2016 du blogue en gouvernance
Les autorités réglementaires, les firmes spécialisées en votation et les experts en gouvernance suggèrent que les rôles et les fonctions de président du conseil d’administration soient distincts des attributions des PDG (CEO).
En fait, on suppose que la séparation des fonctions, entre la présidence du conseil et la présidence de l’entreprise (CEO), est généralement bénéfique, c’est-à-dire que des pouvoirs distincts permettent d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts, tout en rassurant les actionnaires.
C’est ce que les professeurs de finance Harley Ryan*, Narayanan Jayaraman et Vikram Nanda ont tenté de valider empiriquement dans leur récente étude sur le sujet. L’article a paru aujourd’hui dans le forum du Harvard Law School on Corporate Governance. Comme on le sait, la plupart des études antérieures ne sont pas concluantes à cet égard.
Les auteurs ont proposé un modèle d’apprentissage de la dualité des deux fonctions en identifiant une stratégie basée sur la préparation de la relève : “passing the baton” (PTB). Dans ce modèle, les administrateurs s’allouent une période de probation afin de bien connaître les habiletés de leurs nouveaux CEO.
Si les membres du CA sont rassurés sur les talents du CEO et s’ils sont satisfaits de ses performances, ils lui attribuent également le poste de « chairman ». Le pouvoir accru du CEO améliore la rétention des meilleurs éléments.
Les résultats de la recherche montrent que les CEO qui ont obtenu le titre de « chairman » dans ces conditions (PTB) tendent à mieux réussir qu’avant la nomination à ce poste. De plus, les actionnaires sont plutôt réceptifs à ce mode de nomination, surtout si la promotion est faite dans un court délai, car cela leur indique que le CEO constitue une valeur sûre pour l’organisation.
Les auteurs insistent sur l’importance de considérer les mécanismes d’apprentissage en place (PTB) ainsi que les objectifs de rétention des meilleurs CEO dans l’évaluation des structures de gouvernance.
Ainsi, les actionnaires ne sont pas toujours nécessairement mieux servis par la séparation des deux rôles. Notons cependant qu’en général, les sociétés cotées ont de plus en plus tendance à séparer les deux fonctions.
Le billet paru sur mon blogue le 17 novembre 2015 fait état de la situation à ce jour :
Les études contemporaines démontrent une nette tendance en faveur de la séparation des deux rôles. Le Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index estime qu’une majorité de 85 % des 100 plus grandes entreprises canadiennes cotées en bourse ont opté pour la dissociation entre les deux fonctions. Dans le même sens, le rapport Clarkson affiche que 84 % des entreprises inscrites à la bourse de Toronto ont procédé à ladite séparation. Subsistent cependant encore de nos jours des entreprises canadiennes qui permettent le cumul. L’entreprise Air Transat A.T. Inc en est la parfaite illustration : M. Jean-Marc Eustache est à la fois président du conseil et chef de la direction. A contrario, le fond de solidarité de la Fédération des travailleurs du Québec vient récemment de procéder à la séparation des deux fonctions.
Aux États-Unis en 2013, 45 % des entreprises de l’indice S&P500 (au total 221 entreprises) dissocient les rôles de PDG et de président du conseil. Toutefois, les choses ne sont pas aussi simples qu’elles y paraissent : 27 % des entreprises de cet indice ont recombiné ces deux rôles. Évoquons à ce titre le cas de Target Corp dont les actionnaires ont refusé la dissociation des deux fonctions .
Est-ce dans l’air du temps ? Est-ce le résultat d’études sérieuses sur les principes de bonne gouvernance ?
Comme on dit souvent en management : Ça dépend des cas !
Considerable disagreement exists on the merits of CEO-Chair duality. In recent years, there has been growing regulatory and investor pressure to split the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. In fact, there is a significant trend towards separation of the two titles. However, the empirical evidence in the literature is inconclusive on the impact of separating these roles. We argue that the inconclusive evidence arises from endogenous self-selection that complicates empirical identification strategies and the ability to recognize the correct counterfactual firms.
In our paper, Does Combining the CEO and Chair Roles Cause Poor Firm Performance?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we propose a learning model of CEO-chair duality and implement an identification strategy to address sample selection issues. Our model and identification is based on “passing the baton” (PTB) firms that award the chair position after a probationary period during which the board of directors learns about the ability of the CEO. In the model, the board optimally awards the additional position of board chair if the CEO demonstrates sufficient talent. The increase in CEO power improves the retention of high-quality CEOs by mitigating concerns about the board reneging on compensation contracts. The model delivers several implications that we test in our empirical analysis.
Using a very large sample of over 22,000 firm-year observations for the period 1995-2010, we explore the determinants and consequences of the combining the two roles. Firms that always combine the two roles, always separate the roles, or award the additional title following a period of evaluation exhibit significantly different firm characteristics, which suggest self-selection. We find that PTB firms are more likely to be from industries that are less homogenous. This is consistent with a learning rationale underlying PTB strategies: CEO performance is harder to benchmark in such industries and reneging on contracts may be of greater concern to CEOs. We also find that firms with more business segments are more likely to combine the two roles. These findings suggest that more complex organizations are better served by combining the roles of the CEO and the Chairman.
Overall, CEOs that receive the additional title of board chair outperform their industry benchmark before receiving both titles. In firms that combine the roles after observing the CEO’s performance under a separate board chair, the combination is positively related to both firm and industry performance in the two years prior to the combination. As predicted by our model, a naïve analysis of the post-chair appointment performance, one that fails to control for selection issues and mean reversion in performance data, indicates a significant drop in firm performance relative to the pre-chair period. However, in a matched sample of firms where the matching criteria includes the pre-appointment performance and firm attributes that predict a high propensity for using a PTB succession strategy, there is no evidence of post-appointment underperformance. These results suggest that the pass-the-baton succession process appears to be an equilibrium mechanism in which some firms optimally use the PTB structure to learn about the CEO and then award the additional title of board chair to increase the odds of retaining talented CEOS. Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the learning hypothesis that the additional title is awarded by the board after evaluating the ability of the CEO.
Our model suggests that, ceteris paribus, talented CEOs in a weaker bargaining position relative to the board will tend to be promoted to chair more quickly. The reason is that more vulnerable CEOs are more likely to pursue outside opportunities. Supportive of the prediction, we find that when the board is more independent, is not coopted and the CEO is externally sourced—the promotion to chair occurs more quickly. These findings are also counter to the notion that agency considerations and influence are central to the CEO being appointed chairman. We also show that stockholders react positively to combinations that occur early in the CEO’s tenure, which suggests that early promotions reveal directors’ private information about the quality of the CEO to the market. This is inconsistent with alternative explanations such as an incentive rationale for PTB or agency problem, since both of these alternatives would suggest a negative market reaction to such promotions.
A major implication of our analysis for researchers is that one should consider learning mechanisms and retention objectives when evaluating various board structures. Structures that are seemingly incompatible with effective monitoring may in fact be optimal when one considers the impact of learning on retention. For governance activists and policy makers, the implications of our analysis are straightforward: the results call into question the prevailing wisdom that suggests that shareholders will always be better served by separating the two roles. Thus, those who seek to reform governance should be cautious in proposing to unambiguously separate the roles of CEO and board chair. Forcing separation by fiat is likely not an ideal policy. Overall our evidence suggests that having one type of executive and board leadership structure is not optimal for all firms.
Harley Ryan* is Associate Professor of Finance at Georgia State University, Narayanan Jayaraman is Professor of Finance at Georgia Institute of Technology et Vikram Nanda is Professor of Finance at the University of Texas at Dallas.
Je crois que cet article intéressera tous les administrateurs siégeant à des conseils d’administration. Personnellement, je suis très heureux de constater que la démarche ait consisté en des rencontres avec des groupes d’administrateurs chevronnés.
Plusieurs messages très pertinents ressortent des rencontres. Ils sont regroupés selon les catégories suivantes :
La taille du conseil
La composition du conseil
La présidence du conseil
L’évaluation du conseil
Information et prise de décision
Les comités du conseil
Je vous invite à lire l’ensemble du document sur le site de l’IGOPP. Voici un extrait de cet article.
« Une longue expérience comme administrateur de sociétés mène souvent au constat que la qualité de la gouvernance et l’efficacité d’un conseil tiennent à des facteurs subtils, difficilement quantifiables, mais tout aussi importants, voire plus importants, que les aspects fiduciaires et formels.
Cette dimension informelle de la gouvernance prend forme et substance dans les échanges, les interactions sociales, l’encadrement des discussions, le style de leadership du président du conseil, dans tout ce qui se passe avant et après les réunions formelles ainsi qu’autour de la table au moment des réunions du conseil et de ses comités.
Cela est vrai pour tout type de sociétés, que ce soient une entreprise cotée en bourse, un organisme public, une société d’État, une coopérative ou un organisme sans but lucratif.
L’IGOPP estime que pour relever encore l’efficacité des conseils d’administration il est important de bien comprendre ce qui peut contribuer à une dynamique productive entre les membres d’un conseil.
Pourtant, alors que les études sur tous les aspects de la gouvernance foisonnent, cet aspect fait l’objet de peu de recherches empiriques, et ce pour une raison bien simple. Les conseils d’administration ne peuvent donner à des chercheurs un accès direct à leurs réunions ni à leur documentation en raison des contraintes de confidentialité.
Le professeur Richard Leblanc, grâce au réseau de son directeur de thèse de doctorat et co-auteur James Gillies, a pu, rare exception, observer un certain nombre de conseils d’administration en action. Ils ont publié en 2005 un ouvrage Inside the Boardroom, lequel propose une intéressante typologie des comportements dominants des membres de conseil au cours de réunions.
Depuis aucune autre étude empirique n’a été menée sur le sujet. D’ailleurs, l’ouvrage de Leblanc et Gillies, se limitant aux comportements observables lors de réunions formelles, ne nous éclairait que sur une partie du phénomène »
…
« L’IGOPP a voulu mieux comprendre cette dynamique et, si possible, proposer aux administrateurs et présidents de conseil des suggestions pouvant améliorer la qualité de la gouvernance.
L’IGOPP a donc invité des membres de conseil expérimentés et férus de gouvernance pour un échange sur cet enjeu. Les 14 personnes suivantes ont accepté promptement notre invitation et nous les en remercions chaleureusement:
Jacynthe Côté
Gérard Coulombe
Isabelle Courville
Paule Doré
Jean La Couture
Sylvie Lalande
John LeBoutillier
Brian Levitt
David L. McAusland
Marie-José Nadeau
Réal Raymond
Louise Roy
Guylaine Saucier
Jean-Marie Toulouse, qui a agi comme modérateur des discussions.
Collectivement, nos interlocuteurs siègent au sein de 75 conseils, dont 34 sont des sociétés ouvertes parmi lesquelles 14 ont leur siège hors Québec.
Nous avons tenu quatre sessions, chacune comptant un petit nombre d’administrateurs, de façon à ce que les discussions permettent à tous de s’exprimer pleinement.
Ces sessions furent riches en commentaires, observations pertinentes et suggestions utiles ».
Plusieurs messages très pertinents ressortent des rencontres. Ils sont regroupés selon les catégories suivantes :
La taille du conseil
La composition du conseil
La présidence du conseil
L’évaluation du conseil
Information et prise de décision
Les comités du conseil
En conclusion, l’auteur mentionne que « ce texte tente de rendre justice aux échanges entre les 14 administrateurs chevronnés qui ont participé à cette recherche de pistes d’amélioration de la dynamique des conseils d’administration et donc de la gouvernance de nos sociétés ».
Aujourd’hui, je vous propose la lecture d’un article paru dans la revue European Journal of Risk Regulation (EJRR) qui scrute le scandale de Volkswagensous l’angle juridique, mais, surtout, sous l’angle des manquements à la saine gouvernance.
Le texte se présente comme un cas en gouvernance et en management. Celui-ci devrait alimenter les réflexions sur l’éthique, les valeurs culturelles et les effets des pressions excessives à la performance.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’intégralité de l’article avec le consentement de l’auteure. Je n’ai pas inclus les références, qui sont très abondantes et qui peuvent être consultées sur le site de la maison d’édition lexxion.
Like some other crises and scandals that periodically occur in the business community, the Volkswagen (“VW”) scandal once again highlights the devastating consequences of corporate misconduct, once publicly disclosed, and the media storm that generally follows the discovery of such significant misbehaviour by a major corporation. Since the crisis broke in September 2015, the media have relayed endless détails about the substantial negative impacts on VW on various stakeholder groups such as employees, directors, investors, suppliers and consumers, and on the automobile industry as a whole (1)
The multiple and negative repercussions at the economic, organizational and legal levels have quickly become apparent, in particular in the form of resignations, changes in VW’s senior management, layoffs, a hiring freeze, the end to the marketing of diesel-engined vehicles, vehicle recalls, a decline in car sales, a drop in market capitalization, and the launching of internal investigations by VW and external investigations by the public authorities. This comes in addition to the threat of numerous civil, administrative, penal and criminal lawsuits and the substantial penalties they entail, as well as the erosion of trust in VW and the automobile industry generally (2).
FILE PHOTO: Martin Winterkorn, chief executive officer of Volkswagen AG, reacts during an earnings news conference at the company’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, Germany, on Monday, March 12, 2012. Volkswagen said 11 million vehicles were equipped with diesel engines at the center of a widening scandal over faked pollution controls that will cost the company at least 6.5 billion euros ($7.3 billion). Photographer: Michele Tantussi/Bloomberg *** Local Caption *** Martin Winterkorn
A scandal of this extent cannot fail to raise a number of questions, in particular concerning the cause of the alleged cheating, liable actors, the potential organizational and regulatory problems related to compliance, and ways to prevent further misconduct at VW and within the automobile industry. Based on the information surrounding the VW scandal, it is premature to capture all facets of the case. In order to analyze inmore depth the various problems raised, we will have to wait for the findings of the investigations conducted both internally by the VW Group and externally by the regulatory authorities.
While recognizing the incompleteness of the information made available to date by VW and certain commentators, we can still use this documentation to highlight a few features of the case that deserve to be studied from the standpoint of corporate governance.
This Article remains relatively modest in scope, and is designed to highlight certain organizational factors that may explain the deviant behaviour observed at VW. More specifically, it submits that the main cause of VW’s alleged wrongdoing lies in the company’s ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees to reach those targets. Arguably, the corporate strategy and pressures exerted on VW’s employees may have led them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards. And this corporate misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected.
Although limited in scope, this inquiry may prove useful in identifying means to minimize, in the future, the risk of similar misconduct, not only at VW but wihin other companies as well (3). Given the limited objectives of the Article, which focuses on certain specific organizational deficiencies at VW, the legal questions raised by the case will not be addressed. However, the Article will refer to one aspect of the law of business corporations in the United States, Canada and in the EU Member States in order to emphasize the crucial role that boards in publicly-held companies must exercise to minimize the risk of misconduct (4).
II. A Preliminary Admission by VW: Individual Misconduct by a few Software Engineers
When a scandal erupts in the business community following a case of fraud, embezzlement, corruption, the marketing of dangerous products or other deviant behaviour, the company concerned and the regulatory authorities are required to quickly identify the individuals responsible for the alleged misbehaviour. For example, in the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and Adelphia scandals of the early 2000s, the investigations revealed that certain company senior managers had acted fraudulently by orchestrating accounting manipulations to camouflage their business’s dire financial situation (5).
These revelations led to the prosecution and conviction of the officers responsible for the corporations’ misconduct (6). In the United States, the importanace of identifying individual wrongdoers is clearly stated in the Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations issued by the U.S. Department of Justice which provide guidelines for prosecutions of corporate misbehaviour (7). On the basis of a memo issued in 2015 by the Department of Justice (the “Yatesmemo”) (8), these principles were recently revised to express a renewed commitment to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing.While recognizing the importance of individual prosecutions in that context, the strategy is only one of the ways to respond to white-collar crime. From a prevention standpoint, it is essential to conduct a broader examination of the organizational environment in which senior managers and employees work to determine if the enterprise’s culture, values, policies, monitoring mechanisms and practices contribute or have contributed to the adoption of deviant behaviour (9).
In the Volkswagen case, the company’s management concentrated first on identifying the handful of individuals it considered to be responsible for the deception, before admitting few weeks later that organizational problems had also encouraged or facilitated the unlawful corporate behaviour. Once news broke of the Volkswagen scandal, one of VW’s officers quickly linked the wrongdoing to the actions of a few employees, but without uncovering any governance problems or misbehaviour at the VW management level (10).
In October 2015, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the VW Group in the United States, Michael Horn, stated in testimony before a Congressional Subcommittee: “[t]his was a couple of software engineers who put this for whatever reason » […]. To my understanding, this was not a corporate decision. This was something individuals did » (11). In other words, the US CEO considered that sole responsibility for the scandal lay with a handful of engineers working at the company, while rejecting any allegation tending to incriminate the company’s management.
This portion of his testimony failed to convince the members of the Subcommittee, who expressed serious doubts about placing sole blame on the misbehaviour of a few engineers, given that the problem had existed since 2009. As expressed in a sceptical response from one of the committee’s members: « I cannot accept VW’s portrayal of this as something by a couple of rogue software engineers […] Suspending three folks – it goes way, way higher than that » (12).
Although misconduct similar to the behaviour uncovered at Volkswagen can often be explained by the reprehensible actions of a few individuals described as « bad apples », the violation of rules can also be explained by the existence of organizational problems within a company (13).
III. Recognition of Organizational Failures by VW
In terms of corporate governance, an analysis of misbehaviour can highlight problems connected with the culture, values, policies and strategies promoted by a company’s management that have a negative influence on the behaviour of senior managers and employees. Considering the importance of the organizational environment in which these players act, regulators provide for several internal and external governance mechanisms to reduce the risk of corporate misbehaviour or to minimize agency problems (14). As one example of an internal governance mechanism, the law of business corporations in the U.S., Canada and the EU Member States gives the board of directors (in a one-tier board structure, as prescribed Under American and Canadian corporation law) and the management board and supervisory board (in a two tier board structure, as provided for in some EU Member States, such as Germany) a key role to play in monitoring the company’s activities and internal dealings (15). As part of their monitoring mission, the board must ensure that the company and its agents act in a diligent and honest way and in compliance with the regulations, in particular by establishing mechanisms or policies in connection with risk management, internal controls, information disclosure, due diligence investigation and compliance (16).
When analysing the Volkswagen scandal from the viewpoint of its corporate governance, the question to be asked is whether the culture, values, priorities, strategies and monitoring and control mechanisms established by the company’s management board and supervisory board – in other words « the tone at the top »-, created an environment that contributed to the emergence of misbehaviour (17).
In this saga, although the initial testimony given to the Congressional Subcommittee by the company’s U.S. CEO, Michael Horn, assigned sole responsibility to a small circle of individuals, « VW’s senior management later recognized that the misconduct could not be explained simply by the deviant behaviour of a few people, since the evidence also pointed to organizational problems supporting the violation of regulations (18). In December 2015, VW’s management released the following observations, drawn from the preliminary results of its internal investigation:
« Group Audit’s examination of the relevant processes indicates that the software-influenced NOx emissions behavior was due to the interaction of three factors:
– The misconduct and shortcomings of individual employees
– Weaknesses in some processes
– A mindset in some areas of the Company that tolerated breaches of rules » (19).
Concerning the question of process,VW released the following audit key findings:
« Procedural problems in the relevant subdivisions have encouraged misconduct;
Faults in reporting and monitoring systems as well as failure to comply with existing regulations;
IT infrastructure partially insufficient and antiquated. » (20)
More fundamentally, VW’s management pointed out at the same time that the information obtained up to that point on “the origin and development of the nitrogen issue […] proves not to have been a one-time error, but rather a chain of errors that were allowed to happen (21). The starting point was a strategic decision to launch a large-scale promotion of diesel vehicles in the United States in 2005. Initially, it proved impossible to have the EA 189 engine meet by legal means the stricter nitrogen oxide requirements in the United States within the required timeframe and budget » (22).
In other words, this revelation by VW’s management suggests that « the end justified the means » in the sense that the ambitious production targets for the U.S. market and the time and budget constraints imposed on employees encouraged those employees to use illegal methods in operational terms to achieve the company’s objective. And this misconduct could not be detected because of deficiencies in the monitoring and control mechanisms, and especially in the compliance system established by the company to ensure that legal requirements were respected. Among the reasons given to explain the crisis, some observers also pointed to the excessive centralization of decision-making powers within VW’s senior management, and an organizational culture that acted as a brake on internal communications and discouraged mid-level managers from passing on bad news (23).
IV. Organizational Changes Considered as a Preliminary Step
In response to the crisis, VW’s management, in a press release in December 2015, set out the main organizational changes planned to minimize the risk of similar misconduct in the future. The changes mainly involved « instituting a comprehensive new alignment that affects the structure of the Group, as well as is way of thinking and its strategic goals (24).
In structural terms, VW changed the composition of the Group’s Board of Management to include the person responsible for the Integrity and Legal Affairs Department as a board member (25). In the future, the company wanted to give « more importance to digitalization, which will report directly to the Chairman of the Board of Management, » and intended to give « more independence to brand and divisions through a more decentralized management (26). With a view to initiating a new mindset, VW’s management stated that it wanted to avoid « yes-men » and to encourage managers and engineers « who are curious, independent, and pioneering » (27). However, the December 2015 press release reveals little about VW’s strategic objectives: « Strategy 2025, with which Volkswagen will address the main issues for the future, is scheduled to be presented in mid 2016 » (28).
Although VW’s management has not yet provided any details on the specific objectives targeted in its « Strategy 2025 », it is revealing to read the VW annual reports from before 2015 in which the company sets out clear and ambitious objectives for productivity and profitability. For example, the annual reports for 2007, 2009 and 2014 contained the following financial objectives, which the company hoped to reach by 2018.
In its 2007 annual report,VW specified, under the heading « Driving ideas »:
“Financial targets are equally ambitious: for example, the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand aims to increase its unit sales by over 80 percent to 6.6 million vehicles by 2018, thereby reaching a global market share of approximately 9 percent. To make it one of the most profitable automobile companies as well, it is aiming for an ROI of 21 percent and a return on sales before tax of 9 percent.” (29).
Under the same heading, VW stated in its 2009 annual report:
“In 2018, the Volkswagen Group aims to be the most successful and fascinating automaker in the world. […] Over the long term, Volkswagen aims to increase unit sales to more than 10 million vehicles a year: it intends to capture an above-average share as the major growth markets develop (30).
And in its 2014 annual report, under the heading « Goals and Strategies », VW said:
“The goal is to generate unit sales of more than 10 million vehicles a year; in particular, Volkswagen intends to capture an above-average share of growth in the major growth markets.”
Volkswagen’s aim is a long-term return on sales before tax of at least 8% so as to ensure that the Group’s solid financial position and ability to act are guaranteed even in difficult market periods (31).
Besides these specific objectives for financial performance, the annual reports show that the company’s management recognized, at least on paper, the importance of ensuring regulatory compliance and promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability (31). However, after the scandal broke in September 2015, questions can be asked about the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms, especially of the reporting and monitoring systems put in place by VW to achieve company goals in this area (33). In light of the preliminary results of VW’s internal investigation (34), as mentionned above, it seems that, in the organizational culture, the commitment to promote compliance, CSR and sustainability was not as strong as the effort made to achieve the company’s financial performance objectives.
Concerning the specific and challenging priorities of productivity and profitability established by VW’s management in previous years, the question is whether the promotion of financial objectives such as these created a risk because of the pressure it placed on employees within the organizational environment. The priorities can, of course, exert a positive influence and motivate employees to make an even greater effort to achieve the objectives (35). On the other hand, the same priority can exert a negative influence by potentially encouraging employees to use all means necessary to achieve the performance objectives set, in order to protect their job or obtain a promotion, even if the means they use for that purpose contravene the regulations. In other words, the employees face a « double bind » or dilemma which, depending on the circumstances, can lead them to give preference to the performance priorities set by the company rather than compliance with the applicable legal and ethical standards.
In the management literature, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the beneficial effects of the setting of specific and challenging goals on employee motivation and performance within a company (36). However, while recognizing these beneficial effects, some authors point out the unwanted or negative side effects they may have.
As highlighted by Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky and Bazerman, specific goal setting can result in employees focusing solely on those goals while neglecting other important, but unstated, objectives (37). They also mention that employees motivated by « specific, challenging goals adopt riskier strategies and choose riskier gambles than do those with less challenging or vague goals (38). As an additional unwanted side effet, goal setting can encourage unlawful or unethical behaviour, either by inciting employees to use dishonest methods to meet the performance objectives targeted, or to “misrepresent their performance level – in other words, to report that they met a goal when in fact they fell short (39). Based on these observations, the authors suggest that companies should set their objectives with the greatest care and propose various ways to guard against the unwanted side effects highlighted in their study. This approach could prove useful for VW’s management which will once again, at some point, have to define its objectives and stratégies.
V. Conclusion
In the information released to the public after the emissions cheating scandal broke, as mentioned above, VW’s management quickly stated that the misconduct was directly caused by the individual misbehaviour of a couple of software engineers. Later, however, it admitted that the individual misconduct of a few employees was not the only cause, and that there were also organizational deficiencies within the company itself.
Although the VW Group’s public communications have so far provided few details about the cause of the crisis, the admission by management that both individual and organizational failings were involved constitutes, in our opinion, a lever for understanding the various factors that may have led to reprehensible conduct within the company. Based on the investigations that will be completed over the coming months, VW’s management will be in a position to identify more precisely the nature of these organizational failings and to propose ways to minimize the risk of future violations. During 2016, VW’s management will also announce the objectives and stratégies it intends to pursue over the next few years.
Quelles actions les conseils d’administration sont-ils susceptibles d’adopter dans les cas où leur PDG (CEO) a un comportement « limite » tout en n’étant pas illégal ?
L’article récemment publié par David Larcker* et Brian Tayan** dans la Harvard Business Review présente plusieurs exemples de situations où les CEO captent l’attention du public pour de mauvaises raisons !
Les CA sont les garants de la réputation de l’entreprise et, lorsque confrontés à des comportements fautifs de la part de leur CEO, ils doivent s’assurer de prendre toutes les mesures appropriées.
Les auteurs ont identifié 38 cas de comportements de CEO déviants qui ont un des échos révélateurs et qui ont généré des actions de gestion de crises. L’échantillon des cas retenus a été présenté en cinq grandes catégories :
(1) 34 % des cas impliquent des CEO qui ont menti à propos de leurs affaires personnelles ;
(2) 21 % des cas sont de nature sexuelle, impliquant un subordonné, un entrepreneur ou un consultant ;
(3) 16 % des cas concernent l’utilisation « questionnable » des fonds de l’entreprise ;
(4) 16 % des cas consistent en comportements grossiers ou abusifs ;
(5) 13 % des cas consistent en déclarations publiques qui ont des conséquences négatives sur les clients ou sur un groupe social en particulier.
Les résultats suivants ressortent clairement de l’étude :
– The impact of misbehavior on corporate reputation is significant and long-lasting.
– Shareholders generally (but do not always) react negatively to news of misconduct.
– Most companies take an active approach in responding to allegations of misconduct.
– Corporate punishment for CEO misbehavior is inconsistent.
– CEO misbehavior can reverberate across the organization.
For boards of directors, the lessons are clear: For better or worse, the CEO is often the face of the corporation. When the CEO engages in misconduct, the board has an obligation to investigate the matter, take proactive steps to ensure that it is properly dealt with, and — most important — ensure that corporate reputation, culture, and long-term performance are not damaged.
Je vous invite à lire plus à fond les répercussions de ces mauvais comportements sur la réputation de l’organisation ainsi que les décisions prises par les CA dans chaque situation.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont les bienvenus.
Most boards of directors know what to do when their CEO is accused of illegal activity. They conduct an independent investigation, and if the allegations are verified, they take corrective action. In most cases, the CEO is terminated.
It is much less obvious what actions the board should take when the CEO is accused of behavior that is questionable but not illegal. For example, if the CEO makes controversial public statements, has personal relations with an employee or contractor, or develops a reputation for being rude, overbearing, or verbally combative, the board must decide what merits investigation. It must also decide whether to address matters publicly or privately. These decisions become even more important when CEO misbehavior is picked up by the media, bringing unwanted public attention that can have an impact on the organization and its reputation.
To examine how corporations handle allegations of CEO misbehavior, we conducted an extensive review of news media between 2000 and 2015. We identified 38 incidents where a CEO’s behavior garnered a meaningful level of media coverage (defined as more than 10 unique news references). We categorized these incidents as follows:
34% involved reports of a CEO lying to the board or shareholders over personal matters, such as a drunk driving offense, undisclosed criminal record, falsification of credentials, or other behavior.
21% involved a sexual affair or relations with a subordinate, contractor, or consultant.
16% involved CEOs making use of corporate funds in a manner that is questionable but not strictly illegal.
16% involved CEOs engaging in objectionable personal behavior or using abusive language.
13% involved CEOs making public statements that are offensive to customers or social groups.
Examining these incidents in detail, five main findings stood out:
The impact of misbehavior on corporate reputation is significant and long-lasting. The incidents that we identified were cited in over 250 news stories each, on average. Furthermore, media coverage was persistent, with references made to the CEO’s actions up to an average of 4.9 years after initial occurrence. For example, news stories today continue to reference former American Apparel CEO Dov Charney’s odd behavior of walking around the company’s offices in his underwear, even though it was first reported over 10 years ago. Boards should not expect allegations of misbehavior to disappear quickly.
Shareholders generally (but do not always) react negatively to news of misconduct. Among the companies in our sample, share prices declined by a market-adjusted 3.1% (1.1% median) over the three-day trading period around the initial news story. For example, Hewlett-Packard stock fell almost 9% following reports that former CEO Mark Hurd had a personal relationship with a female contractor. However, shareholder reactions are not uniformly negative. Of the 38 companies in our sample. 11 exhibited positive stock price returns when CEO misbehavior made the news. Perhaps unexpectedly, there is no discernible relationship between the type of behavior and stock price reaction.
Most companies take an active approach in responding to allegations of misconduct. In 84% of cases, the company issued a press release or formal statement on the matter. In 71% of cases, a spokesperson provided direct commentary to the press. Board members were much less likely to speak to the media, making direct comments only 37% of the time. In over half of cases (55%), the board of directors was known to initiate an independent review or investigation. The board is most likely to announce an independent review in cases of potential financial misconduct. However, the willingness of an individual director to discuss the matter directly with the press does not appear to be associated with the type of behavior involved or the “severity” of the CEO’s actions.
Corporate punishment for CEO misbehavior is inconsistent. In 58% of incidents, the CEO was eventually terminated for his or her actions. Questionable financial practices was the only category of behavior that almost uniformly resulted in termination; all other behaviors resulted in both outcomes (termination and retention) across our sample. Even behavior as straightforward as falsifying information on a resume was treated inconsistently by different boards. In a third of cases (32%), the board took actions other than termination in response to CEO misconduct, such as stripping the CEO of the chair title, removing the CEO from the board, amending the corporate code of conduct, reducing or eliminating the CEO’s bonus, other director resignation, and other changes to board structure or composition.
CEO misbehavior can reverberate across the organization. Approximately one-third of companies faced additional fallout from the CEO’s actions, including loss of a major client, federal investigation, shareholder or federal lawsuit, or shareholder action such as a proxy battle. Forty-five percent of companies in the sample experienced a significant unrelated governance issue following the event, such as an accounting restatement, unrelated lawsuit, shareholder action, or bankruptcy. As for the CEOs themselves, three were reported to resign from other boards because of their actions. Two CEOs who were terminated were subsequently rehired by the same company. We found that many continued in their position or were hired by other corporations or investment groups; otherwise there was no notable news of what happened to them professionally.
For boards of directors, the lessons are clear: For better or worse, the CEO is often the face of the corporation. When the CEO engages in misconduct, the board has an obligation to investigate the matter, take proactive steps to ensure that it is properly dealt with, and — most important — ensure that corporate reputation, culture, and long-term performance are not damaged.
David Larcker* is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting and Senior Faculty at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. He is a co-author of the books Corporate Governance Matters and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.
Brian Tayan** is a researcher at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. He is a co-author of the books Corporate Governance Matters and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.
Les investisseurs et les actionnaires reconnaissent le rôle prioritaire que les administrateurs de sociétés jouent dans la gouvernance et, conséquemment, ils veulent toujours plus d’informations sur le processus de nomination des administrateurs et sur la composition du conseil d’administration.
L’article qui suit, paru sur le Forum du Harvard Law School, a été publié par Paula Loop, directrice du centre de la gouvernance de PricewaterhouseCoopers. Il s’agit essentiellement d’un compte rendu sur l’évolution des facteurs clés de la composition des conseils d’administration. La présentation s’appuie sur une infographie remarquable.
Ainsi, on apprend que 41 % des campagnes menées par les activistes étaient reliées à la composition des CA, et que 20 % des CA ont modifié leur composition en réponse aux activités réelles ou potentielles des activistes.
L’article s’attarde sur la grille de composition des conseils relative aux compétences et habiletés requises. Également, on présente les arguments pour une plus grande diversité des CA et l’on s’interroge sur la situation actuelle.
Enfin, l’article revient sur les questions du nombre de mandats des administrateurs et de l’âge de la retraite de ceux-ci ainsi que sur les préoccupations des investisseurs eu égard au renouvellement et au rajeunissement des CA.
Le travail de renouvellement du conseil ne peut se faire sans la mise en place d’un processus d’évaluation complet du fonctionnement du CA et des administrateurs.
À mon avis, c’est certainement un article à lire pour bien comprendre toutes les problématiques reliées à la composition des conseils d’administration.
In today’s business environment, companies face numerous challenges that can impact success—from emerging technologies to changing regulatory requirements and cybersecurity concerns. As a result, the expertise, experience, and diversity of perspective in the boardroom play a more critical role than ever in ensuring effective oversight. At the same time, many investors and other stakeholders are seeking influence on board composition. They want more information about a company’s director nominees. They also want to know that boards and their nominating and governance committees are appropriately considering director tenure, board diversity and the results of board self-evaluations when making director nominations. All of this is occurring within an environment of aggressive shareholder activism, in which board composition often becomes a central focus.
Shareholder activism and board composition
At the same time, a growing number of companies are adopting proxy access rules—allowing shareholders that meet certain ownership criteria to submit a limited number of director candidates for inclusion on the company’s annual proxy. It has become a top governance issue over the last two years, with many shareholders viewing it as a step forward for shareholder rights. And it’s another factor causing boards to focus more on their makeup.
So within this context, how should directors and investors be thinking about board composition, and what steps should be taken to ensure boards are adequately refreshing themselves?
Assessing what you have–and what you need
In a rapidly changing business climate, a high-performing board requires agile directors who can grasp concepts quickly. Directors need to be fiercely independent thinkers who consciously avoid groupthink and are able to challenge management—while still contributing to a productive and collegial boardroom environment. A strong board includes directors with different backgrounds, and individuals who understand how the company’s strategy is impacted by emerging economic and technological trends.
Sample board composition grid: What skills and attributes does your board need?
In assessing their composition, boards and their nominating and governance committees need to think critically about what skills and attributes the board currently has, and how they tie to oversight of the company. As companies’ strategies change and their business models evolve, it is imperative that board composition be evaluated regularly to ensure that the right mix of skills are present to meet the company’s current needs. Many boards conduct a gap analysis that compares current director attributes with those that it has identified as critical to effective oversight. They can then choose to fill any gaps by recruiting new directors with such attributes or by consulting external advisors. Some companies use a matrix in their proxy disclosures to graphically display to investors the particular attributes of each director nominee.
Board diversity is a hot-button issue
Diversity is a key element of any discussion of board composition. Diversity includes not only gender, race, and ethnicity, but also diversity of skills, backgrounds, personalities, opinions, and experiences. But the pace of adding more gender and ethnic diversity to public company boards has been only incremental over the past five years. For example, a December 2015 report from the US Government Accountability Office estimates that it could take four decades for the representation of women on US boards to be the same as men. [1] Some countries, including Norway, Belgium, and Italy, have implemented regulatory quotas to increase the percentage of women on boards.
Even if equal proportions of women and men joined boards each year beginning in 2015, GAO estimated that it could take more than four decades for women’s representation on boards to be on par with that of men’s.
—US Government Accountability Office, December 2015
According to PwC’s 2015 Annual Corporate Directors Survey, more than 80% of directors believe board diversity positively impacts board and company performance. But more than 70% of directors say there are impediments to increasing board diversity. [2] One of the main impediments is that many boards look to current or former CEOs as potential director candidates. However, only 4% of S&P 500 CEOs are female, [3] less than 2% of the Fortune 500 CEOs are Hispanic or Asian, and only 1% of the Fortune 500 CEOs are African-American. [4] So in order to get boards to be more diverse, the pool of potential director candidates needs to be expanded.
Is there diversity on US boards?
Source: Spencer Stuart US Board Index 2015, November 2015.
SEC rules require companies to disclose the backgrounds and qualifications of director nominees and whether diversity was a nomination consideration. In January 2016, SEC Chair Mary Jo White included diversity as a priority for the SEC’s 2016 agenda and suggested that the SEC’s disclosure rules pertaining to board diversity may be enhanced.
While those who aspire to become directors must play their part, the drive to make diversity a priority really has to come from board leadership: CEOs, lead directors, board chairs, and nominating and governance committee chairs. These leaders need to be proactive and commit to making diversity part of the company and board culture. In order to find more diverse candidates, boards will have to look in different places. There are often many untapped, highly qualified, and diverse candidates just a few steps below the C-suite, people who drive strategies, run large segments of the business, and function like CEOs.
How long is too long? Director tenure and mandatory retirement
The debate over board tenure centers on whether lengthy board service negatively impacts director independence, objectivity, and performance. Some investors believe that long-serving directors can become complacent over time—making it less likely that they will challenge management. However, others question the virtue of forced board turnover. They argue that with greater tenure comes good working relationships with stakeholders and a deep knowledge of the company. One approach to this issue is to strive for diversity of board tenure—consciously balancing the board’s composition to include new directors, those with medium tenures, and those with long-term service.
This debate has heated up in recent years, due in part to attention from the Council of Institutional Investors (the Council). In 2013, the Council introduced a revised policy statement on board tenure. While the policy “does not endorse a term limit,” [5] the Council noted that directors with extended tenures should no longer be considered independent. More recently, the large pension fund CalPERS has been vocal about tenure, stating that extended board service could impede objectivity. CalPERS updated its 2016 proxy voting guidelines by asking companies to explain why directors serving for over twelve years should still be considered independent.
We believe director independence can be compromised at 12 years of service—in these situations a company should carry out rigorous evaluations to either classify the director as non-independent or provide a detailed annual explanation of why the director can continue to be classified as independent.
— CalPERS Global Governance Principles, second reading, March 14, 2016
Factors in the director tenure and age debate
Source: Spencer Stuart US Board Index 2015, November 2015.
Many boards have a mandatory retirement age for their directors. However, the average mandatory retirement age has increased in recent years. Of the 73% of S&P 500 boards that have a mandatory retirement age in place, 97% set that age at 72 or older—up from 57% that did so ten years ago. Thirty-four percent set it at 75 or older. [6] Others believe that director term limits may be a better way to encourage board refreshment, but only 3% of S&P 500 boards have such policies. [7]
Investor concern
Some institutional investors have expressed concern about board composition and refreshment, and this increased scrutiny could have an impact on proxy voting decisions.
What are investors saying about board composition and refreshment?
Sources: BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities, February 2015; California Public Employees’ Retirement System, Statement of Investment Policy for Global Governance, March 16, 2015; State Street Global Advisors’ US Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, March 2015.
Proxy advisors’ views on board composition—recent developments
Proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services’s (ISS) governance rating system QuickScore 3.0 views tenure of more than nine years as potentially compromising director independence. ISS’s 2016 voting policy updates include a clarification that a “small number” of long-tenured directors (those with more than nine years of board service) does not negatively impact the company’s QuickScore governance rating, though ISS does not provide specifics on the acceptable quantity.
Glass Lewis’ updated 2016 voting policies address nominating committee performance. Glass Lewis may now recommend against the nominating and governance committee chair “where the board’s failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company’s poor performance.” Glass Lewis believes that shareholders are best served when boards are diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, as well as on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure, and culture.
How can directors proactively address board refreshment?
The first step in refreshing your board is deciding whether to add a new board member and determining which director attributes are most important. One way to do this is to conduct a self-assessment. Directors also have a number of mechanisms to address board refreshment. For one, boards can consider new ways of recruiting director candidates. They can take charge of their composition through active and strategic succession planning. And they can also use robust self-assessments to gauge individual director performance—and replace directors who are no longer contributing.
Act on the results of board assessments. Boards should use their annual self-assessment to help spark discussions about board refreshment. Having a robust board assessment process can offer insights into how the board is functioning and how individual directors are performing. The board can use this process to identify directors that may be underperforming or whose skills may no longer match what the company needs. It’s incumbent upon the board chair or lead director and the chair of the nominating and governance committee to address any difficult matters that may arise out of the assessment process, including having challenging conversations with underperforming directors. In addition, some investors are asking about the results of board assessments. CalPERS and CalSTRS have both called on boards to disclose more information about the impact of their self-assessments on board composition decisions. [8]
Take a strategic approach to director succession planning. Director succession planning is essential to promoting board refreshment. But, less than half of directors “very much” believe their board is spending enough time on director succession. [9] In board succession planning, it’s important to think about the current state of the board, the tenure of current members, and the company’s future needs. Boards should identify possible director candidates based upon anticipated turnover and director retirements.
Broaden the pool of candidates. Often, boards recruit directors by soliciting recommendations from other sitting directors, which can be a small pool. Forward-looking boards expand the universe of potential qualified candidates by looking outside of the C-suite, considering investor recommendations, and by looking for candidates outside the corporate world—from the retired military, academia, and large non-profits. This will provide a broader pool of individuals with more diverse backgrounds who can be great board contributors.
In sum, evaluating board composition and refreshing the board may be challenging at times, but it’s increasingly a topic of concern for many investors, and it’s critical to the board’s ability to stay current, effective, and focused on enhancing long-term shareholder value.
The complete publication, including footnotes and appendix, is available here.
Endnotes:
[1] United States Government Accountability Office, “Corporate Boards: Strategies to Address Representation of Women Include Federal Disclosure Requirements,” December 2015. (go back)
*Paula Loop is Leader of the Governance Insights Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Ms. Loop and Paul DeNicola. The complete publication, including footnotes and appendix, is available here.
Voici un article très intéressant, récemment publié dans Harvard Business Review par Steven Boivie, Scott D. Graffin, Abbie Oliver et Michael C. Withers, qui montre, de façon convaincante, que, pour un haut dirigeant, le fait de siéger à un CA externe augmente ses chances de promotion dans son entreprise.
Lorsque l’on sait que le travail des administrateurs des entreprises publiques (cotées) est de plus en plus exigeant, l’on peut se demander pourquoi un PDG (CEO) accepte de siéger à un conseil d’administration d’une autre entreprise !
Les auteurs de l’étude ont trouvé des réponses à cette question. Les hauts dirigeants des entreprises de la S&P 1500 qui siègent à d’autres CA augmentent de 44 % leurs chances d’accéder à un poste de CEO dans une entreprise de la S&P 1500, comparativement à leurs collègues qui ne siègent pas à d’autres CA. Et, même s’ils n’ont pas de promotion, la recherche montre que leur rémunération s’accroît de 13 %.
So what do these findings mean for today’s boards of directors and aspiring CEOs? The evidence shows that board appointments increase an executive’s visibility and give him/her access to unique contacts and learning opportunities. Further, these opportunities translate into tangible economic benefits, specifically promotions and raises, which help explain why a sane person would choose to sit on a board.
La recherche d’administrateurs avec un profil de CEO ou de haut dirigeant est de plus en plus fréquente et les firmes de recrutement considèrent que l’obtention de promotions est un signe de leadership notable.
L’étude conclut que, contrairement à la croyance populaire, le fait de siéger à des conseils constitue un atout pour un haut dirigeant, un moyen susceptible d’accroître ses opportunités de carrière.
Il semble bien que le haut dirigeant considère qu’il y a un avantage personnel réel à exercer la fonction d’administrateur dans une autre entreprise. Mais, le CA de l’entreprise sur lequel il siège en retire-t-il un avantage aussi appréciable ?
Ultimately board service is a key professional development tool in grooming potential CEOs that executives and boards alike are beginning to recognize and value.
More than 25 years ago, William Sahlman wrote the HBR article “Why Sane People Shouldn’t Serve on Public Boards,” in which he compared serving on a board to driving without a seatbelt, that it was just too risky—to their time, reputations, and finances—for too little reward.
Board service has always been very demanding. When Warren Buffett retired from Coca-Cola’s board in 2006, he said he no longer had the time necessary. When you consider all of the retreats, travel, reading, meeting prep time, transactions, and committee meetings involved, it is a wonder anyone serves at all.
So why would a busy executive agree to sit on a board? Why is there is a cottage industry of executive search firms focusing on “reverse board searches,” where they proactively work to place executives on outside corporate boards? What do executives gain from serving on boards?
This question was at the heart of a recent study we conducted that is forthcoming at the Academy of Management Journal. In an effort to explore executives’ motivations for serving on boards, we looked at how board service is evaluated in the executive labor market. Specifically we studied whether or not board service increased an executive’s likelihood of receiving a promotion, becoming a CEO, and/or receiving a pay increase.
We hypothesized that being a board director would help an executive in two main ways: First, sitting on a board serves as an important signal or “seal of approval,” for an executive. It means that other people think this executive has potential and value as a result of being selected to serve on a board. Second, board service is an avenue for an executive to gain access to unique knowledge, skills, and connections, so firms actively use external board appointments as a way to groom and develop executives. As Mary Cranston, former CEO and Chairman of Pillsbury, LLP said in an interview, “Being on that board really helped me develop as a CEO because I had another CEO to watch. It was an incredible leadership school for me. On a board you’re together a lot, and you’re working on problems together and you have a shared fiduciary duty, so it creates very tight bonds of friendship.” Similarly, Sempra CEO Debra L. Reed has also said that sitting on the board of another company is “better than an M.B.A.”
…
*Steven Boivie is an associate professor in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University, Scott D. Graffin is an associate professor at the University of Georgia’s Terry College of Business and also an International Research Fellow at Oxford University’s Centre for Corporate Reputation, Abbie G. Oliver is a doctoral candidate in strategic management at the University of Georgia’s Terry College of Business, Michael C. Withers is an assistant professor of management in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University.
Comment votre organisation peut-elle mieux contrôler les risques liés à ses tiers ? C’est ce que vous apprend ce document de Deloitte dans un numéro du bulletin « À l’ordre du jour du conseil ».
Encore récemment, le risque lié aux fournisseurs se limitait pour ainsi dire à la qualité des produits ou des matières premières fournies ou à la possibilité qu’un fournisseur ne respecte pas ses engagements d’approvisionnement et perturbe ainsi la production. Aujourd’hui, les entreprises sont de plus en plus tenues responsables du comportement de leurs fournisseurs, que ce soit en ce qui a trait aux pratiques en matière de santé, de sécurité et d’environnement, au respect des lois sur le travail et autres règlements, à l’utilisation de la propriété intellectuelle, à l’approvisionnement en matières premières, à la corruption et plus encore. Et comme les clients ne font pas de différence entre une organisation et ses fournisseurs, les actions de tiers peuvent également nuire à la réputation de l’organisation ou à la confiance de ses clients.
Voici un aperçu de ce document, notamment les questions que les administrateurs devraient se poser eu égard aux risques reliés aux entités tierces. On y présente également le point de vue de José Écio Pereira, administrateur de compagnie et associé retraité de Deloitte.
L’usine d’un fournisseur s’effondre, faisant des centaines de victimes parmi les travailleurs, dont certains sont des enfants. Des milliers de fichiers contenant des données sur les cartes de crédit de clients et d’autres renseignements financiers confidentiels font l’objet de piratage d’un tiers autorisé à accéder au réseau de l’entreprise. Un fournisseur a utilisé des matériaux contaminés et une vaste campagne de rappel visant certains produits doit être lancée.
Encore récemment, le risque lié aux fournisseurs se limitait pour ainsi dire à la qualité des produits ou des matières premières fournis ou à la possibilité qu’un fournisseur ne respecte pas ses engagements d’approvisionnement et perturbe ainsi la production.
De nos jours, des lois comme la Foreign Corrupt Practices Act aux États-Unis, la Bribery Act au Royaume-Uni et d’autres encore font en sorte que les entreprises sont de plus en plus souvent tenues responsables des agissements de leurs fournisseurs. De même, les clients ne distinguent pas toujours une entreprise de ses fournisseurs. Pour eux, l’entreprise est celle qui leur fournit une solution ; s’il survient un problème, c’est elle qu’ils tiennent responsable, et c’est donc sa réputation qui est en péril. C’est pourquoi les entreprises doivent maintenant élargir leur surveillance des risques à l’entreprise étendue1 et observer chez leurs tiers fournisseurs les pratiques de santé, de sécurité et d’environnement, le respect des lois sur le travail et autres règlements, l’utilisation de la propriété intellectuelle, l’approvisionnement en matières premières, la corruption et plus encore.
Questions que les administrateurs devraient poser
(1) Notre entreprise a-t-elle évalué de manière exhaustive son risque lié aux tiers et, si c’est le cas, quelles en sont les composantes les plus déterminantes pour l’entreprise à l’heure actuelle ?
(2) Quels sont les tiers susceptibles d’entraver le plus gravement la capacité de l’entreprise à atteindre ses buts et objectifs stratégiques ?
(3) Que faisons-nous pour gérer et surveiller de manière proactive le risque et son évolution au sein de notre entreprise étendue ? Quels outils de gestion du risque utilisons-nous ?
(4) Qui est responsable de la gestion du risque lié aux tiers dans notre entreprise ?
(5) À quelle fréquence la direction informe-t-elle le conseil d’administration de son évaluation des risques de tiers et du processus mis en place pour atténuer ces risques ? Cette information est-elle suffisamment détaillée et présentée en temps opportun ?
Le point de vue d’un administrateur
José Écio Pereira est membre des conseils d’administration de Votorantim Cimentos, Fibria et Gafisa et a été membre du conseil de BRMalls ; il préside également le comité d’audit de Votorantim Cimentos et de Gafisa. Il est le propriétaire fondateur de JEPereira Consultoria em Gestão de Negócios et a été associé, maintenant à la retraite, de Deloitte Brésil.
Le risque lié aux entités tierces figure-t-il à l’ordre du jour des conseils d’administration ?
Les conseils dont je connais le fonctionnement effectuent une évaluation du risque tous les trois ou quatre mois. Le risque lié aux entités tierces à proprement parler n’est pas un point distinct à l’ordre du jour, mais nous l’abordons dans notre analyse des risques. Ceci dit, il est clair que de nos jours, les conseils accordent plus d’attention au risque lié aux tiers qu’il y a à peine deux ans. Au Brésil, c’est principalement à cause de la loi anticorruption (Clean Company Act) de 2014. En vertu de cette loi, les entreprises peuvent être tenues responsables des activités illégales ou de la conduite contraire à l’éthique de leurs tiers fournisseurs.
Depuis que cette loi est en vigueur, les administrateurs examinent de beaucoup plus près les risques associés aux tiers fournisseurs des entreprises qu’ils supervisent. Ils examinent les pratiques de leurs fournisseurs en matière de conditions de travail, de normes pour les employés, de mesures de santé et de sécurité et d’autres facteurs pour s’assurer que tous respectent les normes de l’entreprise qui a fait appel à eux. La santé financière des fournisseurs est un autre paramètre fort important, surtout au vu de la situation économique actuelle au Brésil. Les entreprises veulent être sûres que leurs fournisseurs paient leurs impôts et respectent leurs obligations juridiques, en particulier dans leurs relations avec leurs employés, et qu’ils seront à même de poursuivre leur exploitation.
Les administrateurs examinent-ils les relations avec des tiers dans le contexte du cyberrisque ?
Je pense que les entreprises dont les systèmes sont connectés avec ceux de tiers fournisseurs à des fins d’approvisionnement ou de logistique sont conscientes de l’existence du cyberrisque et prennent les mesures nécessaires pour s’en prémunir. Mais ces mesures sont généralement liées aux échanges de produits et de services.
Dans une perspective plus vaste, je dirais que la plupart des entreprises ne disposent pas de systèmes d’information appropriés pour gérer leurs relations avec des tiers. Les systèmes de la plupart des entreprises ne sont pas assez sophistiqués pour se connecter aux systèmes des fournisseurs ; les entreprises ont recours à divers outils pour gérer leurs relations avec des tiers et souvent, ces outils ne sont pas très bien intégrés entre eux. Les relations sont par exemple gérées à l’aide de plusieurs systèmes, y compris des chiffriers et des outils manuels qui ne sont pas du tout conçus pour cet usage.
À qui devrait revenir la responsabilité des tiers fournisseurs ?
Le conseil d’administration doit jouer un rôle de supervision et faire en sorte que les cadres supérieurs disposent d’un processus de gestion du risque lié aux tiers.
Au Brésil, c’est souvent le service de l’approvisionnement qui reste responsable des problèmes opérationnels et qui vérifie que les produits et les services sont bien fournis selon les modalités du contrat conclu avec le tiers fournisseur. De plus, nombre d’entreprises mettent aussi sur pied une fonction particulière chargée de la gestion des contrats conclus avec des tiers. La plupart des entreprises brésiliennes entretiennent plusieurs relations avec des tiers : services alimentaires, sécurité, transports, fabrication. Toutes sont essentielles au fonctionnement d’une entreprise au quotidien. Les entreprises sont donc nombreuses à affecter davantage de ressources à la gestion efficace des contrats.
Certaines entreprises surveillent constamment leurs fournisseurs pour s’assurer que les contrats sont observés à la lettre. Bon nombre exigent que leurs fournisseurs autoévaluent leur conformité contractuelle, en plus d’effectuer des audits périodiques et d’autres tests afin de vérifier le respect des contrats. Toutes ces mesures représentent un travail colossal et parfois, il faut y consacrer une fonction administrative particulière.
Je vais vous relater un exemple authentique. L’une des sociétés avec lesquelles je collabore est en train de construire de nouvelles installations de grande envergure. C’est un investissement de près de 2 milliards de dollars américains, et c’est un projet d’environ : 18 mois. À l’heure actuelle, la construction vient juste de commencer. Plusieurs fournisseurs y travaillent, que ce soit pour la sécurité du chantier ou pour l’approvisionnement en matériel ou son installation.
L’entreprise a mis sur pied un comité directeur de projet qui comprend entre autres des membres de l’équipe de direction. Ce comité se réunit au moins une fois tous les : 15 jours, et les relations avec les fournisseurs reviennent justement sans cesse à son ordre du jour. C’est beaucoup plus qu’une question de diligence raisonnable ; le comité procède aussi au suivi constant des tiers fournisseurs.
Le comité directeur présente chaque mois au conseil l’état d’avancement du projet. Le rapport d’avancement consigne tout ce qui a trait aux tiers fournisseurs : le défaut de verser les retenues sur salaires des employés, de payer des impôts fonciers ou des avantages sociaux, la violation des règles de santé et de sécurité sur le chantier, aussi bien que les problèmes opérationnels comme le non-respect des échéances par un fournisseur ou la qualité insuffisante des services qu’il a rendus. Lorsque des problèmes surgissent, le comité de projet les reporte sur la « carte du risque » du projet, et la direction prend les mesures de suivi nécessaires, y compris l’application des pénalités contractuelles, le cas échéant.
Les entreprises devraient-elles aussi définir leurs propres normes déontologiques à l’endroit des tiers fournisseurs ?
Après l’entrée en vigueur de la loi brésilienne anticorruption, la plupart des entreprises ont passé en revue leurs normes déontologiques et leur code de conduite ; l’une des grandes nouveautés, c’est qu’elles y ont ajouté des procédures et des règles qui s’adressent aux tiers fournisseurs.
Par le passé, toutes les activités encadrant les règles de déontologie, comme la formation et les ateliers, étaient entreprises dans une perspective interne. Les normes s’appliquaient au personnel de l’entreprise, mais ne dépassaient pas les limites de celle-ci pour viser également les fournisseurs externes. Maintenant, la portée s’est élargie et les règles régissant les employés, les mesures de santé et de sécurité, les conditions de travail, l’obéissance aux lois, etc., englobent aussi les tiers fournisseurs. Les entreprises ont également étendu leurs programmes de formation et invitent leurs fournisseurs à leurs séminaires et ateliers où seront expliqués les règles et les processus de surveillance.
Il faut se méfier des problèmes de gouvernance liés au syndrome du « chic type » qui prévaut encore trop souvent dans les OBNL.
Les administrateurs des OBNL ont autant de responsabilités que ceux des autres types d’entreprises. Trop souvent, ceux-ci n’exercent pas la vigilance requise pour la bonne gestion de l’entité.
Les administrateurs n’osent pas prendre de décisions difficiles parce que les personnes impliquées sont bien connues de la communauté et, en conséquence, ils doivent faire preuve d’une tolérance accrue à leur égard…
C’est une erreur d’administrer une entreprise sur une présomption de bon gars (ou de bonne fille) du DG et des dirigeants en général. Il en va de même pour les administrateurs, et même pour le président du conseil.
L’article d’Eugene Fram* fait état des éléments importants à considérer plus particulièrement dans la gouvernance des OBNL.
At coffee a friend serving on a nonprofit board reported plans to resign from the board shortly. His complaints centered on the board’s unwillingness to take critical actions necessary to help the organization grow.
In specific, the board failed to take any action to remove a director who wasn’t attending meetings, but he refused to resign. His term had another year to go, and the board had a bylaws obligation to summarily remove him from the board. However, a majority of directors decided such action would hurt the director’s feelings. They were unwittingly accepting the “nice-guy” approach in place of taking professional action.
In another instance the board refused to sue a local contractor who did not perform as agreed. The “elephant” was that the board didn’t think that legally challenging a local person was appropriate, an issue raised by an influential director. However, nobody informed the group that in being “nice guys,” they could become legally liable, if somebody became injured as a result of their inaction.
Over the years, I have observed many boards with elephants around that have caused significant problems to a nonprofit organization. Some include:
• Selecting a board chair on the basis of personal appearance and personality instead of managerial and organizational competence. Be certain to vet the experience and potential of candidates carefully. Beside working background (accounting, marketing, human resources, etc.), seek harder to define characteristics such as leadership, critical thinking ability, and position flexibility.
• Failure to delegate sufficient managerial responsibility to the CEO because the board has enjoyed micromanagement activities for decades. To make a change, make certain new directors recognize the problem, and they eventually are willing to take action to alleviate the problem. Example: One board refused to share its latest strategic plan with it newly appointed ED.
• Engaging a weak local CEO because the board wanted to avoid moving expenses. Be certain that local candidates are vetted as carefully as others and that costs of relocation are not the prime reason for their selection.
• Be certain that the board is not “rubber-stamping” proposals of a strong director or CEO. Where major failures occur, be certain that the board or outside counsel determines the causes by conducting a postmortem analysis.
Retaining an ED who is only focusing on the status quo and “minding the store.” The internal accounting systems, human resources and results are all more than adequate. But they are far below what can be done for clients if current and/or potential resources were creatively employed.
* A substantial portion of the board is not reasonably familiar with fund accounting or able to recognize financial “red flags.” Example: One CFO kept delaying the submission of an accounting accounts aging report for over a year. He was carrying as substantial number of noncollectable accounts as an asset. It required the nonprofit to hire high-priced forensic accountants to straighten out the mess. The CEO & CFO were fired, but the board that was also to be blamed for being “nice guys,” and it remained in place. If the organization has gone bankrupt, I would guess that the secretary-of-state would have summarily removed part or all of the board, a reputation loss for all. The board has an obligation to assure stakeholders that the CFO’s knowledge is up to date and to make certain the CEO takes action on obvious “red flags”.
* Inadequate vetting processes that take directors’ time, especially in relation to family and friends of current directors. Example: Accepting a single reference check, such as comments from the candidate’s spouse. This actually happened, and the nominations committee made light of the action.
What can be done about the elephant in the boardroom?
Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to use, no pun intended! These types of circumstances seem to be in the DNA of volunteers who traditionally avoid any form of conflict, which will impinge upon their personal time or cause conflict with other directors. A cultural change is required to recruit board members who understand director responsibilities, or are willing to learn about them on the job. I have seen a wide variety of directors such, as ministers and social workers, successfully meet the challenges related to this type of the board learning. Most importantly, never underestimate the power of culture when major changes are being considered.
In the meantime, don’t be afraid to ask naive question which forces all to question assumptions, as in Why are we doing the particular thing? Have we really thought it through and considered other possibilities? http://bit.ly/1eNKgtw
Directors need to have passion for the organization’s mission. However, they also need to have the prudence to help the nonprofit board perform with professionalism.
*Eugene Fram, Professor Emeritus at Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’extrait d’une lettre que Warren Buffett fait parvenir annuellement à tous les actionnaires de Berkshire Hathaway. Les énoncés de cette lettre sont issus des rapports annuels de la société.
Cette lettre réfère aux orientations de l’entreprise eu égard à la sélection des administrateurs siégeant au conseil d’administration de Berkshire Hathaway, mais aussi, je suppose, aux nombreux conseils d’administration dans lesquels la société est représentée. Quels enseignements peut-on retirer de l’approche Berkshire, et qui peut expliquer, en partie, le succès phénoménal de cette entreprise ?
Ce que le comité de sélection recherche, ce sont des administrateurs foncièrement indépendants, c’est-à-dire des personnes qui ont la volonté, l’expérience et les compétences pour poser les questions clés aux membres de la direction. Selon Buffett la vraie indépendance est très rare.
Le secret pour assurer cette indépendance est de choisir des personnes dont les intérêts sont alignés sur les intérêts supérieurs des actionnaires, et solidement ancrés dans la détention d’une partie significative de l’actionnariat (pas d’options ou d’unités d’action avec restriction ou différées).
Également, la rémunération des administrateurs de Berkshire est minimale ; selon la doctrine Buffett, aucun administrateur ne devrait compter sur une rémunération susceptible de constituer une part importante de ses revenus et ainsi de compromettre son indépendance (on parle ici de rémunérations globales de l’ordre de 250 000 $ et plus…).
La sélection des administrateurs repose donc sur quatre critères fondamentaux : (1) l’orientation propriétaire (2) l’expérience et la connaissance des affaires (3) l’intérêt pour l’entreprise et (4) l’indépendance complète vis-à-vis du management.
La lettre se termine par ce propos empreint de sagesse… et de simplicité.
At Berkshire, we are in thespecialized activity of running a business well, and therefore we seek businessjudgment.
Je suis reconnaissant à Henry D. Wolfe, investisseur privé dans le capital de risque et dans les fonds LBO, pour avoir partagé cette lettre sur LinkedIn.
Bonne lecture !
Warren Buffett: Annual Letter Comments Regarding the Selection of Corporate Directors
True independence – meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish – is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is also rare. The place to look for it is amonghigh-grade people whose interests are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders – and are inline in a very big way.
We’ve made that search at Berkshire. We now have eleven directors and each of them, combined with members of their families, owns more than $4 million of Berkshire stock. Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many years. In the case of six of the eleven, family ownership amounts to at least hundreds of millions and dates back at least three decades. All eleven directors purchased their holdingsin the market just as you did; we’ve never passed out options or restricted shares. Charlie and I lovesuch honest-to-God ownership. After all, who ever washes a rental car?
In addition, director fees at Berkshire are nominal (as my son, Howard, periodically reminds me). Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all eleven is proportionately the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder. And it always will be…
The bottom line for our directors: You win, they win big; you lose, they lose big. Our approach might be called owner-capitalism. We know of no better way to engender true independence. (This structure does not guarantee perfect behavior, however: I’ve sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were rubber-stamped.)
In addition to being independent, directors should have business savvy, a shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company. The rarest of these qualities is business savvy – and if it is lacking, the other two are of little help. Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no real understanding of business. That’s no sin; they may shine elsewhere. But they don’t belong on corporate boards.
In selecting a new director, we were guided by our long-standing criteria, which are that board members be owner-oriented, business-savvy, interested and truly independent. I say “truly” because many directors who are now deemed independent by various authorities and observers are far from that, relying heavily as they do on directors’ fees to maintain their standard of living. These payments, which come in many forms, often range between $150,000 and $250,000 annually, compensation that may approach or even exceed all other income of the “independent” director. And – surprise, surprise – director compensation has soared in recent years, pushed up by recommendations from corporate America’s favorite consultant, Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo. (The name may be phony, but the action it conveys is not.)
Charlie and I believe our four criteria are essential if directors are to do their job – which, by law, is to faithfully represent owners. Yet these criteria are usually ignored. Instead, consultants and CEOs seeking board candidates will often say, “We’re looking for a woman,” or “a Hispanic,” or “someone from abroad,” or what have you. It sometimes sounds as if the mission is to stock Noah’s ark. Over the years I’ve been queried many times about potential directors and have yet to hear anyone ask, “Does he think like an intelligent owner?”
The questions I instead get would sound ridiculous to someone seeking candidates for, say, a football team, or an arbitration panel or a military command. In those cases, the selectors would look for people who had the specific talents and attitudes that were required for a specialized job. At Berkshire, we are in thespecialized activity of running a business well, and therefore we seek businessjudgment.
L’organisation Corporate Practice Commentatorvient de publier la liste des meilleurs articles en gouvernance, plus précisément ceux qui concernent le marché des actions.
La sélection a été faite par les professeurs qui se spécialisent en droit corporatif. Cette année plus de 540 articles ont été analysés.
La liste inclut trois articles de la Faculté du Harvard Law School issus du programme en gouvernance corporative dont Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates et Jesse Fried font partie.
Voici la liste en ordre alphabétique.
Bonne recherche !
Les dix articles américains les plus marquants en gouvernance corporative en 2015
Bartlett, Robert P. III. Do Institutional Investors Value the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action? Evidence from Investors’ Trading Behavior following Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 44 J. Legal Stud. 183-227 (2015).
Bebchuk, Lucian, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang. The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism. 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085-1155 (2015).
Bratton, William W. and Michael L. Wachter. Bankers and Chancellors. 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1-84 (2014).
Cain, Matthew D. and Steven Davidoff Solomon. A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation. 100 Iowa L. Rev. 465-500 (2015).
Casey, Anthony J. The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement. 124 Yale L. J. 2680-2744 (2015).
Coates, John C. IV. Cost-benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications. 124 Yale L .J. 882-1011 (2015).
Edelman, Paul H., Randall S. Thomas and Robert B. Thompson. Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism. 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1359-1434 (2014).
Fisch, Jill E., Sean J. Griffith and Steven Davidoff Solomon. Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform. 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557-624 (2015).
Fried, Jesse M. The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-term Shareholders. 124 Yale L. J. 1554-1627 (2015).
Judge, Kathryn. Intermediary Influence. 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573-642 (2015).
Voici une liste des billets en gouvernance les plus populaires publiés sur mon blogue au premier trimestre de 2016.
Cette liste de 15 billets constitue, en quelque sorte, un sondage de l’intérêt manifesté par des milliers de personnes sur différents thèmes de la gouvernance des sociétés. On y retrouve des points de vue bien étayés sur des sujets d’actualité relatifs aux conseils d’administration.
Que retrouve-t-on dans ce blogue et quels en sont les objectifs?
Ce blogue fait l’inventaire des documents les plus pertinents et les plus récents en gouvernance des entreprises. La sélection des billets est le résultat d’une veille assidue des articles de revue, des blogues et des sites web dans le domaine de la gouvernance, des publications scientifiques et professionnelles, des études et autres rapports portant sur la gouvernance des sociétés, au Canada et dans d’autres pays, notamment aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en France, en Europe, et en Australie.
Je fais un choix parmi l’ensemble des publications récentes et pertinentes et je commente brièvement la publication. L’objectif de ce blogue est d’être la référence en matière de documentation en gouvernance dans le monde francophone, en fournissant au lecteur une mine de renseignements récents (les billets) ainsi qu’un outil de recherche simple et facile à utiliser pour répertorier les publications en fonction des catégories les plus pertinentes.
Quelques statistiques à propos du blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé
Ce blogue a été initié le 15 juillet 2011 et, à date, il a accueilli plus de 185000 visiteurs. Le blogue a progressé de manière tout à fait remarquable et, au30 avril 2016, il était fréquenté pardes milliers devisiteurs par mois. Depuis le début,j’aiœuvré à la publication de 1355billets.
En 2016, j’estime qu’environ 5000 personnes par mois visiteront le blogue afin de s’informer sur diverses questions de gouvernance. À ce rythme, on peut penser qu’environ 60000 personnesvisiteront le site du blogue en 2016.
On note que 80 % des billets sont partagés par l’intermédiaire de différents moteurs de recherche et 20 % par LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook et Tumblr.
Voici un aperçu du nombre de visiteurs par pays :
Canada (64 %)
France, Suisse, Belgique (20 %)
Maghreb [Maroc, Tunisie, Algérie] (5 %)
Autres pays de l’Union européenne (3 %)
États-Unis [3 %]
Autres pays de provenance (5 %)
En 2014, le blogue Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé a été inscrit dans deux catégories distinctes du concours canadien Made in Blog [MiB Awards] : Business et Marketing et médias sociaux. Le blogue a été retenu parmi les dix [10] finalistes à l’échelle canadienne dans chacune de ces catégories, le seul en gouvernance. Il n’y avait pas de concours en 2015.
Vos commentaires sont toujours grandement appréciés. Je réponds toujours à ceux-ci.
N.B. Vous pouvez vous inscrire ou faire des recherches en allant au bas de cette page.
Bonne lecture !
Voici les Tops 15 du premier trimestre de 2016 du blogue en gouvernance
Le séminaire à la maîtrise de Gouvernance de l’entreprise (DRT-7022) dispensé par Ivan Tchotourian*, professeur en droit des affaires de la Faculté de droit de l’Université Laval, entend apporter aux étudiants une réflexion originale sur les liens entre la sphère économico-juridique, la gouvernance des entreprises et les enjeux sociétaux actuels.
Le séminaire s’interroge sur le contenu des normes de gouvernance et leur pertinence dans un contexte de profonds questionnements des modèles économique et financier. Dans le cadre de ce séminaire, il est proposé aux étudiants de l’hiver 2016 d’avoir une expérience originale de publication de leurs travaux de recherche qui ont porté sur des sujets d’actualité de gouvernance d’entreprise.
Cette publication numérique entend contribuer au partage des connaissances en gouvernance à une large échelle. Le présent billet expose le résultat des recherches de Margaux Mortéo et de Léonie Pamerleau sur les liens entre la rémunération des dirigeants, les effets de la démission du PDG et les questions éthiques sous-jacentes.
Dans le cadre de ce billet, les auteurs reviennent sur l’affaire Volkswagen, notamment sur la légitimité des parachutes dorés dans les cas de démission « obligée ». Ils se questionnent également sur les valeurs éthiques dans de tels cas.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont appréciés.
Éthique, démission et parachutes dorés | une délicate alchimie
par
Margaux Mortéo et Léonie Pamerleau
La légitimité des parachutes dorés : Le cas de Volkswagen
Volkswagen, une entreprise automobile leader sur le marché, a fait face à l’un des plus gros scandales dans ce secteur[1]. À la suite de la découverte des tricheries utilisées par la firme afin de commercialiser des véhicules diesel tout en cachant leurs effets polluants, le PDG de Volkswagen (Martin Winterkorn) a décidé le 23 septembre 2015 de démissionner de son poste. Or, cette démission, qui s’inscrit dans un processus quasi habituel des dirigeants face à de telles circonstances, ne semble pas si légitime au regard de certains aspects en raison de l’énorme parachute doré, aussi appelé golden parachute. Cela soulève en effet plusieurs aspects, notamment la responsabilité d’un dirigeant face à des dégâts causés à l’environnement et ce que cela engendre au regard de la réputation de l’entreprise, « actif stratégique le plus important sur le plan de la création de valeur » [2].
Une démission en quête de légitimité ?
Cette pratique est loin d’être un cas isolé. En juillet dernier, le PDG de Toshiba (Hisao Tanaka) a démissionné de ses fonctions suite à un scandale comptable [3]. Cette pratique démontre une quête de légitimité de la part des puissants dirigeants de sociétés. La raison est simple : ces derniers semblent entachés d’une immunité du fait de leur position, mais décident cependant de céder leur place pour le bien-être de leur entreprise, en portant sur leurs épaules le poids de l’entière responsabilité. Martin Winterkorn a même déclaré que son départ avait pour but de permettre à Volkswagen de « (…) prendre un nouveau départ ».
Cette décision, très médiatisée, tente de redorer l’image de l’entreprise, sans compter le fait que le PDG n’a pas tout perdu dans l’affaire.
L’étonnante attribution d’un parachute doré confortable
Démissionner semble honorable, mais quand Martin Winterkorn a la garantie d’obtenir près de 28,5 millions d’euros et de prétendre jusqu’à 60 millions d’euros, les objectifs de son départ peuvent avoir le mérite d’être revus. Bien que paraissant légitime, la démission d’un dirigeant de société cotée est souvent accompagnée de golden parachute. Ce qui est intéressant c’est que le contrat qui instituait Winterkorn à la tête d’une des plus importantes sociétés automobiles prévoyait que ce parachute doré lui serait accordé… quelles que soient les raisons de son départ.
La presse n’a pas manqué à son devoir d’information du public en dénonçant cette situation d’autant plus que « (…) les parachutes dorés ainsi que les bonus et primes des dirigeants sont de plus en plus élevés et dépassent ce que l’on peut imaginer » [4] et que l’échec (et le départ) d’un dirigeant fait « (…) partie des risques normaux du métier de patron » [5].
Face à d’énormes scandales, comme celui de Volkswagen, il est normal de se questionner sur la légitimité de telles sommes. Bien que le dirigeant ait pour ambition un nouveau départ de la société, pourquoi dans ce cas bénéficier de bonus qui coûtent à la société ? L’illusion est bonne, mais elle n’est somme toute pas parfaite. Martin Winterkorn a laissé croire que son intérêt n’était porté que vers les actionnaires, les administrateurs et les parties prenantes, mais le fait de pouvoir prétendre à 60 millions d’euros remet tout en cause.
Et l’éthique dans tout cela ?
Si la loi permet de telles sommes de départ, et ce même en cas de fraude, quand est-il de l’éthique ? Ces indemnités de départ, quel que soit leur nom sont-elles légitimes dans un contexte de prise de conscience de la responsabilité sociétale des entreprises (RSE) ? Les parties prenantes sont-elles respectées face à ce genre de comportement ?
Sachant qu’à l’heure actuelle il est impossible d’ignorer complètement les enjeux entourant la RSE, il est normal de se questionner relativement à la légitimité de parachutes dorés [6]. Dans le cas de Volkswagen plus précisément, il est possible de voir les actionnaires se lever et tenter d’empêcher le président d’obtenir son golden parachute, notamment au regard des résultats boursiers moyens de l’entreprise [7].
Vont-ils le faire ? Ne sont-ce pas aux administrateurs eux-mêmes à réagir [8] ? Tant de questions et d’interrogations en réponse au scandale du géant automobile allemand restent en attente de réponses.
[2] Olivier Mondet, « La réputation de l’entreprise est-elle un actif spécifique ? », CREG Versailles, vendredi 21 mars 2014, en ligne : http://www.creg.ac-versailles.fr/spip.php?article732 (consulté le 30 novembre 2015).
[5] J. El Ahdab, « Les parachutes dorés et autres indemnités conventionnelles de départ des dirigeants : approche pluridisciplinaire et comparée », Rev. Sociétés, 2004, p. 18.
[6] Christine Neau-Leduc, « La responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise : quels enjeux juridique ? » Droit social, 2006, p. 956.
[7] Jena McGregor, « Outgoing Volkswagen CEO’s exit package could top $67 million », Washington Post, 24 septembre 2015.
[8] « Boards are responsible for limiting excess pay », Financial Times, 17 avril 2016, en ligne : http://www.ft.com/cms/s/194a5de6-02fa-11e6-af1d-c47326021344, Authorised=false.html?siteedition=uk&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F194a5de6-02fa-11e6-af1d-c47326021344.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&iab=barrier-app#ixzz4677JCobn (consulté le 18 avril 2015).
______________________
*Ivan Tchotourian, professeur en droit des affaires, codirecteur du Centre d’Études en Droit Économique (CÉDÉ), membre du Groupe de recherche en droit des services financiers (www.grdsf.ulaval.ca), Faculté de droit, Université Laval.
Voici un extrait d’un billet d’Eugene Fram, professeur émérite au Saunders College of Business de l’Institut de technologie de Rochester. Celui-ci nous recommande un guide présentant les caractéristiques d’une matrice de recrutement d’administrateurs d’OBNL et il nous rappelle les principales compétences et habiletés généralement requises :
Expériences dans des fonctions de direction
Expérience dans le secteur d’activité
Qualités reconnues de leader
Compréhension du rôle de la gouvernance
Compétences en matière de stratégie
Expertise dans certains domaines spécialisés (comptabilité, GRH, affaires juridiques, marketing, etc.)
Autres connaissances spécifiques à l’organisation
Afin d’avoir plus d’information sur le sujet des matrices de compétences d’administrateurs, veuillez vous référer à l’article paru sur le site de eganassociates.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, un extrait du billet d’Eugene Fram.
There’s never enough to say about the selection of nonprofit board members. Following my last post on board behaviors and cultures I ran across a guide fo desirable skills/abilities for “for-profit” directors. From this list, I suggest the following additions to the recruitment matrices of 21st century nonprofit board candidates to improve board productivity*. Those included will have:
• Executive and Non-Executive Experiences: These include planners with broad perspectives needed to have visionary outlooks, a well as persons with unusually strong dedication to the organization’s mission. It may include a senior executive from a business organization and a person who has had extensive client level experience. Examples for an association for the blind could be the human resources VP for a Fortune 500 corporation and/or a visually impaired professor at a local university.
• Industry Experience or Knowledge: An active or retired executive who has or is working in the same or allied field. However, those who can be competitive with the nonprofit for fund development could then present a significant conflict of interest.
• Leadership: Several directors should be selected on the bases of their leadership skills/abilities in business or other nonprofit organizations. Having too many with these qualifications may lead to internal board conflict, especially if they have strong personalities.
• Governance: Every board member should have a detailed understanding of the role of governance, their overview, financial/due diligence responsibilities and the potential personal liabilities if they fail to exercise due care. In practice, nonprofits draw from such a wide range of board backgrounds, one can only expect about one-quarter of most boards to have the requisite knowledge. But there are many nonprofit boards that I have encountered that even lack one person with the optimal board/management governance knowledge. Some become so involved with mission activities that they do what the leadership tells them when governance issues are raised. Example: One nonprofit the author encountered, with responsibilities for millions of dollars of assets, operated for 17 years without D&O insurance coverage because the board leadership considered it too costly.
• Strategic Thinking & Other Desirable Behavioral Competencies: Not every board member can be capable of or interested in strategic thinking. Their job experiences and educations require them to excel in operations, not envisioning the future. Consequently, every board needs several persons who have visionary experiences and high Emotional
Quotients (EQs.) Those with high EQs can be good team players because they are able to empathize with the emotion of others in the group. Finding board candidates with these abilities takes detailed interpersonal vetting because they do not appear on a resume.
• Subject Matter Expertise: Nonprofit Boards have had decades of experience in selecting board candidates by professional affiliations like businessperson, marketing expert, accountant, etc.
• Other Factors Relevant to the Particular Nonprofit: Examples: A nonprofit dedicated to improve the lives of children needs to seek a child psychology candidate. One focusing on seniors should seek a geriatric specialist.
Dans son édition d’avril 2016, le magazine Financier Worldwide présente une excellente analyse de la dynamique d’un conseil d’administration efficace. Pour l’auteur, il est important que le président du conseil soit habileté à exercer un niveau de saine tension entre les administrateurs et la direction de l’entreprise.
Il n’y a pas de place pour la complaisance au conseil. Les membres doivent comprendre que leur rôle est de veiller aux « intérêts supérieurs » de l’entreprise, notamment des propriétaires-actionnaires, mais aussi d’autres parties prenantes.
Le PDG de l’entreprise est recruté par le CA pour faire croître l’entreprise et exécuter une stratégie liée à son modèle d’affaires. Lui aussi doit travailler dans le meilleur intérêt des actionnaires… mais c’est la responsabilité fiduciaire du CA de s’en assurer en mettant en place les mécanismes de surveillance appropriés.
La théorie de l’agence stipule que le CA représente l’autorité souveraine de l’entreprise (puisqu’il possède la légitimité que lui confèrent les actionnaires). Le CA confie à un PDG (et à son équipe de gestion) le soin de réaliser les objectifs stratégiques retenus. Les deux parties — le Board et le Management — doivent bien comprendre leurs rôles respectifs, et trouver les bons moyens pour gérer la tension inhérente à l’exercice de la gouvernance et de la gestion.
Les administrateurs doivent s’efforcer d’apporter une valeur ajoutée à la gestion en conseillant la direction sur les meilleures orientations à adopter, et en instaurant un climat d’ouverture, de soutien et de transparence propice à la réalisation de performances élevées.
Il est important de noter que les actionnaires s’attendent à la loyauté des administrateurs ainsi qu’à leur indépendance d’esprit face à la direction. Les administrateurs sont élus par les actionnaires et sont donc imputables envers eux. C’est la raison pour laquelle le conseil d’administration doit absolument mettre en place un processus d’évaluation de ces membres et divulguer sa méthodologie.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article du Financier Worldwide qui illustre assez clairement les tensions existantes entre le CA et la direction, ainsi que les moyens proposés pour assurer la collaboration entre les deux parties.
In this age of heightened risk, the need for effective governance has caused a dynamic shift in the role of the board of directors. Cyber security, rapid technological growth and a number of corporate scandals resulting from the financial crisis of 2008, all underscore the necessity of boards working constructively with management to ensure efficient oversight, rather than simply providing strategic direction. This is, perhaps, no more critical than in the middle market, where many companies often don’t have the resources larger organisations have to attract board members, but yet their size requires more structure and governance than smaller companies might need.
Following the best practices of high-performing boards can help lead to healthy tension between management and directors for improved results and better risk management. We all know conflict in the boardroom might sometimes be unavoidable, as the interests of directors and management don’t necessarily always align. Add various personalities and management styles to the mix, and discussions can sometimes get heated. It’s important to deal with situations when they occur in order to constructively manage potential differences of opinion to create a healthy tension that makes the entire organisation stronger.
Various conflict management styles can be employed to ensure that any potential boardroom tension within your organisation is healthy. If an issue seems minor to one person but vital to the rest of the group, accommodation can be an effective way to handle tension. If minor issues arise, it might be best to simply avoid those issues, whereas collaboration should be used with important matters. Arguably, this is the best solution for most situations and it allows the board to effectively address varying opinions. If consensus can’t be reached, however, it might become necessary for the chairman or the lead director to use authoritarian style to manage tension and make decisions. Compromise might be the best approach when the board is pressed for time and needs to take immediate action.
The board chairperson can be integral to the resolution process, helping monitor and manage boardroom conflict. With this in mind, boards should elect chairs with the proven ability to manage all personality types. The chairperson might also be the one to initiate difficult conversations on topics requiring deeper scrutiny. That said, the chairperson cannot be the only enforcer; directors need to assist in conflict resolution to maintain a proper level of trust throughout the group. And the CEO should be proactive in raising difficult issues as well, and boards are typically most effective when the CEO is confident, takes the initiative in learning board best practices and works collaboratively.
Gone are the days of the charismatic, autocratic CEO. Many organisations have separated the role of CEO and chairperson, and have introduced vice chairs and lead directors to achieve a better balance of power. Another way to ensure a proper distribution of authority is for the board to pay attention to any red flags that might be raised by the CEO’s behaviour. For example, if a CEO feels they have all the answers, doesn’t respect the oversight of the board, or attempts to manage or marginalise the board, the chairperson and board members will likely need to be assertive, rather than simply following the CEO’s lead. Initially this might seem counterintuitive, however, in the long-run, this approach will likely create a healthier tension than if they simply ‘followed the leader’.
Everyone in the boardroom needs to understand their basic functions for an effective relationship -executives should manage, while the board oversees. In overseeing, the board’s major responsibilities include approving strategic plans and goals, selecting a CEO, determining a mission or purpose, identifying key risks, and providing oversight of the compliance of corporate policies and regulations. Clearly understanding the line between operations and strategy is also important.
Organisations with the highest performing boards are clear on the appropriate level of engagement for the companies they represent – and that varies from one organisation to the next. Determining how involved the board will be and what type of model the board will follow is key to effective governance and a good relationship with management. For example, an entity that is struggling financially might require a more engaged board to help put it back on track.
Many elements, such as tension, trust, diversity of thought, gender, culture and expertise can impact the delicate relationship between the board and management. Good communication is vital to healthy tension. Following best practices for interaction before, during and after board meetings can enhance conflict resolution and board success.
Before each board meeting, management should prepare themselves and board members by distributing materials and the board package in a timely manner. These materials should be reviewed by each member, with errors or concerns forwarded to the appropriate member of management, and areas of discussion highlighted for the chair. An agenda focused on strategic issues and prioritised by importance of matters can also increase productivity.
During the meeting, board members should treat one another with courtesy and respect, holding questions held until after presentations (or as the presenter directs). Board-level matters should be discussed and debated if necessary, and a consensus reached. Time spent on less strategic or pressing topics should be limited to ensure effective meetings. If appropriate, non-board-level matters might be handed to management for follow-up.
Open communication should also continue after board meetings. Sometimes topics discussed during board meetings take time to digest. When this happens, board members should connect with appropriate management team members to further discuss or clarify. There are also various board committee meetings that need to occur between board meetings. Board committees should be doing the ‘heavy lifting’ for the full board, making the larger group more efficient and effective. Other more informal interactions can further strengthen the relationship between directors and management.
Throughout the year, the board’s engagement with management can be broadened to include discussions with more key players. Gaining multiple perspectives by interacting with other areas of the organisation, such as general counsels, external and internal auditors, public relations and human resources, can help the board identify and address key risks. By participating in internal and external company events, board members get to know management and the company’s customers on a first-hand basis.
Of course, a strategy is necessary for the board as well, as regulatory requirements have increased, leading to greater pressure for high-quality performance. Effective boards maintain a plan for development and succession. They also implement CEO and board evaluation processes to ensure goals are being met and board members are performing optimally. In addition to the evaluation process, however, board members must hold themselves totally accountable for instilling trust in the boardroom.
Competition in today’s increasingly global and complex business environment is fierce, and calls for new approaches for success. Today’s boards need to build on established best practices and create good relationships with management to outperform competitors. The highest performing boards are clear on their functions, and understand the level of engagement appropriate for the companies they support. They are accountable and set the right tone, while being able to discern true goals and aspirations from trendiness. They are capable of understanding and dealing with the ‘big issues’ and are strategic in their planning and implementation of approaches that work for the companies they serve. With the ever-changing risk universe, the ability to work with the right amount of healthy tension is essential to effective governance.
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Hussain T. Hasan is on the Consulting Leadership team as well as a board member at RSM US LLP.
Aujourd’hui, je vous présente un article de Joanne Desjardins* qui agit comme auteure invitée sur mon blogue.
Elle a produit une synthèse des caractéristiques les plus importantes pour évaluer l’efficacité des conseils d’administration.
Je crois que les quinze éléments retenus sont très utiles pour mieux comprendre les bonnes pratiques des CA.
Bonne lecture !
Quinze (15) astuces d’un CA performant
par
Joanne Desjardins
On mesure la performance de nos employés et de notre entreprise. Qu’en est-il de celle du CA ? Évaluez-vous la performance de votre CA ? Les CA performants s’évaluent et mettre en place les mesures requises pour optimiser leur performance et celles des administrateurs. Au surplus, des études démontrent qu’un CA performant a un impact positif sur la performance de l’entreprise.
Quelles sont les caractéristiques d’un CA performant?
Nous décrivons, ci-après, les 15 caractéristiques des CA performants.
Le CA doit rassembler des administrateurs aux compétences, expériences et connaissance présentant un juste équilibre, une diversité et une complémentarité avec celles de la haute direction et contribuant à alimenter la stratégie de l’organisation. Il n’y a pas de nombre idéal d’administrateurs. Cependant, un CA impair, composé de moins de 13 personnes fonctionne généralement mieux.
Le CA assure l’intégration efficace des nouveaux administrateurs pour leur permettre de se familiariser avec leurs fonctions aisément (par ex. : programme d’accueil et d’intégration, coaching, mentorat, etc.).
Les administrateurs sont dédiés et s’engagent à consacrer le temps, les efforts et l’énergie nécessaires pour agir efficacement dans le meilleur intérêt de l’entreprise. Ils partagent les valeurs de l’entreprise.
Le CA désigne un président indépendant, mobilisateur, à l’écoute, qui a la capacité et le courage de concilier les points de vue divergents, de prendre des décisions difficiles et de régler les conflits. Le président gère efficacement les réunions du CA en favorisant un équilibre entre la spontanéité dans les échanges et le les règles de régie interne.
Les rencontres sont programmées à l’avance. Les rencontres sont d’une durée raisonnable et à des intervalles réguliers. Le président du CA et le président de l’entreprise s’entendent sur l’ordre du jour de chaque réunion du CA et priorisent les sujets en fonction de la stratégie de l’entreprise et des risques.
Les administrateurs démontrent une capacité d’écoute, de communication et de persuasion pour pouvoir participer activement et constructivement aux délibérations du CA. Ils ont le courage de poser des questions difficiles.
Le CA ne s’ingère pas dans les opérations de l’entreprise (¨Nose in, fingers out¨).
La haute direction transmet aux administrateurs, en temps opportun, des informations fiables dont l’exhaustivité, la forme et la qualité sont appropriées pour permettre aux administrateurs de remplir adéquatement leurs fonctions.
Le rôle, les responsabilités et les attentes envers les administrateurs, les comités et le CA sont clairement définis. Les administrateurs comprennent les obligations de fiduciaires qui leur incombent et les implications qui en découlent.
Le CA a mis en place une procédure d’évaluation rigoureuse, fiable et confidentielle. Les attentes envers les administrateurs ainsi que les critères d’évaluation sont clairs et connus de tous. En fonction des résultats de l’évaluation, des mesures sont prises pour améliorer l’efficacité du CA et des administrateurs (par ex. : formation, outils, ajustement dans les pratiques, etc.).
Le CA participe activement à la sélection et à l’évaluation du rendement du président de l’entreprise.
Le CA participe à l’élaboration de la stratégie de l’entreprise et approuve le plan stratégique. Une fois approuvé, le CA suit l’état d’avancement du plan stratégique et les risques inhérents.
Un système robuste de gestion des risques a été mis en place et la responsabilité́ de la surveillance des risques relève d’un comité du CA. Les administrateurs connaissent les principaux risques pouvant influencer la réalisation de la stratégie et le plan de mitigation.
Les administrateurs mettent à jour et actualisent leurs compétences et connaissances.
On planifie la relève pour veiller au renouvellement du CA et assurer un équilibre entre les administrateurs expérimentés ayant une connaissance approfondie de l’organisation et les nouveaux, apportant une perspective différente aux problématiques.
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*Joanne Desjardins, LL.B., MBA, ASC, CRHA, est présidente-fondatrice de Keyboard, une firme spécialisée en stratégie et gouvernance. Elle est également conférencière et bloggeuse en stratégie et en gouvernance. Elle rédige actuellement un livre sur les meilleures pratiques en gouvernance.
Voici un article d’un grand intérêt publié par Forester Wong de l’Université Columbia et paru aujourd’hui sur le site du Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. Dans cette recherche doctorale, l’auteur tente de répondre à trois questions très pertinentes pour toute personne s’intéressant à l’effet des comportements activistes sur la gouvernance des entreprises publiques (cotées) et sur le cours des actions.
(1) Assiste-t-on à la formation d’une meute d’investisseurs menée par un activiste dominant ?
(2) Quels sont les mécanismes sous-jacents à cette « coalition » ?
(3) Le comportement de meute est-il efficace ?
Le chercheur a tenté de répondre à ces questions en utilisant une base de données regroupant 1 992 campagnes d’activistes (hedge funds) sur une période allant de 1990 à 2014. Notons qu’aux États-Unis, les investisseurs sont obligés de divulguer leur taux de participation dans le capital d’une entreprise publique dès que la part de leur investissement dépasse 5 % (Schedule 13 D).
Les résultats ont montré qu’il y avait effectivement une forme de comportement de meute puisque plusieurs autres grands investisseurs se joignent à la campagne menée par l’activiste principal.
Les résultats montrent également que l’ampleur des transactions est en grande partie le fait de l’activiste dominant, et que l’accumulation des parts de propriété n’est pas le fruit d’une action spontanée de la part des investisseurs. Les meneurs avisent les institutions avec lesquelles ils sont en relation de leurs intentions d’accumuler des actions de l’entreprise, ce qui influence le cours des actions à la hausse.
Enfin, les résultats ont montré que les comportements de meute des investisseurs donnaient des résultats positifs en termes de succès de la campagne. En effet, ces comportements d’activistes sont utilisés pour contrer les tentatives de blocage des offres hostiles.
Pour plus de détails sur la recherche, je vous invite à lire l’extrait de cet article.
Some commentators attribute the success of certain hedge fund activism events to “wolf pack” activism, the theory that the primary activist is successful because of the support offered by other investors (i.e., the wolf pack). Commentators usually assume that activist hedge funds orchestrate the formation of wolf packs. According to this line of thinking, the lead activist—the 13D filer—recruits other investors to join the campaign before the 13D filing becomes public because the public announcement of the activist’s campaign typically leads to a positive stock return. In effect, the activist uses the expected jump in stock price to compensate the other investors for their support. This arrangement may be viewed as a way to circumvent securities regulations and takeover defenses triggered by holdings thresholds. The SEC, for example, requires activists to file a Schedule 13D within 10 days after crossing a 5% ownership threshold. By inducing other investors to acquire shares of the target, the lead activist may be able to accumulate a larger percentage of de facto ownership before triggering regulation thresholds, thereby increasing the chances of a successful campaign (Coffee and Palia, 2015). I label this as the Coordinated Effort Hypothesis. However, an alternative mechanism is that wolf packs arise spontaneously because investors monitor and target the same firms around the same time. Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews (2015), for example, analytically show that, under certain conditions, a pack can form around an activist campaign without any explicit coordination by the activist. I label this as the Spontaneous Formation Hypothesis.
In my paper, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge-Fund Activism, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I investigate wolf pack activism by addressing the following three questions. First, is there any evidence of wolf pack formation? Second, what is the mechanism for such pack formation? Third, is the “wolf pack” tactic effective? I investigate these questions using 1,922 activist hedge funds’ campaigns—all campaigns in the SharkRepellent database from 1990 through 2014 in which an activist filed Schedule 13D.
First, I find evidence consistent with wolf pack formation. I document a higher level of share turnover prior to the public disclosure of activists’ campaigns. In particular, on the day that the 13D filer crosses the 5% threshold (the “trigger date”), a date that is not publicly observable until the 13D filing, the share turnover is about 325% of the normal trading volume. Furthermore, using a manually collected dataset, I find that the bulk of the trading volume reflects trades by investors other than the lead activist. In the 60 days prior to the public disclosure, the abnormal trading volume by other investors cumulates to around 9% of total shares outstanding (the median holding by lead activists is 6%), possibly indicating that investors other than the lead activist accumulate significant share-holdings before the public disclosure of activists’ campaigns.
Second, I examine the mechanism of wolf pack formation. As mentioned above, there are two theories for how wolf packs are formed. The Coordinated Effort Hypothesis assumes that the wolf pack is orchestrated by the lead activist as a way to bypass certain regulatory constraints. By contrast, the Spontaneous Formation Hypothesis proposes that wolf pack arises spontaneously because investors monitor and target the same firms around the same time. My results find evidence consistent with the Coordinated Effort Hypothesis. In particular, my evidence indicates that these share turnovers are more likely to be mustered by the lead activist than to occur spontaneously, and that lead activists are tipping off institutions with which they have prior relationships. Using a proprietary dataset, I find that an institution is more likely to accumulate shares in an activist’s campaign if the institution has done so in an earlier period.
In addition, by showing substantial trading by other investors on the trigger date, I provide evidence against the Spontaneous Formation Hypothesis. While other investors may independently decide to accumulate shares in the target firm, it is not clear why so many of them would do so on the same day—and even less clear why they would do so exactly on the day the 13D filer crosses the 5% threshold (i.e., the trigger date). Under the Spontaneous Formation Hypothesis, the only explanation for this synchronicity would be that they are all responding to the same, sudden changes in market conditions. Using a battery of univariate and multivariate tests, I show that the abnormal trading volume on the trigger date cannot be fully explained by any sudden changes in market conditions.
Finally, in the last section of my paper, I find evidence that the “wolf pack” tactic is effective. The presence of a wolf pack is associated with a statistically significant 6% increase in the success rate of campaigns and a statistically significant 8.3% (6.9%) increase in buy and hold abnormal (raw) returns calculated over the duration of the campaigns. Furthermore, consistent with the notion that the wolf packs are used to circumvent securities takeover defenses, I find that wolf packs are more likely to occur in better-defended companies, as proxied by Bullet Proof Rating (a takeover defense measure by FactSet) and the use of poison pills.
Comme je l’ai déjà évoqué dans plusieurs autres billets, il faut réfléchir très sérieusement à la taille du CA, à la limite d’âge des administrateurs ainsi qu’à la durée de leurs mandats.
Eu égard à la taille du CA, on note que les membres de conseils de petite taille :
(1) sont plus engagés dans les affaires de l’entité
(2) sont plus portés à aller en profondeur dans l’analyse stratégique
(3) entretiennent des relations plus fréquentes et plus harmonieuses avec la direction
(4) ont plus de possibilités de communiquer entre eux
(5) exercent une surveillance plus étroite des activités de la direction
(6) sont plus décisifs, cohésif et impliqués.
On constate également une tendance lourde en ce qui regarde le nombre de mandats des administrateurs de sociétés, mais que ce changement ne se fait pas sans heurt.
Plusieurs pensent que, malgré certains avantages évidents à avoir des administrateurs séniors sur les CA, cette situation est un frein à la diversité et au renouvellement des générations au sein des conseils d’administration. Je crois que les CA devraient se doter d’une politique de limite d’âge pour les administrateurs ainsi que d’une limite au cumul des mandats ?
Les conseils d’administration devraient se préoccuper de ces questions afin :
(1) d’accroître la diversité dans la composition du conseil
(2) de faciliter la nomination de femmes au sein des CA
(3) d’assurer une plus grande indépendance des membres du conseil
(4) d’assurer la relève et l’apport d’idées neuves sur la gouvernance et les stratégies
(5) d’éviter que des administrateurs peu engagés s’incrustent dans leurs postes.
À cet égard, voici certains extraits d’études qui présentent les changements au Canada en 2015 :
Cumul des mandats d’administrateur
« Dorénavant, un administrateur qui est chef de la direction est considéré comme cumulant trop de mandats s’il siège au conseil de plus d’une société ouverte en plus du conseil d’administration de la société qui l’emploie (auparavant, il fallait que ce soit plus de deux sociétés). Un administrateur qui n’est pas chef de la direction cumule trop de mandats lorsqu’il siège à plus de quatre conseils d’administration de sociétés ouvertes (auparavant, c’était plus de six sociétés) ».
Renouvellement des conseils d’administration
Les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (ACVM) ont révélé que « seulement 19 % des émetteurs examinés avaient adopté une combinaison quelconque de limites à la durée des mandats et/ou de limite d’âge… Toutefois, la grande majorité des émetteurs ne se sont dotés d’aucun mécanisme officiel pour le renouvellement du conseil, à part leur processus d’évaluation des administrateurs ».
Notons que les émetteurs assujettis sont tenus de divulguer les limites à la durée du mandat des administrateurs ainsi que les mécanismes de renouvellement du conseil. S’ils ne se conforment pas, ils doivent en expliquer les raisons.
En France, par exemple, un administrateur qui a siégé à un conseil pendant plus de 12 ans n’est plus considéré comme étant indépendant. Au Royaume-Uni, le conseil doit déclarer publiquement pourquoi il croit qu’un administrateur qui a siégé plus de 9 ans est toujours considéré comme étant indépendant.
Beaucoup de conseils au Canada estiment que les limites de mandat servent un objectif, 56 % des sociétés du Canadian Spencer Stuart Board Index (CSSBI) indiquant qu’elles recourent volontairement à des limites d’âge et de mandat. Selon une récente étude de Korn Ferry International/Patrick O’Callaghan and Associates, les limites de mandat pour les entreprises canadiennes inscrites en bourse ayant été sondées oscillent entre sept et vingt ans, 53 % d’entre elles présentant une limite de mandat de 15 ans.
Voici quelques billets publiés sur mon blogue qui peuvent être utiles à un président de conseil aux prises avec ces questions délicates.
Company directors getting older – fewer age limits
Buffett’s influence
Berkshire’s willingness to retain directors in their ninth decades reflects Buffett’s influence on the firm and a national trend toward older boards. About 15 percent of directors at companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index are older than 69, compared with 9.8 percent in 2002, according to executive-compensation benchmarking firm Equilar. Proxy filings show 52 directors are age 80 or older.
« You can have great 85-year-olds and horrible 55-year-olds, » said Anne Sheehan, director of corporate governance for the $155 billion California State Teachers’ Retirement System. « A lot of this depends on the 80-year-old, because I’d love to have Warren Buffett on any board. »
Boardroom age limits are less prevalent and set higher than they were five years ago, according to the latest report on director trends by executive recruitment company Spencer Stuart. Companies use age limits to promote turnover and assure investors that management is getting new ideas. Those goals may instead be achieved through term limits, Sheehan said.
At a recent event, a member joked with me that his CEO was asked: « What was the average age of directors on his board? » – and the CEO answered: « Dead. » Based on recent stats, it appears that many directors are comfortable as turnover is quite low these days. This is reflected in Jim Kristie’s Directors & Boards piece entitled « Troubling Trend: Low Board Turnover. » As Jim points out, a director with a certain background might make sense for the company now – but might not ten years down the road as the circumstances change.
Perhaps even more important is the independence issue – is a director who sits on the board for several decades likely to still be independent after such a long tenure (see this WSJ article about the 40-year club)? Does it matter if management turns over during the director’s tenure? And if so, how much? These are issues that are being debated. What is your take?
As blogged by Davis Polk’s Ning Chiu, CII is considering policy changes linking director tenure with director independence, under which it would ask boards to consider a director’s years of service in determining director independence. According to the proposed policy, 26% of all Russell 3,000 directors have served more than 10 years and 14% have served more than 15 years. CII would not advocate for any specific tenure, unlike the European Commission, which advises that non-executive directors serve no more than 12 years. Note that under the UK’s « comply or explain » framework, companies need to disclose why a director continues to serve after being on the board nine years. I have heard that seven years is the bar in Russia.
How Does Low Board Turnover Impact Board Diversity?
Related to proper board composition is the issue of whether low board turnover is just one more factor that stifles board diversity. As well documented in numerous studies (see our « Board Diversity » Practice Area), gender diversity on boards has essentially flat-lined over the past decade – and actually has regressed in some areas. This is a real-world problem as it’s been proven that differing views on a board lead to greater corporate performance. To get boards back on track, I do think bold ideas need to be implemented – and plenty are out there, such as this one. I can’t believe that more investors haven’t been clamoring for greater diversity – but I do believe that day is near…
Dans son édition d’avril 2016, le magazine Financier Worldwide présente une excellente analyse de la dynamique d’un conseil d’administration efficace. Pour l’auteur, il est important que le président du conseil soit habileté à exercer un niveau de saine tension entre les administrateurs et la direction de l’entreprise.
Il n’y a pas de place pour la complaisance au conseil. Les membres doivent comprendre que leur rôle est de veiller aux « intérêts supérieurs » de l’entreprise, notamment des propriétaires-actionnaires, mais aussi d’autres parties prenantes.
Le PDG de l’entreprise est recruté par le CA pour faire croître l’entreprise et exécuter une stratégie liée à son modèle d’affaires. Lui aussi doit travailler dans le meilleur intérêt des actionnaires… mais c’est la responsabilité fiduciaire du CA de s’en assurer en mettant en place les mécanismes de surveillance appropriés.
La théorie de l’agence stipule que le CA représente l’autorité souveraine de l’entreprise (puisqu’il possède la légitimité que lui confèrent les actionnaires). Le CA confie à un PDG (et à son équipe de gestion) le soin de réaliser les objectifs stratégiques retenus. Les deux parties — le Board et le Management — doivent bien comprendre leurs rôles respectifs, et trouver les bons moyens pour gérer la tension inhérente à l’exercice de la gouvernance et de la gestion.
Les administrateurs doivent s’efforcer d’apporter une valeur ajoutée à la gestion en conseillant la direction sur les meilleures orientations à adopter, et en instaurant un climat d’ouverture, de soutien et de transparence propice à la réalisation de performances élevées.
Il est important de noter que les actionnaires s’attendent à la loyauté des administrateurs ainsi qu’à leur indépendance d’esprit face à la direction. Les administrateurs sont élus par les actionnaires et sont donc imputables envers eux. C’est la raison pour laquelle le conseil d’administration doit absolument mettre en place un processus d’évaluation de ces membres et divulguer sa méthodologie.
Vous trouverez, ci-dessous, l’article du Financier Worldwide qui illustre assez clairement les tensions existantes entre le CA et la direction, ainsi que les moyens proposés pour assurer la collaboration entre les deux parties.
In this age of heightened risk, the need for effective governance has caused a dynamic shift in the role of the board of directors. Cyber security, rapid technological growth and a number of corporate scandals resulting from the financial crisis of 2008, all underscore the necessity of boards working constructively with management to ensure efficient oversight, rather than simply providing strategic direction. This is, perhaps, no more critical than in the middle market, where many companies often don’t have the resources larger organisations have to attract board members, but yet their size requires more structure and governance than smaller companies might need.
Following the best practices of high-performing boards can help lead to healthy tension between management and directors for improved results and better risk management. We all know conflict in the boardroom might sometimes be unavoidable, as the interests of directors and management don’t necessarily always align. Add various personalities and management styles to the mix, and discussions can sometimes get heated. It’s important to deal with situations when they occur in order to constructively manage potential differences of opinion to create a healthy tension that makes the entire organisation stronger.
Various conflict management styles can be employed to ensure that any potential boardroom tension within your organisation is healthy. If an issue seems minor to one person but vital to the rest of the group, accommodation can be an effective way to handle tension. If minor issues arise, it might be best to simply avoid those issues, whereas collaboration should be used with important matters. Arguably, this is the best solution for most situations and it allows the board to effectively address varying opinions. If consensus can’t be reached, however, it might become necessary for the chairman or the lead director to use authoritarian style to manage tension and make decisions. Compromise might be the best approach when the board is pressed for time and needs to take immediate action.
The board chairperson can be integral to the resolution process, helping monitor and manage boardroom conflict. With this in mind, boards should elect chairs with the proven ability to manage all personality types. The chairperson might also be the one to initiate difficult conversations on topics requiring deeper scrutiny. That said, the chairperson cannot be the only enforcer; directors need to assist in conflict resolution to maintain a proper level of trust throughout the group. And the CEO should be proactive in raising difficult issues as well, and boards are typically most effective when the CEO is confident, takes the initiative in learning board best practices and works collaboratively.
Gone are the days of the charismatic, autocratic CEO. Many organisations have separated the role of CEO and chairperson, and have introduced vice chairs and lead directors to achieve a better balance of power. Another way to ensure a proper distribution of authority is for the board to pay attention to any red flags that might be raised by the CEO’s behaviour. For example, if a CEO feels they have all the answers, doesn’t respect the oversight of the board, or attempts to manage or marginalise the board, the chairperson and board members will likely need to be assertive, rather than simply following the CEO’s lead. Initially this might seem counterintuitive, however, in the long-run, this approach will likely create a healthier tension than if they simply ‘followed the leader’.
Everyone in the boardroom needs to understand their basic functions for an effective relationship -executives should manage, while the board oversees. In overseeing, the board’s major responsibilities include approving strategic plans and goals, selecting a CEO, determining a mission or purpose, identifying key risks, and providing oversight of the compliance of corporate policies and regulations. Clearly understanding the line between operations and strategy is also important.
Organisations with the highest performing boards are clear on the appropriate level of engagement for the companies they represent – and that varies from one organisation to the next. Determining how involved the board will be and what type of model the board will follow is key to effective governance and a good relationship with management. For example, an entity that is struggling financially might require a more engaged board to help put it back on track.
Many elements, such as tension, trust, diversity of thought, gender, culture and expertise can impact the delicate relationship between the board and management. Good communication is vital to healthy tension. Following best practices for interaction before, during and after board meetings can enhance conflict resolution and board success.
Before each board meeting, management should prepare themselves and board members by distributing materials and the board package in a timely manner. These materials should be reviewed by each member, with errors or concerns forwarded to the appropriate member of management, and areas of discussion highlighted for the chair. An agenda focused on strategic issues and prioritised by importance of matters can also increase productivity.
During the meeting, board members should treat one another with courtesy and respect, holding questions held until after presentations (or as the presenter directs). Board-level matters should be discussed and debated if necessary, and a consensus reached. Time spent on less strategic or pressing topics should be limited to ensure effective meetings. If appropriate, non-board-level matters might be handed to management for follow-up.
Open communication should also continue after board meetings. Sometimes topics discussed during board meetings take time to digest. When this happens, board members should connect with appropriate management team members to further discuss or clarify. There are also various board committee meetings that need to occur between board meetings. Board committees should be doing the ‘heavy lifting’ for the full board, making the larger group more efficient and effective. Other more informal interactions can further strengthen the relationship between directors and management.
Throughout the year, the board’s engagement with management can be broadened to include discussions with more key players. Gaining multiple perspectives by interacting with other areas of the organisation, such as general counsels, external and internal auditors, public relations and human resources, can help the board identify and address key risks. By participating in internal and external company events, board members get to know management and the company’s customers on a first-hand basis.
Of course, a strategy is necessary for the board as well, as regulatory requirements have increased, leading to greater pressure for high-quality performance. Effective boards maintain a plan for development and succession. They also implement CEO and board evaluation processes to ensure goals are being met and board members are performing optimally. In addition to the evaluation process, however, board members must hold themselves totally accountable for instilling trust in the boardroom.
Competition in today’s increasingly global and complex business environment is fierce, and calls for new approaches for success. Today’s boards need to build on established best practices and create good relationships with management to outperform competitors. The highest performing boards are clear on their functions, and understand the level of engagement appropriate for the companies they support. They are accountable and set the right tone, while being able to discern true goals and aspirations from trendiness. They are capable of understanding and dealing with the ‘big issues’ and are strategic in their planning and implementation of approaches that work for the companies they serve. With the ever-changing risk universe, the ability to work with the right amount of healthy tension is essential to effective governance.
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Hussain T. Hasan is on the Consulting Leadership team as well as a board member at RSM US LLP.
Aujourd’hui, je cède la parole à Johanne Bouchard* qui agit, de nouveau, à titre d’auteure invitée sur mon blogue en gouvernance.
Celle-ci a une solide expérience d’interventions de consultation auprès de conseils d’administration de sociétés américaines ainsi que d’accompagnements auprès de hauts dirigeants de sociétés publiques (cotées), d’organismes à but non lucratif (OBNL) et d’entreprises en démarrage.
Dans ce billet, elle aborde une activité assez délicate, mais qui devrait s’imposer pour la bonne gouvernance des entreprises : l’évaluation de la performance des membres du conseil d’administration.
Johanne nous fait part :
(1) de son expérience de consultante eu égard à cette activité
(2) de sa méthode de travail pour assurer l’adhésion des administrateurs
(3) des résultats auxquels on est en mesure de s’attendre.
L’expérience de Johanne Bouchard auprès d’entreprises cotées en bourse est soutenue ; elle en tire des enseignements utiles pour tous les types de conseils d’administration.
Bonne lecture ! Vos commentaires sont toujours les bienvenus.
Do you belong to a board? How healthy is it? With the kick off of a new year, I invite you to encourage your board to conduct an annual leadership effectiveness assessment (if you haven’t already). Regardless of the type of board(s) you belong to (corporate, private and/or non-profit), your board(s) will heighten its/their effectiveness by committing to this process.
I began conducting board leadership effectiveness assessments at the request of a CEO client over a decade ago. In my role as a trusted confidante to CEOs, it has been very common to exchange about the dynamics and climate of the board and how to best support his/her effectiveness as a director and leader of the organization.
My clients and I agree that it is extremely beneficial to work with a 3rd party. It has helped my CEO clients to engage me with the support of their Chair or Governance Chair to be a trusted partner to the board. And, Chair and directors are often my champions for engaging with this process. In meeting everyone on the board, I can share insights that sometimes are not easily addressed within the board, between the directors, with the CEO and/or with the Chair.
While an internal general counsel could conduct a process to assess their boards, this approach may not be as objective as having someone who is totally detached from the outcome and has no preconceived judgments. Besides, I personally believe that it is important that the general counsel not be the facilitator but be included in the process so that his/her observations are also taken into consideration, given his/her important role with the board. Similarly, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Chief Human Officer (CHO) need to be polled.
The Board Performance Assessment that I have developed helps my board clients to be more proactive in evaluating how they execute their fundamental role as a board, evaluate the interrelationships within the board, assure that they attend to governance priorities, and are actively involved in the development and oversight of the organization’s business strategy and goals.
Not every board’s dynamic is the same. Here’s what to consider when choosing how to approach an evaluation for yours:
Don’t conduct an assessment just to check off getting it done. If you are a Governance Chair, a Board Chair or a CEO, take a few minutes to reflect about your board and honestly take note of how healthy it really is.
Are the dynamics as healthy as they should be? Is communication within the board (including between the Chair and the CEO/Executive Director, as well as between the directors and the CEO/Executive Director/Chair) fair, good or outstanding? Are there sticky issues overdue for examination? Is the board’s composition great or just ok? Is diversity of skills, experience and talent optimal and in alignment with the strategic trajectory of the organization? Is the board clear of the boundaries with management, investors and shareholders? Is the board’s composition due for refreshment or augmentation? Etc.
Be clear that there should be a director self-assessment as well as a peer evaluation. Stay away from associating “assessment” with “criticism.” Rather, consider assessment as a powerful approach to constructively examine how each director is effective individually and collectively. No one should feel threatened. Everyone should feel eager to be part of the process and empowered as a result of it. Ensure that governance will be examined in a constructive and helpful manner. Ask your CEO for what s/he would like to know more about regarding his/her effectiveness wearing the director hat.
Refrain from filling out a questionnaire online. Rather, invite a conversation—ideally in person, but at least over the phone. It is ok to have some questions answered by email in addition to a verbal exchange while cognizant of total confidentiality and security. There is enormous value to including a 3rd party, such as myself, in this process to probe during the moment when any insights are being shared.
Ensure that the results are effectively summarized according to the priorities.
Make sure the outcome includes a list of next steps for the committees, the Chair, the CEO and individual directors.
What results should you look for?
Clear identification of what works well with the board, what needs improvement and what is missing.
Surfacing of delicate and important role and responsibility issues.
Clarity or greater clarity of Chair, CEO and committee roles and alignment on the roles and responsibilities.
Identification of any unconscious split between board members with a long history with the organization and newer board members. (Opening this up for discussion clears the air and explains some previous attitudes and opinions on issues.)
Clarification of expectations amongst all directors.
Succinct recommendations in areas of board dynamics, board composition, roles and responsibilities, succession planning and other governance issues.
Conducting a leadership effectiveness assessment ensures that no assumptions are made about the board, that elephants get out of the room and that sticky issues are addressed with an attitude of maturity. It is an opportune time to agree to what works and to applaud the people who are really taking the lead in their individual roles. It is also a time to get insights about how leadership, opining during meetings, deliberation, process adoption and priorities can be better addressed. This is a wonderful opportunity to take the board to a new level of effectiveness, collaboration, cordiality, respect, trust and openness. It is the time to have a breakthrough to welcome positive change and make progress in the needed direction.
Remember, a board need not be dysfunctional to commit to a board leadership effectiveness assessment. It is good governance to adhere to an annual process either as a stand-alone assignment or as a precursor to gathering the board for a strategic planning session to align the board on strategy.
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*Johanne Bouchardest consultante auprès de conseils d’administration, de chefs de la direction et de comités de direction. Johanne a développé une expertise au niveau de la dynamique et de la composition de conseils d’administration. Après l’obtention de son diplôme d’ingénieure en informatique, sa carrière l’a menée à œuvrer dans tous les domaines du secteur de la technologie, du marketing et de la stratégie à l’échelle mondiale.
est consultante auprès de conseils d’administration, de chefs de la direction et de comités de direction. Johanne a développé une expertise au niveau de la dynamique et de la composition de conseils d’administration. Après l’obtention de son diplôme d’ingénieure en informatique, sa carrière l’a menée à œuvrer dans tous les domaines du secteur de la technologie, du marketing et de la stratégie à l’échelle mondiale.
Gouvernance | Jacques Grisé 